result
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this witness explicitly denied the agreement’s existence, we hold that no rational jury could have found that the agreement to distribute had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Government presented insufficient evidence of the existence of the conspiracy it alleges Castro-Avalos facilitated, and we REVERSE his § 843(b) convictions. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 . Even if the Government had argued that Castro-Avalos facilitated Ruiz-Castro’s wider conspiracy to distribute, its evidence is insufficient to prove that he ""knowingly or intentionally facilitated” that conspiracy. See United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 888-89 (9th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by United States

    ### Response:
    holding that purchase of drugs alone does not constitute facilitation of a conspiracy to distribute within the meaning of  843b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jay Deck, ¶ 1. In that survey, respondents were read the sentence “We have pledged a minimum of 1.5 million dollars worldwide to charity as a/in tribute to the beloved Princess Diana,” and were then asked “What does this sentence mean to you?” and “When the sentence refers to charity does any particular charity or organization come to mind?” Id., ¶ 2. Aggregating responses across both questions, only 6.9% of respondents said they thought money was being donated to “a/the Princess Diana fund; the Princess Diana trust fund; the Princess Diana organization; Diana or Princess Diana’s/her charity.” Id., ¶ 3. “[S]urvey evidence clearly favors the defendant when it demonstrates a level of confusion much below ten percent.” Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Eastern

    ### Response:
    holding 3040 confusion between leggs and leg looks provided significant degree of actual confusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exists after confirmation of a plan only for those matters expressly reserved by the confirmation. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 7 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir.1993). Other courts have held that jurisdiction extends to proceedings designed to interpret, enforce' or aid the operation of the reorganization plan. See, e.g., In re Erie Hilton Joint Venture, 137 B.R. 165, 170 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992). We, however, need not decide the general scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction following the confirmation of a plan, for at a minimum it would have jurisdiction over a case otherwise within its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 if, as here, the court has reopened a case after confirmation and converted it to a Chapter 7 case. See Walnut Assocs. v. Saidel, 164. B.R. 487, 493-94 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, wé conclude that the status of the case

    ### Response:
    holding that reopening closed case was necessary for bankruptcy court jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller or lessor is engaged in the business of selling or leasing such product, and (b) the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in its condition after it is sold or leased. Id. at 75, 470 P.2d at 243 (emphasis added). The Stewart court explained that it “essentially” adopted the rule in Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter Restatement (Second)) § 402A (1977). Stewart, 52 Haw. at 75, 470 P.2d at 243. We initially note that, notwithstanding its obvious significance in the rule pronounced in Stewart, the issue of substantial change does not apply in every case. With respect to newer products, for example, the issue hardly arises. See, e.g., id., 52 Haw. at 78-79, 470 P.2d at 244-45 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the issue has limited significance

    ### Response:
    holding that given the relatively unused condition of the car there was sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer and distributor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that Sonic’s proffered reasons for terminating him are false. While this does not lead to the automatic conclusion that Sonic’s decision was based on Israel’s age, it does create an “inference” that Sonic might be “cover[ing] up a discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. at 2108. Israel offers evidence of a statement made by a member of Sonic’s management that he might be too old to change. Sonic argues that this comment, if even, made, was not made by the decisionmaker in this case and was in December, three months before Israel was terminated, and, therefore, too far-removed from the decision to fire Israel to be considered evidence of ageism. See, e.g., Standard v. A.B.E.L. Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). However, because it is not clear to this

    ### Response:
    holding comment that was heard out of context and not necessarily related to employment of plaintiff was not evidence of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    faith” belief that drugs would be at the residence at a future time. The affidavit states, in effect, that an undisclosed informant said drugs would be at a certain residence at an unspecified future date and time. Based on the affidavit, the informant did not report having been inside the residence, having seen anyone purchase or sell drugs inside the residence, or having seen anyone using drugs inside the residence. Neither the affiant nor the informant reported having witnessed a drug transaction in the residence or a drug transaction involving anyone who was there or resided there. The affidavit contains no statement which asserts that anyone saw drugs in the residence or on a person at the residence. See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 646, 653-54, 472 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1996) (<HOLDING>), aff'd en banc, 23 Va.App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534

    ### Response:
    holding that the affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location rendering the officers belief in probable cause based solely on the affidavit objectively unreasonable 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was multiplieitous, any prejudice Petitioner may have suffered was cured when the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on conspiracy to commit escape. See, United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.2008) (finding that offense of possessing child pornography was lesser included offense of receipt of child pornography, and thus entering judgment against defendant on separate counts for receiving child pornography and possessing child pornography was multiplieitous, in violation of Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of double jeopardy and remanding to the district court to vacate defendant’s conviction on one of the two counts and allowing that it be reinstated without prejudice if his other conviction should be overturned on h Cir.1978) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). • In this case, the Court of Appeals found

    ### Response:
    holding that consecutive sentences imposed on multiplieitous counts  two counts of conspiracy for one drug smuggling enterprise  violated double jeopardy clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    condition was present for such a period of time so as to constitute constructive notice of the hazard. Anderson v. St. Thomas More Newman Ctr., 287 Minn. 251, 253, 178 N.W.2d 242, 243-44 (1970). But speculation as to who caused the dangerous condition, or how long it existed, warrants judgment for the landowner. See Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc., v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn.1993) (affirming grant of summary judgment where nonmoving party engages in mere speculation and conjecture); Messner, 238 Minn, at 413-15, 57 N.W.2d at 661-62 (grant of judgment notwithstanding verdict proper where there was no direct evidence as to how a banana peel came to be on the floor, or how long it had been there). Appellant did not present any evidence showing who 01 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn.1960) (<HOLDING>). The district court correctly ordered summary

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had constructive notice of gum on a stair where there was evidence that defendant had been diligent in keeping the premises clean and the source of the gum and length of time the gum remained on the stair were undetermined
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.Supp.2d 342, 349 (D.Conn.2005). Therefore, the court shall analyze Tucker’s Title VII and CFEPA retaliation claims together. 2 . There is no dispute that Tucker’s termination constitutes an adverse employment action. Therefore, the court need only discuss the other three elements of Tucker’s prima facie case. 3 . Even Tucker's memorandum of law is muddled when making the distinction between these two clauses. 4 . The parties do not discuss whether a CHRO action constitutes ""an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII, and it is not clear to the court what the specifics were of Pecoraro's CHRO complaint. The court notes, however, that a CHRO action, although proceeding before a state, not federal, agency, can nevertheless be brought pursuant to bo p. 61, 64 (D.Ohio 1977)

    ### Response:
    holding that whether an employee decides to assist the charging party or refuses to assist the  employer the employer may not retaliate against the employee because this decision of the employee constitutes participation in an investigation or proceeding under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duty are ripe. Proof of actual damages is not an element of Tribune Publishing’s breach of contract claim. See, e.g., Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228 (1984). “[W]henever there is a breach of contract, ... the law ordinarily infers that damage ensued, and, in the absence of actual damages, the law vindicates the right by awarding nominal damages.” Id. A “breach of a contract is per se a legal injury from which some damage will be inferred, and, in the absence of proof of actual damage arising from such breach, the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages.” Car & Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Davimos, 12 N.J. Misc. 569, 173 A. 150, 151 (1934), aff'd, 114 N.J.L. 192, 176 A. 320 (1935); see also Culver v. Dziki, 123 N.J.L. 66, 8 A.2d 51, 52 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Tribune Publishing need not allege

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages in a breach of contract regarding a fire appraisal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the inherently unfair and inequitable results [that] occur in the strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the legislature recognizes that while a private party may readily be held liable for his torts within the chosen ambit of his activity, the area within which the government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit, and therefore government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done. Section 41—4—2(A); see also Caillouette, 113 N.M. at 497, 827 P.2d at 1311 (refusing to find a waiver of immunity based on wrongful death statute and Article II, section 4 of New Mexico Constitution because to do so would eliminate the principle of sovereign immunity). Cf. Torres, 116 N.M. at 383-84, 862 P.2d at 1242-43 (<HOLDING>). We thus construe the language of Section

    ### Response:
    holding that officers are not liable to additional victims of murderer because there is no duty to promptly investigate and solve every reported homicide
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with Rule 84.04(d).” Landers v. Huffman, 914 S.W.2d 394, 396[5] (Mo.App.1996). A point that violates Rule 84.04(d) preserves nothing for appellate review. Id. at 396[6]. Even so, we may exercise our discretion to review under the plain error standard if the contentions can be understood from the argument section of the brief. Id. In this case, we reviewed two of Meekers’ Point I claims of trial court error ex gratia. Because we do not understand Meekers’ contentions about the trial court’s overruling of their alternative “Motion For Exclusion From Trial” as a separate incident of error, we will not exercise our discretion to review under the plain error standard. Point I denied. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. PARRISH, P.J., and MONTGOMERY, J., concur. 1 . pp.1964) (<HOLDING>); In the Interest of A.H., 963 S.W.2d at 378[4]

    ### Response:
    holding aggrieved means suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not met. The second alternative, that “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest” is often referred to as the “absolute priority rule.” SOS’s Plan does not provide for equity holders to receive or retain an interest, because the Debtor, as a non-profit organization, has no equity holders. See e.g., In re General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 890, 265 F.3d 869 (9th Cir.2001) (affirming bankruptcy court’s holding that a labor union, which was a non-profit entity, had no equity holders and that, therefore, the absolute priority rule was not applicable to its Chapter 11 plan); In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n., Inc., 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. U.S. v. Wabash Valley

    ### Response:
    holding that the absolute priority rule was not applicable to the chapter 11 plan of a nonprofit electric cooperative which had no equity holders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM: Appealing the judgment in a criminal case following a remand for resentencing, Billy Wallace raises arguments that are foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine. See United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Even if we were to consider his arguments on-

    ### Response:
    holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the crime. Our de novo review of the record convinces us that “considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable fact finder could have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A.1987) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). But even if we were to find error, we are convinced any such error was harmless. Although the military judge may have thought otherwise, he could have taken judicial notice of the statute, even over defense objection, and instructed the members accordingly. MilitaRY Rule of Evidenoe 201A, Manual For Courts-Martial, United States (2008 ed.); see also United States v. Moore, 55 M.J. 772, 781 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, there was no dispute at trial

    ### Response:
    recognizing that mil r evid 201a authorizes judicial notice of domestic law even a of consequence to the action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (a) Government's Disclosure. (1) Information Subject to Disclosure. (G) Expert Witnesses. — At the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its casein-chief at trial ... The summary provided under this subparagraph must describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s qualifications. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(G). 3 . Because we conclude that there was no violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, there is no need to consider the issue of whether any possible violation of that rule was prejudicial to Barrett’s substantial rights. See United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 483-84 (3d Cir.2001)

    ### Response:
    holding that reversal is proper only when a rule 16 violation results in prejudice to substantial rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relationship to an agency needs but be written in a non-restrictive way to enhance competition and not be unduly restrictive). The restrictive provisions may be included in a contract solicitation, but only to the extent necessary to satisfy the needs of the agency or as authorized by law. See 10 U.S.C. § 2305(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also 48 C.F.R § 14.101(a) (“Unnecessarily restrictive specifications or requirements that might unduly limit the number of bidders are prohibited.”); Fed. Data Corp. v. Dept. Of Justice, GSBCA No. 12264-P, 94-1 B.C.A. 1126,324, 1993 WL 306145 (Mar. 25, 1993) (solicitations must have a rational basis for agency needs and not be unduly restrictive); Integrated Sys. Group, Inc. v. Dept. of Navy, GSBCA No. 12127-P, 93-2 B.C.A. ¶25,637, 1992 WL 360143 (Nov. 30, 1992) (<HOLDING>). ii. A Determination Regarding

    ### Response:
    holding that justification for only new equipment in procurement lacked rationale for why used or refurbished equipment would not meet the agencys minimum needs and requiring procurement in a manner designed to achieve maximum competition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of action has four elements: (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages (4) proximately caused by the breach. D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex.2002). In the context of the employer-employee relationship, a company has a duty (1) to provide rules for the safety of employees, and to warn them of reasonably foreseeable hazards; (2) to furnish reasonably safe machinery and equipment; (3) to furnish a reasonably safe place to work; and (4) to exercise ordinary care to select careful and competent fellow employees. Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 135-36, 70 S.W.2d 397, 401 (1934); see also Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex.2006); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170, 186 n. 45 ) (<HOLDING>); Houser v. Smith, 968 S.W.2d 542, 544-45

    ### Response:
    holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    letter to appellant, redefining his sales territory and specifying the manner in which he would be paid his future commissions. In its third letter dated May 27, 1997, appellee acknowledged its earlier commitment to appellant “to make no changes for one year.” However, appellee then proceeded, unilaterally, to terminate appellant’s status as an “installing dealer,” thereby reducing the amount of commissions he would receive on future sales. Although the writings in evidence do not expressly state the beginning and ending dates of a particular one-year period, we find there is legally sufficient evidence, albeit circumstantial, from which a jury could make that determination. See Templeton v. Nocona Hills Owners Assn., Inc., 555 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ) (<HOLDING>). For example, if a jury, after hearing all the

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to determine date employment was to begin
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right to compete.” 164 N.Y.S.2d at 243. However, in Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51 (2nd Cir.1974), the Second Circuit stated that in light of subsequent decisions by the Court of Appeals of New York: We do not agree that Kristt represents the law of the state if it be construed to eliminate any inquiry into reasonableness because of some purported doctrine of ‘employee choice.’ The inquiry remains whether or not the restraint was reasonable and the contract was breached. 501 F.2d at 57. Although the Second Circuit in Bradford had apparently interred the much criticized “employee choice” rule, at least three district court decisions within the Second Circuit have since concluded that Kristt remains alive and well. Murphy v. Gutfreund, 583 F.Supp. 957, 962-65 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>); Diakoff v. American Re-Insurance Co., 492

    ### Response:
    recognizing the employee choice rule but refusing to apply the rule to noncompetition clause imposed after former employee agreed to work for a competitor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . Accord Aryai, 25 F.Supp.3d at 387 (“[I]t [is] more likely that Congress deleted the word ‘employer’ not to provide for individual liability but to avoid confusion in cases involving a ‘contractor or agent' rather than an ‘employee.’ ”). 12 .In pertinent part, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) provides: Relief under [this section] shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status that employee, contractor, or agent would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) (emphasis added); see also Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 872 (4th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Compare Jantzen, 386 U.S. at 234-35, 87

    ### Response:
    holding that relief under  3730h is mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    That is not the court’s proper role. In reviewing the arbitrator’s construction of the phrase “immoral conduct,” the issue is not what we believe to be moral or immoral conduct in the philosophical sense. The issue before the arbitrator was whether Dixon’s conduct rose to the level of “immoral conduct” as that term is used in the CBA. The arbitrator evidently concluded that Dixon’s fabrication, though it demonstrated “poor judgment,” did not rise to the level of “immoral conduct” within the meaning of this offense. An arbitrator has discretion to decide whether particular conduct constitutes a dischargeable offense within the meaning of a CBA, as the First Circuit aptly explained in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 864 F.2d 940 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The CBA in Georgian-Pacific provided that

    ### Response:
    holding that where the arbitrator found that an employee committed an offense listed as a ground for discharge he lacked discretion to order the employees reinstatement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tardiness without prejudice. Id. at 911-12 (noting that indemnitee did not lack timely notice of the underlying action). The court ruled that a twenty-month delay in seeking indemnity and a three-year delay in filing a third-party complaint against the indemnitor did not preclude recovery. Id. Here, taking all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Duncan-Williams, the Moving Defendants knew of the suit at least as early as October 2004. PL’s Facts ¶ 10 (noting a deposition by Borgosz in the Vest action on October 1, 2004). If the bonds defaulted in September 2003 as alleged, the Moving Defendants were on notice of the suit at most thirteen months after the bond default, and therefore the timing of the suit did not cause prejudice. Cf. Ex parte Jones, 939 So.2d, at 917-18 (<HOLDING>). b. Alabama Law Does Not Permit

    ### Response:
    holding that a party that settled but failed to immediately notify a third party of indemnity claims did not waive indemnity claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 4 (collecting cases and describing the Circuit split on the issue). The court does not address arguments raised for the first time in a Reply. Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. v. ACI Int'l, Inc., 521 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1173 n.70 (D. Kan. 2007) (citing Hutton Contracting Co. v. City of Coffeyville, 487 F.3d 772, 788 (10th Cir. 2007)). Even so, the court notes that the Employment Agreement here contains no express waiver of the right to bring collective or class action claims in any forum. And, even if the Employment Agreement specifically included such waiver language, our court has addressed this issue, concluding that such provisions do not render an arbitration agreement unenforceable. See Bell v. Ryan Transp. Serv., Inc., 176 F.Supp.3d 1251, 1263 (D. Kan. 2016) (Lungstrum, J.) (<HOLDING>); see also Pollard v. ETS PC, Inc., 186

    ### Response:
    holding that the tenth circuit if faced with this issue would follow those circuit court of appeals  that have permitted the use of class action waivers in arbitration agreements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the challenged action creates a ‘direct and immediate’ dilemma for the parties.” Id. (citation omitted). The relationship between these two parts of the test — fitness and hardship — has never been precisely defined. Though some commentators have suggested that either of the two showings may suffice to allay ripeness concerns, see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-10, at 80 (2d ed. 1987), the predominant weight of authority supports the opposite view, see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1759, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (dismissing for lack of ripeness despite the predominantly legal nature of the question presented and the minimal need for an extensive factual record); Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr., v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573,1581 (Fed.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal

    ### Response:
    holding that a ripe case must meet both prongs of abbott labs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""denies the trial court the opportunity to correct any error that might have occurred” and waives subsequent review of that issue in the appellate court. People v. Macke (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 815, 816, 587 N.E.2d 1113. We address the merits of defendant’s contention based on the reasons expressed in People v. Gomez (1993), 247 Ill. App. 3d 68, 71, 617 N.E.2d 320: ""Mindful, however, of the division within the appellate court on this issue (see People v. Turner (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 449, 456, 599 N.E.2d 104 (expressly rejecting Macke and holding that a motion to reduce sentence is not a necessary precondition to appellate review of that sentence); People v. Sims (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473, 599 N.E.2d 137 (same); see also People v. Hess (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 276, 283 (<HOLDING>)) ***.” Determination of the sentence to be

    ### Response:
    recognizing the disagreement among the appellate districts but reaching the merits of the case on the basis of plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exist). “Where a district court denies equitable re lief ... we review the matter for abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption Petition of Rebecca M., 2008-NMCA-038, ¶ 22, 143 N.M. 554, 178 P.3d 839. In this case, Aunt raised her extraordinary circumstances argument simultaneously with her assertion that the Act allowed her to intervene. Even presuming the existence of such extraordinary circumstances, however, we hold that, in the long run, though it eschewed a valid route for Aunt which leads to our reversal herein, the district court properly refused to consider Aunt’s custody claim because she had an “available or adequate remedy” under the Act. See In re Lupe C., 112 N.M. at 119, 812 P.2d at 368; see also Meiboom v. Watson, 2000-NMSC-004, ¶ 20, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154 (<HOLDING>). We consider that issue below. {12} Aunt’s

    ### Response:
    holding that we may affirm a district court if its holding was right for any reason
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for determining when a person has obtained a vested right in an existing zoning use: Generally, in order to obtain a vested right in an existing zoning use that -will be protected against a subsequent change in a zoning ordinance prohibiting that use, the owner must initially obtain a valid permit. Additionally, in reliance upon the valid permit, the owner must make a substantial beginning in construction and in committing the land to the permitted use before the change in the zoning ordinance has occurred. Powell v. Calvert County, 368 Md. 400, 411-12, 795 A.2d 96, 102-03 (2002) (quoting O’Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 508, 425 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1981)). The Hearing Examiner, applying this rule, and other settled Maryland t Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 707, 337 A.2d 712, 721 (1975) (<HOLDING>). MRA attempts to carve out a new category of

    ### Response:
    holding that one million dollars in expenditures and a valid building permit did not create vested right in previous zoning classification of the land at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    error for the trial court to admit the recorded statements because defense counsel did not cross-examine T.S. following their admission. Regarding this claim of error, defendant does not take issue with the State playing the recorded statements during its own ease-in-chief. Defendant does, however, take issue with the fact that he was “not permitted” to recall T.S. Defendant first alleges violations of the Vermont Rules of Evidence. Defendant maintains that Rule 804a(a)(3) requires the child declarant to be available to testify. Defendant also cites Rule 806 for the proposition that if a hearsay statement is admitted, and the party against whom the statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, he may examine the declarant “as if under c 4 Vt. 251, 958 A.2d 1179 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 20. Here, the trial court expressed concern

    ### Response:
    holding that we would not review a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence when the defendant stipulated to its admission at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    251 La. 749, 206 So.2d 95 (1968); American Metal Window Co. v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 183 So.2d 667, 669 (La.App. 1st Cir.1966). 12 . Duet v. Lucky, 621 So.2d 168, 173 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993) (noting that absent evidence substantiating alleged mistake in intent, no reason exists to look beyond four comers of document); Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939, 941 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992) (noting that ""the language of the release is so broad and unambiguous it leaves little to be misunderstood”); Barnhill v. Consolidated Medical, Disability & Life Trust, 569 So.2d 1115, 1117 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 93 (La.1991) (finding language of release so broad as to clearly cover liability sued upon); Shepherd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 So.2d 1099, 1102 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Watkins v. lohns-Manville Corp., 458 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding unambiguous release executed by literate intelligent party could not be nullified absent vice of consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to justify the court's dismissal without jurisdiction.’ ”) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974)). In 1974, when the consent decree was entered, and in 2005, when the present enforcement action was filed, the Bell v. Hood requirements were satisfied. As will be discussed below, in 1974, it was far from clear that a Constitutional right did not protect the information at issue in this case. Although the Constitutional law appears to have shifted before the institution of the present action, the very existence of the federal consent decree which purports to protect the information at issue in this case is enough to show that the plaintiff's claim is not ""wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (<HOLDING>). 4 . Although the plaintiff, in his most

    ### Response:
    holding that it was fanciful to think that the court had revised its jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not automatically produce a failure of jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Project. The plaintiffs amended motion for judgment asserts two counts against the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner (“Commissioner”): a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-187 and a common law action to directly enforce the takings clause of Article I, § 11, of the Constitution of Virginia. Following oral argument on November 28, 2007, this Court sustained the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss Count II of the plaintiffs amended complaint. In a case of first impression, the Court held that Virginia Code § 8.01-187 provides the exclusive mechanism to obtain just compensation from the Commonwealth for damage to private property under Article I, § 11, of the Virginia Constitution. Cf. Chaffinch v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 227 Va. 68, 73, 313 S.E.2d 376 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Because of that ruling, this case will

    ### Response:
    holding that a statutory remedy does not preempt common law remedies against a nonsovereign entity vested with the power of eminent domain unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication so provides
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adequate substitution to defeat loose leaf prices increases, then it should be included in the relevant product market, because of its ability to constrain prices and maintain a competitive marketplace. See, e.g., Cardinal Health, 12 F.Supp.2d at 46 (“In other words, when one product is a reasonable substitute for the other, it is to be included in the same relevant product market even though the products themselves are not the same. A product is construed to be a ‘reasonable substitute for another when the demand for it increases in response to an increase in the price for the other.’ ”). Whether moist snuff tobacco is similar in character or use to loose leaf tobacco may be termed “functional interchangeability.” See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 399, 76 S.Ct. 994 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,

    ### Response:
    recognizing functional interchangeability between cellophane and other flexible wrappings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence of the abuse was self-reported and uncorroborated); State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 520-21, 898 P.2d 454, 469-70 (1995) (discounting an expert’s opinion that the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct when he committed the crimes was diminished because it was based entirely on the defendant’s self-reported alcohol consumption and blackout on the night of the murders). ¶42 Second, Appellant failed to show a causal connection between his traumatic childhood or history of substance abuse and his actions on the night of the murder. We have previously explained that we require a causal connection to justify considering evidence of a defendant’s background as a mitigating circumstance. See State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 592, 951 P.2d 454, 467 (1997) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 490-91, 917

    ### Response:
    holding that a history of substance abuse is only a mitigating factor when a causal connection exists between the alcohol and drug abuse and the crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    193 L.Ed.2d 694 (2016) (per curiam) (“It is this Court’s responsibility to say what a [federal] statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.”); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1067, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (“State courts adjudicating civil RICO claims will ... be guided by federal court interpretations of the relevant federal criminal statutes, just as federal courts sitting in diversity are guided by state court interpretations of state law.”). But the state court proceedings in which such a claim is pursued are governed by the procedural law of the forum, in this case Indiana procedural law. Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 1194 (1938) (<HOLDING>); Brill v. Regent Commc’ns., Inc., 12 N.E.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Appeals Notice indicates that “[a]n attorney-at-law or an accredited agent may also represent” the claimant before the VA or Board, and specifically notifies the claimant where she may inquire regarding similar legal representation before the court. Thus, the Appeals Notice does refer to the issue of representation before the court, even though it is not required by statute. Additionally, the notice sought by Cummings regarding the EAJA’s attorney fees provision might be misleading. Because the government’s position has been found to have been “substantially justified” under the EAJA even- when the government has lost on appeal, such a notice might give a claimant false hope that her attorney fees would be paid by the VA. See, e.g., Felton v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 276 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,

    ### Response:
    holding that the vas position was substantially justified even though the regulation on which it relied was invalidated as exceeding its statutory authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    form of a caller identification record. Suits have been brought against debt collectors who blocked their number or made a misleading name appear in a caller ID window. The propriety of blocking or otherwise preventing disclosure of caller identity is unsettled. See Jiminez v. Accounts Receivable Mgmt., Inc., No. CV 09-9070, 2010 WL 5829206, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 15, 2010) (“[I]t is not impossible to imagine some scenario in which a debt collector’s hanging up without leaving any identifying information might entail a violation of the statute [referring to the identification requirement] (for example, if the debt collector used some form of caller identification blocking device).”); but see, Glover v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-81, 2007 WL 2902209, at *3-4 (W.D.Mich. Oct. 2, 2007) (<HOLDING>). In a case arising in this district, liability

    ### Response:
    holding that it is not a deceptive practice under the fdcpa for a debt collector to have unavailable appear in a caller id window instead of its telephone number
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3 Cl.Ct. 323 (1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 168 (Fed.Cir.1984), the plaintiff argued that compensation had been awarded but never disbursed. Id. at 328. The court found that review was inappropriate. Id. at 328-29. 3 . Various other courts have likewise limited the scope of § 8128(b). See, e.g., Czerkies v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1441 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc) (stating that ""[wjhen all that a claimant is seeking is benefits on the basis of an error of fact or law by the administering agency, judicial review is barred altogether”); Stephens v. Office of Worker’s Compensation Program, 721 F.2d 642, 642 (8th Cir.1983) (finding no jurisdiction to review denial of compensation for air traffic controller's hearing loss); DiPippa v. United States, 687 F.2d 14, 17 (3rd Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Courts have found that it is appropriate to

    ### Response:
    holding that the application of feca to tort claims bars all other recovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a kilogram of heroin in the eight years between 2000 and 2008 appears to have ranged from $60,000 to roughly $100,000. See United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir.2003); United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir.2009). We assume that district judges in this circuit, who handle large numbers of wholesale-quantity drug cases each year, are familiar with these prices and require no further evidence unless the point is challenged. In short, because Nino admitted trafficking in a quantity of heroin with a wholesale value at least in the high six figures, that admission by itself provided a sufficient factual basis to support a preponderance finding that the proceeds realized by the conspiracy were at least $100,000. See United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d at 48 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that forfeiture calculation is not exact science and that district court may make reasonable extrapolations from evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    th lations say “all laws and ordinances,” they truly mean all laws and ordinances—would mean that a Chicago police officer serves the City’s goals when he nabs a suspected wrongdoer anywhere—not just elsewhere in Illinois but also, presumably, while vacationing in Hawaii. An interpretation of the CPD Regulations that compels officers to enforce a littering ban in Honolulu cannot be correct. The fact that Moussa identified himself as a police officer, gave police-like orders, and showed his badge after the altercation—in other words, the fact that Moussa held himself out as a police officer to some degree—also does not mean that his actions in DuPage County were undertaken in service to the City. See Wolf v. Liberis, 153 Ill.App.3d 488, 106 Ill.Dec. 411, 505 N.E.2d 1202, 1206 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Rivera, 2005 WL 2739180, at *1-2, 6 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that an offduty officers assertion to bystanders that he was on the job  at the scene of a car accident did not place him within the scope of employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at a post office box or drop-box, designated for court documents, and the clerk’s docketing the document is not attributable to the filing party. See, e.g., Stevens v. Heard, 674 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir.1982) (“[W]hen a party has no control over the delay between the clerk’s receipt of a notice of appeal and its filing, the fact that a notice of appeal, timely received, was filed out of time [does] not defeat the appeal.”) (emphasis added); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.1980) (“Because an appellant has no control over delays between receipt and filing, a notice of appeal is timely if received by the district court within the applicable period specified in Rule 4.”); Turner v. City of Newport, 887 F.Supp. 149, 150-51 (E.D.Ky.1995) (citing Central Paper, 199 F.2d at 904) (<HOLDING>); Hetman v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 200

    ### Response:
    holding that placing a complaint in clerks offices postoffice box at 1130 pm of the day the statute of limitations expired counted as timely filing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (-TWC) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.201-21.202 (West 2015); Specialty Retailers, 933 S.W.2d at 492-93 (explaining 180-day period commences on date alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, not when plaintiff feels effect of decision). , We frame the issue regarding a failure to comply with Chapter 21’s administrative exhaustion requirement as a defense to liability, rather than ajurisdictional bar, mindful that the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Prairie View A & M University v. Chatha raises questions about whether the failure to satisfy Chapter 21⅛ administrative exhaustion requirement implicates trial court jurisdiction in a suit between private parties. See 381 S.W.3d 500, 510-11 (Tex.2012); compare Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 488 (<HOLDING>) with Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to comply with the 180day deadline for filing a charge is a jurisdictional bar even in suits between privateparties because texas commission on human rights act does not provide an unconditional private right of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that renders a claim “novel” is present here: [that is,] Johnson [II] “explicitly overruled” previous Supreme Court precedent [ie., James and Sykes]. United States v. Jefferson, No. 14-cr-00105-EMC-1, 2016 WL 6496456, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016). The Court acknowledges that, with respect to the instant case, James and Sykes were actually decided many years after Mr. Johnson was sentenced. However, as Mr. Johnson points out, “at the time of his sentencing in 1993, the Ninth Circuit had already rejected a vagueness challenge to the ACCA” and further had “analyzed whether a federal statute qualified as a ‘crime of violence’ under § 924(c)’s residual clause without any constitutional concerns.” Opp’n at 3 n.5. See, e.g., United States v. Sorenson, 914 F.2d 173, 175 (9th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants voice for vagueness argument fails  because there is no indication that the sentence enhancement provision at issue is so vague that it grants undue discretion to law enforcement officials the factors for sentence enhancement under 18 usc  924e1 are quite specific
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the method of transmission error because it would have a substantial chance of receiving the contract award in a rebid. By conflating the standing requirements of prejudicial error and economic interest, Labatt would create a rule that, to an unsuccessful but economically interested offeror in a bid protest, any error is harmful. Under this radical formulation there would be no such thing as an error nonprejudicial to an economically interested offeror in a bid contest. We decline to adopt such a rule. Instead, we reiterate the established law in this circuit that nonprejudicial errors in a bid process do not automatically invalidate a procurement. Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1996); Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d 1044, 1048 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Andersen Consulting v. United States, 959

    ### Response:
    holding inter alia that de minimis errors by the procuring agency are not sufficient grounds for overturning a contract award
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large.[ ] Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir.1998). At the time Defendants adopted the alleged policies and customs about which Plaintiffs complain, decedent was not an identifiable victim. Plaintiffs acknowledge these policies and customs were “longstanding” and had been in effect “for years.” Thus, they were not aimed at decedent directly, and did not pose a threat of immediate and proximate harm to him. Rather they “presented a threat of an indefinite range and duration.” Ruiz, 299 F.3d at 1183. To be sure, Defendants’ policies and customs did not increase the danger to the public at large in any real sense, but rather to a defined group, namely, patients in the EMU. See Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1067 (<HOLDING>). But this does not undermine our analysis. The

    ### Response:
    holding a citys policy of freely releasing information from undercover officers personnel files created a constitutionally cognizable special danger
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ex rel. George Gage v. Davis S.R. Aviation, L.L.C., — Fed.Appx.-, 2015 WL 4237682, at *1 (5th Cir. July 14, 2015). 2 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) (""In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.”); see also Gage, — Fed.Appx. at -, 2015 WL 4237682, at *2 (""Rule 9(b) requires, at a minimum, that a plaintiff set forth the 'who, what, when, where, and how’ of the alleged fraud.” (quoting United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir.2010))). 3 .Gage, — Fed.Appx. at -, 2015 WL 4237682, at *5. 4 . Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir.2015). But see Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that review of a rule 60b4 motion is de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on this issue, but the several courts around the country that have addressed the issue have held that persons in a same-sex relationship qualified for domestic violence protection under various state statutes. See Glater v. Fabianich, 252 Ill.App.3d 372, 192 Ill.Dec. 136, 625 N.E.2d 96 (1993) (affirming domestic violence injunction in homosexual relationship based on statute defining family or household member in part as those who share or formerly shared common dwelling); Ireland v. Davis, 957 S.W.2d 310 (Ky.Ct.App.1997) (2-1 decision) (reinstating domestic violence proceedings in homosexual relationship based on statute defining members of unmarried couple as those who are living together or have formerly lived together); State v. Hadinger, 61 Ohio App.3d 820, 573 N.E.2d 1191 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. STRINGER and SILBERMAN, JJ.,

    ### Response:
    holding that domestic violence statute applied to partners in samesex relationship based on statutes definition of person living as spouse to include person who is otherwise cohabiting with offender rejecting trial courts imposition of requirement that such persons must have the ability to marry before domestic violence statute applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute. The merger agreement provided that at the effective time of the merger, First Tennessee “shall be liable for all liabilities of each of the participating banks and all deposits, debts, liabilities, obligations and contracts of each of the participating banks, whether material or immaterial, accrued, contingent or otherwise ... shall become those of the Association, and shall not be released or impaired by the merger, and all rights of creditors and other obligees ... shall be preserved unimpaired.” (Emphasis added.) As one court has stated in a similar case, “It is difficult to imagine a more comprehensive statement of assumption of liability than that which is contained in this merger agreement.” Douglas v. Bank of New England/Old Colony, N.A., 566 A.2d 939, 941 (R.I.1989) (<HOLDING>). Under the merger agreement, the bank

    ### Response:
    holding successor national bank liable for punitive damages judgment against bank that merged into successor national bank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the district courts, which have concluded uniformly that a fíne does not stem from a consensual transaction and thus is not a debt under the FDCPA. See Reid v. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., Nos. 10-ev-204-JPG-DGW & 10-cv-269-JPG, 2010 WL 5289108, at *4-5 (S.D.Ill. Dec. 20, 2010) (concluding that fines for traffic violations are not debts under FDCPA); Mills v. City of Springfield, Mo., No. 2:10-CV-04036-NKL, 2010 WL 3526208, at *15-16 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 3, 2010) (same); Durso v. Summer Brook Preserve Homeowners Ass’n, 641 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1264-65 (M.D.Fla.2008) (concluding that fines assessed against homeowner by homeowners association did not create debts under FDCPA); Shannon v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., No. 08-594(DSD/SRN), 2008 WL 2277814, at *1 (D.Minn. May 30, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that fines levied by county for parking violation and failure to register vehicle did not meet criteria for fdcpa debts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Federal control and responsibility.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. “Effects” are defined to “include: • (a) [d]ireet effects, which are caused by the action and occur at the same time and place,” and “(b) [i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.” Id. § 1508.8. It is undisputed that HUD’s funding of the project is a major federal action. Thus, we must determine whether HUD acted reasonably and in accordance with law in deciding, based on its EA and FONSI, that its action had no direct or indirect effects that significantly affected the quality of the human environment. See Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 763-64, 124 S.Ct. 2204. Plaintiff iate Credit Bank, 727 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (S.D.Miss.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis Mountains, 116 Fed.Appx. 3,

    ### Response:
    holding that directive not promulgated according to apa procedure lacks force and effect of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Constitution to hold that the textbook loan program unconstitutionally furnished aid to private sectarian schools. Gaffney, 220 N.W.2d at 557. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the fact that the loan of textbooks was to the parents and students was not determinative because the program “lends strength and support to the school and, although indirectly, lends strength and support to the sponsoring sectarian institution.” Id. {35} The Supreme Courts of Oregon, Massachusetts, and Missouri interpreted similar Blaine-like state constitutional provisions and determined that even indirect aid to the sectarian, denominational, or private schools violates the constitutional provision. See Dickman v. Sch. Dist. No. 62C, Or. City, of Clackamas Cty., 366 P.2d 533, 543 (Or. 1961) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); see also Bloom v. Sch. Comm. of Springfield,

    ### Response:
    holding that the aid is extended to the pupil only as a member of the school the pupil attends and although the pupil may share in the indirect benefit such aid is an asset to the sectarian or private school
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment rule might well have come to the aid of the proponents of the plan.”); Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 603 (Del.1948) (finding that disinterested directors had the power to approve a grant of stock to other directors, and that, ""in the absence of fraud, ... their unanimous action [was] final”); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del.Ch.1971) (""[S]ince the transaction complained of was accomplished as a result of the exercise of independent business judgment of the outside, independent directors whose sole interest was the furtherance of the corporate enterprise, the court is precluded from substituting its uninformed opinion for that of the experienced, independent board members_”). 150 . Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.1985) (<HOLDING>); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs.,

    ### Response:
    holding that as part of a new standard of review requiring directors taking defensive actions to show that those actions were reasonable in relation to threat posed such proof is materially enhanced  by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the contrary. If the latter is the case, the inverse presumption is applied and the statutory amendment has retrospective effect. A statute that is purely procedural is one that has to do with the steps that must be taken to enforce a right. Such a statute will be “construed as operating on all proceedings instituted after its passage whether the right accrued before of after that event.” Kelch v. Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 145, 36 A.2d 544 (1944). Because procedural enactments will not be applied so as to undo already concluded proceedings, see Holland v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., Inc., 113 Md.App. 274, 287, 687 A.2d 699 (1996), they are retroactive in effect in the sense that they apply immediately to actions that already have accrued. See Roth v. Dimensions, 332 Md. 627, 632 A.2d 1170 (1993)(<HOLDING>); see also The Wharf At Handy’s Point, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that statute mandating an extension of time in which a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case may file a certificate of qualified expert circumstances was procedural and therefore applied retroactively to cases pending when the law was enacted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concerning the Omitted Parcel and the Quarry Property, the court should determine anew which party, if any, is the prevailing party entitled to an award under the fee provisions. In doing so, the court should apply the “percentage of success factor” or the “totality of the litigation” test. Assuming the court finds either party prevailed, it must enter an award for a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees on appeal ¶ 38 Both parties ask for an award of attorney’s fees expended on appeal pursuant to the fee provisions in the Agreements. In light of our decision, neither party has yet “prevailed” in the litigation. We therefore deny both requests. See Desert Mountain Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 225 Ariz. 194, 213, ¶ 81, 236 P.3d 421, 440 (App.2010) (<HOLDING>). On remand, however, the court should award

    ### Response:
    holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mortgage. MERS has disavowed any interest in the debt, including the right to receive payment or otherwise service the loan. Even to the extent MERS is an agent of the note holder, its rights and duties concern only legal title to the mortgage, not the note or beneficial interest in the mortgage. See Saunders, 2 A.3d at 295. Without a claim to the underlying debt, MERS therefore cannot exercise the power of sale, regardless of the language in the mortgage contract giving it this power. See Saurman, 292 Mich.App. at 328-29, 807 N.W.2d 412. That the mortgagor consented to this contractual language does not operate as a waiver of the law’s protection against foreclosure by the wrong entity. Cf. Henry v. Mansfield Beauty Acad., Inc., 353 Mass. 507, 511, 233 N.E.2d 22 (1968) (Wilkins, C.J.) (<HOLDING>). Yet, it cannot be that no party may exercise

    ### Response:
    holding that a party may not contract away the protection that a statute is intended to afford him nor may the other party to the contract exempt itself from its duty to comply with such statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The trial court responds by noting that the court set the Motion for submission on March 18, which is more than 21 days after the Reply was filed. Except on leave of court, a movant is required to file and serve summary-judgment evidence at least 21 days before the time specified for the motion to be submitted to the trial court for decision. See TexR. Crv. P. 166a(c); Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998). Though the trial court did not grant the Brokers leave to file the Reply Evidence, it did not need to do so because the trial court took an action that made the evidence in question timely filed — it specified March 18 as the submission date for the Motion. See Dalehite v. Nauta, 79 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Medical Arts Hosp. of Texarkana,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence filed less than 21 days before original summaryjudgment hearing was timely even though trial court never granted leave to file late evidence because the summaryjudgment hearing was reset to a date more than 21 days after the evidence was filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a third the juror was reported as describing eluding as ""a very minor violation."" No affidavit referred to the penalty as a ""slap on the wrist,"" though the term was used by defense counsel in the motion and in oral argument. We conclude that these discrepancies are immaterial to our analysis, which applies to all of the versions of the juror's statements regarding the severity of, or the penalty for, vehicular eluding. 2 . At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the prosecution presented two dictionary definitions of ""elude"" to the trial court, which indicate that eluding involves ""skill"" or ""trickery."" If the jury had viewed those definitions, it may have added those concepts as additional elements to be proven, increasing the prosecution's burden. See Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1143

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the jurys exposure to the dictionary definition of burglary because the definition referenced theft which was not an element the prosecution was required to prove
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because 4.05 announced a new rule, and no exceptions apply, it should not be applied on habeas to provide Garcia relief from his criminal conviction. B. Did Jeopardy Attach in the Civil Proceeding Before the Jury Was Empaneled in the Criminal Proceeding? Even if 405 could be retroactively applied to this case, it would not provide Garcia a basis for relief from his criminal conviction because je r.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In that case, the EEOC’s final decision dismissing plaintiffs ADEA claim stated that: “If any of your claims were based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... AS TO THOSE CLAIMS ONLY, you MAY have up to six years after the right of action first accrued in which to file a civil action.” Id. The Second Circuit held that equitable tolling was not warranted because the “uncertainty reflected in the notice stems from the inconsistency in the case law between the circuits.” Id.; see also Lavery, 918 F.2d at 1028 (”[t]he arguably contradictory language — that claimant must file within thirty days and that age discrimination claimants may have up to six years — appears to be a reflection of the difference of judicial opinion ....); compare Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 221 (<HOLDING>) with Edwards, 64 F.3d 601, 604-06 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he challenges the refusal of the territorial auditor to undertake an audit of the Legislature. It is this governmental action-the refusal to undertake an audit-in which the Appellant must show a property interest. He has not done this. Regardless of whether the audit is undertaken, Appellant will continue to be taxed at the same rate. Thus, he has shown no property interest in. the territorial auditor's refusal to audit the legislature. Appellant argues that his standing to bring suit as a taxpayer necessarily shows that he has a property interest which has been infringed. This argument is also misplaced. The mere fact that a person has standing to bring an action does not mean that they have a property interest at stake. The re 79 (9th Cir.), modified 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>); Punikaia v. Clark, 720 F.2d 564, 566 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that a tribe had no property interest in the continued operation of a bureau of indian affairs office on the reservation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims, Gabriel v. O’Hara, 368 Pa. Super. 383, 534 A.2d 488 (1987), and a two-year statute of limitations to fraud and most other tort claims. 42 Pa.C.S. §5524. Depending on when the defendants’ allegedly improper actions took place, it is conceivable that some class members’ claims could be barred by the appropriate statute of limitations. The court also notes that the plaintiff’s claims had not been certified prior to the presentation of the settlement to the court. Addressing consumer claims such as this one as class actions secures a particular benefit for injured persons for a variety of reasons. However, it is far from certain that the plaintiff would have been able to establish those elements necessary for certification. Cf. Weinberg v. Sun Co., 565 Pa. 612, 777 A.2d 442 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Klemow v. Time Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 197 n.17,

    ### Response:
    holding that private utpcpl claim included individual questions of fact and could not be certified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    include supporting affidavits detailing the disputed material facts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Given the dearth of information Plaintiff communicated to the district court in response to the Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the issue of timeliness with respect to the district court’s grant of summary judgment is not properly before this Court. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir.2002) (recognizing the Court will not normally address whether there was adequate time for discovery absent the Court’s apprisal of discovery issues prior to the appellate process, except here where Plaintiff set forth identical discovery issues in a simultaneously filed opposition to a motion to stay discovery); see also Vance, 90 F.3d at 1149-50 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs efforts do not rise to the level

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs right to argue a need for discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment was preserved since plaintiff moved to vacate summary judgment ten days later and included precisely the discovery needed and not generalized statements of necessary discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts that have considered these issues. The BOP does not exceed its authority by setting a payment schedule for inmates such as Durham. As noted by the Second Circuit, the IFRP “serves a valid penological objective of rehabilitation by facilitating repayment of debts,” and “is fully consistent with the Bureau of Prisons’ authorization, under the direction of the Attorney General, to provide for rehabilitation and reformation.” Johnpoll, 898 F.2d at 851. Nor do we believe, on this record, that the district court violated separation of powers principles by improperly delegating Article III functions to the BOP. Durham has simply not shown any indication that the district court delegated any core judicial functions. Accord Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F.Supp. 1398,

    ### Response:
    holding ifrp is neither a usurpation of sentencing courts article iii power nor violation of separation of powers doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an immigration judge’s denial of her application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction to review Osorio Sanchez’s constitutional challenge. See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review. Osorio Sanchez’s sole contention on appeal is that placing her in removal rather than deportation proceedings violated equal protection. This contention lacks merit. Osorio Sanchez was served with a Notice to Appear after April 1, 1997. Accordingly, the permanent rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) apply. Cf. Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This

    ### Response:
    recognizing that aliens whose proceedings are commenced with a notice to appear on or after april 1 1997 are subject to removal proceedings under iirira while aliens whose proceedings were commenced with an order to show cause before april 1 1997 were subject to deportation proceedings under prior law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his release from prison and the killing for which he received a death sentence that the jury knew nothing about. Given the psychologists’ testimony [at the 3.850 hearing] that Mills’ mental problems boiled down to being impulsive, it is purely speculative that the currently tendered evidence would have carried sufficient weight to abrogate the judge’s override of the jury recommendation. 603 So.2d at 486. The trial court also considered evidence of Mills’s childhood through testimony of his family members and the presentence investigation report. We hold that the district court correctly concluded that the failure of Mills’s lawyers to present mental health evidence as mitigating evidence and then- failure to seek mitigating evidence did not prejudice him. See Routly, 33 F.3d at 1297 (<HOLDING>). E. Felony Murder Aggravating Factor Mills

    ### Response:
    holding that the petitioner could not show prejudice because the essence of the mitigation evidence that he argued was before the judge through the presentence investigation report and his mental health experts testimony and the judge referred to it specifically in the sentencing order further the same judge and the florida supreme court held that the mitigation evidence would not have changed the result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 419 Pa. 229, 213 A.2d 608 (1965). In Martino, the plaintiff had slipped on a grape on the floor of the defendant’s store. As in the present case, the plaintiff presented testimony that produce frequently fell to the floor. Grapes were an especially pervasive problem, because the scale used to weigh the grapes was located across the aisle from the grape counter. Accordingly, grapes fell to the floor as customers carried them to the scale. The testimony also revealed that, as in the present case, an employee was required to keep the produce area, including the floor, clear of debris. In affirming the non-suit entered in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court held the following: So far as this record discloses, the offending grape A.2d 691 (1989) (<HOLDING>). For the above reasons, we conclude that the

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    medical conduct, and an impending investigation by the Michigan Department of Consumer and Industry Affairs. They declined to purchase the plaintiffs medical practice because they deny that any such contractual obligation exists, and that it is not in the economic interest of the hospital to do so. Finally, they explain that the hostility and acrimony that characterized the relationship between the hospital administration and the plaintiff over the years grew from the plaintiffs vituperative and dicta torial personality directed toward the medical and nursing staffs. These nondiscriminatory reasons are sufficient to shift the burden back to the plaintiff to show pretext. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43, 120 S. ces, 30 F.3d 45, 47-48 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). It must be recognized, however, that it is

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress, of course, remains free to establish a uniform definition of PMSI applicable to cases governed by the hanging paragraph. 2 . Several federal circuit cases from the 1980s addressed the treatment of overloaded PMSIs in bankruptcy, with respect to the anti-avoidance provision in § 522(f). See In re Billings, 838 F.2d at 408 (suggesting that an obligation can ""be considered only partly a purchase money debt,"" and therefore a security interest can still be considered a PMSI with respect to the portion that is not overloaded (emphasis added)); Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir.1984) (adopting ""pro tanto preservation of purchase-money security interests,” but invalidating overloaded portions of PMSIs); In re Matthews, 724 F.2d at 801 (<HOLDING>). 3 . The Fourth Circuit has suggested that

    ### Response:
    holding that when a creditor refinances a purchase money obligation the pmsi is extinguished
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those facts, but a prior commitment may be.’’ Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters, 1997-NMCA-031, ¶ 24 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, although some instances of prejudgment may present no instance of bias, evidence of a prejudgment certainly augurs strongly in its favor. {67} This idea of prejudgment as the line between administrative bias and impartiality explains our holdings in both Reid and Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters. In Reid, the board member’s admitted statement of prejudgment required recusal. Whereas, in Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters, the board member’s prior affiliation with the union was inadequate to create a bias. See In re Comm’n Investigation v. N.M. State Corp. Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-016, ¶ 42, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (<HOLDING>); Phelps Dodge Tyrone, Inc. v. N.M. Water

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudgment constitutes cause for recusal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; and William S. Thompson, President, American Intellectual Property Law Association); see also Jacobs Wind, 919 F.2d at 728, 16 USPQ2d at 1973 (affirming the dismissal of an infringement claim against the state as barred by the Eleventh Amendment'because Congress failed to enunciate clearly in the text of the patent laws that it intended to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states); Chew, 893 F.2d at 332-33, 13 USPQ2d at 1394 (same); Watts v. University of Del., 622 F.2d 47, 53, 206 USPQ 106, 112 (3d Cir.1980) (involving an infringement action against an arm of the State of Delaware); Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F.Supp. 708, 711-12, 181 USPQ 313, 314-15 (N.D.Ill.1974) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim a C.N.D.Ohio 1887) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the legislative history reflects

    ### Response:
    holding that ohio counties could be sued for patent infringement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acquired through the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution violates due process. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). This is true regardless of whether the prosecution solicited testimony it knew to be false or simply allowed such testimony to pass uncorrected. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. And, knowingly false or misleading testimony by a law enforcement officer is imputed to the prosecution. See Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 n. 1 (2d Cir.1982); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir.1958) (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942)); cf. Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 450-51 (4th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). But see Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530-31

    ### Response:
    recognizing that withholding of exculpatory evidence by police is imputed to the prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Grupo Arosfran Em-preendimentos E Participacoes Sari filed a Motion to Dissolve Writ of Garnishment and Memorandum of Law, raising the argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction over blocked assets being held at a New York bank branch (Dkt. 1030), to which Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (Dkt. 1033). The Court then stayed all proceedings in this case pending resolution of the substantive jurisdictional issue (Dkti 1047), fo S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). While .personal jurisdiction may be waived, “in rem jurisdiction is a very special type of necessary judicial subject matter jurisdiction” under- Florida law— one that cannot be waived. Center Capital Corp. v. Gulfstream Crane, LLC, 2009 WL 4909430, at *7 (S.D.Fla.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). In keeping with these jurisdictional rules,

    ### Response:
    holding that a party cannot waive in rem jurisdiction under florida law and a court proceeding pursuant to in rem jurisdiction must actually possess in rem jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of appeals. See supra p. 501. There is thus no room in the dissent’s position for the considerations of “prudence and comity” that the dissent agrees must ""shape our decision” as to whether to exercise injunctive power. Dissent at 504. 6 . A rule against simultaneous actions would seem especially unlikely in those circuits given the uncertain contours of the relief available to an aggrieved employee before DOT. While “make-whole,” as well as injunctive, relief is available in federal court, see, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 207, 65 S.Ct. 226, 234, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944) (providing for ""usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of damages” in fair representation claims); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196, 87 S.Ct. 903, 920, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (<HOLDING>), we have been unable to ascertain whether (and

    ### Response:
    holding that damages and injunctive relief may be awarded in fair representation cases when necessary to make employees whole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    869, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 918 (Fla.1985)). “When a court interferes with an executive agency’s discretion in spending its appropriate[d] funds, it is encroaching on the powers of the agency.” Office of State Attorney for Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. Polites, 904 So.2d 527, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). A court may order an executive department to spend funds when a statute or constitution authorizes a court to do so. Courts, however, have rejected the idea that there is a “doctrine of inherent judicial power” that allows a court to direct how an executive department exercises its discretion to spend funds appropriated to the department. Dep’t of Children & Families v. J.H., 831 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). Instead, courts have repeatedly held that

    ### Response:
    holding absent statutory authority a trial court could not order the department to pay for longterm therapy by a specific therapist and any and all necessary evaluations for the dependent child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). A tribe can waive its own immunity by expressing such a waiver. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998). Without an unequivocal and express waiver of sovereign immunity or congressional authorization, tribal entities are immune from suit. Id. at 757, 118 S.Ct. 1700. {6} Other entities under tribal control are extended the same sovereign immunity as the tribe itself. Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F.Supp. 1127, 1131 (D.Alaska 1978) (<HOLDING>). Defendant in this ease is an entity that

    ### Response:
    holding that the sovereign immunity afforded to tribes extends to their governmental organizations and business entities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his account. Day was obligated to “control” the “disposition” of those funds for paying the plans’ insurance premiums. Instead, Day absconded with the funds. Because the disposition clause contains no “discretion” requirement, it is irrelevant whether Day exercised “discretion” in his thievery. “[A]ny authority or control” is enough. Therefore, in light of ERISA’s statutory text and structure, we conclude Day was a “fiduciary,” regardless of whether he possessed “discretionary authority or discretionary control” over the disposition of the plans’ assets. Our conclusion comports with the results reached by every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue. See David P. Coldesina, D.D.S., P.C., Empl. Profit Sharing & Trust v. Estate of Simper, 407 F.3d 1126, 1132-35 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Srein v. Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214,

    ### Response:
    holding an accountant is a fiduciary under the disposition clause where he wrongfully disbursed the plans funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    support first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Davido, 582 Pa. 52, 868 A.2d 431, 435 (2005). This case presents a slightly different procedural posture. Although the jury imposed a death sentence in this case, the trial court vacated that penalty and the Commonwealth has appealed the court’s decision. Thus, we have before us a case in which the death penalty was imposed and then vacated, with the Commonwealth requesting that we re-impose the death sentence. In prior cases that involved collateral review, we have characterized matters in which a lower court vacated the death sentence as ones “in which the death penalty has been imposed,” thus triggering our review of all issues properly preserved on appeal. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 566 Pa. 307, 780 A.2d 646, 648 (2001) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). See also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45,

    ### Response:
    holding death sentence need not be pending in order for this court to engage in review of issues on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant from liability, given that when a party wishes to exculpate itself from negligence liability “a greater degree of clarity is necessary to make the exculpatory clause effective than would be required for other types of contract provisions.” Id. at 375, 553 A.2d at 145. The opening paragraph of the release recites that operating a motorcycle is inherently dangerous and that operation may result in injury. The release then waives “any claim” resulting from the operation. Base aska Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Hartley Motors Inc., 444, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding release not specific enough to bar recovery for injuries from amusement park’s negligence during a horseback ride). But see Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 711-12 (Wyo. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we conclude that plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that release unambiguously released defendants from negligence liability even though the release did not include the word negligence because there was no other rational purpose for which the exculpatory language could have been intended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its rules, and a duty to exercise reasonable care under these circumstances.” Id. Relying in part on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965), the court agreed. The court found that, by prohibiting tenants from keeping vicious dogs and further requiring Scepurek to promise to remove annoying pets, the landlord undertook the obligation to control vicious dogs in its trailer park, i.e., keep the premises free from vicious dogs. Alaskan Village, 720 P.2d at 948. Significantly, the court also noted that “evidence that the undertaking is for the plaintiffs benefit is a prerequisite to liability; a plaintiff who does not produce such evidence is not entitled to a jury instruction on this theory.” Alaskan Village, 720 P.2d at 947; see also Goddard by Goddard, 558 N.E.2d at 854-55 (<HOLDING>). The instant case, however, is distinguishable

    ### Response:
    holding landlord was not liable because landlord had relinquished control despite landlords distribution of notices to residents telling them to keep their dogs tied or inside because evidence suggested that the reason for notice was that landlord had received complaints about barking and trash removal and not to protect others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Government by history and -the Constitution.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 604, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1990)(O’Connor, J., dissenting)). By contrast, in one-person, one-vote cases — in which a plaintiff in an overpopulated district alleges that she is injured because the"" districting plan dilutes her vote relative to voters in underpopulated districts — the plaintiff may challenge the districting plan on a statewide basis. See, e.g., Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7, 84 S.Ct. 526 (permitting voters in a single overpopulated district to raise one-person, one-vote challengé to districting plan as a whole); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 370, 375, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) (<HOLDING>); Baker, 369 U.S. at 187, 206-07, 82 S.Ct. 691

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff who was qualified to vote in primary and general elections in fulton county georgia had standing to lodge statewide challenge to georgias county unit system as a basis for counting votes in a democratic primary for the nomination of a united states senator and statewide officers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a debt.’ ” Id. Thus, although the Massey defendants’ practice involved their regularly conducting non-judicial foreclosures to enforce their clients’ security interest in mortgaged property, defendants were not acting as general “debt collectors,” unless they also took other actions, beyond those necessary to foreclose under the deed of trust, were regularly taken in an effort to collect a debt. In contrast to non-judicial foreclosures, which are intended only to enforce the lender’s security interest and not to collect the underlying debt, a typical judicial foreclosure usually does involve seeking a personal judgment against the debtor for a deficiency and hence would likely amount to debt collection. See McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1216-1218 (D.Kan.2004) (<HOLDING>). In his affidavit, Massey acknowledges that

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note  by filing a lawsuit in state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). Just as a court’s failure to appreciate its authority to depart constitutes an error of law appealable under § 3742(a)(1), see, e.g., United States v. Adeniyi 912 F.2d 615, 619 (2d Cir.1990), it is likewise legal error for a court to take the unusual step of expressly abdicating the discretion that it has been duly entrusted by law to exercise. In the unusual circumstances with which we are presented, as in the situation where a court fails to recognize its authority to depart, our task is not to question the merits of a court’s discretionary judgment about the propriety of departure, but simply to ensure that the court actually makes the discretionary judgment that the law allows and expects it to make. Cf. United States v. Gangi, 45 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590-91

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant must have opportunity to respond to governments substantial assistance motion because that response is essential predicate to exercise of courts discretion and distinguishing cases holding denials of 5k11 motions unreviewable because those cases concerned underlying merits of courts discretionary judgments not their very exercise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    App. 293. As to Miller’s health, the District Court accounted for the fact that Miller’s medical condition would make his incarceration more difficult. Indeed, the District Court stated that it would have varied upward more but for Miller’s health. Thus, the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. V The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 1 . State and federal authorities have since revoked Miller’s registration as an investment adviser representative and have barred him from association with the securities industry. In re Miller, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-3840, 108 SEC Docket 4484 (May 30, 2014); In re Cap. Mkts. Advisory, LLC, Summary Order, 2010 WL 6363111, ¶ 3 (N.J. Bureau Sec. Dec. 20, 2010); see also Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). 2 . We cite to Appellee's brief, which is not

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may take judicial notice of sec filings that are matters of public record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those offenses, but not on any greater offense. See Stone, 188 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d at 822. However, where the record is not clear as to whether the jury was deadlocked over acquittal, a greater offense, or a lesser-included offense at the time of discharge, the court must presume that it was the least serious lesser-included offense. See Tate, T183 A2d at 825-26; Castrillo, 566 P.2d at 1151-52. Thus, the retrial of the greater offenses would be barred by double jeopardy. Here, the record does not reveal the specific charges on which the jury was deadlocked. Based on Richardson's specific objection to retrial on first- and second-degree murder only, I would hold that double jeopardy bars retrial on those two offenses. See People v. Ortiz, 196 Colo. 438, 439, 586 P.2d 227, 228 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would make the rule to show

    ### Response:
    holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for not more than twenty years” for a money laundering conviction); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (providing that a person who conspires to commit money laundering is “subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy”). Daniels was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 210 months (17.5 years), followed by 2 years of supervised release. Because Daniels’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offenses that she was found guilty of committing, Apprendi is not implicated, and the amount of laundered money for which Daniels was held responsible did not need to be set forth in the indictment, presented to the jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Corvado, 227 F.3d 528, 542 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). With regard to Daniels’s argument that she

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi was not triggered because the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were within the maximum penalties for the rico offenses that they were found guilty of committing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel who would have to familiarize himself with the Debtors’ affairs at great expense to the Debtors and the estate. II. Conclusions of Law The primary issue before the Court is whether Ewing’s prepetition security interest in virtually all of the Debtors’ assets, taken to secure payment of fees for bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy services, disqualifies him from serving as their counsel in this Chapter 12 case. A secondary issue is whether the Court should authorize compensation to Ewing for postpetition legal services provided to the Debtors. It is undisputed that trustees should be permitted to select their own attorney without interference from others. See In re Magna Prod. Corp., 251 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.1957); Matter of Market Response Group, Inc., 20 B.R. 151 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1982) (<HOLDING>). Trustees do not, however, have unfettered

    ### Response:
    holding that only in the rarest cases will the trustee or debtor in possession be deprived of the privilege of selecting qualified counsel since the relationship between them is highly confidential demanding personal faith and confidence in order that they may work together harmoniously
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of $25,000, and her retirement became effective on January 3, 2014, as she requested. See id. at 1, 4. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs voluntary retirement precludes a reinstatement remedy. See Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot., ECF No. [51-2], at 32-33. Plaintiff has offered no response to Defendant’s argument on this issue. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. [58], at 1-2. Plaintiff also has not asserted a “constructive discharge” claim or otherwise contended that her retirement was not voluntary. Upon review of Defendant’s arguments, the record as a whole, and the applicable legal authorities, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs voluntary retirement precludes her from her requested remedy of reinstatement. See, e.g., Kalinoski v. Gutierrez, 435 F.Supp.2d 55, 72-73 (D.D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>);, see also id. (citing cases). Accordingly,

    ### Response:
    holding that a voluntary resignation cuts off a plaintiffs eligibility to recover under title vii beyond the date of the resignation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were intentional and mali-clous;"" (8) publication, ie., ""[the Defendants have released to a few individuals the alleged contents of part of the report highly negative about [Eddie];"" and (4) special damages, i.e., ""[Eddie] has suffered ... loss of earnings ... from the Defendant's actions. Appellants' Appendix at 19-20. Thus, the complaint is sufficient to defeat an Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(8) motion to dismiss. Although unartfully pleaded, the complaint placed the Defendants on notice as to the theory of Eddie's defamation claim and its underlying facts and is capable of supporting a defamation claim. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of this defamation claim and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See, e.g., McQueen, 711 N.E.2d at 67 (<HOLDING>). IV. Loss of Consortium The last issue is

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800. The exception also embodied the bankruptcy policy that “[i]n general, tax claims which are nondischargeable, despite a lack of priority, are those to whose staleness the debtor contributed by some wrong-doing or serious fault.” S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800. After Congress enacted § 523(a)(1)(B), several courts considered whether a failure to file reports similar to the one § 13-409 requires constituted the failure to file “a return,” such that the corresponding tax liability would be excepted from discharge, and almost all of them determined that § 523(a)(1)(B) did not except the tax liability from discharge. Compare Dahmer v. United States (In re Dahmer), 336 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2006) (<HOLDING>), State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Jerauld

    ### Response:
    holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    engaged in a civil conspiracy with [named and unnamed defendants] to defraud [the RTC as Receiver for Universal Savings] in connection with [the Houston Storage transaction]?” The RTC then sought to put what amounts to the same question before the district court in the dischargeability proceeding: Do you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Carpenter participated in a scheme to defraud the RTC as receiver for Universal Savings? However, as the Supreme Court explained in Ashe v. Swenson, “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Because the is 7-78 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). E In addition to arguing that the issues are

    ### Response:
    holding that judgment in prior state court proceeding against debtor in which court found that debtor made false representations had preclusive effect on courts determination of nondischargeability under  523a2a based on false representations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to judicial process and accusations of child abuse without basis for doing so. (Amended Complaint at 53.) Further, plaintiffs allege that the City and DHS failed to adequately discipline and t L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). Here, plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action against City of Philadelphia and DHS premised on Scheer’s conduct in obtaining temporary custody of Miller’s children. Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to state a claim against DHS and City of Philadelphia regarding their policy and custom for investigating child abuse allegations because plaintiffs fail to identify any persons, groups of persons or official offices that are responsible for the alleged unconstitutional policy. Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1062; Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F.Supp. 367, 376-77 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>). This defense is premature at this stage of

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs must identify officials with ultimate policymaking authority in the area in question and adduce scienterlike evidence  with respect to them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The appellant is the surviving spouse of veteran Randall A. Pandry. On October 4, 2000, the appellant had filed a Notice of Appeal from a July 7, 2000, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA or Board) that denied her claims for service connection for the cause of the veteran’s death and for entitlement to dependent’s educational assistance. Subsequent to that BVA decision, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub.L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000), was enacted. Among other things, the VCAA eliminated the well-grounded-claim requirement and modified the Secretary’s duties to notify and assist claimants. See generally VCAA, §§ 3, 4, 7; see also Holliday v. Principi, 14 Vet.App. 280, 284-86 (2001) (<HOLDING>). On November 20, 2000, the Secretary filed a

    ### Response:
    holding all sections of vcaa retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    letter fails to observe the formalities required by the Clean Water Act, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. See Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351, 1355 (9th Cir.1995). Neither the regulation nor the Supreme Court has clearly established the specificity or level of detail that a notice letter must include. The regulation requires that the plaintiff provide enough information to permit the recipient to identify the dates of the violation, but does not specifically require the notice to contain those dates. See 40 C.F.R. § 135.5(a). Ideally, a plaintiff will identify a precise date, but if not, the range of the dates should be “reasonably limited.” California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. City of West Sacramento, 905 F.Supp. 792, 799 (E.D.Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Ninth Circuit has held that plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that dates of violation must be stated with some specificity and rejecting a notice letter that alleged hundreds of violations in a fiveyear range as insufficiently specific
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offense, ie., whether there was an improper grant of a mistrial by the trial court. In State v. Woodson, supra, this Court set out the parameters to consider where a mistrial may affect an individual’s double jeopardy rights, when we said: “The double jeopardy prohibition against retrial for the same offense attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and sworn. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973); Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 444, 330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975). Thus, after jeopardy attaches, retrial is barred if a mistrial is declared without the defendant’s consent unless there is a showing of ‘manifest necessity’ to declare the mistrial. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (<HOLDING>). Although there is no clear test to determine

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court may discharge a jury without the defendants consent whenever taking all the circumstances into consideration there is a manifest necessity for the act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceed with receipt of proposals prior to the resolution of this matter could effectively exclude [Red River] from competition entirely.”). Accordingly, Red River has established that it is an “interested party” with standing to pursue this pre-award protest under the Tucker Act. C. Standard Of Review. 1. In Bid Protest Cases. Bid protest actions are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., which provides: ' The reviewing court shall — ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be — ... (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ... (D) without observance of procedure required by law[.] 5 U.S.C. § 706; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4); see also Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1332 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the court must ascertain

    ### Response:
    holding that a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    non-sequitur because it does nothing to rebut Williams’s evidence that administrative remedies were not available to her at the time she tried to file the relevant grievance and appeal in this case. Other circuits have similarly concluded that defendants may not simply rely on the existence of an administrative review process to overcome a prisoner’s showing that administrative remedies were not available to him. In Hemphill v. New York, for example, the Second Circuit held that merely showing that grievance mechanisms are in place does not end the inquiry into availability where the plaintiff claims that threats by prison officials made the remedy functionally .unavailable to him. 380 F.3d 680, 687-88 (2d Cir.2004); see also Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268-69 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, permitting a defendant to show that

    ### Response:
    holding that records showing 53 other inmates had filed grievances during the period in question did not demonstrate that administrative remedy was available to plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in their memorandum of law that any inaccurate disclosures with respect to the recording and filing fees were overstatements and therefore ""not considered material disclosure violations under Regulation Z,” (see ECF No. 19-2, Def. Mem. at 11), defendants appear to have abandoned this argument in their reply brief, (see ECF No. 21, Def. Reply at 2-5). In any event, this argument is meritless because the case law supports the proposition that overcharging a borrower for recording and filing fees constitutes an understatement of the finance charge. See McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., 665 F.Supp.2d 132, 148 n. 16 (E.D.N.Y.2009); see also Payton v. New Century Mortg. Corp., Nos. 03 C 333, 03 C 703, 2003 WL 22349118, at *4, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18366, at *12-13 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 10, 2003) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 607

    ### Response:
    holding that only the actual recording fee paid to a public official was properly excluded from the finance charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 201. Federal arbitration law has established a presumption that an arbitral body has acted within its powers. Howard Elec, and Mechanical Co. v. Frank Briscoe Co., 754 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir.1985). This presumption exists to effectuate the “ ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ ” Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3353, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)); Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 976. The policy favoring arbitration “applies with special force in the field of international commerce.” Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3356-57. See also Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 847 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We review de novo a contention that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing added presumption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting Beard, 402 F.3d at 605). Here, despite the complete lack of any reasonable belief than any single student possessed any pills, the Academy searched all 134 of its students. Further, the school required all of the girls to perform the “bra lift” even if nothing revealed during the less intrusive part of the search suggested that the student was hiding contraband in her underwear. A search of the entire student body based on vague tips from unidentified students — where no follow-up investigation was made to determine who the actual perpetrators may be, how many students were estimated to be bringing pills into the school, or the nature and level of danger of the pills — was not an appropriate method of discovering the wrongdoers. See Redding, - U.S. at -, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 362 (<HOLDING>). As summarized by one scholar, Application of

    ### Response:
    holding the required knowledge under the reasonable suspicion standard is that a school administrators search of each student must forecast a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    length of service, and sexual singularity, it is plausible that discovery could reveal facts further substantiating the reasonableness of Tasciyan’s belief that her employer discriminatorily failed to promote her. Defendants argue that the Tasciyan’s firing lacked sufficient temporal proximity to her complaint of discrimination to warrant the inference of causation. The Court disagrees. Taken as true, Tasciyan’s factual contentions demonstrate that her employer fired her two to two-and-a half months after she complained about perceived discrimination. Although this length of time is not insignificant, the Court declines to hold that two to two-and-a-half months is insufficient as a matter of law to prove causation. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Court’s disposition is particularly

    ### Response:
    holding that proof that an employer fired an employee three months after the employee filed a charge of discrimination sufficed to state a prima facie case of causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has a prior meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. Crawford was concerned only with testimonial statements. The Crawford court expressly stated that “[w]here nontestimo-nial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law” and to “exempt[ ] such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Crawford Court held that “at a minimum” “testimonial statements” included “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial” and police interrogations, but left for another day “an d.2d 930 (2008); Pflieger v. State, 952 So.2d 1251, 1253-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>); Card v. State, 927 So.2d 200, 203 (Fla. 5th

    ### Response:
    holding that annual inspection report on breath test instrument is not testimonial as it is not prepared during the investigation of a particular crime and is intended for the nontestimonial purpose of making sure the machine is working properly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jean Fiore and the Defendant, Richard O. Hilliker.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Mr. Hilliker on that basis. Mr. Hilliker argues on appeal that because there is neither a common plan nor mutual restrictions, the restriction could be enforced by the Fiores only if there was language in the deed itself expressly giving them the right to do so. Additionally, the appellee law firm argues that the “conditions” in Schedule B on which the Fiores rely were personal to Mr. Spivey, and not covenants running with the land. We decline to address these arguments because they were not raised in Mr. Hilliker’s summary judgment motion, nor were they addressed in the trial court’s order. See Rosenberg v. Cape Coral Plumbing, Inc., 920 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Bank of Am. Corp., 927 So.2d 1091

    ### Response:
    holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mot. at 3. Finish Line does not assert that it would have negotiated the terms of its Arbitration Agreement with Capili — a retail sales associate — or that Finish Line’s unequal bargaining power was mitigated by Capili’s sophistication. See Haisha Corp. v. Sprint Solutions, Inc., No. 14-cv-2773-GPC MDD, 2015 WL 224407, at *5 (S.D.Cal. Jan. 15, 2015) (finding that the fact that’the parties to the arbitration agreement were “two sophisticated corporate entities” mitigated against a finding of procedural unconscionability). Although the Court notes that the fact that Finish Line’s automated process specifically called out the Arbitration Agreement reduces the level of unfairness, see Molina v. Scandinavian Designs, Inc., No. 13-cv-4256 NC, 2014 WL 1615177, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 21, 2014) (<HOLDING>), the Court finds that the circumstances of,the

    ### Response:
    holding the amount of procedural unconscionability was limited by the fact that the arbitration agreement was presented as a separate two page document
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    little problem in applying the holding of Chu to the situation at bar. A third party, such as King, cannot be held, liable in tort when community property is taken by one of the spouses. Chu v. Hong, 249 S.W.3d at 445. Thus, and to the extent that she asserted tort claims sounding in legal malpractice, breached fiduciary, duty, fraud and the like to recover community property or the value of her lost interest in it, her remedy was and is restricted to pursuing a just and right distribution of the marital estate. Of course, she was free to also seek, during the divorce, a reconstitution of that estate per § 7.009 of .the Family Code to assist in achieving a just and right distribution. Barnhill, however, attempts to distinguish Chu and Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>), by contending that “[s]he is not suing the

    ### Response:
    holding there was no independent tort cause of action between spouses for damages to the community estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the terminal date set by the ALJ and neither Boeing nor the Fund had requested an extension under K.S.A. 44-523(b). See Bushey v. Plastic Fabricating Co., 213 Kan. 121, 125- 26, 515 P.2d 735 (1973) (noting that continuances may be granted so that parties may be heard). The lateness of these ietters, however, does not alter the language of K.S.A. 44-523(c) that all parties must have submitted the case to the ALJ before the 30-day period begins. It is worth noting that Bradford’s submission letter was also late and no request for an extension appears in the record. The ALJ is not bound by technical rules of procedure. K.S.A. 44-523(a); Armstrong, 21 Kan. App. 2d at 758; see also Bahr v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 8 Kan. App. 2d 627, 634, 663 P.2d 1144, rev. denied 233 Kan. 1091 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Bradford does not demonstrate that the

    ### Response:
    holding that lack of notice regarding the classification of the disability did not prejudice the respondent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the grounds stated by the lower court. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>). The Nassau County Circuit Court was correct

    ### Response:
    holding that even when based on erroneous reasoning a conclusion or decision of a trial court will generally be affirmed if the evidence or an alternative theory supports it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    896, 898 (11th Cir.1988). The court also will be able to determine whether any of the privileges asserted has been waived or otherwise undercut, as urged by appellee at oral argument. It would be premature for this court to determine these issues at the present time. 3. No Waiver of Right to In Camera Hearing We next determine whether appellants’ failure to request an in camera hearing before the bankruptcy court constitutes a waiver of their right to one on remand. Although those asserting privileges in response to a subpoena generally are required to do so on a question-by-question and/or document-by-document basis, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 831 F.2d 225, 227 (11th Cir.1987), a blanket assertion does not waive later, specific assertions under all circumstances, see id. at 228 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, appellants’ instant argument

    ### Response:
    holding so under circumstances similar to the present ones
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    well-being of the criminal justice system of this state, the legislature declares its intent, in this chapter, to ensure that all victims and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy and sensitivity; and that the rights extended in this chapter to victims and witnesses of crime are honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal defendants.” Wis.Stat. § 950.01. Thus, the defendant officers in investigating the suspicious circumstances concerning the intimidation and harassment of their primary crime witness were only fulfilling their obligation and sworn duty as law enforcement officers under Wisconsin law. See e.g., State v. Lombardi, 8 Wis.2d 421, 99 N.W.2d 829 (1959) (<HOLDING>). As the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in

    ### Response:
    holding sheriff liable for inter alia failing to properly investigate possible battery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946, 950 (Alaska 2000)). 6 . Id. (quoting A.B., 7 P.3d at 950). 7 . Carl N. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 102 P.3d 932, 935 (Alaska 2004) (citing Sherry R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 74 P.3d 896, 901 (Alaska 2003)). 8 . Compare Wendell C. II v. State, OCS, 118 P.3d 1, 4 (Alaska 2005) (referring to the parents' failure to remedy their conduct in a reasonable time as a ""legal conclusion"") and Dennis B. v. State, Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., DFYS, Mem. Op & J. No. 1202, 2005 WL 435173, at ""7 (Alaska, Feb. 23, 2005) (stating that we review de novo ""'the legal conclusion that the parents failed to remedy their conduct"") with Jon S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 763 (Alaska 2009) (<HOLDING>) and Sherry R., 74 P.3d at 903 (same). 9 . AS

    ### Response:
    holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employer discrimination. In Gross, the Court concluded that the ADEA requires proof that the prohibited criterion was the “but-for” cause of the prohibited conduct. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). Moreover, while causation relies heavily on certain facts and circumstances of a case, “temporal proximity between the two events, an intervening pattern of retaliatory conduct, inconsistent reasons by the employer for the adverse action, and differential treatment of other employers,” are pertinent factors to the causation element. Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F.Supp.2d 153, 165 (D.Md.2000) (decided at the summary judgment stage thus applying a different legal standard than Rule 12(b)(6)); see also Williams, 871 F.2d at 457 (<HOLDING>). Here, Moser maintains that DSI terminated his

    ### Response:
    recognizing temporal proximity as important factor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shift is rational and, therefore, not arbitrary and capricious. Id. (internal citations omitted). “[Tjhis is not a difficult standard to meet.” Id. We have recognized that after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001), the level of deference owed to an informal agency interpretation is “freighted with uncertainty.” Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that Mead “does not clarify the circumstance in which Congress should be deemed to have intended an informal agency interpretation to carry the force of law and thus, attract Chevron deference”). Arguably, the AAO’s unpublished decision may lack force and as such, Chevron deference could be inappropriate. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (<HOLDING>); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,

    ### Response:
    holding that a tariff classification does not warrant judicial deference under chevron because there was no indication that congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the arbitration award as final. As we have said, the underlying policy of Rule 2 — 602(b) is the avoidance of piecemeal appeals. For this reason, the Court of Appeals and this Court have repeatedly cautioned trial judges that, in determining whether Rule 2-602(b) should be invoked, they “should balance the exigencies of the case ... with the policy against piecemeal appeals and then only allow a separate appeal in the very infrequent harsh case.” Diener, 266 Md. at 556, 295 A.2d 470 (emphasis added); accord Planning Bd. of Howard Co. v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 648, 530 A.2d 1237 (1987) (stating that invocation of Rule 2-602(b) is for the “exceptional case,” and that “[t]he exercise of discretion ... should not be routinely exercised”); Canterbury, 66 Md.App. at 649, 505 A.2d 858 (<HOLDING>). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Angeletti, 71

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a strong policy consideration against certification has always been to prevent piecemeal appeals as far as possible and to avoid thereby the confusion delay and expense which would be caused by having two or more appeals in the same suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    criterion for fixing an amount of alimony is—after a payee’s need'—-a present ability of the payor to sustain it. See § 61.08(2) Fla. Stat. (2005); Zold v. Zold, 911 So.2d 1222 (Fla.2005) (trial courts should consider only that portion of income available to spouse in calculating alimony); Olds v. Olds, 555 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (trial court should have considered husband’s ability at present time, not what might occur in the future); Kernan v. Kernan, 495 So.2d 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (same). There is an important reason for this. The failure to pay alimony may be coerced through the contempt powers of the court. A final judgment to pay alimony carries with it a presumption that the payor is currently able to do so. Martyak v. Martyak, 873 So.2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Such coercion is absolutely dependent on the

    ### Response:
    holding that final judgment ordering 4000 in monthly alimony created presumption in subsequent proceedings that husband had ability to pay that amount
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (9th Cir. 1985); accord Cameron v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 843 F.Supp. 334, 336 (W.D.Mich.1994.) Sovereign immunity does not, however, bar actions for prospective relief against individual tribal officials who have allegedly acted outside the scope of their permissible authority. Burlington Northern R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 3013, 120 L.Ed.2d 887 (1992); Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F.Supp. 1401 (E.D.Wis.1994.) A sovereign official’s immunity is removed in this case because the official exercised a power that his or her sovereign was powerless to convey. State of Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1332-33 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207, 103 S.Ct. 3537, 77 L.Ed.2d 1388 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus the individual Community Defendants are

    ### Response:
    holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact that Cherokee as an entity had access to the closet is demonstrated by the fact that Cherokee employees other than Mrs. Madison had keys to the closet. Moreover, a Cherokee employee testified that Mrs. Madison had come to 2771 Colony Park and removed her personal possessions before April 17. Mrs. Madison also argues that even if the receiver had authority to consent to a search of the Colony Park premises, he did not have authority to consent to a search of her office, which she sometimes, but not always, kept locked. However, she never so much as alleges what, if any, incriminating documents were seized from her office, nor contends that she was prejudiced by the admission of any particular document. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Both defendants incorrectly assert that

    ### Response:
    holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    She argues, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the terms of her probation because more than 60 days had passed since the initial order reimposing the original conditions was rendered. We agree and remand for imposition of the original conditions of probation. Bowling’s probation officer filed an affidavit of violation of probation alleging that Bowling had violated three conditions of probation. At the violation of probation hearing in June 1995, no evidence was presented. The court had a brief discussion with Bowl- tog’s probation officer, found the alleged violations “de minimis,” and without objection from the State, the court cautioned Bowling to adhere to her probation and reimposed the original conditions of probation. No appeal w 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>); Weaver v. State, 588 So.2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that court lost jurisdiction to impose restitution payments where it attempted to add that condition more than 60 days after the original sentence was imposed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Br. at 168; D. Reply at 89-90. The government argues precisely the opposite: with reference to her own affidavit, Juror No. 6 states (¶ 9) that she merely relied on personal experience when deliberating. Overwhelming caselaw in the Third Circuit and elsewhere clearly establishes that Juror No. 6’s conduct is perfectly permissible, and does not amount to “extraneous” information, even when that experience is rather unique and focused on the controversy at issue. The Third Circuit has made clear that jurors can and should draw upon prior life experiences and use them in the course of deliberations. Wilson, 170 F.3d at 395; Gereau, 523 F.2d at 151. Such conduct does not amount to bringing in extraneous information. Dickerson v. DiGuglielmo, 2004 WL 1465662, at *6 (E.D.Pa. June 29, 2004) (<HOLDING>), adopted 2004 WL 1753258 (E.D.Pa. Aug.5,

    ### Response:
    holding no extrinsic evidence was brought into jury deliberations when in drug case two jurors discussed their personal life experiences with crack cocaine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deficiency assessment is the “ascertainment of the amount due [in delinquent taxes] and the formal entry of that amount on the books of the Secretary.” United States v. Dixieline Fin., Inc., 594 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir.1979). In the case of a tax deficiency, “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court within ... [ninety days from the date of the issuance of the Notice of Deficiency], the deficiency ... shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary.” 26 U.S.C. § 6213(c). Once an assessment has been made, the Government is entitled to pursue certain remedies, similar to those of a judgment creditor, in seeking satisfaction of the tax deficiency owed. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260, 55 S.Ct. 695, 699, 79 L.Ed. 1421 (1935) (<HOLDING>). In this case, as a condition of the judgment

    ### Response:
    holding that the assessment is given the force of a judgment and if the amount assessed is not paid when due administrative officials may seize the debtors property to satisfy the debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was convicted of violating. See United States v. Evans, 576 F.3d 766, 769-70 (7th Cir.2009) (Posner, J., concurring). Here, the judgment indicates that defendant was convicted of distribution of simulated crack cocaine. The Iowa statute of conviction, as noted above, covers distribution of both real and fake drugs; thus, if the judgment had been silent, it may have been permissible to look to the documents mentioned in Shepard to determine which provision of the statute defendant violated. But the judgment is clear — defendant was actually convicted of distributing fake drugs — so there is no need to look any further. For the trolled substance analogue” under 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(32) & 813, but those provisions are not at issue here. See United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The guideline states: ""The term

    ### Response:
    holding that a wax and flour mixture is not a controlled substance analogue and explaining that congress did not intend to cover such substances under  80232
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeal that the district court erred in conducting this analysis, and the record otherwise does not reveal such an error. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.l(A)); Moore, 541 F.3d at 1328. The district court is not permitted to analyze whether the sentence was unconstitutional. See Moreno, 421 F.3d at 1220; Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781-82. Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to do so, and we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . As a preliminary matter, the district court had, and we have, subject matter jurisdiction over Bateman’s motion for modification of sentence. Although Bateman filed the motion before Amendment 706 became retroactively applicable on March 3, 2008, the district court ruled on the motion after this date. See United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir.2008)

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an area where the federal court possesses exclusive jurisdiction The fifth factor the Court must consider — whether state or federal law will apply — raises the issue of whether a federal Court can abstain when it has exclusive juris diction. The question of abstention and exclusive federal jurisdiction is unsettled. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to address it, Will v. Calvert Ins. Co., 487 U.S. 655, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 57 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978); and those courts that have confronted the issue have reached conflicting results. Compare American Disposal Services, Inc. v. O’Brien, 839 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.1988) (upholding district court’s dismissal of plaintiff s federal § 1983 action under Colorado River) with Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2308,

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal court improperly dismissed suit on abstention grounds where there was no concurrent jurisdiction over the federal claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offer, which it did the following day. Both parties and their respective attorneys signed the agreement, further demonstrating their intent. to. be bound by the terms of the document. And the elated response. of Beverly’s counsel to Abbott’s acceptance further underscores the parties’ understanding that the handwritten agreement would settle Beverly’s claims. Beverly contends that the district court erred in relying on cases such as Elustra v. Mineo that involve oral agreements because the agreement at issue here was handwritten, not oral. , But Beverly fails to cite a single case to support this contention, much less explain wby the oral-versus-written distinction is relevant here. This failure amounts to forfeiture. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Forfeiture aside, our cases counsel that the

    ### Response:
    holding that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority are forfeited on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights to be free from discriminatory state action by acting with a discriminatory intent to prevent plaintiffs from purchasing property located in the village. Compl. ¶¶ 32-33. Absolute and Qualified Immunity Before delving into the merits of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, we consider defendants’ claims to immunity from suit. The defendants claim that West and the trustees are absolutely immune from damage suits under § 1983 because they were aeting in their legislative capacities when they acted to approve an offer by the village to purchase the Lansing Bible Church property. Thus, the individual defendants claim to enjoy absolute legislative immunity under Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402-06, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1177-80, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979) (<HOLDING>) and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71

    ### Response:
    holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were a quid pro quo for the debtor’s execution of a settlement agreement that extinguished his interest in the hotel that was the subject of the consulting agreement, and were therefore property of the debtor’s estate, where the consulting agreement (1) was “inexorably inter twined” with the settlement agreement, (2) nder a pre-bankruptcy non-compete agreement executed in connection with the sale of the debtor’s car dealership were “sufficiently rooted in the pre-bank-ruptcy past to be included in the estate” because they were “a method of paying for the value of [the debtor’s] name, and for insuring that [the purchaser of the dealership] will receive all of the good will previously owned by [the debtor]”); cf. United States v. Kennedy, 234 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). As numerous courts have recognized, moreover,

    ### Response:
    holding noncompete payments were not exempt from the debt ors bankruptcy estate as earnings from postpetition services under  541a6 because the noncompete agreement was inextricably intertwined with the debtors sale of stock that was an includable bankruptcy asset that predated debtors bankruptcy petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or residence of the parties, Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served, as defendants is a citizen of the State in which, such action is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958). The Seventh Circuit recently stated that Romero, by holding that admiralty cases do not fall within the § 1331 federal question jurisdiction and thus (absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction) cannot be removed under § 1441, necessarily concluded that admiralty cases were properly classified as “[a]ny other such action[s]” within the meaning of § 1441(b)’s second sentence and could not be classified as among the cases covered by the first sentence. See Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 817; accord In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (alterations in original). That interpretation

    ### Response:
    holding that admiralty and general maritime claims fall within the category of any other civil action governed by the second sentence of  1441b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir.1980) (noting that while “[n]either the statute nor common understanding equates national origin with the language that one chooses to speak[, language may be used as a covert basis for national origin discrimination”); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (observing that English-only policies may foster a sense of “inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on [an employee’s] national origin”). To date, however, we have addressed only a sweeping English-only policy mechanically enforced by an employer in all circumstances and at all times within the work environment; we have not had occasion to review a more tailored policy limited, like the one now before us, to specific places or times within the workplace. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1307-08 (<HOLDING>). For its part, however, the EEOC, expressly

    ### Response:
    holding that an englishonly policy which applied at all times to all employees regardless of occupation or activity may have created a hostile work environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    521, 523 (1960); Escajeda v. Cigna Ins. Co., 934 S.W.2d at 404-405. Simply put, the successive steps in the progress and maturation of a claim are mandatory; therefore they must be followed. And, since those steps were implemented by the legislature, it is before the legislature that changes or additions thereto must be sought. The judiciary lacks the authority to sua sponte make those changes. In sum, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to afford Killion relief to the extent that the relief was not dependent upon the adjudication of a matter within the TWCC’s exclusive jurisdiction. Yet, it could not directly or indirectly adjudicate those issues within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction. See Attaya v. Shoukfeh, 962 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, since 1) the issue of Killion’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a court cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discovery ordered by the trial court was overbroad, prohibitively expensive, and unduly burdensome. The trial court denied the motion. Because Arthur did not file a motion to compel further discovery from Harris following the November 21, 2008 hearing, Harris had no opportunity to urge his objections and motion for a protective order prior to being ordered to produce the documents sought by Arthur. We hold that in compelling discovery from Harris without requiring Arthur to identify specific discovery requests with which Harris had not complied and without having before it a motion to compel discovery from Harris, the trial court acted arbitrarily and without considering the discovery rules. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 215.1, 215.2, 215.3; In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex.2005) (<HOLDING>). We further hold that the trial court abused

    ### Response:
    holding that mandamus relief is available when trial court does not follow guiding rules and principles and reaches arbitrary and unxeasonable decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1962, Title 11 § 11.15.010. He contends that although he received a sentence of life imprisonment, nevertheless the members of the court-martial were faced with the sole alternative of life imprisonment or death after a determination of guilt. See 10 U.S.C. § 918. Moreover, he says that decisions by the military tribunal were possible by a two-thirds majority of the 11-man court-martial, as opposed to a five-sixths majority being necessary for conviction under State law. See Alaska Statutes Annotated, Title 12 § 12.45.010 and Title 9 § 09.20.100. Appellant claims that he lost the advantages of these and other rights available under State law and federal rights, as stated above. We believe that the views expressed above require rejection of Appellant’s contentions. If , 12 L.Ed. 2d 1041 (<HOLDING>) ; Doughty v. Maxwell, Warden, 376 U.S. 202, 84

    ### Response:
    holding that due process forbids the use of a coerced confession irrespective of its truth as announced in jackson v denno 378 us 368 84 sct 1774 12 led2d 908 to be retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the Oregon Office of Administrative Hearings that was in force at the time of the parties’ due process hearing. Under that agreement, the hearing officer’s decision should have been issued within thirty days of the close of evidence. Given that evidence in this case closed on May 12, 2006, the hearing officer’s decision would ordinarily have been due on June 12, 2006. Parents point to several out-of-circuit cases to support their claim for “interim” relief. Although the stay-put provision does not directly authorize reimbursement for pre-decision expenses, courts may rely on the broad discretion contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) to require reimbursement if a hearing officer’s decision is inappropriately delayed. Cf. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (<HOLDING>). For example, in Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the idea grants district courts broad discretion to craft appropriate relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While this factor is important, it is not determinative. Further, while somewhat vague, Victoria Yeager testified that she received phone calls regarding confusion as to whether plaintiff endorsed defen dant's services. (Dep. of Victoria Yeager, Ex. H to Stroud Decl., at 134:2-13.) 11 . The parties do not discuss the first two elements of this defense, but rather focus their arguments on the third element, the likelihood of consumer confusion regarding endorsement because of defendant’s conduct. 12 . Furthermore, while defendant argues that its limited reference to plaintiff's name and accomplishment is insufficient to imply endorsement, it fails to proffer any evidence regarding what type of use would imply endorsement for purposes of comparison. Cf. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1154-55

    ### Response:
    holding that the absence of statements regarding authorization that the defendant used in relation to other products supported applicability of nominative fair use defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Cullen v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 863 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir.) (noting that “[a] confirmation proceeding under 9 U.S.C. § 9 is intended to be summary: confirmation can only be denied if an award has been corrected, vacated, or modified in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act”) (quoting Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3159, 104 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1989). The Act, like the Georgia proceeding at issue in Weems, enumerates only a few, strictly limited defenses to the confirmation of an award. Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 581-82 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>). The Act’s enunciation of specific defenses to

    ### Response:
    holding that the role of the courts is limited to ascertaining whether there exists one of the specific grounds for the vacation of an award as provided in  10 of the arbitration act and that the court should not review the arbitration proceeding for errors of law or fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an equitable action, and either sold or sequestered under the judicial decree, and its proceeds in the one case, or its rents and profits in the other, applied upon the demand of the creditor in whose favor the lien exists.” Klaustermeyer v. The Cleveland Trust Co., 89 Ohio St. 142, 145-46, 105 N.E. 278, 280 (1913). Stated in a simpler way, an equitable lien is a charge on a thing which can be enforced only in equity. Such a lien may arise, as the Defendant contends, when a mortgage is improperly executed or recorded. Basil v. Vincello, 50 Ohio St.3d 185, 188-89, 553 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ohio 1990). See also Snyder v. Betz, 2 Ohio C.C. 485, 1 Ohio C.D. 602 (1887), aff'd 48 Ohio St. 492, 28 N.E. 234 (1891); but see Foerstner v. Citizens’ Sav. & Trust. Co., 186 F. 1, 4 (6th Cir.1911) (<HOLDING>). The application of an equitable lien against

    ### Response:
    holding an improperly executed but recorded mortgage creates a contract for a lien as distinguished from an actual lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prohibition within the meaning of § 1441. The authority on this point is currently divided, and of the only two circuit courts to squarely consider the question, one prohibited removal and one allowed it. Compare Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87, 88-90 (8th Cir.1947) (prohibiting removal) with Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 450-51 (1st Cir.1986) (allowing removal). See also Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir.1988) (discussing removability generally, and stating that the FLSA is an example of a statute that allows cases to be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction and “contain[s] no limitation on removal, express or otherwise, to bar removal as required under § 1441(a)”); Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 458, 460- 61 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). In Johnson, which was decided over fifty

    ### Response:
    holding that adea actions which are enforced under the flsa are removable but recognizing the split of authority on the removability of flsa actions and reserving ruling on that question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a mutual understanding of and concerted action by the parties. A judgment entered upon the stipulation of the parties is a judgment by consent.” Right to appellate review of consent judgments, American Law Reports, 69 A.L.R.2d 755 (1960). 54 . Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment, (e). 55 . La Preferida, Inc. v. Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C. V., 914 F.2d 900, 906 (7th Cir.1990) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)). 56 . Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414, 120 S.Ct. 2304, 1 e C. v., 914 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing the general rule forbidding the application of collateral estoppel to consent judgments especially when the judgment lacks clarity); Hughes v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 847 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Levinson v. U.S., 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that settlement agreements like consent judgments are not given preclusive effect unless the parties manifest their intent to give them such effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agency’s decision not to prepare the original EIS, the “legal standard for determining when a supplemental EIS is required is ‘essentially the same as the standard for determining the need for an original EIS.’ ” Fritiofson, 772 F.2d at 1239 n. 8 (citation omitted). Oregon Natural has plainly emasculated our precedent applying the reasonableness standard with respect to the review of an agency’s decision to forego a supplemental EIS. See Oregon Natural, 109 S.Ct. at 1861 n. 23 (citing with disapproval our decision in Sierra Club v. Froelhlke, 816 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir.1987)). We believe that it has similarly undercut our precedent applying the reasonableness standard with respect to an agency’s decision to forego the original EIS. See Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 186, 116

    ### Response:
    holding that the intervening decision of oregon natural undercut eight circuit precedent applying the reasonableness standard with respect review of an agencys decision to forego preparation of an original eis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was a “misunderstanding” or “mistake” and that appellant did not intend to engage in the charged offense. See id. at 642; see also Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 227 (Tex.App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref'd) (“[B]ecause the [extraneous offense] testimony was remarkably similar to [the complainant’s], the trial court could have reasonably found that its inherent probative force was significantly bolstered.”). A claim that an extraneous offense is relevant to show a signature crime is often a shorthand way of saying it is relevant to show the identity of the perpetrator of the charged offense, his modus operandi, or the absence of a mistake or accident. Abshire v. State, 62 S.W.3d 857, 866 (Tex.App,—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>), and Owens v. State, 827 S.W.2d 911, 915-16

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pre emption.” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 391 (1978). Viewed in this light, the Order “conflicts” with federal law if, and to the extent that, it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). In conducting this inquiry, we remain mindful of the fact that “ [a]n unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be"" inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command, read in the light of its history, remains ambiguous.” Penn Dairies, 318 U.S. at 275, 63 S.Ct. at 623; cf. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 819 v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025, 1029 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). B. Congressional legislation authorizing

    ### Response:
    holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could proceed as a class action, and before any settlement. Under no circumstances does Rule 23 require that notice be given before a class has been certified, and in a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(2), no notice need be given prior to a settlement. Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 5. In the absence of agreement by the parties, a class member is not allowed to opt out of a class action brought under Rule 23(b)(2). Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506-08 (5th Cir. 1981); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1220 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, den., 439 U.S. 1115, 99 S.Ct. 1020, 59 L.Ed.2d 74 (1979). Cf. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 438 n. 11 (2nd Cir. 1978) (en banc), aff’d, 444 U.S. 472, 100 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980), (<HOLDING>). The Consent Decree imposes substantial

    ### Response:
    holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of paternity exceeded the scope of the contempt proceeding, the trial court erred in vacating the order without notice that the issues would be heard. The second issue is whether the trial court even had jurisdiction to vacate a paternity order entered almost two years ago. This Court has held that “ ‘[ajbsent a showing of fraud upon the court, a paternity order is res judicata on the issue of paternity and re-litigation of paternity issues would be unauthorized in connection with a subsequently-filed motion for contempt for failure to pay court-ordered child support.’ ” Dep’t of Revenue v. Allen, 717 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. Goulbourne, 648 So.2d 866, 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)); see also DeVaughn v. Dep’t of Revenue, 691 So.2d 11, 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). In this case, paternity was established by

    ### Response:
    holding that ajbsent fraud on the court the trial court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the 1982 judgment of paternity more than one year after its rendition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to declare pronouncements of public policy is sharply restricted. Mamlin v. Genoe (City of Philadelphia Police Beneficiary Ass’n), 340 Pa. 320, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941). Rather, it is for the legislature to formulate the public policies of the Commonwealth. The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with public policy exists “only when a given policy is so obviously for or against public health, safety, morals, or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it.” Mamlin, 17 A.2d at 409. Only in the clearest of cases may a court make public policy the basis of its decision. Id. To dete g no cause of action where an employee was discharged in retaliation for placing an advertisement with a competing paper); Gillespie, 355 Pa.Super. 362, 513 A.2d 471 (<HOLDING>); McCartney v. Meadowview Manor, Inc., 353

    ### Response:
    holding that an employee may be discharged as a result of an accusation of criminal behavior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of crimen falsi crimes is different from reputation evidence. However, Appellant fails to differentiate the two methods. Contrary to Appellant’s position, it has long been the law of this Commonwealth that a witness’s credibility may be attacked by showing her bad reputation for truth and veracity. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 434 Pa.Super. 148, 150, 642 A.2d 517, 518 (1994), allocatur denied, 539 Pa. 688, 653 A.2d 1227 (1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Payne, 205 Pa. 101, 104, 54 A. 489, 491 (1903)). In Butler, the court stated, “[a defendant’s] previous record is admissible for [impeaching credibility] just the same as testimony of prior reputation for veracity is evidence for the jury’s consideration.” 405 Pa. at 47, 173 A.2d at 474. See also Fowler, 434 Pa.Super. 148, 642 A.2d 517 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Packel & Poulin, supra, § 608.1. Based on our

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a defendants good reputation for truth and veracity may be introduced when he was impeached by evidence of bad reputation for truth and veracity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    320 (1974) (""A new statute will not be read as wholly or even partially amending a prior one unless there exists a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new and those of the old that cannot be reconciled.”) (quotations and citations omitted); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (""In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.”); I.C.C. v. S. Ry. Co., 543 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir.1976). (“Under the usual rules of statutory construction, where there is a conflict between an earlier statute and a subsequent enactment, the subsequent enactment governs.”); see also'United Stat 8, 822 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fuller was clearly aware that he was required to register and update his registration by virtue of his voluntary agreement to and participation in Missouri’s sex offender registration scheme, his failure to register upon his interstate travel, with either New York or Missouri authorities, was a knowing act, see Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192-93, 118 S.Ct. 1939, and was therefore sufficient to sustain the indictment for violating SORNA, see 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); cf. Gould, 568 F.3d at 468. C. Fuller’s Remaining Arguments Fuller advances several additional arguments that require only brief consideration. First, he argues that his conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Since we hold that SORNA applied to Fuller upon its enactment, this argument is foreclosed. See Guzman, 591 F.3d at 94 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Fuller argues that his

    ### Response:
    holding that where a sorna defendants travel and failure to register occurred after sornas enactment and the effective date of the act there is no ex post facto problem emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is notably absent any conferral of state jurisdiction over the tribes themselves ... ”); California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that “[n]either the express terms of [Public Law 280], nor the Congressional history of the statute, reveal any intention by Congress for it to serve as a waiver of a Tribe’s sovereign immunity”). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, tribes are immune from processes of the court. Nevertheless, Defendants argue that in light of Supreme Court decisions that have described an inherent limitation on tribal sovereignty, Public Law 280 must be read to grant jurisdiction to the states to execute a search warrant over the Tribe. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that an indian tribe retains jurisdiction to punish one of its members unless withdrawn by treaty statute or implication as a necessary result of their dependent status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the lawyer arrived but suppressed the rest. The only issues on appeal related to the pre-arrival interrogation. Although in McClaskey this Court discussed Burbine in upholding the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, it is not clear from McClaskey whether that case turned on the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or some other provision. Because there is no mention of the Indiana Constitution, and no suggestion that any state constitutional issue was raised, McClaskey does not support the notion that Burbine has been incorporated into Indiana constitutional jurisprudence. 8 . This case is cited throughout the opinion as Moran v. State to avoid confusion with Moran v. Burhine, which is referred to simply as Burbine. 9 . See Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>); Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 & n. 3

    ### Response:
    holding that statute allowing videotaped testimony of child witnesses at trial violated state constitutional right of confrontation but not sixth amendment right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of having to take paid vacation time, he “should have been on [a]dmin[istrative] leave or comp[ensatory] time [off].” PL’s Opp’n at 3. But he also alleges that when he was first taken off of the work schedule, he “requested to be on vacation leave until [he could] return to work.” Am. Compl. at 4. Of course, it is possible that Blackwell asked to take vacation .time under the assumption that he would otherwise be placed on unpaid leave. But even drawing this factual inference in Blackwell’s favor — as the Court must in this posture— forcing an employee to take paid vacation leave does not “constitute[ ] a significant change in [his] employment status.” Burlington, 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257; cf. Sethi v. Narod, 12 F.Supp.3d.505, 528-29, 2014 WL 1343069, at *15 (E.D.N.Y.2014) (<HOLDING>). SecTek’s deduction of vacation time for

    ### Response:
    holding that depriving an employee of vacation days to which he was entitled would constitute adverse action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of any party nor affect the jurisdiction of circuit and district courts or venue of actions therein.” We find no inconsistency in the operation of §§ 6-3-5 and 6-3-7 that would require us to refer to procedural rules. Section 6-3-5 is specifically related to insurance companies. This specific statute would apply exclusively to these cases if it conflicted with § 6-3-7, the general corporate venue statute. See Crawford v. Sprin-gle, 631 So.2d 880 (Ala.1993) (where statutes in pari materia are general and specific, the more specific statute controls the more general statute). This Court finds no conflict between § 6-3-5 and § 6-3-7; accordingly, these corporate venue statutes should be read in pari materia. Cf. Ex parte New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 663 So.2d 952 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices No. 599 So.2d 1166

    ### Response:
    holding that  635 does not exclusively govern contract actions against an insurance corporation and that  637 does not exclusively govern personal injury actions against an insurance corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of convenience weighed in its favor. The motion was denied without comment. 4 . Clinton Foods, Inc. v. United States, 188 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 825, 72 S.Ct. 45, 96 L.Ed. 624 (1951); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360. (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947, 70 S.Ct. 484, 94 L.Ed. 584 (1950). At least one circuit has recognized the availability of the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as a means of reviewing a transfer motion under section 1404(a). Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bell Marine Serv., Inc., 321 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1963). But cf. A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Brothers, Inc., 365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966); Standard v. Stoll Packing Corp., 315 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1963); Bufalino v. Kennedy, 273 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1959) (<HOLDING>). In any case, Ellicott failed to seek

    ### Response:
    holding that 1292b is not available to review a district judges disposition under 1404a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    driver” in Andersen and the fact that the Supreme Court affirmed our opinion in Moore, which expressly rejected the approach adopted in the dissenting opinion upon which our dissenting colleague in this case relies, we are unable to conclude that existing precedent leaves open the possibility of holding that the “physical contact” requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21 has been satisfied as long as another vehicle is “implicated” or “involved” in the harm that the insured sustained. Thus, we simply do not believe that the prior decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court permit the adoption of the approach espoused by our dissenting colleague and the dissenting judge in Moore. Finally, our dissenting colleague contends that McNeil, 84 N.C. App. at 442, 352 S.E.2d at 917 (<HOLDING>), and Geico Ins. Co. v. Larson, 542 F. Supp. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the physical contact needed to support a direct claim against an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to nc gen stat  2027921 existed where the physical contact arose between the hitandrun vehicle and plaintiffs vehicle through intermediate vehicles involved in an unbroken chain collision which involved the hitandrun vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immediate vesting of such rights in the donee.”). Until the donor has absolutely and irrevocably divested herself of the title, dominion, and control of the subject of the gift, she has the power to revoke the gift. Edwards, 38 S.W.3d at 197; see also Troxel, 201 S.W.3d at 296 (“All dominion and control over the property must be released by the owner.”). The donee does not have ownership of the subject of the gift until complete ownership has been transferred from the donor to the donee. Edwards, 38 S.W.3d at 197. An inter vivos gift must be absolute and not open for future reconsideration. Soto v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB San Antonio, 868 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, writ ref d); see also Dorman v. Arnold, 932 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Woodworth v. Cortez, 660 S.W.2d 561, 564

    ### Response:
    holding that as matter of law plaintiff did not show present donative intent because donor intended for property to remain his until his death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    involved with Oberlin in the negotiations for the loan agreement; he signed the loan agreement; he was aware of the Echlin breach; he was aware of the material nature of the breach; and he failed to disclose information about the breach to Oberlin. Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Oberlin, we conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleges Edward Slavin’s personal participation in the alleged wrong. As a result, these allegations are sufficient to fit this case into the exception which allows directors and other corporate agents to be held directly liable to injured third parties for torts that they personally committed. See Russell M. Robinson, II, Robinson on North Carolina Corporation Law § 14.08(a); see also Knitting Mills Co., 237 N.C. 97, 74 S.E.2d 351 (<HOLDING>). Again, we note that Oberlin did not assert a

    ### Response:
    recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an unreasonable period of time, thereby prejudicing SMC and rendering the covenant’s enforcement inequitable. See Mann v. Levin, 2004 VT 100, ¶¶ 26-27, 177 Vt. 261, 861 A.2d 1138 (setting forth elements of laches and equitable estoppel). The affirmative defenses were supported by a sworn affidavit of the resort’s planning manager, who stated that Smalley had engaged in numerous meetings with the resort to discuss golf-course issues during its year-long construction and had cooperated with construction personnel, yet failed to raise the restrictive covenant until a year after its completion. This was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the fairness of allowing Smalley to assert the restrictive covenant. See Segerstrom v. Knott, 149 Vt. 391, 392-93, 543 A.2d 706, 707 (1988) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 22. The motion for summary judgment in this

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavit attesting to stipulated agreement between parties was sufficient to raise genuine issue of fact concerning affirmative defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See CompL, Attach, of Photograph, ECF No. 1 at 19; Photographs, ECF No. 68-13 at 11-14. The action figure is hanging in the air, with the thin white cord or rope extending upwards from the action figure’s chest. See CompL, Attach, of Photograph, ECF No. 1 at 19; Photographs, ECF No. 68-13 at 11-14. Magistrate Judge Harvey got it exactly right when he concluded that the action figure was wrapped in cord or rope “in a manner that is not fairly described as a ‘noose.’ ” R & R, ECF No. 96 at 39. Thus this case is readily distinguished from those where an actual noose or noosé-like object was part of the totality of circumstances that gave rise to' a viable racially hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1137 & n.1, 1141, 1156 (10th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Burkes v. Holder, 953 F.Supp.2d 167, 178-79

    ### Response:
    holding that a jury could believe that a lifesize noose prominently suspended from a large industrial wall clock was meant to evoke a hangmans noose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 . Even if such a showing could be made out for Plaintiff, it does not mean that preliminary in-junctive relief on behalf of the entire class would be appropriate here. An individual showing of poverty would have to be made by each class member requesting such relief. 2 . Pursuant to Rule 10.7 of the Sixteenth Edition of The Bluebook (1996), the Court shall omit from its citations denials of certiorari “unless the decision is less than two years old or the denial is particularly relevant.” 3 . While not a constitutional claim, the Seventh Circuit has reached the same conclusion in an ADEA case. See EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir.1980). 4 . But see ACS Enterprises, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision of Philadelphia, L.P., 857 F.Supp. 1105, 1111-12 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 60 F.3d 813 (3d Cir.1995) (unpublished

    ### Response:
    holding that a taking traditionally results in monetary compensation thus negating any claim of irreparable injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ” Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1073 (8th Cir.1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)). Here, the trial court determined that the relevance of Whitehorn’s testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We cannot say that this determination constituted error, much less error that was so prejudicial as to fatally infect the outcome of the trial. Richardson also contends that the court violated the Sixth Amendment by not allowing him to present the testimony of his guilt-phase counsel that she did not see Richardson threaten Whitehorn. The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee, however, that criminal defendants may call every witness they choose. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1264, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (<HOLDING>). A defendant “does not have an unfettered

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    collection of a tax[.]” Indeed, taxpayers typically must pay the tax and later seek a refund if that tax is determined to be “erroneously, illegally, or wrongfully assessed or collected in any manner.” Tax-Gen. § 13-901(a)(2) (emphasis added). We have interpreted § 13-505, when read in conjunction with Tax-Gen. § 13-514 (requiring exhaustion before an appeal to the Tax Court) and CJP § 3-409(b) (requiring pursuit of the statutory remedy instead of a declaratory judgment action) to “demonstrate[ ] the Legislature’s intent that tax disputes be resolved through the procedures established in Md. Tax-Gen. Code Ann. §§ 13-510 through 13-529.” Bancroft Info. Grp., Inc., supra, 91 Md.App. at 115, 603 A.2d 1289; see also Kuypers v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 173 F.Supp.2d 393, 396 (D.Md.2001) (<HOLDING>). In the realm of general tax law,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that pursuant to  13505 the general assembly has by statute expressed its intention that no suit may be brought to interfere with the statutory process for the assessment or collection of a state tax
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    changed hands was the principal— one medical expert put the fraction at ninety percent — cause of Rafael Guzman’s carpal tunnel syndrome and consequent disability. Nobody has called this conclusion or the findings on which it rests into question, and the panel today unanimously approves these findings and that conclusion. II. The major contributing cause amendments were modeled after similar provisions in Oregon law. See Letter from Lawton Chiles, Governor, State of Florida, to Stephen R. Wise, Florida State Representative (Oct. 22, 1993) (on file with the Florida State Archives). It is therefore appropriate to look to Oregon’s major contributing cause provisions, as definitively construed by the Oregon Supreme Court, for guidance. See State v. Aiuppa, 298 So.2d 391, 394 (Fla.1974) (<HOLDING>); Flammer v. Patton, 245 So.2d 854, 858

    ### Response:
    holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest, but little practical significance”); Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws, § 23.10, at 1117 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp.2001) (""A federal common law test for piercing (in claims based on federal law) has not been adopted. The federal court either adopts the state test or frequently finds that there is no conflict between the laws of potentially interested states: there is thus no need to add another, a federal layer.”). But cf. Thomas, 39 F.3d at 504 n. 16 (noting a difference between the Fourth Circuit's federal standard and other state standards). Thus, this court could apply federal or state law. The court assumes it would apply North Carolina's choice-of-law rules if it applied state law. Cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Under North Carolina’s choice-of-law rules,

    ### Response:
    holding in a diversity matter that federal courts must apply the forum states choiceoflaw rules in deciding what law governs a statelawbased claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    both sections and unnecessarily requires resolution of a “conflict” between sections 502 and 503. II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Pursuant to the above analysis, I mak tions, Inc. (In re CM Holdings, Inc.), 264 B.R. 141, 159 (Bankr.D.Del.2000) (Walsh, C.J.) (""[AJttempts to apply the coercive effect of § 502(d) in an effort to dislodge preference payments by disallowing otherwise legitimate administrative expenses payments under § 503 subverts the priority scheme in bankruptcy to no practical effect.”), with Microage, Inc. v. Viewsonic Corp. (In re Microage, Inc.), 291 B.R. 503, 508 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (""[Section] 502(d) may be raised in response to the allowance of an administrative claim.”); Tidwell v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 B.R. 829, 839-40 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1984) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Those subsections provide: (e)(2) A claim

    ### Response:
    holding that  502d applies to prevent payment of any part of administrative expenses due creditor until preferential property transfer is recovered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where using price that had been allocated for tax reasons to the property in question would result in an unduly low option exercise price with ""windfall” effect, declining to regard allocated price as conclusive); Wilber Lime Products, Inc. v. Ahrndt, 268 Wis.2d 650, 673 N.W.2d 339, 343 (2003) (exercising a fair market value methodology and ""recogniz[ing] the possibility that the acres being sold are not all of equal value”). 41 . Consortium Brief at 17. 42 . Consortium Reply Brief, filed August 29, 2006, at 3 (ECF # 11889) (explaining that the price increase was due to adjustments that Time Warner had provided). 43 . Responsive Brief of Time Warner, filed August 29, 2006, at 7 (ECF # 11890). 44 . Id. at 15-16. 45 .See Gleason v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Pantry Pride, 806 F.2d at 1231 (holding in a

    ### Response:
    holding in a package deal case that a right of first refusal  empowers the rights holder with a preferential right to repurchase the property subject to the right of first refusal on the same terms offered by a bona fide purchaser
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 145 N.J. 144, 156-57, 678 A.2d 225 (1996) (reaffirming the Court’s holding in Ventron, supra); Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts §§ 519, 520 (1969) (setting out strict liability rule and test for abnormally dangerous activity on land). The same rationale applies to pollution that is released into the air from chemicals stored at a chemical facility. An actor who chooses to store dangerous chemicals should be responsible for the release of those chemicals into the air. That Alden Leeds lawfully and properly stored chemicals does not alter that conclusion. See DeEugenio & Sons v. Division of Envtl. Quality, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (Vol.5) (EPE) 47, 1992 WL 257715, aff'd, No. A-4055-91T2, (App. Div. April 2,1993), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 480, 634 A.2d 527 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The risks attendant to the storage of

    ### Response:
    holding that despite lawfulness of open burning in question consequent deposit of smoke particulate on neighboring property violated njac 72752a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not include (B) travel by the employee in the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer if the travel is also in furtherance of personal or private affairs of the employee unless: (i) the travel to the place of occurrence of the injury would have been made even had there been no personal or private affairs of the employee to be furthered by the travel; and (ii) the travel would not have been made had there been no affairs or business of the employer to be furthered by the travel. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 401.011(12)(B) (West Supp. 2010). The parties agree that paragraph (B) is not applicable here as Troy was traveling from home to work and had no personal purpose for the trip. See also Leordeanu v. American Protection Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 248-49 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>). 3 . McVey argues that Troy was on a ""special

    ### Response:
    holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    efforts. The testimony also revealed that HHI ramped up its due diligence efforts in the period leading up to the July 20 hearing. 6 .Ciara Donohoe, a managing director with RHJI, testified that RHJI determined that it would be preferable to wait until closer to the July 23 hearing to deliver the satisfaction notice. While the Court does not doubt RHJI's good faith in refusing to send the satisfaction notice earlier, it is undisputed that RHJI did not send the satisfaction notice until 2:11 p.m. on July 23, after RHJI was notified about HHI's bid that had no due diligence out. 7 . As is further explained below, while the Court does not substitute its business judgment for the Debtors', based on the evidence presented, the Court agrees that H , 994 F.2d 744, 746 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 14 .Macakanja's calculations assumed a 10-20%

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankruptcy court does have the power to disapprove a proposed sale recommended by a debtor if it has an awareness there is another proposal in hand which from the estates point of view is better or more acceptable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights. The new franchise agreement between Scott and the defendants did not mention any special privileges that Scott would enjoy as a McDonald’s operator, or that Scott would be treated in any particular way with respect to expansion. The release and disclaimer clauses signed by Scott Schubot, destroy plaintiffs’ claims of justifiable reliance on oral representations that occurred before the new franchise agreement between Scott and Mc-Donalds was entered into. Clauses releasing parties and disclaiming liabilities, such as these involved in the instant litigation, overcome any oral representations not contained in the written franchise agreement. Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F.Supp. 791, 829 (D.Minn.1989); Durkee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F.Supp. 189, 193 (W.D.Wis.1987) (<HOLDING>) completely the obligations and promises of

    ### Response:
    holding that it is unreasonable for plaintiffs to rely on oral representations made before a contract when the contract contained a clause which expressed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    112 S.Ct. at 2037, that general rule has no bearing in this case. First of all, the doctrine of reading statutes in pari materia only makes sense when the word or phrase being interpreted has acquired special, non-literal significance as a legal term of art. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307-09, 112 S.Ct. 711, 716, 116 L.Ed.2d 731 (1992) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263-65, 72 S.Ct. 240, 250, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)). Appellants fail to identify any word or phrase in § 2713 which has become a legal term of art. If Appellants are suggesting that all claims presentation provisions should be interpreted consistent with CERCLA’s, then their argument flies in the face of clear precedent to the contrary. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 28-31, 110 S.Ct. at 310-11 (<HOLDING>); National Envtl. Foundation v. ABC Rail Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that rcras notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    App 1, 15; 770 NW2d 31 (2009) (“[a] temporal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action does not, in and of itself, establish a casual connection”). 26 In its opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that “[o]ur review of the law shows that multiyear gaps between the protected conduct and the first retaliatory act have been insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection.” Fuhr, 710 F3d at 676. This observation is correct; interpretations of our sister states’ whistleblower laws and jurisprudence have made similar observations on how a long time span between the alleged whistleblowing and supposed retaliation weigh against finding causation. See Blake v United American Ins Co, 37 F Supp 2d 997, 1002 (SD Ohio, 1998) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v Meyer Broadcasting Co, 2001ND 125,

    ### Response:
    holding that alleged whistleblowing action that took place five years before the plaintiffs termination was not close enough in time  to support a claim of retaliation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when they find that magistrate judges have dealt with the issues fully and accurately and that they could add little of value to that analysis. We cannot interpret the district court’s statement as establishing that it failed to perform the required de novo review. In re Griego, 64 F.3d at 584. Notably, because “Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations,” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406 (emphasis omitted), a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recom mendations made by the magistrate,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d at 724-25 (<HOLDING>). Where no party objects to the Magistrate

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts adoption of the magistrate judges particular reasonablehour estimates for attorneys fees is consistent with the de novo determination that 28 usc  636b1 and united states v raddatz require
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in New Mexico and do not own any real or personal property in New Mexico. The only contact they have had with New Mexico is to have been guarantors on a loan agreement executed in California, which was entered into pursuant to an agreement which Deerfield and First City had already worked out in New Mexico. The Hiatts “stepped into a business arrangement which [Deerfield] and [ d.2d 89 (1976); accord United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 296 N.C. 510, 251 S.E.2d 610, 616 (1979) (“The mere act of signing [a guaranty in favor of a resident of the forum] or endorsement does not in and of itself constitute a sufficient contact upon which to base in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident.”); Basic Food Indus., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 94 Nev. 111, 575 P.2d 934, 936 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The FDIC urges us to find that the Hiatts are

    ### Response:
    holding that when no more appears than that the guarantor has mechanically executed the guaranty and mailed it back to the forum finding personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he “didn’t want a woman riding on his [fire truck]”; Plaintiff was denied requests for leave because other male medics had already requested the time off (although sometimes her leave requests were granted); Plaintiff filed several formal complaints and grievances which were never addressed by the County; and Plaintiff was told by Chief O’Brien that she had the option to revoke one of her complaints and that if she did not, she might be suspended for 30 days. Other than Captain Mitchel’s comments, there is no evidence that any of these behaviors were “based on” Plaintiffs female status. Trask, 822 F.3d at 1196 (“[T]he plaintiffs 1, 578-79 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (<HOLDING>) with Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367

    ### Response:
    holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hollis signed and acknowledged, because it is prefaced with the following statement: ‘WHEREAS, Lender is unwilling to extend credit to Borrower unless the undersigned, HOLLIS SMITH (the “Guarantor”), shall guarantee payment to Lender of the Obligations, as hereinafter defined....” Furthermore, in its own analysis of this argument, the circuit court found the one-day delay between Hollis’s execution of the $500,000 promissory note on behalf of Brooks and Hollis’s execution of the guaranty agreement in his individual capacity to be immaterial and warrant no further consideration. This, the circuit court reasoned, is because it considered the promissory note and guaranty agreement to be a part of the same transaction. See, e.g., Spreen v. Ruth, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 154, 19 S.W. 583, 584 (1892) (<HOLDING>). We are inclined to agree with the circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that a land sale contract executed on june 24 1887 a conveyance of the land executed on june 281887 and a guaranty executed on july 2 1887 all evidenced the contract between the parties and must be treated as one agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Missouri and with this chapter” before certifying the petition as sufficient or insufficient. The sufficiency determination the Secretary of State is required to conduct plainly does not include whether an initiative petition complies with the Federal Constitution. The sufficiency determination the Secretary of State is required to conduct does include whether an initiative petition complies with “the Constitution of Missouri and this chapter.” A plain reading of Chapter 116 reveals that the General Assembly intended this phrase to refer to constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the procedure and form required to certify an initiative petition as sufficient to appear on the ballot. In fact, our Supreme Court has so held. See Union Elec. Co., 678 S.W.2d at 405 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). See also, Ketchum v. Blunt,

    ### Response:
    holding that barring exceptional circumstances we will not look behind the face of the initiative petition to determine its constitutionality prior to its being voted on by the electorate  and the secretary of state and the courts  may look beyond the face of the petition only to the extent necessary to determine whether constitutional and statutory requirements pertaining to the form of the initiative petition have been satisfied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    id.; Li v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir.2007). The United States may defend against an application for fees by showing that its position throughout the litigation was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The parties do not dispute that an award would be just or that the application for fees was timely; however, they disagree about whether Wagner is a “prevailing party” and whether the government’s position was “substantially justified.” A. Prevailing Party To be a “prevailing party” under the EAJA, a party must establish that a federal court’s actions resulted in a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” and that the alteration was “judicially sanctioned.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05, 121 S.Ct. 1835; see Perez-Arellano, 279 F.3d at 794 (<HOLDING>). 1. Material Alteration of the Legal

    ### Response:
    holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or in England. Plaintiffs’ arguments have already been rejected by other courts, and there is no justification for a different outcome here. Plaintiffs first attempt to distinguish this case based on the citizenship of the investors involved. But even Justice Stevens, who disagreed with the Morrison majority’s complete trouncing of the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects test, acknowledged that the addition of a U.S. investor to the Morrison scenario would be insufficient to create liability under section 10(b). In applying Morrison, a majority of district courts have found the citizenship of the investors involved or mere “listing” on the NYSE insufficient reasons to extend section 10(b) liability. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F.Supp.2d 620, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that section 10b does not extend to foreign securities traded on foreign exchanges even if purchased or sold by us investors and even if the foreign issuer had adrs listed on us exchanges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“[T]he specific intent to commit robbery is the intent to steal, i.e., to deprive an owner of property either permanently or temporarily.”); § 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). Appellant relies on Thomas v. State, 526 So.2d 183, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), which recognized that a well-founded belief in one’s right to the allegedly stolen property constitutes a complete defense to a charge of theft, Rodriguez v. State, 396 So.2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited, and because the demonstration of a theft is indispensable to a robbery conviction, Arnold v. State, 83 So.2d 105, 108 (Fla. 1955), to a robbery case as well. Accord, Alfaro v. State, 837 So.2d 429, 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (error to deny claim-of-right instruction); Owens v. State, 866 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Owens further explained that [a]s to how the

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court was obliged to instruct jury that a wellfounded belief in ones right to possess property constitutes a complete defense to a charge of theft
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Act (“PLRA”) provides: “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). The United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit repeatedly have held that this provision means what it says. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (“[W]e hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227, 230 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65 (3d Cir.2000)

    ### Response:
    holding in addition that  1997eas exhaustion requirement includes a procedural default component
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    241 Conn. 439, 696 A.2d 1235, 1244 (1997) (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-121(b)); State v. Barthell, 554 So.2d 17, 18 (Fla.3d DCA 1989) (citing Fla. Stat. § 812.012(9)(c)); State v. Amsden, 300 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1981) (citing Iowa Code § 714.3); State v. Sampson, 120 N.H. 251, 413 A.2d 590, 592 (1980) (citing N.H.Rev.Stat. § 637:2V(@)); State v. Damiano, 322 N.J.Super. 22, 730 A.2d 376, 392-93 (1999) (citing N.J. Stat. 2C:20-2b(4)); State v. Baca, 123 N.M. 124, 934 P.2d 1053, 1056 (1997) (citing MPC § 223.1(2)(c)); State v. Johnston, 478 N.W.2d 281, 283 (S.D.1991); Turner, 636 S.W.2d at 196 (citing Tex. Penal Code § 31.09); State v. Garman, 984 P.2d at 457 (citing former Wash. Rev.Code 9A.56.010(17)(c) (1998)). But see State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Mo.1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See, e.g., State v. Childs, 242

    ### Response:
    holding that aggregation statute serves the limited purpose of permitting the state to combine the value of property stolen during a single course of conduct to determine if the defendant should be charged with a class c felony or a lesser offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceeding under article 59.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.02 (Vernon 2006). 2 . Because Universal stands in the shoes of Helfman as its assignee and subrogee, this theory, if correct, would also result in forfeiture of Universal’s superior right to possess the property. 3 .In its first issue, Universal asserts that the trial court proceedings were “unnecessary and improperly instigated by the State.” In its third issue, Universal argues that the trial court’s order granting unconditional ownership to the State violates the United States and Texas Constitutions. 4 . The cases cited by the State do not articulate this rule. See National Safe Deposit Sav. & Trust Co. v. Hibbs, 229 U.S. 391, 396, 33 S.Ct. 818, 57 L.Ed. 1241 (1913) (<HOLDING>); Glasscock v. First Nat'l Bank of San Angelo,

    ### Response:
    holding that bank was equitably estopped from recovering against stock broker for conversion of stock certificates that were assigned in blank and that broker had sold for a bank employee who misappropriated the stock certificates from the bank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an automatic bar to its malpractice suit against Squitieri. Plaintiff contended that, like the plaintiff in Ziegelheim, it attempted to remedy its counsel’s negligence at the trial court—the Ziegelheim plaintiff filed a motion to set aside an ill-advised and inadequate matrimonial settlement her attorney had recommended, and Prospect filed a motion to amend its complaint to include the omitted Medicare reimbursement claims its principal contended Squitieri was aware of from the outset. When the trial court denied plaintiffs motion, as it did in Ziegelheim, plaintiff argued it thus should have been entitled to the same relief of pursuing a legal malpractice action against its former counsel. Plaintiff distinguished Puder, emphasizing that it never represen 9, 559 A.2d 868 (App.Div.1989) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Puder, supra, 183 N.J. at 440, 874 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a clients legal malpractice action instituted after his attorney failed to file suit in new jersey within the statute of limitations was a reasonable response to a legal catastrophe and was not barred by the doctrine of mitigation of damages although the client could have filed suit against one of the underlying tortfeasors in mississippi which had a longer statute of limitations the client was not required to litigate in an inconvenient forum in an attempt to extricate the defendant from his own wrongful act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Pro se plaintiff-appellant Martin Bramson appeals from the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. After carefully reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm. We briefly address Bramson’s arguments. First, Bramson claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons may not set the timing and amount of his restitution and fine payments through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”) without submitting any such plan to the sentencing court for its approval. While district courts may not delegate to probation or the Bureau of Prisons designation of the timing and amount of court-ordered payments, see United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 409 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), this case is distinguishable. Contrary to

    ### Response:
    holding that district court could not delegate to probation the obligation of scheduling defendants installment payments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should be voided for lack of mutuality] and the [Conservation Service’s] obvious disregard [of its] terms.”). Declaratory relief is available in Tucker Act suits when it is an “incident of and collateral to” a money judgment, meaning it must be “subordinate to a money judgment.” James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For example, this court has jurisdiction to determine, as a prerequisite to a claim for back pay, that a soldier’s discharge was erroneous, even if the court then holds that the soldier is not entitled to back pay. Id. In the Telzrows’ case, a declaration that the easement deed is invalid could be subordinate to a judgment for the government, because the Telzrows then would have no basis for a claim of breach of contract. See Gould, 67 F.3d at 929-30 (<HOLDING>). But a determination that the easement deed is

    ### Response:
    holding that the tucker act confers jurisdiction to hear claims for alleged breach of contract and that jurisdiction is not lost if the court later determines on the merits that the alleged contract is in fact void ab initio or invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could be sued in any county in which it had an agency); see also Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code ANN. § 15.001 historical note (Vernon Supp.1996) (Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 11, 1995 Tex.Gen.Laws 978, 981-82 provides that suits commenced before September 1, 1995, are governed by former law). The plaintiffs’ response to the motion to transfer venue did not comply with Rule 87: neither an affidavit setting forth venue facts nor any duly proved attachments accompanied the response. Tex.R.Civ.P. 87 3(a). Conversely, Bleeker’s motion to transfer venue properly set forth all the facts necessary to show that Williamson County was a permissible venue for the litigation. See id. 2(a), 3(a). But see Watson v. City of Odessa, 893 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The hearing on the motion to transfer venue

    ### Response:
    holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. In the instant case, Stephen Allison’s purported appeal of an order requiring DNA testing in a paternity action has been redesignated as a petition for writ of cer-tiorari. See State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Chambers v. Travis, 971 So.2d 157, 159 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). We find that the order in this case departs

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an order for dna testing could cause irreparable harm because the test is intrusive and any error in improperly ordering genetic testing cannot be remedied on appeal after the testing is done and the results are released
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demonstrates that the district court would have imposed a sentence outside the properly calculated sentencing range for the same reasons it provided at the sentencing hearing. However, that is not the end of our inquiry. As set forth above, the government must also • demonstrate that Martinez’s 46-month sentence “was-not influenced in any way by the erroneous -Guidelines calculation.” Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d at 719. As Martinez .correctly points out, his sentence of 46 months coincides with the lowest end of the improperly calculated guideline range. .Thus, he argues that the error influenced the district court’s- determination of his sentence. There is persuasive, albeit unpublished, authority for this proposition. See United States v. Cardenas, 598 Fed.Appx. 264, 269 (5th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vasquez-Tovar, 420 Fed.Appx,

    ### Response:
    holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a receiver’s authority. Since there is simply no legal basis for usurping and encroaching upon the district court’s broad equitable powers in this case, I would affirm the district court’s decision. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review As an initial matter, the majority’s fails to set forth the correct standard of review. The record clearly shows that the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Receiver. The majority appears to argue that the district court’s decision should be reviewed for abuse of discretion because the district court’s “ultimate decision was founded on equitable concerns.” (Appellee’s Br. at 21) This standard of review is unsupported by case law. See, e.g., Carter v. RMH Teleservices, Inc., 205 Fed.Appx. 214, 218 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006) (unpublished case) (<HOLDING>). Since this Court reviews a district court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff incorrectly concludes that an abuse of discretion is the standard of review for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), noted that “as a general matter ... a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause,” but that certain exceptions have been created. McQueen, 433 F.3d at 464 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To prevail under the state-created danger theory, Plaintiff must show “an affirmative act [by Defendants] that creates or increases the risk [to Plaintiff]; a special danger to the victim as distinguished from the public at large, and the requisite degree of state culpability.” Id. The Court can assume that the second prong of the test, a “special danger,” has been met. See id. (<HOLDING>). On the other two prongs of the test, however,

    ### Response:
    holding that a material fact had been raised as to whether the danger of one student shooting another while the teacher was out of the room was a special danger
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a crime scene analyst. Since Richards did not exceed the scope of his qualifications as a crime scene analyst, attorney Smith could not have been deficient for failing to make an additional objection that Richards was testifying beyond his qualifications. Everett also has failed to show Strickland prejudice. Everett failed to present any evidence that Richards was unqualified, that the stains were not the victim’s blood stains, or that Richards testified incorrectly. Everett has not explained how objecting to Richards’ testimony would have improved his defense or undermined the State’s presentation. Because Everett did not present any evidence that Richards’ testimony was improperly inculpating, Everett’s claim is insufficient. See State v. Larzelere, 979 So.2d 195, 211 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>). The extensive evidence presented at trial

    ### Response:
    holding that where larzelere claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a concrete expert defendant failed to prove prejudice because she failed to show what a concrete expert would have testified to or how testimony would have cast doubt on her guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offense and informs the defendant of the charges against him so that he can prepare his defense and be protected against double jeopardy. See United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 290 (4th Cir.2003). Here, the indictment adequately alleged the elements of a conspiracy under § 371. See id.; United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 922 (4th Cir.1997) (providing elements). Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to prove that Hemby-Brown conspired to defraud financial institutions that were FDIC-insured. For example, several vehicles were purchased by using information provided by Hemby-Brown to obtain financing from Wachovia Bank, First Citizen’s Bank, and Chase Manhattan Bank, all FDIC-insured. See United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm Hemby-Brown’s conviction.

    ### Response:
    holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a particular illness. The first several victims of a new toxic tort should not be barred from having their day in court simply because the medical literature, which will eventually show the connection between the victims’ condition and the toxic substance, has not yet been completed. If a properly qualified medical expert performs a reliable differential diagnosis through which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, all other possible causes of the victims' condition can be eliminated, leaving only the toxic substance as the cause, a causation opinion based on that differential diagnosis should be admitted. Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1209 (8th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Hollander v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a reliable differential diagnosis alone may provide a valid foundation for a causation opinion even when no epidemiological studies peerreviewed published studies animal studies or laboratory data are offered in support of the opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Prosecutors’ motion to dismiss was properly denied in this respect. 2. The Charging Decision Munchinski alleges that the Prosecutors ignored Bowen’s inconsistent interview statements and thus could not have reasonably believed there was probable cause to arrest and charge him. The arrest of a criminal defendant and the filing of charges are at the core of the prosecuto-rial function, and “[a] prosecutor is absolutely immune when making [the decision to initiate a prosecution], even where he acts without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing has occurred.” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir.1992). Accordingly, the Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct. Id.; see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 3. Disclosures after the 1983 Mistrial

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutors filing of an arrest warrant and charging documents are protected by absolute immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court failed to apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in imposing a life term of supervised release is without merit. The government bears the burden of proving the applicability of guidelines that enhance a defendant’s offense level. United States v. Cataldo, 171 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.1999). The district court’s factual findings for purposes of sentencing may be based on, among other things, evidence heard during trial, undisputed statements in the PSI, or evidence presented during the sentencing hearing. United States v. Saunders, 318 F.3d 1257, 1271 n. 22 (11th Cir .2003). It is well-settled that where a defendant does not object to the facts of the PSI, they are deemed admitted for Booker purposes. See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). “It is also established law that the failure

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant admits to the psis factual statements about his relevant conduct where he raises no objections to those statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 418. In the aggregate, refracted through our deferential lens, the Board’s inference of animus meets the minimum threshold of reasonableness. The contrary evidence' — -such as Neeman’s friendly relationships with union members, his hiring of a small number of union members in the past, and his comments in the May 1 meeting indicating that employees were free to decide whether to participate in union activities — does not compel a contrary conclusion in this case. Further, the Board does not suggest that, having found an illegal motivation for an adverse action, an employer risks liability for all subsequent adverse decisions as to the same individuals, regardless of how far in the future, with no further showing of animus. Cf. Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); BE & K Constr., 133 F.3d at 1376 n. 10

    ### Response:
    holding in title vii case that the span of time between an employers raciallycharged remarks and the decision to fire the plaintiff is relevant to a determination of whether discriminatory animus motivated the firing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with very little benefit. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (separate administrative convenience class permissible); see also In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669, 671 n. 4 (8th Cir.1991) (stating that the purpose of section 1122(b) is “to allow special treatment for small claims, so that they [can] be eliminated early and reduce the number of claims that would have to be paid over time.”); Troy Sav. Bank v. Travelers Motor Inn, Inc., 215 B.R. 485, 489 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (explaining that convenience classes are authorized under section 1122(b) so that unsecured creditors with relatively small claims can “receive their percentage immediately upon confirmation, rather than making tiny payments over a period of years like the bigger unsecured claims”); In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331, 397 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1984) (<HOLDING>). Further, any Class 4 claimant has the option

    ### Response:
    holding that the purpose and intended goal of  1122b is the reduction of administrative costs accomplished by reducing the number of claims to be dealt with postpetition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    them by the terms of the contract. Paragraph 11 limits Plaintiffs’ remedy to replacement of the swine or, at Defendant’s option, refund of the purchase price. Such a limit cannot be enforced if the remedy fails of its essential purpose or if it is an unconscionable limitation on consequential damages. Iowa Code §§ 554.2719(2) and 554.2719(3). Plaintiffs maintain that the limitation causes the remedy to fail its essential purpose because the replacement or refund of purchase price of the boars which spread the disease bears no relation to the damage which might be sustained. Plaintiffs’ argument fails to address the relevant question, however. “The purpose of a remedy is to give the buyer what the seller promised him. . .” Hartzell v. Justus Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 770, 774 (8th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>), see also Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine,

    ### Response:
    holding where a house sold by defendant was found to fall short of the sellers promises and where it could not be repaired to the promised condition defendants liability could not be limited to the cost of repairs however if the repairs had been adequate to restore the house to its promised condition and if plaintiff had claimed additional consequential damages for example water damage to a rug from the leaky roof the limitationofremedies clause would have been effective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    78 F.3d 397, 399 (8th Cir.1996). Minnesota Mutual argues, however, that our review is foreclosed because Parkhill did not indicate in his notice of appeal that he intended to appeal the district court’s denial of class certification. We agree and conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the denial. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) provides that the notice of appeal must “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” When determining whether an appeal from a particular district court action is properly taken, we construe the notice of appeal liberally and permit review where the intent of the appeal is obvious and the adverse party incurs no prejudice. Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 788 Inc., 153 F.3d 622, 625-26 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that notice indicating the appeal was from summary judgment order was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction to reach appellants challenge to earlier order compelling arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy that is nominally applicable” to the entire range of personnel subject to the Department’s authority. See Ahern v. Nassau County, 118 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1997); Balgowan v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 115 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1997); Stanley v. City of Tracy, 120 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1997); Carpenter v. City & County of Denver, 115 F.3d 765, 766-67 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court Services Units are staffed by a broad range of exempt and nonexempt employees. There is no basis for finding that this policy creates a “significant likelihood” of deductions for disciplinary action or other infractions. The Commonwealth presented evidence that the JPOs have not been subject to any disciplinary deductions in the wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The absence of prior deductions under this

    ### Response:
    holding that congress has power to subject the states to wage and hour regulation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a Note, will be deemed to have agreed in this Indenture that neither the Manager nor its assets nor the Master Partnership nor its assets (nor any of their respective affiliates (other than the Issuers) nor their respective assets) shall be liable for any of the obligations of the Issuers under this Indenture or the Notes (except as provided for by any Subsidiary Guarantee). In addition, neither the Manager nor the Holders of Notes will have any right to require the Company to make distributions to the Master Partnership. (c) Notwithstanding the forgoing, nothing in this provision shall be construed as a waiver or release of any claims under the federal securities laws. 65 . LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 141 F.Supp.2d 451, 459 (D.Del.2001). 66 . Lange, 2002 WL 2005728, at *5 (<HOLDING>); Feldbaum, 1992 WL 119095, at *8 (same);

    ### Response:
    holding that noaction clauses barred debentureholder from bringing noncontractual claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aggravated circumstances] determination and to require [the Department] to both put in place a treatment plan and [to] offer the parent assistance in working that plan.” In Mother’s view, delaying an aggravated circumstances finding during the pendency of an appeal from the ear ed to use drugs throughout the pendency of this case, and she remained unemployed and without a home. Additionally, the district court may not terminate parental rights to a child absent a finding “that the conditions and causes ofthe neglect and abuse are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future}.]” Section 32A-4-28(B)(2). This finding is required regardless of aggravated circumstances. Amy B., 2003-NMCA-017, ¶ 18. And it must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 25 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the risk of an erroneous deprivation

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judge did state, in a general comment about the bags of cocaine found throughout the Glenwood residence, that ""the record ... does not indicate whether Sum-mersett dropped the bags on his way to or from the bathroom or when he was ordered to lie down on the stairwell, or whether they were recovered during the officers' search of him."" There is nothing in the record currently before us, however, that supports the position that these three possibilities were the only ways in which the cocaine could have found its way to the bottom of the stairs. We do not know whether the magistrate judge's list of possible origins of the found drugs was meant to be exclusive. But if it was, that finding would be clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Krizek v. Cigna Group Ins., 345 F.3d 91, 100 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). It is possible to read the magistrate judge’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in full: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 3 . Indeed, this .circuit has found prior act evidence admissible for a wide range of reasons unrelated to character. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Aramony, 88 F.3d at 1378 (holding evidence of

    ### Response:
    holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its trustworthiness and renders it inadmissible”); compare Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.1991) (admitting same SIC Report when issued on eve of trial). Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim under Colon against the Supervisory Defendants. The Motion to Dismiss the State Law Claims Against the Supervisory Defendants is Denied According to the Supervisory Defendants, New York law bars lawsuits against prison employees in their personal capacity for damages arising out of “any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.” N.Y. Correct. Law § 24 (McKinney’s 2010). See Baker v. Coughlin, 77 F.3d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Supervisory Defendants also contend that

    ### Response:
    holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statement listed the collateral as shown on the security agreement. On April 21, 1986, Mr. Gillie signed a note in the amount of $6,166.02, including interest at 17.77% per annum payable to the Bank in 42 monthly installments of $146.81 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $316.90. The noted listed “Table, Chairs, and Entertainment Center” as security for the loan. The note also recited the June 19, 1985 security agreement as security for the loan. Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. Although the Bank stamped the note signed by Mrs. Gillie “PAID BY RENEWAL”, the note signed by Mr. Gillie did not recite that it renewed or extended the note signed by M ), 9 B.R. 710 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1981) (<HOLDING>). Disagreeing with Matthews are courts from the

    ### Response:
    holding that where a security agreement contained collateral other than collateral for which creditor advanced funds to debtor since it secured antecedent debts as well as new debt and the agreement provided that the security interest secured payment and performance of the debtors present and future debts to the creditor the creditor did not have a pmsi and the debtors could avoid the creditors lien on collateral claimed as exempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the same events was available and that witness actually testified. The Court stated: Although there appear to be few opinions on this aspect of the residual hearsay exception, United States Courts of Appeals have held ... that, if a party who proposes to introduce a pretrial statement under the “residual exception” has a witness who will testify in court to the facts sought to be provided, the trial judge should not admit the statement under Fed.R.Evid. 803(24). Id. at 275 (footnote omitted) (citing and discussing Netterville v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 798 (8th Cir.1986) (civil rights complaint for racial discrimination); United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670 (4th Cir.1985) (criminal trial for the interstate transportation of stolen property); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5t 1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fink, 32 M.J. 987

    ### Response:
    holding ehildvictims testimony at pretrial investigation admissible under residual exception in addition to doctors testimony under medical treatment exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from suits arising from their for-profit construction activities in Maryland. While the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes “is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance,” Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 890, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986), Alaska Native Corporations and their subsidiaries are not comparable sovereign entities, see Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 34 (Alaska 1988) (reviewing differences between Alaska Native groups and Indian tribes and holding most Alaska native groups lack immunity from suit because they are “not self-governing or in any meaningful sense sovereign”); see also Seldovia Native Ass’n v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1350 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In short, Indian tribal immunity does not

    ### Response:
    holding that alaska native village corporation does not meet one of the basic criteria of an indian tribe because it is not a governing body
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was followed from the classroom or that the robber knew his schedule. Furthermore, Rosenbloom did not teach at UIC and was robbed after leaving his car with a mechanic. No evidence was presented that defendant knew his profession. Both victims were white males, but this is hardly a unique feature of the crime that earmarks it as the work of a single offender. Similarly, there is nothing unique about the location in which the crime occurred. Van Burén is a busy thoroughfare and it is not improbable that two robberies would occur within days of one another near that street. The location and choice of victim in this case do not sufficiently earmark these crimes as the handiwork of one individual. See Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d at 257; but cf. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 65-66 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The similarities the State identifies between

    ### Response:
    holding other crimes evidence was properly admitted to establish modus operandi when the defendant attacked older women as they exited their garages in the same area of chicago
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Forfeiture occurs because of neglect, while waiver happens intentionally. United States v. Charles, 476 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir.2007). Waiver precludes review, while forfeiture permits plain error review. Id. While Garrett failed to timely assert his challenge to the assessment of a criminal history point for his bail jumping conviction, there is no indication on the record that Garrett knew that his criminal history score might be erroneous, nor would he choose to be sentenced under a higher criminal history score and thus a higher Guidelines range. A logical explanation is that neither Garrett nor his counsel realized that including the bail jumping conviction was incorrect, therefore we review for plain error. See United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847-49 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Under the plain error test, we must decide

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants confirmation of a psrs findings does not waive a challenge on appeal where there is no conceivable strategic reason for not objecting to a sentence at a higher offense level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doubt. First, although Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones provided a fact-based narrative of their conversations with the defendants and their trip from El Paso to Albuquerque, their testimony ultimately was not essential to the Government’s case. The other evidence presented by the Government — which included video and audio surveillance as well as agent testimony — was enough to secure a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir.1973) (affirming cross-examination limitations in part because “even if the credibility of the witness was [further] impugned, the Government’s case in chief did not rest upon the credibility of this witness alone”); cf. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 238, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Second, much of Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones’s

    ### Response:
    holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    participated in or approved the alleged wrongdoing, ... or are otherwise financially interested in the challenged transactions ....”) (citation omitted). Pleadings in derivative suits are governed by Super. Ct. Civ. R. 23.1. Bazata v. National Ins. Co. of Washington, 400 A.2d 313, 315-16 (D.C.1979). With respect to the assertion of the demand requirement or its futility, Rule 23.1 provides, in pertinent part: The complaint [in a shareholder derivative action] shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, an ll depend upon the substantive law defining these elements. See Kamen, supra, 500 U.S. at 97, 111 S.Ct. 1711 (<HOLDING>). The substantive law governing the powers of a

    ### Response:
    holding that the contours of the demand requirement founded on federal statute are governed by that law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Discrimination Claim under Title VII and TCHRA Ketera contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Hobbs’s discrimination claim because Hobbs cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination and she has not come forward with evidence to rebut Ketera’s evidence regarding pretext. Ketera acknowledges in its motion that Hobbs has asserted a discrimi nation claim under Title VII and the TCHRA but does not differentiate between them in its analysis. Because the court determines the same standard applies to discrimination claims under Title VII and the TCHRA, it considers Hobbs’s discrimination claims under Title VII and the TCHRA together based on the standard applicable to Title VII claims. See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 n. 2 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 1. Legal Standard for Title VII

    ### Response:
    holding that law governing claims under the tchra texas labor code  21001 et seq and title vii is identical
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    THE TIME THAT SEARCH TOOK PLACE, ANY REASONABLE NOTION OF “EXIGENCY’ HAD LONG SINCE PASSED, AND THERE WAS PLENTY OF TIME TO GET A WARRANT, TELEPHONIC OR OTHERWISE. Under the circumstances presented here, the warrantless search of the SUV was unconstitutional. We thus reverse the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motions to suppress. Because our decision vacates the convictions, we will not address the remaining arguments raised by Minitee. As a threshold issue, the State argues that Bland does not have standing to challenge the propriety of the search. Before we address the merits of this argument, we note that the State did not raise this issue before the trial court. This issue may not therefore be properly before us. See State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 327, 877 A.2d 1183 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Anticipating this problem, the State cites

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an appellate court ordinarily will not consider issues that were not raised at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. -U.S. at-, 132 S.Ct. at 2048, 182 L.Ed.2d at 941. 12 . In fact, some of the Amici in Blueford sought adoption of a per se rule requiring trial judges to take partial verdicts wherever any unanimity exists as a prerequisite to a finding of manifest necessity as to the remaining counts — in effect, requiring even states that do not permit partial verdicts in certain circumstances to accept them. See, e.g., Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Blueford v. Arkansas, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2044, 182 L.Ed.2d 937 (2012). 13 . The majority of jurisdictions accepting partial verdicts are in accord with this interpretation. See, e.g., Wallace v. Havener, 552 F.2d 721, 723 (6th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Burt, 895 F.Supp. 180, 184

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in not accepting partial verdicts as to counts on which the jury indicated unanimity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should have known that an assault was imminent. Even if the carrier had the requisite knowledge, its duty to take protective action does not arise unless that duty arose well enough in advance of the assault to have prevented it with the force in its command. Although whether one party owes a duty of care to another is ordinarily a legal question for the court to decide, the existence of MTA’s duty in this case is predicated on its asserted similarity (or not) to the factual conditions prerequisite described in Tall. Because the jury is the appropriate body to find the facts, we need only decide if there is a dispute of material facts as to whether these conditions existed in the present case. Cf. Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 361 Md. 645, 693, 762 A.2d 582, 608 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Todd presented such a factual dispute

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the existence of a legal duty may depend on a preliminary factual determination namely whether contractual privity existed which should be decided by the trier of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The type of evidence provided by the party opposing summary judgment need not meet the standards for admissibility at trial. The nonmovant, however, must produce evidence beyond the mere pleadings to survive the summary judgment motion and proceed to trial. Id. The fact that both parties have moved for partial or full summary judgment, based on the alleged absence of genuine issues of material fact, does not relieve the court of its responsibility to determine the appropriateness of summary disposition in the particular case. Prineville Sawmill Co. v. United States, 859 F.2d 905, 911 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citing Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1987)); Levine v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 646 F.2d 825, 833 (3d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 528

    ### Response:
    holding that it is inappropriate to conclude that because both sides moved for summary judgement that both concede that the case is ready for disposition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    than a jury are of such gravity and controversy that disqualification of a lawyer who will serve as a witness maybe justified. See id. at 138 (2). This Court has recognized that a lawyer is more likely to act ethically in serving as both a witness and an advocate if his or her testimony relates to merely formal matters, but this factor clearly did not weigh in Martin’s favor, because the lawyers’ anticipated testimony concerned a critical and disputed matter. See Payne, 295 Ga. at 611. Alawyer is more likely to be allowed to testify and remain as an advocate where the need for his or her testimony is unexpected or occurs when a change in counsel would be disruptive to the proceedings. See id. at 611, n. 2; Pulte Home Corp. v. Simerly, 322 Ga. App. 699, 702-703 (746 SE2d 173) (2013) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Clough, 274 Ga. App. at 137-138 (2)

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until only weeks prior to trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    941 (Tex.1998). “With respect to resolution of factual issues,” “[t]he relator must establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. However, “[a] trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ.” Id. Abatement We have repeatedly held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it arbitrarily abates a civil case for an indefinite period of time. See In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 306 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding); Gebhardt v. Gallardo, 891 S.W.2d 327, 330-32 (Tex s 2000, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); Trapnell v. Hunter, 785 S.W.2d 426, 429

    ### Response:
    holding blanket order staying discovery on main issue because of related criminal proceeding was abuse of discretion because it vitiated defendants ability to prepare defense in civil case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the immigration statute expressly removed jurisdiction to consider whether the officer acted in accordance with the statute. See id. at 663-64, 12 S.Ct. 336. There was thus nothing to show that Congress intended the process due such an arriving alien not to include the power of the courts to review whether the congressionally prescribed process was followed. That Congress by statute once permitted greater judicial review and procedural rights to arriving aliens does not mean that the Suspension Clause prohibits Congress from providing arriving aliens fewer procedural protections, so long as the writ still lies to determine whether a sufficient ground of removal and detention appears. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212-15, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Here, review lies under the INA to ensure

    ### Response:
    holding that entering alien detained on ellis island while able to test validity of his exclusion by habeas corpus did not have right to retry determination of attorney general in courts to have a hearing or to have evidence disclosed to him upon which determination rested
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by choosing not to testify, the defendant failed to preserve for the court’s review whether the trial court violated his constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination when it ruled that, if he testified for a limited purpose at sentencing, the government could cross-examine him about “everything” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1115-17 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a pretrial ruling that would have limited the government to cross-examining him only upon matters about which he testified on direct examination and about his credibility was foreclosed because he never, in fact, testified); cf. United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 598-601 (7th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, at least two state courts have also

    ### Response:
    holding unreviewable the defendants assertion that his fifth amendment right to remain silent was violated by the trial courts conditional ruling to allow the government to introduce evidence of his selective silence if he referred to the associate he had originally mentioned to a federal agent because although the defendant testified he did not in fact mention the associate quotation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by a junior associate. Although a court must exclude hours that reflect “the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to non-professionals or less experienced associates,” delegation is neither always possible in a small firm nor always desirable. Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir.1983) (emphasis added). First, a duty to delegate presupposes that the attorneys charging maximum rates readily have junior associates and supporting paralegals at their disposal. See Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20 (D.N.J.1984) (finding that it is not always possible to delegate in small office); see also Roldan v. Phila. Hous. Auth., Civ. A. No. 95-6649, 1999 WL 1167658, at *5, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19093, at *14-15 (E.D.Pa. Dec.7, 1999) (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiff was represented by

    ### Response:
    holding that reduction in rates is unwarranted in office that is understaffed and where no less experienced attorney was available to perform tasks
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evaluate the entire jury charge. See Warner, 245 S.W.3d at 461. The trial court is required to give the jury a written charge ‘setting forth the law applicable to the case; not expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passi 013 WL 1461841, at *7 (Tex.App—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. refd.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). However, even when an abstract charge is erroneously given on a theory of law, without specific application to the facts of the case, the court of criminal appeals have found this is not error. Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); see Lewis v. State, 815 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). In analyzing the jury charge as a whole, the

    ### Response:
    holding there was no error in giving superfluous abstract instruction on transferred intent when the issue of transferred intent was not incorporated into the application paragraph
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4 A.3d 561 (quoting In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412, 424, 461 A.2d 736 (1983)). In our review of each of these questions, we owe “no deference to the trial court’s conclusions.” Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J.Super. 103, 114, 30 A.3d 1061 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 368, 29 A.3d 740 (2011). Rather, we must “seareh[] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary.” Green, supra, 215 N.J. at 451-52, 73 A.3d 478 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 192 N.J. 372, 386, 929 A.2d 1076 (2007) (<HOLDING>). B. Common to both appeals is whether class

    ### Response:
    holding questions of law related to class certification are reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damages, Gresh must prove, inter alia, that the search and seizure were illegal. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The search of Gresh’s car was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. That exception “permits law enforcement to seize and search an automobile without a warrant if probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir.2002). Probable cause exists when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also U.S. v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 367 (3d Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). The police had probable cause to search

    ### Response:
    holding that objective facts of this case certainly justified the officers in concluding that there was a fair probability that evidence of a burglary would be found in the car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    underlying claim is triggered. Plaintiffs ask that the court delete reference to “diagnosable and compensable” injury in fact since no such limitation exists in either New York or Missouri law. Upon reconsideration, this court agrees with plaintiffs. The “diagnosable and compensable” language was formulated by Judge Sofaer of the Southern District of New York in American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F.Supp. 1485, 1489 (S.D.N.Y.1983). That opinion was affirmed by the Second Circuit, but was modified to delete the “diagnosable and compensable” limitation because there was no basis for it in the policy language. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760, 765-66 (2d Cir.1984); see also Abex Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 740 F.2d 119 (D.C.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The Missouri case relied on predominantly by

    ### Response:
    recognizing new york law as not imposing a diagnosable and compensable limitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract questions of law.” St. Louis Fire Fighters Ass’n, 96 F.3d at 329. While voluntary cessation of the alleged conduct does not make the case moot, the case is moot when “there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and ... interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Id. Wdien this occurs, “neither party has a legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying questions of fact and law.” Id. [¶ 11] The trial court erred in finding the easement created essentially the same relief the Tiberts were seeking. The newly-created easement is more limited than .2d 1006, 1012 (La.2003) (<HOLDING>); C.J.S. Dedication § 2, 280 (2001) (common-law

    ### Response:
    holding an implied dedication gives rise to a servitude of public use and does not transfer ownership
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the California Court of Appeal reaffirmed this analysis. 231 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1420 n. 1, 282 Cal.Rptr. 805 (1991) (“A requirement that the false statement or representation be made knowingly or with intent to deceive or defraud appears to be an element of the crime described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 10980 subdivision (c) ... but because the necessary mental state was not raised as an issue on appeal, we have no reason to so hold.”). Ferreira correctly asserts that both of the above statements are dicta, but the California Court of Appeal has specifically held that WIC section 10980(c)(2)’s predecessor statute, which contained language identical to the present statute, required proof of intent to defraud. People v. Faubus, 48 Cal.App.3d 1, 5, 121 Cal.Rptr. 167 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, California caselaw indicates that all

    ### Response:
    holding that because of the legislative history of welfare and institutions code section 11483 we conclude that an intent to defraud is also an ingredient of a violation of that statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    standard strikes an acceptable balance between the interest in requiring plaintiffs promptly to file suit and the competing interest in avoiding the encouragement of baseless or premature suits by requiring plaintiffs to sue before they can discover the facts underlying their claims. See New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 336 F.3d at 501; Young, 305 F.3d at 9; Sterlin, 154 F.3d at 1202. B We have previously stated that, if we were to adopt an inquiry notice standard for § 10(b) suits, we would apply a standard similar to that applied by the Tenth Circuit. See Livid Holdings, 416 F.3d at 951; Berry, 175 F.3d at 704. Today we adopt the inquiry-plus-reasonable-diligence test used by the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g., Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Under that standard, to determine when the

    ### Response:
    holding that inquiry notice triggers an investors duty to exercise reasonable diligence and that the  statute of limitations period begins to run once the investor in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Supreme Court has articulated a strict construction, limiting its application to situations “where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.” Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179, 109 S.Ct. 987, 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (finding that the district court, while considering the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration on the merits, had affirmatively assured the plaintiffs that the motion was timely under Rule 59(e) and effective to toll the appeal period). This doctrine has never been applied to allow the trial court to extend the filing deadline, and in fact, courts are forbidden to do so. See McCarthy at 1275 (<HOLDING>). However, even if trial courts could extend

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may not alter waive or amend the filing deadline
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    NCAA is a recipient of federal funds because it is an entity which receives federal financial assistance through another recipient and operates an educational program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance.” App. at 98. This allegation plainly alleges that the NCAA receives dues from member institutions, which receive federal funds. As discussed above, this allegation would be sufficient to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds and would survive a motion to dismiss. If a district court concludes that an amendment is futile based upon its erroneous view of the law, it abuses its discretion in denying a plaintiff leave to amend to include a legally sufficient allegation. See Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if the district court denied Smith

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court which erred in its conclusion that there was jurisdictional defect abused its discretion in denying a plaintiffsmotion for leave to amend his complaint because the proposed amendment would not cure the jurisdictional defect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other acts evidence to show “knowledge” or lack of “knowledge” was limited. The potential of the proffered other acts evidence for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and considerations of undue delay substantially outweighed the probative value of the preferred evidence. Had the evidence been admitted, there would have been mini-trials about Dr. Callahan’s prior surgeries on Haar, Uhing, Nohr, and Meng. Despite these cases being defended by the same law firm, Dr. Callahan’s counsel stated that they were not prepared for such mini-trials. Such mini-trials would risk dis tracting the jury with competing evidence on allegations by other patients against Dr. Callahan. In addition, admission of the other acts evidence could have opened the door App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 238

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of prior similar acts was not proof of medical malpractice or whether the doctor lacked the proper degree of knowledge or skill
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were committed by an adult. (3) The child has previously been found to have committed a delinquent act. (4) The child has previously been placed in a treatment facility outside the child’s home or in a supervised community treatment program established pur suant to section 232.191, subsection 4, as a result of a prior delinquency adjudication. Cassie challenges the juvenile court’s findings with regard to each of the above elements. In addition, she contends the court erroneously concluded placement at the state training school was the least restrictive alternative. Although the State asserts Cassie failed to preserve error on her arguments, we believe Cassie’s direct appeal was sufficient to preserve her claims for our review. See In re N.W.E., 564 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Although Cassie raises a number of issues

    ### Response:
    holding a direct appeal sufficiently preserves a challenge to delinquency dispositional orders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule of supervisory liability under § 1983. Defendants Hooker, Ehrin-ghaus, Baddour, Miller, and Swofford have not, therefore, established their qualified immunity defense at this stage in the proceedings. Defendant Dorrance has failed to show that Plaintiffs’ cannot prove a set of facts regarding unconstitutionality of his inquires into their sex lives. The Supreme Court held that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705,

    ### Response:
    recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the disparate impact theory without proof that the questioned policy or practice has had a disproportionate impact on the employer’s workforce. This conclusion should be as obvious as it is tautological: there can be no disparate impact unless there is [an ultimate] disparate impact.” Where, under a facially neutral employment process, there has been no adverse effect on the group — and certainly there has been none here — Title VII has not been infringed. I — I HH The Court’s position is no stronger in case authority than it is in logic. None of the cases relied upon by the Court controls the outcome of this case. Indeed, the disparate- impact cases do not even support the propositions for which they are cited. For example, the Court cites Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321 (1977) (<HOLDING>), and observes that “[although we noted in

    ### Response:
    holding impermissible minimum statutory height and weight requirements for correctional counselors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (HRE) Rule 404(b) (Supp.1994) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”). The timing of the introduction of the fact not in evidence is also relevant. We have previously noted that “ ‘the prosecutor’s argument is likely to have significant persuasive force with the jury.’ ” Basham, 132 Hawai'i at 115, 319 P.3d at 1123 (quoting State v. Klinge, 92 Hawai'i 577, 592, 994 P.2d 509, 524 (2000)). Here, introduction of CWs death during the prosecutor’s rebuttal distinguished it as one of the last facts heard by the jury prior to deliberations, further exacerbating the risk of prejudice. That CWs death was introduced during the State’s rebuttal precluded Nofoa from c 692, 718 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the circuit court’s direction to

    ### Response:
    holding potential for unfair prejudice related to evidentiary issue dispelled by the circuit courts limiting instruction to the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). However, any substantive rule of law may implicitly make certain evidence irrelevant in determining the ultimate rights of parties. For example, in California, evidence brought more than two years after a child’s birth that a certain person is the biological father of the child is irrelevant for purposes of determining the paternity of a child bom into a marriage. See Cal.Fam. Code §§ 7540-7541 (West 1994). This “conclusive presumption” was upheld in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). See also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (<HOLDING>). It therefore follows that the mere fact that

    ### Response:
    holding rule that any payment agreement having four or more installments is a finance agreement not an improper conclusive presumption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    5 Washington has not necessarily required cross-examination of the minor child in instances where a parent’s contact with a minor child could be restricted. See In re Dependency of H.W., 70 Wn. App. 552, 558, 854 P.2d 1100 (1993) (noting that due process was satisfied for the purpose of a temporary shelter care hearing where the accused parent had access to statements made by the children). Moreover, where the result of a hearing would only temporarily restrict a purportedly abusive parent’s access to a minor child, less process is due than in termination proceedings. See id. at 556-57 (considering the “obvious need for prompt and decisive action in order to protect a child from possible abuse and neglect’’); see also In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wn.2d 123, 126-27, 65 P.3d 664 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 6 [D]omestic violence is a problem of immense

    ### Response:
    recognizing that petitions to modify a parenting plan are initially evaluated based only on documentary evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ordered that the defendant pay a fine of $50,000 and remain on probation for five years. Defendant appeals, arguing that Gras-mere Brook is not part of the “waters of the United States” and is instead a “municipal separate storm sewer,” which is part of a municipal “waste treatment system” and thus expressly excluded from the Act’s coverage. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (‘Waste treatment systems ... are not waters of the United States.”). DISCUSSION Defendant concedes that the Clean Water Act is a “zero tolerance” statute, and that the Act “strictly prohibits any ‘point source’ discharge of any pollutant to the ‘waters of the United States’ ” without a permit. Defendant argues, however, that the waterway known as Grasmere Brook is instead “a municipal waste stream” 345, 347 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a small unnamed tributary fell under the act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would bear the burden of proof as the moving party. “... Therefore, in the instant ease, Miriam must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of the investigation and the determination of the investigation were both incorrect.” Accordingly, Stone Creek is distinguishable, and the Department’s erroneous allocation of the burden of proof is reversible error. IV Although we would ordinarily remand for new findings when an error in allocating the burden of proof occurs, it is unnecessary to do so in this case because we further conclude, as a matter of law, the Department’s probable cause determination is not supported by the evidence and is not in accordance with the relevant statutory law. See Ornelas v. United States, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of N.D.C.C. Ch. 50-25.1, “abused

    ### Response:
    holding the ultimate question of probable cause should be reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    past and admission by defendant that there was nothing to be done). Construing Brown’s claims of Scarberry’s prior knowledge and repetition of the incidents liberally, we conclude that he has alleged sufficient deliberate indifference to require a response from Scar-berry. However, Brown’s complaint does not substantively mention Defendant R. Brock, Food Services Manager, and does not allege any prior knowledge on his behalf, aside from the fact that he is in a management position in food services at the prison and that he responded to certain grievances. As the principles of re-spondeat superior do not apply in § 1983 cases, Brown’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against Brock. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss No. 15-6685, affirm

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant in  1983 action may not be sued solely for injury caused by his employee or agent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prescribed or approved by [an] attending physician.” Finally, the SPD vests Aetna, the Chevron Plan’s t 213); Vercher, 379 F.3d at 226 (noting “that even where the plan does not expressly give the administrator discretionary authority, ‘for factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the appropriate standard’ ”) (quoting Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co./Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 453, 116 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991)); Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1994) (commenting that “district courts in the Fifth Circuit review under an abuse of discretion standard a plan administrator’s factual determinations ... ”); see also Schadler, 147 F.3d at 395 (<HOLDING>). The underlying factual determination at issue

    ### Response:
    holding that an administrators findings of fact should always be reviewed for an abuse of discretion based on the record before the administrator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law, Molina has not demonstrated that she Suffered from a serious injury. The Government has easily made a pri-ma facie case that Molina’s injuries do not meet the relevant standard for serious injury. The Government has submitted the affidavit of its expert, Dr. George DiGia-cinto (“DiGiacinto”), who examined Molina in November 2002 and determined that she had a full range of motion in her neck and lower back, and that there were no objective signs that she suffered any relevant limitati f this evidence and assuming the accident caused the bulging discs, Molina has failed to provide objective evidence of the extent or degree of the alleged resulting physical limitation. See Ceglian v. Chan, 283 A.D.2d 536, 724 N.Y.S.2d 762 (App. Div.2d Dep 61 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div 2d Dep’t 1990) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Molina’s complaint alleges that she

    ### Response:
    holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punishment when other subdivisions within Minn.Stat. § 609.66 refer specifically to crimes committed in a park. Compare id., subd. la(b)(l) (authorizing a more severe penalty for a nondrive-by reckless discharge of a firearm when committed in a park zone) with id., subd. le (outlining penalties for a felony drive-by shooting without consideration of location). B. Other bases for departure We next consider whether the other factors identified by the lower courts would justify a departure, specifically the indiscriminate firing of multiple shots into a group. Appellant argues that a departure on these facts was an abuse of discretion as they are the predicate facts upon which the presumptive sentence for a drive-by shooting is based. See State v. Brusven, 327 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Minn.1982) (<HOLDING>). The definitions of the relevant crimes are

    ### Response:
    holding it was unfair for the trial court to rely upon factors already considered in the presumptive sentence as a basis for a durational departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fund would be depleted, then immunity should be applied on the theory that, in fact, the State is the real party in interest because it would answer the judgment. This doctrine was first announced in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) and was more recently reiterated and emphasized in Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997)(“The question whether a money judgment against a state instrumentality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any evaluation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued.”) and Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48, 115 S.Ct. 394, 404, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994)(<HOLDING>). The Colorado General Assembly has created a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the most important factor in determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to eleventh amendment immunity is whether a judgment against it would be paid from the state treasury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defense of qualified immunity). 126 . See Pierce v. Smith, 111 F.3d at 871-72; Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir.1996); Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School District, 55 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied;-U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 532, 133 L.Ed.2d 438 (1995); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d at 310; White v. Taylor, 959 F.2d at 544: ""If reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to immunity.”; Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Texas, 950 F.2d at 279-80; Streetman v. Jordan, 918 F.2d at 556; Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 918 F.2d at 552-53; and Hopkins v. Stice, 916 F.2d 1029, 1030-31 (5 th Cir.1990). See also Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas, 855 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir.1988), (<HOLDING>); and Gunaca v. State of Texas, 65 F.3d 467,

    ### Response:
    holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interests ... are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms,” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the Due Process Clause’s “procedural component does not protect everything that might be described as a benefit.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 749, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701). State law, contract, or a promise implied from circumstances, are generally sufficient to create a property interest protected by due process. See e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (finding that a state statute, permitting employee dismissal only for cause, created a property interest in continued employment); see also Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Ramsey v. Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1272

    ### Response:
    holding that a collective bargaining agreement between school board and teachers union established a teachers legitimate claim of entitlement to their positions at elementary school
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    view of the facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.”). Subsequent cases, however, have rejected that approach and clarified that we may consider a pure question of law, despite the defendants’ failure to concede the plaintiffs version of the facts for purposes of the interlocutory appeal: “If ... aside from the impermissible arguments regarding disputes of fact, the defendant also raises the purely legal question of whether the facts alleged ... support a claim of violation of clearly established law, then there is an issue over which this court has jurisdiction.” Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 310 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 772 (6th Cir.2005); but see McKenna v. City of Royal Oak, et al., 469 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that this court has

    ### Response:
    holding this court lacks jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeal where appellant relies solely on disputed facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “automatically satisfied] the more than slight or minimal effect standard.” Fanning, 827 F.2d at 633 n. 3 (citing Nieves, 775 F.2d at 14). After Fanning was decided, the Commissioner revised the regulations pertaining to the evaluation of mental disorders to clarify that for purposes of applying section 12.05C, we will assess the degree of functional limitation the additional impairment(s) imposes to determine if it significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, i.e., is a “severe” impairment(s), as defined in §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). If the additional impairment(s) does not cause limitations that are “severe” as defined in §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c), we will not find that the additional impairments) imposes “an additional and significan 985) (<HOLDING>). For all of the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the second prong of the c criteria in section 1205 was satisfied where the claimant was limited to light or sedentary work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was tried. See § 782.065, Fla. Stat. (2016). 2 . Ramroop does not challenge and we do not address his conviction for Knowingly Discharging a Firearm from a Vehicle Within 1000 Feet of a Person. § 790.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). 3 . Section 924.34, Florida Statutes, provides the following: When the appellate court determines that the evidence does not prove the offense for which the defendant was found guilty but does establish guilt of a lesser statutory degree of the offense or a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser degree of the offense or for the lesser included offense. § 924.34, Fla. Stat. (2011); see State v. Sigler, 967 So.2d 835, 841 (Fla. 2007) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The Standard Jury Instructions should be

    ### Response:
    holding that section 92434 could be unconstitutional in application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694-95, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). Absolute immunity is determined by a functional analysis that looks to “ ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’ ” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)). The official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that immunity is justified in light of the function she was performing. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934. This court has held that under certain circumstances, social workers are entitled to absolute immunity. See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    LEXIS 1651, *47) (M.D. Pa. January 6, 2012) (dismissing invasion of privacy claim based on disclosure of a minor’s vaginal infection to students at her school and a neighboring school as “the publication was not so widespread that it was communicated to the public at large, or to so many people that it was ‘substantially certain’ to become public knowledge”). The trial court erred in denying the appellants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim. 5. Lastly, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to the City and Sahlberg, in his official capacity, as to Maia’s claims for punitive damages. We agree, and Maia concedes that the trial court erred in this respect. See City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga. 571, 573 (4) (272 SE2d 302) (1980) (<HOLDING>). Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in

    ### Response:
    holding that absent explicit statutory authority a municipality cannot be held liable for punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of title thereunder is not a “security interest” ... Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security. By the 1970s, this provision had generated considerable litigation and academic commentary, with particular emphasis on the interests of claimants in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Feldman v. First National City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 486 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>); DeVita Fruit Co. v. FCA Leasing Corp. (In re

    ### Response:
    holding in a reclamation action against a bankruptcy trustee that the determination of whether the lease instruments were true leases or security agreements is critical
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    clear up any false impressions” that Walton had introduced by his testimony indicating that a conspiracy to rob Barragan existed or that a gun would be used. On appeal, Nickerson challenges the trial court’s ruling as an impermissible infringement of Nickerson’s Sixth Amendment right to- confront witnesses against him. In the trial court, however, Nickerson argued that the evidence was relevant. He did not raise a Confrontation Clause objection. To complain of a Confrontation Clause objection on appeal, a party must object in the trial court to the ruling disallowing that testimony. Wñght v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). A relevance objection is insufficient to preserve a Confrontation Clause challenge. See Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 & n.29 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>) (citing Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 535

    ### Response:
    holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Nonetheless, under Strickland, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A key prosecution witness’s prior criminal history and resultant parole status clearly constitute important impeachment evidence. It is beyond the range of professionally reasonable judgment to forego investigation of, and impeachment based upon, such evidence absent some apparent strategic reason that might explain or excuse counsel’s failure. “Thus, viewed objectively, [Grant’s] counsel unreasonably failed to introduce such impeachment evidence.” Ross v. Dist. Att’y of the Cnty. of Allegheny, 672 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Counsel’s failure to make reasonable efforts

    ### Response:
    holding that trial counsels failure to introduce evidence of prosecution witnesss crimen falsi conviction constituted deficient performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the [independent] contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way. 11 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c (1965)). In turn, an owner or general contractor “can direct when and where an independent contractor does the work and can request information and reports about the work” without assuming vicarious liability. Fifth Club, 196 S.W.3d at 792. In limiting liability in this way, we have explained that imposing liability on owners and general contractors who stop work perceived as unsafe “would deter [them] from setting even minimal safety standards.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602, 607-09 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Chapa, 11 S.W.3d at 156 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to preclude work from beginning and the implementation of a safework permit system were insufficient to establish actual control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision was motivated in part by a discriminatory animus, even though other factors besides the discrimination influenced the employer’s decision. See Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 488 F.3d 489, 508 n.22 (1st Cir. 2007) (“In a mixed motive case, the plaintiff would only have to establish that national origin ... discrimination was a motivating factor in the analysis, rather than the sole basis for the decision.”) Additionally, the plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discrimination to pursue a mixed-motive theory. Rather, “[a] plaintiff is entitled to prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence alone.” Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Once the plaintiff demonstrates that his

    ### Response:
    holding that title vii does not mention much less require that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence in mixedmotive cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other, not with both. As recited above, other courts have uniformly held that the burden of proof as to the good faith defense is on the controlling person. Were it otherwise, good faith would not be a defense; its absence would be an element of a § 20(a) cause of action. Since it is not an element of § 20(a), Anderson and Strudwick’s argument is untenable. This conclusion is supported by the case law. In Lorenz v. Watson, supra, one of the leading cases on § 20(a) liability, “the defendants point[ed] to the absence in the complaint of any allegation that the defendants induced the activity complained of....” Id. at 732. The court rejected this contention, holding that it was “for the defendants to prove that they acted in good faith.” Id. See SEC v. First Securities Co., supra, at 987 (<HOLDING>). See generally 1974 Duke L.J., supra, at

    ### Response:
    holding that the district judge gravely misapprehended the operation of section 20a in rejecting the claim on the ground that plaintiffs had not produced sufficient evidence of controlling persons bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the light most favorable to the non-moving party). We reject this argument. First and foremost, Capital One is not a party to this action. If Bentrud has a complaint with the manner in which Capital One changed (i.e. reduced) the interest rate, he can raise that issue in arbitration. The district court’s inquiry, and ours on appeal, concerns the representations and collection efforts of Bowman Heintz, the party alleged by Bentrud to have committed the FDCPA violations. Based on the record before us, Bentrud has not raised a triable issue that Bowman Heintz either misrepresented the interest rate or attempted to collect an amount not authorized by the agreement with Capital One. Because Bentrud failed to carry his burden, see Hess v. Kanoski Bresney, 784 F.3d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>), his second FDCPA claim, theorized under §

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff to his burden of persuasion on appeal of summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the district court’s “necessary” party analysis, we need not decide whether “in equity and good conscience” Mutual qualifies as an indispensable party under Rule 19(b). See United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1381 n. 18a (9th Cir.1984). Since Mutual has not demonstrated that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over a “necessary” party to the Hendricks’ action, the district court could grant injunctive relief against the Bank without deciding whether it had personal jurisdiction over Mutual individually. C: Mutual argues next that the shareholder agreement’s forum selection clause required the district court to dismiss the Hendricks’ action for improper venue. See Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). There is some ambiguity in the record as to

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to dismiss based on a forumselection clause should be treated as a rule 12b3 motion to dismiss for improper venue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. SPCP Grp. VI, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Mo.Ct.App.2013) (quoting Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 435-36 (Mo. banc 2003)). In the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to assert that Defendants Deaton, Lucas, and Young agreed to' submit the dispute brought before the student disciplinary panel for arbitration. Without an agreement between the parties, the disciplinary panel’s decision did not establish a decision capable of being vacated pursuant to the Missouri Arbitration Act. Even though the disciplinary proceedings may resemble arbitration, proceedings under the University’s rules do not constitute arbitrations in the absence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the dispute. See. Kritzer v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 289 S.W.3d 727, 732-34 (Mo.App.W.D.2009) (<HOLDING>). , Therefore, without a valid arbitration

    ### Response:
    holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    19 (2009). I. Jurisdiction under UCCJEA Section 201 The first provision of the UCCJEA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201, “addresses the jurisdictional requirements for initial child-custody determinations.” In re J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. 439, 446, 669 S.E.2d 850, 854 (2008). The UCCJEA defines an “initial determination” as “the first child-custody determination concerning a particular child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-102(8). Here, the record establishes that the initial custody determinations with respect to all three juveniles were made by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in Fayette County. Consequently, the North Carolina court lacked jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201 to enter an order terminating respondent’s parental rights. See N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. at 298, 598 S.E.2d at 150 (<HOLDING>). II. Jurisdiction under UCCJEA Section 203 The

    ### Response:
    holding trial court lacked jurisdiction under uccjea  201 to enter termination order where initial custody issues have already been addressed by an arkansas court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only applies to a prisoner who is serving “a term of imprisonment” and contains two significant limits. First, the prisoner’s trial must be commenced, subject to some tolling principles, in the receiving state within 120 days of his or her arrival in the receiving state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-31-101, art. IV(c). Second, the prisoner’s trial must be conducted in the receiving state before the prisoner is returned to the “original place of imprisonment.” TenmCode Ann. § 40-31-101, art. IV(e). If the trial is not commenced within 120 days of the prisoner’s arrival or if the prisoner is returned or “shuttled” back to the original place of imprisonment before trial, the trial court is required to dismiss the charges with prejudice. Id. Whether Defendant is entitled to relief under App.1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Black, 989 N.E.2d 151, 156 (Ohio

    ### Response:
    holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a mental health defense. Counsel employed no fewer than four mental health experts for the guilt phase. Dr. Frederick Whipple, a forensic psychiatrist, evaluated Mickey on March 23, 1981, only two months after Mickey’s extradition to the United States and over two years before the start of his trial. In July 1981, still nearly eighteen months before trial, counsel hired another psychiatrist, Dr. A. David Axelrad, who examined Mickey several times over the course of three months. Axelrad, in turn, hired two clinical psychologists, Grant L. Hutchinson and Thomas L. Morrison, to assist in evaluating Mickey. Hutchinson evaluated Mickey on September 21, 1981. Morrison also administered psychological testing to assist Axelrad. This investigation was sufficient. See Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (<HOLDING>). Even if there were deficiencies in that

    ### Response:
    holding that hiring of only two mental health experts was not deficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel do not show that he was deficient. See McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 843 (noting isolated omissions in record do not render counsel’s performance ineffective). Failures to Object. Appellant finally complains that his counsel did not object to leading questions regarding the elements of misdemeanor assault or to hearsay regarding testimony elicited from one of the officers at trial. These failures to object to potentially inadmissible testimony are not sufficient, in themselves, to constitute deficient performance. See Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“An isolated failure to object to certain procedural mistakes or improper evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see also Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, appellant was required to provide

    ### Response:
    holding presumption of strategy not rebutted when record was silent as to why appellants trial counsel failed to object to the states persistent attempts to elicit inadmissible hearsay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person's right to petition the court for discharge over the secretary's objection. The notice shall contain a waiver of rights. The secretary shall forward the notice and waiver form to the court with the report of the department's examination under s. 980.07. If the person does not affirmatively waive the right to petition, the court shall set a probable cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that warrant a hearing on whether the person is still a sexually violent person. The committed person has a right to have an attorney represent him or her at the probable cause hearing, but the person is not entitled to he present at the probable cause hearing. 14 Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a). 15 Id. 16 Id 17 id. 18 State v. Paulick, 213 Wis. 2d 432, 438-39, 570 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1997) (<HOLDING>). 19 Thayer, 241 Wis. 2d 417, ¶¶ 8-9 (holding,

    ### Response:
    holding that probable cause hearing under wis stat  980092 was not intended to be an evidentiary hearing but rather a review of the paper record with argument allowed by counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. 1986). In Brown, the D.C. Court of Appeals adopted the approach of the California courts to malicious prosecution claims. Harris, 696 F.Supp.2d at 134. Accordingly, “ ‘[i]f [the termination] is of such a nature as to indicate the innocence of the accused, it is a favorable termination sufficient to satisfy the requirement. If, however, the dismissal is on technical grounds, for procedural reasons, ... it does not constitute favorable termination.’ ” Id. (quoting Brown, 503 A.2d at 1245). “[Dismissal for failure to prosecute has been held to be a favorable termination where the facts of the case indicate that such a disposition reflects on the innocence of the defendant in the underlying suit.” Brown, 503 A.2d at upp.3d 132, 145 (D.D.C. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Harris, 696 F.Supp.2d at 134 (finding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the bare assertion that a dismissal without prejudice was favorable to the plaintiff was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Accordingly, the state is not obligated to mitigate the risk of injury from a dangerous condition inherent in the design of a highway. To hold otherwise would require the state to reduce the risk of injury below the general state of being, repair, or efficiency of the road as initially constructed, and the statute specifically excludes from the state's maintenance obligation any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design of a facility. § 24-10-108(1); Springer, 13 P.3d at 802 (""The public entity has no duty under 'maintenance' to upgrade the construction of the facility.""). For similar reasons, designs that become inadequate over time-because of a change in use of the highway or because of changing safety standards-need not be corrected. Willer 811 (Colo.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). In short, the state's duty to maintain is no

    ### Response:
    holding that while safety improvements to public golf course were both feasible and highly desirable the citys failure to take such steps did not create a dangerous condition on the golf course for purposes of the cgia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    re-sentence Starkweather accordingly. 1 . AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A). 2 . AS 11.41.200(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). 3 . Id. at 584. 4 . Ibid. 5 . Ibid. 6 . SLA 1978, ch. 166, § 2. 7 . AS 12.55.125(c). 8 . Minutes of the House Health, Education, and Social Services Committee for March 15, 1988, Tape 1, Side 2, log no. 124. 9 . Id., log no. 341. 10 . Id., log no. 155. 11 . Ibid. 12 . Ibid. 13 . See Brown v. State, 12 P.3d 201, 210 (Alaska App.2000); Comegys v. State, 747 P.2d 554, 558-59 (Alaska App.1987). 14 . Compare Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 772 (Alaska App.2002) (""'we have repeatedly upheld sentences in the upper end of the penalty range for defendants who committed gratuitous or otherwise inexplicable acts of extreme violence""); Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434, 444 (Alaska App.1995) (<HOLDING>). 15 . See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811,

    ### Response:
    holding that a firstdegree murder is aggravated when the defendant tortures or inflicts gratuitous pain on the victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deciding whether appellant was intoxicated. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8; Speer, 890 S.W.2d at 90. The record reflects that, although Officer Green agreed that he did not know whether “it was him being normal or him being intoxicated,” because he had no prior contact with appellant, the officer refused to go so far as to agree that appellant could have been either “intoxicated” or “normal.” No law, however, requires that an officer have prior contact with a defendant. Prior knowledge of the defendant’s normal state is not a prerequisite to testimony by an officer that he believed that the defendant was intoxicated. See Railsback v. State, 95 S.W.3d 473, 484 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd); see also Massie v. State, 744 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the question whether station-house

    ### Response:
    holding that if evidence exists that appellant could not use his faculties on the occasion in question in the manner in which the normal nonintoxicated person would be able to use his faculties the evidence is sufficient to convict 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Benito Sanchez-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his requests for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. We have reviewed the administrative record and the Board’s order and find no error in the Board’s conclusion that Sanchez-Garcia is statutorily ineligible for both forms of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(c) (2012) (providing that an alien shall not be permitted to “depart voluntarily ... if the alien was previously permitted to so depart after having been found inadmissible under [8 U.S.C. § ]• 1182(a)(6)(A) [2012])”; Garcia v. Holder, 732 F.3d 308 (4th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). We therefore deny the petition for review for

    ### Response:
    holding that boards ruling that aliens continuous physical presence terminated when he voluntarily departed country was a reasonable interpretation of 8 usc  1229b 2012
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guidelines) with Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 4a (2004) (“[s]upport order” includes rulings requiring a party to provide “monetary support, child care, [or] medical support”). Because the substantially changed circumstances required by Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2, to modify child support must render the existing support obligation unreasonable and unfair, the changed circumstances must pertain to the portion of the obligation sought to be modified. Thus, if multiple types of child support are involved in multiple motions to modify, the mere statement in a prior order that there was no substantial change in circumstances rendering the existing obligation unreasonable and unfair does not necessarily justify invoking res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. See Loo, 520 N.W.2d at 744 (<HOLDING>). Here, the CSM’s statements from the bench in

    ### Response:
    holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a statutory right. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”). 5 . Facebook’s argument against personal jurisdiction is also directed at the Cohen Complaint and raises a number of valid but vexing questions as to the interaction between New York’s statutory scheme, for extending jurisdiction over corporations and recent Supreme Court decisions concerning due process limitations on personal jurisdiction. (See MTD Mem. at 27-30.) Because the court has determined that the Cohen Plaintiffs fail to establish standing, it need not address the question of personal jurisdiction as to their Complaint. Cf. Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 583-84, 119 S.Ct. 1563 (<HOLDING>). 6 . Immediately before its service provision,

    ### Response:
    holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    County had a pattern and practice of applying excessive force in the context of mental health extractions. This Circuit recently reiterated in the case of Pineda v. Toomey that a supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 as a secondary violator for the behavior of his subordinates only if: (1) the behavior of [his] subordinates results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the [supervisor]^ action or inaction was affirmativefly] link[ed] to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference. 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988)); see also Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, “[t]o succeed on a supervisory

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff brings  1983 claim against a defendantsupervisor liability attaches if the responsible official supervises trains or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may contribute to a civil rights deprivation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of capital punishment is satisfied only if the prisoner understands that his execution will end his physical life. Accord Martin v. Dugger, 686 F.Supp. 1523, 1569 (S.D.Fla.1988) (“An essential part of the punishment society imposes on a defendant is to make the defendant realize and live with the concept that he will die for what he did.... Accordingly, if retribution is to be served by the death of a condemned prisoner, the prisoner must at least have this realization.”). Similar language, indicating an appreciation that a prisoner’s awareness of his execution must include the understanding that execution means the end of his physical life, is found in numerous federal and state court decisions before and after Ford. See, e.g., Scott v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d 871, 876-77 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that competency is appropriately defined as the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the convict emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) mistakenly believed that she had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, or (2) mistakenly believed that an actual, nonlim iting impairment substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139. To establish that Amtrak ran afoul of the ADA when it terminated her employment on the basis of a perceived disability, see id. at 490, 119 S.Ct. 2139, plaintiff asserts that Porter was aware that she “used a special chair for her back, walked with a limp, could not stand or walk for long periods of time, and regularly attended physical therapy sessions .... ” (PL’s Opp’n at 43.) Plaintiff further asserts that Porter regarded her as disabled because she informed Porter in 76 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs complaint of back pains and request for simple stands to assist with lifting made to his employer were insuffi cient to establish that the employer regarded him as disabled because he at no point indicated to the employer that he was disabled within the meaning of the ada
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 616; Rollins, 738 A.2d at 448; Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 719 A.2d 233, 238 (1998); Uderra, 706 A.2d at 339-40. Because counsels’ investigation was reasonable, Appellant has not met the second prong of proving ineffectiveness. See Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 213. XII. Ineffectiveness Relating to “Good Conduct” in Prison Appellant asserts that evidence tending to show the he was a well-behaved and well-adjusted prisoner, from which the jury could draw favorable inferences regarding Appellant’s character and future conduct as a prisoner, if sentenced to life in prison, is admissible mitigating evidence, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present such evidence to the jury. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Appellant alleges counsel

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that a petitioner has been a wellbehaved and welladjusted prisoner from which the jury could draw favorable inferences regarding the petitioners character and probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison is admissible as mitigating evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that is unwarranted.”). The “lodestar” is no longer a lodestar in the true sense of the word- — “a star that leads,” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1329 (1981). Nor do courts use it in the way the term was first used by the Third Circuit — as a base amount that is susceptible of ready adjustment; rather, circuit court deference to the district court’s estimate of a “reasonable” hourly rate is a “lodestar” only in the sense that it is a guiding jurisprudential principle, see Dague, 505 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638 (“The ‘lodestar’ figure has, as its name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence.”). What the district courts in this circuit produce is in effect not a lodestar as originally conceived, but rather a “presumptively reasonable fee.” See id. (<HOLDING>). The focus of the district courts is no longer

    ### Response:
    holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    maxim, de minimis non curat lex, or that since the riparian owner may lose soil by the action of the water he should have the benefit of any land gained by the same action.” 45 C. J. p. 525. [Hilt, supra at 219-220 (emphasis modified in part).] Hence, under Hilt, a riparian owner has the exclusive right to the use of relicted land subject to only the state’s navigational servitude, and therefore “it has been held that the public has no right of passage over dry land between low and high-water mark but the exclusive use is in t 7; 324 NW2d 104 (1982); Turner Subdivision Prop Owners Ass’n v Schneider, 4 Mich App 388, 391; 144 NW2d 848 (1966) (“Hilt established that a riparian owner owns land between the meander line and the water.”); Nordale v Waxberg, 84 F Supp 1004, 1006 (D Alas, 1949) (<HOLDING>). The Hilt conclusion that a riparian owner has

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in hilt it was held that the boundary line of riparian owners along the great lakes is the waters edge and not the meander line the riparian owner has the right to accretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to an other within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532. Accord Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State.”). Most cases discussing prisoners’ Fourth Amendment challenges address searches of the prisoner’s cell. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Christopher v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 306 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    50-16.9(b) (2009). Cohabitation is defined by statute as “the act of two adults dwelling together continuously and habitually in a private heterosexual relationship.” Id. “Cohabitation is evidenced by the voluntary mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations which are usually manifested by married people, and which include, but are not necessarily dependent on, sexual relations.” Id. Therefore, to find cohabitation, there must be evidence of: (1) a “dwelling together continuously and habitually” of two adults and (2) a “voluntary mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations which are usually manifested by married people.” Id.; see Lee’s Family Law § 9.85, at 494-95; cf. Craddock v. Craddock, 188 N.C. App. 806, 812, 656 S.E.2d 716, 720 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Oakley v. Oakley, 165 N.C. App. 859, 863, 599

    ### Response:
    holding that conflicting evidence related to various factors including frequency of overnight visits by alleged cohabiting man presented genuine issues of material fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by showing that Kom-pan’s trade dress is functional. As noted above, a showing of likelihood of success also creates a presumption of irreparable harm. PSI has done nothing to rebut this presumption, so Kompan is entitled to injunctive relief on its trade dress claim. III. False Advertising Claim Kompan also claims that PSI violates the Lanham Act by false advertising. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects against two distinct wrongs: false designation of origin and false description or representation (false advertising). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B) ; Agee v. Paramount Communications, 858 F.Supp. 778, 790 (S.D.N.Y.1994), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir.1995); cf. Forschner Group, v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348, 357, 360 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Kompan blurs the line between these two

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants use of the phrase swiss army knife did not constitute false advertising under section 43a of the lanham act but remanding to consider whether among other things use of the same phrase constituted false designation of origin
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    within the res judicata.” Thus, privity centers on the closeness of the relationship in question. Courts have held that the attorney-client relationship itself establishes privity. See, e.g., Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1235 n. 6 (7th Cir.1986)) (“The law firm defendants appear by virtue of their activities as representatives of Green and AT & T, also creating privity.”); Henry, 808 F.2d at 1235 n. 6 (“Even though the Bank was the only actual party to the state court mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the other defendants, as directors, officers, employees, and attorneys of the Bank, are in privity with the Bank for purposes of res judicata.”); Verhagen v. Arroyo, 552 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 617. But

    ### Response:
    holding that under florida law for the purposes of collateral estoppel an attorney is in privity with his or her client in a previous suit when the opposing party in that action brings a subsequent suit against the attorney based in the same facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Patrick Oil would not subsequently deny having received notice of the existence of the security interest. If that was the sum total of Motobecane’s position, it might satisfy the conditions for obtaining an estoppel to this extent. However, Motobecane further argues that the acknowledgement now prevents defendants from denying that they had an obligation to protect Motobecane’s security interest. No such promise appears in the September 28 letter, nor can the court infer one from the plain meaning of the language of the letter. An estoppel can not rest upon an alleged promise which the court can not discern from the statements made by the defendant, cf. Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit v. Jewish Welfare Federation of Detroit, 62 Mich.App. 54, 233 N.W.2d 184 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The court therefore holds that defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that estoppel will not lie upon a promise that is too indefinite to permit the court to determine the scope of the alleged obligation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v Martin, 367 Mass 404; 326 NE2d 12 (1975) (necessary means ""wise in the light of facts known at the time rendered”); and Group Hospitalization, Inc v Levin, 305 A2d 248 (DC App, 1973) (""necessary” means ""reasonably calculated to shorten and relieve an ordeal of agonizing pain and thereby effectuate the most rapid recovery possible”). Reference to McLaughlin v Connecticut General Life Ins Co, 565 F Supp 434 (ND Cal, 1983), illustrates that Free’s list of definitions was not exhaustive. McLaughlin cites, inter alia, Fassio v Montana Physician’s Service, 170 Mont 320; 553 P2d 998 (1976) (finding that the language ""necessary services” requires only that services be prescribed and performed by a licensed physician), and Aetna Life Ins Co v Sanders, 127 Ga App 352; 193 SE2d 173 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, McLaughlin provides a new

    ### Response:
    holding that the language necessary to the treatment should be construed to accord great weight to a physicians recommendation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    884 (D.C.Cir.2008). By contrast, in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949), the Court dismissed an action brought against the head of the War Assets Administration alleging that he had refused to deliver coal that he had contracted to sell to the plaintiff and seeking an injunction prohibiting him from selling or delivering that coal to anyone else, because the relief sought was “against the sovereign.” And while the Court has sometimes decided takings claims without considering Eleventh Amendment immunity, see, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found, of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992 auro, 21 P.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Citadel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 695 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court correctly determined that the foundations fifth amendment inverse condemnation claim brought directly against the state of texas was barred by the eleventh amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conversation of the type generally not subject to Edwards. Mickey argues that the small talk, though casual, does not fall under this general rule. In his view, Landry had reason to know his behavior might elicit an incriminating response because he was “softening up” Mickey by participating in a discussion of the connections between their two families, including Landry’s knowledge of Mickey’s brother’s suicide. But, Landry did not intend and had no reason to know that his statements about his various family members and how they interacted with Mickey’s family were likely to elicit an incriminating response in the context of a conversation ranging from California, philosophy, and politics to family, food, and football. See United States v. Hackley, 636 F.2d 493, 498 (D.C.Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, the small talk was not interrogational.

    ### Response:
    holding that a statement from a conversation about defendants cousin in which police mentioned their inability to reach her after her arrest was not interrogatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    464, 470 (2014); Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 403, 257 P.3d 1226, 1229 (2011); Renzo v. Idaho State Dep’t of Agr., 149 Idaho 777, 781, 241 P.3d 950, 954 (2010); Cordova v. Bonneville Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 642-43, 167 P.3d 774, 779-80 (2007); Dorea Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 426, 163 P.3d 211, 215 (2007); Nation v. State, Dep’t of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007); O’Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho 49, 55-56, 122 P.3d 308, 314-15 (2005); Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57, 64-65, 72 P.3d 897, 904-05 (2003); Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400, 901 P.2d 501, 507 (1995). In Block, we did cite Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 182 P.3d 713 (Ct. App. 2008), but it was for the proposition, “(<HOLDING>).” 156 Idaho at 490, 328 P.3d at 470. In

    ### Response:
    holding ic  12117 did not provide an exception after noting it has held that ic  6918a governed to the exclusion of all other standards when the case was brought under the itca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    York, was the true owner of the property, Sergeant Martinez’s testimony does not indicate that he ever contacted or attempted to contact McNutt Co.; he simply concluded that since York could not produce the original VIN plates that the property was “deemed” stolen and that there was no way of ever tracing ownership. McNutt Co. was never served in the 47.01a proceeding or named as an interested party. This is significant because if McNutt Co. were the owner, as evidenced on the DPS registration receipts, and was allowing York to use the property, also as evidenced by the DPS registration receipts, then York would have a superior right to possess the trailer as against appellees, regardless of whether the trailer was deemed stolen or not. See Universal Underwriters, 283 S.W.3d at 901 (<HOLDING>). It seems logical that if DPS were acting in

    ### Response:
    holding that a title holder has  the superior right to possession over one who holds no title
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    June 22, 1994, when State Farm deposited money representing the policy limits by inter-pleader into the state court. Burton did not sue State Farm until June 7, 2000. Burton contends that until the entry of a judgment in excess of the $100,000 paid to Burton out of State Farm’s insurance proceeds, Padgett did not incur any damages caused by State Farm’s alleged mishandling of the claim, and so the earliest his cause of action accrued was in October 1994 when the insurance funds were disbursed to the parties without a release. Burton contends, however, that Padgett’s cause of action did not accrue until the excess judgment was entered against him on October 27, 1999. The Montana Supreme Court has rejected this argument. Peris v. Safeco Ins. Co., 276 Mont. 486, 916 P.2d 780, 784 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, State Farm’s refusal to settle Burton’s

    ### Response:
    holding that an insured may sue an insurance company for violation of the utpa before the underlying lawsuit is settled or a judgment entered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a breach of written contract action to which Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-56-111, a five-year statute of limitations, should apply. We need not decide which statute of limitations applies because under either the three- or five-year statute of limitations, the Committee’s claim is barred because more than five years have passed since this cause of action accrued. This action was filed on March 18, 2002; thus, the Committee’s claim is barred under either statute if it accrued prior to March 18, 1997. The Committee argues that the date on which the claim accrued was April 8, 2000: the date it became aware of Settlement II. We disagree. Generally, this court applies the discovery rule to determine when a claim accrues. Union Pacific R.R. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d 325, 330 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The discovery rule provides that “a

    ### Response:
    holding that absent a contrary mandate from congress the discovery rule determines when a cause of action accrues in a federal question case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cannot grant a new trial on its own motion. Only a defendant can request and receive a new trial in a criminal case. Nor, even if we were to construe Appellant’s letters as a motion for new trial, are the bare assertions contained in them sufficient to create a record supporting involuntariness where none exists in the appellate record before us. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. Conclusion Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 1 . Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (West Supp.2013). 2 . Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim.App.1984). 3 . Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). 4 . Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); see Gobell v. State, 528 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (<HOLDING>); Ross v. State, 523 S.W.2d 402, 404

    ### Response:
    holding revocation proper because even if his contentions were correct gobells revocation was based on two offenses and he challenged only one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ruling was erroneous, Petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the violation rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Redman v. Dugger, 866 F.2d 387, 390 (11th Cir.1989). The Redman case defined fundamental unfairness as that where the evidence is “material in the sense of crucial, critical [and a] highly significant factor.” Id. See also Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1422 (11th Cir.1988). In certain instances, defense testimony or evidence should be admitted even though the testimony or evidence is otherwise inadmissible. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (recognizing the “right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts”); Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1544

    ### Response:
    holding that where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of litigation in that it addresses a legal issue only and is not associated with a medical office visit—contains an opinion that, although Claimant needs treatment, Claimant’s current symptoms were not related to her compensable injury. This medical opinion is in direct conflict with that expressed by Dr. Meli on November 16, 2009, in his office note and DWC-25, both of which state that Claimant’s industrial accident remains the MCC of the need for the recommended treatment. Moreover, the document in question—a doctor’s letter— is hearsay not within the exceptions set out in sections 90.803(4) or (6), Florida Statutes (2011). ITT/Palm Coast Utils., CIGNA v. Douglas, 696 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (citing Scotty’s, Inc. v. Sarandrea, 645 So.2d 121, 123 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>)). Under these facts, the JCC erred in

    ### Response:
    holding doctors letter is inadmissible hearsay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can obtain habeas relief if the state court adjudication “involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). But even if a state court made a constitutional error within the meaning of this provision, the federal court must also assess whether the error was prejudicial. Ortiz v. Yates, 704 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, Jaffe argues that evidence was admitted at his trial unconstitutionally via a transcript of Officer David Miller’s testimony during a preliminary hearing. Miller was not available to testify at trial, and Jaffe argues he was unable to cross-examine Miller effectively. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Assuming without deciding that the state

    ### Response:
    holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant   had a prior opportunity to crossexamine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the risk is applicable where “ ‘the plaintiff... subjectively know[s] of the existence of the risk and appreeiate[s] its unreasonable character.’ ” Jarrett v. Woodward Bros., 751 A.2d 972, 986 (D.C.2000) (internal citations omitted). By assuming the risk, the plaintiff relieves the defendant of any duty owed to the plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are not available to defendants because defendants committed intentional torts. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 139 Md.App. 308, 775 A.2d 476, 481-82 (2001) (explaining that the de fenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are not applicable for intentional torts); Janelsins v. Button, 102 Md. App. 30, 648 A.2d 1039, 1044 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Defendants, however, are not alleged to have

    ### Response:
    holding that assumption of the risk is not an available defense for civil battery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    {¶ 10} In determining whether the trial court properly denied or granted a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration, the standard of review is whether the order constituted an abuse of discretion. Panzica Constr. Co. v. Zaremba, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 95103, 2011-Ohio-620, 2011 WL 496761, citing U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Wilkens, Cuyahoga App. No. 93088, 2010-Ohio-262, 2010 WL 323432. “ ‘ “The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations.” ’ In order to have an abuse of that choice, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact or l . No. 84776, 2005-Ohio-2323, 2005 WL 1119804; Sikes v. Gariley Pontiac Honda (Sept. 13, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 79015, 2001 WL 1075726 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 12} In Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Plaintiff and Decedent. Accordingly, this count is dismissed. D. Count Y Violation of District of Columbia Deceptive Trade Practices Statute Plaintiff claims Defendant has violated unspecified portions of District of Columbia’s deceptive trade practices statute. This claim is analogous to the fraud by nondisclosure claim. Although there are no District of Columbia cases in which Rule 9(b) has been applied to the provisions triggered by this case in deceptive trade practices actions, courts in other jurisdictions analyzing similar provisions of similar statutes have concluded that allegations supporting the claim “must be pleaded with particularity because they are akin to allegations of fraud.” Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F.Supp. 1515, 1524 & n. 8 (D.Kan.1995) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); see also Duran v. Clover

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the essential or material elements of a fraud claim against the same defendant described in a prior complaint.” U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 378 (5th Cir. 2009). Although the Mayes Complaint also identifies BlueWave as a defendant, Riedel provided the Government with information on entirely different fraudulent schemes. No reasonable read ing of the Mayes Complaint would have informed the Government of the need to investigate whether BlueWave was paying speaker’s fees to physicians as a kickback or waiving insurance copays and deductibles. See U.S. ex rel. Galmines v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. CIV.A. 06-3213, 2013 WL 2649704, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2013), on reconsideration in part, No. CIV.A. 06-3213, 2013 WL 5924962 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2013) (<HOLDING>). The Government partially intervened regarding

    ### Response:
    holding that the firsttofile rule did not bar complaint involving same defendants where firstfiled complaint did not put government on notice of a separate fraudulent scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    BOE that relators’ attorney fees would be paid for if the charges against relators did not result in convictions. Additionally, there is evidence in the record alleging that an assistant county prosecutor told the BOE that “the county would only pay the indicted employees’ legal fees if they were found not guilty.” {¶ 34} We do not go so far as to find that pursuant to R.C. 305.14(A), the prosecutor and board of commissioners automatically have a duty to file an application in the trial court when a conflict of interest exists. Rather, we follow the Ohio Supreme Court’s guidance on this issue, and hold that failure to make the application pursuant to R.C. 305.14(A), under the facts of the instant case, constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Stamps, 42 Ohio St.3d at 167, 538 N.E.2d 105 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 35} Respondents have a clear legal duty

    ### Response:
    holding that the seminatore court did not find that the prosecutor and board of county commissioners had a duty to apply for appointment of special counsel under the statute    thus while it does not find a duty on the prosecutors part seminatore does recognize mandamus as a means to compel an application for special counsel where an abuse of discretion has been shown emphasis sic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violations noted by the officers after the incident — were sufficient to deny the defendants’ motion to suppress. See Hartwell, 67 F.Supp.2d at 790 (“Accordingly, the initial parking violation relied upon by the government did not provide the troopers with probable cause to stop defendant Hartwell’s vehicle. Nevertheless, the government now urges this Court to consider other additional violations allegedly committed by defendant Hartwell.”). In particular, the ■ government argued that in parking the vehicle as they did, the defendants necessarily obstructed traffic and drove on the wrong side of the road. On appeal, the defendants argue that the government is precluded from advancing additional bases for probable cause with the benefit of hindsight. See Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391-92 (<HOLDING>). The government counters that Whren provides

    ### Response:
    holding that probable cause determinations turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court.” Id. at 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198. Although the language of Rose seemed to allow only the above three options, this court, in a footnote in Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.1988), suggested an alternative procedure, that of stay- and-abeyance: “When a petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies before filing a federal habeas petition, a district court may hold the federal petition in abeyance, issue a stay of execution, and allow the petitioner an opportunity to exhaust his state remedies.” Id. at 1472 n. 1. Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases, however, rejected the stay-and-abeyance procedure offered in Neuschafer, holding it inconsistent with Rose. Taylor, 134 F.3d at 985; see also Calderon v. United States District Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court erred when it relied on neuschafer for the proposition that dismissal of mixed habeas petitions is not the rule in the ninth circuit 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a legally executable lease. In fact, the very same e-mail that Andersen argues creates a promise notes that “[Kranz] needs to get [the lease] signed, or it is going to cause some serious problems with them opening on-time as they have to order supplies, and everything else for the store.” Pl. App. 44. Andersen cannot parse certain statements FCOA made, leaving out words and relying on only those portions favorable to Andersen. FCOA also represented to Andersen that it could not install any fixtures or move any merchandise to the Coralville site until the parties executed a lease agreement. These statements, taken in their entirety, did not amount to “[a] declaration ... to do or forbear a certain specific act,” and were instead in the nature of an opinion. See Schoff, 604 N.W.2d at 51 (<HOLDING>). In Chipokas v. Hugg, 477 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa

    ### Response:
    holding that statements that merely convey an impression or understanding of a fact do not constitute a promise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the allowed amounts of their claims. Thus, the alternative test set forth in Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) is not satisfied. It is also undisputed that the interest holders are junior to the unsecured creditors, and that under the plan they will receive the opportunity to buy the stock of the reorganized debtor. The question is whether this opportunity constitutes “property” made available to them “on account of” their old equity interest in violation of the absolute priority rule. A. The Exclusive Option to Acquire a New Equity Interest Constitutes Property Received “on Account of” the Old Equity Interest Buerk objects that the plan cannot qualify as “fair and equitable” because the right to acquire an interest in the reorganized debtor has f Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). A similar argument was equally unavailing to

    ### Response:
    holding that an option to purchase stock is property under section 1129b2bii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rules of law. Therefore, petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to their claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief. Although the BIA sua sponte found that petitioners were ineligible for withholding of removal and CAT relief, this does not alter the conclusion that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to review before this Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d at 1250-51. Further, the petitioners do not raise any argument in their brief before this Court regarding the IJ’s denial of their application for withholding of removal or CAT relief. Accordingly, even if petitioners had exhausted these claims before the BIA, they have since abandoned them on review. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1228 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that where an appellant fails to raise arguments regarding an issue on appeal that issue is deemed abandoned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Masses at both former parish properties raise the most difficult aspect in these matters. Testimony at trial and security log books maintained at each church clearly show that, usually, no more than two persons were present at each Mass: the pastor and the security guard for the church. The log books indicate that, occasionally, others did attend, but those days were few and far between. Although the doors to the churches were unlocked on the days Masses were said, no one could have known about the Masses unless they asked the pastors, or happened by the churches, since there was otherwise no advance notice to the public. Although it is clear that regular Mass was celebrated at each former parish, why individuals celebrating the Mass chose to .Super. 355, 542 A.2d 505 (App.Div.1988) (<HOLDING>); New Jersey Stake of Church of Jesus Christ of

    ### Response:
    holding that property used for nonexempt purposes on assessment date and later acquired by exempt church is nevertheless subject to taxation for the succeeding year without violating federal or state constitutions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28 U.S.C. § 158(a) on an appeal from a bankruptcy judge’s decision is binding thereafter on all of the bankruptcy judges of the same district. It is a difficult one. The text of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 158, is utterly silent on the issue. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken to the issue. As the Eleventh Circuit observed several years ago, neither the United States Supreme Court nor any of the Courts of Appeal have ruled on the issue. In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 127 F.3d, 1398, 1403 n. 3 (11th Cir.1997). The pubbshed case law is of limited utihty; there is quite a split on the question among the courts below the circuit level. Id. At least one judge of a district court has ruled on each side of the issue. In re KAR Dev. Assocs., LP, 180 B.R. 629, 640 (D.Kan.1995) (<HOLDING>); Bryant v. Smith, 165 B.R. 176, 180-181

    ### Response:
    holding that bankruptcy judges are not bound by appellate ruhngs of single district judges even those from their own district
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also entitled to withholding of deportation based on that persecution. Id. at 1023, 1031-32. Remand was not necessary for further factual development, as the predicate facts were not disputed. In contrast, the IJ here never reached the legal or factual questions of eligibility for either asylum or withholding in light of current country conditions because she simply rejected all of Secaida’s testimony regarding the events in Guatemala he claimed led to his flight. Furthermore, a substantial amount of time has passed since the IJ assessed Secaida’s application. Given our above conclusion that the IJ erred by rejecting Secaida’s testimony, it appears remand is necessary in this case to allow the IJ to reach the secondary question of country conditions. See Ventura, 123 S.Ct. at 355-56 (<HOLDING>). As we noted in Yang, however, while Secaida

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court erred by reaching question of changed country conditions where neither bia nor ij had been given a chance to address it in the first instance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    possessed in committing an offense. Searcy <& Patterson, Practice Commentary, 1 Texas Penal Code Annotated § 16.01 (Vernon 1974), quoted in Eodice, 742 S.W.2d at 846. The authors’ emphasis on the word “specially” suggests that the Legislature intended a narrow construction of what constitutes a criminal instrument. Finally, Janjua conflates two separate elements of the statute. The statute forbids possession of “a criminal instrument with intent to use it in the commission of an offense.” Thus, to be guilty of this offense, a person must (1) possess a criminal instrument, and (2) have the intent to use it in the commission of an offense. But rather than treating intent as a separate element, Janjua folds intent into the definition of “criminal instrument.” See 991 S.W.2d at 426 (<HOLDING>). We agree with Eodice and Andrews that intent

    ### Response:
    holding that what constitutes a criminal instrument is determined by both its design or adaptation and its intended use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    witness. To ease the witness’s testimony, they can either alter my voice and [sic] not show myself to the witness.” He then objected to not being permitted to conduct cross-examination by personally questioning Child as opposed to having to write out questions to be asked by his standby counsel. In the context of the two options proposed by the prosecutor, the Defendant’s response was that he did not object to Child testifying by closed circuit television. Therefore, he cannot now raise that issue on appeal. Defendant also asserts that prohibiting him from conducting the cross-examination violated his right of confrontation. The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution includes the right to cross-examine one’s accusers. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (<HOLDING>). The only person who could testify to the

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error to admit a videotaped interview of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse because the defendant was deprived of the right to crossexamine the child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [1] directly advances [2] a substantial governmental interest and [3] that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest” (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980))). I therefore believe that Casey applied something akin to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. Even if Casey applied something less than intermediate scrutiny, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), confirms that intermediate scrutiny applies here. In that case, the Court applied a “reasonable relation” standard of First Amendment review, similar — in wording, though not necessarily in form — to the one applied in Casey. Id. at 651, 105 S.Ct. at 2282 (<HOLDING>). Zauderer explained that the reasonableness

    ### Response:
    holding that although the first amendment was implicated the regulation compelling disclosure of certain information in advertisements was constitutional as long as it was reasonably related to the states interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    executed pursuant to a confessed judgment the basis of which is contested at least would be constitutionally suspect. For purposes of due process, it is difficult to conclude that a judgment debtor is entitled to a prompt hearing on a claim that some of his attached property is exempt but not on a claim that all of his property has been attached unjustifiably or even fraudulently, on the basis of an unsupportable or even spurious pleading. The pertinent considerations in either context are whether the applicable attachment procedures minimize the risk of an inappropriate seizure and ensure an opportunity. to be heard in opposition at a meaningful time. See Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 607-08, 95 S.Ct. at 722-23; Fuentes v. She-vin, 407 U.S. 67, 97, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 2002, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58-59; Jonnet, 530 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding pennsylvania replevin statute unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the whole the Court is convinced that they are good, honest people who made no attempt to defraud their creditors or make false oaths, despite losing , their business and life savings. . The Court will grant the Debtors a discharge. A separate judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. 1 . Unless otherwise noted all statutory referenees are to 11 U.S.C. 2 .To the extent any finding .of fact is construed as a conclusion of law, it is adopted as such, and vice versa. The Court may make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law as it deems appropriate or as may be requested by any of the parties. In making these findings, the Court took júdicial notice of the docket. See St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); LeBlanc v. Salem (In re Mailman Steam Carpet

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appropriate in the immigration context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’ ” Id. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988)). Applying the principles of Chevron here, we conclude that Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The term “particularly serious crime” is open-ended, and the statute does not define it. And prior to the BIA’s decision in N-A-M-, the courts of appeal were divided over whether only aggravated felonies could be particularly serious crimes for purposes of withholding of removal. Compare Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 456 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), with Ali, 468 F.3d at 470 (rejecting that

    ### Response:
    holding that particularly serious crimes must be aggravated felonies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his sentence while on parole and whatever expectation of privacy he may have had while on parole had been waived. At the hearing on the suppression motion, Officer Tripp testified he conducted the search based only on the agreement. He testified there had been no complaints involving Baldón at the motel. Peterson, the parole officer, agreed the search was “completely based on [the] agreement and nothing more.” The district court denied Baldoris motion to suppress. It found Baldón consented to the search by signing the parole agreement and that the consent made the search reasonable. It also found Baldón waived any claim of privacy. Baldón then waived his right to a trial by a jury, and the court found him guilty of the charges. Following the imposition 734, 968 P.2d 445, 448 (1998) (<HOLDING>); People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 781

    ### Response:
    holding suspicionless searches of parolees cannot be justified by consent if prospective parolee does not have freedom to accept or reject parole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    principles developed in caselaw (an implication which is supported by the arbitrator’s citation to authority in support of his use of equity) rather than any personal view of right and wrong. Second, the arbitration agreement undoubtedly gave the arbitrator authority to invoke equity, as it provided him with the power to award any relief which a court could award. The arbitrator, therefore, acted — or at least arguably acted— within the scope of his authority when he noted that equity supports the certification of an opt-out class. Finally, even if Respondents have — at the very most — raised an arguable issue as to whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his powers, the Court is without authority to vacate the arbitrator’s decision. Am. Postal Workers Union, 204 F.3d at 527 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court cannot say that the

    ### Response:
    holding that as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority a court should not vacate his decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3. Furthermore, she contends that her attorney’s sworn declaration contains sufficient proof of her counsel’s qualifications, and that she has satisfied her burden of establishing the reasonableness of her requested rates. Id. at 3-4. The party requesting attorney’s fees must submit evidence showing “the attorneys’ billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)). The prevailing market rate in the Laffey Matrix is “but one of the elements needed to establish the reasonableness of a billing rate sought in a fee application.” Jackson, 696 F.Supp.2d at 104; see also Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (<HOLDING>). The prevailing market rate “provide[s] merely

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs may provide evidence to supplement the laffey matrix including fees awarded to attorneys with similar qualifications in comparable cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an auto shop. She also testified she could work at more physically demanding jobs, such as making pizzas at a local restaurant, stocking shelves and running cash registers at the Dollar General and working in an emergency room. While Gretillat apparently did not get any of these jobs, only the United States Postal Service (USPS) turned her down because she was physically unable to perform the job. It is well settled, however, that an inability to perform one particular job is not a substantial limitation on working. Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir.2003). “Instead, a plaintiff must show that because of his impairment he has suffered a significant reduction in meaningful employment opportunities.” Id.; accord Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Because Gretillat has introduced no evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that one who is precluded from working a narrow range of jobs is not disabled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and proprietors of similar establishments, see Brewer v. Roosevelt, 295 A.2d 647, 651 (Me. 1972); Schultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368, 371 (Me. 1975); Tenney v. Atlantic Assocs., 594 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Iowa 1999); jailers, see Harrison v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Correction, 90 Ohio Misc.2d 32, 695 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (1997); and schools, see Hill v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 191 Ariz. 110, 952 P.2d 754, 756 (1997). 7 . We do not address herein duties created by statute. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1666, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (recognizing a statutorily imposed duty on the part of schools to protect children from abuse by other children or adults). 8 . Accord Gragg v. Wichita State Univ., 261 Kan. 1037, 934 P.2d 121, 128 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19

    ### Response:
    holding that corporate sponsors of fireworks on a university campus had no duty to control conduct of third party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7004(b)(3) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(e) states that “[s]ervice of process and service of any paper other than process or of notice by mail is complete on mailing.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9006(e). Hence, under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(e), upon mailing, service is complete. Turgeon v. Victoria Station Inc. (In re Victoria Station Inc.), 840 F.2d 682, 684 (9th Cir.1988). Bankruptcy Rule 7004 “does not require proof of actual receipt; it requires only that the summons and complaint be mailed.... ” In re Vincze, 230 F.3d 297, 299 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). See also Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to post bail, but this issue is neither timely raised nor relevant. The question presented is not whether it was lawful to detain Weiss before he was found incompetent, but rather whether some period of detention was lawful after that finding was made. The answer to this question requires a balancing of the individual’s interests in liberty against the government’s interests. Although individuals have rights to liberty, the government has legitimate interests in bringing accused persons to trial and protecting the public from arrested persons who present a demonstrable threat to the community. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987). See also Born v. Thompson, 117 Wn. App. 57, 69 P.3d 343 (2003), review granted, 150 Wn.2d 1025 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Where a time period for treatment is not

    ### Response:
    holding that the legislatures intentions in adopting 14day restoration provisions include 1 restora tion for purposes of prosecution 2 protecting the public through its police powers and 3 providing the accused with access to treatment as an alternative to incarceration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and' entered summary judgment against him. We review that decision de novo. See McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 817 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2016). II The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the- government from “abridgirig the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (incorporating “the right of free speech” into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Content-based restrictions on judicial-campaign speech are subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White (“White I”), 536 U.S. 765, 774, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002) (assuming strict scrutiny applies); Wolfson, 811 F.3d at 1180 (<HOLDING>). To survive strict scrutiny, the government

    ### Response:
    holding that strict scrutiny applies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    position — which they have maintained throughout this case — with their new allegations that Defendant started receiving customer complaints related to the defect almost immediately after the first-generation motors hit the market. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has echoed doubt expressed by other courts “that customer complaints in and of themselves adequately support an inference that a manufacturer was aware of a defect, noting that complaints posted on a manufacturer’s webpage ‘merely establish the fact that some consumers were complaining’. By themselves they are insufficient to show that [the manufacturer] had knowledge [of the defect].” Wilson, 668 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Berenblat v. Apple, Inc., Nos. OS-4969 JF (PVT), 09-1649 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 1460297, at *9 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 9, 2010) (<HOLDING>)). Nevertheless, the court in Wilson conceded

    ### Response:
    holding that an unspecified number of complaints posted on the defendants website was insufficient to show that the defendant had knowledge of an alleged defect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of secondary meaning, but what the court actually found was just an association between the grill design and Vornado, not that the primary significance of the design in the consumer's mind was as a brand identifier, rather than as a grill type. Some of our previous cases may have led Vornado to believe that mere association is sufficient. See, e.g., Marker Int'l v. DeBruler, 844 F.2d 763, 764 (10th Cir.1988) (stating that a mark has acquired secondary meaning if because of long association with a product or firm it has come to stand for that product or firm in the minds of the public). But the Supreme Court has made clear that the test is the more stringent ""primary significance” standard. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118, 59 S.Ct. 109, 113, 83 L.Ed. 73 (1938) (<HOLDING>). For other cases also citing the ""primary

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff company could not monopolize name shredded wheat because it had shown only an association in consumers minds of the name with the company not that the terms primary significance to the consuming public was the producer and not the product
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (finding interim ceiling principle to be admissible, but remanding for additional hearings); Brim, supra, 695 So.2d at 273 (finding ceiling principle, but not unmodified product rule, potentially to be admissible pending a hearing); Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436, 443-44 (1990) (finding unmodified product rule in admissible based on evidence of departure from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314-16 (1992) (finding product-rule estimates by Cell mark to be in admissible; noting in dicta agreement with ceiling principles); Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991) (rejecting Cellmark’s probability analysis as not being generally accepted at that time); State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn.1994) (<HOLDING>); Carter, supra, 524 N.W.2d at 776-83 (ruling

    ### Response:
    recognizing problems with unmodified product rule and finding productrule calculation modified by ceiling principle to be admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Flood, Harinek, scad Hen-rich, but the rationale of River Park was based on a case that originated before the 1970 Constitution. In that decision, Young v. Hansen, 118 Ill. App. 2d 1 (1969), the Second District adopted the common law exception of “corrupt or malicious motives” as an exception to the Act. Young held that the “immunity afforded by section 2 — 201—while not expressly referring to the question of malice — extends only to those types of acts not resulting from corrupt or malicious motives.” Young, 118 Ill. App. 2d at 8. Since then, the Second District has followed the Young holding to recognize the “corrupt or malicious motives” exception to other grants of immunity by the Act. See River Park, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 163; Madonna v. Giacobbe, 190 Ill. App. 3d 859, 868 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Idlehour Development Co. v. City of St.

    ### Response:
    recognizing corrupt or malicious motives exception to sections 2  103 2  201 and 2  205
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    position in order to provide a supervisor for a group of officers who formerly were independent, those officers become inferior to the new officer. That is precisely what happened here. As it stands now, the law places United States Attorneys under the direction and supervision of the Attorney General. No more is exigible to show that United States Attorneys — and a fortiori interim United States Attorneys — are inferior officers. D. Separation of Powers. Because United States Attorneys are inferior officers, Congress as a theoretical matter can entrust their appointment to the President, the head of a department, or the courts of law, without requiring Senate confirmation. See U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (<HOLDING>). We say “theoretical” because Congress’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitution contains no flat prohibition against interbranch appointments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    what an arbitration award resolved, it could hardly delineate every single right and duty that each party had with respect to all others. Nor is it open to Noble to argue that there is a middle ground, according to which the arbitration award, to be final, must resolve not all issues between the parties but all issues relating to the relevant transaction and occurrence. This court has held that an award is final when it resolves the issues presented for arbitration and does not determine other issues beyond its delegated scope of authority, even when those other issues are relevant to the same transaction giving rise to the issues that the arbitration did address. See United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers (In re Karmen), 32 F.3d 727, 732-33 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that Conn-Tech is

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitration decision that invalidated a rate increase but declined to set a new rate was final when the arbitration panels authority did not extend to setting new rates
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. Compl. ¶ 14. Nowhere in WRIA’s summons, however, could defendant be expected to find such constitutional claims. (b) Argument for modification of existing law: Counsel for WRIA contended, in the alternative, that there exists a good faith argument for the modification of existing law, namely, the filing of a complaint is not a jurisdictional prerequisite under the current statutory scheme because 28 U.S.C. § 2636(c), not 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (a)(2), governs jurisdiction. WRIA’s Opp’n to Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, at 3. Counsel failed to mention, however, that this argument had already been rejected by the Federal Circuit. See Georgetown Steel, 4 Fed. Cir. (T) at 147-48, 801 F.2d at 1312-13 (<HOLDING>). Counsel subsequently advised the court that

    ### Response:
    holding that 28 usc  2636c did not modify the filing requirement in 19 usc  1516aa2a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reveals that he did, in fact, emphasize to the jury that the government’s witnesses should not be believed based on their status as convicted criminals and “liars[,]” and on their personal incentives to cooperate with “presumption of undue influence” under the laws of different states in the context of wills); see also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 843 (6th ed. 2006 & Supp.2009) (explaining presumptions in general and listing “illustrative presumptions”). In support of its belief that the law should reflect a presumption of propriety in favor of court interpreters, the court notes that courts in general have recognized that various professionals are entitled to presumptions that they perform their duties accurately. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324, 102

    ### Response:
    recognizing in ineffective assistance of counsel claims a presumption that counsels conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of ultimate fact in the two proceedings are identical, we hold that the RTC was precluded from asserting its “participation in a fraudulent scheme” theory of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A), and the district court was bound by the jury’s verdict in Carpenter’s favor on the factual issue underlying the RTC’s theory. We do not hold that a finding of nonliability for civil conspiracy to defraud necessarily precludes litigation of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A). Rather, we hold that where, as here, the factual issue that forms the basis for the creditor’s theory of nondischargeability has been actually litigated in a prior proceeding, neither the creditor nor the debtor may relitigate those grounds. See Sheerin v. Davis (In re Davis), 3 F.3d 113, 115-16 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Lacy v. Dorsey (In re Lacy), 947 F.2d 1276,

    ### Response:
    holding that jury verdict in prior state court fraud action including finding that debtor willfully breached fiduciary duty had preclusive effect on courts determination of nondischargeability based on defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under  523a4
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contend that the plaintiff is collaterally es-topped from arguing that element of his claim because the state court magistrate found probable cause that the crime was committed at the preliminary examination. Because the charged crime' — drunken driving third offense, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625(9)(c) (“If the violation occurs within 10 years of 2 or more prior convictions, the person is guilty of a felony” and may be imprisoned for one to five years)— was a felony, a preliminary examination was required. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 767.42(1). The purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that an offense has been committed by the defendant. Mich. Ct. R. 6.110; see also People v. Perkins, 468 Mich. 448, 452, 662 N.W.2d 727, 730 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The state magistrate specifically found

    ### Response:
    holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notification informing them of the charges, and were given the opportunity to confront the charges before a “fair and impartial adjudicator.” (Docket No. 98 at 14.) Furthermore, both Plaintiffs had attorneys present at the hearings. Id. While Plaintiffs do not deny that they were provided with notice and a hearing, they argue their due process rights were violated because the process provided was a “sham,” and Defendants had already made up their mind to fire them because of their political affiliation. (Docket No. 110 at 40.). Plaintiffs that allege the hearing was a sham must prove the hearing officer reached his decision before listening to the testimony and did not take into account the evidence presented. See Acosta-Sepúlveda v. Hernández-Purcell, 889 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also López-Anaya v. Palacios-de-Miranda,

    ### Response:
    holding recommendation of hearing examiner valid when not arbitrary and capricious in nature and when no evidence demonstrates the result was preordained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to what it legitimately may do with the evidence.”). Therefore, the error in this ease was not harmless and requires reversal. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment below and remand for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . Citations to the ""S.J.A.” refer to the Supplemental Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 2 . Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 3 . Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs,, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 4 . The motion also mentioned a fourth arrest, which was not presented to the jury. 5 . The district court later entered judgment in favor of BCPD and Batts pursuant to City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (<HOLDING>). See Order, Smith v. Baltimore City Police

    ### Response:
    holding that where no underlying constitutional violation occurred the city cannot be liable under monell
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we conclude that stay is a more appropriate synonym than extinguish. A personal injury action will not survive if the injury resulted in the plaintiffs death, as in this case, but a stay will allow time for the substitution of a party and the filing of an amended or supplemental pleading. This is consistent with the direction of rule 1.190(a) that leave to amend “shall be given freely when justice so requires.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a). In cases dealing substantively with abatement, the term is more properly understood as a stay of the proceedings rather than an automatic dismissal. See, e.g., Anderson v. Helen Ellis Mem’l Hosp. Found., Inc., 66 So.3d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (using the terms abate and stay interchangeably); Relinger v. Fox, 55 So.3d 638, 639-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). This court has not reached a contrary

    ### Response:
    holding that abatement of action was properly renewable by certiorari because an appeal from an eventual final judgment would not be an adequate remedy for the delay caused by abatement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of law. The relationship between an employer’s obligations under its collective bargaining agreement and potentially conflicting obligations under an anti-discrimination statute like Title VII is more complex than the district court’s decision indicates. Title VII and collective bargaining agreements each represent important congressional policies: preventing discrimination in the workplace, and “effecting workable and enforceable agreements between management and labor,” Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 79, 97 5.Ct. 2264. Given the important national policies underlying both Title VII and collective bargaining agreements, it is incorrect to hold, as the district court did, that obligations under Title VII always trump obligations that exist under valid labor agreements. See id. (<HOLDING>); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an agreedupon seniority system did not give way to an employers duty to reasonably accommodate religious observance under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether a right is clearly established, we may rely upon cases of controlling authority in the jurisdiction in question, or a ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful.’ ” Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). While there is no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit case directly on point, each of the three circuits to have considered whether an individual has a constitutional right to be free from the unreasonable destruction of his or her dog has found that right to be clearly established. See Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3rd Cir.2001); Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 151 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Fuller v. Vines (Fuller I), 36 F.3d 65, 68

    ### Response:
    holding that a dog that was destroyed by the police department was obviously  seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    PUC from litigating the Eleventh Amendment issue now. Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues that have been decided in a previous action. See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 474 (3rd Cir.1997). It “protect[s] litigants from the burden of relit-igating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and ... promotes] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” See id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979)). The issue of the PUC’s Eleventh Amendment immunity has already been thoroughly litigated between Amtrak and the PUC in this Court. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Com. of Pennsylvania Public Utility Com’n, 1997 WL 597963, at *6-10 (Sep. 15, 1997) (<HOLDING>); National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Com. of

    ### Response:
    holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility, not for the sake of the deceased.” Id. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Accordingly, contrary to PLN’s contention that any privacy interest of Estrella’s family is derivative of Estrella’s own privacy interest, family members’ privacy interests under FOIA are independent interests. Estrella’s status as a prisoner only has the potential to affect his own, and not his family’s, privacy interests. Estrella’s family did not waive their privacy interests in the video and photographs as a result of the government’s use of these materials at the Sablans’ trials. The government cannot waive individuals’ privacy interests under FOIA. See Sherman v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 244 F.3d 357, 364 & n. 12 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). As such, neither the government’s conduct in

    ### Response:
    holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Electric that “installation” triggers coverage). Therefore, the court concluded that all of the defendant’s policies in effect from the time of the municipality’s discharge until the date of remediation were triggered. In New Castle County, supra, the court held that the “injurious process” encapsulated by the continuous trigger doctrine included a municipality’s initial discharge into a landfill and the gradual leaching of contaminants into surrounding property. 725 F.Supp. at 812 (noting that the “process that led to this property damage began as early as the first half of 1969” and referring to testimony indicating that “there had been a slight deterioration of the wells at Tybouts by July, 1969”). See also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., supra, 662 F.Supp. at 76 (<HOLDING>); United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mutual

    ### Response:
    holding several defendant insurers liable where policyholders allegedly exposed the sites to pollutants during policy periods
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and is governed by the credible facts which, in the judgment of the district attorney, can be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and are consistent with the policies of that office, including relevant standards applicable to the initiation of charges. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8931, Indictment and information, (d) Duties of prosecuting attorneys; see also ABA Standard for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function Standards, 3-3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision. It is axiomatic that neither the trial court nor an appellate court may interfere with this function of the prosecution provided the appellant has not established fraud, prejudice or bias in the district attorney’s election of the individual charges. See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (1996) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Private Complaint of Petitioner

    ### Response:
    holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crimes will be charged and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that allegations of stress, humiliation, embarrassment, injury to reputation, and mental anguish unaccompanied by objective physical injury, medical attention, or lost income are not sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1991); see also Dotson v. U-Haul Co., 42 Va. Cir. 121 (Fairfax Co. 1997); Rollins v. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., 54 Va. Cir. 147 (Richmond 2000). However, Russo and its progeny addressed emotional distress claims that were “independent of any physical injury and unaccompanied by any physical impact,” 241 Va. at 24, 400 S.E.2d at 161, and clearly differ from cases involving physical or sexual assaults. See Hygh v. Geneva Enters., Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 569, 575 (Fairfax Co. 1997) (<HOLDING>). In the cases at hand, the Plaintiffs have

    ### Response:
    holding that an alleged victim of sexual assault need not plead with graphic specificity any additional objective physical injury  and clearly experiences severe emotional distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failed to recognize the distinction between permanent spousal support and rehabilitative alimony, Ron has failed to prove that Loita has gained a continuing legal obligation of support constituting a material and substantial change of circumstances. Ron argues that ”[t]he decisional law of Washington State ... makes use of quasi-marriage or de facto marriage in order to ... establish benefits and to settle claims to property_” However, Ron never asserts that David has a legal obligation to support Loita or cites any persuasive precedent. Loita correctly asserts that Washington law only creates “[r]ights to jointly acquired property [which] is not the same as a legal right to support, which is the issue in the instant case.” See Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash. App. 693, 676 P.2d 1037 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Ron also invites this court to reinstate

    ### Response:
    holding only that the statutory criteria for property division upon divorce apply to nonmarital relationships of long duration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a local government’s statutes or ordinances based on racial animus violates the Equal Protection Clause. Gettys, 215 F.Supp.2d. at 679. The task before the Court is to examine the record to determine whether there are triable issues of fact concerning whether the allegedly violative conduct occurred. IV. Summary Judgment Standard The Court may grant summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Ca-trett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, in determining whether there is

    ### Response:
    recognizing that trial judges have an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and to allow the chosen dispute resolvers to award the same varieties and forms of damages or relief as a court would be empowered to award”). 8 . Cf. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006) (upholding arbitrator’s jurisdiction to arbitrate a claim that an entire contract, including the arbitration clause, was void for illegality). 9 . See Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712-13 (6th Cir.) (upholding award in excess of a damage limitation under the ""essence” test where the arbitrator had plausibly determined it was unenforceable), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 735, 163 L.Ed.2d 570 (2005). 10 . Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 448 N.E.2d 413, 416-18 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See id. at 416; Corinno Civetta Constr.

    ### Response:
    holding that a no damagefordelay clause would be unenforceable where a party had acted with bad faith and with deliberate intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The government presented no evidence to support the enhancement except the presentence investigation report (PSR) prepared by the probation office. The PSR indicates that Hampton hit the officer after he lost control of his vehicle. We cannot conclude from this evidence that Hampton intended to hit anyone, let alone a law enforcement officer. Moreover, we disagree with the district court that the enhancement should apply because the crash was a foreseeable consequence of the high-speed chase. Rather, the government must prove that 1) the defendant engaged in action akin to aggravated assault, and 2) the defendant had reason to believe the intended and actual victim was a law enforcement officer. USSG § 3A1.2(b)(1); accord United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1236 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the meager evidence presented

    ### Response:
    holding that an enhancement under  3a12 cannot apply absent evidence that defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe victim was a law enforcement officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “without unnecessary delay.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c), in turn, creates a six hour “safe harbor” for confessions elicited before an arraignment. A court may “admit a statement made outside of the safe harbor if the delay was reasonable or if public policy concerns weigh in favor of admission.” United States v. Padilla Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 731 (9th Cir.1998), United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir.1996). The district court concluded that the thirty-two hour pre-arraignment delay in this ease was reasonable because Fritts was suffering from heroin withdrawal and had to be hospitalized. Relying on our decision in United States v. George, 987 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.1993), it held that “a delay caused by medical necessity does not violate Rule 5(a).” See George, 987 F.2d at 1431 (<HOLDING>). The district court did not clearly err in

    ### Response:
    holding that a confession made before arraignment was admissible because medical necessity was the reason for the prearraignment delay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    typically defined as “an accident, event or happening, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury” that is “neither expected nor intended” by the insured. To establish or trigger coverage, “an insured must demonstrate that damage ‘occurred’ while the policy was in effect.” N. States Power Co. v. Fid. and Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 659-60 n. 3 (Minn.1994) (quotation omitted). An occurrence takes place not when the policyholder engages in the wrongful act, “but the time the complaining party was actually damaged.” Singsaas v. Diederick, 307 Minn. 153, 156, 238 N.W.2d 878, 880-81 (1976). Consequently, if the damage occurs outside of the policy period, the policy does not provide coverage. See id. at 155, 238 N.W.2d at 880-81 (<HOLDING>). As a preliminary matter, it should be noted

    ### Response:
    holding that policy did not provide coverage where negligent repair of lift in elevator occurred during policy period while resulting injury occurred after policy was canceled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seek to advance in this lawsuit. The Court could not square a different result with fundamental requirement that a 60-day notice must “be sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know what corrective actions will avert a lawsuit.” Atlantic States, 116 F.3d at 819. Not having given Defendants notice of the violations alleged in this lawsuit, but only for violations that had already been addressed by the end of the 60-day notice period and that were therefore “wholly past” by the time Plaintiffs would have been permitted to sue for properly noticed ongoing violations, Plaintiffs’ Clean Water Act claims must be dismissed. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387, 399-403 (4th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); ONRC Action v. Columbia Plywood, Inc., 286

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court erred in finding violations that were not alleged specifically in the plaintiffs notice letter and no penalties could be imposed for those violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a waterborne transportation function in any practical sense. The dredge at issue in Super Scoop was moved much more frequently and easily. That the ATP TITAN can be moved does not qualify it as a vessel, given the enormous expense associated with its relocation and the extent to which it is securely attached to the floor of the Outer Continental Shelf in its role as' a production facility. Further, there is no evidence that the ATP TITAN frequently uses its mooring lines to shift itself, and in any event, the Fifth Circuit held in Fields that the spar at issue was not a vessel, despite its ability to move up to 250 feet by tightening and slackening its lines. 182 F.3d at 359; see also Richardson v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., No. 08-1074, 2011 WL 2565315, at *3 (E.D.La. June 28, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the ATP TITAN resembles much more

    ### Response:
    holding that stewart did not vitiate the test set forth in fields since a platforms ability to move 250 feet in the middle of the ocean does not constitute transportation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on account of procedural deficiencies. 2. Substantive Sufficiency of Count I In the seminal West case, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted strict liability for manufacturers and sellers whose products reach a consumer in an unreasonably dangerous condition and thereafter cause injury. West, 336 So.2d at 86-87. “In order to hold a manufacturer liable on the theory of strict liability in tort, the user must establish the manufacturer’s relationship to the product in question, the defect and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product, and the existence of the proximate causal connection between such condition and the user’s injuries or damages.” Id. at 87; see also Clark, 395 So.2d at 1229; see also Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859, 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). In other words, there are three elements to a

    ### Response:
    holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a protected ground such as their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinions. Rather, he testified that the farm was on fertile land, and thus valuable. Zetino implied that the only motivation for the murders was the land itself. He testified that the attackers “were insisting on the lands and [his] grandfather did not want to get rid of the land.” Zetino also testified that he was afraid of gang violence because he had tattoos that gang members might mistake as a sign of membership in a rival gang. An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground. See id. §§ 1231(b)(3), 1101(a)(42); Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the BIA properly ruled that

    ### Response:
    holding that random criminal acts bore no nexus to a protected ground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to maintain the action. The elements of replevin are: (1) the goods in question have a value greater than twenty dollars; (2) the goods are unlawfully taken or detained; and (3) the owner or person entitled to possession is deprived of the goods. Mass.Gen.L. ch. 247, § 7. Evergreen alleges that the value of the scallops is approximately $1,200,00.00. (Compl. Count III, ¶ 29, p. 10.) Evergreen has adequately pled that the Banks are currently detaining the scallops unlawfully. Evergreen alleges that the scallops are now located at the Gloucester Corporation warehouse and that the Banks control both the warehouse and the contents therein. (Compl. Count II at 1116.) This court draws the reasonable inference that defendant Banks are currently detaining the scallops. Gooley, 851 F.2d at 515 (<HOLDING>). Evergreen further alleges that because the

    ### Response:
    recognizing inferential factual allegations to defeat a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    through 1968 .... ” (Mem. at 9, 15.) Defendants contend that after 1968 Abbott and Costello’s heirs were required to register a renewal of the copyright to the Routine. (Id. at 15.) Given the plausible allegation that Abbott and Costello assigned their common law copyright in the Routine to UPC with the 1940 Agreement, Defendants argument that the duo’s heirs had to register a renewal of the copyright is unavailing. ' Because as much of the 1938 Routine as was disclosed in the motion picture was published when the motion picture was published, and because the law treats motion pictures as a unitary works, the copyrights in One Night and The Naughty Nineties that UPC registered “merged” the Routine with the films. See 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257-58 (2d Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that because filmmaking is a collaborative process typically  involving artistic contributions from large numbers of people statutory copyright in the film itself could be undermined if copyright subsisted separately in each of their contributions to the completed film citing richlin 531 f3d at 975 a motion picture is a work to which many contribute however those contributions ultimately merge to create a unitary whole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 999, 111 S.Ct. 558, 112 L.Ed.2d 565 (1990); Betts v. Board of Admin, of the Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 21 Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158, 161, 582 P.2d 614, 617 (1978) (en banc) (stating that the right to a “substantial” or “reasonable” pension accrues on first day of employment); Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d 894, 896 (Del.1983) (explaining that rights accrue when vesting occurs); Singer v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 356, 607 P.2d 467, 475 (1980) (similar to Petras, but adding that rights remain subject to “reasonable modification”); Sylvestre v. State, 298 Minn. 142, 214 N.W.2d 658, 666-67 (1973) (taking the position that an employee’s rights accrue on first day of employment); Baker v. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 353 (Okla.1986) (<HOLDING>); Leonard v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash.2d 479,

    ### Response:
    holding that rights accrue only when an employee vests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court to issue a search warrant for the defendant’s property when it was located at the United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Indeed, as much is recognized by a pending amendment to Rule 41. Certainly, the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment cannot be abrogated because Congress has failed to enable the federal courts to enforce those very rights. Indeed, some argue that United States District Courts have a common law right to issue warrants even when statutory authorization is lacking. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 364, 370 n. 14, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (noting “an inherent power.. .to issue search warrants under circumstances conforming to the Fourth Amendment[ ]”); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 878-79 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CERCLA); BCW Assocs. Ltd. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. CIV.A. 86-5947, 1988 WL 102641, at *17 (E.D.Pa. Sept.29,1988); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 849 F.Supp. 931, 963-64 WD.Pa.1991) (finding that expenses incurred for monitoring a waste site and developing a cleanup plan are recovery costs); Artesian, 659 F.Supp. at 1288 (adopting the reasoning of Wickland and allowing recovery of evaluation and monitoring costs). Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to recover as past response costs payments to Valley Forge Laboratories, Kaselaan & DeAngelo Associates, and Spires Engineering Company. With respect to Zaid’s claimed expenses of $26,250.00 for his time, they, too, are recoverable as labor costs. Cf.T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F.Supp. 696, 707 (D.N.J.1988) (<HOLDING>). However, these expenses are currently

    ### Response:
    holding that cercla permits recovery of labor costs incurred in responding to radiation containment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “grave reservations as to the correctness of Toolson,” the Chief Justice stated that “[cjourts are not the forum in which this tangled web ought to be unsnarled.” Id. at 285-86, 92 S.Ct. 2099 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice William O. Douglas, joined by Justice William J. Brennan, dissented and disagreed with the Chief Justice’s assessment of the proper forum for change, stating that “[Federal Baseball ] is a derelict in the stream of law that we, its creator, should remove.” Id. at 286, 92 S.Ct. 2099 (Douglas, J., dissenting). While engagingly written, the Flood opinion is not clear about the extent of the conduct that is exempt from antitrust laws. The opinion begins by identifying the issue as whether “professional baseball’s reserve sy 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.1974) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding antitrust claim properly dismissed citing flood
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    305, 307 (Minn.App.1994) (court will apply statute prospectively absent clear indication of legislature’s intent to give statutory amendment retroactive application). The legislature did not include a special enactment date nor did it prescribe retroactive application of the statute. In fact, the amendment to the Act took effect on August 1,1996, after appellants had brought this action and received a ruling from the court. See Minn.Stat. § 645.31 (1996) (legislative amendments “shall be construed as effective only from the date when the amendment became effective”). Consequently, the fact that the Act now establishes an employee’s right to recover gratuities does not further appellants’ claim. See In re Wage & Hour Violations of Holly Inn, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Appellants next interpret Holly Inn to

    ### Response:
    holding that absent clear legislative intent court will not apply statute retroactively even when it creates new remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to connect defendant to offense, but failure to instruct jury in accordance with corroboration requirement for accomplice witness testimony was nevertheless harmful error). When the State elicits testimony from an accomplice for the purpose of proving a defendant’s guilt, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that a conviction cannot be based on the accomplice testimony unless the jury believes the testimony to be true, and unless there is other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense. Green v. State, 72 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Selman v. State, 807 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)). This rule serves the legislative policy reflected by article 38.14 that such testimony implicating another person should b 99 S.W.3d at 793 (<HOLDING>). Appellant concedes that no objection was made

    ### Response:
    holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Defendant Property was involved in her illegal money transmitting business and that the Defendant Property could not be from her wages from her work on the Dawn Princess. The Claimant baldly states that the Defendant Property in fact came from cash that her employer paid her for her services in addition to cash gratuities from Dawn Princess guests. Those self-serving factual assertions do little to shed light on any legitimate origin of the Defendant Property. See, e.g., United States v. $21,510 in United States Currency, 292 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (D.P.R. 2002) (reasoning that the “claimant’s income from his construction business is at best a weak explanation for $31,750.00 in cash found at his residence”); United States v. Dusenbery, 80 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Brock, 241 U.S. App.

    ### Response:
    holding that the absence of legitimate income supports the finding of probable cause in a forfeiture action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the incident. As to the first reason, the court may not base a downward departure on the defendant’s “intoxication at the time of the offense.” § 921.0016(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, the court erred in departing downward based on its finding that Chapman lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of the offense and that his conduct was substantially impaired. The trial court’s second reason for the down ward departure, that Chapman’s need to support his child outweighs his need for prison, has been rejected by this court as well. See Rafferty v. State, 799 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); State v. Bray, 738 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The fact that Chapman has had no arrests since 1994, the trial court’s third reason for departing downward, is not d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). Reversed. CASANUEVA and STRINGER, JJ„ Concur.

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court may not depart downward based on the quantity of money stolen in a theft case based on the reasoning in atwaters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendants and April Page in such a way to distinguish this case from the holding in D.R. The alleged attack on April Page was by fellow students, not by agents of the school district or the City of Philadelphia. Under the rationale of DeShaney and D.R., April Page did not stand in a special relationship to the defendants because April Page was not in the physical custody of Officer Zulka, the City of Philadelphia, or the school district defendants. The agreement reached between the defendants and Raymond Page did not limit April Page’s or her parents’ freedom to act on her behalf, and thus such an agreement did not establish a special relationship so as to raise constitutional implications. See Graham v. Independent School District No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994-95 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The defendants are entitled to judgment as a

    ### Response:
    holding that schools have no duty under the due process clause to protect students from assaults by other students even where the school knew or should have known of the danger presented
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Days’ appeal is dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. So ordered. Wolff, P.J., and Glasser, J., concur. George M. Glasser, J., retired, of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting by assignment. 1 . Appellate courts differ as to their application of the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, in situations such as here, where they find that a dismissal without prejudice is not a final appealable order. See Stafford, Cuyahoga App. No. 72825, 1998 WL 289383, at *2 (refiling a claim under R.C. 2305.19 within one year of the trial court’s order renders harmless any error the court may have committed in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim without prejudice); but, see, Van-American Ins. Co. v. Schiappa (Apr. 29, 1999), Jefferson App. Nos. 97-JE-42 and 97-JE-46, 1999 WL 260904, at *4

    ### Response:
    holding that the saving provisions of rc 230519 commence to run on the date of the appellate courts order of dismissal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Laws Ann. § 278a-l (Official translation Supp.1991). The fact that this new section was expressly made non-retroactive could be interpreted to support the view that the invasion of exclusive territory did not constitute “impairment” prior to the date of effectiveness of the 1988 amendment. However, the better interpretation, and the one adopted by the Court, is that the 1988 amendment did not establish new law, but instead only codified the unbroken line of judicial decisions determining that a principal’s interference with its distributor’s exclusive territory constituted impairment for Act No. 75 purposes. See, e.g., General Office Prods. Corp. v. Gussco Mfg., Inc., 666 F.Supp. 328, 331 (D.P.R.1987); cf. Vulcan Tools of P.R. v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 23 F.3d 564, 568-69 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). See also Arturo Estrella, El contrato de

    ### Response:
    recognizing that naming additional distributors in a distributors exclusive territory would constitute impairment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 694. In the present case, no juror said that there had been premature deliberations. Judge Nevas conducted an individualized examination of the two jurors he thought were relevant and found neither misconduct nor prejudice. In an abundance of caution, Judge Nevas gave reinforcing instructions. He reminded the jurors “not to discuss this case with anyone,” “not to make any determinations until you have heard all the evidence,” and to keep an open mind and await all of the evidence, closing arguments, and instructions. (Tr. of Jury Trial, dated Jan. 19, 2001, at 47-48; Tr. of Jury Trial, dated Jan. 22, 2001, at 14.) “In many instances, the court’s reiteration of its cautionary instructions to the jury is all that is necessary.” Thai, 29 F.3d at 803; see also Abrams, 137 F.3d at 708 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1241-42

    ### Response:
    holding court did not abuse discretion in deciding to deal with the jurors note solely by giving a curative instruction when there was no evidence of misconduct or prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    importantly, (3) “[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause ....” Id. at 60. The first limitation provides that where the informant’s communication will not reveal the informant’s identity, such communication may be divulged. This limitation applies where the government has concealed both the informant’s identity and the contents of that informant’s communication. In such a situation, if it is possible to release only the contents of the communication, without making obvious the informant’s identity, the government is often required to reveal such information. Carbajal v. Village of Homestead, 2003 WL 23138447 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, however, ASG has already

    ### Response:
    holding that government should release contents of videotaped tip where contents of the tape do not reveal identity of those involved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    representation doctrine). We decline to adopt this doctrine. The doctrine of virtual representation apparently originated in the eighteenth century as a means by which courts of equity could “bind persons holding remainder and reversionary interests in real property to a decree adjudicating property rights as long as the owner of the first vested estate of inheritance . . . was made a party to the suit.” Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 206. The nineteenth century saw an expansion of the doctrine beyond its real property origins. Id. at 209-11. Taxpayers, for example, were held to be bound by prior judgments entered in “public rights suits” challenging the legitimacy of government action. Id. at 210 (citing Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 132, 13 N.E. 161, 163-64 (1887) (<HOLDING>)). The doctrine of virtual representation fell

    ### Response:
    holding that a challenge by taxpayers and property owners to the issuance of municipal bonds was barred by a judgment entered in a prior action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rivera-Sanchez argues that the inclusion of § 1326(b)(2) in the judgment is potentially harmful because it may cause confusion as to the number of his convictions. Such confusion, he argues, could adversely affect him if he were to face a more severe punishment based on the number of prior convictions he has in his record. This type of error, however, is at most clerical and may be corrected pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure without the need for a new trial or a new sentencing hearing. See Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record ... may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.”); see also United States v. Thomas, 774 F.2d 807, 814 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hanna, 639 F.2d 192, 194

    ### Response:
    holding that the court made a clerical error or was just guilty of creating ambiguous verbiage where it sentenced the defendant to parole under counts four and five instead of one and three and concluding that the answer is for the order to be corrected not vacated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    742 F.2d at 1258 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). Edens failed to raise his Sixth Amendment objection at trial. Therefore, in order to establish his claim now, he must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir.1990). During joint representation, an actual conflict of interest arises if the codefendants’ interests “diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 356 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. at 1722 n. 3; see also Bowie, 892 F.2d at 1500 (<HOLDING>). Edens has the burden of showing specific

    ### Response:
    holding that defense counsels performance was adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest if a specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to defense counsel but it was inherently in conflict with his duties to others 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its bad faith, can result in a breach of an obligation necessarily implied by the contract. As there is competent evidence in the record to support the finding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sun breached its duty of good faith inspection. ¶ 21 Third, we examine the effect of Sun’s breach on the other provisions of the contract. In general, when a party fails to satisfy an express contractual obligation, the lack of performance is a breach of the provision creating that obligation. On the other hand, when there is no provision creating an obligation, a failure to act in a certain way amounts to no more than exercise of privileges reserved in the contract. See, e.g., Heritage Surveyors & Eng’rs, Inc. v. Nat’l Penn Bank, 801 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa.Super.2002) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Lafayette Coll., 350 Pa.Super. 68,

    ### Response:
    holding that a lending institution does not violate a separate duty of good faith by adhering to its agreements with a borrower or enforcing its contractual rights as a creditor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 455.085.8 for walking down a public hallway toward Petitioner because of the ""no contact” provision in the order. This theory was flawed for two reasons. First, the information did not charge Defendant with violating this part of the order. See Magalif, 131 S.W.3d at 437-38 (rejecting the State's argument that the defendant’s conduct constituted a communication in violation of an ex parte order because the information only charged defendant with violating the terms and conditions relating to abuse). Second, unless the State had alleged and proven that walking down a public hallway violated the terms and conditions of the order relating to abuse or stalking, such conduct would not constitute a crime as defined by § 455.085. See State v. Cooper, 871 S.W.2d 92, 93-94 (Mo.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). 5 . We reject the State’s argument that

    ### Response:
    holding that an information alleging the defendant abused the petitioner by coming to her apartment failed to allege a criminal violation of  455085
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to im 543, 1991 WL 94403, *5 (Cal.Bar Ct.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr.

    ### Response:
    recognizing involuntary manslaughter as an offense that does not in and of itself constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    briefs, both the government and Robinson proceed with the assumption that Robinson has a constitutional right to a jury trial on certain forfeiture issues — -an assumption we are not convinced is correct. RICO forfeiture is an in personam criminal forfeiture and a form of monetary punishment. Alexander v. United States, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993). See also United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1243 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011, 106 S.Ct. 1186, 89 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986). “The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination” on the appropriate punishment for the offender. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3161, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (<HOLDING>). This analysis suggests, and we believe, that

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants sixth amendment right to a jury did not include having a jury decide whether or not he should receive a capital sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dep’t 1997) (citation omitted); see also Merzon v. County of Suffolk, 767 F.Supp. at 448 (stating that “[t]he elements of a civil ‘battery’ [under New York law] are: (1) bodily contact, which is (2) harmful or offensive in nature, and (3) made with intent”). An unlawful, a claim for assault and battery may arise.” L.B. v. Town of Chester, 232 F.Supp.2d 227, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F.Supp.2d 274, 294 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (stating “[i]f an arrest is determined to be unlawful, any use of force against a plaintiff may constitute an assault and battery, regardless of whether the force would be deemed reasonable if applied during a lawful arrest”)); see also Johnson v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 245 A.D.2d 340, 341, 665 N.Y.S.2d 440, 440-441 (2d Dep’t 1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, it is necessary for this Court

    ### Response:
    holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no contention that either the sender or the recipient of the wire transfer is domiciled in Arizona. ¶ 35 The Supreme Court has expressly pretermitted whether in rem jurisdiction over intangibles not embodied in documents can be exercised in more than one state. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 247, 78 S.Ct. 1228. We therefore need not decide today whether the wire transfers are present for constitutional purposes in more than one locale. It might well be reasonable under the circumstances of this case to consider the seized funds as present in the state from which they were sent until they are collected. It might also be reasonable to view the funds as located in Colorado, Western Union’s state of incorporation. Cf. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 494, 113 S.Ct. 1550, 123 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 212,

    ### Response:
    holding that when owner of unclaimed securities distributions cannot be found state of domicile of debtor has priority in escheat proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    situation was appreciably changed for the worse during the five-month period of delay. We do not find persuasive TMLT’s argument that a bill of review is, by definition, excluded from an insurer’s duty to defend because a defective-service default judgment, though void, nonetheless becomes final thirty days after entry, thereby ending the lawsuit. A judgment may be final for purposes of appeal but still open to direct attack. Even if the language of a policy requiring an insurer “to defend any lawsuit” against the insured does not explicitly require an insurer to seek post-judgment relief, it is illogical to suppose that the word “defense” relates only to the trial of the action and does hot embrace such relief. See 22 Eric M. Holmes, Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance § 136.11 (2d ed.2003) (<HOLDING>). While the Texas Supreme Court has not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that by that reasoning an appeal is likewise not a defense by definition but is nonetheless in some circumstances encompassed within an insurers duty to defend
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the media. Id. at § 50.10(c). However, as the District Court correctly observed, the guidelines expressly state that they do “not create or recognize any legally enforceable right in any person.” Id. at § 50.10(n). This reservation has been upheld by several federal appellate and district courts. See In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 n. 3 (1st Cir.2004) (noting that DOJ guidelines state that they do not create legally enforceable rights); In re Grand Jury Subpoena American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 1314, 1322 (D.Ark.1996) (declining to quash subpoena based on failure to comply with DOJ regulations, on ground that regulations, by their own terms, confer no rights on media witnesses). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings No. 92-4, 42 F.3d 876, 880 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The guidelines, not required by any

    ### Response:
    holding that special prosecutors failure to comply with guidelines regarding issuance of subpoenas to attorney even if applicable were not enforceable by witness through motion to quash
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    since “the State was forced to change its trial strategy mid-trial and argue in the alternative at closing because of McWhorter’s surprise trial testimony. The State’s theory had always been that Diondráy Beal was the principal robber.” The state argues that even if the trial court did err in allowing it to impeach McWhorter, the outcome of the trial would not have been different, given the ample circumstantial evidence that Dearmond participated in the robbery as the getaway driver. Further, the state argues that the jury must be presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Finally, the state notes that we previously determined that the admission of McWhorter’s inconsistent statement was proper in State v. Beal, Clark App. No. 07-CA-86, 2008-Ohio-4007, 2008 WL 3165924 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 25} Evid.R. 607(A) provides, “The

    ### Response:
    holding that admission of mcwhorters prior statement did not unfairly prejudice beal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are referred to in the complaint and central to the claim are deemed to form a part of the pleadings). III. ANALYSIS A. Compliance with Administrative Procedures Defendant contends that Plaintiffs claims based on conduct that occurred pri- or to March 12, 2011 are untimely and must be dismissed. After carefully reviewing the pleadings, and considering the relevant authorities, the Court finds that Defendant’s argument is well-taken. Congress has mandated that a Title VII complainant must seek relief through an established administrative mechanism before filing suit in federal court, and that the administrative process must be fully exhausted before the court can act. See Brown v. City of Cleveland, 294 Fed.Appx. 226, 233 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455

    ### Response:
    holding that the timely filing of an administrative charge of discrimination is a prerequisite to bringing suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    traffic light until after he has ensured that he can safely do so. 2. S driver not reckless as a matter of law under emergency response exception where evidence showed lights and siren were activated, driver slowed and looked at intersection and observed drivers yielding to ambulance, and proceeded into intersection without coming to complete stop). Therefore, DPS met its burden to establish lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Martin, 971 S.W.2d at 430. Because DPS alleged and introduced evidence that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the burden shifted to Sparks to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether Hallett acted with conscious in 2008 WL 820385, *4-5, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 2236, at **12-14 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). Sparks also cites Sergeant Garrett’s report

    ### Response:
    holding that written reprimand stating that officer failed to exercise due care and failed to comply with section 546005 were evidence that officer only acted negligently and did not raise fact issue on reckless disregard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of amount of sanctions, was not appealable until entry of order fixing amount). A notice of appeal filed prematurely can be saved by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) (notice of appeal filed after court announces order — • but before entry of judgment or order — is treated as filed on date of and after entry), but “only when a district court announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment,” FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 274-76, 111 S.Ct. 648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991). We conclude Rule 4(a)(2) does not save the instant notice of appeal filed prematurely from the dismissal order, because the order “left unresolved” the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. See Dieser, 440 F.3d at 924-25 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack

    ### Response:
    holding rule 4a2 did not save notice of appeal filed from district court orders which left unresolved amount of statutory penalties prejudgment interest attorneys fees and costs and which called for further submissions from parties to determine those amounts as those orders could not reasonably be believed to be final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim be raised not only before trial, but in the period between the selection of the jurors and the administration of their oaths, is a sensible rule.”). We also note that the fact that the rule we adopt is widely followed by other jurisdictions — both federal and state — that have considered this issue. See, e.g., Morning v. Zapata Protein (USA), Inc., 128 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir.1997) (noting that most of the federal circuits have taken the cue from Ford and “requir[ed] Batson challenges to be raised, at the latest, before the venire is excused”); McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247 (“The Court’s discussion in Batson, however, makes clear that it envisioned an objection raised during the jury selection process.” (emphasis added)); State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230, ¶ 30, 306 Mont. 517, 39 P.3d 108 (<HOLDING>). We are aware of no case in any jurisdiction,

    ### Response:
    holding that a batson challenge is not timely if the jury has been sworn and the venire dismissed and observing that sjeveral jurisdictions have closely analyzed batsons language and concluded that the us supreme court envisioned that a batson challenge must be made before the jury is sworn while citing numerous state decisions barring batson objections after the jury is sworn and the venire is dismissed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    drawback on any “duty, tax, or fee that is assessed in a nondiscriminatory fashion against all shipments” — not just imports — “utilizing ports.” See Texport Oil Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1291, 1295-97 (Fed.Cir.1999). Texport ruled the Merchandise Processing Fee (“MPF”) to be eligible for drawback, concluding that the MPF “is explicitly linked to import activities.” See Texport, 185 F.3d at 1296. On the other hand, reasoning that the HMT is “assessed in a nondiscriminatory fashion against all shipments utilizing the ports” (not just imports), Texport ruled the HMT to be ineligible for drawback. See Texport, 185 F.3d at 1296-97. George E. Warren held the ET to be ineligible for drawback, for similar reasons. See George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In December 2004, Congress amended the

    ### Response:
    holding et ineligible for drawback and ruling reversal of texport unwarranted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the estate or the creditors as a whole, obviously may not roam around collecting whatever property suits her fancy. Her task instead is to recover and manage the ‘property of the estate,’ As for the kinds of claims reserved for the trustee, first, the trustee has the sole responsibility to represent the estate by bringing actions on its behalf. Fisher, 155 F.3d at 879 (citing, at a single creditor may not maintain an action on his own behalf against a corporation’s fiduciaries if that creditor shares in an injury common to all creditors and has personally been injured only in an indirect manner.” Koch, 831 F.2d at 1349 (citing, inter alia, Delgado Oil Co., Inc. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857, 861 (10th Cir.1986)); see also In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1277 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Dana Molded Prods., Inc. v. Brodner, 58 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether Rohrig stands for the proposition that the community-caretaking exception can justify warrantless entries into private residences. See, e.g., Williams, 354 F3d at 508 (“[Djespite references to the doctrine in Rohrig, we doubt that community caretaking will generally justify warrantless entries into private homes.”). 45 Ray v Warren Twp, 626 F3d 170, 177 (CA 3, 2010). 46 See, e.g., Ortiz v State, 24 So 3d 596, 615 (Fla App, 2009) (Orfinger, J., dissenting) (“Other than situations involving the medical emergency exception, until today, the community caretaker exception has not been applied in Florida as a separate exception to the Fourth Amendment to validate an entry into a residence.”). 47 See, e.g., State v Ford, 2010 VT 39, ¶¶ 11-21; 188 Vt 17, 24-29; 998 A2d 684 (2010) (<HOLDING>). 48 United States v Quezada, 448 F3d 1005 (CA

    ### Response:
    recognizing the existence of both the communitycaretaking and emergencyaid exceptions but holding an officers entry into a private residence unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy the emergencyaid exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prison is ‘necessary’ to vindicate any identified state interest.”); see also Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F.Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J.1970) (striking down New Jersey felon disenfranchisement law because court “perceivefd] no rational basis for the ... classification” of felons as a group that could not vote). My reading of the legislative history of Article 120, much of which indicates a punitive motivation, and the lack of a sufficient rational nexus to any non-punitive purpose, suggest that any purported regulatory motivations are, in fact, disingenuous. Moreover, the potential non-punitive rationales for felon disenfranchisement are, in many cases, now regarded as illegitimate grounds for restricting the vote, and as such, should not be credited. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 96, 78 S.Ct. 590 (<HOLDING>). That leaves criminal punishment as the only

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute is nonpenal if it imposes a disability not to punish but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Texas Bar for just over two years. 5 . Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 418-19 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). 6 . This was not technically true. The number of applications an inmate could file was not limited by statute, but an inmates ability to seek relief was regulated by the abuse of the writ procedure. Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 226 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). 7 . When the applicant's initial habeas counsel was appointed by this Court to another capital murder defendant's case, such was the state of his resume. See Second Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 8, Ex parte Etheridge, No. 36-443-02 (Tex.Crim.App. hied Oct. 31, 2001). We appointed the same counsel to the applicant’s case less than a year later. 8 . Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559, 107 S.Ct 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10, 109

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel on discretionary review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in recent times.” See Wallis, 261 Ark. at 627, 550 S.W.2d at 456. Under the new approach, which is an adoption of Dr. Robert A. Leflar’s “choice influencing considerations,” Arkansas courts look to the following five factors to determine which state’s law to apply: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum’s governmental interests; and (5) application of the better rule of law. See Schlemmer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 344, 346, 730 S.W.2d 217, 219 (1987) (citing Wallis v. Mrs. Smith’s Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977) (en banc); Williams v. Carr, 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978)); see also Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). “In other words, the Arkansas Court, as the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in wallis the arkansas supreme court replaced the traditional choice of law rules in tort actions with dr leflars approach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right ... to pose questions of credibility as in an ordinary trial, but only to offer evidence which explains or clarifies that proof.” Eain, 641 F.2d at 511; see Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 605 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that respondent’s challenge to “the reliability and credibility of the evidence is misdirected”); In re Extradition of Mainero, 990 F.Supp. 1208, 1218 (S.D.Cal.1997) (“Evidence that conflicts with that submitted on behalf of the demanding party is not permitted, nor is impeachment of the credibility of the demanding country’s witnesses.”); United States v. Peterka, 307 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1349 (M.D.Fla.2003) (at extradition hearing, “the court shall exclude evidence that is proffered to ... challenge the credibility of witnesses”); Rodriguez Ortiz, 444 F.Supp.2d at 891-93 (<HOLDING>); In re Extradition of Solis, 402 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the issue of inconsistencies in witness statements are properly reserved for the eventual trial in mexico
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the claims against all the Defendants save Merrithew and DiCarlo are unsustainable because there is no evidence that they knew of the speech. In Gordon v. Marquis, 3:03-cv-01244 (AWT), 2007 WL 987553, at *10 (D.Conn., Mar. 31, 2007), the court granted summary judgment and dismissed the case after finding that the plaintiff, a police officer in the City of Hartford who asserted a claim of First Amendment retaliation, did not show that the employees responsible for various adverse employment actions had knowledge of the plaintiffs protected speech. The court stated that “[a] causal connection cannot exist if the person allegedly responsible for the adverse action had no knowledge of the protected activity.” Id.; see also Golub v. City of New York, 334 F.Supp.2d 399, 409 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (<HOLDING>); Kalb v. Wood, 38 F.Supp.2d 260, 268

    ### Response:
    holding that temporal proximity between the alleged retaliators knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action may be sufficient to establish causal connection or retaliatory motive in some cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    But a similar factual inquiry into the parties’ intent does not occur when the bankruptcy court interprets a state court’s ruling awarding fees in post-decree litigation over custody or visitation. Thus, characterization of this issue as one of fact is questionable. It is an issue of federal law, to be determined with reference to state law. Therefore, I did not find Adams v. Zentz persuasive. Other courts have used different reasoning in reaching the Adams result. Some courts, like the bankruptcy court below, have focused solely on whether the attorney fees were awarded based on financial need. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Schlitz (In re Schlitz), 97 B.R. 671, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1986); cf. Seymour Ostrow, P.C. v. Schwartz (In re Schwartz), 53 B.R. 407, 411 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>). Others have held that attorney fees incurred

    ### Response:
    holding fee awarding nondischargeable because former spouse was impoverished
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Regardless of whether the court construes the Plaintiff’s “illegal seizure of property claim” as a traditional tax refund claim, as an illegal exaction, or as a criminal allegation, the court does not have jurisdiction. A tax refund claim is a classic example of an ille 163, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (“[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]”). Second, a plaintiff must file a ecessary to invoke the court’s jurisdiction over tax refund claims. Plaintiffs partial payment of a tax liability through levies totaling $3,599.70 on a deficiency of $27,930.73 does not meet the full payment prerequisite. See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 75-76, 78 S.Ct. 1079, 2 L.Ed.2d 1165 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to plead that,

    ### Response:
    holding that the full payment rule literally requires full not partial payment and rejecting the argument that a partpayment remedy is necessary when a taxpayer is too poor to pay the full amount of the tax
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    435, 442 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2001), Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299, 302-303 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1996), and Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.1996), with McKinnis v. McKinnis (In re McKinnis), 287 B.R. 245, 257 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.2002), McCracken v. LaRue (In re LaRue), 204 B.R. 531, 535-536 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1997), Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R. 669, 674 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996), Barstow v. Finaly (In re Finaly), 190 B.R. 312, 315 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1995), and Stegall v. Stegall (In re Stegall), 188 B.R. 597, 598 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1995). 1. Section 52 F.3d 192, 200 (observing that “Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1994 to allow exemptions from discharge for all obligations incurred as a result of a divorce decree”); Osborne, 262 B.R. at 445 (<HOLDING>); Salerno v. Crawford (In re Crawford), 236

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors liability for payment of the balance owing on three joint credit card accounts assumed by the debtor under a marital dissolution agreement with his former spouse were nondischargeable under  523a15
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decided by summary judgment. See, e.g., Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2005) (“[IJssues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”) (quoting Rogers v. Peabody Coal Co., 342 F.2d 749, 751 (6th Cir.1965)); see generally Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (“We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”); Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir.1977); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that whether the gerrymandering at issue was the product of impermissible racial motivation was a disputed fact and that it was error in this case for the district court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appellant shot and killed a man during an argument over a backyard dice game in 2011. He was convicted of three felonies and sentenced to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which is 30 years. He raises four issues in this direct appeal, and we find merit in two. First, we agree with Appellant that the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury that “if [Appellant] was engaged in an unlawful activity, [his] use of deadly force was not justified if he could have reasonably and safely avoided the use of deadly force by retreating.” This was an incorrect statement of then-existing law. Section 776.012(1), Florida Statutes (2010) — the sole statute on which Appellant’s self-defense claim was based— provided that “a person is justified in the use of dead DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). This error was preserved below and was not

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant engaged in an unlawful activity when he or she uses force cannot obtain immunity from prosecution based on section 7760133 but he or she can obtain immunity based on section 7760121
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const, amend. V, cl. 4. Although the Supreme Court has stated that “[cjontract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid,” United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977), it has also emphasized that government interference with contractual rights does not necessarily constitute a taking of property: Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties 9 (Fed.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The first distinction is that both cases

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where california officials acting under the authority of a federal order occupied land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Luka testified that the trooper’s investigative report indeed reflected that law enforcement officers had unsuccessfully tried to find Coleman before trial. Moreover, Reed asserted at the hearing that he sent his friends to look for Coleman, who lived two streets over from him, but none was able to locate the potential witness. Finally, Coleman himself testified that when he first heard his name was raised in the case, he did not want to get involved. He explained, “I was like they need to keep me out of it.” Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed’s trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den.,

    ### Response:
    holding that for a habeas petitioner to prove that he was prejudiced by counsels failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness he must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed.Cir.1988). Due to the jurisdictional nature of section 2501 it may not be waived. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1577 (“[SJince the 6-year limitations period of section 2501, serves as a jurisdictional limitation rather than simply as an affirmative defense, such statu the numerosity requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) is jurisdictional); Eberhart, 126 S.Ct. at 405 (finding that the seven-day time limit for filing a motion for a new trial under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2) and 45(b)(2) is not jurisdictional); Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 414, 124 S.Ct. 1856 (finding that the thirty-day time limit for filing a claim for fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) is not jurisdictional); Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456, 124 S.Ct. 906 (<HOLDING>). Instead, the statutes at issue involved minor

    ### Response:
    holding that a time limit for filing a complaint as a creditor in bankruptcy proceedings is not jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court used the wrong version of the bankruptcy code. According to Mr. Flanders, the bankruptcy court erred by using the current version of 11 U.S.C. § 523 rather than the version that had been in effect when his bankruptcy petition was filed. Mr. Flanders claims that if the earlier statutory version had been used, the bankruptcy court would have concluded that his debt to Great Northern Transportation Co. had been discharged and that the bankruptcy court had enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over dischargeability. Prior to this appeal, Mr. Flanders had not questioned the bankruptcy court’s or the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s reliance on the current statutory version. Thus, we consider this argument forfeited. See Foster v. Hill (In re Foster), 188 F.3d 1259, 1264 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Flanders points out that • he raised

    ### Response:
    holding that an appeal point was forfeited because the litigant failed to make the same argument when appealing from the bankruptcy court to the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    124, 125 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (claim for economic loss); Flax v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ) (claim for economic loss, emotional distress, and other elements of damages). 5 . The IIED claim was Hardin's only claim against Devall. 6 . Through an election of remedies, LeBlanc elected to recover against Devall the conversion damages and abandon the IIED damages. 7 . See supra at n.6. 8 . OGA filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. on other grounds. The trial court could grant it judgment n.o.v. on the ""wrongful pregnancy” issue to the extent the law supported such an outcome even without OGA moving on that basis. See McDade v. Tex. Commerce Bank, Nat'l Ass’n, 822 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court may grant judgment nov on grounds other than that presented in motion for judgment nov so long as the party receiving such relief did file motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    excuse, or explain defendant’s subsequent conduct that resulted in Sergeant Johnson’s death. The court’s rejection of the police stop as a mitigating factor, or as some type of threat or duress ameliorating defendant’s actions, was well within its broad sentencing discretion, and therefore can not be disturbed on appeal. Ingerson, 2004 VT 36, ¶ 10. Indeed, even if we disagreed with the trial court’s finding in this regard — which we do not • — ■ it would not warrant a reversal of the sentence. See State v. Simoneau, 2003 VT 83, ¶ 21, 176 Vt. 15, 833 A.2d 1280 (noting general rule that we will not disturb discretionary rulings of trial court that have a reasonable basis even if this or another court would have reached a different conclusion); White, 172 Vt. at 502, 782 A.2d at 1193-94 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 826, 116 S.Ct. 92, 133 L.Ed.2d 48 (1995). “General harassment if not ... sexual is not actionable.” Id. See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (“Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at ‘diseriminatfion] ... because of ... sex.’ We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.”); DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825, 108 S.Ct. 89, 98 L.Ed.2d 50 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, as recognized by the Eleventh

    ### Response:
    holding that the proscribed treatment must be based on a persons sex and not their sexual affiliations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    imposing the doctrine of caveat lessee on residential leases would in effect shield landlords from lability and place tenants in an inferior bargaining position in comparison to that of the landlord. Thus, Indiana courts have consistently acknowledged the landlord's duty to render the premises habitable even in the absence of an express covenant. Although Indiana clearly recognizes the implied warranty of habitability in the context of landlord-tenant disputes, it is less obvious whether the implied warranty provides the basis for relief on claims of personal injury. See Hodge v. Nor-Cen, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (deelin-ing to address the extension of the warranty of habitability to personal injury claims); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind.Ct.App.1976) (<HOLDING>), trans. granted 267 Ind. 176, 369 N.E.2d 404

    ### Response:
    holding that upon breach of an implied warranty of habitability landlord is liable to tenant for all damages available under traditional remedies for breach of contract and for personal injury and personal property damage in tort under traditional negligenee principles
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion for postconviction relief on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Superior Court in its Opinion dated April 14, 2014. 1 . See Rodriguez v. State, 30 A.3d 764 (Del.2011). 2 . State v. Rodriguez, 2014 WL 1724778 (Del.Super.Apr. 14, 2014). 3 . Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del.1996). 4 . Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 5 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 6 . Id. 7 . Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del.1988) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 8 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 9 . Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 10 . See Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1280 (Del.1991). 11 . See Manlove v. State, 527 A.2d 281, 1987 WL 37711, *1 (Del. June 3, 1987) (TABLE) (<HOLDING>); Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 391 (Del.2011)

    ### Response:
    holding this court need not consider these criteria in any particular order or even address both if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). The law generally disfavors retroactive rule-making. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988). The Medicare statute is no exception — it requires an opportunity for notice and comment, and findings by the Secretary, before CMS can implement retroactive, substantive changes in regulations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395hh(a)(l)-(4), 395hh(e)(l)(A). Fayetteville argues that the addition of a temporal limitation to the preamble of paragraph (c)(4)(iii) was a substantive, retroactive change that required notice and comment. See Hardy Wilson Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 616 F.3d 449, 461 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). It also asserts that the Secretary knew the

    ### Response:
    holding that the 2005 amendment was a substantive change
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of timing of a summary judgment motion, the request for additional discovery in opposition to a summary judgment motion must not be raised for the first time on appeal. Vance, 90 F.3d at 1149. Although it is generally improper to grant summary judgment without affording the non-movant sufficient opportunity for discovery, the non-movant bears the burden of informing the district court of his need for discovery. Id. (citing Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a summary judgment motion is decided, a non-movant must file an affidavit pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) that details the discovery needed, or file a motion for additional discovery. Wallin v. Norman, 317 F.3d 558, 564 (citing Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the

    ### Response:
    holding that a party invoking rule 56f protections must affirmatively demonstrate  how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him by discovery or other means to rebut the movants showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    481 U.S. 41, 56-57, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). Congress intended the clause to be broadly-interpreted. Id. However, as the Sixth Circuit has recently explained: preemption and complete preemption are distinguishable concepts. Simply because a claim is preempted by ERISA does not mean it is automatically removable .... “ERISA pre-emption, without more, does not convert a state claim into an action arising under federal law.” A state claim may be preempted by ERISA; however, it is not removable unless it is completely preempted by ERISA. See Wright v. General Motors Corp., 262 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)); see also Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning behind this is that, generally,

    ### Response:
    holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the district court, we may in our discretion afford him some latitude because he was then incarcerated and proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 97 (1st Cir.2000); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir.1999). Because the outcome is clear, we elect to address the merits of this argument. Our analysis begins and ends with the language of the AEDPA’s tolling provision. By its terms, that provision applies to state post-conviction filings directed to “the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In a typical habeas case, then, the tolling provision applies only to those state post-conviction filings that seek reexamination of the relevant state-court conviction or sentence. See Rodríguez v. Spencer, 412 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Voravongsa v. Wall, 349 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that motion addressed to state appellate courts supervisory powers did not toll the period for seeking federal habeas relief because under state law that motion could not affect the judgment of conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the 2007 Amendment to the FRSA to this case. The amendment, however, is not applicable to this case. The amendment concerns preemption of state causes of actions. As discussed above, this case involves the possible conflict of two federal statutes. The court agrees with the reasoning of the courts that have found that the issue of walkways is not covered by the regulation concerning ballast. It is obvious when reading the regulation that it “is concerned with the track and its immediately adjoining area and not with railroad yards. The obvious concern, moreover, is with the safety of the train, the prevention of derailments, and not the quality of the work place provided for . employees.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 159 Md.App. 123, 858 A.2d 1025, 1050 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs FELA claim concerns defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that frsa and regulation did not preclude plaintiffs fela ballast claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shut off and a car door opening without necessarily seeing where the car parked. Furthermore, at the Franks hearing, both Hanson and Humboldt County Deputy Mark Peterson confirmed the accuracy of the statement in Hanson’s affidavit. Oct. 14, 2004 at 48, 102, 114. Accordingly, in the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, the court finds Hanson’s testimo th Cir.1995) (200 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Brady, 993 F.2d 177, 178 (9th Cir.1993) (45 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.1993) (70 to 75 feet is outside of the curti-lage); United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir.1987) (50 feet is outside of the curtilage). But cf. United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Depew, 8 F.3d at 1427 (distance of 50 to 60

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    90. The circumstances in Mr. Bassett’s case are factually similar to Mr. Taylor’s. Vanderslik did not have permission to enter Mr. Bassett’s home. Mr. Bassett locked the door earlier and emphatically communicated to Vanderslik that he did not have permission to enter. See also Espiet v. State, 797 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA .2001) (finding that an officer was not engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when he made warrantless entry into the defendant’s house by lunging through a screened window in an attempt to grab the defendant and pull him out in order to arrest him on the charge of misdemeanor domestic violence, and thus, - the state failed to make a prima facie case of resisting a law enforcement officer without violence); M.J.R. v. State, 715 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). The evidence presented by the state does not

    ### Response:
    holding that absent warrant or exigent circumstances an officer had no authority to demand that the juvenile keep the door open to his residence or demand entry into it and thus the juvenile could not be convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer for trying to close door even if the officer had probable cause to believe that the juvenile was sheltering a runaway
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the general principle of sovereign immunity [that] allows a suit for injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s actions in enforcing state law under the theory that such a suit is not one against the State, and therefore not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354-55 (2d Cir.2003). Under the doctrine, a suit may proceed against a state official in his or her official capacity, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, when a plaintiff “(a) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and (b) seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” See In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir.2007) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 945 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653, 94

    ### Response:
    holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allegations that the arbitrator ""exceeded his pow ers” and that the award ""failed to draw its essence from the agreement,” Apache never specifically alleged that the Exculpatory Clause overrode the Arbitration and Choice-of-Law Clauses, thereby stripping the arbitrator of jurisdiction to award consequential damages. See Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, at 48 (“Nothing suggests that [the arbitrator] exceeded his powers or failed to rationally infer the essence of the contract.”). Although Apache's conduct in this litigation has made it a close issue, we conclude that Apache has sufficiently preserved the argument that we will address it on the merits. 5 . See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Local 900 of the Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 968 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots

    ### Response:
    holding arbitrator exceeded authority where submission limited issue to finding proper cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Dr. Dirksmeier and the Veterans Affairs Medical Center misrepresented Dr. Dirksmeier’s level of experience and gave Wooding the impression that he had more experience performing surgeries than he actually had. Accordingly, to make out a claim for intentional misrepresentation, Wooding was required to show that his injuries were proximately caused by his reliance on Dr. Dirksmeier’s alleged misrepresentations. See Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d at 560. Thus, in this case, Wooding must show that his injuries were caused by Dr. Dirksmeier’s alleged lack of experience, and not simply a result of the surgery. This requires expert testimony, because the causal link is not obvious to a lay person. Cf. Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 589 Pa. 183, 907 A.2d 1061, 1070-71 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Wooding concedes that the expert he has

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a plaintiff must produce a medical expert to testify as to causation in all but the most selfevident medical malpractice actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that appellant was seen throwing either a plastic or a glass bottle, which was filled with some liquid, into the air in an arc, and hitting a tree. The object that was thrown was never recovered, and there was no testimony that the officer heard glass breaking. Although Officer Reddick presumed that had the object not hit the tree, it would have hit him, the fact is that the tree was there and Officer Reddick was not hit by the object. An analogous case is D.B.C. v. State, 341 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), where the sole witness to the incident testified that he saw appellant and two other boys throwing “something” in the direction of the train, but did not see what they were throwing. The trial court denied D.B.C.’s motion for judgment of acquittal, but was reversed on d DCA 1984)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the throwing of a grapefruit at a passing tanker truck thereby shattering its windshield and superficially cutting the driver constituted the crime of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have also stated — without analysis other than citation to the above cases declining to reach the issue — that the personal injury limitations period applies to ADA claims. See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Or., 570 Fed.Appx. 693, 694 (9th Cir.2014); Hubbs v. Cnty. of Son Bernardino, 519 Fed.Appx. 468, 469 (9th Cir.2013); Lancaster v. City of Reno, 479 Fed.Appx. 774, 774 (9th Cir.2012). 4 . Although we find that section 11135 provides the most analogous state-law claim to an ADA Title II claim, we note that the other state statutes proffered by Sharkey — the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons Act (DPA) — also provide analogous causes of action for disability discrimination. See Cal. Civ.Code §§ 51(f); 54(c); Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 701 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The principal difference between section

    ### Response:
    holding that because the city was not entitled to summary judgment on cohens ada title ii claim the district court also erred in granting summary judgment to the city on cohens claims under the dpa and the unruh act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must obtain a CON from SHPDA. § 22-21-265. SHPDA is the sole agency responsible for handling reviews of CON applications. See § 22-21-260(14) and § 22-21-264. Section 22-21-263(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides the scope of SHPDA’s review: “All new institutional health services which are subject to this article and which are proposed to be offered or developed within the state shall be subject to review under this article. No institutional health services which are subject to this article shall be permitted which are inconsistent with the [SHP].” Section 22-21-263(a) provides SHPDA with the authority to review all proposed new institutional health services subject to § 22-21-265. See Prime Lithotripter Operations, Inc. v. LithoMedTech of Alabama, LLC, 855 So.2d 1085, 1093 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). For those institutional health services

    ### Response:
    holding that shpda lacked authority to require a con review for a matter not subject to  2221263
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by splitting the primary residential custody of the two minor children between the parents, by failing to make a child support determination, by failing to award her alimony or explain why she was not entitled to any, and by failing to award her attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm 001) (same). This is especially necessary in the current case to overcome the presumption in favor of alimony that arose from the long term of the marriage. Because the final judgment contains no mention of the alimony issue, we remand for further proceedings. Staton v. Staton, 710 So.2d 744, 745-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The final judgment also did not address Mrs. Schomburg’s claim for attorney’s fees. We therefore remand with instructions that the trial court resolve this issue. Perrin, 795 So.2d at 1024 (<HOLDING>). The final judgment reserved jurisdiction to

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court cannot decide the issue of attorneys fees without findings as to one spouses ability to pay and the others need
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See, e.g., Fritz, 682 F.2d at 784 (“[A] motion to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is empaneled, unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay.”). Although this latter line of cases suggests that “meaningful trial proceedings” do not occur until the jury is sworn, none of these cases actually involved a motion for self-representation that was made after jury selection had begun. Thus, their focus on jury empanelment is made in the abstract and, in our view, is based on an incomplete analysis. In fact, we have only found a single case dealing with a self-representation motion that was made during jury voir dire and that case held that “meaningful trial proceedings” commenced with the beginning of jury selection. See Robards v. Rees, 789 F.2d 379, 382 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The court ruled the motion untimely and

    ### Response:
    holding a selfrepresentation request untimely where made after voir dire had begun but before the jury had been empaneled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be and the same is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to take all steps necessary to effectuate remand of this action to the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Alabama. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion To Stay, filed on October 5, 1999, be and the same is hereby DENIED AS MOOT. It is further ORDERED that the Motion To Dismiss, filed by Defendant James Thomas Wilcox on September 15, 1999, is left for resolution by the state court after remand. 1 . Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981, constitute binding authority in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Pilchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc). 2 . The facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as they must b d 875, 877 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court finds that the failure

    ### Response:
    holding that a party fraudulently joined to defeat removal need not join in removal petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officers could avoid illegal “entry” into a home simply by remaining outside the doorway and controlling the movements of suspects within through the use of weapons that greatly extend the “reach” of the arresting officer. United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1166 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.1980)). Applying the principle idea taken from United States v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Morgan determined that warrantless control of a suspect inside his own home constitutes a seizure. See id. The Tenth Circuit has similarly accepted the notion that “[ojpening the door to one’s home is not voluntary if ordered to do so under color of authority.” United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1167. See United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d at 1226 (<HOLDING>). In his affidavit, Matthew Smith presents a

    ### Response:
    holding that if a residents decision to open his door to police is made involuntarily a seizure within his home has occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Disabilities, 64 F.3d 810, 817 (2d Cir.1995). Hence, the defamation claims arise under state law only, and the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court on alternative grounds. We DISMISS all claims against all defendants. * It is specifically noted that, in affirming the result reached by the district court on alternative grounds, this Court has not addressed, and offers no opinion on, the complicated questions of whether a Connecticut probate judge would enjoy absolute immunity for ordering a person to be arrested, as alleged by Collins, or whether a conservator would be immune for requesting such an action by the police. See Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930,

    ### Response:
    holding by a 21 vote that an ohio probate judge was entitled to absolute immunity for filing a criminal complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reduced to practice in May 1993 and November 1993 patent applications. If true, these facts permit Broadcom to antedate the Burson reference, which was filed in December 1993 — subsequent to both the lab notebook and the 1993 patent applications. See generally Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1996). Having been presented with the deceased inventor’s lab notebook, the patent applications, and the testimony of a co-inventor, a coworker, and Broadcom’s expert, the jury rejected Qualcomm’s invalidity contentions. Qualcomm argues that neither the lab notebook nor the 1993 patent applications disclose every limitation of the asserted claims. Qualcomm relies on our recent holding in PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), and argues that Broadcom failed to carry its

    ### Response:
    holding that once a defendant established prior art anticipating the asserted claims the burden was on the patentee to come forward with evidence to the contrary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Regarding the subpoenas at issue in this case, the court is not persuaded that the reasoning of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (T.S.) should counsel the same result. First, it is worth noting that the cited case involved a grand jury subpoena seeking blood (evidence at the far end of the posited Fourth Amendment privacy continuum), while the material sought here is saliva (evidence falling more toward the middle of that continuum). Moreover, Supreme Court precedent in this area suggests that when a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated by production demands found in a grand jury subpoena (regardless of the type of evidence sought), the proper remedy is not to require the government (or grand jury) to obtain a search warrant. See, e.g., Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15, 93 S.Ct. 764 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, requiring the government or

    ### Response:
    holding that a grand jury subpoena seeking a voice exemplar did not implicate fourth amendment rights but suggesting that even if it had at most the government would have been required to demonstrate that the grand jury subpoena was reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case being treated differently from those in which the broker has procured the buyer is that unlike in the latter situation, the seller is not taking the benefit of the broker’s actions. “[T]he contract bound [the seller] to pay the commission if he sold the property during the period of the agency, but did not bind him to make a sale during said period unless a buyer was found by [the broker]. The utmost of his obligation to [the broker] was to allow it to find a purchaser while its agency continued, and thereby earn a commission, or to pay [the broker] a commission not earned by it in the event defendant found a buyer and sold during the period. [The seller] would have been within his rights in refusing to sell until the expiration of the agency.” Mercantile Trust Co., 128 S.W at 23 (<HOLDING>). Lewis and Henry S. Grinde Corp. precluded

    ### Response:
    holding that so long as the seller did not have an agreement with the buyer during the term of the listing agreement it was free to delay selling until after the listing agreement had expired even where the delay was for the purpose of escaping the payment of a commission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the facts that are placed forth on this record. While I’m denying your motion to suppress[,] this is in the [c]ourt’s mind a very close call and I invite you on disposition, encourage you on disposition^] to have the [a]ppellate [c]ourt look at it. On appeal, defendant argues that: THE HANDGUN TAKEN FROM DEFENDANT’S BEDROOM WITHOUT A WARRANT OR CONSENT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED AS THERE WAS NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE[ ] OR COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION. The facts upon which the motion judge relied in reaching his decision are not in dispute. Therefore, we address whether the motion judge properly applied the law to those facts. In that regard we owe no special deference to any legal conclusions reached from the established facts. See State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604, 573 A.2d 886 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The trial court’s application of the law is

    ### Response:
    holding that if the trial court acts under a misconception of the applicable law we need not defer to its ruling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of jurors’ agreement to be bound to vote in accordance with longer of two lists of facts making defendant guilty and not guilty), with Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2012, pet. denied) (“Personal pressures felt by jurors to wrap up the deliberations do not constitute outside influences.”), Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643, 660-61 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (reasoning that bailiff informing jury that it would have to deliberate another day unless a decision was reached was neutral information that would not persuade a juror to decide the case in any particular manner), and Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. Kirkland, 772 S.W.2d 226, 234 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Although juror Aguilera changed his vote to

    ### Response:
    holding testimony of two jurors that they changed their votes because of pressures to return to work was inadmissible because such pressures were not outside influences within the meaning of rule 606b and rule of civil procedure 327
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 421 (5th ed 1979)). This court also has suggested that the proper approach to defining the conduct that constitutes “dishonesty” is on a case-by-case basis. See Hockett, 303 Or at 159 (noting with approval that courts of other jurisdictions determine whether acts constitute dishonesty on case-by-case basis). To evaluate the accused’s conduct in response to Martinis’s November 25,1996, letter, we first must evaluate that letter. The first paragraph states that “[a] 11 other points of your counter offer are acceptable.” The “counter offer” to which Martinis was referring included payment of $1,400 and return of the horse. The second paragraph, however, states that Martinis was tendering $2,210 “in full satisfaction” of the parties’ dispute a (1984) (<HOLDING>). The accused acted dishonestly in negotiating

    ### Response:
    holding that accused lawyer violated dishonesty rule by retaining double payment of settlement amount when second settlement check had been sent in error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a member of a given race is never enough to make out a prima facie ease of racial discrimination, we are equally reluctant to hold that it is always enough. “The bare fact of strikes exercised against persons of a certain race does not necessarily reveal the work of a racially prejudiced mind.” Linscomb, 829 S.W.2d at 166. Thus, while statistical evidence alone may be conclusive in cases where strikes are exercised against a given race disproportionately or in suspiciously large numbers, in cases where the numbers are not so compelling, the trial court may rightly find that the statistics alone do not make out a prima facie ease. Muhammad, 846 S.W.2d at 435 (analyzing Linscomb, 829 S.W.2d at 166); see also Aguilar v. State, 826 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the proper analysis does not consist

    ### Response:
    holding that the strike of one hispanic veniremember was insufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination where the challenging party failed to show any pattern or any other evidence to the trial court which would raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove that veniremember on account of her race
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“contributions to [PACs] may be limited ... as a means of preventing evasion of the limitations on contributions to a candidate”). 1. The Challenged Limits Considered in Isolation Plaintiffs take pains to make clear that they are not arguing that the contribution limits on individuals and PACs, standing alone, are too low. Doc. 42 at 4-5. That said, and to place Plaintiffs’ actual arguments in context, 5-97, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) (upholding a $1,075 limit on individual and PAC contributions to candidates for statewide office in Missouri); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-29, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding a $1,000 limit on individual and PAC contributions to candidates for federal office); see also Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1124 (<HOLDING>). The same holds for the Act’s $10,000 limit on

    ### Response:
    holding that citizens united did not implicitly overrule beaumont
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added). Under this definition, for the Partnership Defendants to be PRPs, there must have been a “discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing” of contaminants on the property during their ownership. Id. Although we have previously concluded that RCRA’s defin 06, 722 (3d Cir.1996) (“[T]he passive spreading of contamination in a landfill does not constitute ‘disposal’ under CERCLA”), with Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The first circuit court to face the question

    ### Response:
    holding past owners liable for the disposal of hazardous wastes that leaked from an underground storage tank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    five years is permissible under Apprendi. To rub salt in the resultant wound, Craven further argues that he must be sentenced based on the minimum amount of marijuana contemplated by the statute (250 grams), which, with a criminal history category of I, would yield a maximum sentence of no longer than six months. See USSG § 2Dl.l(c)(17); USSG Ch.5, Pt. A (sentencing table). Craven’s argument has some problematic aspects. In the first place, Apprendi requires that “any fact (other .than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment....” 120 S.Ct. at 2355. At first blush, it is unclear whether drug quantity in this instance increases the “maximum penalty” permitted by the statute. Cf. United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27 (1st Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding apprendi inapplicable in heroin trafficking prosecution even though drug quantity not determined by the jury because district court sentenced defendant within the statutory maximum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In this case, the district court held a hearing that focused on the second Strickland factor, by wading into the hypothetical merits of the would-be motion to suppress. It did not, however, address the first factor and even specifically noted on the record that the hearing was not “a 2255 hearing,” meaning it was not intended to fully address the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Typically, we do not address ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal because the trial court record often does not contain the attorney’s rationale for the challenged action or inaction. See United States v. McCarty, 628 F.3d 284, 295-96 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In this case, only Mullikin testified at the

    ### Response:
    holding that when the appellate record consists largely of unsubstantiated allegations without affidavits from defense counsel or the defendant it is not adequately developed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exercise their discretion to reach a particular result. “Whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action is a question of law that we review de novo.” Kent v. Secretary of Labor, 148 F.3d 1264, 1265 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam). “The doctrine [of consular nonreviewability] holds that a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C.Cir.1999). Although our rese 70, 971 (9th Cir.1986) (“[I]t has been consistently held that the consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject either to administrative or judicial review.”); Burrafato v. United States Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 556 n. 2 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). De Castro does not deny the viability of the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that court would lack jurisdiction to review denial of visa application by consul in palermo italy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “when one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim.” Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002). On appeal of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court “conducts a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal sufficiency and to determine whether the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss was correct.” Page v. Lexington Ins. Co., 177, N.C. App. 246, 248, 628 S.E.2d 427, 428 (2006) (citation omitted); see also McLamb v. T.P. Inc., 173 N.C. App. 586, 588, 619 S.E.2d 577, 580 (2005) (<HOLDING>). North Carolina General Statutes, Section

    ### Response:
    holding trial court properly dismissed pursuant to 12b6 plaintiffs claim where plaintiff did not allege existence of a valid option contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights by using excessive force in carrying out his arrest. The Court addresses each claim in turn, applying the above stated two-part test governing qualified immunity. a. Substantive Claim At issue is the Fourth Amendment and its prohibition against excessive force. The Fourth Amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest. Graham, v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870-71, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 205 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 956, 111 S.Ct. 2266, 114 L.Ed.2d 718 (1991). This right is unquestionably an ‘established right,’ thus the Court assumes that Officers Tremblay and Dodge were cognizant of this right. See Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). The Officers’ defense thus hinges on the

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to be free from the use of excessive force has been well established since 1976
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for several days after his arm was broken except when he was taken for medical treatment or was in the presence of the major or two lieutenants. If so, then he lacked access to other inmates who might have written a grievance for him. We have stated that, when inmates cannot comply with grievance procedure without essential help from prison officials and that assistance is withheld, the failure of the officials to facilitate the grievance process effectively renders administrative remedies unavailable. See Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (vacating grant of summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-exhaust defense where inmate submitted evidence that prison officials failed to respond to his requests for required grievance forms); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667

    ### Response:
    holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    37(b) and/or (d) is referred to Magistrate Judge Fox, who handled the discovery and who is uniquely positioned to decide whether sanctions relating to discovery are warranted. 6. IBM’s motion for summary judgment on liability for foreign sales is deferred until trial. TM recognizes that it is not allowed to recover twice for a single instance of infringement. The Court cannot ascertain whether TM is trying to obtain double recovery until the evidence comes in. Thus, this motion is premature. 7. The parties are directed to appear for a final pre-trial conference on December 1 at 2 PM. Jury selection will commence on January 8, 2001. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. 1 . See Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Arma Engineering Co., 271 U.S. 232, 46 S.Ct. 505, 70 L.Ed. 922 (1926) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,

    ### Response:
    holding the precursor statute to  1498 to be nonjurisdictional as to private defendants merely establishing an affirmative defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when looking at section 606 in the context of the entire probate scheme, it appears the Legislature intended section 606 “to regulate the process of obtaining review” by providing strict guidance for probate proceedings and it did not intend “to limit the court’s adjudicatory authority.” Brooks v. Gov’t of the V.I., 58 V.I. 417, 426 (V.I. 2013). By requiring that the executor or administrator have the first opportunity to decide whether a plaintiff’s claim is meritorious, and in providing an alternative avenue for prompt summary review through the probate proceedings, it is clear that the Legislature intended creditors to file suits outside of the probate proceedings as an option of last resort. 15 V.I.C. § 606(b); see Bramwell v. Heseltine, 122 Ore. 519, 259 P. 1063, 1063-64 (1927) (<HOLDING>). The Oregon Supreme Court interpreted Oregon’s

    ### Response:
    holding the intent behind an almost identical statute is to protect the estate of the deceased person from litigation over claims which if properly presented might be allowed and paid by the executor or administrator without action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petition to permit an interlocutory appeal and therefore decline to reach the merits of the District’s challenge to the class certification. I. The named Plaintiffs in the underlying case are citizens of the District who have been receiving Medicaid-funded long-term care in nursing homes and who seek access to community-based alternatives. They brought this Olmstead action against the District, alleging it had failed to comply with its obligations under federal law— specifically, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act — that require it to “provide services to people with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.” Compl. at 2; see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs claimed to

    ### Response:
    holding that unjustified segregation constitutes discrimination prohibited by the americans with disabilities act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    twenty-seven, thirty and thirty-one, appellant complains the State indulged in improper jury argument. In each instance, appellant failed to make a timely objection and is complaining of the alleged errors for the first time on appeal. Generally, jury argument error is waived by the accused’s failure to object or request an instruction to disregard. Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 390 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1989). An exception arises, however, where the argument is so prejudicial that an instruction to disregard would not have cured the harm. Romo v. State, 631 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); see also Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15, 37 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1227, 108 S.Ct. 2887, 101 L.Ed.2d 921 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In other words, unless the prosecutor’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the prejudicial effect of a direct reference to an accuseds failure to testify normally cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a long barrel blue steel handgun. Suspect # 2 is described as a black male, short, stocky built, wearing a tan jacket, white or light colored pants and white sneakers.... Id. at A5. 67 . Wright, 2012 WL 1400932, at *38. 68 . Cf. United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404 (3d Cir.1991) (concluding that a defendant may use other crimes evidence defensively ""to negate his guilt of the crime charged against him” (quoting State v. Williams, 214 N.J.Super. 12, 518 A.2d 234, 238 (Ct.App.Div.1986))); Watkins v. State, 23 A.3d 151, 157 (Del.2011) (reversing a conviction where the trial judge excluded evidence of a similar robbery that could have been used by the defendant to support his misiden-tification defense). 69 . The State argues that a reasonable inve 82, 623 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 72 . See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438, 115 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecutors duty extends to correcting mistakes or falsehoods by a witness whose testimony on the subject is inaccurate under brady
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his desire and ability to proceed pro se on the record, and that a medical expert determined he was competent. The Commonwealth maintains that, based on these factors, the PCRA court properly concluded that Appellant waived counsel under Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1)(a). The Commonwealth em phasizes that at the May 13, 2013 proceeding, Appellant asserted that he “understands the ramifications and the pitfalls of self[-]representation ...” and “would like to proceed pro se with this case so the Defendant can perfect the record, bring the case before the Court and argue and litigate the proceedings.” N.T., May 13, 2013, at 27-28. Appellant further stated that he was confident that he could represent himself competently. Id., at 28. He acknowledged that if he is not successful, “Atto uper.2005) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237,

    ### Response:
    holding that the forfeiture of the right to counsel unlike the waiver of such right does not require that the defendant intend to relinquish a right but rather may be the result of the defendants extremely serious misconduct or extremely dilatory conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the application of the guardian ... decree a conveyance of the property, by mortgage or deed of trust....” We note tangentially that the Maryland Court of Appeals observed that ""[i]t is not altogether clear how a court in a foreign jurisdiction ‘decrees’ the sale of property in Maryland!,] ” and that Maryland law generally does not require court approval for such a conveyance. Id. at 244 & n. 6; see also id. at 258 n. 16 (""[T]he Maryland statute permitted guardians to do just what the guardian did in executing and delivering the bill obligatory.""). 3 . 11A John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 6712, at 407-08 (1981). 4 . Appleman, supra, § 6713, at 415 (describing the rule ""generally” but not unanimously fol 9 A.D. 639, 639, 291 N.Y.S. 82 (N.Y.App.Div.1936) (<HOLDING>). 7 .See D.C.Code § 21-115, which provides

    ### Response:
    holding that surety was not liable for losses arising out of 1931 acts by the principal a committee of an incompetent person because the bond agreement limited the scope of the suretys undertaking by providing that the surety would assume liability on fiduciary court bonds for all losses occurring on and after the 1st day of may 1933 and all losses as to which no notice was received by the old company prior to midnight of april 30th 1933
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    extraneous to the record evidences a financial picture different than that depicted in the bankruptcy record. Such information may be unknown or unavailable without the input of creditors. Although creditors may not enforce § 707(b), they may certainly provide information to the United States Trustee or court for their analysis. See United States Trustee v. Clark (In re Clark), 927 F.2d 793, 797 (4th Cir.1991); In re Morris, 153 B.R. 559, 563 (Bankr.D.Or.1993) (finding that a § 707(b) action is not tainted if based on a creditor’s suggestion because the United States Trustee has the duty to independently investigate any allegations of substantial abuse prior to filing the motion); see also United States Trustee v. Joseph (In re Joseph), 208 B.R. 55, 59-60 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the United States Trustee did

    ### Response:
    holding that the united states trustee may bring a  707b motion upon referral from panel trustee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court involve itself in inherently local issues? Although neither counsel for the parties nor I have found any cases resolving this issue, I find it unnecessary to do so in this case because the parties have now stipulated that the Rule 106 claim should be remanded. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and cannot act in the absence of constitutional and statutory authority. United States v. Hardage, 58 F.3d 569, 574 (10th Cir.1995). Because it is at least questionable whether I may conduct a hearing pursuant to state procedural rules to review an action taken by a local governmental body or officer, I accept the parties’ stipulation and order that this claim be remanded. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., - U.S. -, -, 116, S.Ct. 1712, 1720-21, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Qualified Immunity of Individual Defendants

    ### Response:
    recognizing that federal courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction where warranted by regard for federalstate relations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must operate over fixed routes and regular schedules. This is incorrect; Flight Options confuses a sufficient condition with a necessary one. In Central Railroad, the United States Supreme Court explained that a state could impose an apportioned property tax on railroad cars that traveled through it on “fixed and regular routes.” 370 U.S. at 614. It also recognized that a tax situs could be created in a state through “[h]abitual employment within the State of a substantial number of cars, albeit on irregular routes.” Id. at 615. Thus, fixed and regular routes are sufficient to create a tax situs for instrumentalities of interstate commerce within a state but are not necessary. See Am. Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70, 71-72, 81-82,19 S. Ct. 599, 43 L. Ed. 899 (1899) (<HOLDING>). ¶15 Flight Options contends that the language

    ### Response:
    holding that colorado possessed authority to tax property of outofstate business that furnished railroad cars to railroad companies where the cars used in colorado were not part of regularly run trains were not run at regular times and were not constantly the same specific cars
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is sufficient to convict a defendant for “carrying” a firearm under § 924(c). See United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395 & n. 4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 241, 136 L.Ed.2d 170 (1996). In order to convict a defendant for “carrying” a firearm, it is necessary only to show that the defendant knowingly carried a gun in a car that was being used as a drug-distribution center. United States v. Range, 94 P.3d 614, 617 (11th Cir.l996)(defendant who knowingly carried a gun under the floormat of his car when delivering drug money was properly convicted of carrying a firearm under § 924(c), even though there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for use of a firearm); see also, Muscarello v. United States, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998)(<HOLDING>). In Bousley, — U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 1607,

    ### Response:
    holding the phrase carries a firearm is not limited to the carrying of firearms on the person but also applies to a person who knowingly possesses firearms in a vehicle including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of $1,926 and $2,100 for electricity and natural gas bills. See In re Estate of Miller, 18 A.3d at 1169; In re Wade’s Estate, 28 A.2d at 495. Second, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in its calculation of fair market rent and maintenance for Mother while she lived at the Oakdale Property. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly based its determination on Appellee’s unsubstantiated and uncorroborated research. Appellant, however, did not object to the admission of this evidence at trial. See N.T. Trial, 5/4/10, at 252-53; R. 892a-93a. Accordingly, she waived the issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116-17 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Third, Appellant contends she is entitled to

    ### Response:
    holding failure to object in timely fashion at trial results in waiver of issue for appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    draw negative conclusions regarding Carse’s behavior and his absence from trial. Therefore, the original venire was replaced with a new panel. 3 . Carse does not claim that he was involuntarily absent at any point during the trial. “Clearly, a defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her absence from trial was involuntary. That burden is a heavy one to meet, and rightly so.” Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d at 710. Absent an argument to the contrary, we conclude that Carse was voluntarily absent from his trial. 4 . It should be noted, however, that a district court is not required to accept a defendant's waiver of his right to be present and, particularly where identity is at issue, a defendant may be required to be present. See United States v. Moore, 466 F.2d 547, 547 (3d. Cir. 1972) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Rourke was decided after briefing but

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to absent himself from the trial at which his identification would be an integral issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 1995), and King v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc., 697 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss.1997), is misplaced. In Pavone and King, for example, the courts treated whether a floating gaming casino was a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act and the general maritime law, not for purposes of Mississippi state tax law or any other purpose. 10 . See, e.g., Motorola Communications & Elecs., Inc. v. Dale, 665 F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Richardson v. Borden, 42 Miss. 71, 75-76 (1868)) (describing Mississippi law on fixtures); Bondafoam v. Cook Constr. Co., Inc., 529 So.2d 655, 658 (Miss. 1988) (same); Ziller v. Atkins Motel Co., 244 So.2d 409, 411 (Miss. 1971) (same). 11 . See Watson v. Caffery, 236 Miss. 223, 109 So.2d 862, 866 (1959) (<HOLDING>). 12 . We also note that this issue will not

    ### Response:
    holding that the term personal property in its broadest legal signification includes everything the subject of ownership not being land or any interest in land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    carried and determine the vessel’s routes and destinations. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 4-1 at 194 (2d ed.1975). We have therefore indicated that a time charterer might be hable for choosing an unsafe combination of cargo in the same hold. See Kerr-McGee, 830 F.2d 1332, 1341. A time charterer may also be liable for directing the vessel to encounter natural conditions like hurricanes or treacherous seas. See, e.g. Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d 376, 388 (5th Cir.1987) (upholding finding that, under the circumstances, time charterer was liable for death and injury resulting from capsizing because time charterer sent vessel into unsheltered water and failed to broadcast weather information); Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1041-42 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Offshore Logistics Services, Inc. v. Mutual

    ### Response:
    holding time charterer liable for injury resulting from decision to continue unloading operations in treacherous weather conditions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Palmer’s current conviction specifically provides: Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not he considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added) (defining the statutory term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”). Chapter 44 includes both § 922 and § 924, which sets out maximum sentences for offenses under this chapter. Accordingly, “for purposes of this chapter” clearly includes sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Traxel, 914 F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because the governing statute

    ### Response:
    holding that the definition in  921a20 applied throughout the entire firearms chapter of the uscode
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    therefore reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. To the extent Pollard’s appeal seeks to challenge the district court’s dismissal of GEO from the lawsuit, we affirm the district court’s disposition as to that issue. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED. 1 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), is an extraordinary precedent that gives a party harmed by constitutional error a remedy against federal officials in a way that parallels the § 1983 remedy against state actors. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006). 2 . See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 3 . And arguably a third. In Peoples v. CCA

    ### Response:
    holding that employees of a private prison management firm are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a violation of 42 usc  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supra, 157 N.J. at 474, 724 A.2d 234. Observing that of all the witnesses who testified Samji was the most credible, the ALJ determined that Taylor did strike B.M. We find that determination to be adequately supported by evidence in the record and accordingly sustain it. Our conclusion that the ALJ’s factual findings must be upheld does not end our inquiry. We also consider whether the evidence supports the ALJ’s legal conclusion that Taylor’s conduct constituted “abuse” as defined by DHS, in order to support the sanction of permanent removal from employment. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) (“A recommended report and decision [shall] contain findings of fact and conclusions of law....”). Our review of that determination is de novo. See Mayflower Sec. Co., supra, 64 N.J. at 93, 312 A.2d 497 (<HOLDING>). We are unpersuaded that the ALJ’s conclusion

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court is not bound by the agencys interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest.” Williams, 859 F.2d at 666. Because the trustee in that case was “attempting to collect money not owed to the estate[,]” he did not have the authority under the Code to bring the creditor claims, notwithstanding the assignment. Id. at 666-67. In discussing the benefits of court-approved assignment of creditor claims, the Court in In re CBI Holding remarked that “[allowing a debtor’s creditors to assign their claims for the benefit of the debtor’s estate permits debtors, creditors, and bankruptcy courts the flexibility in reorganizing or liquidating a debtor’s assets necessary to achieve efficient administration of the reorganization or liquidation.” 529 F.3d at 549 (emphasis added); see also Logan v. JKV Real Estate Servs. (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 507, 512-513 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Even where a trustee brings assigned claims,

    ### Response:
    holding that trustee may bring assigned creditor claims where estate is the real party in interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 210. Thus, Connecticut law would still control with respect to the length of the limitations period. Id.; see also. ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 (2d Cir.1997). 89. The FRCD of CERCLA would clearly preempt the accrual date of Conn. GemStat. § 52-577, which is an occurrence statute where the limitations period begins to run at the moment the act or omission complained of occurs. See Gibbons v. NER Holdings, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 310, 314 (D.Conn.1997). The start of the running of the limitations period is not delayed until the injury has occurred or the cause of the injury has been discovered. Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212, 541 A.2d 472 (1988); see Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. P’ship, 77 Conn.App. 675, 688, 825 A.2d 210 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 90. Similarly, the FRCD would preempt the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs claims under conn gemstat  22a16 were barred by the threeyear statute of limitations in conn genstat  52577 which began to run when the vendor caused the contamination of the property even though this was prior to the plaintiffs ownership of the contaminated property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “the liability envisioned by [§ 41-4-6] is not limited to claims caused by injuries occurring on or off certain ‘premises,’ as the words ‘machinery’ and ‘equipment’. reveal.” Cobos v. Doña Ana Cnty. Hous. Auth., 1998-NMSC-049, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 418, 970 P.2d 1143. Section 41-4-6 “contemplates waiver of immunity where due to the alleged negligence of public employees an injury arises from an unsafe, dangerous, or defective condition on property owned and operated by the government.” Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 653, 808 P.2d 614, 623 (1991) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). New Mexico courts have found that the waiver of immunity in § 41-4-6 does not extend to negligent supervision, see Pemberton v. Cordova, 105 N.M. 476, 478, 734 P.2d 254, 256 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), negligent design, see Rivera v. King, 108

    ### Response:
    holding that the nmtca did not waive the school boards immunity under the nmtca where there was a claim only of negligent supervision and when a fight between students not a physical defect of the premises caused the injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    enforced § 12-913 and § 12-915 of the traffic code, which King contends permitted him to park his scooter on the sidewalk. Even if King’s interpretation of these provisions were correct, violations of state or municipal law do not, standing alone, necessarily state constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 2011). “To state a claim under. § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not p 0 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Kovler v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060, 1062-64 (Pa. Commw. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Appellees’ allegedly incorrect reading or

    ### Response:
    holding that philadelphias procedures for adjudicating parking violations satisfy the due process requirements of both the united states and the pennsylvania constitutions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinion that Innomed is not entitled to a new trial on its Robinson-Patman Act claims, Innomed’s contention that its breach was excused by the alleged price discrimination is moot. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 115 (2d Cir.2002) (declining to address challenge to summary judgment ruling because it was mooted by the jury’s verdict). Innomed also asserts that, in terminating the Distribution Agreement, ALZA breached the parties’ January 26 agreement, in which ALZA promised to allow Innomed to pursue the assignment with AHP, because the termination hat ALZA breached the January 26 agreement without speculating as to the scope of ALZA’s obligations under the contract. See Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 502 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Innomed also asserts that ALZA violated the

    ### Response:
    holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party adduces nothing more than speculation to support its claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    City] had already established, and did not purposefully avail [themselves] of the ‘privilege of conducting activities within’ New Mexico, ‘thus invoking the benefits and protections’ of New Mexico law.” Customwood Mfg., Inc. v. Downey Constr. Co., 102 N.M. 56, 58, 691 P.2d 57, 59 (1984) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240)). Additionally, no choice of law provision favoring New Mexico was included a also hold that merely signing a guaranty, in and of itself, is insufficient contact to confer personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Edwards v. Geosource, Inc., 473 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (“signing a promissory obligation, in and of itself, is insufficient contact to confer personal jurisdiction”); Sibley v. Superior Court, 546 P.2d 322, 325 (Cal.1976) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826, 97 S.Ct. 82, 50

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting business in california or of the benefits and protections of california laws where petitionerguarantor had executed a guaranty in florida guaranteeing payments to a california partnership
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    distinct from jurisdiction over the person's property. ... The validity of an attachment order [over the person’s property] therefore is not settled by a court's attainment of in personam jurisdiction over the property owner. Consent to one does not imply or effect consent to the other.”). Cf. In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 770-71 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821, 110 S.Ct. 77, 107 L.Ed.2d 44 (1989) (concluding that a school board's appearance in federal district court to move to opt out of class action, and appeal of denial of that motion, did not constitute consent to exercise of personal jurisdiction by district court over the school board); Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd., S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 804 F.2d 773, 778-79 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Although we have recognized that ""an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a partys initial entry of a restricted appearance manifested its lack of consent to personal jurisdiction but that partys subsequent actions constituted a waiver of its jurisdictional defenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of vitiating the original information as fully as though it had been formally dismissed by order of court.” Id. at 694. Here, the State amended the information for the sole purpose of adding Howard’s alias. The next two issues raised involve the trial court’s instructions to the jury. First, Howard contends the trial court committed fundamental error in providing the jury with incorrect written instructions regarding the elements of burglary because the instructions stated that the jury must find the defendant entered the dwelling with the intent to commit a burglary. The instructions given below are not materially distinguishable from those which we have previously upheld, and thus, this is not a point of reversible error. Freeman v. State, 787 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Another jury instruction issue raised is

    ### Response:
    holding that the erroneous use of the term burglary in the beginning of the written jury instructions was not fundamental because any error was cured by the correct use of the term theft in the latter portion of the written instructions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to more than one person in any criminal organization”). The evidence supporting the district court’s factual determination is consonant with the evidence found in other judicial decisions applying the organizer adjustment. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 315 F.3d 929, 932 (8th Cir.2003) (affirming adjustment under § 3Bl.l(c) for “organizing the criminal activity” when defendant recruited retail clerk in advance to pass off counterfeit bills and compensated clerk after transaction); Valdez-Arieta, 127 F.3d at 1272-73 (affirming organizer adjustment under § 3Bl.l(e) when defendant provided sources to supply drugs, directed suppliers to deliver particular drugs, and decided on financial arrangements concerning deliveries); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208, 214 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence was sufficient to support twolevel organizer adjustment where defendant admitted to undercover officer that it was his fault that earlier cocaine transaction had fallen through negotiated meeting through phone calls he initiated and personally delivered cocaine to officer although defendant obtained cocaine he was going to sell from another source
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whatsoever. See (SOF 12, DE #33 at 4) (“Plaintiff has produced only his March 12, 2008 ‘Statement of Claim’ (and attached documents) in support of his alleged claim for damages”); (DE #57 at 4) (“Plaintiff has sworn that his ‘Statement of Claim’ ... completely sets forth his alleged claim for damages.”); (DE #85) (Court’s Notice of Consideration of Motion for Summary Judgement). A factfinder would have to engage in impermissible speculation in order to create a causal link between Plaintiffs alleged emotional distress injuries— which occurred over an eight-year period — and Bank of America’s alleged failure to properly investigate its reporting of a charged off account — which occurred over a three-month period. See Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 370-71 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). d. Plaintiffs Substantial Emotional Distress

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of the fcra that a claim for emotional distress must be supported by evidence of genuine injury  requiring a degree of specificity which may include corroborating testimony or medical or psychological evidence in support of the damage award 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in determining whether an encounter is consensual include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon, some physical touching of one’s person, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating compliance with the officer’s request is compelled). Lastly, we note that McKinnon has not made an argument for resentencing based on United States v. Booker, — U.S. --, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and his plea agreement presumably explains why. See JA 28 (“I have been advised that I will be sentenced ... pursuant to guidelines established by the United States Sentencing Commission.”); JA 36 (“[T]he defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed pursuant to this agreement.”); see also United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we

    ### Response:
    holding that prebooker plea agreements remain binding after booker
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the same amount. The $34,005.91 sanctions award did not include the. $2,038.00 about which Aguilar complains. Absent any controverting evidence to show that the reduced amount is inaccurate, we cannot conclude the affidavit or accompanying invoices were inadmissible based on inaccuracy. See Bullet Concrete Materials, Inc, v. Texoga Techs. Corp., No. 09-11-00162-CV, 2012 WL 586676, at *3 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (quoting Cochran, v. Wool Growers Cent. Storage Co., 140 Tex. 184, 166 S.W.2d 904, 908 (1942) (“ ‘[Tjestimony of an interested witness ... [that] is clear, direct, and positive, and free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and .circumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon, .... is taken as true, as a matter of law.’ ”));, see also Daniel, 981 S.W.3d at 232 (<HOLDING>). As to harm, Aguilar reviewed the affidavit

    ### Response:
    holding trial court free to evaluate credibility of witnesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    render their individual declaratory claims moot. Fox, 42 F.3d at 140; Mincone, 923 F.Supp. at 403. However, a student who has graduated may still be found to have a justiciable claim if he or she sued in a “representational capacity” as the leader of a student organization. See Brandon v. Bd. of Educ. of Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971, 973 n. 1 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123, 102 S.Ct. 970, 71 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981) (finding that high school students who had since graduated were acting in a representational capacity in challenging defendants’ refusal to allow their student prayer group to conduct daily prayer meetings on school property); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 514 n. 1 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 1491, 55 L.Ed.2d 519 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiff Rivas-Cinque brought this

    ### Response:
    holding that graduation of one plaintiff who was editorinchief of student newspaper did not render moot an action to establish newspapers right to conduct and publish a survey since plaintiffs were acting on behalf of student association and its members both of whom had continuing stake in the litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that may properly be decided as a matter of law. IV. Analysis J. Thomas McCarthy, the leading commentator on the right of publicity, has characterized the determination of the right’s duration as “by nature almost arbitrary.” 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Rights of Publicity & Privacy § 9:16 (2d ed. 2012) (henceforth, “McCarthy”). An “almost arbitrary” ruling is unacceptable, however. The following analysis seeks to avoid one. A. New Jersey Law Determines the Duration of the New Jersey Right of Publicity The right of publicity is a property right under both New Jersey common law and California statutory law. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917 (3d Cir.1994) (“In New Jersey, the right of publicity is a property right.”); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.N.J. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Cal. Civ.Code § 3344.1(b) (“The rights

    ### Response:
    holding that the right of publicity is descendible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s application of the Guidelines was illegal. Like Brown, Bolinger claimed that his waiver was ineffective because his plea agreement specified that he would be sentenced “under the guidelines.” Id. at 480. The Bolinger court rejected that argument, reasoning that “[t]he plain meaning of the plea agreement is that Bolinger waived his right to appeal the sentence ... unless he received a term of incarceration in excess of 36 months.” Id. The court explained that “focusing exclusively on the ‘under the guidelines’ language, ignores the plain meaning of the plea agreement and fails to account adequately for the express waiver of the section 3742 appeal right.” Id. at 480 n. 1. These words are equally applicable here. See also United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 748 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Nor, contrary to Brown’s suggestion, does the

    ### Response:
    holding that if an express appeal waiver does not preclude a challenge to the sentence as unlawful then the covenant not to appeal becomes meaningless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and transact all and singular her affairs.” 2 . For ease of discussion, the defendants in the Sullivan Suit are referred to collectively as the ""Malta Park Defendants."" 3 . In the Sullivan Suit, the plaintiffs asserted the following causes of action: (1) fraud in the inducement, (2) strict liability pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2317.1, (3) failure to exercise reasonable and ordinary care over the premises, (4) negligent hiring, (5) a Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice Act claim, (6) breach of state law as to the administration of drugs to residents, (7) breach of fiduciary duty, (8) mental anguish, (9) invasion of Ms. Sullivan’s right to privacy, (10) unjust enrichment, (11) fraud, (12) negligent misrepresentation, (13) conspiracy, (14) detrimental reliance, (15) c 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (<HOLDING>); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285

    ### Response:
    holding that private detectives report imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship constitutes libel as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in this case, unrelated to any money claim pending before it, would effectively override Congress’s decision not to make the Declaratory Judgment Act applicable to the Court of Federal Claims. Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. United States, 160 F.3d 714, 716-17 (Fed.Cir.1998); see also United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 131 S.Ct. 1723, 179 L.Ed.2d 723 (2011) (The United States Court of Federal Claims “has no general power to provide equitable relief against the Government or its officers.”). Moreover, in an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), this court can only provide declaratory or injunc-tive relief “as an incident of and collateral to” a judgment for money damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1492(a)(2); see also Taylor v. United States, 113 Fed.Cl. 171, 173 (2013) (<HOLDING>). For example, in a case brought under the

    ### Response:
    holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the original complaint are not dissipated by the amended complaint.’” Hamilton v. Bean, 745 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Hohensee v. Akron Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 277 F.2d 359, 360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914, 81 S.Ct. 277, 5 L.Ed.2d 227 (1960)). Because the infirmities in the original complaint were not cured by the allegations in the amended complaint, the district court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend. C. The district court held that “the two-year statute of limitations applicable in Section 1983 cases bars any of plaintiffs’ claims which occurred beforé October 21, 1990, two years prior to the filing date.” The plaintiffs assert that this was incorrect and that a four-year statute of limitations is actually the 19, 21 (1989) (<HOLDING>). If this Court had not spoken on this issue,

    ### Response:
    holding ohio revcode  230509d is the appropriate statute of limitations in  1983 actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942-43); accord Krashna, 895 F.2d at 114. Arguing that the first requirement is met here, Legg Mason contends that the civil enforcement provision found in 26 U.S.C. § 7426 vindicates the same interest that the plaintiffs seek to vindicate in their state-law claims—their interest in getting back their property. But section 7426 creates a cause of action against the federal government only, not against a third party who surrenders levied property. Because the plaintiffs in this case have chosen to sue the surrendering third party rather than the government, arguably section 7426 does not vindicate the same interest as does plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Cf. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560-61, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 1237-38, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs statelaw claim was completely preempted under federal statute even though relief soughtan injunctionwas not available under the federal statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    open forum for student groups could not deny that forum to a student group wishing to use it for prayer and religious discussion, despite the university’s contention that to permit students to use university facilities for religious purposes would violate the Establishment Clause. Although the Court in Widmar expressly noted that its holding there did not necessarily apply in the secondary school context, see 454 U.S. at 274 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. at 276 n. 14, many members of Congress believed that secondary school students should enjoy the same constitutional rights as their older counterparts. In the absence of an authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement, however, the lower federal courts divided on the question. Compare Brandon v. Guilderland Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123, 102 S.Ct. 970,

    ### Response:
    holding that the establishment clause forbids studentinitiated religious meetings on public secondary school property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concerning avoiding use of excessive force,” as well as ""correct training and procedures for take downs.” (See ACMC and Lo-rig’s Obj. Ex. A.) 16 .Excerpts from the Odom deposition are attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Stephine M. Wells, filed July 8, 2003. 17 . Harvey does not expressly allege in the FAC that any defendant violated her right to equal protection. Both Dr. Lorig and ACMC, however, have discussed the merits of any such claim, to the extent Harvey is asserting one. 18 . Because the Court has found that Harvey cannot prevail on her claim that Dr. Lorig deprived her of a federal right, the Court will analyze the Monell claim against ACMC with reference to the actions of ACMC employees other than Dr. Lorig. See Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, 536 U.S. 958, 122 S.Ct. 2661,

    ### Response:
    holding monell claim fails as a matter of law unless a city employees conduct violates one of the plaintiffs federal rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    non-rescission on the date of the transaction, the [lender] suggested [the borrower] had foreclosed her right of rescission.” Id. Other courts, under similar circumstances, have reached the same conclusion. In Wiggins, the borrower granted a security interest in her home in return for a home improvement loan. 62 F.Supp.2d at 92. At the loan closing, the borrower was presented a Notice of Right to Cancel form nearly identical to the form at issue here. Id. at 94-95. As with the Moaus, the borrower simultaneously signed the si .Supp.2d 829, 834 (N.D.Ill.2004) (finding a certification of election not to rescind signed at closing “was, quite simply, untrue” and the average borrower would be confused); and Pulphus v. Sullivan, No. 02 C 5794, 2003 WL 1964333, at *15 (N.D.Ill. April 28, 2003) (<HOLDING>). We find the reasoning of these cases

    ### Response:
    holding where among other things the borrower signed confirming the transaction had not been rescinded on the date the loan closed she stated a claim for violation of tila
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), compensatory and punitive damages are not available. Bradley v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 301 F.3d 952, 957 (8th Cir. 2002). In Fry, the Supreme Court declined to address whether exhaustion is required “when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific remedy she requests — here, money damages for emotional distress — is not one” the IDEA provides. Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 752 n.4, 2017 WL 685533 at *8 n.4. However, this court has noted that “the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement remains the general rule, regardless of whether the administrative process offers the particular type of relief that is being sought.” J.B., 721 F.3d at 595, quoting M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. School Dist. No. 721, 326 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2003). See Muskrat, 715 F.3d at 785 (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Fairhaven School Comm., 276 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding a plaintiff cannot avoid exhaustion simply because he or she asks for damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    directly reassured Hemphill of the court’s impartiality; and the court made it clear to Hemphill that it was prepared to conduct a trial. The Government’s argument misses the mark. The district court’s commentary occurred before Hemphill agreed to accept the offer and to enter his plea at the plea hearing. For the reasons noted above, the district court’s commentary thereby created pressure in Hemphill’s mind to accept a plea agreement or face a potentially harsher sentence as punishment. See Rodriguez, 197 F.3d at 159-60. Although the district court did indicate that it would be impartial and that Hemphill could proceed to trial, once a court has exerted pressure on a defendant it is difficult, if not impossible, to undo the coercive effects of that pressure. See Pena, 720 F.3d at 575 (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez, 197 F.3d at 160 (“Once the judge

    ### Response:
    holding that even district courts instruction to disregard an earlier improper condition on entering a plea could not alter defendants perception of courts desired disposition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sayre whole by holding McGough Construction accountable for Sayre’s otherwise unrecoverable damages to the extent McGough Construction is liable. See Berg v. Jasper Dev. Corp., 1997 WL 177655 (Minn.App.1997) (reducing tort damages award by amounts paid and payable for past and nonspeculative future damages recoverable under the Act), review denied (Minn. May 28,1997). We have attempted to reconcile the limitations imposed by the Act with Sayre’s right as a plaintiff to be fully comp easor settles potential subrogation claims for workers' compensation benefits with the employer and the employer's workers' compensation insurer. See McDonough v. Muska Elec. Co., 486 N.W.2d 768, 771 n. 4 (Minn.1992); see also Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 130, 257 N.W.2d 679, 689 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The parties agree that the statute limits

    ### Response:
    holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adopting its factual findings, Freeman did not object to the findings related to the § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement. The court therefore did not violate Rule 32(i)(3)(B). See United States v. Treadway, 328 F.3d 878, 886 (6th Cir.2003) (“We can find no reason to require a district court to make independent findings outside the PSR when the facts are undisputed.”) 3. Support for the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement Freeman’s final argument relating to § 2K2.1(b)(5) is that the district court did not make the necessary findings as set out in .3d 346, 349 (6th Cir.2001). Decisions from our sister circuits interpreting the current version of § 2K2.1(b)(5) also support the conclusion that this provision applies in the present case. See United States v. Juarez, 626 F.3d 246, 252 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mena, 342 Fed.Appx. 656, 658

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that the transferee did not wish to be associated with the firearms transactions the secretive nature of the defendants dealings with the transferee and the fact that she was paid 200 above the retail cost of each of twentyfive weapons  would give juarez reason to believe that the firearms were being purchased for an unlawful purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will “vary from case to case, depending on how intoxicated the driver is, how far he drives, how fast he drives, and how many other drivers and pedestrians are sharing the road with him”) (quotation omitted) (opinion of Rogers, J.); Eckelberry v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 340, 345, 347 (4th Cir.2006) (rejecting such a per se rule); Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1110 (7th Cir.1998) (affirming denial of AD & D benefits where insured died while driving drunk, but expressly not suggesting that insurer “could sustain a determination that all deaths that are causally related to the ingestion of alcohol ... could reasonably be construed as not accidental”); Danouvong ex rel. Estate of Danouvong v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 659 F.Supp.2d 318, 326-27 (D.Conn.2009) (<HOLDING>). MetLife’s assertion, in its decision denying

    ### Response:
    holding plan administrators denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious because the administrator in effect applied a per se rule treating all drunk driving deaths as nonaccidental
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can acquire from the debtor rights greater than those of the secured party. See generally N.J.S.A 12A:9-301 et seq. None of the concerns addressed by the U.C.C. filing requirements are implicated in the surety context. A construction surety is “secured” not by collateral per se, but rather by the “opportunity, on default, to finish the job and apply any available funds against its cost of completion.” National Shawmut Bank, 411 F.2d at 845-46 (discussing distinctions between Article 9 and sureties). The reasoning that underlies such a result is that, but for the acts of the surety to pay materialmen and laborers and complete the project, none of the contract funds would have ever been owing to the defaulting contractor. See Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965) (<HOLDING>). While it is true that Connecticut’s Proof of

    ### Response:
    holding that subrogation rights are not security interests under ucc article 9
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any statutory or constitutional contention that the agency does not, or cannot, decide, see Thunder Basin Coal, 510 U. S., at 215, and n. 20; Haitian Refugee Center, supra, at 494; Ringer, 466 U. S., at 617; Salfi, supra, at 762, including, where necessary, the authority to develop an evidentiary record. Proceeding through the agency in this way provides the agency the opportunity to reconsider its policies, interpretations, and regulations in light of those challenges. Nor need it waste time, for the agency can waive many of the procedural steps set forth in § 405(g), see Salfi, supra, at 767, and a court can deem them waived in certain circumstances, see Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 330-331, even though the agency technically holds no “hearing” on the claim. See Salfi, supra, at 763-767 (<HOLDING>); Eldridge, supra, at 331-332, and n. 11

    ### Response:
    holding that secretarys decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the appellees exhaustion was in effect a determination that the agency had rendered a final decision within the meaning of  405g
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to a requirement that, in fairness, the party wronged must pursue the remedy in a timely fashion. See generally Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L.Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950). The concern is for stale claims, when witnesses and records are missing, and memories have faded. There is also the concern for repose— after some period of time, claims should not continue to hang about, unresolved. The thought is that a plaintiff cannot sleep on his or her rights, and then suddenly demand a remedy, without creating a greater wrong against the party charged, and a wrong against the peace of the community. In Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980), the Supreme Court said: Statutes of limitations are 3d 1349 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334

    ### Response:
    holding that unenforced tobacco regulations did not constitute a taking of vending machine owners contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1380 (1975); Great Am. Ins., 492 F.2d at 825; Home Indem., 376 F.2d at 893; Newark Ins. Co., 169 F.Supp. at 957). In this case, all of the necessary elements are present for the court to conclude that the government violated its duty as a stakeholder with respect to Travelers’ subrogated equitable rights in the $32,718.99 of the contract balance that the government retained. First, “[ajbsent a viable allegation of full performance under the payment bond, the surety would be unable to invoke the doctrine of equitable subrogation.” Nova Casualty, 69 Fed.Cl. at 294; see U.S. Fid. & Guar., 475 F.2d at 1381 (citing American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133, 136, 56 S.Ct. 9, 80 L.Ed. 105 (1935); North Denver Bank v. United States, 193 Ct.Cl. 225, 432 F.2d 466 (1970)) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no dispute that Travelers

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff surety had to pay all outstanding claims owed by the contractor or it otherwise would not be permitted to share in any retained funds held by the government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    another, but only to permit a transaction which is made the subject of suit by plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects.” Id. at 611, 110 S.Ct. 1361 (quoting Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 67 S.Ct. 271, 91 L.Ed. 296 (1946)). Pransky failed to seasonably contest the denial of his claims for the 1984 and 1985 tax years through a proper refund action instituted within two years of their denial in 1992. In addition, the IRS notices of disallowance were forwarded to Pransky at least four months before the filing of his 1987 tax return on July 20, 1992. See 1(A) supra. The debtor cannot revive the denied and unpursued claims from his 1984 and 1985 tax returns by affixing them to a later claim. See Strat-more v. United States, 463 F.2d 1195, 1197 (3d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). Pransky filed for bankruptcy in January 1997,

    ### Response:
    holding that the purpose of  6532a1 would be contravened if a taxpayer could raise previously denied claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967) and Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992). MBNA claims these two cases “underpin[] all commerce clause nexus analysis.” (See Pet’r Br. at 12-16.) Consequently, the resolution of this case hinges on: 1) whether the holdings of Bellas Hess and Quill control, and, if not, 2) whether economic presence satisfies the substantial nexus requirement for purposes of Indiana’s FIT. Before 1967, the Supreme Court explained that when determining whether a nexus existed between a taxing State and a taxpayer, physical presence was not the sole factor. See, e.g., Nw. States Portland Cement v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452, 79 S.Ct. 357, 3 L.Ed.2d 421 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court held that

    ### Response:
    holding that a state may tax the net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation  provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing state forming sufficient nexus to support the same
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a party,"" and concluded Penrose did not qualify under either category. Id. at TV 12, 14, 20. 115 In Penrose, we analyzed the facts under an identity of interest theory, and did not permit relation back where the plaintiff had attempted to add a new party in an amended complaint after the statute of limitations had run. See id. at TT20-21. We concluded there was not an identity of interest between the teenage driver of a car involved in a car accident and his father, the owner of the car, in part because their defenses and potential lability were different. See id. at 1119-20. Therefore, we determined that the plaintiff could not use rule 15(c) to add the driver as a defendant after the statute of limitations had run. See id.; but ef Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 130, 53 P.3d 2 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 16 We conclude that Persrose is not

    ### Response:
    holding that an identity of interest existed between the university and one of its doctors because the university took steps to provide counsel for the doctor and required that all communications concerning the plaintiffs claim be sent to the universitys risk management attorney or to the doctors counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Biotronix 2000 failed to communicate to Safety Technologies a material fact and that Safety Technologies justifiably relied upon Biotronix 2000 to communicate that fact to the plaintiff. Biotronix 2000, therefore, is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. • Prejudgment interest In its brief in support of punitive damages, Safety Technologies requests that the court order prejudgment interest. The allowance of prejudgment interest under Kansas law is a matter of judicial discretion. See K.S.A. § 16-201; Miller v. Botwin, 258 Kan. 108, 118, 899 P.2d 1004 (1995); Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 245 Kan. 724, 737, 783 P.2d 900 (1989). “The general rule in Kansas is that prejudgment interest is allowable on liquidated claims.” Miller, 258 Kan. at 11 616, 618 (D.Kan.1995) (<HOLDING>). In a fraud case, a concrete amount of money

    ### Response:
    holding that the amount of damages in a sex discrimination case was in dispute until the court entered judgment on the jury verdict the sum was not liquidated for ksa  16 201 purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.W.2d 75, 76 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1977, no writ), that the macaroni salad had been on the floor as long as the surrounding dirt on the floor, or that the dirt on the macaroni salad had dried, suggesting that it had been there for a prolonged period of time. The presence of footprints or cart tracks in the macaroni salad equally supports the inference that the tracks were of recent origin as it supports the opposite inference, that the tracks had been there a long time. In Kimbell, Inc. v. Roberson, 570 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tex. ike it had been there awhile” is mere speculative, subjective opinion of no evidentiary value. The witnesses had not seen the macaroni salad prior to the fall and had no personal knowledge of the length of time it had been on the floor. See Robledo, 597 S.W.2d at 561 (<HOLDING>); Roberson, 570 S.W.2d at 589 (rejecting the

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    18, 1997, when her time to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court expired. See Michigan Court Rule 7.302(C)(2). Although Allen’s brief is not clear on this point, she appears to argue that her conviction was actually final much earlier, on October 14, 1994, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied her application for leave to cross-appeal the Court of Appeals’s decision affirming her assault conviction. She argues for this earlier date in the apparent belief that it bolsters her contention that equitable tolling should be applied. See Part II.C.l. below. Because Allen’s conviction, under this theory, would have been final prior to the enactment of AEDPA, Allen’s time to file her habeas petition would have expired on April 24, 1997. See Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Allen, however, did not file her habeas

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of aedpa had a oneyear grace period after aedpas effective date to file their federal habeas petitions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the profits and/or other monetary sanctions.” Am. Compl. ¶ 69; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 123 (stating that Defendants “engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to misrepresent, omit to disclose, and conceal material information about the true nature and value of securities of Veras Offshore ... in connection with Gottex’s acquisition of Veras Offshore securities.”). Alternatively, Gottex could have sued to recover rescissionary damages the amount that it alleges was wrongfully withheld when Veras refused to return the full amount of its investment. See, e.g., Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 604 (2d Cir.1978) (permitting plaintiff to recover rescissionary damages for Rule 10b-5 claim); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F.Supp. 1449,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff was entitled to sue under rule 10b5 for the difference between the price and the value received from the sale of the security where as here the evil is not the price at which plaintiff bought but the fact of being induced to buy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    corroborate her expulsion. Not even her mother’s letter mentions it, and she claims her mother heard about her expulsion. The problems with Trashehotk-ina’s explanations mean that the record does not compel us to hold that evidence corroborating the court summons or her expulsion was not reasonably obtainable. IV. Finding that key parts of Trashchotki-na’s testimony were implausible and that she failed to produce enough corroborating evidence to compensate for those implausibilities, the IJ and the BIA denied her asylum claim. Because the record does not compel us to conclude otherwise we must affirm that decision. Trashchotki-na’s ineligibility for asylum means that she is also ineligible for withholding of removal. See Rivera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 815, 820-21 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Having no other challenges to the BIA’s

    ### Response:
    holding that an alien who has failed the wellfounded fear test for asylum will necessarily fail the more stringent more likely than not test for withholding of removal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute). We construe rules in their entirety, not piecemeal. Cf. Vector Mktg. Corp., 156 N.H. at 783. While decisions of the federal courts may be helpful in interpreting analogous New Hampshire rules of evidence, we are the final interpreter of our rules. N.H. R! EV. 102. The defendant argues that a conviction for receiving stolen property is always suitable for cross-examination under Rule 609(a)(2) because theft is always a crime of dishonesty. We disagree. We have never addressed the admissibility of receiving stolen property under Rule 609(a)(2). While courts in several states do hold that theft, analogous to receiving stolen property, is per se dishonest and thus admissible under their state rules of evidence, see, e.g., State v. McKinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 909 (Wash. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Com. v. Ellis, 549 A.2d 1323, 1334 (Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding receiving stolen property is per se dishonest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Columbia, is subject to numerous delay-causing vicissitudes) could not be assured to arrive in time to extend the 60-day period. Requiring unduly early mailings to compensate for unknown mail delivery delays would force government agencies to decide large and complex monetary claims in significantly less time than the 60 days provided by statute, and thus, presumptively, in less time than intended by Congress. Plaintiff’s interpretation also would require the courts and Boards of Contract Appeals to act on claims that were not ripe and that might have been resolved more fairly, economically, and efficiently in the first instance, by those more familiar with the contract’s administration, at the agency level. Moreover, if the date hinged on actual receipt, contractor 1 BCA ¶ 28,981 (<HOLDING>); Northrop Grumman Corp., (1999 ASBCA) 99-1 BCA

    ### Response:
    holding that a notification letter dated 10 days before the expiration of the 60day period was timely  and ignoring the date of receipt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    records and insurance documents, some of which were not previously before the Board. The RO, however, determined that the evidence of record was insufficient to reopen the claim for PTSD. Anglin filed a notice of disagreement with the decision by the RO. Following a hearing in August 1995, the Board also determined that the evidence was insufficient to reopen Anglin’s claim. The CAVC affirmed the relevant portion of the Board’s decision. The CAVC noted that Anglin could not reopen his claim for service connection for PTSD unless he was able to present new and material evidence that the alleged stressor occurred while he was on active duty. In refusing to reopen Anglin’s claim, the CAVC cited the first prong of the so-called Colvin test. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 171 (1991) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part by Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liable for hostile environment sexual harassment. In addition, Faragher argues that the harassment was so pervasive that the City should be charged with constructive knowledge of Terry’s and Silverman’s conduct. The City argues that it cannot be held liable under agency principles for Terry’s and Silverman’s conduct because there is no evidence which supports a finding either that Terry and Silverman were acting within the scope of their authority in harassing Faragher, or that they were aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of their agency relationships with the City. The City further contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the City had constructive notice of Terry’s and Silverman’s conduct. VI.Discus 1486 (3d Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>); and EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff must prove that management level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually  hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would have a restrictive effect on county powers rather than a liberal one — that is, it would be restrictive on the successor governing body. Again, we find the statutory requirement to liberally construe the powers of a county, as long as consistent with our Constitution and general laws, to be compatible with Newman’s policy of prohibiting local governing bodies from binding their successors as to governmental functions unless clearly authorized by enabling legislation. Cunningham argues in the alternative that the payment of severance under his employment contract would be a proprietary function rather than a governmental function, and, hence, the 2008 Council was permitted to bind the 2009 Council as to payment of his severance. See Cowart I, 319 S.C. at 132, 459 S.E.2d at 880 (<HOLDING>). Again, the appointment of a public officer is

    ### Response:
    holding that if the contract involves the exercise of the municipal corporations business or proprietary powers it is binding on successor bodies if at the time the contract was entered into it was fair and reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the municipality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence during the preliminary investigation of a crime and made false statements at a press conference announcing the indictment of the petitioner. The Court held that the prosecutors did not have absolute blishing that absolute immunity protects him from potential liability for the other instances of misconduct alleged by Moore. Intimidating and coercing witnesses into changing their testimony is not advocatory. It is rather a misuse of investigative techniques legitimately directed at exploring whether witness testimony is truthful and complete and whether the government has acquired all incriminating evidence. It therefore relates to a typical police function, the collection of information to be used in a prosecution. See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis original). “When a prosecutor

    ### Response:
    holding acquiring evidence which might be used in a prosecutionin contradistinction to organization evaluation and marshalling of such evidence is activity of police nature and is therefore not entitled to absolute protection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it must be satisfactory to us” bestowed upon the plan’s administrator discretion regarding the payments of benefits, and therefore, an arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied. Id. at 379. Here, the plan stated that “when proof is received by [Defendant] that an insured employee is totally disabled ..., [Defendant] will pay a monthly benefit to the insured employee after the completion of the elimination period. This monthly benefit will be paid as long as total disability continues provided that proof of contingent total disability is submitted ... to [Defendant] upon request.” The Court finds that this language is sufficiently similar to that found in Patterson and Donato by which we are bound. See Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, an arbitrary and capricious

    ### Response:
    holding that language determined on the basis of medical evidence satisfactory to the committee sufficiently granted plan administrator discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    359-C:8,1(c), :10,1(b), :12, :14. It is apparent from reading the statute in its totality that the reference in section 13 to “action[s] to enforce liability for a violation of... this chapter” is meant to refer to those remedies explicitly authorized by the statute and is not intended to create any additional rights of action. Although we generally presume that the legislature does not use superfluous or redundant words, see Appeal of Derry Educ. Assoc., 138 N.H. 69, 71 (1993), interpreting RSA chapter 359-C to create additional remedies would circumvent the statute’s plain meaning, in light of the express language in section 14-a. Cross further argues that she is entitled to costs and attorney’s fees associated with her suppression motion. See State v. Flynn, 123 N.H. 457, 465 (1983) (<HOLDING>). At oral argument, Cross’ counsel conceded

    ### Response:
    holding that because suppression of illegally obtained evidence is a form of injunctive relief suppression of defendants bank records obtained in violation of rsa chapter 359c is an appropriate remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ENFORCEABLE? It is well settled that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir.1996). However, “the presumption of [validity] that forum selection ... provisions enjoy is not absolute, [rather such provisions] may be overcome by a clear showing that they are ‘unreasonable under the circumstances.’ ” Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907). In Allen, the Fourth Circuit explained that choice of forum “provisions may be found unreasonable if (1) their formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the complaining party ‘will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day at 593-94, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (<HOLDING>). Relying on Yoder, ACC contends Oracle had

    ### Response:
    holding that nonnegotiated forum selection clause in a cruise ticket was enforceable and reasonable because 1 a cruise fine has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit 2 a cruise ship typically carries passengers from many locales it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line to litigation in several different fora 3 a forum selection clause  has the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must be brought and defended sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions and 4 because passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause  benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and at oral argument EPA was emphatic: it did not waive its non-merits, threshold defense that Petitioners are barred from challenging the wastewater limits because they failed to object to them during the notice and comment period. Resp. Br. 33-35; Oral Arg. Rec. at 30:00-32:00; 40:30-45:00. EPA contended that, if the court found the issue to be properly before the court, then and only then would EPA “not oppose” a stay or vacatur of the wastewater limits. Resp. Br. 35. EPA’s consent is not alone a sufficient basis for us to stay or vacate a rule. The court is not bound to accept, and indeed generally should not uncritically accept, an agency’s concession of a significant merits issue. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The risk is that an agency could circumvent

    ### Response:
    holding that courts will not defer to an agencys litigating position where it contradicts the agencys prior regulations rulings or administrative practice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will suffer an “undue hardship” if required to repay the Loan. Under the first prong, Marcotte has shown that, without considering the Loan payments, his monthly income is insufficient to meet his basic needs. Therefore, if required to make monthly payments on the Loan, his budget would result in a larger deficit and he would be unable to maintain a minimal standard of living. With regard to the second prong, Mar-cotte has proven that additional circumstances exist indicating that his state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the loan’s repayment period. His injuries have rendered him unable to work and there is no indication that his condition will improve. He collects SSDI as his only income and his medical expenses will persist. Cf. Spence, 541 F.3d at 544 (<HOLDING>); Frushour, 433 F.3d at 401 (finding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that debtor failed to meet the second prong because despite the fact that debtor suffers from diabetes and high blood sugar those ailments did not affect her ability to work fulltime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988)). Rather, a plaintiff will satisfy the “injury” requirement if it demonstrates merely a credible or well-founded fear that the statute will be enforced against it. See id. (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)). A plaintiff demonstrates proof of a credible or well-founded fear of prosecution if the statute in question can reasonably be construed to cover the expressive or communicative activities in which a plaintiff presently engages or reasonably intends to engage in the future. See id. at 380-83; Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 299-300, 99 S.Ct. 2301; Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F.Supp.2d 459, 475-76 (D.Vt.2000). Compare Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 331 (2d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). The government’s contention that it does not

    ### Response:
    holding that unsubstantiated  alllegations of a subjective chill  do not establish an injury in fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir.2000) (“The fact that management’s optimism about a prosperous future turned out to be unwarranted is not circumstantial evidence of conscious fraudulent behavior or recklessness: People in charge of an enterprise are not required to take a gloomy, fearful or defeatist view of the future; subject to what current data indicates, they can be expected to be confident about their stewardship and the prospects of the business that they manage.” (quotations omitted)). 85 . 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(A). 86 . In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F.Supp.2d 613, 629 (S.D.N.Y.2003). Accord Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc., 122 F.Supp.2d 407, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (observing that the bespeaks caution doctrine ""doe 66, 292 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>). 92 . Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs must specifically allege defendants knowledge of facts or access to information contradicting their public statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (13th ed.2006) (collecting cases). In the District of Columbia, however, “where compliance with notice provisions is a contractual precondition to coverage, a failure to timely notify releases the insurer from liability.” Greycoat Hanover F Street Ltd. P’ship, 657 A.2d at 768 (contrasting District of Columbia law to that of Maryland, which “is more favorable to an insured on the issue of notice in that it requires that the insurer show actual prejudice before it may assert a defense of late notice”); Diamond Service Co., Inc. v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 476 A.2d 648, 652 (D.C.1984) (notice provisions are “of the essence” of insurance contracts and are “given effect in the interest of the public as well as the insurer”); Greenway v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 307 A.2d 753, 756 (D.C.1973) (<HOLDING>). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in

    ### Response:
    holding that actual prejudice is not a necessary element of an insurers untimely notice defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    principle, even though individual instances of the regulated activity may not have substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at 1215. However, the class of activities analysis set forth in Robinson must be read in the context of a prosecution under the Hobbs Act, a statute providing for an interstate commerce nexus. United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 677 n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); see Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1213 (jurisdictional element explicitly limits the scope of the Hobbs Act to those robberies and extortion schemes which affect interstate commerce). Since this Court’s Aug. '9, 1996 order was entered in Sierra Club v. San Antonio, two circuit courts of appeals have addressed the constitutionality of the ESA: National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) and Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding that the esa can protect a species that lives in only one state by virtue of the national interest in biodiversity and other factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and appellant incorrectly argues on appeal that the DNA evidence was the “sum and substance of the State’s case.” Appellant had admitted that Ethan sucked his penis on multiple occasions for one to two minutes, and appellant admitted to ejaculating on the floor of the prison and inside Ethan’s mouth. Thus, the evidence supporting the conviction was strong, and the jury certainly would have convicted appellant regardless of the improper argument. Further, by “sustaining appellant’s objection and instructing the jury as it did [to disregard the prosecutor’s statement], the trial court sufficiently ameliorated any potential harm.” Id. at 700. We cannot conclude this was an extreme case with incurable prejudice warranting reversal. See id. at 699; see also Tucker, 15 S.W.3d at 238 (<HOLDING>). The trial court’s decision was within the

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecutors argument injecting new facts based on specialized experience was harmless even though the first factor favored reversal because the trial court told the jury to disregard the comment and the evidence of the defendants selfdefense claim was tenuous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    There was, in other words, no possibility of “stacking” exemptions in Louisiana at the time McManus was decided, and Congress did not modify McManus when it eliminated “stacking” for all debtors in 1984. Pursuant to Allen, Texas debtors are no worse off than Louisiana debtors following McManus, and the 1984 amendment of § 522(b) does not undermine the validity of either holding. Appellants finally resort to the contention that our prior decisions erroneously construe § 522(f) and should be reversed. There is a split of authority on this question concerning the interaction of § 522(f) and state exemption statutes. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.29 n. 2a (15th Ed. 1987). Compare In re Bland, 793 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc), questioning In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), with In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir.1983),

    ### Response:
    holding that state law limiting exemptions on personal property encumbered by nonpurchase money nonpossessory liens did not preclude operation of  522f
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facts were more than sufficient to establish exigent circumstances warranting entry into the defendant’s house. The officers had been dispatched in reference to a kidnapping, and the 911 call that precipitated the dispatch was corroborated by the officers when they arrived at the defendant’s house. The 911 caller was at the scene, and she told the police that she had observed the defendant drag the victim into the house by the neck and heard the victim calling for help. Officer Jean-Francois was able to confirm that there was a woman in the house when he personally heard her screams. Under these circumstances, the officers’ belief that immediate action was necessary to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury was reasonable. See Arango v. State, 411 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1982) (<HOLDING>). The subsequent search of the defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that where safety is threatened and time is of the essence the courts have recognized that the need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides justification for an otherwise invalid entry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    these cases support her argument that wrongful death actions fall within the purview of section 13 — 214(a). We find the cases cited by plaintiff of little precedential value. In none of the cases cited by plaintiff was the reviewing court asked to decide whether the construction statute of repose governed over the Act’s two-year statute of limitations. In fact, none of these cases cite to or mention the Act’s two-year limitations period. We are also unpersuaded by plaintiffs reliance on cases comparing the limitations period in section 13 — 214(a) of the Code with the limitations period found in other statutory provisions of the Code. None of those cases addressed the role of the Act’s limitations period. See, e.g., Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Tatara, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 1038 (same);

    ### Response:
    holding that the limitations period in section 13  214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13  202 of the code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the remand order in CV-29. And as the district court’s order in CV 29 was not itself a § 1477(c) remand order, § 1447(d) does not preclude this court from reviewing the district court’s legal determination that it had no authority to review the remand order. ii) Certification Plaintiffs also contend that federal court jurisdiction in this case was divested when the district court clerk sent a certified copy of the April 1999 remand order to the Michigan state court. In dicta, we have recognized that such certification generally divests federal courts of jurisdiction. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 531 (6th Cir.1999). Several other circuits have explicitly adopted this divestment principle. See, e.g., In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 732, 735 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that mere entry of a remand order divests a federal court of jurisdiction even where no certified copy of the order was mailed to a state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and on reconsideration. (T. 95-97). An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing in the case on February 20, 1996 (T. 29-77), and issued a decision dated April 22, 1996. (T. 16-20). The ALJ found that Jermaine was not eligible for SSI benefits. (T. 20). That determination became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review on April 23, 1998. (T. 5-6). This action, commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), to review the Commissioner’s determination followed. DISCUSSION A. The Standard of Review The first issue to be determined by this Court is whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770 (2d Cir.1999); see also Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109,

    ### Response:
    holding that the court must first review the aljs decision for correct legal principles before applying the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    harassing behavior,” and (b) “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257; accord Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d at 125. In this case, Petrosino asserts that Bell Atlantic is automatically vicariously liable for the gender-hostile work environment created by its employees and supervisors because that conduct culminated in two tangible adverse employment actions: her failure to receive managerial promotions and her constructive discharge. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that constructive discharge may qualify as a tangible employment action depriving employer of right to assert affirmative defense when a supervisors official act precipitates the constructive discharge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting R. Gerber, Criminal Law in Arizona 197 (1978)). A.R.S. section 13-1402 was also discussed in Rolph v. City Court of City of Mesa, 127 Ariz. 155, 618 P.2d 1081 (1980), another decision involving charges brought pursuant to A.R.S. section 13-1403. In Rolph, the Arizona Supreme Court contrasted the two statutes and held that A.R.S. section 13-1402 (indecent exposure) was not a lesser included offense of A.R.S. section 13-1403 (public sexual indecency) as the latter statute did not require public nudity as an element. Id. at 159, 618 P.2d at 1085. As a result, it was unnecessary for the court to determine what other elements were required for a conviction under A.R.S. section 13-1402. See also State ex rel. Baumert v. Superior Court, 130 Ariz. 256, 257, 635 P.2d 849, 850 (1981) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of prior controlling court

    ### Response:
    holding that a violation of ars section 131402 was not subject to a misdemeanor compromise remedy by civil action pursuant to ars section 133981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the government’s reasons for not producing the witness. This was error under Rule 32.1. Further, we cannot conclude that the district court would have admitted the hearsay if it had properly balanced the interests because, even if the hearsay was reliable (which we think it was), the government has offered no reason whatsoever for failing to produce Simmons. Accordingly, there is nothing in the record to balance against Mosley’s interest. Nonetheless, even where a proper balancing of the interests would weigh in favor of excluding hearsay, its erroneous admission may still be harmless for the alternate reason that the violation of supervised release would have been found even without the hearsay evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999, 1003-04 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). That is the case here because, considering

    ### Response:
    holding that admission of hearsay was harmless where strong circumstantial evidence established the same facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 73, 110 S.Ct. 2729; Suarez, 202 F.3d at 686. As detailed above, myriad evidence establishes that the 2016 Plan makes it easier for supporters of Republican candidates to translate their votes into seats in the state’s congressional delegation and diminishes the need for Republican representatives to respond to the interests of voters who support non-Republican candidates. See supra Part III.B. Accordingly, even if the speech of voters who support non-Republican candidates was not in fact chilled — if, for example, they had all continued to vote for, speak on behalf of, donate money to, and campaign for such candidates — the 2016 Plan nonetheless “adversely affected” such voters’ First Amendment rights by diluting the electoral power of their votes. Shapiro, 203 F.Supp.3d at 597-98 (<HOLDING>). The principle that vote dilution— the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that dilution of disfavored partys electoral power constitutes adverse effect cognizable under the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immediate relative of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (1994). See also In re Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 558 (BIA Feb. 12, 2003); Matter of Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I & N Dec. 472, 474 (BIA 1996) (finding rescission of an in absentia deportation order under § 242B(e)(3)(A), when petitioner filed to reopen within 180 days of the deportation order due to exceptional circumstances). Both the immigration court and the Board noted that the 180 day time period prescribed in § 242B(c)(3)(A) could be subject to equitable tolling due to Muresan’s ineffective assistance of counsel and, thus, suspended from running until Scorteanu had received actual notice. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897-98 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable tolling is available where petitioners attorney engaged in fraudulent or deceptive acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and insults that she endured from her supervisor. In particular, Fuchs stated that her supervisor suggested that Fuchs “realize [she is] broken and go on disability.” Fuchs claimed that her supervisor has questioned her repeatedly about the length of time she requires to use the restroom, and has limited the times during which Fuchs may use the restroom during the workday. Fuchs testified about other actions her supervisor has taken against her, including questioning the volume of work Fuchs completes each day, punishing Fuchs for tardiness, denying Fuchs’s request for leave to see her doctor, and requiring a note from Fuchs’s doctor before allowing her to wear tennis shoes to work. Fuchs testified during her deposition that she believed her supervisor’s remarks and conduct were “in ) (<HOLDING>). Here, viewing the facts in the light most

    ### Response:
    holding that it is peculiarly the jurys function to pass upon what would meet the requirements or satisfy the mind of the theoretical reason able ordinary person which the law gives to the jury as a standard by which to measure human conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the grounds that a jury could have found Shin guilty based on any of three alternate theories: (1) [Shin’s] knowledge, when she prepared the fraudulent loan applications at issue, that they would ultimately be submitted to [J.P. Morgan] Chase; (2) [Shin’s] aiding and abetting of her co-conspirators in committing these offenses; and (3) the fact that [] these offenses were committed in the scope and in furtherance of the wire fraud conspiracy and the acts were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy. (App. 1298-99.) We agree. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as principal.”); United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the criminal act of one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is attributable to the other conspirators for the purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In interpreting Perdue, this Court stated that, “because Congress expressly limited the applicability of § 3582(c)(2) to ‘defendants] whose sentence was based on a subsequently-lowered sentencing range’ and Amendment 706 did not change the base offense level for career offenders under § 4B1.1, defendants sentenced as career offenders are not eligible for sentence modification under § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 706.” United States v. Williams, 367 Fed.Appx. 578, 578 (6th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (quoting Perdue, 572 F.3d at 292) (internal quotation marks omitted by Williams court) (affirming district court’s denial of a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 706 because of the defendant’s status as a career offender); see also United States v. Gillis, 592 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bridgewater, 606 F.3d 258,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant determined to be a career offender is ineligible to receive the benefits of amendment 706
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official policymaker of employment policy at the BPW. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (noting that ability to make municipal decisions is necessarily the power to make final decisions); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (same); Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1118 (“If the decision to punish [plaintiff] for exercising his constitutional rights was made by the ‘government’s authorized decisionmakers’ the City is responsible.”). Moraw ments involved purely private matters and should not be considered protected speech, the Court concludes that these comments are most accurately described as concerning public matters in which Plaintiff also had a private interest. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (<HOLDING>); Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Protection

    ### Response:
    holding that even though speech was motivated by personal grievances it would still be protected conduct if it dealt with public concerns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    record of each person whose name was referred to it. 10 U.S.C. § 628(c)(1) (2000). The SSBs that declined to promote Richey on his corrected military record submitted reports to the Secretary that met these certification requirements. (J.A. 201-07). The SSB reports certified that “[t]he board, acting under oath and having in view the special fitness of an officer and the efficiency of the Army, has carefully considered the record of every officer whose name was furnished to it under Section 628, Title 10.” (J.A. at 201, 205) (emphasis added). The court could not require the SSBs to meet additional reporting requirements beyond those that were mandated by the statute. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 548, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, even when the statutory

    ### Response:
    holding that a court cannot impose procedural re quirements on an agency beyond the minimum requirements imposed by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the case and supported by the record, even if it was not a ground presented to, or relied upon, by the trial court. See Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 336 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Under these circumstances, the State’s issue affords no basis for reversal. Accordingly it is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. FOWLER, J., dissenting. 1 . The State may appeal an order in a criminal case granting a motion to suppress evidence. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon Supp.2005). 2 . Because it has not been raised by the State, we do not address whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule even applies to a community supervision revocation proceeding. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole y. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363-64, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998)(<HOLDING>); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72,

    ### Response:
    holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion depends entirely on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” Smartt, 129 F.3d at 540 (quotation and brackets omitted). As applicable to Mr. Leroy’s situation, § 3582(c) allows the court to modify a sentence only if the sentencing range is subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. A reduction of a defendant’s sentence “is not consistent with [the Sentencing Commission’s] policy statement and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)” if the amended drug-quantity table “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (Supp.2008). Amendment 706 has no effect on the Guideline Mr. Leroy was sentenced under; accordingly, his motion for relief pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) was properly denied. Cf. Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1238-39 (<HOLDING>). Turning to Mr. Leroy’s claim that the

    ### Response:
    holding a reduction in defendants sentence as a career offender was not authorized under  3582c2 because amendment 706 did not lower his applicable guideline range under the careeroffender guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the New York support decree expired by its own terms, Pastor provided no authority for this position and, in fact, UIFSA provides to the contrary. To begin with, as set forth above, section 159.205 provides only two ways in which a court may lose its continuing exclusive jurisdiction: (1) the obligor, the obligee, and the child move out of the rendering state; or (2) all individuals file written consents in Texas allowing a Texas court to assume jurisdiction and modify the other state’s decree. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.205. We agree with Martinez that if the Texas Legislature had intended to provide an additional opportunity for Texas courts to gain jurisdiction it certainly could have, but did not. See, e.g., Mid-Century Svs. Co. of Tex. v. Kidd, 997 S.W.2d 265, 273-74 (Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, despite the expiration of the

    ### Response:
    holding that maxim of expression of one implies exclusion of another is aid to determine legislative intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    But just as this contact was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Lemley, this contact is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Iravani. Second, Plaintiff argues that Iravani’s attendance at the one-day Philadelphia meeting between Cohen, Iravani, Heller, and their respective lawyers supports specific jurisdiction. However, like the phone calls made by Lemley to Cohen, this contact is not sufficiently related to Plaintiffs wrongful initiation of civil proceedings cause of action. This meeting occurred after the filing of suit, and therefore, while it might serve as evidence of an improper purpose, it is not a cause of or even an impetus for Iravani’s allegedly wrongful initiation of the Connecticut Litigation. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 323 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this contact with Pennsylvania cannot

    ### Response:
    holding that specific jurisdiction requires at least butfor causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to do so. See Appleton Papers, 2012 WL 2704920, at *11. First, as the Appleton Papers court correctly concluded, imposing liability on parties lacking this knowledge would not deter them from arranging for the disposal of a product they do not believe to be harmful. See id, It cannot be said, moreover, that such a party was attempting to “contract away” its responsibility for polluting if it did not even realize it was polluting. See id. This interpretation is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition that parties who arrange for the sale of a useful product that contains hazardous substances are not liable as arrangers under CERCLA even when they know the substances “will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded.” Burlington N., 556 U.S. at 510, 129 S.Ct. 1870 (<HOLDING>). Under this rule, a party who sells a product

    ### Response:
    holding that such knowledge may provide evidence of the entitys intent to dispose of its hazardous wastes but alone is insufficient to prove that an entity planned for the disposal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a family member under the First Amendment. See id. at 44 (“[A] spouse’s claim that adverse action was taken solely against that spouse in retaliation for conduct of the other spouse should be analyzed as a claimed violation of a First Amendment right of intimate association.”); see also Garten v. Hochman, No. 08-CV-9425, 2010 WL 2465479, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010) (“Courts in this circuit have acknowledged that a First Amendment right to intimate association is implicated ‘[w]here a plaintiff is allegedly retaliated against for the First Amendment activities of a family member.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Agostino v. Simpson, No. 08-CV-5760, 2008 WL 4906140, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008))); Sutton v. Vill. of Valley Stream of N.Y., 96 F.Supp.2d 189, 192-93 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>). “Where the intimate association right at

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to intimate association where he alleged that his employer harassed him in retaliation for his fathers political activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court cautioned that any further request for post-judgment reconsideration, alteration, or modification of the court’s order could result in further monetary sanctions. Undeterred, Mr. Leo then filed a motion for leave to file a Rule 60(b) motion, which the court denied in a May 10, 2011 order. In light of Mr. Leo’s pro se status, we construe his filings liberally. See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007). But a liberal construction of his papers does nothing for Mr. Leo because his arguments are based upon a misconception of the en if the 2007 online application and the 2008 applications were separate transactions, there is no reason why Mr. Leo’s claims concerning his 2007 application could not have been asserted in his first action. See id. at 503-04 (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks omitted). Further, it does

    ### Response:
    holding that ujnder res judicata or claim preclusion a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties  from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in the prior action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the lost volume theory is that the seller would have generated a second sale irrespective of the buyer’s breach such that it follows that the lost volume seller cannot possibly mitigate damages). Further, we find the legislature’s adoption of S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2A-528(2) is consistent with adoption of the lost volume seller doctrine. Section 36-2A-528(2) (dealing with leased goods) tracks the language of S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-708(2) (seller’s damages for sales). Section 36-2-708 clearly tracks the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code section (UCC § 2-708(2)) upon which the lost volume seller doctrine is premised. See generally, Jerald B. Holisky, Finding the Lost Volume Seller; Tivo Independent Sales Deserve Two Profits Under Illinois Laiv, 22 J. Marshall L.Rev. 363 (Winter 1988) (<HOLDING>); Jonathan J. Lautt, Contract Law: A Clean

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the lost profit seller doctrine emanates from ucc 27082
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provisions convert individual judges into ""sacred vessels.” Instead, as we have detailed, those provisions were added to the constitution in an effort to settle a dispute between the executive and legislative branches over judicial selection. The majority's reliance on the judicial selection and retention provisions in an effort to distinguish persuasive federal case law is simply misplaced. The majority lists several other differences between the FMA and section 78-3-31. It makes no effort, however, to explain why these superficial differences are significant and, more important, why they dictate the wholesale rejection of a large body of persuasive federal case law. 12 . Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3255, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 541 (""[W]e recognize

    ### Response:
    holding that one purpose of separation of powers doctrine is to safeguard litigants right to have claim decided before judge  free from potential domination by other branches of government citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Appellant’s motions for post conviction relief were dismissed by the trial court for lack of proper oaths. Scott v. State, 464 So.2d 1171 (Fla.1985). The orders did not permit amendment, contrary to the procedures announced in Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007). However, we affirm the dismissal, which we will treat as a denial in these circumstances, because appellant did subsequently file motions with proper oaths, and more importantly, because his motions are without merit on their substance grounds. See Gusow v. State, 6 So.3d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); see also Major v. State, 814 So.2d 424 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>). GROSS, C.J., POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ.,

    ### Response:
    holding that neither the trial court nor defense counsel has any duty to advise a defendant entering a plea that the plea may have sentencing enhancing consequences on a sentence imposed for a crime committed in the future
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    license agreements. This fact was first conveyed to Kustom by Norwood’s attorney’s letter of November 3, 2009, which also claimed to terminate the license agreement. But the successor Norwood stands in the shoes of the Old Norwood, and is therefore estopped from attempting to piggyback on Old Norwood’s 2008 notice, given Kustom’s curative efforts and Old Norwood’s ensuing silence and continued commerce with Kustom. Norwood was required to provide new notice and an opportunity to cure whatever breaches it may have alleged prior to terminating. Although the Court previously found in this entry that Kustom committed the first material breach, that breach did not discharge Norwood from its contractual obligations to Kustom. See Frazier v. Mellowitz, 804 N.E.2d 796, 804 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless of Kustom’s breach,

    ### Response:
    holding that an uncured material breach does not discharge the nonbreaching party unless the material failure to perform cannot be cured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    there must be “some evidence that the particular circumstances of [the inmate’s] crime — circumstances beyond the minimum elements of his conviction — indicate[ ] exceptional callousness and cruelty with trivial provocation, and thus suggest[ ] [petitioner] remains a danger to public safety.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1098, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d at 804-05; In re Montgomery, 156 Cal.App. 4th 930, 946, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 732 (2007). In petitioner’s case, his commitment offenses “do[ ] not rationally indicate that [petitioner] will present an unreasonable public safety risk if released from prison.” In re Weider, 145 Cal.App.4th 570, 589, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 147 (2006); Lee, 143 Cal.App.4th at 1411-12, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 931; see also Somers v. Schwartz, 2007 WL 2177880, *9 (E.D.Cal.2007) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this Court “cannot conclude ...

    ### Response:
    holding the state court applied federal law unreasonably in finding the commitment offense of second degree murder stemming from fatal traffic accident while drunk driving was supported by some evidence when there is no evidence that petitioner demonstrated a callous disregard for human suffering when the victim died on impact or shortly thereafter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the utility had realized its fair share of the savings resulting from that return” if certain conditions are met. PURA § 36.060 (emphasis added). This mandatory language requires the Commission to compute a CTSA in order to pass along to ratepayers not only actually realized tax savings achieved via a consolidated return but even unrealized or hypothetical tax savings that have been forgone by a utility and its affiliates in unreasonably choosing not to consolidate returns when they are able to do so. The legislative intention expressed in section 36.060 requires that available tax savings inure to ratepayers. See Reliant Energy, 153 S.W.3d at 199 (CTSA is performed for ratepayers’ benefit); see also Public Util. Comm’n v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 748 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>). In other words, section 36.060 requires that

    ### Response:
    holding that tax savings generated by utilitys expense writeoff should inure to ratepayers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intended to violate the statute. A. Sturm’s first claim is that Congress did not intend the Hobbs Act to apply to actions based on a creditor’s fear of nonre-payment. He supports this claim by pointing to the absence of any mention of such actions in both the statute’s legislative history and in cases interpreting the statute. He argues that extending the statute to include such actions would interfere with state sovereignty and squander federal judicial resources. We find Sturm’s arguments unpersuasive. The statute provides a precise definition of extortion, and there is persuasive evidence that Congress intended “to make punishable all conduct falling within the reach of the statutory language.” United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377, 98 S.Ct. 1112, 1116, 55 L.Ed. 2d 349 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The purpose of the statute was “to prevent

    ### Response:
    holding that proof of racketeering was not a separate prerequisite to criminal liability under the hobbs act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    223 N.J.Super. at 446, 538 A.2d 1292; Kalman v. Grand Union Co., supra, 183 N.J.Super. at 157-59, 443 A.2d 728; O’Sullivan v. Mallon, supra, 160 N.J.Super. at 418-19, 390 A.2d 149. In some cases, however, the employee may show that the retaliation is based on the employee’s exercise of certain established rights, violating a clear mandate of public policy. Hennessey, supra, 129 N.J. at 91, 102-03, 106-07, 609 A.2d 11 (determining that discharge of employee for failing (or refusing to take) a random test for illegal drug use implicates a clear mandate of public policy protecting individual privacy rights, but holding that discharge was lawful where employee served in a safety-sensitive position); Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Lally v. Copygraphics, supra, 85 N.J. at

    ### Response:
    holding that employee demanding her personnel file stated cause of action under the law against discrimination njsa 105 by alleging that she was discharged for seeking to establish a gender discrimination claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    V. While we recognize that “no man” in the federal provision is arguably broader than “the accused” in Pennsylvania’s section, we also observe that Pennsylvania’s protection against being forced “to give evidence” is potentially more extensive than the federal protection against being “a witness against himself.” Given the substantial similarity of the provisions, we do not find the textual differences dispositive. Moreover, “we are not bound to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images, even where the text is similar or identical.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895-96. Indeed, we have previously found Section 9 to provide greater protection than the Fifth Amendment, despite the similar language. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (plurality) (<HOLDING>). Other textual differences exist between the

    ### Response:
    holding in the lead opinion as described below that under the pennsylvania constitution an accused could not be impeached with his prior voluntary but suppressed statements abrogated by subsequent amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4 . We further note that Reyes is distinguishable from this case. In Reyes, the employer contested the application of the fair notice requirements, but also conceded that if the conspicuousness requirement applied, then the waiver signed by the employee was inconspicuous. The appellate court remanded the cause for a fact determination of whether the employee had actual knowledge of the terms of the plan. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d at 193. Reyes did not specifically apply the ""actual knowledge” exception to the express negligence requirement. Id. at 192-94. Further, as support for applying the actual notice exception, Reyes cites Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 505(which applies ""actual notice” to the conspicuousness requirement) and Dresser cites Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex.1990)(<HOLDING>). The Hospital does not direct us to any case

    ### Response:
    holding inconspicuous written disclaimer to be unenforceable absent actual knowledge of the disclaimer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    based on the totality of the circumstances, whether an unsuspecting viewer would consider the depiction to be an actual individual under the age of eighteen engaging in sexual activity.” Id. As an additional safeguard against arbitrary prosecutions, the government must satisfy the element of scienter before it can obtain a valid conviction under the CPPA. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A (West Supp.1999). In any CPPA prosecution, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual “knowingly” produced, distributed, or possessed sexually explicit material and that the material depicts a person who appeared to the pornographer to be under the age of eighteen. See Id. See also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) (<HOLDING>). “Thus, a defendant who honestly believes that

    ### Response:
    holding that the scienter requirement extends to both the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age of the performers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a recent case. In Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, friends and family members of the Motown group, the “Temptations,” sued the makers of a televised mini-series for the manner in which they and the former group members were portrayed in the film. 82 F.Supp.2d 723, 726-27 (E.D.Mich.2000), aff'd, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir.2001). The plaintiffs alleged that their likenesses were appropriated to endorse a product, the film, without their permission. Id. at 728. The court found in that case that the plaintiffs could not overcome the defendant’s First Amendment defense, even where the portrayal of the plaintiffs was partly fictionalized, and even where the likenesses of the plaintiffs were used to promote a videocassette version of the mini-series. Id. at 730-31; see also Seale, 949 F.Supp. at 337 (<HOLDING>). As with the Lanham Act, then, we must conduct

    ### Response:
    holding that the film panther which used the name and likeness of black panther found er bobby seale was protected by the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). An untimely application may be considered “if the alien demon-strafes ... either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period specified in subparagraph (B).” Id. at § 1158(a)(2)(D). The IJ and BIA found that Kemur filed his application after the one-year period had lapsed and that there was nothing to excuse the late filing. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review these findings. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (“No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).”); see Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). We must also affirm the

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1158a3 divests our court of jurisdiction to review a decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances that would excuse his untimely filing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resolution of disputes,” Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761, those rules and their attendant applications by subsequent state or federal courts are subject to a constitutional backstop: the Due Process Clause. Due process protects those rights “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that “extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is ‘fundamental in character.’ ” Richards, 517 U.S. at 797,116 S.Ct. 1761 (quoting Postal Tel, 247 U.S. at 476, 38 S.Ct. 566); see also Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Fayer-weather, 195 U.S. at 297-99, 25 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that for federal court to grant full faith and credit to state court judgment state proceedings must satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendments due process clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a well-recognized rule that a party may not amend its removal notice more than thirty days after removal to assert a new ground for removal. In Blakeley v. United Cable System, 105 F.Supp.2d 574 (S.D.Miss.2000), this court addressed the rule upon which plaintiff relies. The court first noted that “[wjithin the thirty-day period (for removal) prescribed by § 1446(b), a defendant may freely amend its notice of removal,” id. at 578, and observed further that in the view of the majority of courts, at least in more recent times, a defendant may still be allowed to amend its removal petition even after expiration of this thirty-day period in order to cure defective allegations of jurisdiction, id. (citing D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146 (5th Cir.1979)) (<HOLDING>). The court explained: The authorization for

    ### Response:
    holding that amendment of removal petition was properly allowed to correct jurisdictional allegations in removal petition which were defective or faulty due to defendants failure to specifically allege the citizenship of the parties at the time the suit was brought and at the time the removal petition was filed missing allegation was not a fatal omission which could not be cured by amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not based an exception to mootness on any nonlegal consequence. See Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 373, 381 n.38 (1974). 12 . United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979). Vacating the district court’s judgment of civil contempt should satisfy Berwick’s concern that the court’s order may work further injury by Ber-wick’s being considered a recidivist in any future proceeding. It is doubtful, however, that a company that had purged its civil contempt would be characterized as a recidivist in a subsequent contempt proceeding. Cf. In re Application to Adjudge Ohio New and Rebuilt Parts, Inc. and Melvin Booher in Civil and Criminal Contempt, No. C 79 214 (N.D.Ohio May 1, 1979) (<HOLDING>). We also note that had Berwick been convicted

    ### Response:
    holding corporation and its president in criminal contempt because previous order of civil contempt had not been purged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    answer the question whether the resignation which was given was coerced.’’). 26 . See, e.g., Scharf, 710 F.2d at 1575-76 (ordering agency to cancel protected civil service employee's involuntary retirement and reinstate him to his former position with back pay). The federal Back Pay Act, which applies to the District of Columbia government, provides that an employee who has suffered wage loss as the result of ""an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action” is entitled to full restitution. 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (2007); see Mitchell v. District of Columbia, 736 A.2d 228, 230-32 (D.C.1999). 27 . See footnote 18, supra. MPD has advised the court that the position of inspector is an at-will position like that of commander. 28 . District of Columbia v. Califano, 647 A.2d 761, 765 (D.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). See Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 367,

    ### Response:
    holding that district of columbia waived its argument that appellees were not entitled to an income tax credit by failing to assert the argument in the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (and supporting Exhibits). 136 . Thompson, 901 F.2d at 470 (and cases cited therein) (district court's denial of qualified immunity to the individual defendants, as it related to the plaint ahoma, 520 U.S. at 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382. 155 .Id. 156 . See Turner v. Upton County, Texas, 915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069, 111 S.Ct. 788, 112 L.Ed.2d 850 (1991). As discussed at greater length below, a governmental entity’s final policy-maker(s) in an area are those individuals with the authority to independently perform the joint tasks of (1) setting goals for the governmental entity in their area of responsibility and (2) selecting the methods by which the governmental entity attempts to achieve those goals. 157 . See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d at 1278, (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552, 554-55 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that a citys failure to discipline a police officer for an isolated incident involving the alleged use of excessive force to effect an arrest did not give rise to an inference that the city had an official policy authorizing or encouraging police misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to § 2J1.6 does not preclude the district court’s upward departure under § 5K2.21, because the former punishes defendants like Gonzalez for failing to appear at trial while the latter allows upward departures based on the conduct underlying the dismissed charge. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6 cmt. background (2005); United States v. Harper, 932 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir.1991). Yet, the district court’s citation to § 5K2.21 in its written statement of reasons is problematic because the record does not support a finding that Gonzalez engaged in any specific conduct alleged in the dismissed charges. Upward departures based on § 5K2.21 require a finding that the defendant engaged in the conduct underlying the dismissed charges. See United States v. Bailey, 169 Fed.Appx. 815, 825 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The PSR does not describe the facts of the

    ### Response:
    holding that uncharged conduct described in psr and which was discussed by the court at sentencing was sufficient to support an upward departure under  5k221
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    act [that is] fraught with consequences.” 505 U.S. 833, 852, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). And similarly, we observed in Bryant I: As humankind is the most gifted of living creatures and the mystery of human procreation remains one of life’s most awesome events, so it follows that the deliberate interference with the process of human birth provokes unanswerable questions, unpredictable emotions, and unintended social and, often, personal consequences beyond simply the medical ones. 222 F.3d at 175. Accordingly, we conclude that the requirement imposed by § 307 on abortion clinics to make arrangements for referral services to clergy, as needed, does not, on its face, establish religion in violation of the First Amendment. Cf. Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996, 122 S.Ct. 465,

    ### Response:
    holding that a state statute requiring a moment of silence to enable students to meditate pray or engage in any other silent activity does not establish religion in violation of the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    399, 409 (1988); U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 157-158, 445 A.2d 353 (1982); American Fire & Cos. Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Ins., 256 N.J.Super. 423, 428, 607 A.2d 196 (App.Div.1992). When legislation impinges upon a fundamental right, or disparately treats a suspect class, it is subject to strict scrutiny, Rinier v. State of New Jersey, 273 N.J.Super. 135, 140, 641 A.2d 276 (App.Div.1994) (citing Drew Assocs. of NJ, LP v. Travisano, 122 N.J. 249, 258, 584 A.2d 807 (1991), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 269, 649 A.2d 1288 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1016, 115 S.Ct. 1358, 131 L.Ed.2d 216 (1995)), thereby requiring that the statute be the least restrictive alternative to accomplish a compelling governmen tal interest. San Antonio Sc . 118, 495 A.2d 1362 (App.Div.1985) (<HOLDING>). The equal protection safeguard “is offended

    ### Response:
    holding that a law that merely affects voting without actually denying the right to vote or depriving voters of equal representation is usually not subject to strict scrutiny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Overton was murdering the Maclvors. Overton’s counsel clearly did not want to pursue the alleged involvement of Hernandez because it would place Overton at the scene, which was totally inconsistent with the defense theory that Overton was not at the scene and that his DNA had been planted. Overton fails to include names of other suspects allegedly concealed. Due to law enforcement’s investigation of multiple suspects here, the failure to include identification of which suspects were allegedly not disclosed constitutes an insufficient pleading. See Gore, 846 So.2d at 466-67. Even if this sub-issue had been sufficiently pled, it is without merit as the record illustrates that nothing fruitful resulted from law enforcement’s investigation into other suspects. See Wright, 857 So.2d at 870 (<HOLDING>). The Brady claim as to missing pages from

    ### Response:
    holding that the information contained in the police files with regard to other possible suspects was not brady material
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir.1997). Any concerns Mr. Taylor had with Dr. Finch’s qualifications could have been addressed at the supplemental hearing, which afforded Mr. Taylor a “meaningful opportunity to address the post-hearing evidence.” Yount v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir.2005). Mr. Taylor insists that Dr. Finch’s report was deficient because it did not specify the basis for the doctor’s findings, particularly regarding Mr. Taylor’s fine motor skills, but the report was based on the doctor’s complete physical exam and review of Mr. Taylor’s medical records; and it was substantial evidence because it detailed Mr. Taylor’s abilities, including his hand strength, fine motor skills, and range of motion. Cf. Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We perceive no due process violation. Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that evaluation forms standing alone unaccompanied by thorough written reports or persuasive testimony are not substantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    noted by the Tenth Circuit in Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo, a case involving the incorporation of the Latin cross on a city seal. In Friedman, the court expressed concern lest [a] person approached by officers leaving a patrol car emblazoned with this seal could reasonably assume that the officers were Christian police, and that the organization they represented identified itself with the Christian God. A follower of any non-Christian religion might well question the officers’ ability to provide even handed treatment. A citizen with no strong religious conviction might conclude that secular benefit could be obtained by becoming a Christian. Friedman, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986) (<HOLDING>). As the Friedman court further concluded, the

    ### Response:
    holding district courts order upholding county seal clearly erroneous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court did not err in denying Appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. C. Jury Instructions 1. Contributory Trademark Infringement To prevail on its claim of contributory trademark infringement, Louis Vuitton had to establish that Appellants continued to supply its services to one who it knew or had reason to know was engaging in trademark infringement. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982). Because Appellants provided services rather than a product, Louis Yuitton also needed to establish that Appellants had “[djirect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe” Louis Vuitton’s marks. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Appellants contend that the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule that common law fraud claims under Illinois law must be proved by clear and convincing evidence); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (confirming that a court “must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden” in determining whether a genuine issue of fact has been raised sufficient to withstand summary judgment). Lee’s affidavit does not state that he did not intend to fulfill a promise to pay; it affirmatively states that he did intend to follow through with the commissions in the letter, but that he believed the source funds for the payments would be included within the fee sharing request made by AAA. See R.105-1, Ex.5 at 7; cf. Price v. Highland Cmty. Bank, 722 F.Supp. 454, 460 (N.D.Ill.1989), aff’d, 932 F.2d 601 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because ABS has failed to raise a genuine

    ### Response:
    holding that an admission from the promisor that he lacked intent to form a contract by his promise could provide clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff on a promissory fraud claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    302 Ga. App. 111, 114 (2) (690 SE2d 242) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Robertson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 649, 650 (1) (538 SE2d 755) (2000); Pace v. State, 239 Ga. App. 506, 509 (6) (521 SE2d 444) (1999). 13 Walker v. State, 304 Ga. App. 45, 47 (695 SE2d 373) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Lilly v. State, 285 Ga. App. 427, 429 (646 SE2d 512) (2007). 14 See Walker, 304 Ga. App. at 47; Bright v. State, 301 Ga. App. 204, 205-06 (1) (687 SE2d 208) (2009). 15 Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga. App. 423, 425 (1) (662 SE2d 235) (2008) (footnote and punctuation omitted). 16 DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 469-70 (3) (169 SE2d 801) (1969) (citation and punctuation omitted). 17 Quiroz, 291 Ga. App. at 425 (1) (footnote and punctuation omitted). 18 See id. at 424-26 (<HOLDING>); Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 766-67 (1)

    ### Response:
    holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant held knife to victims neck and proof that defendant only pointed knife at victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Their claim is that the government unjustifiably interfered with their relationship with counsel and their ability to mount the best defense they could muster. The government, relying on Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989), contends that a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to a defense funded by someone else’s money. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of choice was not violated when the funds he earmarked for defense were seized under a federal forfeiture statute, because title to the forfeitable'assets had vested in the United States. Id. at 628, 109 S.Ct. 2646; see also United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The government focuses on the following

    ### Response:
    holding that pretrial restraining order based on showing of probable cause that property is forfeitable does not arbitrarily interfere with a defendants fair opportunity to retain counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. Shaw, 309 U.S. at 501, 60 S.Ct. 659 (“No officer by his action can confer jurisdiction.”). “Moreover, a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane, 518 U.S. at 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092. We may not enlarge the waiver beyond the purview of the statutory language. United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531, 115 S.Ct. 1611, 131 L.Ed.2d 608 (1995). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the federal government is immune from suit. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554, 108 S.Ct. 1965, 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988). The absence of such a waiver is a jurisdictional defect. Kulawy v. U.S., 917 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1990); Bodin v. Vagshenian, 462 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2410, Congress has waived

    ### Response:
    holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to tax costs, but that discretion is restricted by Fed R App P 39(e), which provides: Costs on Appeal Taxable in the District Court. The following costs on appeal are taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule: (1) the preparation and transmission of the record; (2) the reporter’s transcript, if needed to determine the appeal; (3) premiums paid for a supersedeas bond or other bond to preserve rights pending appeal-, and (4) the fee for filing the notice of appeal. [Emphasis added.] In cases such as the present case, in which a party has obtained a supersedeas bond or stay bond and collateralized that bond with a letter of credit, the federal circuits have generally held a taxed cost to be “reasonable” under Rule 39(e) if the total c ) (<HOLDING>). A minority of jurisdictions has refused to

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants were entitled to recover as costs not only bond premiums but the additional cost to obtain a letter of credit that was required by the surety as collateral before the issuance of bond
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Club v. Copolymer Rubber & Chemical Corp., 621 F.Supp. 1013, 1015 (M.D.La.1985)). Thus, it cannot be said that the First Circuit has adopted a restrictive interpretation of the CWA citizen’s suit provision. Furthermore, other courts have interpreted the CWA and Gwaltney expansively, holding that the continuing migration of pollutants from past discharges is sufficient to establish jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). See North Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517 at *2 (E.D.N.C.1989) (finding “it is not the physical act of discharging dredge wastes itself that leads to the injury giving rise to citizen standing, but the consequences of the discharge in terms of the lasting environmental degradation.”); Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp. 887, 897 (D.Minn.1990) (<HOLDING>), class, cert. vacated by 793 F.Supp. 898

    ### Response:
    holding pollutants from past discharges that are released over time by infiltration of contaminated soil is ongoing pollu tion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    accord Moore v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 376 Md. 558, 831 A.2d 12, 16-17 (2003). The question is “whether the allegations in a new suit, ‘if proven to be true, would negate, contradict, and in that sense nullify an essential foundation for the earlier ... judgment.’ ” Sheahy, 284 F.Supp.2d at 282-83 (quoting Green, 828 A.2d at 830). This test is narrower than the transaction test. See Moore, 831 A.2d at 16 (quoting Restatement § 22(2)(B) cmt. F). Generally, the subsequent action will only be precluded if “the prior action had eventuated in a judgment for plaintiff since only in such a case would there be the threat of nullification of the judgment or impairment of rights[.]” Sheahy, 284 F.Supp.2d at 282 (quoting Restatement § 22(2)(B) cmt. F); see also Moore, 831 A.2d at 17 (<HOLDING>). Examples of subsequent judgments “nullifying”

    ### Response:
    holding that debtor was not prevented from raising a claim based facts that had served as a successful defense against creditors previous suit to recover the debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Due Process based on a Right to Pursue a Chosen Career Plaintiff also asserts that she was denied a substantive Due Process right by the Individual Defendants because their actions have prevented her from asserting her liberty interest in pursuing her chosen profession as a teacher. “While a person’s right to pursue the profession of his choice is recognized as a constitutionally protected liberty interest, courts in the Second Circuit have consistently held one must have no ability to practice one’s profession at all in order to state a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest.” Toussie v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 806 F.Supp.2d 558, 579-80 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (Seybert, J.) (citing Jaeger v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 96CV9336, 199 .2d 331, 336 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (Kaplan, J.) (<HOLDING>). As Plaintiff was, in fact, capable of

    ### Response:
    holding citys termination of plaintiffs contracts and publishing negative news report did not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest even though a significant part of plaintiffs business had involved projects for the city
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    IV & XIV; Fla. Const, art. 1, § 12. The demand for a speedy trial sounds in the constitutional right to a “speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const, amend. VI & XIV; Fla. Const, art. 1, § 16(a). A person does not ordinarily abandon the right to seek suppression of evidence unlawfully seized merely by demanding a speedy trial. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that a speedy trial demand can be compatible with a pending motion to suppress. State v. Embry, 322 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla.1975) (“[T]he mere filing of a motion to suppress is not tantamount to a finding of law that the speedy trial deman-der does not have a bona fide desire to obtain trial, that he is not prepared and will not be prepared for trial.”); see also Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 898, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). Nor are we persuaded by the trial court’s

    ### Response:
    holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not present arguments, the issues are waived for appellate review. Moreover, we agree with the post-conviction court's decision that these issues were available at the time of Douglas' direct appeal and, therefore, were waived for post-conviction review. See Benefiel v. State, 716 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ind.1999) (waiving as free-standing claims any issues available on direct appeal), reh'g denied, cert. denied 531 U.S. 830, 121 S.Ct. 83, 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000). Finally, to the extent Douglas invites us to consider these issues as examples of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we cannot. Because Douglas did not provide arguments regarding these issues, we are unable to evaluate whether Douglas' counsel committed error or whether Douglas was prejudiced thereby. See id. at 911, n. 2 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Douglas waived his claim of

    ### Response:
    holding a single sentence declaring counsel was ineffective for raising issues on direct appeal is insufficient to avoid waiver of the issue rather to avoid waiver appellant must provide argument regarding why his counsel was ineffective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    believed that the prospect of finding a DNA expert favorable to the defense was an indulgence in speculation. Second, the court noted that the trial court had authorized funds for defense counsel to retain a DNA expert, and there was no reason to assume that the effort was not made. Those conclusions are reasonable. The petitioner has not offered even a suggestion of what a defense DNA expert might have contributed to the trial inquiry. Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that defense counsel attempted to locate someone who could provide expert advice, and no one answered the bell. The decision not to call such a witness, therefore, must be relegated to trial strategy, which is beyond the realm of criticism for defective performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>); Higgins v. Renico, 470 F.3d 624, 632 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that counsels conduct is entitled to the strong presumption that it falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and the petitioner must overcome the presumption that the conduct might be considered sound trial strategy quoting michel v louisiana 350 us 91 101 76 sct 158 100 led 83 1955
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sentences of 30 years in prison from the trial court. At the hearing on the motion for new trial conducted by the trial court after we abated the appeal, the trial court considered evidence in the form of affidavits from appellant, appellant’s trial attorney, and the State’s attorney. Appellant’s affidavit acknowledged that he received and rejected the 15-year plea-bargain offer on October 4, 2002. Appellant’s affidavit is silent concerning any events that may or may not have transpired on October 3, 2002, but asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective by not conveying the appellant’s accepted plea-bargain offer of 20 years in prison, to run concurrently, before November 15, 2002, when it was withdrawn and replaced with a new plea-ba 232 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Allegations of ineffective assistance of

    ### Response:
    holding that ramirez waived right to appeal because no nexus between failure to disclose medical evidence that allegedly violated brady and appellants plea of guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    caused or aggravated by service-connected peptic ulcer disease, rather than due directly to any incident of active service.” R. at 8. The Board did not provide a sufficient explanation of the reasons or bases for concluding that the appellant’s arguments were competent to limit VA’s development and adjudication of the case. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (requiring the Board, in rendering its decision, to provide a written statement of the reasons or bases for its “findings and conclusions[ ] on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record”); see also Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 492, 494-95 (1992) (indicating that evidence regarding medical diagnoses provided by a person without “medical knowledge” is not probative); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 56-57 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the boards statement of reasons or bases must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the boards decision as well as to facilitate review in this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ordinances to any local government, at no cost, and with no obligation on the part of the government unit to become a member of SBCCI. Id. The total cost of preparation, promulgation, and maintenance of the codes is borne by SBCCI, which includes the input of thousand of design professionals, building contractors, build ing officials from all over the country, construction industry groups, trade associations, and other interested citizens. Id. It is from this pool of knowledge and expertise, compiled in a readily usable and understandable form, that the codes are offered to the local governments at no cost to the public. SBCCI does not mandate the use of their codes nor are the other services of SBCCI required upon adoption of the codes. See Practice Management, 121 F.3d at 521 (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that there exists no misuse

    ### Response:
    holding misuse of copyright because of limitations imposed on licensing agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or excuse.” Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 805. 20.In the present case, we determine the contours of the asserted duty of confidentiality as well as any affirmative defenses of justification or excuse, by reference to expressions of public policy stated in New Mexico’s professional licensing statutes, rules of evidence, and our state constitution. The New Mexico legislature has recognized that the duty to safeguard patient confidences extends to psychologists, social workers, mental health counselors and therapists, and their staffs. See NMSA 1978, §§ 61-9-18 (1989) (psychologists and psychologist associates); 61-9A-27 (1993) (mental health counselors and therapists); 61-31-24 (1989) (social workers); cf. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13-19, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1930-32, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the New Mexico Rules of Evidence

    ### Response:
    recognizing that it serves no discernible public purpose to draw distinctions between clinical social work and other mental health professions with regard to the need for confidentiality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reason to conclude that Leal set that meeting with any intentions other than to address the conflict. While there may be circumstances which would counsel against a supervisor confronting wayward employees about their treatment of a co-employee and disclosing that co-employee’s complaint with specificity, this is not one of them. 2.Lack of assistance and false reports Next, Valderaz advances that his female coworkers refused to give him proper assistance and lodged false reports against him because he reported their harassing conduct. These incidents do not qualify as materially adverse because they were committed by ordinary employees and were not committed in furtherance of UMC’s business. See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>)). 3.Requirement to attend training Although

    ### Response:
    holding that employers are not liable for conduct of ordinary employees because an ordinary employees conduct will normally be so unrelated to the employers business that it cannot be deemed in furtherance thereof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has consistently invoked state law throughout this litigation, neither party argues that any of the state-law provisions exceeds the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. Because the briefs do not provide specific arguments or authorities to distinguish the state-law claims from the federal-law claims, we will limit our analysis to the Fourth Amendment. Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). 9 . St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). 10 . Id.; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 11 . Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). 12 . The court of appeals’s opinion cites Maxwell v. State for the proposition that ""whether consent was valid is a question of fact.” Hubert, 286 S.W.3d h Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 1581-82

    ### Response:
    holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 928-33 (1973); Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup.Ct.Rev. 173, 197-200. To escape this criticism, the privacy right enunciated in Roe v. Wade must be defined with some precision. What is protected as private is not so much the actual abortion ás the process of deciding whether or not to abort. It is this intimate and often agonizing decision which Roe v. Wade recognized must not be left to majoritarian institutions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 312, 100 S.Ct. at 2685 (Wade protects the woman from “unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy”); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92

    ### Response:
    recognizing the constitutionally protected interest in making certain kinds of important decisions free from governmental interference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of law. C. The Appropriate Remedy There remains the issue of whether vacating the consent decree is the proper course of action, or whether modifying it in some other way is more appropriate at this time. In Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748, the Court held that “[a] proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor.” Instead, “[o]nce a court has determined that changed circumstances warrant a modification in a consent decree, the focus should be on whether the proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances.” Id. The court should “do no more” because “a consent decree is a final judgment;” however, “[w]ithin these constra 53, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 475

    ### Response:
    holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appellant remains subject to the trial court’s order but is currently receiving treatment on an out-patient basis. 3 . In the criminal context, we will review error alleged for the first time on appeal under a fundamental error analysis. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 608 (2005). However, fundamental error analysis is rarely used in the civil context. Williams v. Thude, 188 Ariz. 257, 260, 934 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1997). Civil commitment hearings are not criminal proceedings. In re MH-2008-000867, 225 Ariz. 178, 180-81, ¶ 8, 236 P.3d 405, 407-08 (2010). Given the liberty interests at stake in civil commitment proceedings, we will review the issue of the trial court’s duty to inquire into remote participation by the Appellant without resort t 816, 819 (1982) (<HOLDING>), and Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492,

    ### Response:
    holding when counsels acts and omissions reduce his role to one approaching that of a neutral observer a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and emphatically reaffirmed that the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial mandates that “ ‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Blakely, — U.S. at-, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348). The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment and we are bound to apply the construction given it by the United States Supreme Court, to the extent it establishes a minimum standard of protection as against government action. See State v. Adrian, 51 Haw. 125, 131, 453 P.2d 221, 225 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Applying the plain import of Blakely and

    ### Response:
    holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is applicable to the states and therefore the us supreme courts interpretation of the provision is binding upon this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this court for review of the FLRA’s decision upholding that award. Section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute (“FSLMRS” or “Statute”) provides for Authority review of labor arbitration awards involving parties covered by the Statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (1988). However, section 7123(a) of the Statute precludes judicial review of final orders of the Authority “involving an award by an arbitrator,” unless the order involves an unfair labor practice. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1988). This case falls squarely within the ambit of preclusion under section 7123(a). The DCJ argues that, notwithstanding this preclusion, we should consider its petition for review under the doctrine enunciated in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188, 79 S.Ct. 180, 184, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Here, the DOJ contends that, in upholding an

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2043 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The other involves “[e]xemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech ... [that] may diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.” Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2044 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., — U.S. -, ---, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1511-15, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993)). Based on our reading of Gilleo and the other Supreme Court cases cited above, we conclude that an underinclusive time, place, and manner regulation that is otherwise valid must be found to be constitutional so long as it does not favor one side of an issue and its rationale is not undermined by its exemptions. Cf. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The sales regulation meets both of these

    ### Response:
    holding that an underinclusive regulation will violate the first amendment only if it favors a particular viewpoint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We have held that, to be deemed competent, a defense attorney must, “at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent his client.” Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis in original); see also Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1011(9th Cir.2002); Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir.1997). Thus, an attorney’s performance is constitutionally and unreasonably deficient when he “neither conduetts] a reasonable investigation nor ma[kes] a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.” Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1456; see also Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 980 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1435-36 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorneys performance was deficient because he failed to investigate and reasonably select the   defense used at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if they were huddled, just having a conversation, or merely standing in a line. Moreover, in light of the officers’ unclear testimony, it is just as likely that consistent with Wallace’s testimony, a black male, who may have been Bellflower, or who looked like Bellflower, was crossing the street a few yards from where she and McCray were standing. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court cannot credit Muniz’s claim that the three were huddled together suspiciously. Even if Bellflower was standing with Wallace and McCray, the officers still did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe that a drug transaction was occurring. Proximity to a drug dealer can be a factor that gives rise to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 342 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cruz, 909 F.2d 422, 424

    ### Response:
    holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with direct infringement — i.e., “use of an invention -that, if done by a private party, would directly infringe the patent.” Id. at 1323. Liability under this provision, like liability under § 271(a),'re-quires a showing'that “each limitation is present in the accused product or process,” such that the government “would be liable for direct infringement of the patent right for such use or manufacture if [it] was a private party.” Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). Accordingly, § 1498 encompasses “any direct infringement that would normally require a license by a private party.” Id. at 1320. Infringement is a prerequisite to § 1498(a) liability; the government’s infringement triggers its obligation to pay just compensation. See James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58; 26 L.Ed. 786 (1881) (<HOLDING>); see also Crozier v. Fried Krupp

    ### Response:
    holding that a patent confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself without just compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no occasion to consider the issue presented here: Whether knowingly causing physical injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon satisfies Be-gay’s “purposeful” requirement. Rather, in those contexts, we considered whether crimes committed with gross negligence or recklessness were sufficiently purposeful and concluded they were not. Id. at 710; Femandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1129-30. Today we reaffirm that more than recklessness or gross negligence is required, and more specifically hold that Begay can be satisfied by knowing conduct. In addition, we note that every circuit to have addressed the issue has held that Begay’s “purposeful conduct” requirement is satisfied where the underlying state offense requires the defendant to act knowingly. See Johnson, 587 F.3d at 211 (<HOLDING>); Wilson, 568 F.3d at 674 (“We conclude that

    ### Response:
    holding that to the extent simple assault under pennsylvania law is committed intentionally or knowingly it is by definition purposeful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when the jury reached a verdict on one charge. When viewing the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when instructing the jurors to continue deliberations. Defendant has failed to point to any statement, act, or omission by the trial court which could be interpreted as coercive. Defendant also notes that the jury deliberated nine hours without a mistrial being declared. However, our prior cases indicate that the amount of time that the jury deliberated in the case at bar was not so long as to be coercive in nature. See State v. Jones, 47 N.C. App. 554, 562, 268 S.E.2d 6, 11 (1980) (stating a two-day period is not an “unreasonable” period under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1235); see also State v. Beaver, 322 N.C. 462, 465, 368 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Without any other evidence of coercion or

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no coercion by the trial court where the jury deliberated all day friday and all day saturday
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    172 F.3d at 615 n. 3, which was authored by the same judge. Calvit v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 122 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir.1997), also authored by the same judge, apparently based its reversal of a grant of summary judgment on direct evidence of retaliation. Id. at 1118 (“There is evidence that the school district denied him a fair opportunity to be reappointed to Four Winds because of his speech. The school district sent him a letter stating that he would not be reassigned to Four Winds in order to ‘forestall any complaint of Whistle Blowing.’ ”) (emphasis added). The panel in Stever v. Independent School District No. 625, 943 F.2d 845 (8th Cir.1991), applied a “pretext” analysis (consistent with McDonnell Douglas) to conclude that the plaintiff presented a submissible case. Id. at 853 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). There is no indication that

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence raised a disputed issue of fact regarding whether the district used stevers purported nursing expertise as a pretext for transferring her in retaliation for her outspokenness on matters of public concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim against the Darby Police Department since the Borough of Darby is the proper defendant); Curry v. Huyett, Civ. No. 93-6649, 1994 WL 111357 at *2 (E.D.Pa.1994) (""The pólice department is merely an arm of the City ... and therefore, the City ... is the only proper defendant.’’); Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F.Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D.Pa.1993)(dismissing claims against the City of Erie Police Department as the proper defendant is the City of Erie). Accordingly, we will dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against the Chester County Sheriff's Department. As plaintiffs have sued all of the remaining defendants in their official capacities, however, plaintiffs have essentially sued Chester County. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018

    ### Response:
    holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relative for sufficient period of time may reside therein); Holtberg v. Bommersbach, 236 Minn. 335, 338, 52 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1952) (concluding intent to return may be of “extreme importance” in determining place of abode); 4A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1096, at 81 (stating service on employee who spends only part of his time at defendant’s residence is likely defective). Finally, evidence that the service actually reached the intended person strongly supports a conclusion that service is valid because due process has been afforded. See Minneso e v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.Dist.CtApp.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks and told process server she lived there, was residing therein); Sangmeister, 278 So.2d at 676-77 (<HOLDING>); Mahone v. Marshall Furniture Co., 142 Ga.App.

    ### Response:
    holding fourmonth visitor was residing therein
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only for clear error. Id. “This standard requires us to affirm a district court’s findings of fact unless the record lacks substantial evidence to support that determination.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Charest filed the instant habeas petition on May 8, 2003, seeking to challenge the validity of his state court convictions and two consecutive life-term sentences, which became final on February 6,1996, for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and causing the delinquency or dependency of a child or causing a child to be in need of supervision. Absent tolling, the limitations period would have expired one year from the April 24, 1996 effective date of the AEDPA, or on April 24, 1997. See Wilcox v. Fla. Dept. of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The district court dismissed the petition as

    ### Response:
    holding that  2254 petitions of prisoners whose convictions became final before the passage of the aedpa are timely if filed within one year from the aedpas effective date
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm’n, 389 F.3d 536, 544 (6th Cir.2004). As such, this RCRA action relates only to whether the C8 contamination on Plaintiffs Wellfield presents an imminent or substantial endangerment to human health. Further, aside from a person drinking the Plaintiffs untreated water, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the C8 contamination on its Wellfield presents a threat to human health via any other pathway of exposure. Accordingly, this court hereby GRANTS, Defendant Summary Judgment for any RCRA claims related to endangerment to health, ii. Endangerment to the Environment Liability under RCRA’s ISE provision can rest on a showing of substantial and imminent endangerment to human health or the environment. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>); Maine People’s Alliance, 471 F.3d at 282

    ### Response:
    holding that a showing of environmental endangerment is all that is required under  6972a1b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts have not addressed whether a contractual relationship exists between a college and its students. However, the Maine Law Court has set forth a number of principles that will guide this Court’s determination of the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and Bowdoin. First, in order for a contract to exist between parties, the “parties must have mutually assented to be bound by all its material terms; the assent must be manifested in the contract, either expressly or impliedly; and the contract must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine its exact meaning and fix exactly the legal liabilities of the. parties.” Searles v. Trs. of St. Joseph’s Coll., 695 A.2d 1206, 1211 (1997) (quotation omitted). See also Bragdon v. Shapiro, 146 Me. 83, 77 A.2d 598, 601 (1951) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, “a reservation to either party

    ### Response:
    holding that terms of agreement regarding bonus too indefinite or meaningless to permit recovery because they did not set forth standard to assist fact finder and left too much discretion to the employer but allowing recovery for value of labor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right under Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right “without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.” Butte, 712 P.2d at 1311. We also hold that the District Court correctly interpreted the law in its Instructions number 15 and 9. This interpretation of Montana’s constitution is supported by the decisions of other jurisdictions which have held their state constitutions to encompass a fundamental right to the opportunity to pursue employment. For example, the right to pursue any proper vocation under the personal liberty clause of Indiana’s state constitution is a fundamental right. Kirtley v. State (Ind. 1949), 84 N.E.2d 712, 714 (<HOLDING>). In Kirtley, the Indiana Supreme Court

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute regarding the sale of tickets interfered with the liberties and the personal and property rights of a ticket owner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [W]here a demand or some other act is required of a plaintiff as a condition precedent to his right to sue, “the demand must be made in a reasonable time, and this time, unless there be some special circumstances shown, will be fixed in analogy to the statute of limitations.” 117 So.2d at 502 (quoting Smith v. Middle States Util. Co., 228 Iowa 686, 293 N.W. 59, 64 (1940)). In DeSouza, the Fourth District applied the rationale of Stouden-mire to several oral interest-free loans with no terms for repayment. 708 So.2d at 993-94. The Fourth Distr (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (“The obligations here were akin to demand notes. Such notes are payable on the date of execution and no demand is necessary to start the statute of limitations running.”); Belcher v. Kirkwood, 238 Va. 430, 383 S.E.2d 729 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304

    ### Response:
    holding that a lender was barred from recovering repayment for loans made more than three years before filing suit where obligations without agreed repayment dates were deemed payable on demand and where the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts was three years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in this action. After the entry of the stipulated judgment, Bay Bridge moved to vacate the judgment because the person who signed the stipulation on its behalf was not authorized to do so. The Superior Court denied the motion, and, on appeal, we vacated the judgment against Bay Bridge. See Hamill v. Bay Bridge Assocs., 1998 ME 181 P.2d 435, 437 (1978) (same). 4 . Defendants also suggest that a creditor may not simultaneously pursue alternate remedies to collect a debt. Defendants do not assert, however, that Hamill pursued conflicting remedies regarding the auctioned assets. Nor do defendants present any reasoned basis for vacating or otherwise amending the judgment on the basis of other collection efforts by Hamill. See Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Bowen, 742 F.Supp. 308, 311 (W.D.Va.1990) (<HOLDING>); Bank One Akron, N.A. v. Nobil, 80 Ohio App.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a secured judgment creditor may pursue simultaneous remedies to collect a debt as long as his pursuit does not constitute harassment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    individual capacities. d. Farmer, Dunbar, Sarnecky, and Wattai — Official Capacities — All Claims Longoria’s remaining claims are against individual state officers acting in their official capacities. Because a suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is effectively a suit against the state itself, only prospective injunctive relief is available against such defendants, absent a waiver by the state of its sovereign immunity. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). Relief may only be had when there is an ongoing violation of federal law extant at the outset of the suit. See B.H. Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 278, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90, 97

    ### Response:
    holding that ex parte young exception to states sovereign immunity applies only where violation of federal law is ongoing not where federal law was violated only in the past
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 154-55, 90 S.Ct. 294, 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969)). 16 . United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). 17 . Id. at 579, 80 S.Ct. 1347. 18 . Norris, 512 U.S. at 264-65, 114 S.Ct. 2239. 19 . Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1991). 20 . Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn, 491 U.S. 299, 305, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989) (emphasis added). 21 . See Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir.2001) (“A claim brought under an independent federal statute is precluded by the RLA only if it can be disposi-tively resolved through an interpretation of a CBA. This occurs only when a provision of th F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 25 .Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that title vii claim is independent of cba and thus minor dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a parent’s statutory duty to provide his or her children with necessaries evidences the Legislature’s intent to grant trial courts broad discretion to assess attorney’s fees as child support. Id. at 703-05. The court of appeals further held that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the attorney’s fees awarded to Thomas were reasonable, reversing on that issue and remanding the case to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. at 714. In this Court, Tucker has pursued only the issue of whether Thomas’s attorney’s fees could be awarded as additional child support, and we granted his petition to resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals. 56 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 100-01 (Nov. 16, 2012). Compare 405 S.W.3d at 714 (<HOLDING>), with, e.g., In re Moers, 104 S.W.3d 609, 612

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees incurred in a nonenforcement modification suit can be awarded as additional child support under the family code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proposal for settlement of the property damage claims, but was served before Beekie executed releases for those claims. The final judgment awarded to Beekie was twenty-five percent greater than any of Beekie’s proposals for settlement. In regard to the final proposal for settlement, the request for fees was denied because it included the ambiguous condition that proof was required demonstrating an ability to pay the amount demanded. We agree with the trial court that the last proposal cannot be a basis for an award of attorney’s fees because it was both ambiguous and failed to make it clear that it was solely for personal injuries when the settlement of the property damage claim had not yet been fully consummated. See, e.g., Nichols v. State Farm Mut., 851 So.2d 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>), rev. granted, 03-01653 (Fla. Sept. 11, 2003).

    ### Response:
    recognizing that terms and conditions of a proposal for settlement should be devoid of ambiguity patent or latent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeal of the dismissal of his claims against the State Bar officers in a published opinion, and the facts and procedural history are set forth there. See Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2007). Here, we deal with Appellant’s claims against Appellee Daetwyler. We review the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims de novo. See Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002). Appellant § 1983 claims against Appellee Daetwyler fail because he has failed to raise any factual allegations indicating that Appellee Daetwyler acted under color of state law by “jointly engaging] with state officials in the challenged action.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); see also Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); id. at 575 (holding that for a private

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to prevail under  1983 a plaintiff must show 1 that defendants deprived him or her of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the united states and 2 that in doing so defendants acted under color of state law internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entity must hold fee simple title in the property in order for this exception to apply. Even though strict construction of statutory provisions waiving sovereign immunity is required, it is also true that words in statutes are to be considered in their plain and ordinary meaning in order to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers. The statute refers to “a public entity’s property” and the definition of property suggests more than a fee simple ownership. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines, property as “something owned or possessed.” Under the facts of the present case, a definition of the term “public entity’s property” includes the exclusive control and possession of a polling place. Id. (citations omitted); see also Tillison v. Boyer, 939 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo.App. E.D.1996) (<HOLDING>). ' Following Farrington, our courts have

    ### Response:
    holding that property of a public entity includes having exclusive control and possession of  property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have not considered the effect of a voluntary dismissal of a compulsory counterclaim on a subsequent action based on the same claim. C.R.C.P. 13(a) is almost identical to Fed. R.Civ.P. 13(a). Where, as here, there is no controlling Colorado authority, we may look to federal precedent for guidance in construing the language of the Colorado rule. See In re Estate of Krotiuk, supra, 12 P.3d at 305. In SSMC, Inc., N.V. v. Steffen, supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the dismissal of a compulsory counterclaim without prejudice had the same effect as a dismissal with prejudice. In contrast, Arkansas allows a party to refile a compulsory counterclaim that was dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Linn v. NationsBank, 341 Ark. 57, 14 S.W.3d 500 (2000)(<HOLDING>). However, Arkansas’s procedural rules are

    ### Response:
    holding that under ark r civ p 41 a defendant may voluntarily dismiss a compulsory counterclaim without prejudice and refile it within one year
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wide variability of the factors influencing stray voltage contributes to the intermittent nature of the problem. 3 Stray voltage levels are usually higher near the ends of the distribution lines. The 20% figure was taken from a survey made in Washington state. 4 Our scope of review of a PUC adjudication is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed or findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence. Mill v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Oomm’n, 67 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 597, 447 A.2d 1100 (1982). 5 See Reynolds Disposal Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n, 79 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 222, 468 A.2d 1179 (1983). See generally Peoples Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 628, 137 A.2d 873 (1958) (<HOLDING>) ; Philadelphia Suburban Water Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 A. 861, 862 (1920); Commonwealth v. Dame, 62 Mass.(8 Cush.) 384, 384 (1851); Little v. Gibson, 39 N.H. 505, 510 (1859); Whipple, 9 Cow. at 707; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 520, at 651. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted this test in interpreting a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution providing that “[n]o person hereafter convicted of embezzlement of public moneys, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to the General Assembly, or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this Commonwealth.” Pa. Const, art. II, § 7 (emphasis added). Un ecause the general common law applicable to witness incompetency, so far as we can tell, has never been the law in Indiana. See, e.g., Glenn v. Clore, 42 Ind. 60, 61-62 (1873) (<HOLDING>); Alfred Moore, A Treatise on Indiana Criminal

    ### Response:
    holding that assault and battery with intent to commit rape was not an infamous crime that would have ren dered a witness incompetent at indiana common law and therefore conviction thereof could not be used to impeach the credibility of a witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    418 (1987), this evidence sufficiently supports the finding that the rifle was subject to Gregory’s dominion and control. Thus, he knowingly and intentionally possessed the rifle. See Davis, 12 Va.App. at 733, 406 S.E.2d at 924-25 (finding sufficient evidence of knowledge, and dominion and control where marijuana found in defendant’s house and he told police they could find it in the basement). III. PROOF THAT THE ITEM WAS A FIREARM Gregory further contends that the evidence failed to prove that the Remington model 522 semi-automatic rifle was a “firearm.” While not defined by Code § 18.2-308.2, a “firearm” for purposes of this statute is any device “that propel[s] a projectile by an explosion or discharge of gunpowder.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 354, 356, 429 S.E.2d 615, 616 (<HOLDING>), aff’d en banc, 17 Va.App. 233, 436 S.E.2d 192

    ### Response:
    holding that a bb gun which propels a projectile by pneumatic pressure is not a firearm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. Denissa Bowling appeals the order finding her in violation of probation and imposing additional conditions of pr ) (<HOLDING>). The time for arguing the third alleged

    ### Response:
    holding trial court without jurisdiction to impose additional restitution because more than 60 days had passed between the sentencing hearing and the second restitution hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    though she had received a “condolence note” from the FARC regarding her own death); Sepulveda v. United States Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.2005) (concluding that “menacing phone calls and threats” to an applicant and her family, combined with a bombing at her workplace, were not ‘persecution.’). Nor did Prado’s experiences with the local police amount to persecution. Prado testified that he was arrested once on an issue unrelated to his sexuality, and while in custody he was insulted and threatened based on his sexuality, but not physically abused. Another time, he was insulted and struck by a police officer outside a nightclub. Though the officers’ behavior was demeaning and frightening, it was not severe enough to be called persecution. See Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1290 (<HOLDING>); Djonda v. United States Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a chinese applicant was not persecuted though he had been arrested detained for five days and forced to stand in the sun and watch reeducation videos
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the district court is AFFIRMED. * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 . The Listings describe “impairments which are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). 2 . In one conclusory sentence, Mr. Candelario argues that he ""would assert that the numbers of jobs set forth by the VE were insufficient.” Appellant’s Substitute Opening Brief (Aplt.Br.) at 26. This argument is waived. See Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1558 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 995 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of another,” it only had to show that someone other than the appellant had a possessory or proprietary interest in it. The appellant concedes that Rowena had such an interest. Our interpretation of “property of another,” for purposes of § 569.120, is in accord with other jurisdictions and legal authorities that have interpreted this phrase in a comparable context. See State v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 372, 936 P.2d 558, 559 (Ct.App.1997) (noting the general rule that, when interpreting criminal damage statutes without a precise definition of “property of another,” the term included any property in which the defendant had anything less than exclusive ownership); State v. Coria, 146 Wash.2d 631, 48 P.3d 980, 983-84 (2002); State v. Webb, 64 Wash.App. 480, 824 P.2d 1257, 1263 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Model Penal Code § 220.3 cmt. 3 (1980)

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase property of another as used in defining the comparable offense of malicious mischief includes property coowned by the defendant or in which the defendant shares an interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Circuit case, the issue was considered to some degree below but was not presented on appeal. In Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 552 F.Supp. 820 (N.D.Cal.1982), aff'd, 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190, 105 S.Ct. 963, 83 L.Ed.2d 968 (1985), the district court applied the FCIA to a judgment against a private party entered prior to the act’s effective date. It imposed interest at the state rate under on v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment). The Eighth Circuit has adopted the second interpretation — that the FCIA applies to judgments entered before the act’s effective date for interest accruing in the entire period following the judgment. See R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 527,

    ### Response:
    holding that the fcia rate should apply to a march 30 1982 judgment against a private party for the entire postjudgment period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶ 54. The transfer of rights to property of debtor Think3 (like the alleged transfer of Think3’s rights in the Toyota receivable through the Mandatory Prepayment Agreement) and granting of security interests may plausibly constitute “transfers” of Think3’s property that are avoidable preferences. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (defining “transfer” broadly as creating a lien, or directly or indirectly disposing or parting with the debtor’s property or an interest in the debtor’s property); Cullen Center Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In re Criswell), 102 F.3d 1411, 1415 (5th Cir.1997) (definition of “transfer” for purposes of § 547 is comprehensive, broad, and includes every conceivable mode of alienating property); Cadle Co. v. Sumrall (In re Sumrall), 9 F.3d 1547 (5th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Braunstein v. Karger (In re Melon Produce,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that granting of a security interest in real property is a preference under  547 of the bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the Supreme Court’s “public function” test, a private entity acts under color of state law “when that entity performs a function which is traditionally the exclusive province of the state.” Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir.1989). The Supreme Court has explained that “when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.” Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966). Thus, the Supreme Court has found private actors to be susceptible to suit under § 1983. E.g., West, 487 U.S. at 54-57, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (<HOLDING>). Relevant to this case, the Supreme Court has

    ### Response:
    holding that private doctor under contract with a state prison to provide medical care to prisoners acted under color of state law when he treated inmate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of member grievances. In furtherance of the first aim, the relatively short six-month statute of limitations found in section 10(b) of the NLRA applies to hybrid section 301 actions. See DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 168-69, 103 S.Ct. at 2292-93. In furtherance of the second, members must exhaust internal union remedies before bringing an action against the union. Cf. Clayton v. United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 451 U.S. 679, 689, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 2095, 68 L.Ed.2d 538 (1981). Other Circuits have addressed these competing policies and have chosen in favor of requiring exhaustion of internal union remedies. See, e.g., Hester v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 818 F.2d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Dunleavy v. Steelworkers Local 1617, 814 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the timeliness of the employees suit is measured from the later of the date the employee knew or should have known of the employers final action or the date the union appeals procedure is exhausted or otherwise broken down to the employees disadvantage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony of several alleged bookmakers and gamblers whose names were mentioned in recorded conversations involving the defendants. Corrado surmises that the government found and subpoenaed these alleged bookmakers and gamblers, and that their testimony befox-e the grand jury was favorable to the defendants. None of these alleged bookmakers were called to testify at trial. The district court denied Corrado’s motion for disclosure on the ground that Corrado was not charged in the indictment with extorting any of these alleged bookmakers and, therefore, even if their grand jury testimony indicated no illegal behavior on Corrado’s part, it was not exculpatory as to the extortion charges that were in the indictment. We agree. See United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1372 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, CoiTado has made no showing that he

    ### Response:
    holding that material favorable to the accused must be either evidence which serves to impeach a government witness credibility or evidence which is directly exculpatory of the defendant  emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on appeal unless it is unsupported by the evidence or the judge has abused his discretion.” Id. LAW/ANALYSIS I. Willful Contempt Mother raises several grounds as to how the family court erred in its finding of contempt. We have reduced those arguments to their analytical essence. At the outset, we note that because the family court was in a better position to assess the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we defer to the family court as to any alleged error regarding the specific factual findings. After observing these parties over the course of a three-day hearing, the family court was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. See S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Mary C., 396 S.C. 15, 26, 720 S.E.2d 503, 509 (Ct. App. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 387-88, 544

    ### Response:
    holding it is proper to defer to the family court even if conflicting evidence is presented on appeal as long as ample evidence in the record supports the family courts findings and conclusions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to copy, photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce any property or material that constitutes child pornography ... so long as the Government makes the property or material reasonably available to the defendant. (B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), property or material shall be deemed to be reasonably available to the defendant if the Government provides ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination at a Government facility of the property or material by the defendant, his or her attorney, and any individual the defendant may seek to qualify to furnish expert testimony at trial. The constitutionality of the Act has been upheld in United, States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 745-46 (7th Cir.2008), and United States v. Johnson, 456 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1019 (N.D.Iowa 2006) (<HOLDING>). However, courts have been indulgent in

    ### Response:
    holding that the act is constitutional because it restricts who may control the images but not what the defendant may introduce at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirement has been met depends on the grounds under which relief is sought. Rule 60(b) stipulates as a general matter that motions for relief from judgment must be made “within a reasonable time,” with the further requirement that motions brought under subsections (1) through (3) of the rule be made not more than one year after judgment is entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Virginia Lee here seeks relief under subpart (b)(6), which is exclusive of the other subparts of the rule and provides relief for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Therefore, I assess the timeliness of Virginia Lee’s motion on reasonableness grounds. Under Rule 60(b), timeliness must be shown by the movant. See Werner v. Carbo, 73 d 535, 538 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court issued its ruling in

    ### Response:
    holding a plaintiffs rule 60b3 motion untimely where a three and onehalf month delay had occurred with no explanation as to the reason for the delay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (traditional summary judgment). 11 . Smart, 597 S.W.2d at 337. 12 . See Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 20 S.W.3d 692, 695-96 (Tex.2000). 13 . Id. 14 . Id. at 696. 15 . Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 774 (Tex.2007) (emphasis added); see also Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber Co. v. Long, 5 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1928, writ ref'd); Lancer Corp. v. Murillo, 909 S.W.2d 122, 127 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (identifying Texas cases that granted equitable subrogation rights to sureties, guarantors, and creditors and concluding that a self-insured manufacturer was likewise entitled to equitable subro-gation). But see Excess Underwriters v. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tex.2008) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Smart, 597 S.W.2d at 338-39. 17 . Id. at

    ### Response:
    recognizing the longstanding rule that insurers may not apply equitable subrogation against their insureds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1998) (probation officers). Benson concedes that the defendants’ actions were sufficiently associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process such that, to the extent immunity should attach, absolute rather than qualified immunity would be appropriate. He contends, however, that “the complete lack of [personal and subject matter jurisdiction] from and after the expiration of [his] parole eliminates the ... absolute immunity with which [the] defendants would otherwise be cloaked.” In support of his contention, he relies on cases establishing that judges who act in the “clear absence of jurisdiction” are not entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (<HOLDING>). A quick review of the case law in this area

    ### Response:
    holding that judge who ruled on parents petition requesting that tubal ligation be performed on a minor was entitled to absolute immunity because the court upon which the judge sat was implicitly granted subject matter jurisdiction over such petitions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dereliction of counsel was an insufficient reason to invoke equitable tolling. The law is clear that courts must be sparing in their use of equitable tolling. There are, however, narrow circumstances in which the misbehavior of an attorney may merit such equitable relief. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Dev. Corp., 60 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir.1995) (equitable tolling may be appropriate where attorney has abandoned client). As a preliminary matter, we note that it is settled that the ninety-day time limit in which a plaintiff must file a Title VII action is akin to a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional bar. Therefore, the time limit is subject to tolling. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,

    ### Response:
    holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    104 S.Ct. at 3467, 82 L.Ed.2d at 762. 9 . Id. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 3467, 82 L.Ed. at 762 (footnote omitted). 10 . United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). 11 . See cases cited supra note 6. 12 . 747 F.2d 287 at 290-292 (5th Cir.1984). 13 . See Gagne v. Town of Enfield, 734 F.2d 902, 904 (2d Cir.1984); Russo v. State of New York, 672 F.2d 1014, 1022-23 (2d Cir.1982); Reel v. Arkansas Dep't of Corrections, 672 F.2d 693, 697-99 (8th Cir.1982); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 356-58 (3d Cir.1982); Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090, 1095 (4th Cir.1981); Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir.1980); Huffman v. Hart, 576 F.Supp. 1234, 1235-38 (N.D.Ga.1983); see also Redd v. Lambert, 674 F.2d 1032, 1034-37 (5th Cir.1982)

    ### Response:
    holding that  1988 attorneys fees should not be awarded when the tax injunction act 28 usc  1341 bars the plaintiff from obtaining  1983 relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and apply it. See Campbell, 144 Idaho at 257-58, 159 P.3d at 894-95 (no good cause when service was late because one attorney accepted in good faith that the other attorney would remind him to serve process); Regjovich v. First Western Investments, Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 157-58, 997 P.2d 615, 618-19 (2000) (denying claim of equitable estoppel because party had readily accessible means to discover the truth, and finding no good cause on other grounds). Cf. Veal v. United States, 84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.2004) (reliance upon the clerk’s advice did not constitute good cause because clerk’s office has no duty to provide step-by-step guidance). The Naranjos were able to follow other procedural requirements set forth in ITCA (same); Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347, 941 P.2d at 319 (<HOLDING>). 4. Constructive notice The Naranjos next

    ### Response:
    holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right to counsel requires an objective inquiry. Id. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The suspect must, “at a minimum, [give] some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (internal quotation marks omitted). A statement is ambiguous when a “reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.” Id. (first emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has never declared its right to counsel principles applicable to invoking the right to silence, and under AEDPA that precedent was not “clearly established” when the California Court of Appeal rendered its decision. See Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in prior cases, we have declined to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regression occurred after break periods. Ex. 132. He found that it did not. He also noted that M. was not at a point at which an emerging skill needed immediate, and intensive attention to develop properly. He explained these findings to the IEP team, which then discussed whether ESY services were warranted for the six-week break during the summer of 1998. The team found, based on this information, that they were not. While the parents did not agree with this conclusion, it was based on observations that indicated that M. would not significantly regress during the break period, followed by a thorough discussion among the members of the IEP team regarding M.’s unique needs. That is the key requirement under the law, and it was clearly complied with here. See Adams, 195 F.3d at 1150 (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated above, I find that

    ### Response:
    holding that a determination of the proper esy services must be contemplated by the childs iep and linked to his or her developmental goals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    before the Court it is unable to conclude as a matter of law that the defendant aircraft was “involved in a transaction in violation of section ... 1957 ... or ... traceable to [the funds illegally obtained].” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). The aircraft was clearly paid for prior to the commencement of Dr. Howard’s fraudulent activities. And, although it was used by Dr. Howard to obtain his personal loan, it is not clear the loan’s proceeds were used to pay the mortgage on the St. Joe, Florida property. In any event, it seems apparent, absent further briefing on the issue, that because the airplane was paid for with legitimately acquired funds, the value of the plane associated to those funds are not subject to forfeiture by the government. United States v. Loe, 49 F.Supp.2d at 523 (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore cannot conclude, on the

    ### Response:
    holding that because 526 of the purchase funds were tainted property  the united states interest was limited to this portion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the faulty premise that an instruction to use an unsuitable means of transport automatically relieves a carrier of its duty to exercise ordinary care. Under Elmore & Stahl, “the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show ... that it was free from negligence____” Id. at 138, 84 S.Ct. 1142. This requires proof that the carrier “exercise[d] reasonable caret ] under the circumstances.” Federated Dep’t Stores v. Brinke, 450 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir.1971). MAN’s instruction to use allegedly “unsuitable” tarpaulins was but one such circumstance. Advised of MAN’S choice, ASCO had a continuing obligation to act reasonably, under the prevailing circumstances, to prevent damage to the press in whole or in part. See Gordon H. Mooney, Ltd. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 616 F.2d 619, 625 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 400

    ### Response:
    holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the locks on it one time. “Q. Did you have any—so you never collected any rent for approximately a year after you purchased it? “A. Probably about a year at least, if not more. “Q. Since then, you have been renting it out. How much have you been renting it out per month? “A. I have only rented it for probably about six months. The people moved out. A little bit longer than six months. Then it was just a monthly—$300 a month. “Q. Three hundred dollars a month? “A. Yes. “Q. So is that pretty much the standard units— “A. No, it probably would go for more. It was a two-bedroom....” West Wind preserved for our consideration the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages by pleading it in its answer. See Prudential Ballard Realty Co. v. Weatherly, 792 So.2d 1045, 1048 (Ala. 2000) (<HOLDING>); and Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. University

    ### Response:
    holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    date of the model rule, and August 1, 1983, the effective date of the new bankruptcy rules, see White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.1983), we hold today that subsequent to August 1, 1983, any local rule governing procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, in bankruptcy cases must yield to the bankruptcy rules duly promulgated under the Supreme Court’s statutory authority. 28 U.S.C. § 2075. Therefore, to the extent that the model rule and the new bankruptcy rules provide for differing standards of appellate review, the latter must prevail. IY. The judgment of the district court will be vacated and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with the foregoing. 1 . But cf. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 199-200 (3d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Section 636(c)(1) provides: (c)

    ### Response:
    holding that appeals from district court orders entered prior to the effective date of northern pipeline construction co v marathon pipe line co 458 us 50 102 sct 2858 73 led2d 598 1982 reviewing interlocutory orders from bankruptcy courts are appealable inter alia under  1291 rather than  1293
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    affidavits that contradict their prior depositions .... If such contradictions were permitted ... ‘the very purpose of the summary judgment motion — to weed out unfounded claims, specious denials, and sham defenses — would be severely undercut.’ ” Bank of Ill. v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys., 75 F.3d 1162, 1171 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1985)). This rule applies not only to affidavits that contradict deposition testimony but also to those that contradict other discovery responses such as interrogatory answers. See S.E.C. v. Cook, No. 1:13-CV-01312-SEB, 2015 WL 5022152, at *22 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 24, 2015); cf. Viasystems Techs. Corp., LLC v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., No. 10-C-577, 2011 WL 2912763, at *3-4 (E.D. Wis. July 15, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Doris has submitted just the sort of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that affidavit cannot create issue of material fact if it conflicts with affiants interrogatory responses but finding no conflict in that particular case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    capacity to store, produce, or call randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers.” 995 F.Supp.2d at 1193, 2014 WL 494862 at *2 (emphasis in original). In further denying the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, the Gragg court specifically rejected this Court’s February 3, 2014 Order, finding that “[tjhere is no indication that the Ninth Circuit would deem a system that has to be reprogrammed or have new software installed in order to perform the functions of an ATDS to be an ATDS.” Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., Inc., No. C12-0576RSL, 2014 WL 801305 at *2 (W.D.Wash. Feb. 28, 2014). As Yahoo! has argued, two other district courts applying Ninth Circuit law have found similarly. See Hunt v. 21st Mortg. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-2697-WMA, 2013 WL 5230061 at *4 (N.D.Ala. Sept.17, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Dominguez v. Yahoo! Inc., — F.Supp.3d —, 2014

    ### Response:
    holding that to meet the tcpa definition of an atds a system must have a present capacity at the time the calls were being made to store or produce and call numbers from a number generator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purposes of his summary judgment motion. It is therefore unnecessary to consider this issue. Defendant’s sole argument is that plaintiff has failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant’s alleged harassment was based on sex. According to defendant, the evidence shows at most that defendant’s alleged sexual advances were based on “characteristics personal to” plaintiff. Id. As an initial matter, I note that, unlike Title VII, the guarantees of the equal protection clause are not limited to a specified list of groups. Although Title VII applies only to discrimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, national origin and religion, the equal protection clause extends to all forms of discrimination. E.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Even individuals not claiming to be a part of

    ### Response:
    recognizing harassment claim under equal protection clause based on sexual orientation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prejudice. State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn.1983). Sebasky argues M.B.’s testimony that Sebasky sexually abused M.B. numerous times after 1981 is not relevant because the events described are insufficiently similar to the current allegations. See id. (determining relevancy based on the prior bad act’s similarity to the charged offense); State v. Buhl, 520 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn.App.1994) (same), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994). In determining relevance and materiality, the trial court should consider the relation in time, place, or modus operandi between the charged offense and the other crime. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d at 743. The crimes do not have to be identical. State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn.1991); see also State v. Crocker, 409 N.W.2.d 840, 843 (Minn.1987) (<HOLDING>); Buhl, 520 N.W.2d at 181 (stating the

    ### Response:
    holding a conviction for lewd conduct with a sevenyearold was sufficient when presented with evidence of other sexual misconduct to establish a pattern of sexual misconduct with vulnerable young women
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the statute refers directly to the common law D’Oench doctrine. The only language in the statute even relevant to the issue presented by Mo-torcity — the range of oral agreements with respect to which the FDIC will be protected — is found in § 1823(e)(1), and its language was merely carried over intact from prior law. As in Texas, our conclusion is supported by the evident purpose of FIRREA — to enhance the FDIC’s ability, to address the problems created by the increasing number of financial institutions in default. As in Texas, Motorc (“Section 1823(e) requires an identifiable ‘asset’ which is acquired by the bank and then transferred to the regulatory agency, and to which the unenforceable agreements must relate.”); Murphy v. FDIC, 38 F.3d 1490, 1500 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 648-49 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that  1823e does not apply to a claim relating to a letter of credit a letter of credit is a liability not an asset
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trying to collect, and, therefore, interpretation which treats the two claims as arising from distinct events turns a blind eye to reality); Taborski v. U.S., 141 B.R. 959 (N.D.Ill.1992) (debtor’s claim against IRS and IRS’ claim against debtor arose out of same transaction and occurrence, which was IRS’ attempt to collect the taxes); In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 835 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1989) aff'd 161 B.R. 788 (S.D.Tex.1993) (IRS claim for unpaid taxes and debtor’s claim for damages for post-petition levy arose out of same transaction or occurrence). Contra In re Rebel Coal Co., Inc., 944 F.2d 320 (6th Cir.1991) (concluding that claim for attorneys' fees did not arise out of same transactions as a tax collection claim); In re Academy Answering Service, Inc., 100 B.R. 327, 330 (N.D.Ohio 1989) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Accord In re Boldman, 157 B.R. 412

    ### Response:
    holding that irs claim for taxes and claim of debtor against irs for violation of automatic stay did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1, 2013), art. 92. Other authorized manners of service in China include: (1) personal service on a party or its delegated representative, (2) service at the party’s residence, and (3) service via a court or the internal Chinese mail system. Id. art. 85-88. 6 Because the language of these provisions is plain and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to the rules of construction or other sources to interpret its meaning. Nevertheless, we note that our interpretation is supported by extra-jurisdictional authority requiring a party to mail a document abroad in addition to performing an act of service domestically in order to complete service on a defendant residing outside of the United States. See, e.g., Froland v. Yamaha Motor Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (D. Minn. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Quinn v. Keinicke, 700 A.2d 147, 154 (Del.

    ### Response:
    holding that the hague convention applied because while minnesota law permitted a foreign corporation to be served with process through the secretary of states office the applicable statute also required the secretary of state to mail a copy of the summons to the foreign corporation before service was effectuated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this opinion only, and without making any substantive finding thereof, the Marks are both protectable and are protected. Likelihood of causing confusion Regarding the second element, the likelihood of causing confusion, this Circuit normally applies a seven-factor test: “the degree of similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; the similarity of the products for which the name is used; the area and manner of concurrent use; the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; the strength of the complainant’s mark; actual confusion; and an intent on the part of the alleged infringer to palm off his products as those of another.” McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Productions, 787 F.2d 1163, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1986). In addition, , Inc., 841 F.2d 214, 219 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Sunsport Inc. v. Barclay Leisure Ltd., 984

    ### Response:
    holding that a hotel was not permitted to use trademarked paraphernalia such as credit card application forms key rings ash trays and shoe shine clothes after its franchise from the company that issued those items had revoked its franchise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    engineering standards, i.e., a change in the guardrail’s end treatment and length. The trial court specifically found that the resurfacing project constituted an “upgrade.” At that point, the decision not to improve the guardrail constituted an “operational level” decision and not a “broad public policy” decision protected under the “discretionary function exception” of the State Tort Liability Act. Any arguments that the trial court erred in its determination that the resurfacing project in this case was an “upgrade” are foreclosed by the State’s failure to challenge the pertinent FOFs. The conclusion that the “discretionary-function” exception does not apply here is further supported by at least three decisions of this court. See Nakahira v. State, 71 Haw. 581, 586, 799 P.2d 959, 962 (<HOLDING>), reconsideration denied, 71 Haw. 581, 799 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the implementation of a training program as opposed to the adoption of the program is not a discretionary function under the state tort liability act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    foreclosure sale. Id. 4 . The appeal was not decided before the settlement described herein was reached and was therefore voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). 5 . A short sale is a sale of real property for less than the total amount owed on a loan secured by that real property that nonetheless, by agreement, generally releases the property from the encumbrance. See Daniel F. Hinkel, Practical Real Estate Law 167 (7th ed.2014). 6 . Diviacchi claims that he did not learn of the events that occurred between the time he filed his lien and the filing of the stipulation of dismissal until September 21. 7 . But cf. Goldstein, Goldman, Kessler & Un-derberg v. 4000 E. River Rd. Assocs., 64 A.D.2d 484, 488, 409 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y.App.Div.1978)(per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 8 . We note that nothing in our decision

    ### Response:
    holding that although the attorney successfully argued for a reduction in the tax assessment of his clients property producing a measurable saving of taxes for three tax years the savings were not proceeds subject to a lien within the meaning of new yorks attorneys lien statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    851, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)). In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court has held that the “use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure, where necessary to further an important state interest, does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The Supreme Court also explained that “if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.” Id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (<HOLDING>); see also Jelinek v. Costello, 247 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the confrontation clause does not categorically prohibit a child witness in a sexual abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial outside defendants physical presence by means of oneway closed circuit television
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state.” Intera, 428 F.3d at 615 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lloyds claims that the district court erred in concluding that there was general jurisdiction because Lloyds does not maintain any office to transact business in Tennessee, is not registered to do business in Tennessee, has no employees in Tennessee, owns no property in Tennessee, and did not solicit any business in Tennessee. In holding that Harris met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of general jurisdiction, the district court relied on the following contacts: ntinental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 689 F.Supp. 564, 567-68 (E.D.N.C.1988) (<HOLDING>); see generally Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville

    ### Response:
    holding that north carolina court lacked personal jurisdiction over illinois bank even though some of its customers resided in north carolina and loan proceeds were used in north carolina
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to a decision not to designate critical habitat. But the statute cannot be read to say that the FWS is ever obligated to exclude habitat that it has found to be essential. Such a decision is always discretionary and the statute “provides absolutely no standards that constrain the Service’s discretion” not to exclude, unlike the statute reviewed in Amador County, which cab-ined the agency’s discretion to disapprove compacts to a set of specified conditions. See Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1084, n. 16 (11th Cir.2012) (distinguishing Amador County and finding that the use of the word “may” in another section of the ESA precludes the review of an agency’s exercise of discretion); see also Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that where the board of immigration is permitted to reopen proceedings in exceptional circumstances its decision not to reopen a case is unreviewable because there are no statutory regulatory or caselaw definitions of exceptional circumstances  and  thus no manageable standard to apply on review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    approach, or that specifically requires a component-by-component least-cost analysis of an integrated system-wide transmission upgrade. New Haven cites to a provision of the statute defining a natural gas facility as including “any natural gas transmission line,” 30 V.S.A. § 248(a)(3)(A), but this section does not signal a clear legislative intent to subject virtually every proposed gas or electric transmission line or other project component to a separate least-cost analysis when it is part of an otherwise integrated project. As the Board’s approach under § 248 was neither unreasonable nor contrary to the plain terms of the statute, and was well within the scope of its expertise, it must be upheld. See In re Verizon New Eng. Inc., 173 Vt. 327, 334-35, 795 A.2d 1196, 1202 (2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Twenty-Four Vt. Utils., 159 Vt. at 359,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that absent compelling indication of error we will not disturb boards interpretation of statutes within its particular area of expertise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of guilty, where they have prestige enough to induce the trial court to give them latitude. When the error is exposed on appeal, it is met by the stereotyped argument that it is not apparent it in any wise influenced the minds of the jury. The reply the law makes to such suggestion is: that, after injecting it into the case to influence the jury, the prosecutor ought not to be heard to say, after he has secured a conviction, it was harmless. State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124, 128-29, 419 P.2d 966, 970 (1966). {20} Because of the magnitude of the misconduct, and because evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, we conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct was unwarranted and prejudicial to Defendant’s right to a fair trial. See State v. Bartlett, 96 N.M. 415, 419, 631 P.2d 321, 325 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). {21} Because there was no objection, we also

    ### Response:
    holding that intentionally communicating falsehoods to the jury is inherently prejudicial the effects of which cannot be erased
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he or she is not a named defendant. 7 . In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Supreme Court established an exception to state sovereign immunity in federal actions where an individual brings an action seeking injunctive relief against a state official for an ongoing violation of law or the Constitution. Under the doctrine, a suit may proceed against a state official in his or her official capacity, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, when a plaintiff, ""(a) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and (b) seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” See In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir.2007) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 945 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Insofar as plaintiff may allege that the

    ### Response:
    holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agreed that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding the Court from deciding whether Per-ea’s truck was an active accessory to the accident and that the Court should decide this factor. See id. at 30:16-22. LAW REGARDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE The Supreme Court of New Mexico has adopted a three-part test to determine if a motorist’s injuries, resulting from an intentional tort, arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured vehicle, thus .qualifying for coverage under an uninsured motorist policy. See Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co., 120 N.M. at 818-819, 907 P.2d at 999-1000 (adopting a three-part test articulated by the supreme courts of Colorado and Minnesota); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blystra, 86 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Britt teaches that “a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that britt embraced a threepart test for deciding uninsured motorist coverage issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence ... ”, basic notions of procedural due process compel this Panel to conclude that essential rights of the parties may be jeopardized by a procedure where the oral presentation of evidence is not allowed, where the bankruptcy court’s ability to gage the credibility of a witness or evidence is questionable and where rulings on objections to the admissability of all direct evidence, may be unclear. Additionally, in view of the above considerations and the express requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), this Panel is unable to find any authority to support the procedure implemented by the bankruptcy court in taking testimony in the underlying adversary proceeding. See Hoffman v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen’s Local Union No. 888, 536 F.2d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). As previously set forth, Fed.R. Civ.P. 43(a)

    ### Response:
    holding that a civil contempt proceeding is a trial within the meaning of fedrcivp 43a rather than a hearing on a motion  and the issues may not be tried on the basis of affidavits emphasis added citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “ill-suited” for evaluating the effectiveness of counsel in advising of deportation, and held that “ad vice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. at 1481-82. While Youngs refers to Padilla as representing a “trend away from the distinction between direct and collateral consequences,” Appellant Br. at 22, Padilla’s holding was limited to the requirement of counsel to advise of deportation pursuant to their Sixth Amendment responsibilities. These Sixth Amendment responsibilities of counsel to advise of the advantages and disadvantages of a guilty plea are greater than the responsibilities of a court under the Fifth Amendment. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Padilla Court’s unwillingness to

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel not the court bears the responsibility of advising a defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea apart from the small class of rights enumerated in rule 11
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 646 (R.I.2006); see also DeOliveira, 972 A.2d at 659. Moreover, when applying Rule 103(a)(1), this Court has held that if “the introduction of evidence is objected to for a specific reason, other grounds for objection are waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Ucero, 450 A.2d 809, 815 (R.I.1982); see State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1017-18 (R.I.20 and this Court’s jurisprudence concerning that Rule we hold that, once Mr. Patino asserted that the basis of his objection was that the witness was there to testify and pointed to no other grounds, he thereby waived the right to appeal on other evidentiary grounds (including the hearsay evidence rule). See Neri, 593 A.2d at 956; see also State v. Reyes, 984 A.2d 606, 619-20 (R.I.2009) (<HOLDING>). B Termination of the Parental Rights of Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants objection did not suggest that the objected to statement was hearsay and therefore concluding that the defendant waived appellate review of the hearsay argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in cases involving challenge to multicomponent, subjective criteria hiring system is improper because it unjustly burdens employers); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.1986) (same), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 3227, 97 L.Ed.2d 734 (1987), argued Jan. 20, 1988, 56 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1988) and E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir.1983) (challenge that is not directed to “ ‘specific procedure ... [that] has a discriminatory impact on blacks’ ... does not fit within the model disparate impact claim”) (quoting Pouncey, 668 F.2d at 800), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867,104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984) with Atonio v. Wards Cove Parking Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir.1987) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3670

    ### Response:
    holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “written document ... of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery”). In the context of insurance litigation, this policy is particularly appropriate as the insurer generally controls the structure and wording of both the original instrument and its amended form. Cf. Styer, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 335 (“A given policy, as- delivered to the insured, contains a vast torrent of words not a part of the company’s agreement because nonapplicable provisions are not physically removed.”). To the extent that there remains any ambiguity that costs of defense include delay damages or interest running to the time of the verdict, these ambiguities are construed against the drafter-insurer. See Riccio, 705 A.2d at 426; cf. Incollingo v. Ewing, 474 Pa. 527, 379 A.2d 79 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In his April 11, 2003 order, the District

    ### Response:
    holding that postverdict interest is a cost of defense under the terms of an insurance contract similarly worded to the contracts in the instant litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (8), shall direct remission of up to, but not more than, 100 percent of a forfeiture if the surety apprehended and surrendered the defendant or if the apprehension or surrender of the defendant was substantially procured or caused by the surety, or the surety has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant, and the delay has not thwarted the proper prosecution of the defendant. We review the trial court’s order for an abuse of discretion. See Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., Inc. v. Putnam Cnty., Fla., 528 So.2d 430, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Palmetto contended that it substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant. See Conti Heritage Ins. Co. v. Orange Cnty., 798 So.2d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); Cnty. Bonding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 131

    ### Response:
    holding that substantial attempts by surety may entitle it to remission of bond forfeiture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to his entitlement to a clothing allowance. Plaintiffs’ argument is that since Brumbaugh has received deputy uniforms and a cleaning allowance he should not also receive a clothing allowance for detectives (which he did not actually need during that time given his assignment). Plaintiffs’ argument frankly ignores the pertinent statutory language. Under US-ERRA, a returning veteran is entitled to not only pay, seniority and employee benefits, but also all of the “rights and benefits” of the employment. These terms are defined at 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2) as follows: (2) The term “benefit”, “benefit of employment”, or “rights and benefits” means any advantage, profit, privilege, gain, status, account, or interest (other than wages or salary for work performed) that accrues (M.S.P.B.1996) (<HOLDING>); Fernandez v. Department of Army, 84 M.S.P.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that law enforcement commission was a benefit of employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the radio incident, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that even if this event occurred, it does not constitute past persecution. We have held that persecution “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.” Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. Thus, even if Ceraj was threatened and slapped by the police and had his radio broken, we cannot conclude that this alleged mistreatment was sufficiently grave to constitute persecution. We have previously explained that “[persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Lumaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The IJ further concluded that, even if Ceraj

    ### Response:
    holding that an asylum applicant had not suffered past persecution where she claimed to have been beaten and to have suffered some bodily injuries but she was not detained imprisoned tortured or sexually assaulted in any way
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    saw the crime or was a victim of it. There are simply no facts in the affidavit that would have informed the court whether the witness was, in fact, a disinterested citizen, or was someone wit identification order is “issued only upon reliable information.” Myers, 570 N.W.2d at 73 (discussing “statutory test of confidential informant credibility” with respect to search warrants). Because the application and affidavit submitted in the present case lacked the information required by section 810.5(4) with respect to the informant’s credibility and reliability, the facts provided by the informant should not have been considered in assessing the adequacy of the showing made for issuance of the nontestimonial identification order. Cf Iowa Dist. Ct. for Black Hawk County, 472 N.W.2d at 625 (<HOLDING>). Since the informant was the only source of

    ### Response:
    holding that noncompliance with mandatory requirement of search warrant statute designed to ensure that warrants are issued upon reliable information required that information provided by informants be ignored in determining probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since, however, the statute speaks directly to the subject matter of the actual “residuary clause,” 20 Pa.C.S. § 2514(11) (emphasis added), Appellant’s view does not reflect the same literal approach to the statute that she seeks to have applied to another of its parts. 12 . As noted, Subsections (10) and (11) are a re-enactment of Subsections (9) and (10) of Section 14 of the Wills Act of 1947; these supplanted Section 15(c) of the Wills Act of 1917, Act of June 7, 1915, P.L. 403 (superseded). Appellant acknowledges that she would have no interest in the outcome of the present will contest if the presumption as directed in Section 15(c) were to be applied to Dr. Burger's will. See Brief of Appellant at 24 (citing In re Armstrong's Estate, 347 Pa. 23, 25-26, 31 A.2d 528, 529 (1943) (<HOLDING>); In re Morgan’s Estate, 340 Pa. 465, 467, 17

    ### Response:
    holding that under section 15c lapsed residuary gifts fell to the remaining residuary beneficiary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the V.I., 184 F. Supp. 2d 428 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2002). “[A] finding is' ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52 (a). A trial court’s findings are thus upheld if its “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-4, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985). Whether the trial court should have applied the legal doctrine of equitable estoppel is reviewed de novo. See Nibbs v. Roberts, 31 V.I. 196, 209 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1995) (<HOLDING>). III. ANALYSIS A. Appellants’ Equitable

    ### Response:
    holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or supervise another participant in the criminal scheme. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (n.2). In contrast, the sentencing court has the discretion to depart upward from the otherwise applicable sentencing range if the defendant “did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization.” Id. The probation officer’s recommendation that the court enhance Harness’s offense level because he had management responsibility over the assets of the victim was error, because these facts support only a discretionary decision to depart, not a mandatory enhancement under section 3B1.1(e). See, e.g., United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1324 & n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gort-DiDonato, 109 F.3d 318,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the young.” Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir.1986). In addition, the fiscal and administrative burdens entailed with any additional procedures would be excessive. To force IPS to provide actual notice of the opportunity for a hearing to those employees faced with discharge would, in essence, be asking a government entity to sacrifice the efficiency of its operations to factors as trivial as the holiday and travel plans of those with whom it has a duty to correspond. It was incumbent upon Atkins to keep IPS apprised of his current mailing address, and he cannot now be heard to complain because his employer ) (finding that judge waived right to a hearing after he declined the opportunity for one); Suckle v. Madison General Hospital, 499 F.2d 1364, 1367 (7th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Count II is dismissed. 3. Counts III, IV, V

    ### Response:
    holding that physician discharged from staff of hospital was not entitled to a hearing because he could not secure a right which he declined when it was voluntarily offered to him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaint with prejudice on the basis of preclusion and lack of standing. II. We first address the district court’s ruling that Appellants lacked standing to bring their claims. In then-complaint, Appellants sought to enjoin Providian from engaging in alleged violation of the stay and discharge provisions. However, as the district court pointed out, the automatic stay had terminated and Providian had completed its collection efforts by the time Appellants filed suit in district court, rendering their claims for injunctive relief moot. Nonetheless, Appellants have standing. Appellants also sought monetary damages against Providian, and even such a generalized claim for monetary damages is sufficient to maintain justiciability. Shadduck v. Rodolakis, 221 B.R. 573, 579 (Bankr.D.Mass.1998) (<HOLDING>). Hence, the district court erred in dismissing

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had standing even though automatic stay had terminated and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because he also sought actual damages for violation of the automatic stay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the U.S. and incurred an economic risk in the U.S.” could sue under section 10(b)). Similarly, the location of the harm to a plaintiff is independent of the location of the securities transaction that produced the harm. Just as the situs of a defendant’s allegedly deceptive conduct is irrelevant to the transactional test, see Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2883-84, 2886-87, so too is the situs of a plaintiff’s alleged injury. Given that “[n]ot deception alone, but deception with respect to certain purchases or sales is necessary for a violation of the statute,” id. at 2887 (emphasis added), there is no textual or logical basis for making injury a sufficient condition for the statute’s application without the existence of a domestic purchase or sale. See Cornwell I, 729 F.Supp.2d at 626 (<HOLDING>). The place from which Plumbers’ traders placed

    ### Response:
    holding that morrison precluded extraterritorial application of  10b to foreign securities transactions involving alleged wrongful conduct that could cause harm to american investors in the united states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. The defendant, Timothy Bailey, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from the house where he resided. As we conclude that the investigatory stop of the vehicle Bailey was in was based upon reasonable well-founded suspicion, see Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), and that the written consent to search obtained from Bailey was freely and voluntarily given, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546,

    ### Response:
    holding that custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a  consent to search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal stipulation may result in transferring the adversary to an inappropriate venue under Title 28. “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). Accordingly, a federal court must consider their authority “even though parties are prepared to concede it.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 165, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934)). Parties cannot circumvent statutory re quirements, including venue requirements, through stipulations. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>). This Court must determine the proper venue of

    ### Response:
    holding that parties could not stipulate a construction of state law to obtain jurisdiction inconsistent with 28 usc  12542 and prudential doctrines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the original period of his probation expired and, on the date of expiration, the court had yet to revoke his probation. Defendant also argues that the court failed to apply the appropriate test to determine whether he was a fugitive and that the finding that he was a fugitive was not supported by substantial evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW {6} In relevant part, Section 31-21-15(C) states that a probationer is a fugitive “[i]f it is found that a warrant for the return of a probationer cannot be served[.]” Defendant’s jurisdictional challenge requires that we determine whether the district court properly applied Section 31-21 -15(C) to the facts of this case. Defendant thereby raises a question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Neal, 2007-NMCA-086, ¶ 16, 142 N.M. 487, 167 P.3d 935 (<HOLDING>). A jurisdictional challenge may be raised “at

    ### Response:
    holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    apply in a malicious prosecution action based on the dismissal of the underlying action in connection with a settlement. In the absence of controlling state law, a “federal court sitting in diversity must use its own best judgment in predicting how the state’s highest court would decide the case.” Takahashi v. Loomis Armored Car Serv., 625 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir.1980). “In so doing, a federal court may be aided by looking to well-reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions.” Id. It is a well-accepted exception to the general rule that a dismissal resulting from a settlement does not constitute a favorable termination for malicious prosecution purposes. See, e.g., Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l., 177 Ill.2d 267, 226 Ill.Dec. 604, 685 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Cox v. Williams, 233 Mich.App. 388, 593

    ### Response:
    holding that if the dismissal was merely a formal means of securing a negotiated settlement it cannot serve as the basis for a malicious prosecution action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at-will employment or (2) breach of a promise to be given at-will employment subject to certain conditions (which the plaintiff alleges he eventually fulfilled). Aside from certain statutory exceptions (which the plaintiff does not allege), “[i]t has long been settled in the District of Columbia that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all.” Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C.1995). In considering this general principle, “[mjost courts ... have concluded that individuals who are promised at-will jobs, but whose offers of employment are retracted before the employment is to begin, have no remedy in contract law against the prospective employer.” Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F.Supp. 8, 13,14 (D.D.C.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Pfeffer v. Ernst, 82 A.2d 763, 764

    ### Response:
    holding that under district of columbia maryland or virginia law no remedy exists for the claim of breach of a promise to be considered for atwill employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his conviction, sentence, or restitution order to any court on any ground. He contends that the inclusion of “restitution” suggests that “sentence” refers only to the period of incarceration. (If “sentence” included “restitution,” then the plea might include superfluous terms— a result we disfavor. See United States v. Rourke, 74 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir.1996)). Thus, he argues, the conditions of supervised release are not part of his “sentence” as that term is used in his plea agreement. Cf. id. at 806 (significant ambiguities in a plea agreement should be construed in favor of the defendant). However, Adkins’ argument conflicts with our precedent, which suggests that terms of supervised release are part of the sentence. See United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 798-99 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 799 n. 3 (“[W]e find that Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence including the terms and conditions of his supervised release when he agreed to a plea agreement that said he expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed on any ground emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that Appellant was not indigent. This appeal was abated pending a hearing in the trial court on Appellant’s indigency. This court has since been furnished a complete record of the evidentiary hearing, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, and will now consider the cross-point as if no erroneous action had occurred. See TEX. R.APP.P. 81(a). At the evidentiary hearing the parties stipulated that Appellant had filed an affidavit of indigency, that the facts recited therein were and remain true, and that he was indigent at the time of the appeal. Based on these stipulations and the record as a whole, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that he be provided a statement of facts without cost. See Rosales v. State, 748 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). The cross-point is overruled and the judgment

    ### Response:
    holding that an indigency finding will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “it seems incorrect to claim that Goodwin committed his failure to register ‘against a minor.’ ” Id. The court explained that applying the term “ ‘perpetrated against a minor’ to any failure to register stretches this term past its breaking point.’ ” Id. We agree. In Segura’s case, there was no specific victim attributed to his failure to register. Therefore, the crime was not perpetrated against a minor and should not qualify as a sex offense. C. Having concluded that the district court erred in finding that failure to register is a sex offense, we now discuss whether that error was plain — that is, whether the error was clear or obvious. To determine whether the district court’s error was plain, we examine the state of the law at the time of appeal. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d at 423 (<HOLDING>). Segura filed his initial brief in this appeal

    ### Response:
    holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. Nevertheless, §§ 77-9-247 and 248 (discussing installation of cross-bucks), § 77-9-251 (discussing duty of railroad in maintaining the grade), § 77-9-245 (duty to enclose depots), and § 77-9-253 (duty to maintain stock gaps and cattle guards) clearly refer to duties of the railroad in the interest of public safety. This refutes the point that KCS has no duty toward the public in operation of its railroad. However, foreseeability and breach of duty are issues to be decided by the finder of fact once sufficient evidence is presented in a negligence case. Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 400 (Miss.1991). III. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING RECOVERY OF HEDONIC DAMAGES. ¶ 20. 3, 353 (Tex.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 109 Wash.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing as an element of pain and suffering
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federal court when res judicata or collateral estoppel acts as an affirmative defense to that action, on the reasoning that ""federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.” While we recognize that the All Writs Act is utilized as a tool to effectuate the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which deals with the underlying principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, we note that those principles are not asserted as a defense, but rather as the federal claim presented in Liberty Mutual's petition for injunctive relief under the All Writs Act. 7 . Although we rely upon federal law in analyzing the collateral estoppel issue, see Jaramillo v. Burkhart, 999 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), it is irrelevant whether we apply federal

    ### Response:
    holding that to determine collateral estoppel effect of a federal civil rights action fjederal law governs the preclusive effect of a claim arising under federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In his brief, Lin asserts that the documents discussed in Shou Yung Guo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.2006) and Tian Ming Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 468 F.3d 167 (2d Cir.2006), may provide evidence of a policy in Fujian Province of forced sterilization of Chinese nationals with two or more children, and requests that this Court remand his case accordingly. Because such an argument does not raise a constitutional claim or question of law, the Government correctly asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review Lin’s petition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). As such, it is dismissed. To the extent Lin asks this Court to remand his case for the taking of additional evidence not in the record, we decline to do so. See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 269 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that any inherent power to remand to the bia for the consideration of additional evidence should not be exercised where i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Huether is no stranger to being interviewed by law enforcement and that he voluntarily chose to be cooperative. Further, this court’s recent decision in United States v. Perrin, 659 F.3d 718 (8th Cir.2011), indicates that more than what is in the record here reviewed is required for a determination that Huether was in custody for Miranda purposes.' A federal officer, one of at least six in tactical gear who entered the house with a search warrant for child pornography, interviewed Perrin in his bedroom. Id. at 720. Before taking Perrin to the bedroom, the officer told Perrin he was free to leave and that he did not have to answer any questions, to which Perrin indicated he understood. Id. The officer nearly closed the bedroom door, leaving it slightly open, enabling anothe h Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We affirm the district court’s judgment. The

    ### Response:
    holding defendant was not in custody when he gave inculpatory statements in a windowless room with enlarged photographs on the wall as a deceptive interview tactic and where the officers falsely trumped up the evidence they said they possessed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ORDER Defendant-Appellant Montaque Green (“Green”) pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). The District Court sentenced Green principally to 120 months’ imprisonment. Green appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred at his sentencing by not applying the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (“FSA”). See Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2821, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (<HOLDING>). The government concedes that the District

    ### Response:
    holding that the fsa applies to sentencing proceedings occurring after august 3 2010
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with a deadly weapon, finding that a firearm, is by definition, a deadly weapon which fires projectiles likely to cause death or great bodily harm); Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (noting that “[bjecause the definition of ‘firearm’ does not involve proof that the gun is loaded or operable, a defendant’s use of a firearm during a crime can be established even if the gun is not recovered and introduced into evidence”); Miller, 613 So.2d at 531 (concluding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on the justifiable use of non-deadly force, because a firearm is, by definition, a deadly weapon which fires projectiles likely to cause death or great bodily harm) (emphasis added); M.R.R. v. State, 411 So.2d 983, 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); Bass v. State, 232 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. 1st DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument used is a firearm as defined by section 7900016 then that instrument is a deadly weapon as a matter of law  regardless of whether it is loaded or capable of being fired and holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument is not a firearm then courts are to apply an objective test and look to the nature and actual use of the instrument and not to the subjective fear of the victim or intent of the perpetrator in determining whether the instrument is a deadly weapon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    properly determined that Appellants’ motion could withstand challenge. THE IMMUNITY ISSUE Appellants next contend that Horowitz is a public officer who is immune from suit. Preliminarily we note that this cause of action accrued after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (which abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity) and before the adoption of the Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act, 42 Pa. C. S. §§8541-8542. Thus, the Township has no immunity from suit. But Ayala did not involve the issue of im munity granted a public official. Accordingly, Horowitz could have a defense which is unavailable to the Township. See Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 25 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 340, 360 A.2d 250 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Whether or not Horowitz falls within the

    ### Response:
    holding that township supervisors absolute immunity from suit because of their positions as high public officials may not be used to shield the township itself from liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A period of temporary absence of the child or any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.” 5 . Our review of the record reveals no evidence concerning the father’s income for the years between the birth of the children in 2005 and 2009. The income information contained in the record regarding the father re-fleets that he earned $4,807 per month at the time of trial and that he had earned $69,000 in 2009. MOORE, Judge, concurring specially. With regard to that part of the main opinion addressing the trial court’s failure to include the health-insurance premiums in the calculation of the father’s child-support obligation, I concur only because the father did not ask this court to overrule past decisions on that issue such as Brown v. Brown, 719 So.2d 228 (Ala.Civ. App.1998) (<HOLDING>), and Bertram v. Doss, 709 So.2d 1274, 1276-77

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court had not erred in including the cost of health insurance covering both the custodial parent and the parties child in determining the noncustodial parents childsupport obligation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was lawfully tried by the military court, as we believe he was, then he was subject to the procedures and penalties which the law for the military forces provided. Since we have concluded that he was properly under regulation of military law, he was subject to the authority that included “. . not only the creation of offenses but the fixing of the punishment therefor.” Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, supra, 361 U.S. at 246, 80 S.Ct. at 303. We, therefore, hold that the District Court properly denied relief and its judgments are affirmed. 1 . The former action was L-1003 in which Chief Judge Stanley appeared to accept the fact that the offenses were not service connected and said the sole issue was the retroactivity of O’Oallahan and held it not re . 1929, 12 L.Ed.2d 1039 (<HOLDING>) ; McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel must be appointed to indigents for purposes of appeal as announced in douglas v california 372 us 353 83 sct 814 9 led2d 811 to be retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cases and Proceedings Nunc Pro Tunc dated August 3, 1984. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(B), and (L). 2 . The letter does not give an address for the Financial Litigation Unit, but in argument, the Debtors' attorney asserted that the, letter was sent to the Financial Litigation Unit in Fort Worth, Texas. 3 .The docket sheet reflects that the confirmation hearing was held on March 31, 1992 and the court announced at that time it would confirm the plan. The Debtors’ attorney did not submit the order confirming the plan until June 8, 1992. 4 . The Bankruptcy Code is 11 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. References United States (In re Burns), 887 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Gurwitch (In re Gurwitch) 794 F.2d 584 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 7 . This Memorandum shall constitute Findings

    ### Response:
    holding that following confirmation of the debtors chapter 11 plan the internal revenue service could collect a nondischargeable tax claim that was not listed in the irss bankruptcy claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    grant of federal court jurisdiction, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), the Court has since made clear that jurisdiction over APA challenges to federal agency action is vested in district courts unless a preclusion of review statute specifically bars judicial review in the district court. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). Citing Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C.Cir.1983), the defendants maintain that the APA provides no basis for this court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ nonconstitutional claims alleged in Counts I, III, and V because the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) bars judicial review of claims within the purview of the CSRA. See Carducci, 714 F.2d at 175 (<HOLDING>). A careful review of the CSRA convinces this

    ### Response:
    holding that the csras exclusive and comprehensive remedial scheme precludes review under the apa of disputes that concern not only employment practices specifically prohibited under the csra but also employment practices that are so insignificant as not even to bear mention in the csra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demeanor.”). The State’s first issue is overruled. 2. Standing In its second issue, the State contends that appellee has no standing to challenge the search. See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (“Any defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must first show that he personally had a reasonable expectation of privacy that the government invaded.”). The State argues that appellee has no standing to challenge the legality of the search because she was merely a passenger in the vehicle. See United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 657 (8th Cir.2008) (“The general rule is that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile belonging to another.”); Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). This contention is insupportable given that:

    ### Response:
    holding appellant suffered no infringement of any right ensuring freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures where appellant claims no possessory interest in the vehicle itself or in those items seized from within it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinions in favor of Dr. Truchelut’s opinion that plaintiff is not disabled. Initially, the court notes that Dr. Royster’s opinion is not entitled to any special weight simply because he is plaintiffs treating physician. As the Supreme Court held in Black, & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003), courts in ERISA cases “have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant’s physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician’s evaluation.” Id. at 834, 123 S.Ct. 1965. See also Richards v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., 356 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1286 (S.D.Fla.2004) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Even so, “[p]lan

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not wrong for the administrator to rely on the findings of an independent reviewing physician
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clause is ensuring the availability of cross-examination. The Court stated: To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. Id. at 61, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 198. However, Crawford suggests that business records “by their nature” may not be testimonial. Id. at 56, 1-58 L. Ed. 2d at 195-96. See also State v. Windley, 173 N.C. App. 187, 194, 617 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 323 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a fingerprint card maintained in a national database the automated fingerprint identification system afis was a business record and therefore nontestimonial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any supervised released violations that occurred before the expiration of the supervised release term. The majority, moreover, imports into § 3583(i) something that is simply not there — an additional power automatically to further delay revocation proceedings until the defendant is in federal custody. The absence of any statutory basis for such post-term authority is particularly significant, in my view, because the statutory provisions governing supervised release do adjust in another respect for periods of incarceration on charges other than those giving rise to the term of supervised release in question. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (suspending the running of a term of supervised release while the defendant is imprisoned); cf. United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Had Congress intended, as the majority

    ### Response:
    holding that  3624e does not apply until after conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entity that was not paid alleges that it intended to transfer the funds to the United States on receipt. When funds are due abroad and not paid, the direct effects occur abroad. Although the entity might ultimately feel the financial injury at home in the United States, we have held that those reverberations are too attenuated to qualify as direct effects. Am. Telecom, 501 F.3d at 541; see Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F.3d 69, 78 (2d Cir.2010) (noting that “the mere fact that a foreign state’s commercial activity outside of the United States caused physical or financial injury to a United States citizen is not itself sufficient to constitute a direct effect in the United States”); Big Sky Network Can., Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Gov’t, 533 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to receive promised funds abroad will not qualify as a direct effect in the united states 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prevents potential conflicts. Defendants’ Opp., supra at p. 16. Courts have recognized a prison's policy interest in prohibiting unsupervised group activity, or the creation of leadership roles within a religion, in order to maintain prison security and discipline. See, Shabazz v. Arkansas Dept. of Corr., 157 Fed.Appx. 944, 945 and 946 (8th Cir.2005)(affirming District Court's holding that avoiding the elevation of one (1) inmate to a position of religious leadership furthers prison security); Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 129 (8th Cir.1988)(policy which prohibited a Muslim group from creating a distinct leadership structure, and conducting unsupervised religious services, was reasonably related to a legitimate government interest); Akbar v. Borgen, 796 F.Supp. 1181, 1187 (E.D.Wis.1992)(<HOLDING>); Tisdale v. Dobbs, 807 F.2d 734, 738 (8th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that preventing gang activity and maintaining order in the prison population were legitimate penological goals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Richards’s affidavit, given on some unspecified day in March of 2001, concerning the “C-store picker” position states the following: I could perform the C-store picker responsibilities with or without accommodations. Currently, I am on and off my feet frequently. There is no reason why I could not now walk a cart down the aisle and pull products. Furthermore, if Farner-Bocken would accommodate me by allowing me to use a motorized cart that it uses in [the] “case pick” department, I could [do] my job. Plaintiffs LR 56.1(e) Appendix Resisting Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment at 6 (Exhibit 2, Richards’s Affidavit, ¶24) (emphasis added). Although Richards “acknowledges” her prior deposition testimony, Richards’s affidavit appears to be inc Supp. 672, 684-686 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>); Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 902 F.Supp. 882,

    ### Response:
    holding that the affidavit of an expert proffered in opposition to summary judgment motion was assertedly in conflict with the experts prior deposition testimony but the court found that the affidavit could generate genuine issues of material fact because the expert explained the basis for his apparently changed opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    program. Because the defense is sufficient, Defendants are not liable with regard to Plaintiffs’ dilution claims. Defendants title “Finding Rin Tin Tin: The Adventure Continues” is a fair use of the term “Rin Tin Tin” and is protected by the First Amendment from Plaintiffs’ claims of confusion and dilution. Plaintiffs’ have failed to raise any issues of material fact with regard to the three elements of the “fair use” test. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Furthermore, where the First Amendment applies to protect titles and works from federal claims of confusion and dilution, it also extends to state-based claims of infringement, dilution, and unfair competition. TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court’s finding of “fair use”

    ### Response:
    holding that the texas antidilution statute was not intended to address nontrademark uses of a name protected by the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    specifics from which we may conclude that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kika’s motion to reopen on the ground that he was prejudiced by the alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. We move to Kika’s second argument— that the BIA’s reliance on Matter of Fuentes in denying his motion to reopen was contrary to the BIA’s own precedent. In Matter of Fuentes, the BIA held, inter alia, that former membership in a national police force is an immutable characteristic and that “[i]t is possible that mistreatment occurring because of such a status in appropriate circumstances could be found to be persecution on account of political opinion or membership in a particular social group.” 19 I. & N. Dec. at 662 (<HOLDING>). Kika argues that the BIA should not have

    ### Response:
    holding that the alien in that case had not established such circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. at 489 (internal citations omitted). In suits bought under the Establishment Clause, “direct and unwelcome” contact with the contested object demonstrates psychological injury in fact sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 489-90 (finding that plaintiff had sufficiently demonstrated standing to challenge Ten Commandments poster in defendant’s courtroom when “ACLU-Ohio ... identified member Bernard Davis, a lawyer who travels to and must practice law within DeWeese’s courtroom from time to time. There, Davis has and would continue to come into direct, unwelcome contact with the Ten Commandments display.”); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679, 681-82 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 478 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff had standing to challenge a portrait of jesus in the hallway of his high school even after graduation as plaintiff still visited the school and will confront the portrait whenever he is in the hall  plaintiff claimed that  he continued to suffer actual injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    than one owner cannot be aggregated so as to sustain a conviction of grand larceny should the value of property taken from each owner be less than Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars, and he argues the testimony presented at trial is insufficient to show the value of the property taken from any one of the three roommates equals Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars. Id. at 301, 312 S.E.2d at 552-53. The Court found the roommates’ testimony regarding the property’s value sufficient: However, we are satisfied the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that the value of the property taken from one of the roommates did exceed Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars. Id. at 301 n. 1, 312 S.E.2d at 553 n. 1; see also State v. Humphery, 276 S.C. 42, 44, 274 S.E.2d 918, 918-19 (1981) (<HOLDING>); S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Grant, 265 S.C.

    ### Response:
    holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    E. Ctr. v. Qwest Commc’ns Int'l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir.2002); Snowden, 290 F.3d at 638-39; Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9, 19-20 (Ala.1998); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1253-54 (Colo.Ct.App.2001). {54} For the same reasons, we decline to consider the supplemental authority submitted by Fiser on August 30, 2006, and December 29, 2006. None of this additional authority applied Texas law, so assuming without deciding that the underlying facts and issues in these cases are sufficiently analogous to the facts presented by Fiser to be of some relevance, they still do not warrant reconsideration of the analysis contained above. See, e.g., Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 223 Ill.2d 1, 306 Ill.Dec. 157, 857 N.E.2d 250, 267-69, 277-78 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Schwartz v. Alltel Corp., 2006-Ohio-3353,

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with a remedy for a variety of forms of discrimination. See S.Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1986), reprinted in, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300 (stating that section 3730(h) was intended to protect individuals who assist in discovery and prosecution of fraud because “few individuals will expose fraud if they fear their disclosures will lead to harassment, demotion, loss of employment or any other form of retaliation.”). Rather than deny an entire class of plaintiffs a cause of action, the Court finds the better reading of the statute is that it provides an additional remedy for plaintiffs suing private employers, a remedy that is either unavailable or reduced in magnitude, when the employer is a government entity. Cf. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 262-65, 101 S.Ct. 2748 (<HOLDING>). 4. Plaintiff Has Plead a Viable Section

    ### Response:
    recognizing that municipalities immunity from punitive damage awards under section 1983 does not render them immune from suit altogether
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “provides that in exceptional circumstances, a statute of limitations ‘may be extended for equitable reasons not acknowledged in the statute creating the limitations period.’ ” Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir.2004)(quoting David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 345-46 (1st Cir.2003)). This Circuit has yet to address the question of “whether the BIA has either the authority or the obligation” to apply equitable tolling in the immigration context. Guerrero-Santana, 499 F.3d at 93. What is well-established, however, is that the doctrine of equitable tolling should be “sparingly invoked.” Jobe v. INS, 238 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir.2001) (en banc). Equitable tolling is generally unavailable to excuse a party who has failed to exercise due diligence. See Beltre-Veloz, 533 F.3d at 11 (<HOLDING>); Jobe, 238 F.3d at 101 (stating that

    ### Response:
    holding that aliens failure to exercise due diligence in not inquiring into immigration status for eight years despite knowing that removal proceedings had commenced precluded equitable tolling of deadline for filing motion to reopen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court committed both procedural and substantive error by inadequately explaining its decision to impose a consecutive sentence, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, and giving insufficient weight to mitigation evidence presented at sentencing. After review, we affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence, and the record does not demonstrate that the district court committed either procedural or substantive error during sentencing. The district court adequately explained its decision to impose a consecutive sentence, stating among other things that Baughman was responsible for “a considerable amount of drugs” and that “there is just way too much crime going on.” See United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The record does not indicate that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court need not recite a laundry list of factors to demonstrate the reasonableness of its sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1995). 14 . The district court properly modified the specific finding of the AU on this point. The district court agreed with the ALJ that Leggett could be a cashier, but that there was only substantial evidence to support a finding that Leggett can be a cashier in a sedentary position, and not in a ""light work"" position as the ALJ held. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp.1995) (""The court shall have the power to enter ... a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner]”.). 15 . Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir.1985). 16 . Paul, 29 F.3d at 211. 17 . Id.; see also Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237. 18 . Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237. 19 . Pierre v. Sullivan, 884 F.2d 799, 802 (5th Cir.1989) (per curiam). 20 . Id. at 802-03. 21 . See Jones, 829 F.2d at 526 (<HOLDING>). 22 . Latham v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 482, 484 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that the alj did not err by not ordering psychological tests when the claimant was merely emotionally upset about his condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    killing the officer and thus, the State argues, no rational basis existed to instruct the jury on manslaughter. We need not resolve the question of whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a manslaughter instruction, however, because of the nature of the jury verdict. Here, only Pearson’s mental state was disputed at trial. The jury had the opportunity to convict Pearson of either aggravated murder, which requires knowing or intentional killing, or simple murder, which in the case of killing a peace officer requires only recklessness. Because the jury chose to convict for aggravated murder, the court’s refusal to give an instruction on manslaughter, an offense requiring recklessness, constituted at most harmless error. See State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989) (<HOLDING>). But see State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551,

    ### Response:
    holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was if error harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pronouncement must “(1) prescribe substantive rules — not interpretive rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice —and, (2) conform to certain procedural requirements.” Id. at 698 (emphasis in original). To satisfy the first requirement the rule must be legislative in nature, affecting individual rights and obligations; to satisfy the second, it must have been promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority and in conformance with the procedural requirements imposed by Congress. Id. Clearly, this internal procedure for alerting Customs officers to possible infringements of 19 U.S.C. § 1527 was not intended as a substantive rule, and was not entitled to the force and effect of law against the government. See id. at 698-99 (<HOLDING>) Appellant cites Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,

    ### Response:
    holding that va lenders handbook and va circulars do not have the force and effect of the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to formulate a rule that would apply in all situations. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that it has: quite simply ... been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646. Nevertheless, our Opinions and the Opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court have set forth some guiding principles. If a regulation authorizes a physical invasion of private property, no matter how slight, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently concluded that a taking has occurred. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 422, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Clearly, “[a] taking may more readily be

    ### Response:
    holding that a new york law requiring building owners to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on their premises constituted a taking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that non-NMDs may not take their shares in the form of permanent or long-term interests in real property. ¶43 As I envision this rule, it would operate as a starting point for the probate process, not as a basis for actual distribution. It would define those rights which vest at death. The probate court would then be free to arrive at an equitable distribution of estate assets, based upon the facts of each case, the relations between the heirs, the nature of the property contained in the estate, and any other pertinent considerations. ¶44 Such powers of equitable distribution are plainly within the power of the probate court. See Com. R. Prob. P. 22 (empowering probate court to make “such orders as are necessary to close the estate”); Estate of Kumler, 699 P.2d 1388, 1391-92 (<HOLDING>). This type of determination would be difficult

    ### Response:
    holding that uniform probate code  3911 gives probate court power to sell any property which cannot be partitioned without prejudice to the owners and which cannot conveniently be allotted to any one party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the minor is a defense if the minor is sixteen or seventeen, but not if the minor is under sixteen. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304.5(1), (2) (1999). 123 This statutory scheme reflects our legislature's careful consideration of the level of protection required for minors of different ages. We simply cannot say that our legislature's determination to preclude the mistake of age defense for sexual activity with a minor fourteen or fifteen is so arbitrary as to run afoul of the Constitution. Like the statute at issue in Ransom, section 76-5-401 offends no deeply-rooted and fundamental tradition of due process. Children have historically received special protection from sexual contact with adults. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (<HOLDING>); see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake

    ### Response:
    recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vietims age
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rezoning existed at the time of the taking than would the fact that the property was not subsequently rezoned. 9 The plurality is impressive in the breadth of the analogies that it brings to bear in its analysis, ranging from probability to the stock market to psychology. If, as I understand it to be the plurality’s point, the future is unpredictable, I am persuaded. If, on the other hand, it is the plurality’s point that when the future becomes the present it is of no relevance in assessing what the prospects yesterday were of that future, I respectfully disagree. 10 Other states have held that evidence of a posttaking rezoning is admissible to help the jury determine the “just compensation” due for the taking. Roach v Newton Redevelopment Auth, 381 Mass 135, 137; 407 NE2d 1251 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Bembinster v Wisconsin, 57 Wis 2d 277,

    ### Response:
    holding that ajctual amendment of the zoning law subsequent to the taking may be weighty evidence of such a prospect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the other (non-PSR) sealed documents in John Doe’s criminal case, particularly those that refer to Doe’s cooperation, should be enjoined.” Roe, 428 Fed.Appx. at 68-69. That procedure was ultimately modified when the Clerk’s Office in the Eastern District of New York inadvertently unsealed the docket sheet, revealing that Safer was “John Doe” and a cooperator. Judge Glasser then held a series of hearings, with only the Government and Sa-ter’s counsel present, and went through the entire docket to determine which documents should be unsealed. Thereafter, he issued two orders—one sealed, one unsealed—detailing which documents were to be kept sealed. Movants first object that they were not allowed to attend these proceedings, although they were parties to the case. See Aref, 533 F.3d at 81 (<HOLDING>). This argument fails. Judge Glasser’s sealed

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to intervene to assert the publics first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    198 F.3d 100, 103-04 (3d Cir.1999)). ‘""When a term in an insurance policy is ambiguous ... and the intention of the parties cannot be discerned from the face of the policy, the court, in its attempts to arrive at a reasonable construction of the policy that is in accord with the parties’ apparent intention, may look to extrinsic evidence of the purpose of the insurance, its subject matter, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.” Pacific Indemnity Co., 766 F.2d at 761. Ambiguous insurance contracts must be construed strictly against the insurer; ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the insured. Id. Exclusions from coverage of an insurance policy will be effective against an V-041-B-A, 1996 WL 33370669 (N.D.Miss. Jan. 10, 1996) (<HOLDING>). Drumheller does not own the property through

    ### Response:
    holding that a pasture leased by the policyholder was not used in connection with the residence premises of the policyholder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Christopher Patrick Noone have the requisite “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” for standing purposes. McInnis-Misenor v. Maine Medical Center, 319 F.3d 63, 67-68 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). For purposes of Fed. R.Civ.P. 17(b), however, only Joseph Francis Noone IV has the capacity to represent Spud Noone’s estate in this action. See, e.g., Nordberg v. Town of Charlton, 2012 WL 2990763, at *3 (D.Mass. July 19, 2012). But that is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Third, to the extent the Town Defendants also argue that none of the claims survived the death of Spud Noone, the court rejects that assertion as well, at least as to the section 1985 claims. See Pomeroy, 410 F.Supp.2d at 12-14 (<HOLDING>); see also Wagar v. Hasenkrug, 486 F.Supp. 47,

    ### Response:
    holding that pursuant to 42 usc  1988a a  1983 procedural due process claim is an action  of tort  for  damage to the person for purposes of mgl c 228  1 the massachusetts survival statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    further alleges that Defendants have adopted a policy mandating admission of patients with certain medical conditions without regard to the capacity of the Defendants’ facilities to provide adequate care, leading to violations of law. Defendants respond that the statements Plaintiff identifies are non-actionable “puffery.” Defendants contend that these statements cannot serve as the basis for claims under Minnesota consumer protection statutes. Defendants, therefore, argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Court agrees with Defendants. Puffery includes exaggerated blustering or boasting and vague, subjective statements of superiority. Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); LensCrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943

    ### Response:
    holding statement that product was americas favorite pasta was puffery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1710 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). The important criterion in a vagueness analysis of an aggravating circumstance is narrowing: “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). Our analysis is relatively simple in this case. Even though the aggravator at issue was phrased as “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind,” the jury held more narrowly that “the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and h Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 923,

    ### Response:
    holding that intentional torture suffices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Hot Springs Chancery Court specifically found as follows: “Under the terms of the [Disposition Statement], upon the dissolution of the marriage by court order, all control and direction of the tissues as of January 29, 1997, was relinquished to the [the IVF Program Director].” Any ruling in the case at bar in Dodson’s favor, i.e., that the federal constitution demands the return of the embryos to Dodson, would wholly undermine this part of the Hot Springs Chancery Court’s ruling in Dodson I. In Dodson II, the Pulaski Chancery Court determined the IVF Program Director had the right to dispose of the embryos. Even if that determination were technically obiter dictum, it was not a stray remark on an issue not presented to it. Cf. Stemler v. Florence, 350 F.3d 578, 589 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). This is not a case in which the state court

    ### Response:
    holding rookerfeldman did not preclude a federal lawsuit where state court only discussed related claim which was not an issue that was salient to the state court in dicta
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allowing Drapeau to establish the basic facts of these relationships, I would have no problem deferring to the district court’s discretion in the matter. But a total exclusion of all evidence of this family bias leads me to conclude that “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression” of Big Eagle’s credibility and her motivation to testify had they known her sister worked in the U.S. Attorney’s Office prosecuting Dra-peau, and that her brother-in-law was one of the officers who had arrested Drapeau. Beckman, 222 F.3d at 524. If I were a juror, I would want to know about this. While I take issue with the majority’s holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation, I agree the violation was harmless error. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (<HOLDING>). Even without Big Eagle’s testimony, there was

    ### Response:
    holding confrontation clause violations subject to harmless error analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for its departure from the category calculated under the guidelines and its explanation for the category it has chosen as appropriate.”). That is particularly so where, as here, the sentencing court simply selects the criminal history category that results from counting remote convictions as if they had occurred within the applicable time period. See United States v. Maurice, 69 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir.1995) (“[Wjhere a sentencing court selects a higher criminal history category under § 4A1.3 by adding point totals for remote convictions, we have held that an explanation of this calculation serves as an adequate explanation for the inappropriateness of the intervening criminal history categories.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Starr, 971 F.2d 357, 363 & n. 7 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The strongest case the defendant cites in

    ### Response:
    holding that where court considered remote prior convictions that if counted would have put defendant in category iv rather than ii the rejection of category iii was implicit  and an explicit statement of the reasons was not required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Plaintiffs seek an award for a total of 3,748.5 attorney hours and 901.25 paralegal hours for Phelps Dunbar and a total of 2,707 attorney hours for Randolph Lipscomb; the Plaintiffs claim that these hours were reasonably expended on this litigation. The Defendants dispute the total number of hours claimed by the Plaintiffs. Of the 3,748.5 Phelps Dunbar attorney hours for which the Plaintiffs seek an award, the court finds that 1,047.75 of the hours were expended in state court litigation in the Chancery Court of Lowndes County prior to the commencement of this litigation. Accordingly, the fees for those hours are not attorneys’ fees contemplated by § 1988, and no award shall be made for those hours. See Simi Inv. Co., Inc. v. Harris County, Texas, 236 F.3d 240, 255 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees resulting from state court litigation that does not seek to enforce federal constitutional rights but which does precede a successful  1983 suit are not attorneys fees contemplated by  1988
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to assist him with taping the box, which that person did. {Id. at 37.) 21 . Gennarelli was also ambivalent when asked what ""MIA” stood for. Initially, Gen-narelli stated that the letters were also ""just initials” and had no significance of any kind, and that he did not know why he chose them. (Gennarelli Dep. at 60.) After being shown his testimony at Mr. Mejia’s criminal trial, however, Gennarelli grudgingly admitted that it was a code for Miami. {Id. at 61-62.) 22 . Detective Skinner and S/A Tipton testified at the grand jury, but Sergeant McNicholas, Gennarelli, and Bezmen did not. 23 . S/A Tipton, Detective Skinner, Sergeant McNicholas, Bezmen, and Gennarelli all testified at the trial. Notably, the jury never learned of the additional portfolios because they were su .D.Ill.1999) (<HOLDING>). 33 . Historically, this practice is explained

    ### Response:
    holding that private physician and nurse were immune from suit for subjecting motorist to bloodalcohol test after she refused treatment following automobile accident since police officer acting under authority vested by state statute ordered them to withdraw blood after driver was arrested for driving under the influence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tolling not to apply. In such a case, a plaintiff should not expect that the charge will necessarily be cross-filed within the limitations period. 10 . We note that once events are allowed under the continuing violation theory, “the Federal Rules of Evidence and the substantive law at issue, rather than the statutory filing period, should govern the evidentiary determinations of the trial court.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 (3d Cir.1995). 11 . We note that Title VII claims may not be brought against individual employees; under Title VII, Plaintiff can only state a claim against NHS and cannot state a claim (and does not appear to attempt to) against the individual defendants. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we need not engage in a similar

    ### Response:
    holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that it can no longer be viewed as an exercise of “discretion” in attempting to comply with the BOP’s policy statement; and (2) that FCI Ray Brook also “enforce[d]” that policy inadequately, due to the negligent actions of its employees. It is true that Triestman, during oral argument before this panel, did not articulate the “negligent guard” theory for himself. But that is of no moment, as it was the obligation of the district court below to interpret Triestman’s complaint “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Pabon, 459 F.3d at 248 (citation omitted). B. Consideration of the negligent guard theory The negligent guard theory is a theory of liability under the FTCA over which the district court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction. See Coulthurst, 214 F.3d at 109 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Triestman’s complaint should not

    ### Response:
    holding that a negligent guard theory would not fall under the discretionary function exception because sjuch negligent acts neither involve an element of judgment or choice within the meaning of gaubert nor are grounded in considerations of governmental policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    General or the Secretary, of Homeland Security.... 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that the discretion given to the Attorney General to deny or grant an adjustment application made pursuant to the CAA is not given pursuant to “this subchapter” because, according to plaintiff, “this subchapter” refers only to the INA, not the CAA. While no reported decision from any court appears to have squarely addressed the issue, the Supreme Court recently noted, in resolving a different issue, that the reference in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to (“this subchapter” is to “Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II, of the United States Code, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1381 and titled ‘Immigration.’”). Kucana v. Holder, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 827, 832 n. 3, - L.Ed.2d - (2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1252a2bii barred jurisdiction of decisions specified by statute as discretionary but did not bar decisions specified by regulation as discretionary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the government or any other description of the offense charged which indicates the nature and scope of the activity which the government sought to punish in each case, and (5) places where the events alleged as part of the conspiracy took place. Marable, 578 F.2d at 154. We required that these factors be reviewed in tandem for a reason. A single agreement can have as its object several different actions or activities. Moreover, the object of the agreement can be achieved over a period of days, weeks, or months. And the people involved in executing the agreement can change from time to time. In none of these situations, however, can a person be punished under one drug conspiracy statute for more than just the single agreement. See, e.g., Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53, 63 S.Ct. at 101 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nichols, 741 F.2d 767, 771

    ### Response:
    holding that one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and therefore several conspiracies because the agreement envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    departure. Not only was there notice, but the Eighth Circuit has recently concluded that a similar statement in a PSR constituted notice that was sufficient under Rule 32(h). In Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 626, “the PSR stated, under the heading ‘Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstances,’ that ‘the defendant has an extensive criminal history for which no criminal history points were as signed.’ ” The court held that, even though the PSR did not affirmatively recommend an upward departure, the PSR satisfied Rule 32(h) because “the PSR included a specific ground that could form the basis for an upward departure — a criminal history for which no criminal history points were assigned .... ” Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 627; see also United States v. Anders, 899 F.2d 570, 573, 576-77 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is sound

    ### Response:
    holding that there was sufficient notice when the psr listed factors for but did not recommend departure for one codefendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hazardous substances at the landfill, is barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Although it may be an academic exercise to permit a claim for equitable relief to proceed against a dead and buried corporation, such a result appears to be conceptually correct under controlling New York precedent. As to the unjust enrichment and contribution claims, since they did not accrue until well after GACCC was dissolved, they may not be maintained. See Quinn v. Spitale, 203 A.D.2d 674, 675, 610 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (3d Dep’t 1994) (“A cause of action for contribution arises not on the date of injury for which the party seeking contribution may be held liable, but at the time that payment is made on the underlying claim.”); Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, 192 A.D.2d at 503, 596 N.Y.S.2d 435 (<HOLDING>). As to G.A. Corrugated, which was dissolved

    ### Response:
    holding that cause of action for unjust enrichment accrues upon payment of sum giving rise to duty of restitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    raise an issue of whether Erskine owed a duty of care to Barnard who was not his client. It is generally recognized that “an attorney owes a duty to non-clients who the attorney knows will rely on the services rendered.” McCarthy v. Landry, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 488, 490 (1997), quoting Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 524, cert. denied 493 U.S. 894 (1989). No duty of reasonable care will be imposed, however, “if such an independent duty would potentially conflict with the duty the attorney owes to his or her client.” Lamare v. Basbanes, 418 Mass. 274, 276 (1994). In the circumstances of this case, I conclude that to hold Erskine to a duty of care to Barnard would be to create a conflict in the duty he owed to Torrey. See Symmons v. O’Keeffe, 419 Mass. 288, 300 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Although the conveyance in the present case

    ### Response:
    holding that in preparing an estate plan and distributing property either through a will or through inter vivos trusts attorneys can have only one client to whom they owe a duty of undivided loyalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s motion be denied. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall have 60 days from the date of this order to conduct discovery; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that a trial in this matter will be held on September 17,1993 at 10 a.m. 1 . The Recognition Agreement provided that the Union could demonstrate majority status by a card check procedure instead of a formal National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. It further provided that, upon the Union’s demonstration of majority support, the Collective Bargaining Agreement would apply to all new union members. See Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Exh. B. 2 . See also Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 128 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 28, 82 S Ct. 541, 548, 7 L.Ed.2d 503 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. International Union,

    ### Response:
    holdingthat  301a confers jurisdiction on federal district courts over any agreement between employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 332 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Mo.App.2010) (claim not barred by economic loss doctrine when client sued in tort and alleged a breach of fiduciary duty that arose from the special relationship of parties as broker-insured). 5 . ""Once an agency relationship has been established, a fiduciary relationship arises as a matter of law.” A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 978 S.W.2d at 395. 6 . Zeff Dist. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 389 S.W.2d 789, 795-96 (Mo.1965), quoting Am. Jur. 562 Insurance § 164 (1965) (""An agent or broker who undertakes to procure insurance in accordance with instructions impliedly undertakes to give notice to the [client] in the event of his failure to procure such insurance.”); Busey Truck Equip., Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 299 S.W.3d 735, 738-39 (Mo.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Although State ex rel. PaineWebber, Inc.

    ### Response:
    holding that an agent breaches its duty to use reasonable care and diligence in procuring insurance when it fails to provide an insurance policy that covers the contents of the insureds business as the insured had requested
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is stated in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), which makes it unlawful to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding under the FLSA. The majority of circuits have held that this provision protects an employee who makes an internal complaint to the employer. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir.2009). The Eighth Circuit has interpreted the statute to prohibit discrimination against an employee who asserts or threatens to assert FLSA rights. Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 183 (8th Cir.1975). That interpretation has been criticized as contrary to the plain language of subsection 215(a)(3). See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840 (<HOLDING>). Needless to say, the holding of the Eighth

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase file any complaint requires a plaintiff employee to submit some sort of writing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101-02, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), but a legislative choice burdening the exercise of a fundamental right must pass strict scrutiny. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 & n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2395 & n. 15, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). While the freedom of speech is, of course, a fundamental right, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S.Ct. 444, 446, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), courts have developed different standards for its restriction depending on the particulars of the speech or the type of regulation at issue. Compare, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (<HOLDING>), with Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding where contributions to lobbying organization were generally not tax exempt exception for veterans organization was speakerbased discrimination not aimed at the suppression of ideas and satisfied rational scrutiny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the generic, contemporary meaning of “aggravated assault.” Ultimately, we need not decide which party’s interpretation is correct. C. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err Even assuming the court erred in treating Kentucky’s second-degree assault offense as matching the generic “aggravated assault” offense, the error was not plain. Satisfying the second prong of plain error review requires showing that the district court’s error was “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423. We are reluctant to find plain error when no binding precedent contradicts the district court’s holding. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 318 (5th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). If a party’s theory of the case requires

    ### Response:
    recognizing that lack of binding authority is often dispositive in the plainerror context
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1253-54 (Utah 1987), we reiterated the proposition that under the doctrine of equitable conversion, a vendee’s equitable interest in an installment land sale contract constitutes real property for purposes of § 78-22-1; however, this Court has not previously decided the nature of the vendor’s interest for pu 238, 240-41, 21 S.W.2d 162, 163 (1929), Hull v. Maryland Casualty Co., 79 So.2d 517, 518-19 (Fla.1954), Bank of Hawaii v. Horwoth, 71 Haw. 204,-, 787 P.2d 674, 679 (1990), Cumming v. First Nat’l Bank, 199 Iowa 667, 669, 202 N.W. 556, 556 (1925), Clarence M. Bull, Inc. v. Goldman, 30 Md.App. 665, 667-68, 353 A.2d 661, 663 (1976), Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 6-7, 595 P.2d 1199, 1201-02 (1979), and Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 507, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956) (<HOLDING>). See also 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 266 (1969);

    ### Response:
    holding that a judgment lien does not at tach to a vendors interest in an executory land contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a FELA claim in federal court that rule 68.03 is inconsistent with the federal interest in uniformly applying FELA. In Johnson, the Supreme Court explained that the difference in “outcome” requiring preemption of a state rule referred to a difference in “the ultimate disposition of the case” between federal and state courts. 520 U.S. at 921, 117 S.Ct. at 1806 (emphasis added). Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has held state rules to be preempted when such rules significantly affected state-court adjudication of the underlying rights of the federal statute, typically by defeating a plaintiffs cause of action when such defeat would not have occurred in federal court. See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740-42, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 2117-18, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Felder, 487 U.S. at 152-53, 108 S.Ct. at 2314

    ### Response:
    holding state statute that prevented  1983 suits seeking damages relief against correctional officers to be preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1107, 1110 (11th Cir.2006). Pursuant to § 1915A, a district court must dismiss a prisoner’s complaint if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) — (b)(1). A pro se complaint is held to a “less stringe nder § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.2001). A habeas petition is the exclusive remedy for a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); see Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 638 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, a state prisoner’s § 1983 claim

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court mischaracterized a state prisoners  1983 claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because the prisoner did not attack his conviction challenge the fact or length of his confinement or seek immediate release from prison
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6. The County Defendants first argue that they are immune from liability for a violation of section 845.6 by virtue of the immunity provision at Government Code sections 855.6, which, inter alia, confers immunity on public employees and entities for injury caused by “the failure to make a physical or mental examination.” But on its face, section 855.6 does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the failure to “summon medical care”; only to the failure to “make a physical or mental examination.” The statute is therefore inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ section 845.6 claim. See, e.g., Lum v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1257 (E.D.Cal.2010) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the merits of Plaintiffs’ section

    ### Response:
    holding section 8556 inapplicable where plaintiff alleged a failure to refer decedent for evaluation rather than a failure as a result of diagnosis or treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the statements contained in those records under the ancient-documents exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(8); Patterson, 277 F.3d at 713. Fuqua has not raised a single legitimate question as to the records’ trustworthiness, especially in light of the low threshold for authentication. 2. City of Baltimore Police Department Report Fuqua also objects to the admissibility of the police report, not out of any concern over authenticity, but because “statements within the report of what witnesses may have said to the officer are ‘hearsay within hearsay ” that must be excluded. Opp. 22. It is true that third-party statements in a police report, if not subject to another exception, are inadmissible hearsay. See United States v. Burruss, 418 F.2d 677, 678 (4th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). It is just as true, however, that an

    ### Response:
    holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Government), II (Knowingly Making False Statements or Records to the Government), and TV (violation of False Claims Act Anti-Retaliation Provision). II. Smith first argues that the district court erred when it dismissed Counts I and II with prejudice. The district court grounded its dismissal of those counts primarily upon the “very serious matter” of the “violation of the statutory seal.” J.A. 488. Smith’s attorney undoubtedly violated the False Claims Act’s seal requirement by publicly discussing the complaint. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir.2011) (recognizing that “the seal provisions [prevent] the relator ... from publicly discussing the filing of the qui tam complaint”); U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 67 F.3d 242, 244 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The real dispute here centers on whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff clearly violated the seal provision  by making statements to a newspaper about the existence and nature of her qui tam suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failed to act in a reasonably prudent manner to protect and enforce rights, and when a perceived injustice to the defendant exists. See, e.g., AC. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.Cir.1992) (en bane) (patent infringement claim may be barred under the doctrine of laches). Does the fact that the right sought to be enforced has its origin in the Constitution, rather than in a statutory grant, mean that there should be no limits imposed on its enforcement, either by legislature or courts? Plaintiffs so argue. They begin by drawing a distinction between what they call “common-law takings” and “eminent-domain takings.” Common-law takings, according to plaintiffs, include takings that arise from torts (non-contract wrongs) and contract wrongs 3d 1171 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Florida Rock Indtis., Inc. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of federal jurisdiction in ERISA is limited to suits brought by certain parties, as to whom Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal court was necessary to further the statute’s purposes.” Id. Additionally, the Court concluded that ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under § 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issues in this case. A suit for similar relief by some other party does not “arise under” that provision. Id. at 27, 103 S.Ct. at 2855. Given such a strong statement by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs’ contention that section 502(k) is a nonexclusive grant of jurisdiction lacks merit. See Provident Life, 906 F.2d at 988 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in section 502(k)’s jurisdictional

    ### Response:
    holding that based on franchise tax board grant of jurisdiction in section 502e is exclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Patterson does not specifically prohibit retaliation claims under § 1981, Congress still intended to make retaliation claims actionable under § 1981. The House Committee on Education and Labor (“the Committee”), the committee to whom the bill to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was assigned, stated that Section 210 would overrule Patterson by adding at the conclusion of section 1981 a new subsection (b).... The Committee intends this provision to bar all race discrimination in contractual relations. The list set forth in subsection (b) is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. In the context of employment discrimination, for example, this would include, but not be limited to, claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, retali 47 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>); Clark v. City of Macon, Ga., 860 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff states a cause of action under  1981 by alleging that defendant harassed and retaliated against him for filing eeoc claim and otherwise attempting to receive redress for disparate treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    enumerated in the statute. Also, the stan dards that govern subdivisions should incorporate the requirements set out in the local zoning ordinances, N.J.S.A 40:55D-38(b)(1), which, in turn, should be drawn with consideration for the “character of each district” and “to encourage the most appropriate use of land.” N.J.S.A 40:55D-62. Further, as stressed by the Appellate Division, “total suitability” is still a legitimate goal of municipal land-use ordinances. 261 N.J.Super. at 670, 619 A.2d 676. Subdivision ordinances may be flexible enough to allow broad discretion in the protection of the public interest, even though they must be reasonably specific to provide guidance and to foster consistency and fairness in their application. See Levin, supra, 35 N.J. at 511, 173 A.2d 391 (<HOLDING>). In sum, the general purposes of the land-use

    ### Response:
    recognizing that power to act in public welfare must be exercised in manner consistent with established standards
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was the subject of the enforcement proceedings.” Ingrahm, 711 So.2d at 1346. The trial court also found that “[i]n th , argues that based upon the “tipsy coachman” doctrine, this court should nonetheless affirm as the trial court was right for the wrong reason. The former husband argues that dismissal was proper because the former wife’s motion for rehearing was pending in the Duval Circuit Court when she filed her Complaint in Miami-Dade County. The former husband’s reliance on the “tipsy coachman” doctrine is, however, misplaced, as the issue of the former wife’s Duval County motion for rehearing was not included in the record before the trial court. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906 (Fla.2002)(quoting Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 645 (Fla.1999))(<HOLDING>); State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Rochell v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the tipsy coachman doctrine allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that reaches the right result but for the wrong reasons so long as there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Onee established, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to respond with specifically designated facts that establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id, On review, we may not search the entire record to support the judgment, but may only consider that evidence which was specifically designated to the trial court. A presumption of validity clothes a trial court's grant of summary judgment, and the appellant has the burden of demonstrating to this Court that the , 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind.1976) (extending a builder's implied warranty of habitability to a subsequent purchaser, limiting lability to latent de-feets not discoverable by a subsequent purchaser's reasonable inspection of the premises before the sale); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300 (Ind.1972) (<HOLDING>). Although an implied warranty of habitability

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule of caveat emptor is no longer valid with regard to the sale of a new residence by the buildervendor to the immediate purchaser
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    particular punishment.” Thus, the issue of punishment is “one for the legislative branch, and legislative discretion is deferred to unless the sentence imposed shocks the conscience.” In the case sub judice, the trial court sentenced Pepe-Frazier to life for his commission of aggravated child molestation, (725 SE2d 236) (2012) (noting that “a constitutional attack on a sentencing statute should normally be made no later than the sentencing hearing, at a time when corrective action is still possible” and that, because appellant “failed to raise his constitutional challenges at the first available opportunity during the sentencing hearing” and instead “first raised [them] in his amended motion for new trial,” his challenges were untimely and not subject to review). 29 See id. at 674 (3) (<HOLDING>). 30 OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1). 31 Adams v. State,

    ### Response:
    holding that because appellant had waived review of constitutional challenge to sentencing statute by failing to raise it at the first opportunity the trial court correctly proceeded to examine whether the appellants trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional challenges to the sentencing statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of obtaining the property.” 272 F.3d at 910-11. As discussed above, these types of cases— where the insured unlawfully obtained something from the underlying plaintiff— are inapposite: Beaumont did not unlawfully obtain anything from the nurses. Rather, it allegedly unlawfully withheld compensation from them. Thus, we find that Federal’s public policy claim fails. 3. Federal’s Discovery Request Is Moot Because the Policy requires and public policy does not preclude that Federal hon- or its commitment to indemnify Beaumont, there is no need for discovery on those issues. As the district court noted, the method of distribution of the settlement does not change the nature of the settlement itself. Regardless of the distribution of funds Inc., 2007 WL 3473683, *3 (W.D.Wash. Nov. 14, 2007) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 331 Fed.Appx. 473 (9th Cir.2009). 4 .

    ### Response:
    holding that the underlying suit did not seek to prevent unjust enrichment or to deprive defendant of the net benefit of its allegedly wrongful act but rather the underlying settlement was calculated by determining the individual harm suffered by each plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d at 1562. Southern asserts that GUA did not take steps necessary to obtain permits to commence construction or to obtain environmental permits. Moreover, GUA did not contact FERC regarding approval of a bypass facility. Tutcher Deposition at 517-520. Southern also dismisses GUA’s discussions and communications with FERC and the Alabama Public Sendee Commission regarding necessary approvals and eminent domain rights as exploratory. According to Southern, courts have held that such preliminary efforts can not confer antitrust standing. Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 660 (9th Cir.1983). Responding to GUA’s contentions that it was futile to take such steps absent a tap, Southern argues that such positions have routinely been rejected. See, e.g., Jayco Sys., Inc., supra, 111 F.2d at 314 (<HOLDING>). See also Cable Holdings, Inc., supra, 825

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact plaintiff could not have acquired machines from defendant even had it undertaken adequate preparations did not excuse plaintiffs failure to undertake such preparations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 117 S.Ct. 1747, 138 L.Ed.2d 21 (1997), the Supreme Court reached the same result on the viability of a state gross receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by ERISA ir.1987) (finding that ERISA preempted fraudulent inducement claims that required a comparison of the terms of the ERISA-governed policy to the agents’ alleged misrepresentations). In Garren, the court held that ERISA preempted an insured’s tortious interference with contract claim against his insurer for denying his son’s medical claims. Id. In addition, other circuits have found that claims based on the denial of benefits by administrators of ERISA plans are preempted. Cannon v. Group Health Service of Oklahoma, Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim against health insurers and hmo for a seven week delay in authorizing an autologous bone marrow transplant was preempted by erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert and Elaine sought a disproportionate share of the martial estate. Elaine argued that she was entitled to a disproportionate share of the parties’ estate because of the alleged cruelty include findings that characterized and valued each asset or liability on which disputed evidence was presented at the bench trial. See Tex. Family Code Ann. § 6.711 (Vernon 2006) (requiring, on request of party, findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning ""the characterization of each party’s assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets on which disputed evidence has been presented” and ""the value or amount of the community estate’s assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets on which disputed evidence has been presented”); Limbaugh v. Limbaugh, 71 S.W.3d 1, 7 & n. 2 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). However, Elaine does not complain about the

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court must make findings of fact on all material factual issues that involve ultimate issues in divorce and must make findings that characterize and value each asset or liability on which disputed evidence was presented
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    natural gas sales to proceed at market prices. See id. at 1041-42. Second, the FERC reviewed the natural gas market and determined it was competitive. See id. at 1042. Third, although the FERC did not impose individualized reporting requirements on sellers of natural gas, it maintained ongoing oversight of the market and took corrective responses to evidence of market manipulation. See id. We thus concluded that, ""[bjecause FERC has not abdicated its responsibilities but has acted, albeit with a light hand, to authorize just and reasonable rates in the natural gas arena, the Filed Rate Doctrine continues to preempt any rate-setting activities by the courts F.Supp.2d 148, 163 n. 16 (D.Mass.2003); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 263 F.Supp.2d 172, 192 (D.Mass.2003) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, none of these cases address the

    ### Response:
    holding that filed rate doctrine did not apply because pharmaceutical companies do not file rates with any agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    underlying the instant offense. United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 Application Note 1). Therefore, the district court erred by considering testimony as to the weapon’s characteristics to be relevant, but the error was harmless. As noted above, Lipscomb’s single-count indictment, which the district court could consider, alleges that he possessed a sawed-off shotgun. The only remaining question is whether possessing such a weapon, “by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury.” United States v. Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d 456, 467 (5th Cir.2004). We think that the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to § 4B1.2 answers that for us. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). “Unlawfully possessing a firearm described in

    ### Response:
    holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence on some factual issues, such as whether Richelo immediately withdrew from representing CMS when Clough requested that he do so. Other facts, such as the amount and nature of the work performed by Merolla in the Main Line suit, and the amount of attorney fees attributed to that work, can be proved by the record in that case. Therefore, we find that Richelo has failed to demonstrate at this point that Merolla’s testimony is “necessary” to his defense. While it is understandable that Richelo may want to bolster his case at trial with Merolla’s testimony, that interest does not make Merolla’s testimony “necessary” under Rule 3.7 and is outweighed by Clough’s right to be represented at trial by his chosen counsel. Martinez v. Housing Auth. of DeKalb County, 264 Ga. App. at 288 (5) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because Richelo failed to carry

    ### Response:
    holding that the clients right to its chosen counsel superseded the opposing partys right to call that counsel as a witness when there were other witnesses available to testify to the same facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to obtain the incorporated document before signing the contract or risk being bound by its terms. In fact, the face of the contract includes the following warning immediately above the incorporation language: “This document has important legal consequences. Consultation with an attorney is encouraged with respect to its completion or modification.” Consequently, Chabad is presumed to have known about, and accepted, the express language of incorporation on the face of the contract and the terms of the incorporated A201-1997, even if the incorporated document was not attached and Chabad failed to obtain and read it. See Nat’l Prop. Holdings, 453 S.W.3d at 425; Lyon Fin. Seros., 257 S.W.3d at 232; Indem. Ins. Co., 101 S.W.2d at 556; see also Raymond James & Assocs., 196 S.W.3d at 318-19 (<HOLDING>). On appeal, Chabad presents two additional

    ### Response:
    holding broker and clients agreed to arbitration where newaccount forms signed by clients expressly incorporated separate unsigned client agreement containing arbitration provision even if client agreement was not attached or read by clients because they were presumed to have read newaccount form which placed them on notice of client agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs’ negligence claim did not begin to run until the claim “accrued.” CaLCode Civ. Proc. § 312. A claim “accrues” upon the occurrence of the claim’s last essential element. Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 397, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79 (1999). “When damages are an element of a cause of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the damages have been sustained. Mere threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough.” City of Vista v. Robert Thomas Securities, Inc., 84 Cal.App.4th 882, 886, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 237 (2000). Plaintiffs’ allegations support the inference that they did not experience any injury until they were unable to make their mortgage payments in the spring of 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-20.) See Osei v. Countrywide Home Loans, 2010 WL 727831, at *9 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Defendant has not shown that

    ### Response:
    holding similar allegations supported that the plaintiffs negligence claim did not accrue until plaintiffs loan payments exceeded his ability to pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact.”); Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1285 (same); see also Nichols v. S. Ill. Unwersity-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 784 (7th Cir.2007) (concluding that the “subjective beliefs” of African-American plaintiffs “that they were as qualified or even more qualified” for a position upgrade than the non-African-Americans the employer selected did not create a genuine dispute as to this issue, and thus the plaintiffs failed to create a prima facie case of race discrimination). That a non-African-American was ultimately selected for the position and thus treated more favorably than Plaintiff is not, by itself, suggestive of discrimination absent some evidence that Plaintiff and the person selected were similarly situated in material respects. See Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Leong, 347 F.3d at 1124 (upholding grant of

    ### Response:
    recognizing in a title vii case that for the fourth element of the prima facie case the individuals seeking relief must demonstrate at the least that they are similarly situated to those employees allegedly receiving more favorable treatment in all material respects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    10-11; 13-14. But plaintiff does not allege that defendants’ failure to submit supporting documentation constitutes a false claim; rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ failure to maintain such documentation violates the Medicaid regulations. Plaintiff is correct that the Medicaid regulations require all parties seeking reimbursement to maintain supporting documentation. A party seeking reimbursement must maintain financial data to support the cost claim. 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(a). That financial data must be based on audit-quality records. Id. § 413.24(a). Moreover, the party seeking reimbursement must certify compliance with these requirements. Id. § 413.24(f)(4)(iv); see also United States ex rel. A + Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 447 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations, quotations, and ellipsis

    ### Response:
    holding that reimbursement regulations require that providers maintain sufficient financial records and statistical data for proper determination of costs payable under the program moreover the cost reports submitted to the intermediaries must provide adequate cost data capable of verification by qualified auditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    involved a single scheme. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant’s conviction must be REVERSED, and we REMAND this matter to the district court with instructions to dismiss the Indictment. 1 . The government relies on the indictment in United States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184 (6th Cir.1992) as support for its contention that there is no one-year time limit. In Sanderson, the indictment covered acts from October 1985 through December 1986; however, the time issue was not raised on appeal. Thus, Sanderson is not authority that supports the government's position. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 & n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 900, 918 & n. 29, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Appeal of Federal Land Bank of St. Louis (In re Stegall), 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.1989)(<HOLDING>). 2 . Defendant also challenges the sufficiency

    ### Response:
    holding that a matter of law that is assumed but not discussed is not authoritative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    restrictions and limitations. Moreover, Dr. Lap-ing agreed that cardiologists, like Dr. Kurkjian, have more insight into the nature of Reagan’s chest pain and heart condition than he does. As for Reagan’s assertion that UNUM’s settlement offer lends credence to his claim, the Court need look no further than to Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Rule 408 provides: Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Id.; see also New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1482 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Kritikos v. Palmer, Johnson, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that federal rule of evidence 408 authorizes the district court to exclude settlement letters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forth in the DPPA “are not affirmative defenses for which a defendant carries the burden of proof; rather a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the obtainment, disclosure, or use of personal information from [his] motor vehicle records was not for a purpose enumerated in [the statute].” Wootten, 2015 WL 1345276, at *15 n. 11, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35949, at *46 n. 11. Upon review of the amended complaint, the court agrees with the defendants that Stultz has not sufficiently alleged that his DMV information was impermissibly disclosed to the Capitol Police. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (permitting “use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions”); see also Wootten, 2015 WL 1345276, at *15, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35949, at *46 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to

    ### Response:
    holding that the disclosure of the plaintiffs dmv information to the capitol police as described in the complaint was a permissible use under the dppa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contrary terms, stating that “rotation about the axis established by bolt 272 is not permitted; gearbox 85A cannot pivot in a plane perpendicular to the biaxial plane.” ’220 patent, col. 11, 11. 48-51 (emphases added). Allen argues that one of skill in the art would understand that the term “perpendicular” in the claim should be read to mean “parallel.” Allen stretches the law too far. It is not our function to rewrite claims to preserve their validity. Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345, 51 USPQ2d 1377,1379 (Fed.Cir.1999). We are simply tasked with determining whether the claims “particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[]” what the inventor regards as his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2; see also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed.Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it is of no moment that the

    ### Response:
    holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under  112 paragraph 2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proper remedy is not to impose a sentence in violation of the plea agreement, but to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and either negotiate a new agreement, or proceed to trial. See United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If we rule that some provision of the plea agreement is invalid, we must discard the entire agreement and require [the defendant] and the government to begin their bargaining over again.”); United States v. Mukai, 26 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1994) (“If the court later finds the disposition in the plea agreement objectionable it should not reduce the sentence unilaterally in such cases, but rather should withdraw its acceptance of the plea agreement”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Gilchrist, 130 F.3d at 1134 (<HOLDING>). 8 Bernard actually cites to U.S.S.G. §

    ### Response:
    holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is clearly flawed”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir.1990) (“Leslie I”) (“The commerce clause power ... is broad enough to extend [federal] jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); id. at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., concurring) (“Congress does have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species.”); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.) (noting “broad sweep of the Commerce Clause” and declining to reconsider Leslie I), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 407, 133 L.Ed.2d 325 (1995); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-36, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Bramble contends that in light of Lopez, the

    ### Response:
    holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant commerce clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Third Circuit, however, never cited or discussed section 488 or these Superior Court decisions in either Ubiles or Lewis. Significantly, section 488 contains virtually identical language to the former article 27, section 36D of the Maryland Code, and Maryland appellate courts have held that this statute permits a search of any individual suspected of possessing a concealed gun, without also requiring reasonable suspicion that the gun is not licensed. See Allen v. State, 85 Md. App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting search under article 27, section 36D despite officer’s lack of knowledge, and failure to ask questions calculated to determine, whether defendant was licensed to carry a gun); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-88 (Md. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, section 488 may provide authority

    ### Response:
    holding stop and frisk of individual who police were told was carrying a firearm was permissible even though police were not told that gun was unlicensed and individual cooperated and made no unusual movements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we dismiss the petition with respect to this claim. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 over petitioner’s remaining claims. We review for substantial evidence, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), and we deny the claims. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s decision that petitioner failed to show that the government was unable or unwilling to control the Hindu fundamentalists who stoned her home. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir.1998). Because the police responded to petitioner’s request for help, came to her home and asked questions regarding the incidents, and later told her that they were looking into the matter, she fails to show that the government was unable or unwilling to control her perpetrators. See id. (<HOLDING>). Because petitioner failed to establish

    ### Response:
    holding alien failed to show the government was unable or unwilling to control the attackers where police came to aliens location when they were called and no further action was taken which could have been due to a lack of suspects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he was so intoxicated that he could not form a specific intent. Moreover, some of Petitioner’s actions on the night in question are inconsistent with the intoxication defense. To begin with, when Petitioner was attacked and stabbed after leaving the mall, he was able to recognize the gender of his two attackers, escape by running (not walking) away from them, and then locate Ms. Butler’s house on foot in the dead of night while severely injured. Surely this was no easy task, and his ability to complete it, immediately after having consumed all the alcohol that he claims to have consumed, is flatly inconsistent with his assertion that he was so extremely intoxicated that he was unable to form a specific intent. See Kreijanovsky v. State, 706 P.2d 541, 544 (Okla.Crim.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); State v. Davis, 81 Ohio App.3d 706, 612

    ### Response:
    holding that appellants testimony negated the intoxication defense by demonstrating he was in control of his mental faculties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    include or omit words. In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex.2008). In relevant part, section 12.45 of the Texas Penal Code provides: (a) A person may, with the consent of the attorney for the state, admit during the sentencing hearing his guilt of one or more unadjudicated offenses and request the court to take each into account in determining sentence for the offense or offenses of which he stands adjudged guilty. (c) If a court lawfully takes into account an admitted offense, prosecution is barred for that offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.45 (West 2011). Relatively few courts have interpreted Article 55.01(a) in relation to section 12.45 of the Penal Code and have reached contrary conclusions on whether the unadjudi-cated offense can be expunged. See M.M., 354 S.W.3d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Travis County Attorney v. J.S.H., 37 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an admitted offense under section 1245 was not capable of being expunged because the offense had not been dismissed under former article 5501a2a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    market rate. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703, 716-17 (6th Cir.1991) (affirming award where “third-party affidavits submitted by plaintiffs established the prevailing market rate”). However, in the absence of sufficient documentation, the court may rely on its own knowledge of the market. See Norman v. Housing Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988) (“ ‘The court ... is itself an expert on the question [of reasonableness] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.’ ” (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.1940))); Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384,

    ### Response:
    holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    then consider any properly filed motion for appointment of lead plaintiff and approval of lead plaintiffs counsel. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the motion for appointment of lead plaintiffs and the approval of lead plaintiffs’ attorney is denied without prejudice. An appropriate form of order is filed herewith. 1 . Although the plaintiff asserts claims under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, for ease of reference, the Court hereinafter will cite only to the PSLRA as codified in the Exchange Act at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l. 2 . Defendants Chubb, Dean R. O'Hare, David B. Kelso, Henry B. Schram and Executive Risk Inc., represented by Wachtel Lipton 5, 109 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (same). See also Bolger v. First State Financial Srvs., 759 F.Supp. 182, 192-93 (D.N.J.1991) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to make out a claim under  14a of the exchange act a plaintiff must show that a proxy statement contained a material misrepresentation or omission that the plaintiff was injured by the material misrepresentation or omission and that the proxy solicitation itself rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statements about Sanofi’s maintenance of an “effective compliance organization” or Sanofi’s “efforts toward transparency, accountability, and disclosure” are too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely on them. See ECA, 553 F.3d at 205-06. Each of the statements is an example of corporate “puffery,” “which does not give rise to securities violations.” Id. at 206. In ECA Local, the Second Circuit held that JP Morgan Chase’s (“JPMC”) statements about risk management and corporate integrity — that JPMC had “risk management processes [that] are highly disciplined and designed to preserve the integrity of the risk management process,” and that JPMC “set the standard for integrity” — could not be the basis for a securities violation. Id. at 205-06. See also San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 811 (<HOLDING>); Lasker v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that general announcements by philip morris that it was optimistic about its earnings and expected marlboro to perform well were mere puffery and could not have misled a reasonable investor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Commerce Comm., Request for a House Bill 368 Hearing, in H. Jud. Comm. File for H.B. 368 (Jan. 12, 1990). 47 . AS 18.56.300(b). 48 . AS 18.56.300(e)(3)(B). 49 . Rep. C.E. Swaekhammer, Sectional Analysis for House Bill 368, in H. Jud. Comm. File for H.B. 368 (Jan. 12, 1990). 50 . Letter from Alaska Northern Chapter of International Conference of Building Officials to Rep. C.E. Swaekhammer, Ref. “An Act relating to residential housing assistance provided by the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation,” in H. Jud. Comm. File for H.B. 368 (Dec. 6, 1989). 51 . Letter from Jack Chenoweth, Legislative Counsel, to Rep. C.E. Swaekhammer, in H. Jud. Comm. File for H.B. 368 (Jan. 20, 1990). 52 . AS 18.56.300(e)(3)(A)-(D). 53 . See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. LeResche, 663 P.2d 923, 931 (Alaska 1983) (<HOLDING>). 54 . AS 44.62.100; Chevron U.S.A., 663 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that rule of construction that specific statutory provisions control general ones should not be applied where provisions can be harmonized
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of this evidence in his closing argument, Kelly’s remedy was to object before the trial court that the prosecutor had misstated the facts. Cf. State v. Weeks, 634 A.2d 1275, 1276 & n.1 (Me.1993). Kelly made no such objection. The trial court’s decision to admit the statistical evidence was within its broad discretion. IV. [¶ 25] Finally, Kelly contends the court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial. Kelly based the motion in part on what he terms as the State’s prejudicial failure to disclose Bean’s knowledge that the defendant had worn t m.App.1989); see also State v. Gaines, 260 Kan. 752, 926 P.2d 641, 649 (1996) (expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is never admissible). But see People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 726 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 . We ultimately upheld the guilty verdict,

    ### Response:
    holding court abused its discretion when it excluded psychologists testimony regarding host of identification issues among which was crossracial identification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Electric's free-standing argument (not asserted in connection with any issue) that a distinction exists in this case between proof that AHC's smoke-damaged inventory had a post-fire market value of $0 and proof that AHC’s smoke-damaged inventory had ""no [post-fire] ascertainable market.” 26 . In one' sentence. Wise Electric also challenges Maddox’s testimony that the post-fire market value of AHC’s inventory was $0, Because Moore — an expert with a background similar to Maddox’s — testified without objection that there was no post-fire market for AHC’s inventory of hats, if. the trial court did somehow err by permitting Maddox to testify that AHC’s inventory1 had a post-fire market value of $0, any such error was harmless. See Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>); McKinney v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 772

    ### Response:
    holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motor-driven vehicle and the plaintiffs injuries. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543; LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.1992). “This nexus requires more than mere involvement of property” and has been described as a “direct nexus.” Put another way, “ ‘the [vehicle]’s use must have actually caused the injury.’ ” Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543 (quoting White, 46 S.W.3d at 869) (emphasis added). “Thus, as with the condition or use of property, the operation or use of a motor vehicle ‘does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the c at child’s death arose from use of motor vehicle when bus driver honked horn to signal child to walk across street, where she was hit by oncoming vehicle); Hitchcock v. Garvin, 738 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 2. TTCA’s Property Waiver For the TTCA’s

    ### Response:
    holding that childs injuries incurred when she was struck by oncoming vehicle arose from schoolbus drivers failure to activate required warning signals to protect child as she debarked bus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appears to have relied almost exclusively on federal cases interpreting Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — and denying class certification — in drug or medical device actions. As we made clear in Syllabus Point 3 of Brooks v. Isinghood, 213 W.Va. 675, 584 S.E.2d 531 (2003), “[a] federal case interpreting a federal counterpart to a West Virginia rule of procedure may be persuasive, but it is not binding or controlling.” Our reasoning for this rule is to avoid having our legal analysis of our Rules “amount to nothing more than Pavlovian responses to federal decisional law.” 213 W.Va. at 675, 584 S.E.2d at 531, (quoting Stone v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Parkersburg, 208 W.Va. 91, 112, 538 S.E.2d 389, 410 (2000) (McGraw, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part) (<HOLDING>)). The plaintiffs are also seeking a writ of

    ### Response:
    holding that west virginia disability discrimination law is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of lawful acts done ... in furtherance of ... [the qui tam] action.” Id. § 3730(h). Declining to intervene in Wood’s suit, the United States, on behalf of the Institute, moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The district court denied Wood’s motion for discovery and an evidential hearing on the issue, concluded that the Institute “is an arm of the sovereign ... for purposes of [the Institute’s] claim of sovereign immunity under the [False Claims Act],” Wood, No. 98-1952, slip op. at 17, and dismissed the complaint. Wood now appeals, challenging the district court’s sovereign immunity determination as well as its denial of discovery. II. The Institute describes itself as an “agency or instrumentality” of the United States not subject to suit under 24 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513

    ### Response:
    holding that red cross is not part of the government for the purpose of immunity from jury trials in personal injury suits although red cross is virtually  an arm of the federal government entitled to immunity for some purposes including state taxation internal quotation marks and citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    342 (3d Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted). II. Request for Declaratory Judgement In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Hartford is collaterally estopped from seeking declaratory relief before this Court because it has acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel. (Def. Mot. at ¶ 14; Def. Mem. at 7). Both parties admit that the O’Maras’ insurance policy contains a valid arbitration clause; the question is whether that clause applies to .the present dispute. Based on our reading of state law and other courts’ related holdings, we find that it does. Defendant correctly points out that arbitration panels are generally given broad authority to resolve claim disputes. Brennan v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 524 Pa. 542, 574 A.2d 580, 583 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Hartford contends, however, that Defendant

    ### Response:
    holding that question was within arbitration provision because provision contained no specific language precluding arbitrators from reaching question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. It is well established that where a tort claim stems from a breach of contract, the cause of action is ultimately one arising in contract, and thus is properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to the extent that damages exceed $10,000. See Wood v. United States, 961 F.2d 195, 198 (Fed.Cir.1992) (upholding a transfer of the plaintiffs claims from the district court to the United States Claims Court on the ground that negligence and conversion claims could not establish a cause of action in tort independent of the underlying contractual relationship); Blanchard v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs claim against the united states for negligence was not a tort claim within the ftca where it was founded upon an alleged failure to perform explicit or implicit contractual obligations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    all Leadership Act grantees which are members of the Associations. While some individualized showing of facts common to all members to support the factual development of the Associations’ compelled speech and vagueness claims will be necessary, this test does not preclude granting associational standing. See College Bookstores, 990 F.Supp. at 249-50; New York State Nat’l Org. of Women, 886 F.2d at 1349. To enjoin an unconstitutional practice, the Associations do not have to show redundant evidence of each separate impact of the Policy Requirement and Guidelines on every one of their members. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F.Supp.2d at 291; cf American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Co., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 8566,1995 WL 92270, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1995) (<HOLDING>). As for the Associations’ claims that the

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not necessary for the association to show impact on each and every member because at some point the proof provided by individual members will become redundant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and because it was not, the court must order remand. Last, plaintiff seeks default judgment because defendants have not filed an answer in the time provided under Fed.R.Civ.P. 81. The main issue is whether defendants’ procedural failures require this court to remand the case to state court or whether to allow defendants to cure these defects. 1. Failure to Attach Process Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006), there are “two types of improperly removed cases: those in which the federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction and those with defects in the removal procedure itself.” Huffman v. Saul Holdings, Ltd. P’ship, 194 F.3d 1072, 1076 (10th Cir.1999). A defect in subject matter jurisdiction is never waived and can be raised at any time. Id. (7th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); Covington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 251

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failure to attach a copy of the complaint to its notice of removal did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction and stating that to permit this minor irregularity to defeat the district courts jurisdiction would be to elevate form over substance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have been directed to return to deliberate further. See Eades, 75 Md.App. at 419, 541 A.2d at 1005-06. In the case at bar the jury had been discharged before the matter was brought to the court’s attention. 20 . See infra. 21 . The Court of Special Appeals did not decide whether the Remmer presumption remains valid in light of Smith and Olano, as it held that the State rebutted any presumption of prejudice, if one existed. Jenkins, 146 Md.App. at 110, 806 A.2d at 697-98. 22 . The State specifically contends, in reference to Smith and Olano, ‘‘applying this most recent precedent from the Supreme Court, no presumption of prejudice should arise automatically from improper jury contact.” 23 . But see the Maryland case of Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984)(<HOLDING>). 24 . Specifically, the Supreme Court stated

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial where the jury had taken a dictionary that had not been admitted into evidence into the jury room and had improperly referred to and relied on the dictionarys definition of legal cause that was at variance with the definition of proximate cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dismiss. It is equally clear that the December 27, 2007 order, dismissing the remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims based on them failure comply with the court order directing them to provide a more definite statement, also functioned as a resolution on the merits, as nothing in the order indicated otherwise. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (authorizing dismissal for failure to comply with a court order and specifying that “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule — except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 — operates as an adjudication on the merits”); cf. Karim-Panahi v. U.S. Congress, Senate & House of Representatives, 105 Fed.Appx. 270, 273-74 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). In short, because this case involves the same

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Eastern District of Missouri had held, without discussion, that the FLSA does not provide for punitive damages in retaliation cases. Waldermeyer v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 782 F.Supp. 86, 88 (E.D.Mo.1991). On the other hand, the Western District of Missouri followed the Seventh Circuit in one case decided before Snapp, O’Brien v. Dekalb-Clinton Counties Ambulance Dist., 1996 WL 565817, at *6 (W.D.Mo. June 24, 1996) (“In the absence of conflicting interpretation of the amended section 16(b) by another circuit, the court is persuaded to follow the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and hold that compensatory and punitive damages are available for violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.”). See also Johnston v. Davis Security, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1230-31 (D.Utah 2002) (<HOLDING>); Lanza v. Sugarland Run Homemmers Ass’n, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Abdi, 463 F.3d at 557 n.13; Khan, 324 F.Supp.2d at 1187. D. The Court Must Suppress any Derivative Evidence Obtained as a Result of Pacheco’s Unlawful Seizure Under the “Fruit of the Poisonous , Tree” Doctrine. Because Pacheco’s warrantless arrest violated 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) and the Fourth Amendment, the Court must suppress any “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of [that] illegality” under the exclusionary rule as “so-called [tainted] ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” See Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (quotation omitted); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-05, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (discussing the attenuation doc-triné); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>). The “exclusionary rule” serves as the primary

    ### Response:
    holding that fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to both physical evidence and verbal statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact been evicted. Missouri law allows a hotel to eject a person if the hotel operator “reasonably believes that the individual is using the premises for an unlawful purpose.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 315.075(3). Mr. Bastean called the police because of concerns that the room was being used to traffic drugs. The officers’ discovery of drug paraphernalia on Inmon’s person was sufficient to justify Mr. Bastean’s concern that there were illegal drugs in the room and allow him to eject Inmon when the officers arrested him and told Mr. Bastean they were taking Inmon to jail. Under our precedent, once an individual is lawfully ejected from a hotel, the rental period terminates and “control over the hotel room revert[s] to the management.” United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869

    ### Response:
    holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendants disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unpaid assessments and associated interest and late fees. WCT also seeks legal fees pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183A, § 6(a)(ii), which states: If any expense is incurred by the organization of unit owners as a result of [a] unit owner’s failure to abide by the requirements of this chapter ... the organization of unit owners may also assess any fees, attorney’s fees charges, late charges, fines, costs of collection and enforcement, court costs, and interest charged pursuant to this chapter against the unit owner.... However, “[t]he Trustees’ entitlement to attorneys fees, and their inclusion in any lien, is subject to the limitation that they must be reasonable.” Bd. of Trs. of 87 St. Botolph St. Condo. Trust v. Cohen, No. 061829E, 2007 WL 3261301 at *4 (Mass.Super. July 2, 2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Trustees of Whitehall Condo. Trust v.

    ### Response:
    holding that unit owner was liable for reasonable attorney fees incurred in imposing lien for unpaid association fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy expired at the end of 1969, and because Galaxy knew that Canadian denied coverage in the 1970 personal injury actions resulting from the plant fumes, Canadian asserts that this declaratory judgment action should have been brought to determine liability for coverage before now. Galaxy knew in 1969 that Canadian contested coverage regarding the fumes, and in fact filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the parties’ rights. That action was settled. Canadian now asserts that plaintiffs should have proceeded to judgment in that action, and that the present action is time-barred. Canadian argues that the action accrued when Galaxy discovered that Canadian would not perform, under the “discovery rule” adopted in Maryland, see Levin v. Friedman, 271 Md. 438, 317 A.2d 831 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs argue that the statute of

    ### Response:
    holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Bazile’s testimony of her daily living activities. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (“In particular, no reasons were given for rejecting Lester’s testimony as to the ‘marked’ limitations on his activities of daily living.”). b. Daily Living Activities Given that Bazile’s testimony was the only evidence of this essential factor in determining disability, and the administrative law judge improperly rejected it, this Court concludes that the administrative law judge committed legal error by failing to give it due consideration as part of a determination of Bazile’s residual functional capacity. It is insufficient for the administrative law judge to consider “most” of the Avery factors. All six must be given consideration. See Aguiar v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (D.Mass.2000) (Tauro, J.) (<HOLDING>); see also Rohrberg v. Apfel, 26 F.Supp.2d 303,

    ### Response:
    holding that consideration of most of avery factors is insufficient where administrative law judge failed to consider claimants daily living activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rash was argued but before it was issued, the court focused, as we did in Rash, on the second sentence of § 506(a) in declaring that in a chapter 13 proceeding where, as here, the collateral is being retained by the debtor, no hypothetical costs of sale should be deducted, because “ ‘a disposition of the property is not reasonably in the offing.’ ” Id. at 404 (quoting Brown & Co. Sec. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246, 251 (4th Cir.1991)). This holding, tantamount to declaring replacement, or retail, value, to be appropriate, is cited in the passage from Winthrop that we have quoted above. It is so ORDERED. 1 . The court also cites, in addition to the four circuit cases (Rash, McClurkin, Lomas, and Balbus), the following: In re Case, 115 B.R. 666, 670 (9th Cir. BAP 1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Arnette, 156 B.R. 366, 368

    ### Response:
    holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debt or
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    64 . Id. 65 . See Hendricks Decl. Ex. PP (Standard Release) (""I understand and acknowledge that the filmmakers may use my Contribution in connection with the creation of a nonfiction production, which may be released theatrically, non-theatrically, [or] on television.... I acknowledge that the Producer and/or Licensed Parties may edit or alter my Contribution to the Production as they wish.”). 66 . See von Billow, 811 F.2d at 145-46. 67 . Supra n. 65. 68 . See, e.g., Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 33 (""United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.1993), ... did not involve confidential materials, as the attorney's pronouncements were made publicly in front of television cameras.”); see also Saperstein v. Palestinian Auth., No. 09-mc-00619 (SLTXALC), 2010 WL 1371384, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2010) (<HOLDING>). The cases upon which respondents rely are

    ### Response:
    holding that outtakes of a bbc documentary were nonconfidential
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court erred by conflating DOT’s authority to regulate highway access with its power to condemn private property through eminent domain and that defendants’ redress for the driveway closure was limited to the procedures set forth in the Access Act. Because the court mistakenly allowed defendants to present evidence of diminished value due to altered internal traffic circulation, the State maintains that the jury verdict should be vacated and the matter remanded for a new just compensation trial. Consideration of the State’s claims of error in the trial court’s evidentiary ruling and jury charge calls for de novo review. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995); see also Dempsey v. Alston, 405 N.J.Super. 499, 509, 966 A.2d 1 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 518, 973 A.2d 386

    ### Response:
    holding that when trial courts decision turns on question of law appellate review is de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for “caretaking” purposes, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). 328 F.3d at 1241. In United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir.2006), a police officer seized a commercial vehicle that he mistakenly believed was pervasively regulated. See id. at 1241. In clarifying the correct premise of an administrative search, the Tenth Circuit stated: “An administrative search is ... premised on the individual subject to the warrantless seizure and search knowingly and voluntarily engaging in a pervasively regulated business, and on the existence of a statutory scheme that puts that individual on notice that he will be subject to warrant-less administrative seizures and searches.” Id. at 1246 (internal quotations and citati 3, 707-708 (Ark. 1986) (<HOLDING>). The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute that arguably authorized random stops of motor carriers could not be read to authorize random stops of any motor vehicle merely to determine whether the detainees belonged to the regulated class
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Navy ship, which rolled on top of the sailboat, splintering the boat and causing it to sink). The second way a rescuer might worsen a situation is by inducing reliance on the rescuer’s efforts. See Restatement § 323(b). Courts have imposed liability when the Coast Guard’s actions caused potential rescuers to “ ‘rest on their oars’ ... in reliance on the Coast Guard’s undertaking and its presumed, unless affirmatively disclaimed, competency.” Daley v. United States, 499 F.Supp. 1005, 1010 (D.Mass.1980) (quoting Lacey v. United States, 98 F.Supp. 219, 220 (D.Mass.1951)); see Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d at 195 (“[T]he government must not mislead, and induce reliance upon a belief that it is providing something which, in fact, it is not providing.”); Gavagan, 280 F.2d at 328-29 (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s duty of care under the Good

    ### Response:
    holding that the coast guards failure to pass on vital information caused wouldbe rescuers to stand by in reliance on the coast guards celebrated skill
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more is required than simply the notion that a collision is likely to happen there if someone does not follow the rules. Certainly, a roadway may be negligently designed in such a way as to be dangerous when the condition itself significantly aggravates the common dangers of vehicle operation which would already be present. Jemes v. Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977); Linton v. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Comm’n, 980 S.W.2d 4 (Mo.App.1998). Even a downed stop sign might create a dangerous condition where, for instance, the cross street might be designed without a stop sign or other control and, given other factors such as visibility, the downed stop sign could cause the intersection to be a dangerous condition. See Donahue v. City of St. Louis, 758 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. banc 1988) (<HOLDING>). The court in Logan v. Phillips, 896 S.W.2d 38

    ### Response:
    holding claim of downed stop sign sufficient for pleading purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bank fraud. The trial evidence was sufficient to prove each essential element of that crime. The question that remains is whether Schneider suffered prejudice from the variance in the dates charged and proved. This Court has not located a Sixth Circuit case in which the government offered no evidence of criminal conduct within the date range of a conspiracy charged by the grand jury. United States v. Rashid, 274 F.3d 407 (6th Cir.2001), comes close. There, the court held that evidence of criminal activity outside the date range in the indictment did not constitute a “fatal variance,” but there was other evidence of criminal conduct within the date range as well. Rashid, 274 F.3d at 414-15 (stating that the Sixth “Circuit has held that even when evidence is presented of ac 5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Queen, 159 FedAppx. 81, 88

    ### Response:
    holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the one authorized by the “exception” that resulted in its abandonment. In contrast to Perone, the developer in this case never used its property in the manner authorized by the site plan approvals and variances required for construction of a larger apartment building, because plaintiff successfully challenged the validity of the resolutions granting those approvals. Thus, even assuming a property owner could be found to have abandoned a site plan approval and associated variances if it actually developed the property in accordance with subsequent land use approvals, that is not what occurred in this case. Therefore, there is no basis for finding that the developer abandoned the 2004 land use approvals. See Dimitrov v. Carlson, 138 N.J.Super. 52, 56, 350 A.2d 246 (App.Div.1975) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 275, 359 A.2d 487

    ### Response:
    holding that a use variance does not expire and is not lost simply by reason of the passage of time and nonexercise absent an express time limitation set forth in the variance itself or in the zoning ordinance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state the specific grounds therefor.”). A. Duty of Care of Independent Executor The Texas Probate Code defines an “independent executor” as “the personal representative of an estate under independent administration as provided in Section 145 of this Code.” Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 3(q). The purpose of section 145 — and of independent administration itself — is to free an independent executor from the expense and control of judicial supervision except where the Probate Code otherwise provides. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Alice Nat’l Bank, 444 S.W.2d 632, 634-35 (Tex.1969); Bunting v. Pearson, 430 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex.1968); Rowland v. Moore, 141 Tex. 469, 174 S.W.2d 248, 249-50 (1943); Eastland v. Eastland, 273 S.W.3d 815, d 750, 752 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, an executor does not owe a

    ### Response:
    holding that former temporary administratrix of estate did not owe legal duty of care under section 230 of probate code to obtain fire insurance for estate property in negligence action because it was impossible to obtain such insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court notes that 38 U.S.C. § 1541 (""Surviving spouses of veterans of a period of war”) contains the “entitled to receive” language. Although it is extremely difficult to understand precisely to what claim this letter refers (because it was sent after the non-service-connected pension had been awarded), there is no indication that it was referring to the appellant’s DIC claim. Even if it were, the confusion between service connected and non-service connected described at the outset of this footnote would render the information in the letter sufficiently confusing so as to vitiate any possible compliance with section 5103(a). See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 125 (2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-7157 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2005). 5 . Cf. Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 119, 123 (1993) (<HOLDING>) id. at 126, and noting "" 'underlying concepts

    ### Response:
    holding that before the board of veterans appeals bva relies in rendering a decision on a claim on any evidence developed or obtained by it subsequent to the issuance of the most recent statement of the case soc or supplemental soc with respect to such claim the bva must provide a claimant with reasonable notice of such evidence and of the reliance proposed to be placed on it and a reasonable opportunity for the claimant to respond to it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which included most of the pertinent witnesses, and that the prejudice to his ability to present his case was not lessened by depositions of Cargill employees that Cargill voluntarily provided. Furthermore, he asserts that document review voluntarily permitted by Cargill was so restrictive — particularly in Cargill’s refusal to allow him the assistance of an expert to review the mountain of undifferentiated documents provided and other assertions of privilege — that his case was prejudiced. This appears to the court to be a challenge founded to some extent on 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), which concerns the arbitrators’ misconduct or refusal to hear material evidence, and to some extent upon an assertion of “fundamental unfairness” of proceedings. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). Hoffman’s second challenge is based on the

    ### Response:
    recognizing review for fundamental unfairness of the proceedings as an independent extrastatutory ground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Notes to 1969 Amendment of Super. R. Civ. P. 34 (""[ujnwarranted objections are made subject to the peril that costs and expenses will be charged against the recalcitrant party or his counsel under Rule 37(a)”). Here, however, the objection was not unwarranted as indicated by the court's denial of D’Amario's previous motion to compel. 10 .In 1993, subdivision (d) of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 was added expressly to exclude discovery requests, responses, and objections from its provisions. However, prior to the amendment of Federal Rule 11, federal courts recognized that Rule 26(g) was the appropriate certification rule to apply with respect to discovery requests, responses, and objections. See, e.g., United Missouri Bank of Kansas City v. Bank of New York, 723 F.Supp. 408, 414 (W.D.Mo.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1187

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 11 is not properly used to sanction the inappropriate filing of papers where other rules more directly apply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the state offense that Degrate was charged with was a felony. Further, there was no testimony that Appellant knew what the state offense was or whether it was a felony. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence regarding the state crime that Degrate was charged with in order for it to serve as the felony needed for Appellant’s conviction. Next, we turn to the federal offense for, which the marshals were arresting Degrate on the day in question. De-grate was charged with felon in possession of a firearm, which is a felony, and therefore, if the State proved that Appellant knew of the charge, her felony conviction is valid. However, Degrate’s federal indictment was sealed. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(4) states: The magistrate judge to whom an indictment (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). As the rule states, the existence of the

    ### Response:
    holding that locating and gaining custody over a defendant is not the only valid reason for sealing an indictment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seeking damages and injunctive relief. for; (1) intentional interference with contract and conspiracy; (2) intentional interference with prospective-business advantage and conspiracy; (3) inducing breach of contract and conspiracy; (4) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage and conspiracy; and (5) unfair competition and conspiracy- The defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint or stay this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 based on the ongoing California lawsuit. II. Discussion A. Declaratory Judgment Act At the outset, the Court finds that this lawsuit is governed by federal rather than state law because the Declaratory Judgment Act addresses procedural as opposed to substantive rights. See Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. v. Born, 897 F.Supp. 122, 126 & n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>); De Feo v. Procter & Gamble Co., 831 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that the declaratory judgment act as opposed to state law governs cases removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under an erie analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the HPC. Cf. Commentary to HRS § 702-220 (1993) (noting that a “mistaken belief by the defendant that the defendant’s conduct is not legally prohibited by the penal law ... must, in most instances, be held ... [to] afford no excuse ... ”); State v. Cavness, 80 Hawai'i 460, 468, 911 P.2d 95, 103 (App.1996) (Kirimitsu, J., concurring and dissenting) (concluding that, in enacting HRS §§ 702-218 and 702-220, “the legislature eliminated generally the ignorance or mistake of law defense in order ... [to] reflect the legal maxim, ignorance of the law excuses nobody” (footnote omitted)). Just as defendants are charged by the HPC with constructive knowledge of the possibility, for example, of consecutive sentences for multiple crimes, see Cornelio, 84 Hawai'i at 494-95, 935 P.2d at 1039-40 (<HOLDING>), so too may they be charged with constructive

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentence imposing consecutive prison terms must embody inter alia the forwardlooking aim of future crime reduction or prevention the deterrent goal citation and internal quotation signal omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    curriculum comes directly from Lyons’s by-laws. This bold statement lacks support, however, because a comparison of both curriculae reveals that their differences overwhelm any similarities. Firstly, Lyons and the College organize the curriculum differently. The College divides the curriculum into core knowledge, a canine specialization, and an equine specialization. Petition 8-11. In contrast, Lyons’s curriculum does not directly provide for separate equine and canine tracks from its outset, though objective two of the “Objectives and General Structure” document does discuss creating two certification paths for equine and canines. See ACVSMR Bylaws 2-6; ACVSMR Objectives 1. Secondly, th ions of the ACVSMR’s curriculum, there is no substantial similarity. See Harney, 704 F.3d at 181 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the College’s Petition contains

    ### Response:
    holding that divergent expressions of unprotected ideas does not violate copyright law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may not know the time of the suspect's last drink, the amount of aleohol consumed, or the rate at which the suspect will metabolize alcohol. Finally, an officer cannot know how long it will take to obtain the blood sample once the suspect is brought to the hospital Under a totality of the cireumstances test, an officer would be called upon to speculate on each of these considerations and predict how long the most probative evidence of the defendant's blood aleohol level would continue to exist before a blood sample was no longer reliable.[ ] The court also directly addressed the possibility of obtaining a telephonic warrant: Shriner also contends that police may obtain telephonic warrants quickly and, therefore, the police can easily obtain the relevant evidence they need with a 8) (<HOLDING>); State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540, 836 P.2d 1329,

    ### Response:
    holding that bloodalcohol dissipation does not create a per se exigency with respect to the warrant requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assumes Borrower’s obligations under this Security Instrument in writing, and is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Borrower’s rights and benefits under this Security Instrument....”)). Federal law has created certain exceptions to the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. During the early 1980s, some courts criticized these clauses as unreasonable restraints on trade. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal.3d 943, 148 Cal.Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 (1978), superseded by statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3. In response, Congress passed the Gann-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, which generally prohibited state laws restricting due-on-sale clauses. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3; see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Congress also believed “that it would be

    ### Response:
    holding that a pregannst germain act federal regulation preempted a state law restricting the enforcement of dueonsale clauses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insur- anee broker filed a claim with the Indiana Insurance Guaranty Association in August 2003, and on September 11, 2003, the federal government advised Corn Island that it was responsible for the Williams claim regardless of the Frempnt insolvency. Whether measured from August or September, it took Corn Island another five or six months to notify St. Paul that Corn Island believed the Williams accident was covered. Under New York law, delays for one or two months are routinely held unreasonable. American Ins. Co. v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 435, 440 (2d Cir.1995); American Home Assurance Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir.1993) (collecting New York cases); Deso v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 3 N.Y.2d 127, 164 N.Y.S.2d 689, 143 N.E.2d 889, 891 (1957) (<HOLDING>). Under New York law, then, even if there might

    ### Response:
    holding delay of 51 days to be unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    gives that court authority to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that a plaintiff w 977). When determining jurisdiction, however, we must look to the true nature of the underlying action. See Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed.Cir.1994); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 (Fed.Cir.1992). Here, Terran’s claim for relief is based on the Vaccine Act and is a claim for money—that is, compensation un 28 F.2d 844, 846 (Ct.Cl.1970) (<HOLDING>). We are therefore convinced that Terran’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the court of claims did have jurisdiction over plaintiffs statutory claim for back pay including arguments based on the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Brown or the Center could do. Even if a patient shows up with a driver at the time of the appointment, how is the Center to know that the driver will still be there after the procedure is completed and the patient is ready to be released? The only way to assure that no patient drives would be for the Center to acquire cars and hire drivers to take patients home. That would hardly be reasonable. The Center is not an insurer of its patients’ safety. Dollins, supra. Young acted recklessly in ignoring the advice he was given and suffered the consequences. The circuit court correctly found no duty to insure that no patient drives after the procedure. Gunter, J., joins. Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. I concur with the majority opinion and write merely to underscore the f (1989) (<HOLDING>). See also Williamson v. Elrod, 348 Ark. 307,

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavit of respiratory therapist which offered nothing to sustain the courteaus burden of proof of the standard of care under  16 114206al was insufficient to establish radiologists malpractice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not precluded from maintaining “an action in its own name to recover its unpaid attorney’s fees merely because, by the workings of an independent agreement between [insured] and [attorney], [the insured] may be relieved of all or part of its obligation to pay those fees”); Colpan Realty Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 83 Misc.2d 730, 373 N.Y.S.2d 802, 805 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1975) (“If defendant is in fact obligated to pay for legal expenses involved it must pick up the tab whether plaintiff paid it or not. There is no logical reason to require plaintiff to advance money it is not obligated to pay as a condition to obtaining payment from the party responsible for the obligation in the first place.”); cf. Jamar v. Patterson, 910 S.W.2d 118, 123-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); O’Connell v. O’Connell, 843 S.W.2d 212, 220

    ### Response:
    holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those consequences are likely to mean that the litigants in the action as framed will, after final judgment therein is entered, be likely to have to engage in additional litigation in order to conclusively dispose of their respective bundles of rights and liabilities which derive from a single transaction or related series of transactions, then the omitted component must be regarded as constituting an element of the minimum mandatory unit of litigation. That result must obtain whether or not that component constitutes either an independent cause of action by technical common-law definition or an independent claim which, in the abstract, is separately adjudicable. [150 N.J.Super. at 293-94, 375 A.2d 675 (emphasis added).] See also Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 434, 400 A.2d 1189 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Square Brighton

    ### Response:
    holding that marital tort an assault should have been asserted in the prior divorce action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Amendment by sentencing him as an armed career criminal. IV. Crews also contends that the district court erred in applying a four-level increase to his offense level for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. He argues that the district court based this increase on information that did not have sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy because the presentence investigation report contained contradictory information. Even assuming arguendo that the district court erred in applying the four-level increase under § 2K2.1, the er ror was harmless, as the increase had no effect on Crews’s ultimate offense level, which was determined by the application of the ACCA. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1220 n. 39 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). V. Crews’s final argument on appeal is that

    ### Response:
    holding that any error by a district court in applying a sentencing enhancement is harmless if it did not change a defendants total offense level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleging violation of federal rights by state officials. This is exactly what is required in the present case. [1123.] A departure from the Ex parte Young, exception is not applicable in this case based on the fact that plaintiffs are seeking to recover costs and reasonable attorney fees. The argument of the State that this is an attack on the State treasury is rejected. Plaintiffs do not seek any monetary judgment other than costs and reasonable attorney fees. Rather, the plaintiffs’ complaint asks this Court to declare that Amendment E violates the ADA and certain constitutional rights and to enter an order permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing or taking any steps toward enforcing Amendment E. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (<HOLDING>). [1124.] In Coeur d’Alene, the plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding lawsuit against the state could proceed where gravamen of complaint was to vindicate plaintiffs civil liberties and not to establish ownership over state resources or funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    do not render them insubstantial.” Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 35 L.Ed.2d 36 (1973). In Goos-by, the Supreme Court reversed the determination by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that a suit by Pennsylvania pretrial detainees challenging the denial of their right to vote was barred by an earlier Illinois case that denied only the right to vote absentee while detained. While the earlier decision may have placed the likelihood of success in doubt, it did not address situations in which the right to vote had been denied altogether. As a result, the earlier decision could not be said to have “foreclose[d] the subject,” and the case was remanded for consideration on the merits. Id. at 518, 522, 93 S.Ct. 854. See also Hagans, 415 U.S. at 539-41, 94 S.Ct. 1372 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the plaintiffs challenge the

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs suit was not insubstantial because 1 no prior case existed addressing the regulation being challenged and 2 the allegation that the regulation in question violated federal law was not patently irrational
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    party; (2) knowledge of this violation on the part of the aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in achievement of the violation. See Calcutti v. SBU, Inc., 273 F.Supp.2d 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (citing cases). While ""wrongful intent is not an essential element of the conversion,” Leve v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc., 136 A.D.2d 477, 478, 523 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1st Dep’t 1988) (citing cases), a plaintiff must show that the defendant ""aided and assisted” the converter ""with culpable knowledge that such funds did not belong to [the converter]."" Weisman, Celler, Spett & Modlin v. Chadbourne & Parke, 271 A.D.2d 329, 330, 706 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 2000); accord Lenczycki v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 238 A.D.2d 248, 248, 656 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1st Dep’t 1997) (<HOLDING>). New York ""has not adopted a constructive

    ### Response:
    holding that the aider and abettor must know of the converters intention to convert the funds citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it was unreasonable for plan to refuse to consider the effect of plaintiffs “stress,” when the plan did not say that self-reported or subjective factors should be accorded less significance than other indicators); see also Green v. Prudential Ins. Co., 383 F.Supp.2d 980, 997-98 (M.D.Tenn.2005)(Nixon, J.)(where treating physicians and specialists have diagnosed fibromyalgia, and there not objective tests available to prove certain symptoms, it is unreasonable to require objective findings); Pollini v. Raytheon Dis. Employee Trust, 54 F.Supp.2d 54, 59 (D.Mass. 1999)(“the claim administrator’s rejection of a claim solely on the basis of a purported lack of objective evidence is troubling and questionable.”); May v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2004 WL 2011460, *7 (N.D.Cal. Sept.9, 2004)(<HOLDING>). Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit explained:

    ### Response:
    holding that metlife abused its discretion by requiring the plaintiff meet an additional requirement for eligibility beyond those imposed by the plan the administrator cannot exclude a claim for lack of objective medical evidence unless the objective medical evidence standard was made clear plain and conspicuous enough in the policy to negate plaintiffs objectively reasonable expectations of coverage 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proper proof, an equitable lien on insurance proceeds in favor of a mortgagee. South Carolina law also provides that an equitable lien arises following the entry of a judgment recognizing its existence. Lloyd, 458 B.R. at 300 (citing In re Houston, 409 B.R. 799, 811 (Bankr.D.S.C.2009)); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bailey, 316 S.C. 350, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1994) (“An equitable lien is a mere floating equity until a judgment or decree subjecting the property to the payment of the debt or claim is rendered.”). The cases the Court has found which hold that a mortgagee has an equitable lien on insurance proceeds all involve a contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee requiring that the mortgagor maintain insurance. See Knapp v. Victory Corp., 279 S.C. 80, 302 S.E.2d 330 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding in a dispute between first and second mortgagee regarding entitlement to insurance proceeds that because both mortgages required the mortgagor to maintain insurance on the property both mortgagees had a claim to the proceeds and that the first mortgagee was entitled to recover a portion of the proceeds to the extent of the insured amount with the second mortgagee to recover the remainder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . Section 90.401, Florida Statutes (1997), states: Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact. 4 . Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1997), states, in pertinent part: Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 5 . The four criteria are applicable if the purpose of admitting the similar accident is to show notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 411.2 (2007); Warn Indus. v. Geist, 343 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). 6 . Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 411.2 (2007); Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So.2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). 7 .Jackson, 630 So.2d at 1176; Lasar Mfg. Co.

    ### Response:
    holding that no abuse of discretion occurred in admitting evidence regarding a lack of pri or complaints to establish defendants knowledge or lack thereof of a defect in the safety glasses that it produced or sold
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    holding that statements that a company’s business condition was “bad” and “a matter of survival” implicitly asserted an inability to pay, the Board concluded that Lakeland’s statements “reasonably conveyed a present inability to pay.” Id. at 325 (citing Shell Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 133 (1993)). It is debatable whether these three statements, viewed in isolation, imply an inability to pay, as opposed to a mere unwillingness to pay. When considered in light of the record as a whole, however, it is absolutely clear that the statements do not provide a sufficient basis for the Board’s decision. The Board purports to consider the letter “in context.” Order, 335 N.L.R.B. at 325, 326. Indeed, its own precedents require that it do so. See, e.g., Burruss Transfer, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 226, 228 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the Board decision focuses

    ### Response:
    holding that an employers statement that he did not feel that he could afford the unions proposals did not trigger a duty to disclose because the overall context of bargaining did not suggest an inability to pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    imposed tioo previous moratoria. See id. at 1465-67. Notably, the court there did not suggest that either of the first two moratoria were improper. This court is aware that other district courts have issued orders pursuant to the TCA forestalling the effect even of first-time moratoria. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Farmington, No. 3:97 CV 863(GLG), 1997 WL 631104 (D.Conn. Oct.6 1997). In the end, however, “each situation must be independently examined” and this court finds that the moratorium in this case simply was not unreasonable. Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 984 F.Supp. 966, 976-77 (E.D.Va.1998) (finding fourteen-month delay not per se unreasonable under TCA); Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria, 963 F.Supp. 732, 746 (C.D.Ill.1997) (<HOLDING>). B. Discrimination The TCA prohibits

    ### Response:
    holding sixmonth delay in rendering final decision not per se unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exempt personal property only until final settlement of the estate. Probate code section 278 provides as follows: If, upon a final settlement of the estate, it shall appear that the same is solvent, the exempted property, except the homestead or any allowance in lieu thereof, shall be subject to partition and distribution among the heirs and distrib-utees of such estate in like manner as the other property of the estate. Tex. PROB.Code Ann. § 278 (Vernon 2003). Thus, a surviving spouse can retain possession of tangible exempt property under the “use and benefit” provision of section 271, but when the administration terminates, the decedent’s interest in these items must pass to the decedent’s heirs or devisees. Id.; Bolton v. Bolton, 977 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The trial court’s order is captioned in part

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. Harry Savage appeals an order revoking his sex offender probation and resulting twenty-year prison sentence. He argues that his contact with a child was not a willful and substantial violation of his probationary terms. Competent substantial evidence, however, supports the trial court’s finding of a willful and substantial violation. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation, we affirm. We write to address some possible confusion about the applicable standard of review. Both the trial court’s decision wh CA 2001) (reversing revocation where trial court did not have before it competent evidence that probationer’s failure to comply with probation condition was willful); Robinson v. State, 744 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>); Young v. State, 566 So.2d 69, 69-70 (Fla. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding purely hearsay evidence that defendant was aware of requirement to report was insufficient to support finding of willful violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have original jurisdiction founded solely on [28 U.S.C. § 1332], the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). A few federal courts of appeals have considered § 1367’s impact on Zahn, and they have reached divided conclusions. Compare Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Free v. Abbott Labs. (In re Abbott Labs.), 51

    ### Response:
    holding that  1367 overrules zahn
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    going to have to find a new mommy,"" and that the foster mother had comforted Older Sister until she fell asleep in her arms. 116 Mother does not assert that this testimony could not evidence the trust relationships found by the juvenile court, but only that the testimony was biased and therefore unreliable. However, ""[i]t is the province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will not see-ond-guess the [juvenile] court where there is a reasonable basis to support its findings."" Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). The testimony supports the juvenile court's determination that a trust relationship existed between the children and the foster mother and between Older Sister and her therapist. Cf. In re L.N., 2004 UT App 120, ¶ 19, 91 P.3d 836 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err in finding that a trust relationship existed between a foster mother and foster child where it found that the child immediately became attached to the foster mother and was confiding in her when she made statements admitted under the hearsay exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    drugs not prescribed by a physician. The evidence, however, was insufficient to establish that Mr. Ford possessed the marijuana. “All possession crimes may be either actual or constructive. ... Possession is actual when the contraband is (1) in the defendant’s hand or on his person, (2) in a container in the defendant’s hand or on his person, or (8) within the defendant’s ‘ “ready reach” ’ and the contraband is under his control.” Sundin v. State, 27 So.3d 675, 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Harris v. State, 954 So.2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)). Despite Mr. Ford’s admission that the driver tossed the marijuana to him to hide, this momentary possession did not establish Mr. Ford’s dominion and control over the contraband. See Campbell v. State, 577 So.2d 932, 935 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>); Roberts v. State, 505 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla. 3d

    ### Response:
    holding defendants temporary possession of kilo of cocaine in owners presence to inspect it before unconsummated purchase did not infer dominion or control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of defendant Stokes {id. at 132-44); and the prior trial testimony of Raymond Goldberg, owner or partial owner of 2701 Red Lion Associates and Refrigerated Foods Distribution Inc. and its predecessors. {Id. at 145-81.) Interlake had dropped all claims against co-defendants Warehouse Technology and Curti Service. At the conclusion of defendant’s case and upon motion by the plaintiff, and after argument by counsel, I found that Interlake had failed to present sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of negligence against any of the three co-defendants, namely Stokes, Schmidt and Red Lion, and I nonsuited Interlake on its cross-claims then. Id. at 182,193. Accordingly, the matter went to the jury solely on the question of damages. 545 Pa. 209, 216, 680 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 507 Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding that the superior courts erred to the extent that it allowed a new trial on a lung cancer claim and affirming the grant of a new trial limited to noncancer injury claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 181 Ct.Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 USPQ 697, 702 (Ct.Cl.1967) (""In utilizing all the patent documents, one should not sacrifice the value of these references by the unimaginative adherence to well-worn professional phrases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand.L.Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950) (listing thrusts and parries of canons of construction of statutory provisions to illustrate their tractability). 3 . Likewise, any interpretation that is provided or disavowed in the prosecution history also shapes the claim scope. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 USPQ 90, 93-94 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP,

    ### Response:
    holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confrontation and compulsory process clauses, see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1977), and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process and privilege against self-incrimination, see id. at 52-53, 107 S.Ct. 2704. The right to present a defense, however, is not without limits. At a minimum, a defendant is limited to presenting relevant evidence, Ramone, 218 F.3d at 1237, which is evidence having “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” Fed.R.Evid. 401. To determine what evidence is relevant, we first turn to the elements of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Casares-Cardenas, 14 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>). The statute Mr. Mar-key is charged with

    ### Response:
    holding relevance of evidence is established by any showing however slight that the evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant committed the crime in question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    make tests a condition precedent to the operation of the exemption. Because HHS has not promulgated the regulations called for by the statute, the City could not violate § 623(j)(l) by failing to provide fitness tests before enforcing the Ordinance. 2. Timing and Scope The 2000 Ordinance covers all “sworn members” of the police department and all members of the “uniformed service” of the fire department, a broader class than the members of the “career service” covered by the ordinance in effect in 1983. The plaintiffs have argued, as support for their allegations of subterfuge, see below, that the City impermissibly broadened the scope of the Ordinance beyond its coverage as of March 3, 1983, in violation of § 623(j)(l)(A). See Roche v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, Roche was decided before the 1996

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff was in class of employees not covered by ordinance in effect on march 3 1983  623j exemption was unavailable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the waiver may not be knowing and intelligent and thus may not be valid. While a recommended sentence may remove uncertainty, it does not guarantee that the defendant will receive the specified sentence. Because the court is not bound by a plea bargain at the hearing on the motion to adjudicate guilt, a defendant cannot be certain of the term of his sentence until he violates the conditions of his community supervision and guilt is adjudicated. See Ex Parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (stating that “[e]ven if the parties purport to have a plea bargain as to the sentence to be assessed after adjudication, the trial court is not bound by the rules that apply to plea bargains at an original sentencing”); Von Schounmacher v. State, 5 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). The instant case does not escape all three

    ### Response:
    holding that regardless of whether the deferred adjudication was part of a plea bargain recommended by the prosecution imposed by the trial court without objection by the appellant or granted under other circumstances once the trial court proceeds to adjudication it is restricted in the sentence it imposes only by the relevant statutory limits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that operates roller skating rinks and is licensed and doi , 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir.1986) .2d 154 (1993); Bodie-Rickett & Assocs. v. Mars, Inc., 957 F.2d 287, 290-91 (6th Cir.1992) (con cluding that broker of snacks and candies lacked standing to bring an antitrust action against snack and candy manufacturer where targets of alleged conspiracy, competing manufacturers and wholesale customers, were more direct victims); S.D. Collectibles, Inc. v. Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 213-14 (8th Cir.1991) (determining that broker who solicited orders for resale of product and was not a consumer or competing manufacturer or distributor lacked standing to bring antitrust action against manufacturers and distributor of product); Peck v. General Motors Corp., 894 F.2d 844, 847-48 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Henke Enters, v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sr.’s own statements to Jones, as testified to by Jones, would be nonhearsay because they are Frazier, Sr.’s own admissions and were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). Frazier, Sr. also argues that Officer Leyshock’s testimony concerning the information Jones supplied to him was inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because Jones’s statements to Officer Leyshock were not in furtherance of the conspiracy. We agree that Jones’s out-of-court statements as related by Officer Leyshock do not fall within the coconspirator rule, although any error in admitting them was harmless because Jones himself testified in detail about the information he provided to Officer Leyshock and was subject to cross examination about it. See United States v. Melecio-Rodriguez, 231 F.3d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1024, 121 S.Ct. 1968,

    ### Response:
    holding that post arrest statements made by coconspirator to law enforcement officer were not admissible under rule 801d2e but admission of testimony was harmless because officers testimony was cumulative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    32 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). This court further recognized the type of inherent authority that allows a circuit court to grant a new trial in the interest of justice, stating ""[t]he inherent power of the court is ... the power to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not... and the power to provide process where none exists."" Cannon, 196 Wis. at 536 (quoting In re Bruen, 172 P. 1152 (Wash. 1918)). We have established that, even on its own motion, a circuit court has the inherent authority to grant a new trial when an injustice has occurred. Fontaine, 205 Wis. at 577 (""It has long been settled in this state that the court has power to grant a new trial in the interests of justice upon its own motion.""); In re Noe's Estate, 241 Wis. at 177 (<HOLDING>); Behning, 57 Wis. 2d at 188 (recognizing a

    ### Response:
    holding a circuit courts authority to grant a new trial is so necessary to the judicial process and so essential to fair trials that its existence is a necessary incident to the exercise of judicial power by the circuit court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    power, but that is different from a hybrid regulation that delegates regulatory power. That the Department leaves open the number of procedures that an incumbent licensee may perform does not mean it delegates regulatory power to licensees. The restraint of trade is the licensing requirement — a barrier to entry — and it is complete upon enactment. The state imposes the licensing requirements. The state decides what the licensing requirements will be and whether they are met. The state does not delegate any aspect of need calculation to private parties. Admittedly, the state takes notice of whether incumbent providers are meeting the needs of the planning area, but that responsiveness to private activity does not amount to a hybrid restraint. See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the Department has decided that

    ### Response:
    holding that despite the power of tenants to trigger enforcement of a regulated rent ceiling the rent levels were set exclusively by the state and the ceiling thus was a unilateral restraint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court entered an order that allowed the movant relief from the stay if the debtor did not obtain adequate insurance by a certain date. Based on the representation of the movant’s attorney subsequent to that order, the debtor has obtained satisfactory insurance. 2 . If section 109(g)(2) applied to this matter, there would be an issue of how to apply that section. The court in Chrysler Financial Corp. v. Dickerson (In re Dickerson), 209 B.R. 703, 705-706 (W.D.Tenn.) explains: Although seemingly unambiguous on its face, there are at least three distinct lines of cases interpreting this statute. One line of cases holds th holding that § 109(g)(2) ""applies only if there is a contested matter pending at the time of the voluntary dismissal”); In re Patton, 49 B.R. 587 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1985) (<HOLDING>). A third line of cases holds that a court has

    ### Response:
    holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court decision. See Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1274 (11th Cir.2013); Williams, 713 F.3d at 1343; Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244. This requires showing, inter alia, that the new Supreme Court rule upon which Griffin relies — i.e., the rule announced in Al-leyne — applies retroactively on collateral review. See Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274; Williams, 713 F.3d at 1343; Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244. Here, Griffin’s sentence is 360 months, which is 240 months above the statutory minimum penalty of 120 months’ imprisonment. Thus, Griffin is not serving a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, and Alleyne does not apply to his case. In any event, AUeyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review. See Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding the apprendi rule does not apply retroactively in the context of a  2241 petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in their reply brief which alluded to this argument. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly states: ""Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief"" Utah R.App. P. 24(c) (emphasis added). In addition, Parents failed to brief this argument adequately as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (stating that Rule 24(a)(9) ""requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority""). Thus, because Parents first argued this issue in their reply brief and did not adequately brief the issue, we will not address it. Cf Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980) (<HOLDING>). Finally, because Parents appealed only the

    ### Response:
    holding that as a general rule an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant posits that he did not exercise one of his two remaining peremptory challenges to remove juror Bauknecht because he had already allocated those challenges to remove other prospective jurors. As previously indicated, we conclude that defendant has waived his challenge in this regard. a. The Application of Waiver to This Case This court has repeatedly stated that “we will review the trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause only when an objectionable juror was forced upon a party after it had exhausted its peremptory challenges.” (Emphasis added.) Grady v. Marchini, 375 Ill. App. 3d 174, 179, 874 N.E.2d 179, 184 (2007) (citing Flynn v. Edmonds, 236 Ill. App. 3d 770, 779, 602 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1992)). See People v. Green, 199 Ill. App. 3d 927, 931, 557 N.E.2d 939, 942 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, defendant challenged juror Bauknecht

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    classified documents), vacated, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2960, 171 L.Ed.2d 881 (2008) (mem.), reinstated, Order No. 06-1197 (D.C.Cir.2008), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C.Cir.2009). The Fourth Circuit likewise observed in In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 391-92 (4th Cir.1986): [TJroubled as we are by the risk that disclosure of classified information could endanger the lives of both Americans and their foreign informants, ... blind acceptance by the courts of the government’s insistence on the need for secrecy, without notice to others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons, would impermissibly compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the door to possible abuse. See also Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F.Supp.2d 402, 414, 418 (D.N.J.1999) (<HOLDING>). The rationale for requiring such disclosure

    ### Response:
    holding that the governments use of classified evidence in detentionpendingdeportation proceedings violated detainees due process rights and inter alia justified his release
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    21-31-23. While Plaintiffs may be able to seek an investigation under another statutory provision, i.e., Miss.Code Ann. Section 25-4-21, they clearly could not obtain relief under Section 21-31-23 as the trial court found. II. Applicability of Miss.Code. Ann. Section 11-51-75. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs also argue the trial court erred when it failed to address the sole issue the Board had raised in its motions to dismiss. The Board, in its motions, had alleged the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiffs’ case because Plaintiffs were subject to the requirements of Miss.Code Ann. Section 11-51-75 and had failed to object to the rehiring of Jones within ten days of the Board’s October 12, 2004 decision. See Newell v. Jones County, 731 So.2d 580 (Miss.1999) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 11. Plaintiffs acknowledge they had no

    ### Response:
    holding that tenday time limit to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional and an appellate court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    long recognized that the writ is available to those who suffer such a curtailment of liberty as to render them “in custody” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). See, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239-40, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir.1998); and Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 744 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986). In Williams, 795 F.2d at 744, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the Supreme Court’s expansion of “custody” in the criminal context applies to habeas petitions in the immigration context. In the present case, neither party seems to contend this point. What is in contention is whether Petitioner — who is subject to removal orders and the government’s Intensive Supervised Appearance Program (‘ISAP’) — h Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (<HOLDING>) Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291

    ### Response:
    holding that so long as the petitioner is subject to a final order of deportation an alien is deemed to be in custody1 for purposes of the ina
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to reopen its case, counsel used the divorce decree, rather than a transcript, to question J.F.’s mother about her denials of any abuse during the family court proceeding. Considering the numerous other grounds upon which to attack her credibility, counsel did not “believe that this was that strong of a defensive point.” As “the sole fact-finder and judge” of the credibility and weight of each piece of evidence, whether presented “during live testimony” or “in affidavits,” the trial court is “within its right to disbelieve” any of the “assertions upon which [the] appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are based,” so long as the basis for that disbelief is supported by at least one “reasonable view of the record.” Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453, 459 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (<HOLDING>); Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208, 212

    ### Response:
    holding trial court had broad discretion to disbelieve defendants claim he would not have pled guilty but for counsels error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gregory filed an objection to the Colony UCC sale. (Gregory Dep. at 78-83; JX 156 at Ex. B.) Colony then filed suit in New York seeking a declaration that its UCC notice was commercially reasonable and that the actions of Gramercy in replacing the directors was improper. It obtained an ex parte TRO which was subsequently vacated. (JX 133; JX 156 at ¶ 26.) The action remains pending. Colony’s UCC auction was scheduled for October 19, 2011. On October 18, 2011, at 11:00 pm, Mezz II filed a voluntary petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. (D.I. # 1.) That filing was followed by the filing of chapter 11 petitions by Mezz I and the Operating Companies on October 25 and 26, 2011, respectively. (D.I. # 38 at ¶ 4.) Shortly after Mezz II filed its petition, Colony fil ir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Third Circuit has adopted a “totality of

    ### Response:
    holding that chapter 11 case filed by financially healthy company solely to gain a tactical advantage in litigation was in bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were with private landlords. As a result, when the NYCHA terminated their Section 8 benefits and they were no longer able to pay their rent, the private landlords commenced eviction proceedings against the plaintiffs. The court held that the “in aid of jurisdiction” to the Anti-Injunction Act applied, reasoning that: Unless eviction proceedings are stayed long enough to adjudicate plaintiffs’ alleged right to retroactive reinstatement in the Section 8 program, plaintiffs will be evicted before this case can be decided. In this event, the Court will be unable to accord meaningful relief to the parties. Reinstatement in S , 1002 (4th Cir.1970) (affirming the district court’s injunction of a state court eviction proceeding where t CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90

    ### Response:
    holding that the antiinjunction act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because claims for rescission under tila can be brought in state court including as a defense to an eviction claim in housing court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Sekhar, 683 F.3d 436, 440-41 (2d Cir.2012). Petitioner’s allegation that counsel failed to use the absence of mens rea as a defense does not prove ineffective assistance of counsel. 5. Misinterpretation of Laws Feldman further contends counsel was ineffective because he misunderstood the doctrines of specialty and dual criminality, which impacted the outcome of the case. The doctrine of specialty is a principal of international law requiring that a defendant be tried only for those crimes for which he is extradited. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 115 (2d Cir.2003). This doctrine limits a court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and is thus forfeited if not timely raised. Id. (citing Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606, 47 S.Ct. 531, 535, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927) (<HOLDING>)). The doctrine of dual criminality requires

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants objection to personal jurisdiction was forfeited where defendant did not object before he entered his plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    execution of the mortgage, buttressed by its covenants, conveyed his entire interest in the property to the bank, subject to defeasance, and effectively subordinated any homestead interest he possessed to the mortgage lien. Atlantic Savings, 9 Mass.App.Ct. at 288, 400 N.E.2d at 1291 (1980) (emphasis supplied). Again, this Court recognizes that its responsibility is to anticipate how the SJC would decide the issue and that a lower court decision on the matter is not dispositive. In re Miller, 113 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr.D.Mass.1990). However, this Court finds the Atlantic Savings decision well reasoned and substantiated by the statutory provisions underlying standard mortgage covenants: [I]n a conveyance of real estate the words “mortgage covenants” shall h 187 N.E. 118, 119 (1933) (<HOLDING>). Given the foregoing, this Court holds that

    ### Response:
    holding that the mortgagee named in the mortgage at the time of the mortgages execution acquired the legal title to the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DSS presented five witnesses, and respondent mother presented one witness. When the hearing resumed on 4 June 2007, respondent mother presented the testimony of two additional witnesses, and DSS presented four witnesses in rebuttal. At no time during the balance of the first day of hearings or during the entire second day of hearings did respondent mother argue or contend that she had insufficient time to prepare to meet the new allegations made under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1111(a)(2). II. Analysis It is clear that, when there are procedures set forth in Chapter 7B governing termination of parental rights proceedings, those procedures must control over those set forth in the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. In re S.D.W. & H.E.W., 187 N.C. App. 416, 419, 653 S.E.2d 429, 431 (2007) (<HOLDING>) However, because “a termination of parental

    ### Response:
    recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court erred by not reserving jurisdiction in the amended final judgment to address his timely filed charging lien. There is no dispute that counsel filed the notice and claim of charging lien before the original final judgment was entered. Thus, counsel perfected his charging lien by providing timely notice. See Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1986) (“In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.”); see also Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983) (“[T]here are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely notice.”); Brown v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 574, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding a lack of express reservation

    ### Response:
    holding that to be timely the notice of a charging lien must be filed before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substantive work in SEIU Local 1; Berzon provided substantive and strategic guidance; Chandra, Géntry, and McTigue had knowledge of the NEOCH case'history and substantive work on the pending motions; and Miller and Harsh-man performed work on the evidence presented in both cases. Given the importance of this hearing, complexity of the issues, and the number of parties involved in the two cases, the number of counsel present does not seem unreasonable. In any event, the district court was there and in a far better spot to assess whether the number of counsel was necessary. The district court’s ruling that Plaintiffs’ requested fees for travel to and from the court for various oral arguments was therefore proper. See, e.g., Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Perotti, 935 F.2d at 764 (noting that

    ### Response:
    holding that travel time is fully compensable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an estate is created upon the commencement of a case and that such estate is comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The scope of this paragraph is broadly interpreted because “Congress intended a broad range of property ... to be included in the estate.” United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983). Section 541(b), which provides an extensive list of property specifically not included in the estate, quite clearly does not include an exception for a debtor’s interest in a rent-stabilized lease. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b). Accordingly the Debtor’s legal interest in the Lease is property of the estate. See In re Stein, 281 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Trustee is authorized to assume and

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtors interest in a noneviction plan lease under the martin act is property of the estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001). Importantly, summary judgment is not appropriate where “questions regarding an employer’s motive predominate in the inquiry regarding how important a role the protected speech played in the adverse employment decision.” Morris, 196 F.3d at 110 (citation omitted). Here, Sebast has sufficiently established a claim for unconstitutional retaliation to survive summary judgment. While all inferences drawn from the current record would lead the court to find that Sebast engaged in protected speech by complaining to Sheriff Campbell about Undersheriff Mahan’s potential misconduct, see, e.g., Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1084 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), the court is presently unable to conclude as

    ### Response:
    holding that an officers report of misconduct by fellow officer is a matter of public concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    services.”). QIC confesses a lack of independence from the Plan when it states in its complaints that it “provided prescription drugs ... to [Carstens and Williby] pursuant to the terms of the Plan and the Texas AWP statute. As such, [QIC] is entitled to payment from [Humana] pursuant to the Plan....” In essence, QIC’s AWP claims are for benefits under the Plan and, thus, are completely preempted and subject to removal, regardless of any difference in their elements, see Davila, 542 U.S. at 216, 124 S.Ct. 2488, or how artful QIC is in its pleadings, see McGowin v. ManPower Int’l, Inc., 363 F.3d 556, 559 (5th Cir.2004). See also Quality Infusion, 2006 WL 3813774, at *7 (applying similar analysis to AWP); Cleghorn, v. Blue Shield of Cal., 408 F.3d 1222, 1224-26 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). As far as standing is concerned, QIC argues

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim based on an insurers failure to provide emergency benefits under state law is completely preempted because the factual basis of the complaint  was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony at trial. Dr. Karl Williams, the Commonwealth’s relation-back expert, based his calculations on the 0.106% BAC result taken at 5:50 a.m. (N.T. Trial, February 11, 2002, at 491-492). Dr. Williams determined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Appellant’s BAC at 2:11 a.m., the time of the accident, would have been 0.130%. Id. at 493. Thus, Appellant’s BAC had been over the legal limit of .10% at the time of the accident. While Appellant’s expert, Dr. Frederick Fochtman, attempted to east doubt on the findings and methods used by Dr. Williams, the jury resolved this conflicting testimony in favor of Dr. Williams. Therefore, Appellant’s argument that the relation back evidence was unreliable is without merit. See Commonwealth v. Gillen, 798 A.2d 225 (Pa.Super.2002) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the fact that the Allegheny

    ### Response:
    holding mere conflict in testimony does not render evidence insufficient to support verdict because it is with province of fact finder to determine weight to be given to testimony and to believe all part or none of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remains how best to adapt the Title VII employment framework to an educational context and to the unique historical circumstances of this case. C. Applying a Modified Title VII Standard in the Educational Context Under § 1981 Only step three of the traditional three-stage Title VII analysis, Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187, 109 S.Ct. 2363; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626, 107 S.Ct. 1442, is at issue here. At step one, Plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing (as the Schools concede) that the Kamehameha Schools consider applicants’ Hawaiian ancestry, or lack thereof, in making admissions decisions. At step two, the Kamehameha Schools have specified their remedial admissions policy as the non-discriminatory rationale for their decisions. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626, 107 S.Ct. 1442 (<HOLDING>). The validity of this policy is the focus of

    ### Response:
    holding that an affirmative action plan provides a legitimate reason for a hiring decision that considers race or ethnicity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were the sole item of overhead and profit. That the parties chose to articulate the sole item of overhead and profit points toward the conclusion that “[plaintiffs’] cost,” as used in this contract, does not include other items of overhead and profit. With that in mind, we consider the evidence in the record of the underlying circumstances. Defendant points to the parties’ past dealings, prior drafts of the agreement, and a statement that he purportedly made to plaintiffs before the parties signed their contract as the circumstances underlying the formation of the contract. We begin with the evidence of the parties’ prior dealings. Evidence of a prior course of dealing is evidence of the circumstances underlying a contract. See Stanfield v. Arnwine, 102 Or 289, 299, 202 P 559 (1921) (<HOLDING>). Defendant argues that the parties’ prior

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior dealings with the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assets.... ” Letter Memorandum, at 2. While the letter does make reference to RTC’s security interest, RTC fails to make a clear demand against the estate and to show that RTC intended to hold the estate liable. Thompson, 227 F. at 983 (emphasis added). In fact, the very purpose of the letters was to assert that the debtor had no interest in the property in question and therefore the property was not property of the estate. RTC may have intended to pursue an action against the property only outside the bankruptcy case. Indeed, this could even be the reason that RTC never filed a proof of claim. Because the secured creditor has the power to proceed against the property only it is especially important that the secured creditor make a clear demand upon the estate. Thompson, 227 F. at 983 (<HOLDING>). This court holds that RTC, and therefore its

    ### Response:
    holding that making a demand on the estate is especially the duty of a secured creditor who has the choice  of relying upon the security and thereby giving up all or a part of his claim upon the estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because there was no harm requiring compensation — the Receiver would have prepared for and attended the show cause hearing even if Solera had shown up. In fact, that hearing would have taken longer and would have cost more if Solera had shown up. Because that part of the sanction award was neither coercive nor compensatory, it was punitive in nature. See id. (“[T]he sanctions imposed by the district court were neither compensatory nor coercive in nature, but instead were designed to punish [the contemnor] for flouting the authority of the district court”). A “district court may not use the civil contempt power to impose what amounts to a punitive or criminal contempt sanction.” United States v. City of Miami, 195 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir.1999); see also DuPont, 99 F.3d at 369 (<HOLDING>). Because the district court imposed what

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court committed reversible error by imposing criminal sanctions in a civil proceeding which did not afford the contemnor the procedural protections the constitution requires for the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    By prohibiting government from imposing any substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise unless the burden is justified by a compelling, and not just a legitimate, governmental interest, RLUIPA accords greater protection to an inmate than the Free Exercise Clause of both the Idaho and federal constitutions. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.2007); Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1162 (E.D.Cal.2003), affirmed by 456 F.3d 978, (9th Cir.2006) (deciding that because petitioners’ claims succeed under RLUIPA, there was no need to consider whether they succeed under the lower level of scrutiny). See also Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 452 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 656, 663, n. 1, 38 L.Ed.2d 635, 644, n. 1 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Thus, where we have addressed Hyde’s claims

    ### Response:
    holding that constitutional issues need not be decided where narrower grounds exist for according relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court permissibly found that she had not done so and, therefore, a condition of the agreement was not met. 4. The district court did not plainly err in including $13,500 of interest and consequential losses as part of the amount of loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (2000) and as part of the restitution required under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). With respect to the amount of loss, exclusion of the $13,500 would not change the sentencing calculation, so we need not decide whether the court erred. With respect to restitution, Defendant failed to raise this issue below and therefore failed to develop a factual record that would permit meaningful review; accordingly, we decline to reach the merits of the claim. See United States v. Hemandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1563

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Four: Filing a False Police Report — Against All Defendants Plaintiff alleges that on five dates between November 1, 2000, and February 14, 2001, defendants filed or caused to be filed false police reports accusing plaintiff of committing criminal acts. (FAC at 46). Plaintiffs claim is thus predicated on defendants’ communications, albeit allegedly false in nature, with the police regarding plaintiffs purported criminal activities. Such state law claim must be dismissed because, under California law, reports to police of suspected criminal activities— even false reports made with malice — are absolutely privileged and may not serve as predicates for tort claims, except the tort of malicious prosecution. See Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland, Security, 538 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hagberg v. California Federal Bank

    ### Response:
    recognizing that defendants telephone call to san francisco police was privileged under state law and could not be the basis for tort liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Fenster v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 785 So.2d 737, 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). As part of the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, a property owner also has a duty to maintain the property to prevent foreseeable risks that exist on adjacent property. This is true because the “duty element of a negligence action focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general threat of harm to others.” Almarante v. Art Inst. of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 921 So.2d 703, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 899 So.2d 1105, 1110 (Fla.2005)). Accordingly, a “landowner’s conduct can give rise to a zone of risk extending beyond t (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). In this case, it is undisputed that the Point

    ### Response:
    holding that a hotel built adjacent to a highway owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its invitees in passing over the highway to and from appellees hotel facilities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the Taylor/White] standard or the less stringent standard [of McCauley ] requiring only shortness of breath is the proper standard, as I conclude that the plaintiffs in the present cases have satisfied both.”). An analysis under the Tay-lorfWhite test is simple: both men clearly suffer from “physical symptoms” and “functional impairments.” They have been forced into retirement, cannot walk short distances without becoming short of breath, nor can they enjoy fishing. Likewise, under McCauley, each man suffers from shortness of breath, has been diagnosed with an asbestos-related condition, and their shortness of breath, at least in part, has been causally linked to asbestos exposure. Accordingly, under Simmons and its (contradictory) progeny, Appellants suffer fro 71 A.2d 771 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 136

    ### Response:
    holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    oral contract as a matter of law, a party must expressly require a writing. Mason v. Rabun Waste, Inc., 174 Ga.App. 462, 463, 330 S.E.2d 400, 401 (1985) (affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff on its oral contract claim despite the defendant’s uncommunicated intent that the final agreement would have to be in writing to be enforceable). Otherwise, whether a contract existed at all is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Terry Hunt Constr. Co. v. AON Risk Servs., Inc., 272 Ga.App. 547, 551, 613 S.E.2d 165, 168-69 (2005). Furthermore, contrary to the five-part analytical framework Coastal presents, in Georgia even a complicated, expensive construction contract may be oral. See Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard & Moore Constr. Co., 137 Ga.App. 650, 650, 224 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Thus, under Georgia law, the evidence does

    ### Response:
    holding that a contract to build an addition to a textile mill could be oral
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding disciplinary practices, this court finds that the Defendants have satisfied their burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. It is plausible that the specific incidents whereby Kielczynski received discipline, including her failure to properly search a prisoner and failing to respond to calls are so patently different from the actions of other male patrol officers that she would warrant a stricter type of discipline. However, at the same time, a legitimate inference of pretext is raised when, as Kielc-zynski’s evidence infers, similarly situated employees receive different disciplinary actions for what appears, in most instances, to be similar types of Department violations. See Hiatt v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) In short, this court finds that when viewing

    ### Response:
    holding that one means of demonstrating pretext is to put forth evidence that employees outside the protected class who were involved in misconduct or comparable seriousness were not subject to similar adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    so that they could leave the scene undetected. The officer left the room, and the two were arrested. Clearly at the time of the arrest, the defendant and her companion had the right to possession and control of the cocaine and had physically exercised that right. Defendant cites to Garces v. State, 485 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), as supporting her claim that she was not “knowingly in actual or constructive possession” of the drugs at issue. Garces held that the temporary control of contraband in the presence of its actual owner, for the purpose of verifying that it was what it purported to be, did not constitute “legal possession.” However the 1992 amendment to section 893.02(16), Florida negates the possibility of such a claim. See State v. Nellums, 614 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Ortega v. State, 755 So.2d 813 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the 1992 amendment to section 8930216 florida statutes changed the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the purpose of unnecessary delay, the defendant may be required to proceed to trial without counsel. 772 P.2d at 92. The colloquy between the trial court and the defendant should demonstrate on the ree-ord that defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to an attorney, either expressly or through conduct that amounts to an implied waiver of the right to counsel. Id. at 93. 117 In all of these cases, we have consistently held that a trial court must balance the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice against the demands of fairness, efficiency, and the integrity of the judicial system. A trial court has wide latitude in determining how to strike this balance. United States v. Gongalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (<HOLDING>). 118 Although the trial court cannot force a

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court must balance the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and the demands of its calendar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CR 26(c). In Dreiling, we noted that article I, section 10 “does not speak” to the disclosure of information surfacing during pretrial discovery that does not otherwise come before the court because it “does not become part of the court’s decision-making process.” 151 Wn.2d at 909-10. Thus, because there is not yet a public right of access with respect to these materials, “[m]ere discovery may be sealed Tor good cause shown.’ ” Id. at 909 (quoting CR 26(c)). ¶17 Trial proceedings and records attached to dispositive motions, on the other hand, are presumptively open absent an “ ‘overriding interest.’ ” Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 910 (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988)); Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wn.2d 385, 388-89, 535 P.2d 801 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The open administration of justice is more

    ### Response:
    holding that our constitution mandates an open public trial in a civil case absent any of the statutory exceptions or compelling rea sons calling for exercise of the courts inherent power to control its proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial” a trial court may deny summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. II. Third-party beneficiary status Because plaintiffs California Water, the City of Stockton, and the County of San Joaquin receive water from the Stockton East, they claim to be third-party beneficiaries to the Stockton Easb-Reclamation Contract. Defendant disputes that these plaintiffs are intended third-party beneficiaries and contends that they are subject to dismissal or, in the alternative, that their claims should be adjudicated within the parameters of the Stockton East Contract as they have nothing to do with Central. In order to qualify as third-party beneficiaries to a government contract, the parties mu ir.1994) (<HOLDING>). One method of “establishing] privity of

    ### Response:
    holding that absent privity between plaintiffs and the government there is no ease
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [forum selection clauses] should not be given dispositive weight.... The party opposing the transfer can overcome the presumption in favor of enforcing the forum selection clause by showing that the clause is unreasonable [under federal law].”). IDC responds that its motion concerns applying the forum selection clause to arbitration, not litigation, and the cases cited by Aspen are therefore distinguishable. See Def.’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 1-2 (“[T]he Bremen analysis (or any other federal analysis) is improper in situations regarding the forum of arbitration.”). IDC notes that both Allen and Rice, as well as the Supreme Court jurisprudence on which they are based, apply to forum selection clauses in the context 24 n. 1, 31, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (<HOLDING>); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that forum selection clause providing that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the borough of manhattan new york city new york shall have exclusive jurisdiction was not dispositive but merely one factor to consider in transfer analysis quoting underlying contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dismissed the complaints as moot after the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) issued storm water permits. Id. On appeal, we pointed out that the CWA violations alleged in the environmental organizations’ complaints “were the Cities’ continuing discharge of storm waters without NPDES Storm water permits.” Id. at 1015 (emphasis added). Relevant to the present appeal, we also noted that “[b]e-cause permits have now issued, plaintiffs concede that their initial claims for injunc-tive and declaratory relief are moot.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the only issue before the court was whether the environmental organizations’ claims for civil penalties were moot. Id. We ultimately held that the claims for civil penalties were mooted by the MPCA’s issuance of NPDES permits. Id. at 1017-18 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, this court has held that a lake

    ### Response:
    holding that the remedies available to the environmental organizations were limited to those that would redress ongoing and future injury and there was no evidence that discharges without permit would resume
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    757, 762 (7th Cir.1993). Again, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that Howard failed to prove that the given reasons for striking these jurors were pretextual. Finally, Howard argues that the prosecutor’s comprehensive questioning of Gladys McElrath and his mischaracterization of Jeffrey Dunbar’s testimony demonstrate his discriminatory intent. We disagree. McEl-rath’s statements that she did not believe in capital punishment and “would go for life” legitimately prompted extensive questioning by the prosecutor, and the prosecutor’s observation that Dunbar had twice stated he could not vote for the death penalty was accurate. Moreover, Dunbar’s unique status as a recent high school graduate was a race-neutral reason for striking him. See Jackson, 983 F.2d at 762 (<HOLDING>). In sum, we hold that the trial court did not

    ### Response:
    holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — substantially advance the asserted interest. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (striking-down ban on editorializing by noncommercial educational broadcast stations receiving federal funds where prohibition did not substantially promote asserted interest); Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (same for prohibition on certain corporate speech). Thus the Court has invalidated restrictions on speech in eases where the differential treatment of speakers by a partial regulation remained unjustified in terms related to the asserted interest, or where the regulation did not substantially accomplish the asserted goal. See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2672, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979) (<HOLDING>). But see R.A.V., — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at

    ### Response:
    holding statute prohibiting newspapers from publishing juvenile defendants name unconstitutional because inter alia in absence of regulation of electronic media it did not accomplish the stated purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court found, that the cessation of irrigation in 1981 completed the severance process. We disagree. The deciding factor for determining whether severance has occurred is completion of the necessary administrative steps and procedures, not the unilateral cessation of irrigation of land on which irrigation is still permitted. Sun Vineyards, Inc., 107 N.M. at 527, 760 P.2d at 1293. In support of the argument that cessation of irrigation is the critical action for severance, the Bassetts rely on KRM, Inc. v. Caviness, 1996-NMCA-103, 122 N.M. 389, 925 P.2d 9. However, KRM addressed whether water rights which had never been used for irrigation were appurtenant to the land. Id. ¶ 3. In KRM, this Court determine See McCasland v. Miskell, 119 N.M. 390, 395, 890 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). {18} KRM does not require that water rights,

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to use irrigation water rights on conveyed property for more than ten years did not sever water rights from said property absent compliance with statutory requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 3B1.1(c), two levels are added. PSR ¶ 45 (emphasis added). As McCoy correctly notes, however, supervision of an unwitting individual cannot justify an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The guideline commentary requires supervision of one or more “participants,” and a “participant” is defined as a person who, although not necessarily convicted, “is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment., n.1. Because an individual cannot be criminally responsible for making a false statement unless she is witting, see 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (requiring that false statement be made “knowingly”), the fact that McCoy’s employees were unwitting would appear to render this enhancement inapplicable. See United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1325 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The government does not dispute this reading

    ### Response:
    holding that a person is criminally responsible under  3b11 only if he commitfs all of the elements of a statutory crime with the requisite mens rea internal quotations omitted emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It was the government which submitted the duplicitous indictment to the jury, and which decided not to seek a special verdict. By these actions, the government has effectively conceded that the indictment is not im-permissibly duplicitous, ie., that the defendant will not be prejudiced by the harms caused by duplicity, including the harm arising from a jury verdict that does not definitively communicate the jury’s findings with respect to the two crimes charged in Count II. For double jeopardy purposes, therefore, defendant is not prejudiced by the duplicitous indictment because the government is estopped from acting on any interpretation of the jury’s verdict that would prejudice defendant’s double jeopardy rights. Cf. Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 535 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that estoppel prevents a party who secured a judgment in his favor by virtue of assuming a given position in a prior legal proceeding from assuming an inconsistent position in a later action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence. Inconsistencies and material omissions in Javed’s testimony, non-responsive answers, and a lack of corroboration undermined his credibility. Accordingly, Javed fails to qualify for asylum, and he necessarily fails to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1254-55 (9th Cir.2003). Although the IJ denied Javed’s asylum and withholding claims on the basis of his adverse credibility ruling, he failed to explain his reasons for rejecting Javed’s CAT claim. Because claims for asylum and withholding of removal are analytically separate from claims for relief under the CAT, the IJ was obligated to consider separately the merits of Javed’s CAT claim. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1280, 1283 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821,

    ### Response:
    holding that the bia impermissibly conflated the standards for granting relief in asylum and convention cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the entire period of time when Petition No. 1 awaited adjudication in the district court, the one-year clock stopped on August 9, 1996 after 107 days had elapsed, and restarted on July 28, 1997 with 258 days remaining. See, e.g., Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104, 120 S.Ct. 1846, 146 L.Ed.2d 787 (2000). Including tolling for the pendency of Fail’s subsequent state habeas petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year clock stopped again on December 22, 1997, and restarted on November 28, 1998, with 111 days remaining. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-10, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (defining “properly filed” state petition); Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-07; Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). With the combined benefit of equitable and

    ### Response:
    holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Component due to improper accounting. Because questions of fact remain, Global’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this question is DENIED. To support its position, Global relies on a report from a GTECH economic expert, who concludes that GTECH owes Global $257,845 under the Deferred Payment Component. (Pl.’s SUF ¶ 105.) This GTECH report bolsters, to some extent, the report of Global’s economic expert, who also concluded that GTECH owes Global under the Deferred Payment Component. Global misconstrues the import of GTECH’s expert report. While clearly the report is an admission by GTECH, the expert report does not by itself conclusively establish that GTECH breached the Deferred Payment Component. Bianco v. Hultsteg AB, No. 05 C 0538, 2009 WL 347002, at *12 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 5, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, GTECH counters both of these

    ### Response:
    holding that statement within expert report is not a judicial admission but is instead an admission by party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the fact-based elements of the claim, i.e., the causation and overriding-justification elements. Judgment affirmed and cause remanded. Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur. O’Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., dissent. 1 . For ease of discussion, the phrase “the employee files a workers’ compensation claim or institutes, pursues, or testifies in any workers’ compensation proceeding,” which is the language used in R.C. 4123.90, is shortened to “the employee files, institutes, or pursues a workers’ compensation claim.” 2 . Because this ease comes to us on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in Tomco’s favor, the ■facts are recited from Sutton’s complaint. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (<HOLDING>). O’Donnell, J., dissenting. {¶ 39} The

    ### Response:
    holding that when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party as true
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the parties not before the court, who have a direct stake in the litigation, are either unlikely or unable to assert their rights. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 425 (1991). Even if we assume the expiration of the narrow window of time to assert a single-subject challenge meets this test, standing to bring actions on behalf of third parties still requires the litigant to establish a personal injury or stake in the application of the challenged statute. Id. at 410-11, 111 S.Ct. at 1370-71, 113 L.Ed.2d at 425 (providing that to establish third-party standing, litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact” so as to give the litigant a sufficient concrete interest in the outcome of the dispute); ICLU v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 1976) (<HOLDING>). This critical element is not eliminated in

    ### Response:
    holding iowa civil liberties union and lawyers lacked standing to maintain action to challenge a supervisory order of the court pertaining to the trial of criminal cases  only defendants in the criminal cases had standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guidance we can discern. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), is the seminal case in establishing the standard by which non-Public Law 280 states may assert jurisdiction over Indians on reservation land. There the Court held that a state could not exercise jurisdiction in a way that would infringe upon tribal self-government, and set forth the generalized test known as the infringement test. In Williams, a non-Indian was a federally licensed trader residing on the Navaho reservation who sought to collect a debt against an In holding non-Indian logging operations conducted under contract with the tribe and solely on the reservation cannot be taxed by the state); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Bryan v. Itasca County, supra (holding a

    ### Response:
    holding that state cannot impose vendor taxes on indian sellers who operate on the reservation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Croneiser, leading to the false arrest of Mr. Hogan and the ensuing abuse of process. See Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 83-93. “[T]o prevail on a claim against a municipality under Section 1983 based on acts of a public official, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.2008). Because the Court grants the Lewis County Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment against the individual Lewis County Defendants on the § 1983 false arrest and abuse-of-process claims, Plaintiffs have no basis to assert municipal liability. See Escalera, 361 F.3d at 749 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court grants the Lewis County

    ### Response:
    holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have any merit. Moreover, Great Northern’s reliance on Moscatiello is misplaced because, as ADT correctly notes, that case is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. For the most part, the parties’ arguments and cases cited in support thereof track the requirements for evaluating the enforceability of exculpatory clauses in Pennsylvania, however, the Pennsylvania courts and Third Circuit have held that different standards apply when dealing with exculpatory clauses as opposed to limitation of liability clauses. See Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 202 (citing DeFrancesco v. W. Pa. Water Co., 329 Pa.Super. 508, 478 A.2d 1295, 1306 (1984); Posttape, 537 F.2d at 755). Thus, those 'cases which involve the enforcement of exculpatory clauses are simply inapposite here A.2d 747, 748 (1958) (<HOLDING>); Behrend v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 242

    ### Response:
    holding limitation of liability provision limiting damages to replacement or correction of defective material andor installation in service contract for improvements to plaintiffs residence was valid and enforceable citing restatement of contracts  339 cmt g other citations omitted 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forbidden by statute from denying the plaintiffs application. In compliance with Congress’s decree, the ATF has not issued a decision on the plaintiffs application, whether to grant it or to deny it. As the ATF indicated to the plaintiff in its letter of July 9, 1998, it might be capable of issuing such a decision in the future if Congress lifts the restriction on ATF funding, but in the meantime, it “cannot act” upon applications such as that submitted by the plaintiff. When an administrative agency simply refuses to act upon an application, the proper remedy — if any — is an order compelling agency action, not plenary review of the application by a district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1361; Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Even were we to consider the ATF’s refusal to

    ### Response:
    holding that 28 usc  1651 may be used to compel agency action unreasonably delayed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Osgood Mach, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919, 612 N.E.2d 277, 284-85 (1993)) (citation omitted). In determining whether a foreign law is offensive to New York’s public policy, courts should look to “the State’s Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions.” Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am.,. Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90,480' N.E.2d 679, 688 (1985). A number of cases have applied New York law—despite the parties’ choice of another forum’s law—because New York’s usury prohibition constitutes a fundamental public policy. See Am. Equities Grp., 2004 WL 870260, at *8 (“New York has a strong public policy against interest rates which exceed 25%, which policy must be enforced.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re McCorhill Publ’g, Inc., 86 B.R. 783, 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (<HOLDING>); Assih, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (“New York has a

    ### Response:
    holding that enforcing new jersey law would violate new yorks strong public policy against interest rates which exceed 25 which policy must be enforced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the improper juror contact, the court was entitled to infer the opposite from their testimony. See United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir.1990). Thus, the court did not clearly err in finding that William and Chantal indirectly were involved in the improper juror contact. The issue that we must now resolve is whether the court abused its discretion by excluding the Roberts Affidavit with respect to William and Chantal in light of its finding that they violated Local Rule 5.01(d). In excluding the affidavit, the court concluded that “a criminal defendant must not be allowed to benefit from evidence he or she caused to be obtained in violation of the prohibitions against unauthorized post-verdict contact of jurors.” (R.22-972 at 42.) William and Chantal conte Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Concomitant with the district court’s power

    ### Response:
    recognizing power of trial judge to order all postverdict investigation of jurors to be conducted under his supervision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for clients before she would retire, and whether Toombs prevented her from bringing in new clients by not acting on her list of perspective new clients. If these disputes are resolved in plaintiffs favor, a jury may find that defendant’s proffered reason for plaintiffs termination was false and a pretext for discrimination. Further, Toombs’s testimony that he did not set sales goals for plaintiff because he “knew she couldn’t do it” is insufficient to justify her termination. An employer’s subjective evaluations “are not adequate [justification] by themselves because they may mask prohibited prejudice.” Sweeney v. Research Foundation of St. Univ. of New York, 711 F.2d 1179, 1185 (2d Cir.1983); see also Knight v. Nassau County Civil Service Comm’n, 649 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir.l981)(<HOLDING>) “[T]he evidence produced by the employer

    ### Response:
    holding that an employer may not use completely subjective and unarticulated standards to judge employee performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    choice. We further hold that, by waiving their right to conflict-free representation, the defendants have waived their right to later assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as caused by the conflict of interest. Accordingly, we make the rule absolute and direct the district court to vacate its August 22, 1994 order. ERICKSON, J., dissents, and LOHR and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in the dissent. 1 . In United States v. Rodriguez, 9 042, 1049 (4th Cir.1992) (finding that the defendant did not validly waive her right to conflict-free representation when the defendant waived her right at the arraignment and was unaware of the serious nature of the conflict of interest that later developed at sentencing); United States v. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 843-44 (10th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1010 n. 4

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant did not validly waive his right to conflictfree representation where the district court inadequately advised the defendant of the risks of multiple representation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    handicapped 2) suffered adverse employment action, at least in part, because of the handicap and 3) could safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job in question.” Miller v. Premier Indus. Corp., 136 Ohio App.3d 662, 737 N.E.2d 594, 599 (Ohio Ct.App.2000) (citations omitted). Disability discrimination, according to the Ohio statute, includes discrimination on the basis of either “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities” or “being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.” Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.01(A)(13). The Ohio statute was modeled after the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Ohio courts look to the ADA and its interpretation by federal courts for g ., 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Ohio courts have also held that lifting

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs inability to engage in frequent lifting of more than ten pounds  would not significantly restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not enough. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) {emphasis added) . 114 Moreover, a premature request for disposition does not later ""kick in"" once the information is ultimately filed or the indictment returned. A premature request is simply a nullity, having no legal effect. CJ. State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah 1987) (While finding no actual request for disposition was filed, Court concluded, nonetheless, that ""at the time the [alleged request for disposition] was sent, defendant had not yet been charged with the ... robbery, and no untried indictment or information was pending against defendant. Thus, nothing triggered the statutory right to demand trial on any ""untried indictment or information.'"") (citation omitted); State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 274, 276 (1972) (<HOLDING>). 115 The purpose of the statute is to promote

    ### Response:
    recognizing as persuasive state ex rel denmis v morphon108 252 so2d 845 flactapp1971 and citing its holding that any request for disposition filed before the charging information is a nullity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or obtained in aid of the commission of a crime or a fraud.” N.J.S.A. 2A:84-20(2)(a); N.J.R.E. 504(2)(a). This exception is “a statutory recognition of a situation in which the purpose of the privilege would not be served by its enforcement.” Fellerman, supra, 99 N.J. at 503, 493 A.2d 1239. “A lawyer cannot be properly consulted professionally for advice to aid in the perpetration of a fraud on a court. The claim of ‘privilege’ is that of the client and a fraudulent object or purpose puts him beyond” the scope of this protection. Ibid, (citing In re Stein, 1 N.J. 228, 236, 62 A.2d 801 (1949)). A second statutory exception, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20(2)(a), applies when the holder knowingly and without coercion waives the privilege. Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 300, 696 A.2d 556 (1997)(<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The Court recognized a

    ### Response:
    recognizing implicit waiver of the attorney client privilege where the plaintiff has placed in issue a communication which goes to the heart of the claim in controversy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Grand Manor Regulatory Agreement. Moreover, while the two contracts can be “read together” for interpretation purposes, there is nothing in the Grand Manor Regulatory Agreement that purports to give any rights to Hamilton Equities to enforce any obligations in the Grand Man- or Regulatory Agreement. See Cienega, 194 F.3d at 1243 (“[W]e cannot sustain the ... conclusion that ‘when parties in this case ... entered into the regulatory agreement they also intended to be mutually bound by ... the contemporaneous deed of trust note.’ ”); id. (declining to read obligations into a contemporaneous agreement because “[t]he documents evidence separate agreements between distinct parties.”); Snyder v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., No. 11 Civ. 4496, 2011 WL 6382707, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2011) (<HOLDING>) (collecting cases); Coleman Co., Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding under new york law that while multiple documents executed at the same time and concerning the same subjectmatter are required to be read together under new york law this does not mean that  any   particularized clauses  can be lifted from one document and transferred to another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    warrantless search violates the fourth amendment unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement."") Suppression of the illegally obtained evidence was the sufficient and required remedy for the unconstitutional police search and seizure. Additional sanctions might be appropriate in an instance of governmental loss or destruction of exculpatory and material evidence, discovery violation, or other egregious governmental misconduct. See People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 172-73 (Colo.2001). However, an illegal seizure of previous identification samples from the defendant by the police does not foreclose the prosecution from obtaining identity evidence through proper means after filing of the case. See People v. Madsen, 743 P.2d 437, 439 (Colo.App.1987)(<HOLDING>). Crim. P. 41.1 and Crim. P. 16(II)(a) do not

    ### Response:
    holding that second set of defendants palm prints were not tainted by prosecutions violation of crim p 16ida in obtaining the first set of defendants palm prints
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “whether the harm to [plaintiff] was foreseeable in the first instance.” Commerce Bank/Pennsylvania v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 911 A.2d 133, 139 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). Therefore, it is not enough to claim that Boeing knew, at the time, that Plaintiffs husband was exposed to asbestos while working there. Rather, Plaintiff must allege that Boeing knew, or should have known, that if Mr. Gillen took home his work clothing, Mrs. Gillen would be exposed to friable asbestos while washing his work clothing at home. This Plaintiff has not done. Moreover, even if Plaintiff was deemed a foreseeable third party, foreseeability “is not alone determinative of the duty question,” and “is not necessarily a dominant factor” in the duty assessment under Pennsylvania law. Seebold, 57 A.3d 1232, 1249 & n. 26 (<HOLDING>). For example, in Estate of Witthoeft v.

    ### Response:
    holding the court must assign appropriate weight to each policy factor depending on the nature and context of the duty in question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of fact for each factor if there is sufficient evidentiary support on the record for the finding of the lack of good cause.” Id. “A motion under Rule 55(c) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. Owens contends he has shown good cause for failing to answer the complaint. First, Owens argues Paddy misled him into believing Paddy had hired an attorney to answer the complaint on Owens’s behalf. Owens asserts he reasonably relied on Paddy’s representations because Paddy had his power of attorney, which allowed him to act on Owens’s behalf regarding the property. Owens argues he immediately hired an attorney when he learned Paddy did not file an answer on his behalf. Owens maintain to the factors outlined in Wham. See Wham, 298 S.C. at 465, 381 S.E.2d at 501-02 (<HOLDING>). Owens contends his motion for relief was

    ### Response:
    holding the master shall consider the following factors in deciding whether to grant relief from an entry of default 1 the timing of the motion for relief 2 whether the defendant has a meritorious defense and 3 the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a decision in connection with the appellant’s EED claim regarding her DIC award, supported by an adequate statement of reasons or bases, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 1310, 5100 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 7104(a), (d)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b), (c) (2002); Charles v. Principi 16 Vet.App. 370, 374 (2002); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 183, 187 (2002); Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 394, 397 (1991), all consistent with this opinion and in accordance with section 302 of the Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (found at 38 U.S.C. § 5101 note) (requiring Secretary to provide for “expeditious treatment” for claims remanded by BVA or the' Court) [hereinafter VBIA § 302]; see Vargas-Gonzalez v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 222, 225-30 (2001) (<HOLDING>), and with all applicable law and regulation.

    ### Response:
    holding that vbia  302 applies to all elements of claim remanded by court or board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    money transfers in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that this evidence was sufficient to permit the district court to find that Turismo was “engaged in the business of’ transmitting money in New York despite having its principal place of business in Chile. Our recent decision in United States v. Bah, 574 F.3d 106, is not to the contrary. Unlike the defendant in Bah — who argued that he received money in New York, transported it to New Jersey, and then transmitted money from New Jersey where he was licensed to operate a money transmitting business — Mazza-Alaluf carried cash into the United States from Chile, which cash was eventually deposited in Turismo’s United States bank accounts for transmission in New York and the other states at issue. See id. at 114 n. 6 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because the evidence shows that

    ### Response:
    holding that statute prohibits unlicensed transfer not transport of funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federal test for its validitv incorporate state or tribal law. Becerra-Garcia was the subject of an investigatory traffic stop, the reasonableness of which depends only on reasonable suspicion, not on compliance with state or tribal law. See Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir.2003) (investigatory stops require only reasonable suspicion). 4 . We acknowledge some inconsistency in our cases on this broad issue. See, e.g., Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir.2003) (“in evaluating a custodial arrest executed by state officials, federal courts must determine the reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law governing the arrest"") (internal quotation marks omitted); Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>); Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421, 1427 n. 5 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding in a  1983 case that city policy that authorized officers to detain people for nonarrestable offenses violated state law and therefore violated the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It is a deviation from the standards of performance applicable to the professional service in 'question. See Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134-35, 167 A.2d 625 (1961). A major distinction between the “usual negligence case” and a case of professional negligence is that in the latter, the standard of care ordinarily must be established by expert testimony. Id. at 134-35, 167 A.2d 625. Regarding the risk of undue entanglement in ecclesiastical affairs arising out of a case of clergy malpractice, we share the concerns of those courts that have addressed the issue. We are, however, persuaded that those concerns are overstated in circumstances, such as the present case, involving a cleric’s sexual misconduct. Cf. Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 128 N.J. 279, 291, 608 A.2d 206 (1992) (<HOLDING>). But cf. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failed to demonstrate that an employment dispute turned on issues of doctrine or polity and therefore the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction and the sincerity of defendants religious beliefs was not legally relevant to their jurisdictional claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Section 8(a)(1), it is an unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” in Section 7, to wit: “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1). An employer’s statement violates Section 8(a)(1) if, “considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement has a reasonable tendency to coerce or to interfere with those rights.” Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 124 (D.C.Cir.2001); cf. TIC-The Indus. Co. Se. v. NLRB (“TIC""), 126 F.3d 334, 339 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). While “an employer is free to communicate to

    ### Response:
    holding that a single isolated comment by a supervisor indicating the employers preference for nonunion hiring does not constitute substantial evidence of restraint coercion or interference with employees exercising protected rights under section 8a1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stating that FIFRA’s purpose is to promote safety. See, e.g., Merrell v. Thomas, 608 F.Supp. 644 (D.Or.1985), aff'd 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.1986). However, Appellants fail to cite a single case in which a court has held that FIFRA’s preemptive effect is limited to cases involving product safety. “Failure to cite relevant authority where available, or to set forth why such authority is not available, constitutes an abandonment of the point under Rule 84.04(d).” Williams v. Belgrade State Bank, 953 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Mo.App.1997). Furthermore, Respondents cite cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have held that FIFRA preempts label-based claims of product ineffectiveness much like the one now before us. See, e.g., Bruce v. ICI Americas, Inc., 933 F.Supp. 781 (S.D.Iowa 1996) (<HOLDING>); Trinity Mountain Seed Co. v. MSD Agvet, 844

    ### Response:
    holding that labelbased claims for damage to corn crop resulting from pesticides failure to control corn rootworms were preempted by fifra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32). The City established and sponsored a health care benefit for its employees. The City contracted with private providers of health care coverage, including Principal, and offered various plans to its employees. Because the City paid the insurance premiums under the health care plan selected by the employees, the plan is deemed to be established and maintained by the City. See Silvera v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir.1989) (concluding that behavior inconsistent with any of the criteria in 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3 — l(j), such as paying the premiums, would constitute establishment” of a plan). Despite the fact that Principal is a private company administering the plan, it is still a “governmental plan” exempt from ERISA. See id. (<HOLDING>); Simac v. Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a group benefits policy purchased by the city for employees was a governmental plan even though the plan was offered and administered by a private insurer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Act of 1934, as amended, 25 U.S.C. 477, or under section 3 of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, as amended, 25 U.S.C. 503, are not recognized as separate entities for federal tax purposes. [26 C.F.R. sec. 301.7701-l(a)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.] This regulation mentions the twofold basis for Uniband’s argument — “integral part” and section 17 of the IRA. 3. Uniband is not an “integral part” of TMBCI. Uniband argues that it is an “integral part” of TMBCI and should therefore share in TMBCI’s exemption from Federal income tax, notwithstanding its ostensibly distinct corporate status. We note that the regulation quoted above states an exception for “an integral part of the State” (emphasis added); but an Indian tribe is not a State. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 86 (<HOLDING>); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior

    ### Response:
    holding indian tribes subject to gamblingrelated taxes from which states are exempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    id. § 1208.18(a)(1). Determin ing whether a petitioner faces a likelihood of torture involves a two-part inquiry: “(1) what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed; and (2) does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture?” Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012) (characterizing the first prong as addressing the “likelihood of harm” to the petitioner). The first prong is factual, and the second is legal. Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 271. Jasmin argues that the BIA erred by affirming the IJ’s opinion based on the first prong but conducting no analysis of the second prong. While we have jurisdiction to consider this argument, we have previously rejected it. See Green, 694 F.3d at 508 (<HOLDING>). Because the BIA agreed with the IJ that

    ### Response:
    holding that the ij and bia did not err in addressing only one prong of the kaplun test because the petitioners failure to meet either prong is dispositive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    advised in the premises, it is thereupon ordered and adjudged that the aforesaid motion shall be and the same is hereby denied. Done and ordered in open court at Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, this 25th Day of May 2005. As evidenced by the order above and the State’s concession, the trial court did not exercise its discretion based upon factors other than the offense for which the appellant was acquitted pursuant to section 943.059, Florida Statutes. Godoy v. State, 845 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“the exercise of discretion contemplates that the court will make its decision based on consideration of all the facts and circumstances, rather than deciding the petition solely on the nature of the charge”) (citing Anderson v. State, 692 So.2d 250, 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. D.H.W., 686 So.2d 1331,

    ### Response:
    holding that the petition was not properly denied where the trial courts stated reason for denying the petition was that the defendant was afforded a break in the criminal justice system because he received a withhold of adjudication and early termination of probation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    send flyers home with students, and advertise their activities in the Eagle Eye, then Praying Parents are entitled to similar consideration, otherwise Lakeview may demonstrate hostility to religion and violate the First Amendment through unreasonable viewpoint discrimination. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-107, 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.”); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424; Daugherty, 116

    ### Response:
    holding school board could not deny church right to show film on school property where permission was denied solely because film dealt with an otherwise permissible subject from a religious standpoint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be aware of statutory deadlines and dismissal provisions.” Brief for appellant at 12. This contention is simply untrue. Roemer was represented by capable counsel. This court has repeatedly held that notice to the counsel of record constitutes notice to the party represented by such counsel. Emry, supra. Regardless of whether represented by counsel, the plaintiff — not the court, not opposing counsel — bears responsibility to prosecute the case with reasonable diligence. See Schaeffer, supra. A litigant has a duty to follow the progress of the case, rather than to merely assume that counsel is doing everything necessary and proper. City National Bank v. Langley, 161 Ill. App. 3d 266, 514 N.E.2d 508 (1987). See, also, Minkin v. Levander, 186 Cal. App. 3d 64, 230 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1986) (<HOLDING>).' The pattern of delay refutes the claim that

    ### Response:
    holding that specific duty to keep track of calendar and pertinent dates crucial to maintenance of lawsuit is central to plaintiffs general duty to expedite resolution of plaintiffs case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an officer in a patrol car sees an officer on a motorcycle engaged in a high-speed pursuit, the officer in the patrol car is required to take over the pursuit. This is because an officer in a patrol car has a lower risk for injury in a high-speed pursuit than an officer on a motorcycle. When the pursuit began, traffic was “light to moderate.” The weather was clear, and the pursuit quickly lead onto a highway frontage road. I would hold that, at the start of Deputy Johnson’s pursuit, the need to join the pursuit outweighed the risk to public safety. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. Once Deputy Johnson joined the pursuit, however, he had no idea why he was pursuing the fleeing vehicle other than the fact that the vehicle had been fleeing another officer. See Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 582-83 (<HOLDING>). For the entire duration of his six to seven

    ### Response:
    holding determination of reasonableness of pursuit requires a continuing assessment of need and risk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    degree, but failed to present any evidence of her specialized knowledge with respect to fitness assessments. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Downing’s memorandum. And with no other evidence that the results of Downing’s fitness assessments were inac curate, summary judgment in favor of LTF on this breach-of-contract claim was appropriate. 7. Fraud Downing alleged in support of her fraud claim that LTF “purposefully provided inaccurate results and advice” with respect to the fitness assessments. Like her breach-of-contract claim, Downing’s fraud claim fails because she provides no admissible evidence that LTF’s results and advice were false. See Zaremba Equip., Inc. v. Horco Nat’l Ins. Co., 280 Mich.App. 16, 761 N.W.2d 151, 165 (2008) (<HOLDING>). 8. Freedom of Association and Due Process In

    ### Response:
    holding that fraud claim requires proof that the defendant made a material representation that was false
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (9th Cir.1991) (noting in dicta that a defendant’s “ ‘inability to retain money that it should never have received in the first place’ is not the kind of detrimental reliance that justifies estoppel against the government”) (quoting Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 61, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984)). While we acknowledge that the treble damage provision of the civil FCA produces a harsher result than mere recovery of the expended funds, we note that these damages and other remedies are authorized by Congress. In addition, the fact that the unavailability of estoppel permits the government to recover treble damages does not justify departure from the longstanding and widely-accepted principle disfavoring government estoppel. See Merrill, 332 U.S. at 386, 68 S.Ct. 1 (<HOLDING>). Finally, from a practical perspective, we

    ### Response:
    recognizing that not even the temptations of a hard case will provide a basis for ordering recovery of funds that would be expended contrary to law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court remand). An error that does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights is harmless. Id. at 557. A defendant’s substantial rights are not affected if “the court would have imposed the same sentence in the absence of the constitutional error.” United States v. Shatley, 448 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir.2006). Here, even if the district court had been sympathetic to Williams’s argument that the crack/powder disparity is unfair, it would have had no choice but to sentence Williams to life imprisonment, the statutory minimum sentence for Count One. Any Kimbrough error, then, was harmless, as Williams “would have [received] the same sentence in the absence of the constitutional error.” Shatley, 448 F.3d at 267. See also United States v. Blandin, 154 Fed.Appx. 325, 327 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jones, 205 Fed.Appx. 327,

    ### Response:
    holding that there is simply no booker error where a defendant was sentenced to the statutory minimum sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allow litigants tó raise federal challenges.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. St. Compensation Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir.2014). Only if those threshold requirements are met should courts consider whether a federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state court action. Id. Like ReadyLink, this case does not involve- a parallel criminal proceeding and there is no state order or judgment to be enforced. While a proceeding before the ODC has the potential to be “akin to criminal proceedings,” id. ODC’s investigation into this case has not progressed beyond the investigation stage. Other courts have determined that investigation proceedings, without more, do not trigger Younger. Compare Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>), and Telco Commas., Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding state investigatory proceedings before a board that lacked prosecutorial authority were at too preliminary a stage to warrant federal deference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under its provisions.” United States Leasing Corp. v. Chicopee, 402 Mass. 228, 232 (1988). See also All Seasons Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Boston, 416 Mass. 269, 271 (1993). Although it is apparent that c. 93A does not expressly expose the commission to suit, we need not rely on that ground since we conclude that the commission is not a “person” engaged in “trade or commerce.” “[I]t is a widely accepted rule of statutory construction that general words in a statute such as ‘persons’ will not ordinarily be construed to include the State or political subdivisions thereof.” Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 219 (1962). See also Commonwealth v. ELM Med. Labs., Inc., supra at 76-77; Kilbane v. Secretary of Human Servs., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 286-287 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Even if we assume the commission is a person

    ### Response:
    holding that since the commonwealth does not come under the definition of person in g l c 4  7 twentythird it cannot be held liable under g l c 266  91 which proscribes false advertising by any person
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proteetible elements.”) (alteration in original). The second requirement, that there be a substantial similarity between the proteetible elements of the two works, is more troublesome. In considering substantial similarity between two items, a court must ask whether “an average lay observer would ... recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.” Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir.1991). Because the street locations, landmass, bodies of water and landmarks depicted in a map are physical facts, the only material in a map capable of copyright protection — and thus demanding comparison — is original material. Cf. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Understanding this distinction between the

    ### Response:
    holding that a compilation of facts is not capable of copyright protection unless it demonstrates sufficient originality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    identified the bag as belonging to the appellant. These facts prove that the appellant retained an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag. Once a defendant establishes that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item and that the police searched it without a warrant, the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement rendered a search of the item reasonable. See, e.g., Megel v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 534, 551 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2001). The Commonwealth contends here that the appellant’s girlfriend had authority to consent to a search of the appellant’s bag and in fact did so. A consent search by law enforcement officers may be “reasonable when conducted pursuant to voluntary t. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (<HOLDING>). If actual authority is lacking, apparent

    ### Response:
    holding that where a defendant left his duffel bag at his cousins house and authorized the cousin to use the bag the cousin clearly had authority to consent to its search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    due process mandatory maximum cap on punitive damages of $2,500.00 for all cases. While Mendez creates a daunting task for plaintiffs to tackle in nominal damages cases where a large punitive damage amount is awarded, it does not impose a limit that is an across-the-board proxy for an individualized assessment of the BMW factors. First, Mendez is not a discrimination case, but a civil rights case. Sécond, it is not a case subject to a statutory cap on punitive damages, in which the cap itself may inform the excessiveness analysis. Rather, I read the appellate court’s affirmance of the district court’s remittitur of the punitive damages award to a 2,500:1 ratio in Mendez to mean nothing more than that a 2,500:1 ratio was not excessive in that case. See Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1122-23 (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, the fact that the jury’s punitive

    ### Response:
    holding that in light of the bmw guideposts the jurys award was unconstitutionally excessive in violation of due process and therefore properly remitted by the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.1962); Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.1963). In Stoller, the D.C. Circuit distinguished the Ferrer “substance over form” line of eases from the Holly contract cancellations by finding that “[h]ere, ... the underlying contracts were cancelled in substance as well as in form. When a contract was cancelled, it did not merely change hands; it ceased to exist altogether.” 994 F.2d at 857. Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s earlier holding in Stoller, the Tax Court majority in this case found that, since the economic result is the same whether a forward contract is closed by offset or cancellation, the character of the gain or loss to be recognized should be the same. The Tax Court applied the analysis of Commissioner v. Covington, supra, (<HOLDING>) to contracts which were closed by cancellation

    ### Response:
    holding that termination of contracts by offset results in capital gain or loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    underscores the importance of finality of judgments of conviction. ‘ “Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.” * * * “It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice * * ’ ” Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d at 95, 671 N.E.2d 233, quoting Baldwin v. Traveling Men’s Assn. (1931), 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244, and Hart Steel Co. v. RR. Supply Co. (1917), 244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S.Ct. 506, 61 L.Ed. 1148. Of course, the same public policy favoring finality of judgments is recognized in the federal system. Waifersong Ltd., Inc. v. Classic Music Vending (C.A.6, 1992), 976 . 106, 65 N.E. 865 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 47} Some questions raised by Blackwell do

    ### Response:
    holding that whether in tort or contract all malpractice claims are covered by the same statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misadvice by his attorney, not failure to advise, as to the potential for enhanced penalties for future criminal behavior. Although the question addressed in Major is different from the issue presented in this case, based upon the importance of this related issue, we also certify the following question of great public importance: WHETHER ALLEGATIONS OF AFFIRMATIVE MISADVICE BY TRIAL COUNSEL ON THE SENTENCE-ENHANCING CONSEQUENCES OF A DEFENDANT’S PLEA FOR FUTURE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IN AN OTHERWISE FACIALLY SUFFICIENT MOTION ARE COGNIZABLE AS AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM. AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED. PADOVANO, J., concurs; ALLEN, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 1 . Hallman has been abrogated on other grounds. See Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla.1991)(<HOLDING>). 2 . Although we find the petition timely

    ### Response:
    holding that newly discovered evidence must be such that it would probably rather than conclusively produce an acquittal at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not err in finding that A.H.’s arrest was supported by probable cause. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786 (finding that victim and eyewitness statements to the effect that a robbery had occurred and that the defendants had committed the robbery supported a finding of probable cause for the defendant’s arrest). B. Due Process and Pre-Hearing Discovery A.H. argues that his due process rights were violated during the transfer hearing because the GVI did not provide him before the trial, his due process rights will be preserved. United States v. Starusko, 729 F. 2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (“No denial of due process occurs if Brady material is disclosed in time for its effective use at trial.”) (quoting United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983)); see also N.G., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, A.H.’s due process rights were

    ### Response:
    holding that an appellants due process rights were not violated when he did not receive brady material before his transfer hearing because he will be able to make effective use of any brady material at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)], law-enforcement officers may stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes based on a traffic violation. State v. Rodgers, 903 So.2d 176, 178 (Ala.Crim.App.2004).’ J.T.C. v. State, 990 So.2d 444, 447 (Ala.Crim.App.2008).” 66 So.3d at 294. “So long as the police officer has properly seized the occupants of the car, the officer may order the driver, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977), or a passenger, State v. Hails, 814 So.2d 980 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (recognizing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997)), cert. denied, 814 So.2d 988 (Ala.2001), out of the car -without violating the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Bailey, 49 So.3d 1245, 1250 (Ala.Crim.App.2010); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (<HOLDING>). After the driver has been ordered out of the

    ### Response:
    holding that when lawenforcement officers have legally stopped the driver of a vehicle they may consistent with the fourth amendment order a driver out of the ear for any reason or for no reason
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    look alike.... [i]f you put them in the same costume.” H. reported to Hayat’s investigator essentially the same comment by Cote, “that when they dress alike they all look the same.” B. also stated more generally that “[tjhroughout the deliberation process, Mr. Cote made other inappropriate racial comments,” but, aside from the “look alike” remark, did not say what any of them were. Generally, the Federal Rules of Evidence forbid courts from inquiring into what went on during jury deliberations. See Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). We have not decided, as some courts have, whether Rule 606(b) prevents us from considering evidence that a juror’s racial bias was expressed during deliberations. See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120-21; compare, e.g., United, States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 84, 87 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230,

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 606b precludes any inquiry into the validity of the verdict based on juror testimony regarding racial or ethnic comments made during the course of deliberations but that the rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony in those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a defendants right to due process and an impartial jury internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the merits. Qwest Opening Br. at 29-30. In Qwest’s view, it “met all preexisting standards for forbearance,” and the Commission denied its petition, not because it failed to meet those standards, but because the Commission “wished to suspend judgment on whether those standards are in fact the right ones.” Id. at 28. Qwest argues that “the legal consequence of such bureaucratic indecision is to ‘deem[]’ the petition ‘granted’ by operation of law.” Id. at 29 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 160(c)). The Commission counters that Qwest is improperly attempting to reverse the burden of proof in forbearance proceedings. See Aplee. Br. at 28-29. In the Commission’s view, section . § 1101(a)(42); Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin., 847 F.2d 1168, 1175-76 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Even so, a plain reading of section 10 makes

    ### Response:
    holding that an agencys policy shift reallocating the burden of proof from natural gas importers to parties opposing importation was based on a reasonable interpretation of the natural gas act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of seven months with no threat of continuity into the future was not substantially long enough to be considered a pattern. Finding that “... the predicate acts themselves were concluded in less than seven months”, the c 901, slip op., Kram, J., 1989 WL 146212 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1989) (activities occurring over ten months do not satisfy the continuity requirement for a closed-ended pattern); Fry v. General Motors Corp., 728 F.Supp. 455 (E.D.Mich.1989) (closed-ended period of one year and seven months was not sufficiently long enough to be considered a pattern.); Hutchinson v. Wickes, 726 F.Supp. 1315 (N.D.Ga.1989) (questioning whether a two year closed-ended period is of sufficient length.); Banks v. Wolk, No. 89-7219, slip op., Broderick, J., 1989 WL 153936 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 15, 1989) (<HOLDING>); Azurite Corp., Ltd. v. Amster & Co., 730

    ### Response:
    holding that a six month closedended period did not satisfy the continuity requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the statute gives the executive branch substantial control over the litigation.”); see also Robinson, 824 F.Supp. at 837. But see Riley, 982 F.Supp. at 1269 n. 5 (noting in a footnote that “the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act also raise serious constitutional concerns as to whether Congress may delegate the executive powers of law enforcement to private parties .. .”)• 3. Appointments Clause Finally, Hektoen argues that the FCA’s qui tam provisions violate the Appointments Clause, which vests the executive branch with the exclusive power to appoint officers to execute the laws of the United States. Numerous other courts have held that qui tam relators are not officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. See, e.g., Taxpayers Against Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1041 (<HOLDING>); Kelly, 9 F.3d 743, 757 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that relators are not officers because the government may take control of such eases whenever it wishes and because the relators position is without tenure or continuous duties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    however, a post-conviction remedy proceeding is not the same as a habeas corpus proceeding, so Section 34-5-8(A)(4) is as equally irrelevant to this case as Section 31-11-6. {14} Second was Section 39-3-15. This statute-titled “Appeals; contempt and habeas corpus” — was an amendment to the 1915 law allowing the State to appeal the district court’s granting of a writ of habeas corpus. 1966 N.M. Laws ch. 28, § 43, at 124-25 (codified at NMSA 1978, § 39-3-15 (1966)). The amendment provided that instead of the State’s appeal going directly to this Court, the State’s appeal is to now go “to the supreme court or the court of appeals, as appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law in these courts.” § 39 — 3—15(B); cf. State v. Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 9-11, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821 (<HOLDING>). {15} In sum: (1) Section 31-11-6, on its

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute providing for interlocutory appeals to be heard in the court where appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law means that this court has appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in cases where the sentence of life imprisonment or death may be imposed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S.C. § 203, is silent as to personal jurisdiction. The Court thus first turns to state law to determine if personal jurisdiction exists over Consorcio. If a state law basis for jurisdiction exists, a court must next determine if “sufficient minimum contacts exist to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir.1999). While Consorcio is correct in asserting that its mere agreement to Miami as the arbitral situs is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under Florida’s general long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193, see Johns v. Taramita, Inc., 132 F.Supp.2d 1021 (S.D.Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>), its participation in the arbitration created

    ### Response:
    holding in motion to compel arbitration that personal jurisdiction is not created merely by a partys agreement to arbitrate in a particular forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can ""claim in either of them an exclusive right.”)). As we explained in Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility disallows the patenting of “basic concept[s],” such as “processing information through a clearinghouse,” because no entity is entitled to “wholly preempt” such concepts. Id.; see also Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354. Under Alice's second step, the only components disclosed in the specification for implementing the asserted method claims are unambiguously described as “conventional.” See supra Background § I. These components do not supply an inventive concept. See Alice,, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, here, as in Alice, considering the

    ### Response:
    holding that the implementation of an abstract idea using computer functions that are  wellunderstood routine conventional activities previously known to the industry did not supply an inventive concept quoting mayo collaborative servs v prometheus labs inc 566 us 66 79 132 sct 1289 182 led2d 3212012
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    physical or mental inability to perform the required duties or for any other good and just cause, provided, that any such cancellation may be effected only in accordance with the New Mexico Statutes and any applicable rules and regulations of the State and Local Boards of Education. The terms of Harrell’s contract thus implicitly provided that it could be canceled in accordance with the applicable New Mexico statute, Section 22-10-17.1, which requires that any appeal from the local board’s decision be submitted to final and binding arbitration. When Harrell agreed to the terms of the contract, he arguably agreed to the arbitration procedure contained in the statute. See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). We hold, however, that Harrell’s putative

    ### Response:
    holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other measurement error.”). See also Sisk, supra, at 140 (""The volatility of local indices, reflecting the smaller sample size which makes them subject to more sampling and other measurement error, make use of the local measure unwise and inaccurate.”) (footnotes omitted). 23 . See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Indexes: Frequently Asked Questions, 16. What Areas Indexes are Published and How Often, available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm # Question_16 (last visited May 3, 2005) (""As a result, local area indexes are more volatile than the national or regional indexes and BLS strongly urges users to consider adopting the national or regional CPIs for use in escalator clauses.”). 24 . Cf. California Marine Cleaning, 43 Fed. Cl. at 734 (<HOLDING>) Id. (citing Chin v. United States, 948 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that because attorney fees were approximately evenly distributed over these four months the court will use the arithmetic mean of the cpi for these four months to adjust all attorney fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    226, 228, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971) and Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 41-42, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967)). However, the ICA also concluded that the trial court’s failure to provide Mun-don with the written transcripts was harmless inasmuch as Mundon failed to show that he was prejudiced by proceeding at trial without written transcripts. SDO at 3. Specifically, the ICA stated that: Mundon claims that he was entitled to a transcript of the preliminary hearing so he could cross-examine the complaining witness, who allegedly was unable to identify him at the preliminary hearing. However, Mundon has not substantiated this claim by including the transcript of the preliminary hearing in the record on appeal. See State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai'i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 502 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Regarding Mundon’s request for a transcript

    ### Response:
    holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explained in a case involving the shooting of a fleeing motorist, “the law ... has been vague on whether the potential risk to unknown third parties is sufficient to justify the use of force nearly certain to cause death.” Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis added). Because no one “has identified a single case predating the conduct at issue that prohibits [ramming a car] in a materially similar context,” and because I believe that these cases demonstrate that Davis’s actions “at best fell in the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,” the Plaintiff has failed to show that Davis’s conduct was prohibited by clearly-established law. Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1193 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Accordingly, I respectfully

    ### Response:
    holding that because the law in this area is unclear an officer who shot a fleeing motorist was not unreasonable in believing that a potential threat to third parties would justify shooting the motorist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of success on the merits. Anderson challenges the district court’s conclusion about reasonable accommodation. “A reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religion is one that ‘eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.’ ” Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). However, it is well settled that “Title VII ... requires only reasonable accommodation, not satisfaction of an employee’s every desire.” Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). Further, a finding of reasonable accommodation is a finding of fact entitled to deference. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Anderson first argues that the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties.” Id. at 207-08, 82 S.Ct. 691. The Court thus concluded that these plaintiffs had standing because they were asserting “ ‘a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,’ not merely a claim of the right possessed by every citizen to require that the government be administered according to the law ....” Id. at 208, 82 S.Ct. 691 (citations omitted). As already explained, plaintiff falls within the latter category. Plaintiff has also not alleged that he is being treated differently from any other voter in Tennessee. See Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Instead, he asserts that he, like every other

    ### Response:
    recognizing right to participate in state elections on equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the state has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any segment of the states population citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiff must prove. As explained above, there are a number of purposes for which a state redistricting body permissibly may rely on political data or take into account partisan considerations. See supra Part II.B.2.a.. Accordingly, a plaintiff in a partisan gerrymandering case-cannot satisfy the discriminatory intent requirement simply:by proving, that- the redistricting body intended to rely on political data or to take into account partisan considerations. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the redistricting body intended to. apply partisan classifications “in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632,

    ### Response:
    holding redistricting plan would violate equal protection clause if it reflected a naked desire to increase partisan strength
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him or to conduct a timely hearing on probable cause. Six days later, on January 17, 2007, Hill was formally charged on counts relating to possession of marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. In light of this procedural history (i.e., the filing of state charges before any proceedings of substance on the merits of Hill’s § 2241 petition had taken place in federal court), a magistrate judge issued an exhaustive and well-stated Report and Recommendation recommending the district court abstain from hearing Hill’s § 2241 petition pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed Hill’s § 2241 habeas petition without prejudice. See Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1398 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). To be entitled to a COA, Hill must make “a

    ### Response:
    holding district court should have abstained pursuant to younger and thus remanding to district court to dismiss without prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to ensure the integrity of pension and welfare plans courts should confine the benefits to the terms of the plans as written. Pohl, 956 F.2d at 128. Therefore, it is inappropriate to fashion a common law rule that would override the express terms of a private plan unless the overridden plan provision conflicts with statutory provisions or other policies underlying ERISA. Id. In this case, applying federal common law to override the Plan’s reimbursement provision would contravene, rather than effectuate, the underlying purposes of ERISA because the express terms of the Plan provide for the appropriate distribution of attorney’s fees. See Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir.1992); Ryan by Capria-Ryan v. Federal Express Corp., 78 F.3d 128, 127-28 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Those cases which have applied the federal

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal common fund doctrine may not be applied in contravention of a plans terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gibson v. Mendenhall, 203 Okl. 558, 224 P.2d 251 (1950). Under the Oklahoma decisions we think Waugaman’s statement clearly would be regarded as a misrepresentation of law. See First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Muskogee Discount House, 382 P.2d 137 (Okl.1963). There are exceptions to this rule, however, see id., 382 P.2d at 139, and one arguably applies to this case. If the person making the misrepresentation “has superior means of information, professes a knowledge of the law, and thereby obtains an unconscionable advantage of another who is ignorant and has not been in a situation to become informed, the injured party is entitled to relief . . .” White v. Harrigan, 77 Okl. 123, 186 P. 224, syl. 1 (1919). See Nesbitt v. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 440 P.2d 738, 743 (Okl.1968) (<HOLDING>). Even if we assume that Jane Milburn was

    ### Response:
    recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Second, even if the Government’s spin on § 14.9 is taken to be true that it “expand [s] the rights of an FTCA claimant,” (Government Reply Memo, at p. 1) (emphasis in original), this would be an impermissible expansion of jurisdiction provided for in the FTCA, an equally fatal blow to the Government. Without express delegation, § 14.9(b) cannot act to confer a broader waiver of sovereign immunity than set forth in the statute. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215-16, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2967-68, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983); Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir.1990) (stating that “administrative regulations cannot waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity”). See also Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. United States, 28 F.3d 690 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). If the Government’s construction of § 14.9 is

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an agency cannot impose additional conditions on the united states consent to be sued unless congress expressly delegates this authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    743 F.2d at 1345. We made this distinction clear in Majestic Housing: In Painters and Decorators, “the rights and liabilities of both parties were determined by the bargaining agreement,” but in Majestic Housing, “although the amount of the mechanic’s lien must be determined by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, Majestic has no rights or liabilities under the agreement.” Id. Similarly, IBT has no rights or duties under the agreement, and thus Granite Rock’s tor-tious interference claim against IBT does not meet the requirements of section 301(a). Granite Rock makes an additional argument in its unsuccessful attempt to bridge this gap: that the “close relationship” between IBT and Local nion, Local No. 17 v. Commercial Prop. Servs., Inc., 755 F.2d 499, 506 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 948 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonsignatory to a collective bargaining agreement where no rights or duties of the nonsignatory party are stated in the terms and conditions of the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    so ordered on August 13, 2002 extended the time to November 31, 2002; the Eighth Stipulation so ordered on November 24, 2002 extended the time to January 3, 2003; the Ninth Stipulation so ordered on December 13, 2002 extended the time until April 4, 2003; the Tenth Stipulation so ordered on March 17, 2003 extended the time until June 30, 2003 and the Eleventh Stipulation so ordered on June 10, 2003 extended the time until September 30, 2003. 19 . The Debtor incorrectly asserts, in bold print in its Objection, that Burger Boys stands for the proposition that extensions require notice and a motion. See Objection at ¶ 115. 20 . See also, Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Child World, Inc.; Net Realty Holding Trust v. Child World, Inc. (In re Child World), 146 B.R. 89, 92 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>). 21 .The failure to pay post-petition rent and

    ### Response:
    holding that ex parte extensions of time to assume or reject leases had for all practical purposes only an administrative rather than a substantive effect and do not violate due process unless the party asserting improper procedure can demonstrate that they were substantially or irreparably injured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a parole hearing but instead was seeking to be released. See Rather, 973 P.2d at 1267. 7 . We give Fields’s pro se petition the benefit of the doubt by reading it broadly to include an allegation that a recalculation of his parole eligibility date may determine his assignments to work and educational opportunities within the DOC at the present time. Even so, such an allegation does not constitute an immediate practical effect on the restraint of Fields or on any of his fundamental rights. 8 . Fields cites federal authority indicating that the federal writ of habeas corpus is broad enough to entitle him to a hearing on his claims at this time (or at least after he has exhausted his state remedies). See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66-67, 88 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that recent cases have established that habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody but that the writ is available as well to attack future confinement and obtain future releases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and finds that none warrants rejection of Plaintiffs proposed constructions. Plaintiffs proposed constructions reflect accurately the meanings of the disputed terms as they would have been understood at the relevant time by a person of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, Plaintiffs proposed constructions of each of the disputed terms (other than the term “having an alloy content” in claims 31, 34, 36 and 38 of the ’461 patent) are hereby adopted by the Court. The Court adopts Defendant’s proposed construction of the term “having an alloy content in the enumerated claims of the ’461 patent.” This matter remains referred to Judge Eaton for general pretrial management. SO ORDERED. 1 . See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996)

    ### Response:
    holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the habitual offender statutes. However, the cases cited by the dissent all involve prior felony convictions that were vacated on appeal or in post-conviction relief proceedings. Such cases would not fall within the rule we announce in this opinion, and we do not find them dispositive under these circumstances. BROWN, Judge dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court lacked the ability to suspend Gardiner's sentence below the minimum sentence. I do not find the Model Penal Code or Hutcherson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 962 (Ind.1982), cited by the majority, to be determinative or persuasive here. In fact, Indiana courts have allowed similar relief under the habitual offender statutes. See, eg., Coble v. State, 500 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ind.1986) (<HOLDING>); Olinger v. State, 494 N.E.2d 310, 311

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    file referring to Smith as a “sub.,” and (3) the anonymous handwritten note, discussing Smith’s statement and changing the description of Davis’ motorcycle helmet from “blue” to “gold.” In general terms, the issue is whether the state court’s determination that the failure of the State to disclose the foregoing evidence did not constitute a Brady violation contravenes the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2). a.) The Brady Cumulative Materiality Analysis The court first addresses Davis’ contention that the state court’s determination was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law because the state court failed to engage in a collective materiality inquiry in determining whether a Brady violation had occurred. See Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (<HOLDING>). The State acknowledges that the Alabama Court

    ### Response:
    holding that materiality analysis turns on the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence not an itembyitem analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the Tenth Circuit One of the cases cited by the Tenth Circuit in its brief instruction to vacate is entirely distinguishable on its facts from the instant case and the other, like the order of vacatur in this case, does not address the policies against vacatur and the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court. For example, in Beattie, a firefighter with the Boeing Military Airplane Company brought suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the United States, alleging that the Air Force’s denial of his access to certain sensitive areas violated his constitutional rights. Before the case even came before the district court on summary judgment, the plaintiff voluntarily quit his job. The district court nevertheless found the case wa 99 S.Ct. 2149, 60 L.Ed.2d 735 (1979) (<HOLDING>)). Both Iron Arrow and Great Western found

    ### Response:
    holding that completed arbitration pending appeal mooted district courts order directing arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Debtor’s Motion to Remand, argued that the Debtor’s claim was primarily one for violation of the automatic stay, stating that “[t]he only reason why a claim exists at all is because of the bankruptcy stay.” Now, in a stunning about-face, GTR joins GFC in arguing that the Complaint should be read as asserting state law claims only. GTR was right the first time, and it should be cautious about taking such contradictory positions in the same action. As admitted by the Defendants, any rights arising from a violation of the automatic stay are substantive rights created by the Bankruptcy Code and are thus quintessentially core matters. Banks v. Kam’s Auto Sales (In re Banks), 521 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.2014); see also, e.g., MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Fortune & Faal v. Zumbrun (In re Zumbrun), 88

    ### Response:
    holding that  362k claims are core
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    calls were made. He does not plead when he asked Green Tree to cease calling him, nor how he asked. The factual allegations in the complaint represent nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and such “[tjhreadbare recitals ... supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Hanley merely states what he understands the TCPA to proscribe, and then goes on to plead threadbare and conclusory facts that allege the elements of a prima facie cause of action under the Act, but nothing more. Hanley’s complaint, therefore, is highly suspect because it merely recites naked facts mimicking the elements of a cause of action under the TCPA. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 617 (<HOLDING>). The Court explained in Iqbal that “the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs complaint was insufficient under twombly and iqbal because most of the facts alleged were actually legal conclusions or elements of the cause of action which may be disregarded on a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and do not recount them here except as necessary to explain our decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. “We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Loew, 593 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, the district court did not err in applying a four-level enhancement pursuant to § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) of the Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) (2009). The district court properly determined that there was intent to cause bodily injury. See United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Based on the unchallenged facts in the

    ### Response:
    holding that  2a22b2b requires intent to injure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code defines “security interest” as “a lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (emphasis added). In contrast, the Code provides that the term “statutory lien” means a “lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions ... but does not include security interest or judicial hen.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(53) (emphases added). Because plaintiffs’ tax liens arose under state statute, and not from a consensual or voluntary agreement with the taxpayer defendants, we concur in the bankruptcy court’s ruling that those liens are not “security interests” for purposes of § 1322(b)(2). The foregoing interpretation of § 1322(b)(2) is supported by substantial authority from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re DeMaggio, 175 B.R. 144, 146-47 (Bankr. D.N.H.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Sabec, 137 B.R. 659, 667-68 (Bankr.

    ### Response:
    holding that plain language and statutory history of  1322b2 establish that nonconsensual tax hens do not fall within antimodification provision of that statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in contempt charges began during opening statement and later related primarily to the format of the questions he asked during trial. In the trial setting, although counsel and the judge have great responsibilities, the judge had the greater duty to restrain her anger. It was her responsibility to maintain control over the proceedings. Her failure to maintain control in an appropriate manner prejudiced petitioner and his case. A review of cases in other jurisdictions that have addressed the arrest or citation of a criminal defense attorney before the jury supports our view that petitioner’s conviction must be reversed. In Ash v. State, 93 Okla.Crim. 125, 129, 225 P.2d 816, 819 (1950), the trial judge cited the defense counsel for contempt before the jury and then ordered him t 13, 615 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 256 Ala. 373, 54 So.2d 616

    ### Response:
    holding as improper and prejudicial trial courts statement to defense lawyer in front of jury i ought to send you to jail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held in joint tenancy, has been interpreted to allow a joint tenant to disclaim an interest only in that tenant’s accretive interest, not in his or her proportional interest. Id. The rationale for this interpretation is that a disclaimer can only apply ""to property which passes upon death to the disclaimant, not to property owned by the disclaimant prior to the death.” Id. 2 . We express no opinion on whether the legislature's hypothetical divestiture of a joint tenant's proportional interest would be an unconstitutional forfeiture. Compare In re Estate of Shields, 1 Kan.App.2d 688, 574 P.2d 229, 233 (1977) (indicating murderer's loss of undivided interest would constitute an unconstitutional forfeiture), with In re Estate of Fiore, 16 Ohio App.3d 473, 476 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (1984)

    ### Response:
    holding statute requiring that murderer be deemed to have predeceased victim thereby entitling victim to all joint tenancy property was not an unconstitutional forfeiture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the weedeater is described as being “industrial.” As “machines for domestic use,” the mowers and weedeater are appliances, and thus “household goods” under § 522(f)(4)(A). ACCORDINGLY, the Debtor’s Motion to Avoid Lien is GRANTED as to one DVD player, the 27"" JVC television, the Lawnboy w/ bagger, the Craftsman lawnmower, and the industrial weedeater, and DENIED in all other respects. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Except for the Personal Property Appraisal Form, the loan documents from the 2006 loan were not introduced into evidence. The Debt- or testified that she could not recall how much that loan was for, but thought it was approximately $2,000 to $2,500. 2 . 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). 3 . See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.1 l[6][d]. 4 . See, e.g., In re Thompson, 750 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Ray, 83 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.

    ### Response:
    holding that personal goods necessary to the debtors new beginning and of little resale value fit the federal bankruptcy philosophy embodied in   522f2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    use on different kinds of goods, the less is the likelihood of confusion____” Even ownership of well-known marks has not precluded other uses of the mark, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3rd Cir.1978) (plaintiffs ownership of the mark “Scott” as applied to paper products did not preclude defendant’s use of “Scott” on furniture polish); Amstar, 615 F.2d at 260 (notoriety of “Domino Sugar” did not preclude defendant’s use of “Domino’s Pizza”). Trademark law provides the greatest protection to strong and distinctive service-marks. Freedom Savings and Loan Ass’n, 757 F.2d at 1182. There is nothing particularly distinctive about plaintiffs mark “A B.” See American Optical Corp. v. American Olean Tile Co., 1974 WL 20261,185 U.S.P.Q. 405, 409 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has presented little evidence that

    ### Response:
    holding no infringement on mark ao because the initials are letters in the alphabet available for use by everyone  and tjhere is nothing about those initials to conjure up instantaneously the plaintiff american optical co
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to all future proceedings in this matter. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified. 1 See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability to Spectator at Baseball Game Who Is Hit by or Injured as Result of Other Hazards of Game, 91 A.L.R.3d 24 (1979) (electronically updated as of 2005). 2 The following jurisdictions have explicitly adopted the limited duty rule: California (Rudnick v. Golden W. Broadcasters, 156 Cal.App.3d 793, 202 Cal.Rptr. 900 (1984)); Iowa (Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids, 443 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989)); Louisiana (Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co., 16 La.App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931)); Michigan (Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 246 Mich.App. 645, 635 N.W.2d 219 (2001)); Minnesota (Brisson v. Minneapo 7, 850 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 483 Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding that bjecause plaintiff was an invitee the applicable standard of care obligated appellees to discover and warn or protect  against unreasonable risk of harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    created, at which time the attorney can proceed to enforce the lien. See id. The suggestion that a prior attorney has the ability to put a case on hold indefinitely ignores the discussion of laches in Zaldivar. Once a case settles, and the prior attorney is notified of the settlement, the attorney’s failure to institute an action in a timely fashion can result in dismissal of the lien. See id. Because this case had not settled, the JCC erred in dismissing the lien. Although the JCC endeavored to distinguish Gillislee, the result of the order eludes the teaching of that case — a JCC does not have the authority to require a claimant’s attorney to file a verified petition. See Gillislee, 929 So.2d at 717; see also Villazano v. Horace Bell Honey Co., 928 So.2d 515, 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The amount of a claimant’s attorney’s fee can

    ### Response:
    holding the jcc did not have the authority pursuant to either statute or rule to set a time limitation for filing the verified petition for fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Ex. D13 at 45.) 19 . However, in the same report, the GAO did find that cable prices were approximately 17% lower in areas where there was overbuilder competition and that higher cable prices are also associated with higher cable channel choice and with whether a cable company is affiliated with one of the ten largest MSOs. (Id. at 45.) We discuss the impact of overbuilder competition on cable prices infra. 20 . We recognize that, in making its decision interpreting the Program Access Rules, the FCC was not engaged in an antitrust analysis of Com-cast's decision not to license CSN Philadelphia to the DBS providers and that its regulatory approval does not displace the antitrust laws. See United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 346, 79 S.Ct. 457, 3 L.Ed.2d 354 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the FCC’s determination does not in any

    ### Response:
    holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2004) (en banc) (citation omitted). A “bruised ego” or a “mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities” is not sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. Id. at 797. Adverse employment actions are typically marked by a “significant change in employment status,” including “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at 798 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). Reassignments and position transfers can qualify as adverse employment actions, particularly where they are accompanied by “salary or work hour changes.” See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). And even if a reassignment is not paired with

    ### Response:
    holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same  rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in their second assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to continue trial because it did not consider the factors in State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 21 O.O.3d 41, 423 N.E.2d 1078. As we overruled appellants’ first assignment of error, finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants additional time to gather rebuttal evidence, the lower court’s finding of summary judgment in favor of appellees stands. Thus, appellants’ second assignment of error is rendered moot: it is of no consequence to appellants whether we find the trial court to have erred in denying appellants’ request for a continuance of the trial. See James A. Keller, Inc. v. Flaherty (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 788, 791, 600 N.E.2d 736, 738 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we will briefly address

    ### Response:
    holding that it is not the duty of a court to decide purely academic or abstract questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    barred by the Knaffla rule: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the prosecutor’s violation of discovery rules, and his claim that he was denied a fair trial. Sessions implicitly acknowledges that these three issues indeed were known and not raised during his direct appeal. However, Sessions attempts to invoke the “interests of justice” exception. He argues that his failure to raise these issues was not “deliberate and inexcusable” and that but for his attorney’s advice, he would have raised those issues in his direct appeal. None of Sessions’ three claims about his trial fit into the “interests of justice” exception to Knaffla. Sessions’ claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not the type granted under the “interests of justice” exception. See Ives, 655 N.W.2d at 636 (<HOLDING>). Sessions’ claim about the prosecution

    ### Response:
    holding that ives claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel did not fit within the interests of justice exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    noncustodial situations and usually in custodial ones as well, unless government agents make threats or promises.” United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d 815, 817(7th Cir.2001) (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969)). As the First Circuit has noted, trickery is not automatically coercion. Indeed, the police commonly engage in such ruses as suggesting to a suspect that a confederate has just confessed or that police have or will secure physical evidence against the suspect. While the line between ruse and coercion is sometimes blurred, confessions procured by deceits have been held voluntary in a number of situations. United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir.1998); see also United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1039(9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that an inspectors misrepresentation that a piece of evidence existed while reprehensible does not constitute coercive conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Salcedo had alleged that her loss was proximately caused by the negligence of the emergency room employees in using tangible personal property and thus the hospital had waived sovereign immunity. Id. at 32-33. Other courts have used the reasoning in Salcedo to find waiver of immunity under section 101.021(2). See Robinson v. Cent. Tex. MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Tex.1989) (applying Salcedo in determining that plaintiff stated cause of action waiving immunity by alleging that MHMR’s failure to provide life preserver to patient known to suffer epileptic seizures that caused him to lose consciousness led to patient drowning at lake while under MHMR’s care); Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch Hosp. at Galveston v. Hardy, 2 S.W.3d 607, 609-10 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Tejada v. Rowe, 207 S.W.3d 920, 925

    ### Response:
    holding that hospital had waived immunity where wrongful death plaintiff asserted that hospital staff failed to properly oversee cardiac monitor and concluding that use of cardiac monitor like ekg in salcedo directly affected and impacted person whose heart condition was being monitored
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of proof, which is not surprising, as it misunderstood its burden of proof when this case was first tried in 2006. Accordingly, we reverse the third final decision of the Tax Commission and remand to the Tax Commission for the Tax Commission to enter a decision reducing the assessment of the property to $96,458,707.00, the value as listed by taxpayer IBM. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Judge STEPHENS concurs. Judge BEASLEY concurs in result only. 1 . “This evidence,” in context, refers to (1) the NACOMEX report; (2) testimony of IBM’s valuation expert, Mr. Zises; (3) testimony of Durham County’s expert, Mr. Baker, who developed Schedule U5’s depreciation tables, as modified after the Tax Commission’s decision In re Appeals of Northern Telecom, N.C. St. Tax Rep. (CCH) P 201-813 (May 20, 1994) (<HOLDING>), who testified that the tables “were not based

    ### Response:
    holding that values obtained using a former version of schedule u5 were deficient because the assessor failed to consider market information about the prices of new and used equipment in the taxpayers industry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did nothing to decide the proper sequence in which the issues in this case must proceed. 5 . Although most of the plaintiff class consists of pretrial detainees, but Jail No. 3 also contains convicted misdemeanants. Where housed together, courts will typically accord both groups the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that the pretrial detainees do not suffer any denial of their due process rights. See, e.g., Fischer v. Winter, 564 F.Supp. 281, 298 (N.D.Cal.1983). 6 . As a matter of standing, plaintiffs also must demonstrate some evidence of actual or imminent harm, see Lewis v. Casey, - U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2179, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), or subjection to excessive risk of injury. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32-34, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480-81, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Although the Supreme Court found nothing

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoner stated a claim for relief under the eighth amendment for his exposure to secondhand smoke even though he reported no illness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those who run the program to act out of a concern for lawsuits rather than effective preparation of competent law enforcement officers. Although our courts have not previously considered the enforceability of an exculpatory agreement in this or any other similar context, we do not find similarities in those situations where exculpatory agreements have been stricken because of the public interest. The experiences of our courts with exculpatory agreements have largely been on opposite ends of the spectrum. That is, we have considered and negated these agreements when extracted from an individual seeking a necessity, such as a place to live during a housing shortage, Kuzmiak, supra, 38 N.J.Super. at 587, 111 A.2d 425. See also Horelick v. Pa. R.R. Co., 13 N.J. 349, 357, 99 A.2d 652 (1953) (<HOLDING>); Tunkl, supra, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding it against public policy for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption of liability in the event its negligence results in injury to its passengers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinions regarding conclusions of law. 2 . See also Tenery, 932 S.W.2d at 30 (""[Hjarm to the complaining party is presumed unless the contrary appears on the face of the record when the party makes a proper and timely request for findings and the trial court fails to comply.”). 3 , The court has up to forty days to file findings, which 0 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2003) (“There are rules and statutes addressing the continuation of the court’s business after a judge has been replaced.”); W.C. Banks, Inc. v. Team, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (""Moreover, while rule 18 specifically allows the successor judge to rule on motions pending, it does not allow rendition of judgment by a judge who has heard no evidence.”); Lykes, 601 S.W.2d at 420 (<HOLDING>); Fortenberry v. Fortenberry, 545 S.W.2d 40, 43

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 18 grants authority to some successor judges to file findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the notes and other documents evidencing plaintiff's loans to Chemical NJ and to any other subsidiary. Plaintiff could not locate, and therefore failed to produce, any of these documents other than its certificate of incorporation. Plaintiff's efforts to obtain from the Comptroller loan documents relating to the Chemical NJ loan were unsuccessful. Although I have some doubt as to the existence of the loan documents, for purposes of this opinion I will assume that proper documentation existed. 3 An amendment to N.J.S.A. 54:10B-2, L. 1975, c. 171, § 1, excluded financial business corporations from the definition, included financial business corporations in the CBT Act, and inserted a definition of financial bus ter-Mainland, 314 N.J.Super. 468, 481-82, 715 A.2d 348 (App.Div. 1998)

    ### Response:
    holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Blocker’s first appearance at a hearing. At this hearing, he admitted that he “[cjould have been” served, as well as admitting to receiving documents in the mail. When told he had to pay support, he merely stated, “[cjan you give me any later date than that to give me time to come up with the money?” His only concern seemed to be that King’s child may not be his child; his concern was not insufficient service of process. At no time did Blocker allege that he did not actually receive process or that service was somehow defective. Not until he was arrested did such an issue seem to come to the court’s attention. Because Blocker made a general appearance, the defense of insufficient service of process had been waived. See MacDougall v. Kutina, 798 So.2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Service of process was not an adequate

    ### Response:
    holding that former husband waived any defects in service of process by appearing at the first contempt proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1194 (9th Cir.1998). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs action because Dunlap failed to state a cognizable claim against any of the defendants and the deficiencies in his complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). Dunlap failed to state a claim against John and Jane Doe of Pretrial Services because absolute immunity shields judges and those performing judge-like functions from liability for acts performed in their official capacity. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986). There is no cognizable claim against Cynthia Ryan and Barbara LaWall because both are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 4 , 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,

    ### Response:
    holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Munton, 989 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo.Ct.App.1999)). In Macheca Transp. Co., the court of appeals held the district court abused its discretion when it disqualified an attorney without first determining whether he would be the only witness who could testify to events surrounding a vexatious refusal to pay claim. Id. at 833-34. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly held that: “[a] lawyer is not ‘likely to be a necessary witness’ when evidence pertaining to each matter to which he could testify is available from another source.” United States v. Starnes, 157 Fed.Appx. 687, 693-94 (5th Cir.2005) (quoting Horaist v. Doctor’s Hosp. of Opel-ousas, 255 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir.2001)); see Tennessee Bank & Trust v. Lowery, No. 3:11-0984, 2012 WL 4849968, at *1 (M.D.Tenn. Oct. 11, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omit ted); Rothberg

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney is a necessary witness for purposes of tennessee rule of professional conduct 37a only if there are things to which he will be the only one available to testify 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    according to the facts and circumstances of each case. Ponce-Leiva, 331 F.3d at 377 (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted)). In this case, the BIA justified its affirmance of the IJ’s decision on the basis that Faustino lacked both an approved visa petition and an approved labor certification, thus he had not established eligibility for adjustment of status. Given Faustino’s failure to offer evidence that he was eligible for an immigrant visa or that one was immediately available to him at the time the application was filed, and that the decision to adjust the status of an alien is ultimately within the discretion of the Attorney General, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in affirming the IJ’s denial of Faustino’s continuance request. Id. at 371 (<HOLDING>); Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227, 233 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which reads in relevant part: “[I]f any person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property or a penalty or a forfeiture, at the time the cause of action accrued or at any time during the period the statute of limitations is running, is less than 18 years of age, . . . such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one year after the person’s disability is removed . . . .” We are required to consider whether K.S.A. 60-515(a) is a tolling statute that applies only when a plaintiff needs to extend the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-513, as Smith contends, or if, as the defendants contend, the legislature intended for certain plaintiffs who were minors at the time the cause of .2d 11 (1977), aff'd 224 Kan. 12, 577 P.2d 1172 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 79, 495

    ### Response:
    recognizing a childs right to sue for wrongful death pursuant to ksa 60515 when mother could not sue because her statute of limitations had lapsed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    207(e)(2) because plaintiffs did not incur these expenses while actually in transit. Id. But this is a hyper-literal interpretation of the term “traveling” and plaintiffs provide no applicable authority for such an interpretation. Ample authority, including federal regulations, case law, and Department of Labor (DOL) guidance, support the interpretation that “traveling” is not limited to the moments actually in transit, but include time spent “away from home” on an employer’s business. See, e.g„ 29 C.F.R. § 778.217(b) (providing examples of reimbursement of expenses that were not part of the regular rate, including “living expenses away from home”); Acton v. City of Columbia, Mo., No. 03-4159-CV-NKL, 2004 WL 2152297, at *6-7 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 10, 2004), aff'd, 436 F.3d 969 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); U.S. Wage and Hour Division, Dep’t of Labor,

    ### Response:
    holding that payment for meal expenses firefighters incurred while away from home during a 24hour shift were properly excludable under  207e2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    price factors affecting efficiency, including government-ordered conservation programs. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Energy Policy Plan Projections to 2010 at 4-29 (1985), Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 1656. The NEPP predictions appear to incorporate gains from the types of regulatory measures petitioners proposed and thus to indicate that full-scale OCS leasing would be in order even if reasonable conservation measures were adopted. Finally, the proposals suggested by petitioners before this court and in comments submitted to the Department of the Interi- or are included in the FEIS. See FEIS, App. L, Comments of NRDC et al. The inclusion of these comments merits credit as a counter to flaws in the Secretary’s analysis. Cf. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 394, 396 (D.C.Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). We are satisfied, in sum, that, overall, the

    ### Response:
    holding that eiss discussion of alternatives was adequate in part because of inclusion of interested parties comments and governments responses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (citations omitted). Harvey admits that Judge Hernandez’s actions “might have been judicial in nature,” but contends that Judge Hernandez is not entitled to immunity because he “acted in complete absence of jurisdiction” when he ordered the disposal of Harvey’s property without notice and a hearing. We disagree. The Supreme Court has clearly held that as long as a judge has jurisdiction to perform the “general act” in question, he or she is immune “however erroneous the act may have been, ... however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff’ and irrespective of the judge’s motivation. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985); see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (<HOLDING>). The “general act” which Judge Hernandez was

    ### Response:
    holding that because some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction the scope of the judges jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge citations quotations and ellipses omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to allow a fact-finder to reasonably conclude that respondent’s actions were unjustified. It is for the jury to hear the evidence presented by the parties, weigh the witnesses’ credibility, and determine whether respondent unjustifiably killed the cat. DECISION Because the district court invaded the province of the jury in concluding that respondent did not unjustifiably kill an animal, we reverse and remand. Reversed and remanded. 1 . Respondent argues that district courts give ""great deference” to a police officer's experience and judgment in determining whether probable cause exists. Vertina v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 356 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.App.1984) (accepting police officer testimony at an implied consent hearing); see also State v. Harris, 295 Minn. 38, 202 N.W.2d 878 (1972) (<HOLDING>). But the cases respondent cites are not

    ### Response:
    holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be subject, the Owners would then have no cause for complaint. The taking here, however, was accomplished through the implementation of an announced policy to extend public ownership of the shore. The protection afforded by the doctrine of res judicata includes the land court’s identification and use of the seaweed line as the monument fixing the location of high water mark for the seaward boundary of Lot 3. “[A] right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies . .” Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49, 18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 355 (1897). Compare Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 89, 41 S.Ct. 420, 65 L.Ed. 831 (1920), (<HOLDING>) Res judicata applies even if a court

    ### Response:
    holding that determination of the oklahoma and texas common boundary in a prior suit was conclusive in future litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the right to notice and hearing is waived by the person against whom the sanction is imposed, may . . . [b]ar or suspend him from association with a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in this state. 10 NRS 90.420(l)(b) states as follows: The administrator by order may . . . revoke any license ... if the administrator finds that the order is in the public interest and that the . . . broker-dealer . . . [h]as violated or failed to comply with a provision of this chapter as now or formerly in effect or a regulation or order adopted or issued under this chapter .... 11 The relevant provisions of NRS 90.570 provide as follows: In conn t. App. 1996) (stating that scienter is not an element of securities fraud in Indiana); Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (<HOLDING>); State v. Dumke, 901 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Billy K. Cruey, acting on behalf of himself and his law firm, B.K. Cruey, PC, seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing some, but not all, defendants and denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) motion. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The orders that Cruey seeks to appeal are neither final orders nor are they appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. See McCall v. Deeds, 849 F.2d 1259, 1259 (9th Cir.1988) (“[T]he denial of Rule 54(b) certification is not appealable.”); Robinson v. Parke-Davis & Co., 685 F.2d 912, 913 (4th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal of some but not all claims or parties not immediately appealable absent rule 54b certification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her burden of rebutting [the defendants’] proffered nondiscriminatory reason for [promoting others instead of Kearney].” Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2006). Defendants offered evidence explaining that candidates for promotion, known to committee members from their work with the candidates, were selected based on perceived superiority in one or more of six specific criteria, independent of age. This uncontroverted evidence justified summary judgment. Kearney does not point to any evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual question as to whether the defendants’ explanation is a pretext for discrimination. That some of the candidates had blemishes on their redore! of that Kearney feels that the selection process should have produced a di n. 6 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we uphold the district court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the rejection of an adea claim necessitates the rejection of a  1983 agediscrimination claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discharge a duty of office. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2005). In the present case, the petition alleged that the juvenile resisted, delayed, and obstructed Officer Henderson by giving a false name at the time Officer Henderson was conducting an investigation. The trial court found that by insisting his name was “Oscar Lopez,” the juvenile delayed Officer Henderson’s investigation of the offenses of injury to real property and carrying a concealed weapon. The juvenile argues that since Officer Henderson’s stop was invalid, the juvenile was within his right to give a false name. We disagree and hold that the invalid stop did not give the juvenile license to subsequently lie about his identity to Officer Henderson. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 641, 194 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1973) (<HOLDING>). The juvenile argues the well-established rule

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant was not excused for his subsequent criminal behavior even though police entered the premises on an invalid search war rant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not credible when articulating how his court-appointed attorney was deficient. Absent clear and convincing evidence that Rhodes was in fact credible, we must defer to the trial court’s credibility determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We find that Rhodes has not satisfied his burden of rebutting the trial court’s credibility determination, and we therefore conclude that the trial court’s Marsden rulings were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). After the trial court denied his third Marsden motion, Rhodes elected to proceed pro per. We hold that Rhodes’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The trial court repeatedly warned Rhodes of

    ### Response:
    holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    retroactively on collateral review.”); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993 (8th Cir.2001) (“[W]e hold ... that Apprendi is not of watershed magnitude and that Teague bars petitioners from raising Apprendi claims on collateral review.”); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2000) (“[T]he non-retroactivity principle pronounced in Teague prevents Petitioner from benefitting from Apprendi’s new rule on collateral review.”); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 148 (4th Cir.2001) (“[T]he new rule announced Appreridi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’ ”) (quoting Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822); In re Turner, 267 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. -, 122 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when the life sentence he received for this offense amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment” within the meaning of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. To begin with, we note that Pepe-Frazier has waived any direct constitutional challenge to his sentence by failing to raise such a challenge at the first opportunity (i.e., the sentencing hearing), which is what gives rise to his current assertion that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make such a challenge. OCGA § 16-6-4 provides that, except in limited circumstances not applicable in this case, “a person convicted of the offense of aggravated child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 year 1 SE2d 485) (2008) (<HOLDING>); Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 528-30 (3)

    ### Response:
    holding that the imposition of a life sentence for failure to register as a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence was so harsh in comparison to the crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    limited by either, the state constitution or the legislature itself. Robbins v. Rapid City, 71 S.D. 171, 176, 23 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1946) (citation omitted). Municipalities are precluded from engaging in ultra vires acts for which there is no antecedent legislative authority. Ericksen v. City of Sioux Falls, 70 S.D. 40, 53, 14 N.W.2d 89, 95 (1944). [¶ 28.] “Our Court has a history of not interfering with municipal governments unless their actions are palpably arbitrary, unreasonable,, or beyond their authority.” City of Marion v. Schoenwald, 2001 SD 95, ¶ 7, 631 N.W.2d 213, 216 (citations omitted). We have on several occasions upheld a municipality’s incidental acts exercised in the course of its express authority. See Snow Land, Inc. v. City of Brookings, 282 N.W.2d 607, 608 (S.D.1979) (<HOLDING>); City of Vermillion v. Hugener, 75 S.D. 106,

    ### Response:
    holding municipalitys express authority to prohibit all sunday liquor sales under sdcl 35630 included implied authority to also ban lowpoint beer sunday sales despite states proscription under sdcl 35481 which prohibited sales of lowpoint beer sales on sunday between certain hours
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evaluation received on January 15, 2004 was positive, and that it was only after her invocation of FMLA rights that her performance came into question. (R. Doc. 34-2 at Ex. 2). The positive evaluation Anderson referred to was for work completed during the 2002-03 festival year, not for her current performance. At the January 15 meeting, Anderson’s supervisor also discussed her current performance problems, including her inability to focus and to complete assigned tasks, as well as her negative attitude toward her supervisor. This occurred before she brought up taking FMLA leave. Further, Anderson does not dispute that her job performance continued to deteriorate between January 15, 2004 and the date of her termination. Anderson onstructors, Inc., 986 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court finds that Anderson has

    ### Response:
    holding that an employees unsubstantiated testimony that he was better qualified than employees that were not subject to adverse employment actions was insufficient to defeat summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (invalidating a statute requiring persons to produce identification to authorities on demand without reasonable suspicion). When a person is not reasonably suspected of any wrongdoing, the police have no right to detain him or her. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 945 P.2d at 1359. In People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174 (Colo.1992), we set forth the standard for determining whether an encounter is consensual or is an unlawful detention: The test for determining if the encounter is a consensual one is whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe he or she was free to leave and/or to disregard the official’s request for information. Id. at 1177-78. See also People v. Padgett, 932 P.2d 810, 813 (Colo.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, Paynter and his companion had no choice

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was not free to leave when officer directed defendant to stay while he conducted a warrants check
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Court to deny that his Father’s Affidavit of Relinquishment of Parental Rights was signed voluntarily.” See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 760 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied, 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex.2001) (noting that at common law “the word ‘fraud’ refers to an ... omission, or concealment in breach of a legal duty ... when the breach causes injury to another or the taking of an undue and unconscien-tious advantage”)). Dueñas, who was represented by counsel, sought no finding and raised no legal argument before the trial court about a constitutional claim. Given that Dueñas was afforded an extensive evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his affidavit, it was not apparent from the context that Dueñas was attempting to raise a v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 860-61 (Tex.2001) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the due process

    ### Response:
    holding that alleged biological father who sought to establish paternity waived constitutional error though it was undisputed that father had received no notice or hearing on prior paternity adjudication that created bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    form of a Senate tyrannizes over the ^People, and silences and stifles the voice of the Majority.” The Gerry-Mander, or Essex South District Formed. into a Monster!, Salem Gazette, Apr. 2, 1813. Numerous other Nineteenth-Century partisan gerrymanders faced similar condemnation from politicians, the press, the judiciary, and the public. See Br. of Amici Curiae Historians in Supp. of Appellees at 23-34, Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (S.Ct. Sept. 5, 2017). Even if founding-era practice did support Legislative Defendants’ assertion that some degree of partisan gerrymandering was viewed as permissible — which it does not — long-standing, and even widespread, historical practice does not immunize governmental action from constitutional scrutiny. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 582, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (<HOLDING>). That is particularly true when, as here, the

    ### Response:
    holding that malapportionment of state legislative districts violates equal protection clause notwithstanding that malapportionment was widespread in nineteenth and twentieth centuries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 8912 provides: ""The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Fed eral Claims, of a civil action or claim against the United States founded on this chapter.” 3 . 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) provides any ""person acting under” the direction of a federal official may remove a state case brought against him ""for any act under color of such office.” Because the Court concludes removal is proper on federal question grounds, the Court need not reach the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit is removable under this statute. 4 . The Court acknowledges that this finding is in direct conflict with the case law currently surrounding this issue. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 886

    ### Response:
    holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirement of “jurisdiction over the state” as factors in analyzing whether a proceeding constituted a “suit” under the Eleventh Amendment), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 936, 145 L.Ed.2d 815 (2000); cf. Collins, 173 F.3d at 929 (“The Commonwealth ... was not named as a defendant, was not served with process, and was not compelled to appear in bankruptcy court.”). The Mitchells further argue that because they did not request affirmative monetary relief, there is no suit. While courts generally construe “action leading to an order forcing a payment to citizens [as] the quintessential ‘suit’ under the Eleventh Amendment,” In re NVR Homes, 189 F.3d at 453, this factor is not dispositive. See id.; Morrell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Morrell), 218 B.R. 87, 89-90 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a decision in favor of the

    ### Response:
    holding debtors complaint to determine dischargeability of tax debt barred by eleventh amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether a Terry stop was reasonable, we look at the totality of the circumstances, see Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585, and we review the district court’s determination de novo, see United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417-18 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 214, 112 L.Ed.2d 174 (1990). McKie acknowledges that the police undoubtedly had reason to stop Clipper. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (informant’s tip can provide reasonable suspicion). It is argued, however, that the police did not have reasonable suspicion that McKie himself was involved in criminal activity and that they stopped him only because he was with Clipper. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). McKie urges us not to adopt an “automatic

    ### Response:
    holding that a persons mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not by itself constitute probable cause to search or reasonable suspicion to frisk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a deterrent. While banning musical instruments, by itself, may not actually deter anyone, it is possible that BOP (and Congress) thought the ban would indicate to society that prison is a harsh place where one does not want to be.” 150 F.Supp.2d at 45. “The supposition that exclusion of electric instruments will have much of an impact on this perception may be optimistic,” the court wrote, “but it is not irrational,” especially when the ban on other amenities (including, among other things, R, X, and NC-17 rated movies, weightlifting equipment, martial arts training, in-cell coffee pots and in-cell televisions) is considered. Id. In a per curiam opinion, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on different grounds, see Kimberlin, 318 F.3d at 233-34 (<HOLDING>), but one circuit judge on the panel would have

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of turners first prong the bops ban rationally furthered the governments legitimate interest in conserving correctional departmental funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    534 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir.1976)). Plaintiffs also point to record evidence that the bank holding company defendants and their subsidiaries shared common officers and directors (Decl. of Joseph S. Tusa, Dec. 20, 2006, Ex. 1; Decl. of Joseph S. Tusa, Mar. 2, 2007, Exs. Y, PP), but this Resnick factor, without more than otherwise indicated in the instant case, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish alter ego liability of a parent corporation. See Greene v. Long Island R.R. Co., 280 F.3d 224, 235 (2d Cir.2002) (“[Corporate ownership of a subsidiary and overlapping offices and directorates are not, without more, sufficient to impose liability on the parent for conduct of the subsidiary!.]”); see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.Supp.2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on

    ### Response:
    holding that ownership and overlapping directors are insufficient standing alone to pierce the corporate veil
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he understood that the State sought habitualization and that an open plea could result in a sentence as low as the bottom of the guidelines or up to thirty years. After Cooper acknowledged his understanding, the trial court accepted the admission and plea. . However, Cooper filed a motion for downward departure, so the trial court deferred pronouncing a sentence. On February 7, 2003, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing in which it ultimately denied the motion for downward departure. The trial court revoked Cooper’s probation and sentenced him to 48.6 concurrent months on the burglary of a dwelling and dealing in stolen property charges. Cooper was also sentenced to 41.712 months as a habitual felony offender for delivery of cocaine. Cooper’s sentences were e 2000) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find the scoresheet

    ### Response:
    holding habitual offender sentence rendered any errors in guidelines score sheet harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    investments from more than one hundred people, the Kamans did not present evidence at trial that any of the investors — with the single exception of Mary Valmont — ever contacted Jackson Hewitt to inquire about its purported “backing” of Prewett’s investment schemes. The Kamans certainly did not. In fact, the undisputed evidence showed that until Prewett’s arrest in October 2006, Jackson Hewitt had no knowledge that Prewett was soliciting investments in real estate joint ventures and representing that Jackson Hewitt was involved. Jackson Hewitt did not learn about Prewett’s fraud until long after the Kamans had made their investments. Thus the Kamans failed to prove that Jackson Hewitt had knowingly permitted Prewett and JHIS to solicit their investments based on A.2d 840, 849 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick, 615 S.W.2d 323,

    ### Response:
    holding that the customer of a chevron dealer could not maintain an action against the franchisor on an apparent agency theory when the customer knew that the station was independently owned and operated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their decisions while affirming Tax Court decisions, while the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions arose in cases in which those courts reversed the Tax Court. The impact of the Golsen rule apparently has been overlooked in several cases involving the section 6222 penalties. See, e.g., Alpha, 84 Fed.Cl. at 627 (erroneously citing McCrary and Derby as evidence that the Tax Court supports the restrictive view of the section 6662(b)(3) penalty). 31 . See also Merino v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 196 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir.1999) (“whenever a taxpayer knowingly invests in a tax avoidance entity which the taxpayer should know has no economic substance, the valuation overstatement penalty is applied as a matter of course""); Illes v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 982 F.2d 163, 167 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Massengill v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 876

    ### Response:
    holding that the lax benefit generated was directly dependent upon the valuation overstatement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confessions were given under conditions so oppressive that his statements must be deemed involuntary. In Arizona, confessions are presumed to be involuntary, and the State has the burden of proving otherwise. See State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 136, 865 P.2d 792, 797 (1993). In ruling on voluntariness, a court must examine the totality of circumstances. See id.; State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 42, 579 P.2d 542, 546 (1978). Although “personal circumstances, such as intelligence and mental or emotional status, may be considered in a voluntariness inquiry, the critical element ... is whether police conduct constituted overreaching.” State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 524, 809 P.2d 944, 949 (1991); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Scott, 177 Ariz. at 136, 865 P.2d at 797. A

    ### Response:
    holding that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to an involuntariness finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a pleading that does not introduce any new issue does not revive a previously waived right to demand a jury trial. 5 MooRE, supra, ¶ 38.41, at 38-387. Thus, the question is whether the amendment of Yancey’s complaint to permit evidence of the February 1990 agreement raised a new “issue” within the meaning of Rule 38(b). The Rules do not provide a definition of the term, “issue.” Nonetheless, it is clear that if a case is an equitable one being tried to the court and a Rule 15(b) amendment is permitted over objection, then the objecting party is entitled to demand a jury trial only if the amendment has injected a new legal issue that could not have been reasonably anticipated. 5 MooRE, supra, ¶ 38.41, at 38-394; compare Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>) with Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173,

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff sought only equitable relief up through the end of trial and only added claim for legal relief posttrial defendant was entitled to demand jury once legal claim was asserted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frederick Chess, App. 18, 19. In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University’s student handbook already notes that the University’s name will not “be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members.” 1980-1981 UMKC Student Handbook 25. 15 This Court has similarly rejected “the recurrent argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends.” Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973). 16 See, e. g., Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720 (Mo.) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976); Harfst

    ### Response:
    holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    might have been more curious or concerned about the activity at Kidder.”); Shields, 25 F.3d at 1129; Manufacturer’s Life Ins., 2000 WL 709006, at *4. While “[a]n egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, may in some cases give rise to an inference of ... recklessness,” Chill, 101 F.3d at 269 (emphasis added, quotation mark and citation omitted), merely calling a misrepresentation obvious does not make it so. See Feasby v. Industri-Matematik Int’l Corp., No. 99 Civ. 8761, 2000 WL 977673, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000). To sufficiently plead scienter, something more than simply the bare incantation that a misrepresentation was obvious or that the defendant ignored information available to it is required. See S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Rather, plaintiffs must offer particularized

    ### Response:
    holding that pleading standard for recklessness was met where the corporate officer included false statements in sec filings despite the obviously evasive and suspicious statements made to him by the corporate officials upon whom he was relying and despite outside counsels recommendation that these statements not be included
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the federal statutes for the clear words of the ICRA, Iowa courts do look to the analytical framework utilized by the federal courts in assessing federal law. Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989); accord Board of Supervisors of Buchanan County v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (""In deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 677-79 (1973).”). 3 . Because, as discussed above, the court has found that Dose was not disabled, the court concludes that he does not have standing to challenge BVU's restricted duty policy. See Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., 883 F.Supp. 379, 396 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court grants BVU’s motion for

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff lacking standing to challenge employers policy that an employee had to be 100 healed before being permitted to return to work where plaintiff could not gain any relief from the per se violation of the ada because the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was unlikely to strongly influence the jury. Mickey next argues that counsel were deficient in the communication of medical-related information and the facts of the crime to the experts Burstein and Smith. This, too, is unavailing. With respect to Burstein, Mickey claims that counsel were deficient in providing a garbled tape of the Hawaii interview with police. But, Burstein notably does not claim he ever requested a better version or a transcript. Mickey also claims that counsel should have provided access to the testimony of the accomplice Rogers and Mickey’s ex-wife Rochelle for corroboration of Mickey’s history of drug use. But Mickey’s drug use was not in dispute. Conveying such additional information was therefore unnecessary. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 925-26 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We decline to rule that counsel must provide,

    ### Response:
    holding counsel must bring relevant facts to attention of experts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exception and (2) it contains secondary hearsay. Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible unless they fall within a designated exception. Minn. R. Evid. 802. The business-records exception permits admission of records containing hearsay if they are (1) kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and (2) supported by proper foundation. Minn. R. Evid. 803(6). However, records prepared in anticipation of litigation are not admissible as business records. Id. But even if this letter was prepared in anticipation of litigation, appellant’s arguments fail for two reasons. First, any error was harmless because Dr. Gilíes testified at trial regarding her opinion and was subject to cross-examination. See Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enters., 396 N.W.2d 223, 228 (Minn.1986) (<HOLDING>). Second, any error was harmless because the

    ### Response:
    holding that erroneous admission of hearsay medical notes was harmless error when doctor testified and was subject to crossexamination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    standing and was not a real party in interest because it temporarily transferred title to its servicing agent Alliance Mortgage. Fannie Mae has standing because it reserved “at all times” its ownership interest in the note. See Nat. Security Fire & Cas. Co. v. Eureka Fed. S & L Assn., 188 Ga. App. 693, 694 (1) (373 SE2d 811) (1988) (mortgagee, not its servicing agent, was real party in interest entitled to fire insurance proceeds); In re O’Dell, 268 B.R. 607, 617 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (noting “that it is possible for more than one party to be a real party in interest” based upon “an understanding of modern day financing by which creditors frequently carve up the bundle of rights associated with [a] claim”); Bankers Trust v. 236 Beltway Investment, 865 FSupp. 1186, 1191 (E.D. Va. 1994) (<HOLDING>). 2. Reginald McCray also contends that the

    ### Response:
    holding that both owner of money due under mortgage and its loan servicer may have standing to sue for deficiencies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only his or her liability and does not extinguish the liability of the other joint tort-feasors from whom contribution is sought.”); The Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 98 P.3d 681, 683 (2004) (""[A] joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought.”); Husni v. Meden, 94 Ohio App.3d 465, 640 N.E.2d 1207 (1994) (barring contribution claim where release did not extinguish joint tortfeasor’s liability); Schuman v. Vitale, 144 Pa. Cmwlth. 560, 602 A.2d 390 (1992) (same); G & P Trucking v. Parks Auto Sales Service & Salvage, Inc., 357 S.C. 82, 591 S.E.2d 42 (Ct.App.2003) (same); Kirk v. Moe, 114 Wash.2d 550, 789 P.2d 84 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In fact, this concept was articulated in

    ### Response:
    recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dangerous to maintain the condition, at least absent reasonable warnings or other remedial measures being taken. [Emphasis added.] Plaintiff contends that the driveway presented an unreasonable risk of harm because it was steep and covered in snow and ice. Plaintiff also notes that eaves directed water onto the driveway. Although the slippery conditions coupled with the nature of the sloped driveway presented unsafe conditions, our Supreme Court has set an extraordinarily high bar for a condition to constitute an unreasonable risk of harm because the condition must present a “substantial risk of death or severe injury.” Id. Based on this heightened standard, courts have repeatedly held that ice and snow generally do not meet this threshold. See, e.g., Perkoviq, 466 Mich at 19-20 (<HOLDING>); Corey v Davenport College of Business (On

    ### Response:
    holding that the mere presence of ice snow or frost on a sloped rooftop generally does not create an unreasonably dangerous condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its findings”). The court did not abuse its discretion in removing this juror. III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE West argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions on both the possession with intent count under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and the firearm possession count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Given the deferential standard we apply to review of the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury’s verdict, both of West’s claims must fail. The government presented live testimony from two witnesses, Crockett and Scott, identifying West as the ringleader of the drug sale activity at 1204 North 13th Street on the basis of their personal knowledge. A “rational trier of fact” could have found that this evidence established West’s possession with intent to d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We cannot agree that this evidence was

    ### Response:
    holding sufficient to support conviction under  924c evidence of loaded assault rifle recovered from location near where defendants drug transactions were known to occur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a check or draft when person who executed and delivered the check possessed fraudulent intent in not paying the holder the full amount within 30 days); Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-101-520(b)(l) (1995) (court may award treble damages if defendant's use of an unfair, false or misleading solicitation of charitable funds was willful or knowing); Tenn.Code Ann. § 62-37-105(e) (1990) (one who engages in the construction or home improvement business without a license may be subject to treble damages). 8 . Some courts have interpreted a statute declaring itself to be a non-exclusive remedy to entitle plaintiffs to recover both treble damages under the statute and punitive damages pursuant to a common law claim in a single action. See, e.g. Rhue v. Dawson, 173 Ariz. 220, 841 P.2d 215, 228 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Toyota of Florence v. Lynch, 314 S.C. 257,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could recover both treble damages under state racketeering statute and punitive damages under fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims because the statute provided that actions brought under it are remedial and not punitive and that civil remedies provided under it are supplemental and not mutually exclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be brought in district court, on the theory that the right sought to be enforced arises from the due process clause and is not a suit on the contract itself. See Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 610-11 (D.C.Cir.1992); Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523-24 (D.C.Cir.1986). Our circuit has taken a stricter view, however, and has held that constitutional claims based on a contractual property interest fall within the Tucker Act and may not be brought in district court. See Tucson Airport Auth. v. General Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 647-48 (9th Cir.1998) (rejecting Transohio rule); cf. North Star, 14 F.3d at 37-38. In this view, we are joined by the Second Circuit. See Up State Fed. Credit Union v. Walker, 198 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, one district court in New York has

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not have jurisdiction over any claims that could not exist independently of a contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fired. See, e.g., People v Wharton, 53 Cal 3d 522; 280 Cal Rptr 631; 809 P2d 290 (1991) (upholding entry of a residence to locate a missing individual); Carroll v State, 335 Md 723, 731-732; 646 A2d 376 (1994) (citing federal and state cases upholding warrantless entries when the police reasonably believed that a burglary was in progress or had recently been committed); Davis, 442 Mich at 28 (assuming without deciding that, in most cases, the sound of gunfire could justify warrantless entry into a motel room under the emergency-aid doctrine). By contrast, the authority supporting a warrantless entry under facts similar to those presented here is both scarce and dubious. A few cases have allowed warrantless entries in cases involving water leaks. See State v Dube, 655 A2d 338 (Me, 1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v Boyd, 407 F Supp 693, 694

    ### Response:
    holding lawful a warrantless entry to combat a plumbing emergency and stop sewage or water from leaking into apartments below
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    context the plaintiff’s presence Li state court is compelled and involuntary. Id. at 418, 84 S.Ct. at 466. In contrast, the Court noted, “if a party freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates them there, and has them decided there, then ... he has elected to forgo his right to return to the District Court.” Id. at 419, 84 S.Ct. at 466. Our precedent demonstrates the continued vitality of the rule enunciated in England. See, e.g., Kovats v. Rutgers, 749 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir.1984) (finding valid England reservation); New Jersey Educ. Ass’n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 772-74 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894, 99 S.Ct. 252, 58 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978) (same); see also Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 729 n. 5 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Defendants contend England does not apply

    ### Response:
    holding that because the plaintiffs invoked the jurisdiction of the state court in the first instance the application of england has no relevance here
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a defendant from both irrelevant information and overly prejudicial information, the relaxed evidentiary standard also works to a defendant’s advantage in helping to prove mitigating factors and to disprove aggravating factors. Allen’s reliance on California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987), which used the term “evidence” rather than “information” in its opinion, is misplaced because the distinction between evidence and information was not at issue. We therefore reject Allen’s facial challenge to the FDPA’s relaxed evidentiary standard during sentencing. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (“We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.”); Jones, 132 F.3d at 242 (<HOLDING>). c. Appellate Review Allen claims that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the fdpas relaxed evidentiary standard does not impair the reliability or relevance of information at capital sentencing hearings but helps to accomplish the individualized sentencing required by the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Steele’s claims are barred by res judicata. As such, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be allowed. The third criteria for the enforcement of the doctrine of res judicata is also clearly satisfied here. Claim preclusion applies so long as a new defendant is “closely related to a defendant from the original action”. Id. at 17 (internal quotation omitted). Eight defendants were named in both Steele I and Steele III. Steele alleges that the new defendants added in Steele III are directors, managers, employees or affiliates of or acting in concert with the defendants named in Steele I. The Court finds that those affiliations constitute sufficiently close relationships to warrant the application of claim preclusion. See In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Steele also makes numerous allegations of

    ### Response:
    holding that the new defendant an alleged coperpetrator of the harms litigated in the first lawsuit could invoke the doctrine of res judicata because it had a sufficiently close relationship to the original defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a reason. The prosecutor then volunteered that he “didn’t get a good feel for” Valdez. The court allowed the State to strike Valdez without requiring any explanation. After the jury was sworn in, Vasquez objected to the panel. The trial court committed reversible error in failing to conduct a Neil inquiry regarding the peremptory strike of Valdez. Under State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993), and Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996), the defense properly put the strike of Valdez at issue, and the trial court was required to ask the prosecutor his reason for the strike. The trial court overruled the objection to the strike on the basis that it “didn’t find a pattern.” Vasquez correctly contends that this was error because it is unnecessary to prove a pattern of discriminati (<HOLDING>), review denied, 698 So.2d 849 (Fla.1997).

    ### Response:
    holding that section 7750214b2 florida statutes 1993 prohibited conviction for fraud by person authorized to provide goods or services and grand theft based on the same facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “‘latitude [it retains] in organizing [its] internal operations.’ ” American Hosp. Ass’n, 834 F.2d at 1047 (citation omitted). Indeed, the protocol is an enforcement tool that aids surveyors in investigating nursing home compliance, and as recognized in American Hospital Association, “[e]nforcement plans by agencies to direct their enforcement activity warrant considerable deference.” Id. at 1050. The instant protocol is also similar to many agency guidebooks or handbooks that have been held to be exempt from notice and comment proceedings. Essentially, the survey protocol is a compliance handbook issued to federal and state officials charged with conducting the surveys in compliance with OBRA ’87’s requirements. See Cmty. Nutrition Institute v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also United States Dep’t of Labor v. Kast

    ### Response:
    recognizing that agencies may develop written guidelines without the risk of having a court transmogrify those guidelines into binding norms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant acted with the quality of intent that is requisite to an award of punitive damages. For this we must look further beyond the matter of reasonable response to that of motive and intent”). Plaintiffs have cited no evidence warranting the imposition of punitive damages, let alone clear and convincing evidence that Transamerica denied their claim maliciously, oppressively or fraudulently. Plaintiffs, in fact, do not cite any record evidence at all. Because the court need not “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,” this alone warrants granting Transamerica’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ pun-tive damages prayer. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996). See also Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact where the evidenceis not set forth in the moving papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    benefit plans, the Court recognized that the purpose of ERISA preemption of state law is to create a single set of regulations to govern benefit plans’ complex and ongoing administrative activities. Id. at 8-15, 107 S.Ct. at 2215-19. From the fountain of Fort Halifax, and the stream of circuit court cases that have flowed from it, a relatively simple test has emerged to determine whether a plan is covered by ERISA: does the benefit package implicate an ongoing administrative scheme? See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 2218 (“The theoretical possibility of a one-time obligation in the future simply creates no need for 'an ongoing administrative program for processing claims and paying benefits.”); Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 21 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); James v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., 992

    ### Response:
    holding the touchstone of determining existence of erisa plan is whether an administrative scheme is required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the right where, before the alleged violation, Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent “has staked out a bright line” defining the right. See Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 977 (11th Cir.2012) (published opinion). Second, it establishes the right if the police officer’s conduct goes “so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force” such that “every reasonable officer would conclude that the excessive force used was plainly unlawful.” See Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1292. A review of Eleventh Circuit case law does not show a bright line barring Officer Lozano’s conduct. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has offered police officers wide discretion in reacting with force when the police officer believes that a suspect resists arrest. See, e.g., Hoyt, 672 F.3d at 977-78 (<HOLDING>); Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724,

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no clearly established law when suspect refused to allow officers to handcuff him and when suspect died after prolonged taser usage because precedent had not staked out a bright line
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment, (n.l). We readily reject Watson’s argument that the district court erred in failing to reduce his sentences based on Amendment 709, as that amendment is not among those listed in § lB1.10(c) as retroactively applicable. To the extent Watson asserts that he was entitled to a sentence reduction based on Amendment 706, his argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1327-28 (11th Cir.2008), cert. denied, McFadden v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 965, 173 L.Ed.2d 156, and cert. denied, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1601, 173 L.Ed.2d 689 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the judgment of the district

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant whose sentence is based on his status as a career offender under  4b11 is not entitled to  3582c2 relief because amendments 706 and 713 do not lower the applicable guideline range for a career offender
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Parker’s arguments to the contrary, a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is a disposition on the merits. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (“Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, any [involuntary] dismissal ...—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19— operates as an adjudication on the merits.”); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (“The rules of finality, both statutory and judge made, treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds the same way they treat a dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure to prove substantive liability, or for failure to prosecute: as a judgment on the merits.”); Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 935 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). A district court does not have jurisdiction

    ### Response:
    holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 465, remarking that ""the § 465 adjustment was listed right along with the defendant’s other theories for adjusting plaintiffs’ basis and gain,"" the IRS’s decision to cite I.R.C. § 465 does not convert the section into one that applies to loss deductions in the face of its plain language to the contrary. 9 . The other cases the trial court cited to support its conclusion also involved fact patterns where an alternative basis for the IRS’s adjustments existed. See Derby v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177, 2008 WL 540271, *25, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 46, at *90-91 (Tax Ct. Feb. 28, 2008) (“[Bjecause there is a separate, independent ground for disallowing [the] deductions, the overvaluation penalty may not be imposed against the petitioners.”); McCrary v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 827, 851-55 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Rogers v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1386, 1990

    ### Response:
    holding that valuation overstatement penalties did not apply where the taxpayers conceded that they were not entitled to an investment tax credit because the agreement was a license and not a lease which were grounds unrelated to valuation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    crew members on the vessel. Evidence introduced at trial shows (1) Martinez was hired to steer the vessel and did steel the vessel; (2) Martinez, along with the other crew members, threw cocaine overboard when they heard a helicopter approaching; and (8) although Martinez received less compensation than the captain, he received more than at least one of his crew mates. AFFIRMED. 1 . Martinez’s remaining arguments are foreclosed by prior precedent. He argues § 1903, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), is an ultra vires exercise of congressional power under the Piracies and Felonies Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 10. This argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as he argues the MDLEA is

    ### Response:
    holding congress did not exceed its authority in enacting the mdlea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    State, the Austin Court of Appeals held that evidence that the vehicle in question was registered to a person with whom the defendant lived was sufficient to corroborate his admission that he was driving the vehicle that night. 797 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, pet. refd). In Zavala, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that evidence that the appellant was purchasing the vehicle and had taken possession of it, together with the condition of the vehicle at the time officers arrived on the scene, was sufficient to corroborate his statement. 89 S.W.3d at 137 & n. 5. Thus, we conclude that there is evidence outside of appellant’s extrajudicial confession showing that the crime of DWI was committed. Therefore, the corpus delicti rule was satisfied. See Salazar, 86 S.W.3d at 645 (<HOLDING>); Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 131 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that corpus delicti rule is satisfied if some evidence exists outside of extrajudicial confession which considered alone or in connection with confession shows that crime actually occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the defendant [or a witness]: (1) speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language; and (2) this fact inhibits their comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel.” United States v. Black, 369 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir.2004) (citing United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir.2001)), cert. denied. Once a court is put on notice that there may exist a “significant language difficulty,” it must make a determination as to whether an interpreter is needed. Luna v. Black, 772 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir.1985). Federal district courts are given wide discretion in appointing an interpreter. Id. Courts are to base their decision whether to appoint an interpreter on factors such as the d tute; Diaz v. State, 491 S.W.2d 166, 167-68 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). Also, states similarly base the appointment

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court was under no obligation to appoint an interpreter where defendant did not request one and spoke english reasonably well
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment and the harassment was directed at him because of his sex. Not all sexual harassment that is directed at an individual because of his or her sex is actionable. Title VII does not attempt “to purge the workplace of vulgarity.” Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.1995). As the Supreme Court recognized in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., - U.S.-,-, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title VII’s purview.” See also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (<HOLDING>). In deciding whether the harassment to which

    ### Response:
    recognizing that conduct amounts to actionable sexual harassment only when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment  alteration in original citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under Rule 60(b) is abuse of discretion, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse to vacate an invalid judgment. Id. at 1317. We cannot accept Trade Well’s contention that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it because Trade Well is a foreign corporation that did not have counsel at the time of the default judgments. By filing the original replevin action, Trade Well submitted itself to jurisdiction in Wisconsin for purposes of the replevin action and the counterclaim. In general, when a defendant interposes a permissive counterclaim, the plaintiff cannot object that the court lacks personal jurisdiction for purposes of adjudicating the claim. See Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451, 52 S.Ct. 238, 76 L.Ed. 389 (1932) (<HOLDING>); 6 ChaRles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

    ### Response:
    holding in a patent case that when the plaintiff brought the suit in federal district court it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has established a prima facie case under each theory. Therefore, the Court will move directly to analyzing MNP’s proffered reason for firing Zakaria. 2 MNP has offered a non-discriminatory reason for firing Zakaria — namely, that it was downsizing its workforce and it fired Zakaria because he had the third worst attendance record during the twelve months prior to the layoffs. (See S.J. Motion, ECF # 12 at Pg. ID 75-77.) However, on this record, there is a material factual dispute as to whether this reason was a pretext for discrimination in violation of the FMLA. As an initial matter, there is a question as to whether there was a “basis in fact” for MNP’s asserted justification for firing Zakaria. Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 431 (6th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). When the evidence is viewed in the light most

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that an employers proffered reason for an adverse employment action has no basis in fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    thereby suppressing a particular view about a subject.” Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); c.f. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). The Supreme Court made it clear that government suppression of speech, based on the speaker’s motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective is impermissible. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”); Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1456 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). This court follows the Iqbal methodological

    ### Response:
    holding that the first amendment does not permit the federal government to bar ideological opponents from peacefully protesting on the sidewalks of pennsylvania avenue during president clintons second inaugural parade
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if a voter’s registration is a “mechanical adjunct” then a candidate’s act of registration is also a “mechanical adjunct.” Mr. Campbell relies upon Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F.Supp. 729 (D.N.M.1972) (per curiam) to counter the State’s argument. In Dillon, the district court struck down a New Mexico statute that prevented any person from becoming a candidate for United States Senator “unless he ha[d] been affiliated with that party for at least one year prior to the filing date for the primary election.” Id. at 730. The court determined that, because the statute in effect required residency for two years within New Mexico, it added an “impermissible requirement” to the qualifications for candidacy. Id. at 731; see also State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445, 448 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Hellmann v. Collier, 217 Md. 93, 141 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that provision requiring candidate to be a resident and qualified elector unconstitutionally adds additional qualifications
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is construed broadly. Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1266. Although close temporal proximity can indicate causation, the temporal proximity must be “very close.” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). This court has held that “in the absence of any other evidence of causation,” a three-month proximity is insufficient to establish causation. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir.2006); see also Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir.2004) (“If there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and the adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.”); Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). After a thorough review, we conclude that

    ### Response:
    holding that by itself three and onehalf months was insufficient to prove causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of proving that, under these facts and circumstances, a qualified “ASAP privilege” is appropriate. The ASAP materials in dispute (unlike the vast majority of the documents prepared by American in the wake of the crash) were prepared voluntarily, in confidence and for use in a discrete, limited context in cooperation with the FAA and the phots’ union. There is a genuine risk of a meaningful and irreparable chill from the compelled disclosure of ASAP materials in connection with the pending litigation. In making this finding, we stress that the privilege recognized here is qualified rather than absolute. Like any evidentiary privilege, an “ASAP privilege” must be harmonized with the notion that “ ‘the public ... has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” 83 F.2d 1488, 1518-22 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom., 477 U.S. 904, 106

    ### Response:
    recognizing qualified privilege protecting confidential communications among judges and their staffs in the performance of their judicial duties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a presumption of arbitrability.... Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is [ ] broad.... In such cases, ‘[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.’ ” Id. at 650, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-85, 80 S.Ct. 1347). Applying the above principles, the Second Circuit has repeatedly relied on the presumption of arbitrability to find that arbitration clauses, which are arguably geared toward employee grievances, also allow employer-initiated disputes to go to arbitration. See Coca-Cola, 242 F.3d at 57; see also Interstate Brands Corp. v. Bakery Drivers, 167 F.3d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); ITT World Communications, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding employer had contractually waived its right to litigate contract claim and was bound to arbitrate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as the basis for a motion for sanctions, attorneys’ fees, or other costs. And while the Builders’ summary-judgment motion suggests that Landrah was in contempt for failure to appear at a deposition, the motion seeks only attorneys’ fees “incurred in this matter” — not attorneys’ fees as sanctions for Landrah’s failure to appear. (Emphasis added.) Even if we were to construe the Builders’ motion as a motion for sanctions, a trial court may not award sanctions on a basis not asserted in the motion. See Greene v. Young, 174 S.W.3d 291, 298-301 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (reversing sanctions awarded because parties did not have notice of legal basis or conduct under consideration for sanctions); Ball v. Rao, 48 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Neither the summary-judgment motion nor the

    ### Response:
    holding trial court erred by imposing sanctions under section 9 of civil practice and remedies code because claim for sanctions was based solely on section 10 of code and rule 13 of rules of civil procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but the Names who are personally hable on the contracts, it is therefore the Names who are the real parties in interest in this lawsuit. See Stipulation, ¶¶ 16-21, 39. In other district courts, the question of jurisdiction of a Lloyd’s London syndicate has been probed and resolved. While the decisions of the other districts do not bind this Court, the Court finds the reasoning and analysis of the other courts to be persuasive on this issue. The District Courts for the District of Maine, the Northern District of Illinois, and the District of Hawaii have thoroughly examined and analyzed the proper way to categorize a Lloyd’s syndicate for diversity jurisdiction purposes. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Certain Member Cos. of the Inst. of London Underwriters, 870 F.Supp. 3 (D.Me.1994) (<HOLDING>); International Ins. Co. v. Certain

    ### Response:
    holding that citizenship of active underwriters and names with lloyds london had to be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the trial court. The trial court denied SES’s motion and granted the City’s motion. DISCUSSION Standard of Review We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009). A court must grant a traditional motion for summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or in any other response. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c). We re n the alleged breach and the damages sought will preclude recovery. Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Haugland, 973 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied). Compare Abraxas Petroleum Corp., 20 S.W.3d at 758 (<HOLDING>) with Clearview Props., L.P. v. Prop. Texas SC

    ### Response:
    holding that legally and factually sufficient evidence existed that breach by operator of oil lease caused damages to working interest owners because on account of breach operator seized owners interest and withheld earnings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    essentially was in custody when he accompanied the officers to the patrol car. Accordingly, to the extent that Davis has challenged as unreasonable the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' factual determination that Davis was not in custody when the officers ""took [Davis] to a nearby patrol car” Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101, the court rejects Davis' argument. 29 . Davis cites United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), in support of his argument that ""[a]ge and level of education of the individual are relevant” to the Miranda custody determination. (Doc. No. 92 at 20.) At issue in Men-denhall was the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent, not whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (<HOLDING>) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the question whether the defendants consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 94,206, 1986 WL 19610 (RFP stating, “[i]n order to have an acceptable proposal, the offeror must meet all of the mandatory requirements set forth in Section C.2 of the Solicitation Document”). 17 . See, e.g., George Hyman Constr. Co., B265798, B-265798.2, 95-2 CPD ¶ 173, at 3-5, 1995 WL 604642 (Comp.Gen. 1995) (referring to “minimum acceptable past experience” as a ""go/no go” requirement; proposals meetings this requirement would then be rated); Amtec Corp., B261487, 95-2 CPD ¶ 164, at 4, 1995 WL 578228 (Comp.Gen.1995) (same); George A. Fuller Co., B247171.2, 92-1 CPD ¶ 433, at 2, 1992 WL 108946 (Comp.Gen.1992) (same); Contract Servs. Co., B246585.3, 92-1 CPD ¶ 427, at 4, 1992 WL 108952 (Comp.Gen.1992) (same). Compare Mangi Envtl. Group, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. at 16 (<HOLDING>). 18 . Indeed, elsewhere in the evaluation

    ### Response:
    holding identification of personnel requirement mandatory but not the provision of resumes for such individuals where solicitation indicated that proposals failing to provide at a minimum the names and proposed duties of the specified individuals will be considered unacceptable and will not be considered further
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    779. However, “[t]he fact that proof of causation is difficult does not provide a plaintiff with an excuse to avoid introducing some evidence of causation.” Schaefer v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 612 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex.1980); see also Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.1969). As the dissent in the court of appeals explained, “[t]he harsh reality is that if the plaintiff cannot prove facts to support her cause of action, there is simply no recovery. This is true not only in slip and fall cases, but in all cases.” 954 S.W.2d at 784. Dirt in macaroni salad lying on a heavily-traveled aisle is no evidence of the length of time the macaroni had been on the floor. That evidence can no more support the inferen 189, 191 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (<HOLDING>). There were no comparisons between the dirt on

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony that grapes were stepped on and that the juices from both red and green grapes had blended together was no evidence of how long the grapes were on the floor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violations correspond to FLSA causes of action consisting of the same claims. See Filing No. H7—Reply p. 1; Filing No. 186—Brief p. 21. Based on the express statement of congressional intent “not to displace state laws granting workers higher minimum wages or a shorter maximum workweek, it is clear that the FLSA would preempt only state laws that mandated lower minimum wages or longer maximum workweeks.” DeKeyser, 589 F.Supp.2d at 1081. Since, as the parties agree, the Nebraska wage and hour laws are not less generous than those of the FLSA, “it seems clear that the FLSA does not displace the state law. Rather, it would seem that state law may offer an alternative legal basis for equal or more generous relief for the same alleged wrongs.” Id.; see Bouaphakeo, 564 F.Supp.2d at 884 (<HOLDING>). In any event, the case at bar is nearly

    ### Response:
    holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    July 26, 1994, the ninety (90) day time period began to run. Because, plaintiff filed his complaint on October 26, 1994, ninety-two (92) days after the delivery of the Decision to the attorney, defendant argues that the action should be time barred. The facts of the instant case, however, are distinguishable from those of Irwin. Unlike in Irwin, plaintiff and his attorney were no longer in an attorney-client relationship. Coates’ former attorney did not have the authority to accept correspondence for plaintiff nor act as his representative. Thus, delivery to Coates’ former attorney did not constitute notice to plaintiff, and the ninety day time limitation did not begin to run until Coates receive the Decision himself. See Cumbow v. Vermont American Corp., 586 F.Supp. 873 (W.D.Va.1982) (<HOLDING>). Defendant averred that he received his copy

    ### Response:
    holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stutler began working for IDOC in 1988 as an office associate in the clinical services department, where she performed secretarial duties for Diane Rockett. The' two enjoyed a friendship that extended beyond their employment until late 1995 when Stutler complained to Assistant Warden Wanda Bass that Rockett asked her to do personal favors. When Rockett learned of Stutter’s complaint, she became angry, and threw things and screamed at Stutler. The relationship further deteriorated in the spring of 1996 as memorialized in a barrage of incident reports written by Stutler. As many of the reports complained of conduct not protected by Title VII, we will discuss only the ones relevant to this appeal. See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In April and May 1996, Stutler filed three

    ### Response:
    holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in dismissing all claims against King. For the foregoing reasons, we: 1) AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the Holders’ motion to remand, 2) AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the Holders’ claims against Gregory S. Maranto, M.D. and Rush Medical Group, P.A., 3) AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Vaccine Defendants, but 4) REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Eli Lilly and Company, Sigma-Aldrich, Inc., and Spectrum Chemical Manufacturing Corp. and REMAND only the claims that those defendants manufactured, marketed, designed or distributed Thimerosal. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART 1 . 42 U L.Ed.2d 755 (2005). 6 . Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella & Co., Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that an order denying remand based on improper joinder is reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we consider the reasons offered by the prosecutor to explain each strike. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241,125 S.Ct. at 2325. 1. Veniremembers Wiggins and Fon-tenot Wiggins (veniremember 7) and Fontenot (veniremember 31) were both black women employed by the USPS. At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor testified that he struck Wiggins and Fontenot because of their employment with the USPS. The prosecutor also stated that veniremember 31 originally indicated that she would not consider assessing a life sentence. “[W]hen the State indicates that it challenged a prospective juror based on that person’s type of employment and that the State has had poor success with that type of worker, the reason is a race-neutral explanation for exercising the peremptory challenge.” Moore, 265 S.W.3d at 84 (<HOLDING>); see Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 205

    ### Response:
    holding that striking postal worker on basis of occupation was raceneutral
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also could have raised her federal claims on state-court review, but she declined that option. See id. § 16-3-114; see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (“[I]t is sufficient ... that constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceeding.”). 3. Important State Interests The third condition is satisfied because the revocation proceedings concerned important state interests—the regulation and licensure of insurance producers. These matters traditionally fall under the state’s regulatory authority. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-9-201 (prescribing “qualifications and procedures for the licensing of insurance producers”); Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924, 925 (Wyo. 1963) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court correctly abstained

    ### Response:
    recognizing that sale of insurance affects the public interest and is subject to state regulation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    involved, see Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728-29 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion)), the two Airborne employees involved in the Mejias’ arrest and prosecution do not appear to have been final corporate policymakers in the area of cooperation with law enforcement. Bezmen was Airborne’s regional security manager for the greater New York area only, while Gennarelli was the “cartage supervisor” for the particular Airborne office through which the controlled pickup was conducted. Other courts have held that corporate employees in similar positions are not final policymakers for § 1983 purposes. See, e.g., Austin v. Paramount Parks, 195 F.3d 715, 729-30 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. United States, 896 F.Supp. 1183,

    ### Response:
    holding that theme parks manager of loss prevention was not a final policymaker
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Statutes § 52-72 (a) (“[a]ny court shall allow a proper amendment to civil process which has been made returnable to the wrong return day or is for any other reason defective, upon payment of costs taxable upon sustaining a plea in abatement”); Coppola v. Coppola, 243 Conn. 657, 663, 707 A.2d 281 (1998) (“the pmpose of § 52-72 is to provide for amendment of otherwise incurable defects that go to the court’s jurisdiction” [internal quotation marks omitted]). In the present case, the scrivener’s error appeared on the writ of summons. Pursuant to § 52-72, the court properly allowed the plaintiff to amend its process to reflect a correct return date. See Coppola v. Coppola, supra, 243 Conn. 664-66; Concept Associates, Ltd. v. Board of Tax Review, 229 Conn. 618, 625-26, 642 A.2d 1186 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The defect in process was curable, and

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could amend its process to correct return date even though return date already passed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Filing Fee”); PI. Mem. Ex. D at 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 (entries include, for example, “Attention to tax lien”; “Attention to collection [due process] issues”; “Conference ... on CDP issues”; “Petitioning Tax Court regarding Notice of Determination”; “Attention to documents regarding IRS’s collection efforts”; “Answer to petition to Tax Court”; “Attention to collection case before the Tax Court”; and “Attention to motion to continue Tax Court ease”). BASR may not recover any of these litigation costs. c.BASR May Not Recover Paralegal Fees For “Merely Clerical Tasks.” Work performed by paralegals is compen-sable only if it otherwise would have been performed by an attorney, e.g., not “purely clerical.” See Miller v. Alamo, 983 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the paralegals performed

    ### Response:
    holding that paralegal work involving going to a library to locate eases was compensable because it would otherwise have been performed personally by the plaintiffs attorneys and so was not clerical in nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""Davis Found Able for Trial”; (5) August 12, 1979, ""Davis to Face Murder Charges as an Adult”; (6) September 16, 1979, ""Davis Venue Decision Due”; and (7) June 8, 1980, ""Davis Trial Begins Monday.” 12 . In the next subsection, the court addresses, but rejects, Davis' contention that, notwithstanding the jurors' assertions of neutrality, the voir dire was inadequate to divulge preformed biases, particularly biases arising from the pretrial publicity. 13 . The court notes that, on. the question of whether pretrial publicity denied Davis a fair trial by a jury free from actual prejudices, the court finds that it is appropriate to consider as a mitigating factor any cautionary instructions given by the state trial court to the jury. Cf. U.S. v. Richmond, 222 F.3d 414, 416 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In Davis’ case, the state trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to continue due to pretrial publicity in part because court instructed jury on three separate occasions to consider only evidence presented in the courtroom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Court will reverse a decision to grant or to deny remand only for an abuse of discretion. Fisher v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 696 A.2d 895 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). The Referee questioned Procito about her reasons for quitting and gave her the opportunity to call and to question her witness. Testimony and proposed testimony about why her partner quit her job was irrelevant. Finally, Procito would not be entitled to benefits even if the following the spouse doctrine were applied because the necessity to relocate must be caused by circumstances beyond the control of the spouse and must not be a matter of personal preference. A personal preference is not necessary or compelling. Hammond v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 166, 569 A.2d 1013 (1990) (<HOLDING>). II Several standard principles govern the

    ### Response:
    holding that wifes move to oregon was a matter of personal preference and husbands leaving work and following to preserve the family was not for necessitous and compelling cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even though the defendant’s products were at a trade show in the forum State, because the products were displayed at an unrelated distributor’s booth and there was no evidence that the defendant had any relationship or interaction with potential customers in the forum State at the trade show). This is not a situation in which Peter Blanke, CEO of both Blanke Germany and Blanke USA, R. 230-4 at 12-14, can be said to have adopted his “Blanke USA” affiliation and left his “Blanke Germany” affiliation behind. Peter Blanke was at the booth in Chicago, answering questions about Blanke Germany products, and ultimately promoting and endorsing the sale of Blanke Germany products while present in Illinois. Cf. Kingsmill v. Roundo AB, No. 12-3524, 2013 WL 3778351, at *8 (E.D.Pa. July 18, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Blanke Germany obviously knew its products

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants regular attendance at trade shows for national and international markets and infrequent attendance at meetings for a customers nationwide network of local distributors did not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement because plaintiff has provided no evidence indicating how defendants attendance at these trade shows and meetings was related to the forum state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they cannot be cured by consent.” Id. at 613-14, 472 A.2d 566. Likewise, in Catanoso, supra, the Law Division found that if the defendant’s counsel acted as a zealous advocate, he would have had to “breach the duty of loyalty that he owes to his former client,” the State’s main witness against the defendant. 222 N.J.Super. at 648, 537 A.2d 794. Therefore, although the defendant was willing to waive the right to cross-examine the State’s witness so that he could maintain his choice of counsel, the Law Division observed that the defendant’s counsel’s prior representation of the witness may have permitted him to acquire confidential information that could be used favorably by the defendant. Id. at 645, 537 A.2d 794. See also Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 473, 416 A.2d 852 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The Law Division found that defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are not engaged in federal action. Thus, the appellees reason, Orleans established not only that community action agencies are not arms of the federal government, but that such agencies are never engaged in federal action for constitutional purposes. Accordingly, they conclude, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its dismissal should be affirmed. III. The threshold issue is whether the district court properly dismissed the appellants’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Our resolution of that issue depends on the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. This is an area of some disagreement among the circuits. For example, compare Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>) with Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial

    ### Response:
    holding that the proper ground for dismissal of a  1983 action in which the plaintiff has failed to establish state action is lack of jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Colo.1997). Here, we conclude that the language of the statute is unambiguous and, therefore, we assign to the words their plain meanings. - Section 7-118-102(4) states: A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for the shareholder's shares under this article may not challenge the corporate action creating such entitlement unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation. (Emphasis added.) There are no reported appellate decisions in Colorado construing this section. However, we agree with the trust that this section applies to its claim because fraudulent actions in the nature of constructive fraud are within the exception. See See. Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., supra, 39 Colo.App. at 351, 569 P.2d at 881 (<HOLDING>). - Constructive fraud is defined as a breach

    ### Response:
    holding breach of fiduciary duty by a director constitutes constructive fraud and therefore affected shareholder was entitled to dissenters rights and to challenge the corporate action creating entitlement to dissenters rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    loss of twenty decibels or more as established by an audi-ogram. As Tate & Lyle emphasizes, all of the one hundred and five plaintiffs at issue satisfied both these criteria; they all had both ten years of employment and an audi-ogram showing at least twenty decibels of hearing loss before their last date of employment at the Arabi refinery. In rejecting Continental’s argument that the settlement agreement required more in terms of the particular type of au-diogram, the trial court reasoned that Continental was seeking to impose its interpretation of the agreement and that “Continental’s understanding of the settlement agreement is contrary to the principle of contractual interpretation in discerning the intent of the parties.” See Duet v. Lucky, 621 So.2d 168 (La.App.33 4th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>); see also Sumrall v. Bickham, 03-1252 (La.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the sixteen-level enhancement], and (A) the defendant has previously been convicted of only one felony offense; (B) such offense was not a crime of violence or firearms offense; and (C) the term of imprisonment imposed for such offense did not exceed one year, a downward departure may be warranted based on the seriousness of the aggravated felony. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2 commentary at n. 5 (1999) (emphasis added). Marquez was ineligible for a downward departure under Application Note 5 because he was sentenced to a term of three years’ imprisonment for his un derlying aggravated felony. Under the law of this circuit, the fact that Marquez’s three-year sentence was suspended is irrelevant. See United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 170 F.3d 1038, 1039-40 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We do not consider here the merits of

    ### Response:
    holding that the term of imprisonment for purposes of application note 5 is the sentence imposed by the state court and that it shall not be decreased to reflect a suspension of any part of the sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the area of Lot 22 where McDermott was standing did not appear to be posted with any signs. McD. Dep. at 21, 35; Cox Aff. ¶ 3. McDer-mott continued to claim ownership and a right to be on the property. When McDermott refused to leave, Cox asked the dispatcher to call Farley to inquire whether he wanted to have Plaintiff arrested. When the dispatcher reported back that Farley did, there is no indication that Cox was acting under authorization from a rightM property owner to convey a lawful order for Plaintiff to leave the premises. The evidence shows that Cox apparently concluded, based only on Farley’s initial complaint about the car and Cox’s own observation of “No Trespassing” signs, that Plaintiff did not have any right to be present on the subject prope 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>)). Although officers are permitted to make

    ### Response:
    holding that police officer is not required to explore and eliminate all theoretically plausible claims of innocence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    111 Cal.Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168. Violations of the implied warranty of habitability are tethered to violations of the state’s housing codes. See Green, 10 Cal.3d at 637, 111 Cal.Rptr. at 719, 517 P.2d 1168. Accordingly, “substantial compliance with applicable building and housing code standards, which materially affect health and safety, will suffice to meet the landlord’s obligations under the common law implied warranty of habitability.” Id. Here, however, because Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to rebut Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs Platinum Points are not in the nature of a lease, as they do not constitute an interest in real property, the Court finds .Plaintiff has failed to present a genuine dispute. See Fairchild, 90 Cal.App.4th at 924, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 442 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). To present a genuine

    ### Response:
    holding the implied warranty is implied in all residential leases in california
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the appellate record, a bulletin from the Texas Department of Insurance. Our review is confined to the evidence in the appellate record. See Sabine. Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex.1979); Sewell v. Adams, 854 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ). It is improper for any party to cite unpublished judgments and orders from various courts as authority when such items do not appear in the appellate record. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.7; Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex.App. — Austin 1991, writ denied). It is also improper for parties to rely on matters outside the record in making arguments to the court. See, e.g., Melendez v. Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 280 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we shall strike and not consider

    ### Response:
    holding parties are to confine their arguments and factual recitations to matters contained in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28 C.F.R. § 2.7(a); Santiago v. U.S., 889 F.2d 371, 373 (1st Cir.1989). The Parole Commission set a “presumptive release date” for Ellis of October 21, 1989. It subsequently revoked that date, however, because Ellis did not pay the fine. Instead, Ellis asked a federal magistrate to determine that he could not pay the fine because he had no “property [other than exempt property] exceeding $20 in value,” in which case, according to statute, the government must release him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3569 (full text in Appendix). The magistrate, and subsequently the district court, denied Ellis’s request. Ellis now appeals. Ellis argues that the Constitution forbids holding a person in prison solely because he is indigent. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28

    ### Response:
    holding that state may not revoke probation for nonpayment of fine where probationer is unable to pay through no fault of his own
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a certificate, DPW ordered it to cease and desist operating the day care center. St. Elizabeth’s appealed to DPW’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, arguing DPW lacked statutory authority to promulgate regulations requiring certification of nonprofit child day care centers. St. Elizabeth’s also raised constitutional concerns regarding the regulations’ impact on religious liberty. An administrative law judge (ALJ) explained Article IX of the Public Welfare Code, 62 P.S. §§ 901-922, grants DPW supervision over “all children’s institutions within this Commonwealth,” including nonprofit child day care centers like St. Elizabeth’s. Id., § 902(3). This supervisory power has been construed broadly. See Hospital Association of Pennsylvania v. MacLeod, 487 Pa. 516, 410 A.2d 731, 734-35 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Further, the ALJ determined § 911’s primary

    ### Response:
    holding  902 authorized department of health to regulate hospitals managerial practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legislative history); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “property of the estate” to include “the debtor’s tangible and intangible property interests (including both legal and equitable interests)”). Indeed, the Whiting Pools Court expressly stated that “interests in [repossessed] property that could have been exercised by the debtor — in this case, the rights to notice and the surplus from a tax sale — are already part of the estate by virtue of § 541(a)(1).” 462 U.S. at 207 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 2309 (internal citation omitted). Consequently, Moffett’s statutory right to redeem the vehicle was properly made part of her bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accord Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); see also Bell-Tel Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter

    ### Response:
    holding that a statutory right of redemption under alabamas ucc is part of a debtors bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we cannot conclude that the Bessemer Division erred in transferring the cause. See § 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975 (statute allowing discretionary transfer of actions from one proper forum to another “in the interest of justice”). We now turn to the substantive issues raised by the parties. Kaufmann contends that the trial court should not have dismissed its spoliation-of-evidence claim against Blue Dot and Davis. However, Kaufmann asserted that issue during the earlier litigation involving the parties, and the jury in that case was given a spoliation instruction based upon Kaufmann’s claim that Davis had destroyed evidence. Such an instruction is a remedy available when a party to pending litigation is alleged to have spoliated evidence. See Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So.2d 429, 438 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>). Principally because such a remedy exists, the

    ### Response:
    holding that spoliation may be a basis for a cause of action where a third party has negligently destroyed material evidence but stating that jury charges that presume missing evidence weighs against the spoliator and discovery sanctions  are available when spoliation is charged against an opposing party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is able to impose enhancements on the basis of a defendant’s prior convictions. Battle also argues that the district court violated Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), by characterizing his prior convictions as “serious drug offenses” under § 924(e). However, we conclude that Battle’s argument is without merit because there were no disputed issues with respect to Battle’s prior drug offenses. Battle conceded at his change-of-plea hearing that he had been convicted of the necessary predicate offenses for the enhancement. Moreover, he did not object to the descriptions of the prior convictions in the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), and, thus, these facts should be deemed “admitted” for Booker purposes. See Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1330 (<HOLDING>). After the district court determined that §

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant admits to the psis factual statements about his relevant conduct where he raises no objections to those statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 476, 101 A. at 105. Furthermore, the Court held that “the mother is entitled to damages for her distress and disappointment at the time of the birth because through the defendant’s negligence she has been deprived of the right and the satisfaction of bearing a sound child, if it be found that the child’s deformity is due to the injury she received through the defendant’s negligence.” Id. The plaintiffs propose that Gagnon stands for a general rule that a pregnant woman can collect damages for her apprehension that she would give birth to a deformed child. They also cite various cases from other jurisdictions to support their argument that Mrs. Perrotti should be able to recover damages for her alleged mental suffering. See, e.g., Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522 (1908) (<HOLDING>); Fehely v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 135 P.2d 283

    ### Response:
    holding that the mother was permitted to recover damages for mental anguish because of the reasonable probability that the defendants negligent act of severely injuring her would cause her to produce an abnormal child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as levied by the government, with debts which are “obligations ... founded upon contract, express or implied”). Under recent caselaw, however, not all statutorily-created assessments have automatically been deemed involuntary. See Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066-67 (Voluntariness does not depend on the debtor’s motivation, but on the “inherent characteristics of the charges”.); In re Belozer Farms, Inc., 199 B.R. 720, 724 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (noting that the contractual-versus-statutory distinction has not been followed by all courts and concluding that “the simple fact that an assessment is authorized by statute does not require a finding that it is ‘involuntary'”); In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 188 B.R. 392, 395 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995) (citing In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), as examples of “courts under the [Bankruptcy]

    ### Response:
    holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence. The Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination. ... We have struck down capital sentences when we found that the circumstances under which they were imposed created an unacceptable risk that the death penalty [may have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously or through whim . . . or mistake.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-36, 36-37, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the state concedes that if the

    ### Response:
    holding that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allegations about FAA orders which governed the conduct of FAA controllers. However, as the district court concluded, allowing such an amendment would be futile because the court had already considered the claimed violations of FAA orders in the context of the previous complaint. Moreover, the district court concluded that even if the amendment were not futile, it would nonetheless deny the motion because it would be unduly prejudicial to the United States. Given that the plaintiffs’ motion came approximately three years after the start of the litigation and approximately eight months after the plaintiffs completed discovery, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. See Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). III. Paul Alinsky, Jeffrey Walker, Colleen

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court should overturn a district courts denial of a motion to amend a complaint only if the district court has abused its discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Worthy, 915 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir.1990). We are persuaded by the plain language of § 3E1.1 to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 153 (5th Cir.1992), and hold that § 3E1.1 does not provide for such a reduction. In Valencia, the district court expressly found that the defendant had partially accepted responsibility and, therefore, was entitled to a one-point reduction, rather than the two-point reduction provided for in § 3El.l(a). The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that “U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 does not contemplate either a defendant’s mere partial acceptance of responsibility or a district court’s being halfway convinced that a defendant accepted responsibility.” Id. at 156; see also United States v. Farrier, 948 F.2d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning

    ### Response:
    holding that the guidelines do not provide for an acceptance of responsibility reduction other than by two levels therefore reversing fourlevel reduction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    government, conducted only programs formulated and funded by the federal government, and was subject to close supervision by the federal government in its activities. Id. at 811, 96 S.Ct. at 1974. Despite these federal controls, the Orleans Court determined that the state agency was not transformed into a federal agency and thus the employees of the agency were not employees of the federal government. Id. at 816, 96 S.Ct. at 1977. According to the Court, the determinative question was “not whether the [state agency] receives federal money and must comply with federal standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations are supervised by the Federal Government.” Id. at 815, 96 S.Ct. at 1976; see also Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Under this analysis, DDS is an independent

    ### Response:
    holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duty on one of the parties in favor of the third party; and (8) the performance of the terms of the contract render a direct benefit to the third party intended by the parties to the contract. Id. The intent of the parties to benefit the third party is the controlling factor and this may be shown by naming the third party or by other evidence. Id. Further, ""[wlhere there is an agreement that compensation is to be paid but the price is not fixed, the party furnishing services and materials in performance of the contract is entitled to the reasonable value thereof."" Ind. Bell Tel. Co. v. Ice Serv., Inc., 142 Ind.App. 23, 29, 281 N.E.2d 820, 824 (1967). Pearman's complaint indicates that he was acting as the Sisons' attorney and did a significant amount of work for th 78 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), trams. denied. Consequently, we conclude that

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery even though his oral contingency fee agreement with the client violated the ind rules of professional conduct which require a contingency fee agreement to be in writing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ahmed, Javairia Ahmed, Romana Ahmed, No. A096 442 859/858/857 (B.I.A. Feb. 26, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the BIA’s decision issued following remand. See Belortaja v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 619, 622-23 (2d Cir.2007). As an initial matter, we decline to review the Ahmeds’ challenge to the agency’s finding that they did not demonstrate the requisite good moral character to establish their eligibility for cancellation of removal, as the issue was ripe for review at the time of their initial petition for review before a previous panel of this Court, and that panel determined that they had waived the issue. See Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99-100 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the only issue before us is the

    ### Response:
    holding that where an issue was ripe for review at the time of an initial appeal but was nonetheless foregone it is considered waived and the law of the case doctrine bars  an appellate court in a subsequent appeal from reopening such issues in the absence of cogent or compelling reasons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    responded, ‘Yeah, and you’re right. You’ve reserved that issue for appeal ... if you need it, that’s right. That’s preserved.’ Id. At 1132.... I continue to believe that the record was more than sufficient to preserve the issue of the constitutionality of Mo. Stat. § 562.076 as construed by the Missouri Supreme Court. As I stated in my dissent: [A principal] reason for requiring proper preservation of issues at trial is so that the trial court is made aware of the contested issue and will have the first opportunity to correct an error. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Here, the objection was raised early in the proceedings, clearly notifying the trial court of the issue. See, e.g., State v. Barrington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 S.W. 235, 252 (1906) (<HOLDING>); State v. Flynn, 519 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo.1975);

    ### Response:
    holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (7th Cir.2000). In reaching this conclusion, we determined that “the disparate-impact and mandatory accommodation rules found in the ADA” far exceeded the constitutional protections provided by the Equal Protection Clause. Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951; see also Stevens, 210 F.3d at 738. Furthermore, we concluded that these provisions could not be sustained as “reasonable prophylactic legislation.” Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951-52; see also Stevens, 210 F.3d at 740-41. Underlying this holding was our understanding that Congress could not subject disability discrimination, which receives only rational basis review under the Constitution, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-46, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), to more searching scrutiny. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951 (<HOLDING>). In light of these principles drawn from prior

    ### Response:
    holding that the ada exceeds the  5 power  at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for irrational discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Instead, the Ninth Circuit ignored that threshold issue and jumped straight to rational-basis review of a California statute that granted retired police the right to carry semi-automatic weapons despite a ban. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1090-91. The Ninth Circuit then established the California statute’s objectives by relying on legislative history and public statements specific to that statute, all of which indicated that the California law was intended to “eliminate the availability of the [restricted] weapons generally.” Id. at 1091. In contrast, the record here contains no evidence that the Maryland General Assembly had any similarly prohibitionist intent. Most fundamentally, Silveira appears to have been animated by a hostility toward so-called “assault weapons” in general. Id. (<HOLDING>); cf. Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1192 n. 4

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no legitimate state interest in permitting retired police officers  and apparently anyone  to possess and use militarystyle weapons for their personal pleasure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    partially on the grids. The Commissioner’s waiver argument is baseless. Lawrence may not have said anything about the use of the grids when he appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, but neither was he required to say anything at that point. See Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 563 (7th Cir.1999). Without doubt, however, he raised the subject to the satisfaction of the district judge, who addressed his argument at length. The pui-pose of the waiver rule— to allow the district court an opportunity to rule on claimant’s arguments before they reach this court — has been satisfied in this case and therefore Lawrence’s challenge to the ALJ’s application of the grids is properly before this court. See Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 389 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). And Lawrence’s argument that the ALJ

    ### Response:
    holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    questions of state law, the Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims upon dismissal of the claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction. “Under §§ 1367(c) and 1441(c), a court is not required to remand state law claims when the only federal claim has been dismissed. Instead, the district court maintains discretion to either remand the state law claims or keep them in federal court.” Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc., 306 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir.2002). Having granted Krambeck’s motion to dismiss her federal claims, the Court now considers the balance of factors informing the exercise of its discretion to remand. The district court’s discretion is substantial and is reviewed deferentially. See Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 150 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (citing Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982,

    ### Response:
    holding that federal district court retains substantial discretion when deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over pendent state claims after the linchpin federal claims are dismissed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indictments filed longer than thirty days after an arrest which add charges to those contained in the original indictment do not violate the Speedy Trial Act. See, e.g., United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996) (finding no Speedy Trial Act violation when superseding indictment adding new charges was filed following a mistrial based on the fact that the initial indictment was filed within the thirty-day period); United States v. Orbino, 981 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.1992) (“A superseding indictment [adding charges] issued before the original indictment is dismissed may issue more than thirty days after the arrest. Not all charges must be filed within the first thirty day period.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Castellano, 848 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441,

    ### Response:
    holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (quotation marks omitted). First, with regard to Petitioners’ asylum claims, the record does not compel us to disagree with the BIA’s decision. See Halaim v. INS, 358 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2004). In Halaim, we were not compelled to find past persecution where the petitioners were subjected to derogatory comments and police harassment based on their status as Pentecostal Christians in the Ukraine. Id. The instant case is closely analogous, and we reach the same result. Here, as in Halaim, the determination that “Petitioners did not suffer past persecution (as distinct from discrimination) is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. See also Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because Petitioners did not establish that

    ### Response:
    holding that isolated physical violence and unfulfilled threats perpetrated by serbian citizens against an ethnic albanian in kosovo constituted harassment not persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to a felony, is too remote to be so used. Section 49.09 of the Texas Penal Code provides that, on proof of two prior DWI convictions, the offense is elevated to a third-degree felony, supporting a two- to ten-year range of punishment. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 49.09. The State alleged that Gordon had been convicted of two prior DWIs. Gordon signed a written stipulation to two prior convictions. In addition, the State presented evidence of another DWI conviction in 1995. Gordon argues that jurisdictional matters may not be waived and that parties may not confer jurisdiction on a court. See State v. Wheeler, 790 S.W.2d 415, 416 (TexApp.-Amarillo 1990, no pet.); cf. Tamez v. State, 980 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 11 S.W.3d 198 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Texas' Court of Criminal Appeals has very

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant could stipulate to prior dwi convictions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its burden to present substantial evidence of all the elements of possession with intent to sell or deliver, because the admission of and testimony about the Charlesworth report was admitted in error, and Officer Tucker’s testimony standing alone was not sufficient to prove the chemical makeup of the substance. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court is to consider “all of the evidence actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent.” State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 237, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). “[T]he fact that some of the evidence was erroneously admitted by the trial court is not a sufficient basis for granting a motion to dismiss.” State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 540, 467 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1996); see also State v. Morton, 166 N.C. App. 477, 482, 601 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The Charlesworth report, even though

    ### Response:
    holding that erroneously admitted evidence may be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if taken as true, would rebut the presumption of at-will employment.... Accordingly, there was no basis for either a breach of contract or a tortious interference with contract claim.... ”). Moreover, two of the three cases involved suits against third parties to the plaintiffs’ employment arrangements. See Futrell, 816 A.2d at 798, 807-08; McManus, 748 A.2d at 957-58. Conversely, two of the cases that Metz cites as supporting his contention that this principle has an exception when the case is brought against a third party do so only by implication. Although each allowed such a claim for tortious interference with an agreement that was terminable at will, neither addressed the question of whether the at-will nature of the agreement precluded the claim. See Sorrells, 565 A.2d at 290-91 (<HOLDING>); CASCO, 834 A.2d at 83-84 (reciting the result

    ### Response:
    holding only that although a party cannot interfere with its own contract a supervisor who is not an officer of a plaintiffs employer is not a party to the plaintiffs employment contract and therefore can interfere with it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citations omitted) (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666)). Our sister circuits wrongly equate the result afforded by congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I with the constitutional structure under which Congress governs and the federal courts exercise jurisdiction. When the states adopted the Fourteenth Amendment and consented to cede a portion of their authority to the federal government, it was within their contemplation that they limited them Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fitzpatrick teaches so, and we adhere to its reasoning. See 42,1 U.S. at 453-54, 96 S.Ct. 2666. Although there may be some property interests that are not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (<HOLDING>), and discriminating between property interests

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourteenth amendment does not secure to persons the right to prevent disclosure of their arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 506. “The State, as the beneficiary of the Giglio violation, bears the burden to prove that the presentation of false testimony at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Giglio claims present mixed questions of law and fact. Accordingly, this Court defers to those factual findings supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law to the facts. Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1106 (Fla. 2008). We reject Parker’s summarily presented claim that the prosecutor’s statement during resentencing — that the gist of the notice and the agreement were the same — was “tantamount to a Brady violation,” as well as a violation of Giglio. This claim was not presented to the post-conviction court. Thus, it is procedurally barred. See id. at 1104 (<HOLDING>). We now consider Parker’s Brady claim. To meet

    ### Response:
    holding that claim is procedurally barred because it was neither raised in greens 3851 motion nor addressed by the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”); Jentoft v. United States, 450 F.3d 1342, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2006) (stating that waivers of sovereign immunity “ ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed’” (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52, (1969))). Although the FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States as to tort claims generally, see 28 U.S.C. § 2674, Section 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act contains a list of exceptions to the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity, and Section 2680(h) expressly excludes libel and slander from the coverage of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Defamation, though not 73, 77 (3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). However, plaintiff does not allege

    ### Response:
    holding the united states liable under the ftca for exposure of prisoners to prisoner with tuberculosis where the prisoners bodies harbored one or more dormant tubercle bacilli which could later develop into fullfledged cases of tuberculosis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or correct an arbitration award upon the application of any party to the arbitration: (a) where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award. (b) where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. (c) where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. 9 U.S.C. § ll(a)-(c). The statutory grounds allowing a trial court to modify an award are limited to those expressly identified above. White, 369 S.W.3d at 916; see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586-87, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, when a trial court modifies an

    ### Response:
    holding statutory grounds provided in sections 10 and 11 of the faa for vacating modifying or correefing arbitration award are exclusive and cannot be supplemented by contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.2d at 1244; see also § 856.021(2). M.R. attempted to hide behind a dumpster when Officer Quintero first approached in his marked K-9 vehicle. When Officer Quintero approached on foot, M.R. then attempted to flee the scene and started to quickly walk away from the complex. Although “alarm is presumed when a person flees, conceals himself, or refuses to identify himself,” the officers’ testimony at the adjudicatory hearing articulated specific facts that warranted the finding that there was an imminent concern to the public and surrounding property. B.J., 951 So.2d at 102. Officer Quintero testified that after approaching M.R. in his marked K-9 vehicle, he got out and loudly yelled verbal instructions to M.R. to return to the immediate area. M.R.’s delayed compliance la. Bd DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Grant, 854 So.2d at 242 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the second element was not satisfied where the defendant shined a flashlight into a glass door for five to ten seconds then left the area and was stopped by police officer thirteen blocks away
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as the type of unequivocal and explicit waiver of sovereign immunity that Plaintiff needs in order to maintain this action. See Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 33, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (“Waivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be unequivocally expressed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Significantly, courts have long held that the mere fact that Congress expressly permits a certain claim to be brought in federal court does not suffice to show that Congress has abrogated the defense of sovereign immunity to that claim. See Munaco v. United States, 522 F.3d 651, 653 n. 3 (6th Cir.2008) (“[JJurisdictional statutes ... do not operate as waivers of sovereign immunity.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 981 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing

    ### Response:
    holding that 28 usc  1331 which states that district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the constitution laws or treaties of the united states does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of exertional impairment.” Foreman, 122 F.3d at 25. 4 . In this context, ""significant” refers to whether the claimant’s nonexertional impairment or impairments preclude the claimant from engaging in the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines under the demands of day-to-day life. Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir.1997). In other words, an ALJ may rely on the Guidelines even though there is a nonexertional impairm Cir.1997) (""When expert testimony conflicts with the DOT, and DOT classifications are not rebutted, the DOT controls.”); Montgomery v. Chater, 69 F.3d 273, 276 (8th Cir.1995) (same); Smith v. Shalala, 46 F.3d 45, 47 (8th Cir.1995) (“when expert testimony conflicts with the DOT, the DOT controls”); Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1257 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1985)

    ### Response:
    holding discrepancies should be resolved in favor of the dot particularly when the alj simply appears to have made a mistake by relying on the ve testimony over an inconsistent description in the dot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relating to Porter’s penalty phase claim. Accordingly, we reverse and enter judgment for the State. REVERSED. 1 . Bardwell formerly served as an assistant state attorney. He was, at the time of Porter’s trial, an experienced private criminal defense attorney who took conflict cases from the public defender. 2 . The record does not contain a transcript of any proceeding during which Porter requested to represent himself. The only pretrial hearings contained in the record are from February 25, 1987, March 13, 1987, November 20, 1987, November 24, 1987, and November 30, 1987. Porter was represented by the public defender at the February and March 1987 hearings. He proceeded pro se at the November 1987 hearings. 3 . Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The record does not contain the court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that— (A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise ... or (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.... 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (amended). The Defendant admits that any obligations for support, alimony, or maintenance that may be awarded by the Family Court are not dischargeable under section 523(a)(5). She contends, however, that this section is not broad enough to include the order entered by the Family Court awarding attorneys’ 2d 940, 941 (5th Cir.1993); Holliday v. Kline (In re Kline), 65 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Brasslett, 233 B.R. 177, 189

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees were nondischargeable as maintenance even though award was in favor of attorneys not spouse because it was rendered in light of the financial resources of the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when describing this last requirement of state-created danger liability. See Rivas, 365 F.3d at 197 (noting that the state-created danger test asks “whether the state actor used his or her authority to create an opportunity, which otherwise would not have existed, for the specific harm to occur,” and that, “[w]ere it not for [the state’s] acts,” no harm would have occurred); Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209 (observing that the jury could conclude that the officers’ conduct was the “but for ’ cause of the injury, and that their conduct “greatly increased” the likelihood of harm). We noted in Kaucher v. County of Bucks that, “[t]here must be a direct causal relationship between the affirmative act of the state and plaintiffs harm.” 455 F.3d 418, 432 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Smith, 318 F.3d at 510 (<HOLDING>)). Ye’s allegations, which must be taken as

    ### Response:
    holding the fourth element asks if but for the defendants actions the plaintiff would have been in a less harmful position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2002, orig. proceeding) (noting, in discussing whether petitions defective for not including certain information, that “[t]he signatures on Morales’ and on Vera’s petitions could be readily verified by checking the voter registration records for Dawson County”). Once Peoples had obtained such conclusive, public-record evidence of the invalidity of the signatures, she had a ministerial duty to reject the application. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 141.065(b); cf. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 145.003(f)(2) (West 2010) (providing candidate may not be certified for placement on ballot if facts indicating ineligibility are conclusively established by another public record); Hayes v. Harris Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 563 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of

    ### Response:
    holding chair has ministerial duty not to certify candidate if another public record conclusively proves facts showing ineligibility to hold office
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to state a viable over-detention claim, as well as any binding legal authority in support of such a claim. The CCS Defendants argue that they did not have any input whatsoever in how long David was detained and, therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a viable Fourteenth Amendment claim against them. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds merit to some of Defendants’ arguments. The Sixth Circuit has recognized a due process claim arising from an inmate’s incarceration beyond his or her court ordered release date. Shorts v. Bartholomew, 255 Fed.Appx. 46 (6th Cir.2007). As the court explained: .. .when a prisoner’s sentence has expired, he is entitled to release. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Perhaps more to the point, an incarcerated

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no privilege in a jailer to keep a prisoner in jail beyond the period of his lawful sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liquidated the subject property and realized the profits therefrom, the receiver had no remaining interest in the property. Id. at 518. The Pyramid court disagreed, finding that the plain language of the statute reflected Congress’s intent to prohibit any interference, direct or indirect, with the functions of the receiver. Id. And, like Dittmer’s lawsuit, the Pyramid court found that the plaintiffs suit would have the effect of rescinding the transfer of property from the receiver to the purchasing company, a move that “would undoubtedly ‘restrain or affect’ the [receiver] in the performance of its statutory duties.” Id. at 519. Other lower courts are in accord with the reasoning of Hindes and Pyramid. See, e.g., Hoxeng v. Topeka Broadcomm, Inc., 911 F.Supp. 1323, 1334-35 (D.Kan.1996) (<HOLDING>); Furgatch v. Resolution Trust Corp., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that the fdics agent could assert  1821  to bar a claim for specific performance even when the fdic was not and could not have been a party to the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Bd. of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97 L.Ed.2d 765 (1987). At issue is whether Plaintiffs Amended Complaint adequately alleges the elements of violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). In order to establish a § 1981 violation, a party must establish three elements: (1) purposeful discrimination; (2) that is based on race; (3) in the making or enforcing of a contract. See Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 17. See also General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3151, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000d mandates that “[n]o

    ### Response:
    holding that 42 usc  1981 requires a showing of purposeful discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the construction of the sentences or the words used are amenable to some criticism, so long as the meaning the court intended to convey is reasonably clear.” Kline v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 178 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Typically, reversals based on deficient jury instructions involve incorrect statements of the law. For example, in Bankers Multiple Line Insurance Co. v. Farish, 464 So.2d 530, 533 (Fla.1985), the trial court gave an instruction that “the greater a defendant’s wealth, the greater must be punitive damages.” The supreme court reversed for a new trial on punitive damages, since the instruction was “not an accurate rule of law” that had been “specifically repudiated” in an earlier case. Id.; see also Coble v. Am. Parks, 576 So.2d 422, 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>); Poole v. Lowell Dunn Co., 573 So.2d 51, 53-54

    ### Response:
    holding that reversal for a new trial was required where jury instruction relating to fraud was incorrect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assess his preservation of parental rights unless the father has ""first shown that it was 'impossible' for [him] to [comply with Utah's adoption statutes, including the deadlines for filing contained therein], 'through no fault of his own.'"" Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 P.2d 199, 208 (Utah 1984). In fact, Utah courts have mandated a hearing, such as the one contemplated by the majority, only where the father asserts that it was impossible for him to comply with Utah statutes because he did not know and could not have known certain material facts: that the mother was pregnant, that she was living in Utah, or that she intended to place the child for adoption in Utah. See Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892,

    ### Response:
    holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process violation. We turn next to Netland’s alternative argument — that the officer violated her right to due process because his behavior shocks the conscience. A defendant’s right to due process has been held to be violated where the action of the government agent is such that it “shocks the conscience.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (“So-called ‘substantive due process’ prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience,’ .... ” (citations omitted)). A cognizable claim under this standard must describe “egregious” governmental conduct, and we have said that “[o]nly the most extreme instances of governmental misconduct satisfy this exacting standard.” Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 487, 490 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>). Such behavior has generally included acts

    ### Response:
    holding that an officers use of deadly force to stop a dangerous car chase did not shock the conscience because an officers poor judgment in using unreasonable force does not automatically convert the officers acts into conscience shocking conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    likely to be given to minorities because cocaine base is less expensive than cocaine powder. Thus, minorities are disparately impacted. Miller draws support from a Minnesota state district court case which held that a Minnesota statute imposing more severe penalties on individuals convicted of offenses involving cocaine base than those involving cocaine powder violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because of its disparate impact on blacks. See Minnesota v. Russell, No. 89067067, Order (4th Judicial District Dec. 27, 1990); Minnesota v. Russell, No. 89067067, Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (4th Judicial District Jan. 29, 1991). Miller’s due process claim is without merit. United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 978-80 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Miller’s equal protection argument, which we

    ### Response:
    holding 1001 ratio is rationally related to objective of protecting public welfare because cocaine base is more dangerous to society than cocaine powder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Helsel v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 307 S.C. 24, 413 S.E.2d 821 (1992). Here, there have been no allegations that would support the elements of estoppel. 3) Standing County and City contend the trial judge erred in denying its motion to dismiss on the ground of standing. Appellants allege that since Evins failed to allege any personal stake in the action and there is no evidence in the record of a personal stake, she does not have standing. We disagr uing that its holding applies only to ultra vires acts and then only to those of immense public importance. We disagree. While in Baird there was an allegation of an ultra vires act, clearly in several cases, we have held a citizen has standing when ultra vires acts were not alleged. Berry v. Zahler, 220 S.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 459 (1951) (<HOLDING>); Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist.,

    ### Response:
    holding that questions of public interest originally encompassed in an action should be decided for future guidance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because it has so contracted; and it is no concern of the insurer as to who gets the proceeds, except to see that it is paid to the proper parties, under its agreement. It is simply required to perform its contract, and the law will dispose of the money according to the rights of the parties. Cheeves, 28 S.W. at 275 (emphasis added). In the century that has followed Cheeves, Texas courts have held time and again that the insurance contract is to be performed as written. E.g., Wilke v. Finn, 39 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. Comm'n App.1931, judgm't adopted) (quoting Cheeves, 28 S.W. at 275); Stillwagoner, 979 S.W.2d at 358 (“[Although the Texas rule requires the designated beneficiary to have an insurable interest, it is not essential to the validity of the contract.”); DeLeon, 259 F.3d at 353 (<HOLDING>). 167 .In Wilke v. Finn, 39 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.

    ### Response:
    holding that insurable interest doctrine does not entitle deceased insureds estate to a reformation of the insurance contract but a constructive trust on the policy proceeds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony elicited by the State from its expert witness, (3) denial of his proposed jury instruction on “operating” a motor vehicle, (4) fundamental error in failing to declare a mistrial, (5) merger of his convictions for vehicular homicide and the lesser-included offense of reckless driving, and (6) cumulative error. As to the fifth issue, the State agrees that it was error to convict and sentence Defendant on the lesser-included offense of reckless driving, and therefore, we do not consider this issue on appeal. As to the remaining issues, we find no error and, hence, no cumulative error. We affirm and remand, directing the district court to enter an amended judgment and sentence vacating the reckless driving conviction. See State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 87, 792 P.2d 408, 419 (1990) (<HOLDING>). All other issues raised in Defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    president. (PL’s Opp’n at 7:4-8.) By order dated March 23, 2000 the Court struck the Cislo affidavit because Continental failed to timely disclose Cislo as an expert witness. See footnote 3, supra. This leaves only the affidavit of David A. White, Continental’s president, who merely claims that the Continental product represented a ""complete departure” from other products available in the market. (Deck of David A. White ¶ 7.) The alleged uniqueness of Continental's product design, however, does not show inherent distinctiveness. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 n. 7 (5th Cir.1998) (noting that inherent distinctiveness requires more than evidence of a design’s uniqueness); Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F.Supp. 1314, 1321 (N.D.Ill.1991) (<HOLDING>). Without the expert affidavit, Continental has

    ### Response:
    holding that trade dress does not qualify as inherently distinctive merely because no previous product combines the same elements any other rule essentially would require a finding of inherent distinctiveness whenever a new product enters the market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Francis, 343 Ark. 104, 31 S.W.3d 841 (2000). Appellant maintains that the issues were fully contested in good faith prior to the entry of the 2007 order, that the suit continues to involve the same parties, that the trial court had jurisdiction, and that the agreed order is a judgment upon the merits of the case. However, as pointed out by appellee, appellant failed to obtain a ruling on the issue of the application of res judicata to this action. Failure to do so prevents this court from addressing the issue. The Ar kansas Supreme Court has held, in appeals in both the civil and the criminal context, that an appellant’s failure to obtain a ruling from the fact-finder precludes appellate review. See, e.g., Simpson Housing Solutions, LLC v. Hernandez, 2009 Ark. 480, 347 S.W.3d 1 (<HOLDING>); Kelley v. State, 375 Ark. 483, 292 S.W.3d 297

    ### Response:
    holding that the supreme court will not address an argument on appeal if a party has failed to obtain a ruling below
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ordinance prohibiting keeping more than three dogs per residential unit); People v. Yeo, 103 Mich.App. 418, 302 N.W.2d 883, 885-86 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1134, 102 S.Ct. 2961, 73 L.Ed.2d 1351 (1982) (same); Downing v. Cook, 69 Ohio St.2d 149, 431 N.E.2d 995, 997 (1982) (upholding ordinance prohibiting keeping more than three adult dogs on comparatively small residential lots); Village of Carpentersville v. Fiala, 98 Ill.App.3d 1005, 54 Ill.Dec. 521, 522, 425 N.E.2d 33, 34 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990, 102 S.Ct. 2271, 73 L.Ed.2d 1285 (1982) (upholding ordinance limiting the number of dogs in a single-family residence to two and the number of dogs in a single-family unit in a multiple housing building to one); State v. Mueller, 220 Wis. 435, 265 N.W. 103, 105-06 (1936) (<HOLDING>). Appellants cite Commonwealth v. Creighton,

    ### Response:
    holding that limiting to two the number of dogs kept per residential unit was not an unreasonable exercise of police power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to deter others from similar conduct.’ ” Rochan, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 797, 610 N.E.2d at 693, quoting Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 712, 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (1983). Herman argues that the punitive damages award is not proportional to the compensatory damages awarded each of the Fords. However, we have previously held that the amount of punitive damages awarded does not need to be proportional, especially when a proportional punitive damages award with a small compensatory damages award would do little to deter the particular defendant or others from “engaging in the same reprehensible pattern of conduct in the future.” Tague v. Molitor Motor Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 313, 318, 487 N.E.2d 436, 439 (1985); see also Deal, 127 Ill. 2d at 204, 537 N.E.2d at 272 (<HOLDING>). Herman also argues that the punitive damages

    ### Response:
    holding that proportionality is not the touchstone for a punitive damages award
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    apply a harmless error analysis to a trial court’s erroneous summary denial of a request to change counsel. See Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250-52; Morrison, 946 F.2d at 499; McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 933-34 (2d Cir.1981). We agree with those courts and hold that a trial judge’s summary denial of a defendant’s motion to change counsel is not structural error requiring automatic reversal. ¶ 13 Instead, we conclude that the appropriate remedy for a trial court’s error in this situation is to remand for a hearing on the defendant’s allegations. See, e.g., Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250 (remanding the case to the district court to conduct a hearing regarding the defendant’s allegation of total breakdown in communication); People v. Olivencia, 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 251 Cal.Rptr. 880, 885-86 (1988) (<HOLDING>); City of Billings v. Smith, 281 Mont. 133, 932

    ### Response:
    holding that the appropriate remedy for a trial courts refusal to consider an indigent defendants request for new counsel is to remand for a hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rosters or Report of Incidents, that disclosure need not control the result here. In this case the DOJ has sufficiently demonstrated that the information withheld from the Daily Assignment Ros ters could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of one or many individuals and thus falls within Exemption 7(F). As the BOP’s declarations explain, the Daily Assignment Rosters, “reveal the institution’s staffing levels, including how many correctional officers are present on each shift and where those officers are posted throughout the institution. This information could assist individuals in planning incidents, including assaults, homicides, and escape attempts.” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶42; cf. Anderson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 806 F.Supp.2d 121, 128 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>) identified in the investigation and resulting

    ### Response:
    holding that exemption 7f was properly invoked to withhold a bops prison incident report because it would likely result in harassment andor retaliation to possibly include physical assaults directed towards individuals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    residue was contraband. Testing for certainty’s sake will not, by itself, undermine an otherwise valid probable cause determination. Cf. United States v. Prandy-Binett, 995 F.2d 1069, 1073 (D.C.Cir.1993) (""If [the defendant's] perfume bag held clear ziplock bags containing white powder, the detectives also would not have been sure whether he possess t court erred in admitting the evidence discovered subsequent to the field test at the Buchanan residence. Having held that the evidence was lawfully admitted, we need not address this argument. 8 . We distinguish this case from United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 266, 126 L.Ed.2d 218 (1993). In Pofahl, we held that .2d 433 (1994); United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1038, 112 S.Ct. 887,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute and sentencing guidelines applicable to crack cocaine have a reasonable basis and are not vague under commonly understood usages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2010) (finding that ""control” is defined as "" 'exercise[ing] power or influence overt]' ” and that as ""person in a position of trust” defendant was able to exercise sufficient control over victim to uphold conviction). As these cases make clear, one who qualifies under the statute may exert ""control” not constrained by temporal circumstances. 15 . Any suggestion that somehow this Court’s precedent would compel a different outcome based on the facts of this case is misplaced. See Edmonds, 226 W.Va. 464, 702 S.E.2d 408 (upholding conviction where maintenance worker/occasional volunteer at a Christian school picked child up in his van and took her to a house he was remodeling where he sexually assaulted her); State ex rel. Harris v. Hatcher, No. 13-1236, 2014 WL 2439902 (May 29, 2014) (<HOLDING>). Justice KETCHUM, dissenting: The defendant

    ### Response:
    holding that whether bus driver who sexually assaulted student at both her house and his merely creates jury issue on operative elements of west virginia code  618d5a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    added). In this case, Yasquez’s lawsuit does not seek appellate review of the state court’s decision applying Florida’s forum non conveniens rules to his claims. Instead, Vasquez seeks review of the district court’s order that federal maritime law does not apply to his case, an issue not resolved by the state court. “[I]f United States law is applicable, the American court should retain jurisdiction rather than relegate the controversy to a foreign tribunal.” Szumlicz v. Norwegian Am. Line, Inc., 698 F.2d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir.1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Vasquez is not asking a federal court to review and reject a judgment of the state court because the Florida court never addressed the issue Vasquez asks us to resolve. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court determined that

    ### Response:
    holding rookerfeldman doctrine inapplicable to claims that do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or otherwise.” ER 702. 2 In Reese, the concurrence suggested that the Daubert test was the appropriate test to apply in a civil case given the different burden of proof required in a civil proceeding. See Reese, 128 Wn.2d at 310, 312 (C. Johnson, J., concurring). 3 The study was simply designed to see if there was a correlation between such in útero exposures and birth defects; the study was not designed to find cause. 4 For example, polygraph tests have been widely excluded based not only on Frye but as unreliable under ER 702 and as unfairly prejudicial under ER 403. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming trial court exclusion of polygraph under ER 702 and Daubert, 509 U.S. 579); United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the polygraph results were excludable under er 403
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wage index? That issue was addressed at trial by IRMH’s expert, Julia DiFrancesco. DiFrancesco opined that the Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board would have rejected IRMH’s initial application as incomplete and would have provided an opportunity for the hospital to amend its application to seek the Orlando wage index. Counsel for RRI objected generally to DiFrancescos’ expertise in the field, but made no contemporaneous objection to the specific questions resulting in the expert’s opinions. This court need not determine whether DiFrancesco’s opinions are supported by the other evidence in the case because RRI failed to seek their exclusion. As no objection to this crucial evidence was raised below, it was waived. See Anderson v. State, 863 So.2d 169, 180-81 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). While the trial court does not exclusively

    ### Response:
    holding that speculation objection as to expert testimony was waived where a different ground for objection was offered below
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1042 (1923) (noting the fundamental individual right of choice of language); Yniguez v. Arizonans For Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 948 (9th Cir.1995) (“Since language is a close and meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of languages may mask discrimination against specific national origin groups or, more generally, conceal nativist sentiment”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 43, 117 S.Ct. 1055,137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997); Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595, 601 (9th Cir.1993) (“accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined”); United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436, 440 (9th Cir.1990) (recognizing “how closely tied Spanish language is to Hispanic identity”); Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1811,

    ### Response:
    holding accent discrimination may be actionable as national origin discrimination under title vii citing with approval eeoc guidelines defining national origin discrimination to include discrimination based on the linguistic characteristics of a national origin group
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    914 F.2d 565, 568 (4th Cir.1990) (labeling as “ministerial” claimed error that, government had not returned warrant to magistrate judge within prescribed period); United States v. Wyder, 674 F.2d 224, 225-26 (4th Cir.1982) (labeling as “ministerial” scrivenor’s error contained in copy of the warrant given to the defendant). Non-constitutional violations of Rule 41 warrant suppression only when the defendant is prejudiced by the violation, see Smith, 914 F.2d at 568; Wyder, 674 F.2d at 226, or when “there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule,” Burke, 517 F.2d at 387. See Chaar, 137 F.3d at 362; Gerber, 994 F.2d at 1560; Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d at 1283. First, we conclude that the failure of the team executing the wa , 1456 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the Rule 41(d)

    ### Response:
    holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    547”. (Disclosure Statement at 69; Plan § 12.10.) Therefore, Defendant knew or should have known that the Trustee could have commenced the instant action post-confirmation and as such, Defendant cannot now claim that such action is barred. For the reasons discussed above, I reject the rationale of those cases which hold that res judicata bars a subsequent action unless the debtor’s disclosure statement and/or plan specifically reserves the right to litigate that specific claim, and choose to follow those courts which hold that a subsequent action is not barred by a prior confirmation hearing under the doctrine of res judicata where the disclosure statement and plan contain a general reservation of the right to pursue preference actions post-confirmation. See Weidel, 208 B.R. at 853-54 (<HOLDING>); see also Envirodyne Indus., Inc. v. Conn.

    ### Response:
    holding that res judicata did not bar debtors objection to creditors proof of claim where the plan expressly reserved the general right to assert postconfirmation objections to claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence of persecution or harassment of any kind. Only in 2004, when the land dispute arose, did Musabwasoni exhibit any hostility toward Petitioners. Even once this conflict began, the record contains just a few remarks by Petitioners’ alleged persecutors referencing their Burundian background, always in the context of telling Petitioners to return to Burundi so that Musabwasoni could take the land. Given these facts, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that even if Reverien’s remarks suggested that Petitioners’ persecution might be based on their Burundian background, the eight years of prior peace between Petitioners and Musabwasoni dispelled any inference that such animus was a significant reason for their conflict. Cf. Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 535 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 724 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of an ethnic slur during an otherwise ordinary robbery was not enough to show that the robbers acted because of their victims ethnicity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this testimony, unrebut-ted by the record, is that the firearm was kept at the stash house to safeguard the drug inventory. 4 . In a single sentence in his brief, the appellant suggests that his putative withdrawal from the conspiracy may have affected the district court’s drug-quantity calculation. Any such suggestion is doubly defaulted. For one thing, the district court used the very drug-quantity calculation proposed at sentencing by the appellant, and the appellant is bound by that calculation. See United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 28 (1st Cir. 2001). For another thing, the appellant's brief is bereft of developed argumentation concerning any drug-quantity issue and, thus, any such claim of error has been abandoned. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that it is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way leaving the court to do counsels work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    determine total loss, restitution victims and restitution amount. J.A. 30 ¶ 3. 2 . As a general matter, restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See United States v. Buchey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (“Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.""); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended “to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”). In fact, we have previously held that restitution F.3d 969, 973-74 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 690 n. 1 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding issue waived because it was not mentioned in brief but was only raised in notice of appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the PLRA. In support, they correctly note that proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4248 are civil, not criminal, actions. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1954, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010); United States v. Caporale, 701 F.3d 128, 130 (4th Cir.2012); United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 442-43 (4th Cir.2012); United States v. Francis, 686 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir.2012); United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 456 (4th Cir.2012); United States v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2011). Thus, they argue that their claims are not subject to the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement. See Hicks v. James, 255 Fed.Appx. 744, 748 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (collecting cases); Michau v. Charleston Cnty., S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 727-28 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The court agrees that plaintiffs’ claims are

    ### Response:
    holding that a person detained under south carolinas sexually violent predator act does not meet the plras definition of prisoner and therefore the plras requirements do not apply to his claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preempt any State or local law, rule, regulation, or order to the extent that: (a) Compliance with both the State or local requirement and this appendix is not possible; or (b) Compliance with the State or local requirement is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of any requirement in this appendix. 2. The alcohol misuse requirements of this title shall not be construed to preempt provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for reckless conduct leading to actual loss of life, injury, or damage to property, whether the provisions apply specifically to transportation employees or employers or to the general public. 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. J, § 1(E). 14 . Compare Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 343 F.3d 1129, reh’g denied and amended by, 350 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>), with Frank v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 314 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that because the first sentence of  45106a expressly limited the preemptive effect to inconsistent state regulation it would not infer a negative pregnant from the second sentence of subsection a that laws other than the specific state criminal laws described would be preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.” Empire points to the language contained under paragraph 1 of this statute and contends the conduct of Litton constitutes, as a matter of law, an acceptance of its offer under the Equipment Sales Agreement. Litton, on the other hand, points to the lead paragraph of this statute and argues that paragraph 6 of the Equipment Sales Agreement, as a matter of law, “otherwise unambiguously indicated” that only home office acceptance shall constitute an acceptance of the contract. In our opinion, both ar ontaining a clause that acceptance can only be made by approval of officers at the home office could be accepted in a manner other than by such written approval. See Pratt-Gilbert Co. v. Renaud, 25 Ariz. 79, 213 P. 400 (1923) (<HOLDING>); Armour & Co. v. Celic, 294 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that complete performance of contract constituted acceptance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pay. D. Is Lapine Entitled to Lost Wages? In short, Lapine is entitled to receive lost wages. The VERA, sets out, in relevant part, that an employer must compensate the returning veteran “for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by reason of such employer’s unlawful action.” 38 U.S.C. § 4302. Credit must be given for the wages Lapine earned in the years he was not working for the Town, but the Supreme Court has held that courts should not consider unemployment compensation in reducing an award of back pay. That is, the Town ejudgment interest and I find that Lapine is entitled to such interest on the amount of the back pay award. Awarding him interest on his back pay will properly compensate him and make him whole. See Hembree v. Georgia Power Co., 637 F.2d 423, 429 (5 Cir., 1981) (<HOLDING>); Hanna v. American Motors Corp., 724 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that because it was clear that plaintiff veteran was deprived of reemployment rights explicitly granted to him by congress under the vrra the only way he can be made whole is by awarding him prejudgment interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pipes, 398 F.Supp.2d 1126, 1133 (D.Or.2004). “[A] cause of action for defamation accrues immediately upon the occurrence of the tortious act and, thus, is not appropriate for the continuing violation exception.” Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Lettis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 39 F.Supp.2d 181, 205 (E.D.N.Y.1998)). Even if the Court assumes arguendo that plaintiffs allegations are true, the repeated statements do not amount to a continuing tort. “[R]epeated defamations do not constitute a continuing tort; rather, as courts have uniformly recognized, each separate defamatory statement itself constitutes a separate and distinct cause of action.” Lewis v. Gupta, 54 F.Supp.2d 611, 616 (E.D.Va.1999); see also Celli v. Shoell, 995 F.Supp. 1337, 1345 (D.Utah 1998) (<HOLDING>). 2. Defamation of Plaintiff to Antonio Bryant

    ### Response:
    holding that each alleged defamatory statement constitutes a distinct cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the murders, and thus no Brady violation occurred. The statement supports a theory that both Tapia and Domino shot both victims. Insofar as ambiguities in the statement might be construed to support a theory that only Domino shot one or the other of the victims, the statement does nothing to undermine the conspiracy and aiding and abetting theories under which Tapia was also charged. The statement does not meet the “reasonable probability” threshold and does not undermine confidence in the verdict. See id. fusing to decide the issue and affirming on other grounds the district court decision in Lyons v. Johnson, 912 F.Supp. 679 (1996), using Chapman review when testing error for harmlessness for the first time on habeas). But see Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466 (5th Cir.1997)

    ### Response:
    holding that brechtkotteakos should be applied on habeas even when no state court had ever evaluated claim using chapman on direct review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ” Oki Semiconductor, 298 F.3d at 773 (quoting Cox v. Admin. United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1399 (11th Cir.1994)). To prove that an injury is proximately caused by a RICO violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is “a direct relationship between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Imagineering, 976 F.2d at 1311 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311); see id. (“One principle underlying this requirement is that the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintif holding that a sublessee was not directly injured when RICO violations caused an increase in the rent charged to the primary tenant, although the tenant passed the increases on to the sublessee); Imagineering, 976 F.2d at 1311 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, to state a RICO claim,

    ### Response:
    holding that a subcontractor was not directly injured when a rico violation prevented a general contractor that would have retained it from obtaining a construction contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    225, 227 (1991) (noting that although “the underlying determination may be factualfj ... whether those facts are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that clear and unmistakable evidence be shown is a legal determination subject to de novo review”). This Court is required to make an independent determination whether the record contains clear evidence of sufficient weight to rebut the presumption of regularity and whether the Secretary has presented evidence showing that he complied with his mailing obligation under the statute or that there was actual receipt. See Woods, 14 Vet.App. at 220-21 (concluding that presumption as applied to Secretary’s mailing of RO notice oí decision to veteran was rebutted and Secretary failed to meet his burden); Piano, 5 Vet.App. at 26-27 (<HOLDING>); Ashley II, 2 Vet.App. at 311 (same). 1.

    ### Response:
    holding that after presumption of regularity of mailing was rebutted secretary did not meet his burden of establishing that bva decision was mailed to veteran as required by section 7104e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur. 1 . Although the notice of appeal that Defendants filed made reference to both of the orders mentioned in the text of this opinion, Defendants have not, as Plaintiff correctly notes, made any argument challenging the denial of their motion for a new trial. As such, the validity of the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial is not properly before us. 2 . The facts set forth in the text of this opinion are derived from an examination of the allegations set out in Defendants’ amended counterclaim as compared to the allegations contained in their original pleading. See Hughes v. Anchor Enters., Inc., 245 N.C. 131, 135, 96 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1956) (<HOLDING>). 3 . As a result of their failure to advance

    ### Response:
    holding that while the excerpt from the original complaint was competent as evidence as a pleading it was superseded by the amended complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    personal benefit to the religious leader of the church will not defeat the exemption, provided that use consistent with a shown necessity is proved. * # * * “The requirement of ‘used solely’ in the statute pertains to the character and not the amount of use. Infrequent use of property may indicate in part that such utilization is not reasonably necessary for the advancement of church aims.” Id. at 643, 645 (citation omitted). It is possible that only some parts of an organization’s property, or even parts of a single building, are exempt, while other parts are not. ORS 307.140(1); see also Golden Writ of God v. Dept. of Rev., 300 Or 479, 483-87, 713 P2d 605 (1986) (describing rule and holding one parcel exempt and others taxable); German Apost. Christ. Church, 279 Or at 644-45 (<HOLDING>). There is no shortage of cases construing ORS

    ### Response:
    holding an office exempt and the rest of the residence taxable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Student Plaintiffs’ protected First Amendment interests, a delay of only a few hours .was not a sufficient injury to invoke the protections of Article III of the Constitution. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (“There is, of course a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned”); Brown v. Stone, 66 F.Supp.2d 412, 436 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (“[A]ny perceived chilling effect would appear to be de minimus, and hence not of constitutional significance.”); Arce v. Banks, 913 F.Supp. 307, 309 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (“At most, [plaintiff] has suffered a de minimus infringement of his First Amendment rights which is not actionable in a § 1983 petition”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Because the Student Plaintiffs have failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was “plain,” which is the second requirement of the plain error test. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298. Those assumptions are not enough, however, because Vasquez cannot meet the third requirement of the test, which is that he show that the district court’s alleged error prejudiced him — that it created a reasonable probability of a different result. See id. at 1299. One reason that he cannot show that is because the court also based the manager-or-supervisor enhancement on the undisputed fact that Vasquez provided the money with which the conspirators bought the heroin. We have held that “provid[ing] funding for [a] criminal endeavor” supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. United States v. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir.1995); cf. United States v. Packer, 70 F.3d 357, 362 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Another reason Vasquez cannot show that the

    ### Response:
    holding that providing the necessary funding for criminal activity supports a  3b11 enhancement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendant’s motion for new trial would be sustained. We stated that “[u]nless we can say that there is no legal cause or reason for ordering the conditional remittitur or granting a new trial, the action of the trial court must be sustained.” Id. at 748, 224 N.W.2d at 187. We affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding: It is only necessary that we find tenable grounds to support the conclusion that the jury verdict ... is excessive. Such grounds are clearly present. The trial court was acting within the proper bounds of its discretion in entering the order granting a new trial upon the refusal of the plaintiff to file the remittitur. Id. at 750, 224 N.W.2d at 188. See, also, e.g., Scherz v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 151 Neb. 415, 37 N.W.2d 721 (1949) (<HOLDING>). The dissent to this case concedes that this

    ### Response:
    holding that where there is evidence sufficient to sustain finding of trial court that prejudicial error was contained in record there is no basis for stating that trial court abused discretion in granting new trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Unless specified otherwise throughout this opinion, we will generally discuss the appeal in terms of the total relief awarded by the district court rather than by referencing the various awards of relief. 2 . This case was decided prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, and is binding precedent under Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981). 3 . The fact that plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees remained outstanding is irrelevant to the issue as to whether a final judgment had been entered. See Taylor v. Texgas Corp., 831 F.2d 255, 258 (11th Cir.1987) (awards of attorneys’ fees in ADEA cases are collateral to decision on the merits). See generally Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 4 . We similarly reject as frivolous the

    ### Response:
    holding that existence of outstanding claims for attorneys fees do not affect determination whether district court entered a final decision for purposes of 28 usc  1291
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the public policy exception may be recognized on ""a clear showing, based on some identifiable policy that has been ‘officially declared' in a statute or municipal regulation, or in the Constitution”). We perceive no error in the court’s ruling. 4 . Although we do not decide whether any particular cause of action would lie on the facts of this case under the law of the District of Columbia, or if applicable, of Maryland, on remand the parties and the trial court should consider claims based on intentional or reek-less misrepresentation, derived from the common law of torts, see, e.g., Carr v. Brown, 395 A.2d 79, 84 (D.C.1978) (describing tortious interference with prospective advantage as ""loosely allied to defamation”); but see Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>); or arising under statute, D.C. CODE § 51 —

    ### Response:
    holding that defamation claim fails because communication by employer to dc office of employment services is absolutely privileged 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . The IJ found that Mr. Umoh’s CIMT convictions made him inadmissible and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (listing admissibility as one requirement for adjustment of status). Mr. Umoh does not dispute that, in order to be granted adjustment of status, he must obtain a waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182(h). 2 .Mr. Umoh also addresses the BIA's denial of his motion for reconsideration in his opening brief. Because he failed to file a separate petition for review, we do not have jurisdiction to review that decision. See Desta v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Mr. Umoh concedes that he is removable as

    ### Response:
    holding court precluded from reviewing denial of motion for reconsideration where petitioner did not separately seek review of that decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Huff also recognized that the choice of law in this case was not an obvious one, and denied the motion without prejudice to Defendant raising the issue after the parties had conducted relevant discovery. Defendant asserts that since filing its motion, discovery has revealed facts sufficient to support the application of Australian law. Australian law does not recognize a bad faith claim or allow for the recovery of punitive damages based on breach of an insurance contract. (Id. at 7.) Therefore, these claims would be barred. The laws of California and Australia are materially different, making the choice of law analysis a matter of great importance in this case. See, e.g., Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 637, 645, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 (<HOLDING>). Because of the material difference in law,

    ### Response:
    holding that a states law is materially different from california law if application of the other states law leads to a different result
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. This petition for writ of mandamus seeks to compel a ruling on a motion for postconviction relief. Because the circuit court has recently issued an order striking one ground of the motion with leave-, to amend, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Munn v. Florida Parole Commission, 807 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). (<HOLDING>). However, we encourage the circuit court to

    ### Response:
    holding that where the trial court has recently taken action mandamus relief was not warranted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thus, because defendant did not request a full restitution hearing at or before sentencing and had no good cause not to make the request, he waived his entitlement to a restitution hearing. See Utah R.Crim. P. 12(d). ¶ 11 Defendant argues that the trial court, in effect, waived his waiver because he asserts the hearing on his motion after sentencing amounted to a restitution hearing. In support of his position defendant cites to the following cases: State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (concluding when issue raised in motion for new trial for first time, and court addressed issue on merits in denying motion and considered alleged error rather than finding it waived, defendant's right to assert issue on appeal was resuscitated); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah

    ### Response:
    holding when defendant waived objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary hearing granted and judge considered claim defendants waiver was effectively waived by judge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    based on that evidence. State v. Dixon, 880 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992). I fail to see what difference it makes here that the State elected not to contest the motion to suppress. In other words, whether opposed or not, Appellant got exactly what he asked for, suppression of evidence against him. “Bad faith” on the part of the State in this area of the law has heretofore been thought to be the action of intentionally procuring a continuance of the preliminary hearing beyond the 30-day time period of Rule 5(e), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the purpose of presenting the case directly to the grand jury thereby depriving the defendant of a preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 578 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn.1979); State v. Mackey, 638 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982) (<HOLDING>) A mere failure to contest defense motions

    ### Response:
    holding states failure to oppose a continuance of preliminary hearing at the request of the defense is not bad faith and presentation of case to grand jury during continuance was proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, fifty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident[.] Id. It is undisputed that: (1) Thompson Capital owned the Cougar; (2) at the time of the collision, Bough was using the Cougar -with the express permission of Thompson Capital; and (3) the collision occurred in Missouri. Pursuant to the plain language of § 303.190.2(2), the owner’s policy issued by NCC to Thompson Capital was required to provide coverage, up to the $25,000 per person MVFRL limit, for Bough’s permissive use of the Cougar. See Karscig, 303 S.W.3d at 503 (<HOLDING>). NCC argues, however, that the exclusion in

    ### Response:
    holding that an owners policy must comply with the statutory mandates in  3031902
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have therefore determined that, in aid of the proper exercise of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, the Federal District Court in which this proceeding commenced should upon due notice to the State and all other interested parties make a judicial determination as to Rees’ mental competence and render a report on the matter to us. Id.; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (“[E]videnee of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but ... even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient.”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Like the Supreme Court in Rees, we require

    ### Response:
    holding that further inquiry is required where a defendant displays irrational behavior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is also due to be DENIED. 2. Alabama State Law — Assault and Battery Plaintiff alleges state law assault and battery claims against Defendants Seale and Smith .arising out of the April 27, 2009 incident. Generally, sheriffs enjoy sovereign immunity from suits for damages in their individual capacities for acts they performed in the course and scope of their employment. See Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 500-01 (Ala.2005) (“[T]his Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a constitutional officer.in the officer’s individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of the officer’s employment.”); Boshell v. Walker Cnty., 598 So.2d 843, 844 (Ala.1992) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Alabama Supreme Court has

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a sheriff as an executive officer of the state of alabama is immune under article i  14 of the alabama constitution from suit based on state law claims arising out of the execution of the duties of his office
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    infliction of emotional distress. Harris alleged Bray revealed information protected by the attorney-client privilege to her husband’s attorneys during and after Bray’s representation of her in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. After Harris dismissed her petition without prejudice, Bray moved the court to impose sanctions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 80(a). The court sustained the motion' and entered judgment against Harris for $1000 which represented the deductible Bray was obligated to pay under the terms of his malpractice insurance policy when the insurer undertook its duty to defend Bray in the action. Harris appeals. We treat the notice of appeal as an application for issuance of a writ of certiora-ri. See Hearity v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 440 N.W.2d 860, 862-68 (Iowa 1989) (<HOLDING>). Wé grant the writ and review the assignments

    ### Response:
    holding review of district court order imposing sanctions is by application for issuance of a writ of certiorari
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are governed by the same standards as govern ADA, ADEA, and Title VII claims. See Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir.2006) (Title VII); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 332 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000)(ADA); Devlin v. Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 173 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1999) (ADEA). Moreover, employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to Sections 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the three-step, burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. See Mavrommatis v. Carey Limousine Westchester, Inc., No. 10-3404-cv, - Fed. Appx.-, -, 2011 WL 3903429, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2011) (noting that discrimination claims brought pursuant to § 1981 are analyzed under McDonnell Douglas)-, Kearney, 185 Fed.Appx. at 70 (<HOLDING>); Sorlucco, 888 F.2d at 6-7 (2d Cir.1989)

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs equal protection claim pursuant to 42 usc  1983 for agebased employment discrimination fails for the same reasons that her adea and nyshrl claims fail under mcdonnell douglas analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clause rights because the message was used as evidence of her guilt. We review Confrontation Clause challenges de novo. Snelling, 225 Ariz. at 187 ¶ 18, 236 P.3d at 414. ¶ 80 The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. As Forde concedes, the message was not testimonial. “Testimony” means “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The text message reflected Gaxiola’s intent to warn Forde of police activity; it did not seek to establish or prove a fact. Cf. State v. Damper, 223 Ariz. 572, 575-76 ¶ 12, 225 P.3d 1148, 1151-52 (App.2010) (<HOLDING>). The court did not violate Forde’s

    ### Response:
    holding that text message from victim before murder asking friend to come over and advising that she and defendant had been fighting was not testimonial because nothing suggests victim intended or believed it might later be used in a prosecution or at a trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to summary judgment on its Section 542.058 claim, as the court had already held that insurer breached duty to defend); Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Reconsider at 3 (“Admiral ... does not now argue that the ‘independent injury’ requirement applies to a claim under the ‘Prompt Payment Act.’ ”); Performance Autoplex II, Ltd. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 322 F.3d 847, 861 (5th Cir.2003) (“The sole basis for finding liability under [§ 542], then, is that the requisite time has passed and the insurer was ultimately found liable for the claim.”); Harrison v. Int’l Catastrophe Ins. Managers, LLC, No. 10-CV-683, 2012 WL 1231071, at *5 (E.D.Tex. March 22, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 1232020 (E.D.Tex. April 12, 2012); Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff had a duty to defend, and

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no good faith exception for failing to comply with texas insurance code article 2155 predecessor to chapter 542
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by allowing him to plead his complaint generally at the outset and to “fill in the blanks” following discovery. The issue of whether to relax Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements for complaints brought under the FCA and to permit early discovery is one of first impression in this circuit. “[S]ome courts have recognized in theory that the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) may be relaxed in an FCA qui tam action where the information relevant to the fraud is ‘peculiarly within the perpetrator’s knowledge.’ ” United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 229 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co., 343 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir.2003)). However, few courts have actually applied such a standard. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 229, 231 (<HOLDING>). We join the more recent decisions and

    ### Response:
    holding a qui tam relator may not present general allegations in lieu of the details of actual false claims in the hope that such details will emerge through subsequent discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the IJ’s finding that Galdamez was not persecuted “on account” of his membership in this group is not supported by substantial evidence. The government contends that we should deny the petition for review and affirm the denial of asylum on the ground that the group to which Galdamez belongs is not a “particular social group” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. However, neither the IJ nor the BIA decided whether the group of which Galdamez claims to be a member — “young Honduran men who have been actively recruited by gangs and who have refused to join the gangs” — is a “particular social group” within the meaning of the Act. We decline to decide this question in the first instance. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 126 S.Ct. 1613, 164 L.Ed.2d 358 (2006) (<HOLDING>). The IJ denied Galda-mez’s application for

    ### Response:
    holding that court of appeals erred by holding in the first instance that members of a family are a particular social group without prior resolution of this issue by the bia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court did not err in admitting it. In addition, even if the statements were inadmissible, GNS was not harmed by the admission because neither the trial court nor this court relied on them. We therefore affirm the summary judgment in favor of Fullmer. BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur. 1 . As stated in its brief, GNS raises this argument simply to preserve its rights in the event we determine that an affidavit regarding the availability of renter's insurance is necessary. 2 . It is not clear from the Sutton opinion what the terms of the rental agreement were; however, it is clear that the landlords did not obligate the tenant to furnish fire insurance, but rather purchased it themselves. Sutton, 532 P.2d at 482. 3 . But see Page v. Scott, 263 Ark. 684, 567 S.W.2d 101 (1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W.2d 87 (Iowa

    ### Response:
    holding landlord may recover from tenant for fire damage caused by tenants negligence regardless of existence of insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment at 1-2. While the sociological constructs that differentiate ""national origin” from ""race"" are complex and beyond the scope of this Order, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not described his race other than to state that he is of Puerto Rican ancestry. But see Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88. (8th Cir.1977) (discussing section 1981 cases in which Puerto Rican plaintiff claimed national origin discrimination and not racial discrimination). 2 . Plaintiff's Complaint titles Count I as ""Violation of Section 1981,"" but Plaintiff explicitly alleges Title VII violations against Defendants in his Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 2a, as well as implicitly at ¶ 28. See also Ferrill v. The Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 3 . Plaintiff alleges

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the test for intentional discrimination in suits under  1981 is the same as the formulation used in title vii discriminatory treatment cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testified, that after their birth but before testing, the children were not exposed to methamphetamine by Hettieh or any other person. The exposure occurred prior to birth. [¶ 7] Hettieh moved to dismiss the complaint under N.D.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2). She argued the State failed to allege she committed any criminal act upon her child postpartum. The State argued that the child was “exposed” to methamphetamine postpartum and the mother was criminally liable. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding the State failed to prove in its information or affidavit of probable caus h Carolina and Alabama have held an unborn child is a child, person, or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution. See Ex Parte Ankrom, Nos. 1110176 and 1110219, 2013 WL 135748, at *1 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777

    ### Response:
    holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasonably believe an armed robbery occurred. See Osborne. 335 S.C. at 180, 516 S.E.2d at 205; see also State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1986) (finding that the corroboration rule only requires the State’s independent evidence to “touch or be concerned with the corpus delicti ” and, standing alone, it need not prove any element of the crime). Here, Dodd’s confession to having a gun was corroborated by his threat to the clerk that he would kill her if she did not do as he told her. Although his threat, unaccompanied by any representation of a deadly weapon, would not independently be sufficient to establish the element of a deadly weapon, the threat is sufficient to corroborate Dodd’s confession to being armed. See Muldrow, 348 S.C. 264 at 268, 559 S.E.2d at 849 (<HOLDING>). When there is any evidence tending to

    ### Response:
    holding that the state did not sufficiently prove the defendant was armed when the only evidence against him was that he handed a clerk a note that read give me all your cash or ill shoot you and there was no confession to having a gun
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pursuant to zoning ordinances. See Heery, 61 N.C. App. at 613, 300 S.E.2d at 870. In Heery, we held that because there was no finding of fact in the trial court’s order, and petitioners did not allege any special damages, petitioners were not an aggrieved party and thus lacked standing. In contrast, the Neighborhood alleged special damages in their original motion to intervene and particularized the special damages in their amended motion. Petitioner emphasizes that the City found there was no evidence of diminished property values; however, the court, not the City, determines standing. The superior court found the Neighborhood to be aggrieved, such a finding is supported by the Neighborhood’s pleading, and therefore we affirm. See Piney Mountain, 63 N.C. App. at 247, 304 S.E.2d at 253 (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. Judges GREENE and HORTON

    ### Response:
    holding that when a corporate petitioner has no property interest but represents individuals who live in the affected area and who potentially will suffer injury    such petitioner has standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d at 949, 954-57. 46 . Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d at 955. 47 . Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d at 1387. 48 . Id. 49 . Id. (citation omitted). 50 . Id. at 1367. 51 . Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d at 955. 52 . Id. (citation omitted). 53 . Id. (citations omitted). 54 . Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del.1988). 55 . Id. (citation omitted). 56 . Id. 57 . Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del.1996). 58 . Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del.1992). 59 . In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., 2002 WL 31720732, at *16 (Del.Ch. Nov. 22, 2002). See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 60 .See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989) (<HOLDING>). 61 . Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493

    ### Response:
    holding that structural safety devices in a merger agreement are properly subject to a unocal analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Finley knocked on the door, no one responded. When Finley checked the door, he found it chained from the inside. When Finley called out, no one answered. Ms. Patterson’s son, however, insisted that Marquette was inside. As Finley walked off the porch, three shotgun blasts came through the window and struck him. There was an exchange of gunfire, and the police launched tear gas into the house. A small fire broke out. The shooting from inside the house stopped. The police entered. Marquette was dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Ms. Patterson had died next to Marquette, in a kneeling position, possibly from smoke inhalation. Finley sued Ms. Patterson’s estate, seeking damages on theories of negligence and wantonness. The trial court directed a verdict for the estate explainin (<HOLDING>). 3 . We note that in Nail, 542 So.2d at 1211,

    ### Response:
    holding wife did not have a duty to warn a police officer who was shot while escorting her home that her husband had threatened to kill any police officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    required him to remain for the warrant check. We therefore conclude that trial court erred in suppressing the evidence on this basis. However, we turn briefly to address the defendant's additional contention. The defendant argues to us that he did not consent to the search of his pockets. C.A.R. 4.1 provides an appeal for the prosecution rather than for the defendant. See C.A.R. 4.1(a) (""The state may file an interloc utory appeal in the supreme court from a ruling of a district court granting a motion . made in advance of trial by the defendant ... to suppress evidence ....""); see also section 16-12-102(2), CRS. (2008). Consequently, we lack jurisdiction to address an issue the trial court resolved in favor of the prosecution. See People v. Gothard, 185 P.3d 180, 183 (Colo.2008) (<HOLDING>); People v. Reyes, 956 P.2d 1254, 1256

    ### Response:
    holding that issues resolved in favor of the prosecution cannot be considered on the prosecutions interlocutory appeal from an order granting the defendants suppression motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that J.B. is capable of making academic progress without psychological and counseling services because there is no evidence to support such a finding. Consequently, at a minimum, J.B. should receive a psychiatric evaluation for diagnostic and evaluation purposes in order to determine the extent of the psychological and counseling services that he needs to benefit from special education. Based on this evaluation, a PPT must be convened to incorporate the psychiatrist’s recommendations into an appropriate special education program for J.B. This Court is sensitive to the warning that courts should avoid causing states to incur huge expenditures by requiring states to provide health care. See Detsel v. Board of Educ. of Auburn Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 637 F.Supp. 1022, 1027 (N.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

    ### Response:
    holding that constant inschool nursing care for a severely physically handicapped child falls within the medical services exclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464-65 (Utah 1996); Bushey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 164 Vt. 399, 670 A.2d 807, 809 (1995); Warmka v. Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co., 136 Wis.2d 31, 400 N.W.2d 923, 925 (1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 825 (Wyo.1994). Although the standard has the benefit of being fairly widespread, we reject it for two reasons. First, adopting the “fairly debatable” standard would not resolve the conflict that we face. A jury finding of bad faith would still be predicated upon a negative proposition — that coverage of the insured’s claim was not fairly debatable. See, e.g., Gilbert, 646 So.2d at 593 (stating that plaintiff in bad faith case must prove “the absence of a debatable reason”); Tokles & Son, 605 N.E.2d at 943 (<HOLDING>); Billings, 918 P.2d at 464-66 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that insured not liable for bad faith when claim was fairly debatable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the form of its “unique business and marketing systems, its data base, its 800 number, and its very ability to do business”. Appellant’s Brief at 28. Noting that it is an issue of first impression for the District of Columbia whether the tort of conversion should encompass intangible rights other than ones “ ‘customarily merged in, or identified with some document’ ”, 839 F.Supp. at 933 (quoting W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 15, at 92 (5th ed. 1984)), the court rejected the claim on the theory that the District of Columbia would not so extend the tort. The district court may have been correct, but we note that some courts have extended conversion in this way. See, e.g., National Surety Corp. v. Applied Systems, Inc., 418 So.2d 847, 849 (Ala.1982) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the court here did not need to

    ### Response:
    holding that conversion would lie for copying and taking of computer programs even if defendant never took the tapes embodying the programs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are the separate property of each individual. The wages are the result of the efforts of the individual, not the dissolved community. However, when the earnings received after dissolution are in the form of retirement benefits or pension or profit sharing plans and are deferred compensation for work performed during the marriage, then there is a community property interest in the earnings. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); Woodward v. Woodward, 117 Ariz. 148, 571 P.2d 294 (App.1977); Provinzano v. Provinzano, 116 Ariz. 571, 570 P.2d 513 (App.1977). As discussed earlier, workmen’s compensation is based on the loss of earning capacity during the period of disability. There does not appear to be any element of retirement benefit or pension or profit sharin 979) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,

    ### Response:
    holding social security disability payments and military disability payments are separate property after dissolution of marriage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    factual findings of the juvenile court, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1996). We presume the child is innocent of the charges, and the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the delinquent acts. Iowa Code § 232.47(10) (2011). Our review of the juvenile court’s admission of other-acts evidence is for an abuse of discretion. J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d at 751. The State argues that our de novo standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence for juvenile adjudications is inappropriate and unwarranted by Iowa Code chapter 232. The State contends that although our caselaw has long held that our review is de novo and that we consider the facts anew to determine (<HOLDING>). While the State accurately describes the

    ### Response:
    holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    approximately one-month period of prolonged pain and disability. Foster, 303 S.W.3d at 840-41. We held that the report was adequate as to this claim. Id. Richardson is not required to perfect a second interlocutory appeal in order to require the trial court to give effect to our judgment and mandate in Foster. Requiring Richardson to pursue a second interlocutory appeal to obtain relief we have already granted in a prior interlocutory appeal is not an adequate remedy at law. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 306 S.W.3d at 248 (explaining that “[b]ecause this issue arises in connection with a final judgment following an appeal to this Court, we conclude that Columbia now has no other adequate remedy by appeal”); see generally In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex.1999) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). V. Conclusion Because the trial court’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing appellate remedy inadequate when trial courts abuse of discretion constituted automatic reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc. v. Douglas, 194 Neb. 715, 235 N.W.2d 398 (1975) (poker and bridge are games of chance). Thus, the question becomes whether the player bets something of value on the outcome. Something of value shall mean any money or property, any token, object, or article exchangeable for money or property, or any form of credit or promise directly or indirectly contemplating transfer of money or property or of any interest therein, or involving extension of a service or entertainment. § 28-1101(6). The 25 cents used to activate the machines is clearly something of value. The free replay credits awarded by the machines are a credit or promise involving extension of a service or entertainment and are therefore something of value. See, also, Baedaro v. Caldwell, 156 Neb. 489, 56 N.W.2d 706 (1953) (<HOLDING>); Score Family Fun Center v. San Diego Cty.,

    ### Response:
    holding that free games on pinball machines are things of value for purposes of gambling statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entry into the sunroom was lawful. See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] police officer :is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable police officer could have believed his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the officer at the time the conduct occurred”) (citing Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1990)) (alteration supplied). In summary, the law was not sufficiently clearly established at the time of the alleged violation to give Harrison and Loucks. fair warning that their entry into Fish’s sunroom under the circumstances of this case would violate his Fourth Amendment rights. See Carroll v. Carman, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 348, 349, 190 L.Ed.2d 311 (2014) (<HOLDING>). 2. Entry into the residence from the sunroom

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers should have been entitled to qualified immunity when they entered onto a groundlevel deck on the back of a home to knock on a slidingglass door believing the door to be a customary entryway
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides: A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Since its effective date, this court has had only four occasions to interpret Rule 3.7 in the context of an attorney’s testimony being sought by the opposing party. In two of those cases, this court did not specifically discuss the applicability of the rule; rather, the issue was disposed of by holding that there had been no showing that the attorney’s testimony was necessary. See Utley v. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 101 S.W.3d 191 (2003) (<HOLDING>); City of Dover v. City of Russellville, 346

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys testimony was not relevant to any issues contained in the appellants pleadings and that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the attorneys testimony could not be gained from any other witness or source
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the imposition of the 15-year minimum sentence was error because (1) his prior convictions were not for “sexual abuse” as defined by federal law, and (2) the convictions are too remote in time to be considered for sentencing purposes. Both of these are legal contentions subject to de novo review. See United States v. Hecht, 470 F.3d 177, 179 (4th Cir.2006). A. Mills first contends that the district court erred in considering his prior convictions as predicate convictions for purposes of applying § 2252A(b)(l). Relying on Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), Mills maintains that the district court was precluded from considering anything other than the statutory elements of the state offenses. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26,125 S.Ct. 1254 (<HOLDING>); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court in this case but none has been received in any other ease on the effect of Pub.L. No. 105-111, although the Court was in the process of ordering such briefing in Donovan when the appellant there filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), thus divesting this Court of jurisdiction over that appeal, see Cerullo v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 195, 196 (1991); Donovan v. Gober, 11 Vet.App. 2 (1997) (per curiam order) (Steinberg and Kramer, JJ., concurring). The Court’s opinion in Dittrich holds that a CUE claim as to an unappealed and therefore final 1960 Veterans’ Administration (now Department of Veterans Affairs) (VA) regional office (RO) decision was not able to be raised under Smith (William) v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), because that final VARO decision was

    ### Response:
    holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the part of Compton and sought no affirmative relief from Compton. The second reason why Compton was not a necessary party to the ORS 279.067 action is that ODOT had awarded no contract at the time of trial. Compton had no existing contractual right to protect. The third reason why Compton was not a necessary party to the action relates to the first two. Compton lacked a direct interest in the outcome of the controversy brought by Steelman-Duff. Compton did have an interest in the indirect effects of the outcome of the litigation between Steelman-Duff and ODOT. However, Compton’s interest in the indirect effects of the outcome of the litigation is not the same as an interest in the controversy itself. See Wright v. Hazen Investments, Inc., 293 Or 259, 261-64, 648 P2d 360 (1982) (<HOLDING>). For a party to be a “necessary” party to a

    ### Response:
    holding that a lessor and a sublessor were interested but not necessary parties in litigation between the plaintiff and a sublessee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that motion, Spada argued that Dr. Martinez failed to establish that his claims were unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because he had alleged that SCI-Graterford staff withheld grievance forms. The Magistrate Judge found no basis to alter the judgment and denied Spada’s motion. Spada timely appealed. II. Dr. Martinez argues that Spada was required to properly “exhaust” his administrative remedies despite SCI-Graterford officials withholding grievance forms during the 15-day filing period. However, we correctly concluded that Spada’s claims were procedurally defaulted because he initiated his civil action prior to completion of the grievance process, see Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 & n. 9 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), and because his grievance failed to name Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding that under the plra an inmate must exhaust available remedies prior to filing suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    subjected to the procedures could claim asylum relief, immigration judges and the BIA would never have needed to consider whether an applicant’s harm rises to the level of persecution, given that the amendment explicitly provides that a forced abortion or sterilization does rise to this level. 12 . The majority’s assertion that § 601 ""relieve[s] ... persons who actually experienced a forcible abortion or sterilization from the burden of proving a political nexus” is similarly problematic. Maj. Op. at 308-09. In my view, Congress did not relieve anyone of the burden of proving political nexus. Rather, it determined that an applicant can meet this burden by establishing proof of persecution pursuant to a coercive family planning policy. Given the majorit ai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 231 (<HOLDING>). 14 . Because petitioner Dong was not married

    ### Response:
    holding that the bia rule is reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Nelson, 409 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Minn.App.1987); cf. McCollum v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn.App.1999) (right to appeal not waived by involuntarily satisfied judgment). Because the judgment against Waddill was involuntarily satisfied, her motion to vacate was not moot and should not have been dismissed. We note that Reardon was decided before Dorso and that the broad language of Dorso may suggest that the supreme court implicitly rejected the Reardon exception for involuntarily satisfied judgments. We do not believe this was the court’s intent, however. While the court has made clear that the Dorso rule is to have broad application, it also has recognized circumstances in which the rule does not apply. See Jorissen v. Miller, 399 N.W.2d 82, 84 (Minn.1987) (<HOLDING>). The majority rule on the right to appeal

    ### Response:
    holding rule does not apply to satisfied conciliationcourt judgments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is no evidence to show that they were motivated by racial discrimination in their participation in the decision not to hire Dr. Koch for a temporary full-time position in the KSU Political Science Department. Instead of stating their appellate issue in qualified immunity terms and addressing their affirmative defense with respect to the applicable clearly established law, they have presented the factual issue of no evidence to show their discriminatory intent to commit a constitutional tort. Because we lack jurisdiction, we DISMISS this appeal and REMAND the case for further proceedings in the district court. 1 . Dr. Koch obtained her Ph.D. degree from Ohio State University in 1985. See Deposition of Willoughby Jarrell, former chair of the KSU Political Science Department, at 66-67 (<HOLDING>). She taught as an Assistant Professor of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in the academic field a college or university strives for diversity of faculty degrees to provide different perspectives in the classroom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    $24.5 million dollars. The trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that Twist had not made a submissible case. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that Twist had in fact made a submissible case. The court, however, remanded the matter based on an instructional error. Upon retrial, the jury awarded Twist $15 million dollars. The defendants filed an appeal asserting, among other things, that their use of Twist's name was protected speech under the First Amendment. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Doe v. McFarlane, 2006 WL 1677856, - S.W.3d -(Mo.Ct.App.2006). 9 . Use of a plaintiff's name, however, must be more than ''incidental” to violate the right of publicity. TCI, 110 S.W.3d at 375 (<HOLDING>). The court in Henley, 46 F.Supp.2d at 594 n.

    ### Response:
    holding that when a plaintiffs name and identity are used without intent to obtain a commercial advantage but where they are used for some other purpose the use is incidental and does not violate the right of publicity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resulted in a discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1). Although Chapter 20 cases are permitted, TD Bank and the Trustee encourage this Court to adopt a per se rule making lien stripping in a Chapter 20 case contingent upon the entry of a Chapter 13 discharge. A general review of lien stripping is instructive. “In a ‘strip off the entire lien is removed, whereas in a ‘strip down’ a lien is bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims with only the unsecured claim component being removed.’ ” Johnson v. Asset Management Group, LLC, 226 B.R. 364, 365 n. 3 (D.Md.1998) (citing In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36, 37 n. 2 (9th Cir. BAP 1997)). It is well established that a debtor is precluded from lien stripping in Chapter 7 cases. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Ryan v. Homecomings Financial

    ### Response:
    holding that section 506d does not permit the strip down of a partially secured lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment are to be terminated.”). 6 . Synopsis, H.B. 277, 139th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 1998). 7 . 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23:38 (7th ed.). 8 . Our interpretation of the saving statute does not open the door to limitless prosecutions for repealed crimes. For! most crimes the statute of limitations will close the door on future prosecutions. See 11 Del. C. § 205. 9 . Synopsis, H.B. 277, 139th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 1998). 10 .See Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2331, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (""Case law ... makes clear that penalties are 'incurred' under the older statute when an offender becomes subject to them, i.e., commits the underlying conduct that makes the offender liable.”); United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 402, 9 S.Ct. 99, 32 L.Ed. 480 (1888) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jackson, 468 F.2d 1388, 1389

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecution for repealed statute that commenced after statutes repeal was valid by operation of  109
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial) (citations omitted); Bibbs v. Jim Lynch Cadillac, Inc., 653 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir.1981) (recognizing appropriateness of submitting all legal claims under § 1981 to jury and citing caselaw in accord). Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, enacted by Congress in 1991, can be seen as creating a new cause of action that attaches an important new legal burden to engaging in discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII, and that “‘if a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages,’ the jury trial option must stand or fall with the attached damages provisions.” Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); see, e.g., Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 802, 808 (N.D.Ill.1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Decree, entered before the events

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff who sued for damages under title vii after effective date of 1991 amendment was entitled to jury trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testified to Mr. Bell stating that “it was Steve [Wilkins’] department and that he was able to make decisions for that department.” Thus, Mr. Wilkins was Ms. Meier’s immediate supervisor and allegedly had the authority to hire and fire his subordinates. In Holmes v. Marriott Corp., 881 F.Supp. 691, 708 (S.D.Iowa 1993), then Magistrate Judge Bennett held that the defendant’s argument that comments attributed to someone without “full and final authority” to make the adverse employment decision “presents too truncated a view of workplace personnel decisions and is at odds with the reality of today’s workplace where important personnel decisions often represent the collective judgment of several individuals.”. See also Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1226, 1240 (W.D.Mo.1996) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. Alabama State Univ., 980 F.Supp. 426

    ### Response:
    holding superiors statement a stray remark because another employee was the plaintiffs immediate supervisor and had the authority to hire and fire  subordinates
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the identity of the defendant as the person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Medrain, 143 Idaho at 332, 144 P.3d at 37; Martinez, 102 Idaho at 880, 643 P.2d at 560. Where a defendant is not sufficiently identified as the same individual who was previously convicted, the judgment of conviction finding him or her to be a persistent violator must be vacated. State v. Poison, 92 Idaho 615, 622, 448 P.2d 229, 236 (1968). The evidence presented by the state to establish that Lawyer had previously been convicted of felony DUI within fifteen years was a certified copy of a 2001 judgment of conviction with an attached criminal complaint, both bearing the name “Daniel J. Lawyer” with an accompanying birth date. The arresting officer testified this identifying data matched the dat (<HOLDING>); State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704, 705

    ### Response:
    holding that although the social security number in the information and the social security numbers in the previous convictions did not match the rest of the identifying information  the first and last name and date of birth  did match and was sufficient to establish the defendants identity particularly in light of the fact that the defendant did not claim he was not the individual named in the previous convictions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Peter Rodriguez’s conduct negatively affected her ability to work as a CTI sales consultant. See Lee-Crespo, 354 F.3d at 46 (affirming summary judgment for an employer in a hostile environment case where there was no evidence that the conduct caused “an impediment to [the plaintiffs] work performance”). The inappropriate conduct alleged here is similar to conduct which this circuit and others have deemed insufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 783 (concluding that it was “highly doubtful” that five sexual advances by a supervisor “could be considered sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a sexual discrimination claim of the hostile environment variety”); Morgan v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192-93 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 984-85

    ### Response:
    holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the detective’s] interview of [the victim] at the hospital tip the scales in favor of the interview’s being structured police questioning. Id. at 24, 619 S.E.2d at 845. We cannot discern a meaningful distinction between Detective Duft’s request in this case for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg crime laboratory to test the substances he obtained from Defendant for the presence of cocaine and the detective’s request in Lewis for the victim to respond to a photographic lineup and identify the defendant. The sole purpose of Detective Duft’s request was to obtain evidence to support the charges at trial, and a reasonable lab technician would expect that his or her conclusions would be used at the subsequent trial. See People v. Lonsby, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 2533 (No. 250559) (13 Oct. 2005) (<HOLDING>); People v. Rogers, 8 A.D.3d 888, 891, 780

    ### Response:
    holding a nontestifying serologists notes and lab report constitute testimonial hearsay and their introduction through another witness violated the confrontation clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case.”) (emphasis added). Mr. Reed argues, however, that there was a coercive element in the execution of the waiver given his rocky relationship with the Ohio prison officials. See generally Ortiz II, 947 P.2d at 86 (discussing Mr. Reed’s reputation as an advocate for prisoners’ rights and the resentment expressed by Ohio prison officials). But even if we assume that there was coercion, there is no evidence in the record — indeed, Mr. Reed does not even allege — that the Prosecutor Appellees had or should have had any reason to know that the waiver was signed involuntarily. Because the waiver was facially valid, it was objectively reasonable for the Prosecutor Appellees to rely on the waiver. Cf United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). B. Summary Judgment for BCDC Ap-pellees With

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaint was filed after the 180-day statutory period had expired, the district court had no jurisdiction to consider her MHRA claims. Hill strenuously argues that equitable estoppel should apply because someone working for the EEOC misinformed her, leading her to file her complaint too late for purposes of the MHRA. Because the Missouri courts have held that the 180-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, however, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable. Hill’s citation to numerous cases applying equitable estoppel and waiver in the ADEA and Title YII contexts is unhelpful, because unlike the MHRA, the filing deadlines for those federal statutes are not jurisdictional. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-93, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1131-32, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 305-06

    ### Response:
    holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decisions. Charging decisions are primarily a matter of discretion for the prosecution, the representatives of the executive branch of government, who “are not mere servants of the judiciary.” Miller, 722 F.2d at 565. Case law clearly establishes that separation of powers mandates the judiciary remain independent of executive affairs and vice versa. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700 (1965). This principle is also established by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though charging decisions implicate executive power, they also implicate the sentencing discretion of district courts. See Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1464 (<HOLDING>). However, the court’s sentencing discretion is

    ### Response:
    recognizing in dicta that charging decisions restrict the district courts ability to impose what it considered an appropriate sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    excess of the contribution from Medicare and Blue Cross. See id. at 455. The majority finds that by forgiving all appellant’s reasonable medical costs in excess of the $12,167.40 payment from Medicare and Blue Cross, appellee made a $96,500.91 contribution to appellant. Appellee admits, however, that Medicare prohibits it from seeking “the remainder of the fair and reasonable cost of its services from Appellant or from any other source.” Id. at 2. Thus, appellee did not contribute anything to appellant that appellant had not already received from Medicare. This means that appellee itself has made no payment to the injured party in excess of Medicare’s contribution. Accordingly, appellee is not entitled to a setoff. Cf. Kashner v. Geisinger Clinic, 432 Pa.Super. 361, 638 A.2d 980 (1994) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully

    ### Response:
    holding that a clinic was entitled to a setoff where it voluntarily forgave medical expenses pursuant to a charity program
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confidential source and the fact that Cleland “further investigated [Defendant's household income, assets, debts, and continuing expenses to determine that [Defendant’s continuing lifestyle was above and inconsistent with his means.” The district court concluded “[o]ne could reasonably expect to see evidence of continuing and unexplained wealth or affluent lifestyle from someone involved in continuous trafficking of drugs.” Cleland’s knowledge of the confidential informant’s tip, corroborated with the facts of which he became aware through his subsequent investigation of Defendant’s financial situation, constituted articulable facts, objectively judged, that could lead a reasonable person to believe a violation of a condition of probation occurred or was occurring. See id. ¶¶ 6, 16-17 (<HOLDING>); cf. State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA-027, ¶

    ### Response:
    holding an informants tip if questionable can be corroborated by the observation of lawful conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Martin Alfredo Tenorio Segovia, a native and citizen of Peru, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum and withholding r.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because petitioner failed to establish

    ### Response:
    holding that alien was teased bothered and harassed based on her religious beliefs but that it did not rise to the level of persecution and that fear of future persecution was too speculative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confidential and, thus, should remain under seal. For the following reasons, we disagree. R.C. 149.43(B) requires that public records be promptly prepared and made available for inspection at reasonable times upon request. R.C. 149.43(A)(1) defines a “public record” as “any record that is kept by any public office.” However, records that are prohibited from being released by state or federal law are excepted from public inspection. R.C. 149.43(A)(1). For example, in a civil proceeding, records and reports compiled by departments of human services and children’s services boards regarding allegations of child abuse are confidential and privileged. R.C. 2151.421(H)(1); 5153.17; State ex rel. Renfro v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 25, 27, 560 N.E.2d 230, 232-233 (<HOLDING>). R.C. 2151.421(H)(1), provides: “[A] report

    ### Response:
    holding that a childabuse report is not a public record and therefore is not subject to public inspection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the concern of the Trial Lawyers Association that pre-accident conduct will include a plaintiff’s physical conditioning, or lack thereof, we emphasize that a defendant will still take the victim as he finds him and be liable for the damages the defendant causes. Where, however, damages are caused by the plaintiff’s failure to care for his own safety (not his physical condition), plaintiff may not recover those damages. In the past the appellate courts of this state have not shied away from their continuing responsibilities to ensure that the law remains fair and realistic as changes occur. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975) (abrogating sovereign immunity); Scott v. Rizzo (adopting comparative negligence); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Vigil v. Arzola, 22 SBB 868 (Ct.App.1983),

    ### Response:
    recognizing tavernkeepers liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    work here. Second, because SFS owned or leased the offices from which it operated, Jackson Hewitt was not in control of the premises where the tort was committed. And, third, Jackson Hewitt was not in control of either Prewett or JHIS. Jackson Hewitt had no contractual relationship with either Prewett or JHIS. Prewett was employed by SFS, not Jackson Hewitt, and JHIS was an independent corporate entity. Under these circumstances, Jackson Hewitt had no duty to the Kamans, and the Kamans did not meet the threshold requirement necessary to establish their negligence claim. See Cantalupo v. Lewis, 47 So.3d 896, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (stating that one of two brothers did not have a duty to prevent the other brother from driving under the influence of alcohol); Demelus, 24 So.3d at 765-66 (<HOLDING>); Pompano Motor Co. v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 875

    ### Response:
    holding that an automobile dealership which kept its cars locked in a secured lot did not create a foreseeable zone of risk of thirdparty criminal conduct by a juvenile gang that stole vehicles from the lot one of which collided with another vehicle and injured the driver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thompson have interpreted Thompson’s, three-part test. See Larson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 343 (Iowa.Ct.App.1982) (evidence that employee’s supervisor knew of danger associated with post-hole digger machine’s unshielded “power take-off shaft,” that he was familiar with the reasons underlying subsequent Occupational Safely and Health Administration regulations requiring guards to shield the shafts, that he knew that his order requiring weight to be placed on post-hole digger arm required worker to work in close proximity to the unshielded shaft, and that injury was probable whenever working near unshielded moving parts sustained finding that supervisor was guilty of wanton neglect and thus could be held liable to injured worker); Taylor v. Peck, 382 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1986) (<HOLDING>); Justus v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 66

    ### Response:
    holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton neglect by coemployee toward claimant to impose liability on coemployee where there had been no previous accidents on particular punch press no safety inspections to alert employee of danger or malfunction concerning activation of machine and no evidence that coemployee knew that safety mechanism was partially dismantled and coemployee did not instruct claimant to put her hand into die to cheek loose pin
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    delivery, pursuant to the Harter Act, has been held simply to require the discharge of the goods “upon a fit and customary wharf.” Morse Electro Products Corp. v. S.S. Great Peace, 437 F.Supp. 474, 486 (D.N.J.1977); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Imparca Lines, 646 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir.1981). Therefore, although the terms of both COGSA and the Harter Act mandate that a carrier effectuate a “proper delivery,” oftentimes courts must look to the common law in order to determine what conduct actually consti 252, 1255-57 (5th Cir.1983) (opining that carrier properly delivered cargo when it delivered the goods to the “farthest point it could” within limitations of law, customs, and usage of the Nigerian port); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Highlands Insurance Co., 532 F.Supp. 77, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 696 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.1982). This

    ### Response:
    holding that proper delivery occurred under harter act when the carrier relinquished custody and control of the goods to the national port authority of monrovia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Indeed, when asked to summarize his theory of how the McIntosh home was destroyed, Dr. Sinno stated: “I agree fully with the first conclusion of the first inspector from State Farm,” that is, Ford. The Rigsbys are the “paradigmatic ... whistleblowing insider[s].” U.S. ex rel. Lam v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 287 Fed.Appx. 396, 401 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Sylvia, Fraud Against the Government § 11:62; John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions § 4.02[D][3][a] (4th ed. 2014) (“[Kjknow-ledge acquired and witnessed during the course of employment or professional work is direct knowledge.”). Their direct knowledge surpasses that presented by other would-be relators in our original source case law. Compare Jamison, 649 F.3d at 331-32 (<HOLDING>); U.S. ex rel. Fried v. West Indep. Sch. Dist.,

    ### Response:
    holding that relator who described a general scheme of fraud and then listed arbitrarily a large group of possible perpetrators was not an original source
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issuance of a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs need only show that the issues presented are so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make them fair ground for litigation. Zsamba, 56 F.Supp.2d at 1210 (citing Resolution Trust, 972 F.2d at 1199). Although plaintiffs’ complaint contains nineteen counts, plaintiffs focus on Count I, Counts IX-X, and Counts II-IV, as those counts which are likely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiffs’ arguments as to each of these counts will be discussed in turn. 1. Count I — The legal incidence of the tax falls on the Kansas Tribes and therefore the tax is per se invalid as a matter of law. The fuel tax provided for in the Act falls upon the “distributor of first receipt.” Kan. Stat. Ann § 79-3408(c). See also Sac & Fox, 213 F.3d at 578-79 (<HOLDING>). In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation,

    ### Response:
    holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute. See, e.g., Colombo v. Stevenson, 150 N.C.App. 163, 563 S.E.2d 591, 592-94 (2002) (concluding that language that residue included “all lapsed legacies and devises, or other gifts made by this will which fail for any reason” was sufficiently clear language to express testatrix’s intent that North Carolina’s anti-lapse statute did not apply to legacies and devises which had lapsed); Estate of Salisbury, 76 Cal.App.3d 635, 143 Cal.Rptr. 81, 82-84 (1978) (concluding that language stating that “the residue of my estate, real and personal, wheresoever situate, including all failed and lapsed gifts” was a sufficiently clear expression of testatrix’s intent to render that California’s anti-lapse statute inapplicable); In re Neydorff, 193 A.D. 531, 184 N.Y.S. 551, 554 (N.Y.App.Div.1920) (<HOLDING>); In re Phelps’ Estate, 147 Iowa 323, 126 N.W.

    ### Response:
    holding that in case in which testator granted the residue to specified person including lapsed legacies the legacies to testators predeceased brother and sister did not fall within new yorks antilapse statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule 60(b)”). We have said repeatedly that Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an appeal or a timely motion under Rule 59(e), and cannot serve to resurrect arguments that were available before the time for filing an appeal expired. See, e.g., Tango Music, LLC v. DeadQuick Music, Inc., 348 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir.2003); Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir.2000). Eyiowuawi does not dispute that he learned about the dismissal shortly after the decision was announced, but he did not act promptly to seek our review of that ruling. We cannot review it now, and Eyiowuawi offers no other basis for disagreeing with the district court’s exercise of discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Al Salvi for Senate Comm., 205 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ford Heights,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that propriety of dismissal without warning for failure to prosecute although abuse of discretion and grounds for appeal was not basis for overturning denial of motion under rule 60b to set aside dismissal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    access ... to the offender's conviction record, which includes the fact of the conviction along with identifying information.” Id., 829 P.2d at 1222 (citations omitted). 10 . ""It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such protection is.” Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193, 197 (1890) (suggesting that an individual has the ""right to be let alone”). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J„ dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) 5 S.Ct. 1707, 1714-15, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) (<HOLDING>). 12 . This category would include death,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stated that ‘“two chinks’ in the pharmacology department were ‘more than enough.’ ” Id. The second instance of direct evidence was when the chairman of the department said in a later meeting that the plaintiff should “pray to their Buddha for help.” Id. at 1129. The Ninth Circuit found both of these comments to be direct evidence. Id. In Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir.1997), the Eleventh Circuit dealt specifically with what constitutes direct evidence of retaliation in a Title VII action. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the “quintessential example of direct evidence in the age discrimination context would be ‘a management memorandum saying, “Fire Earley — he is too old” ’ ” Id. at 1190 (quoting Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)). In Merritt, the plaintiff offered evidence

    ### Response:
    holding only the most blatant remarks whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate  constitute direct evidence of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I. DISCUSSION A. MRFC form Nation asserts the ALJ did not fully and fairly develop the record because Dr. Le-gum did not complete a MRFC form, and specifically asserts Dr. Legum did not address Nation’s ability to work full-time. Nation contends the only way to address this issue is for Dr. Legum to answer questions 7 and 11 of the MRFC form. The ALJ has an obligation to develop a full and fair record, even if the claimant is represented by counsel. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). The ALJ is not required to seek additional independent expert medical testimony before making a disability determination if the record is sufficient and additional expert testimony is not necessary for an informed decision. Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1209-10

    ### Response:
    holding the record which included the opinion of several physicians was sufficient for the alj to arrive at a decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contends that even assuming equitable estoppel and waiver are legally available defenses, they should be stricken here because the factual allegations proffered by Honeywell do not meet the high standards for maintaining such defenses. (Pl.’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Strike at 5-10.) The government’s argument has merit. Even if Honeywell’s factual asser: tions are accepted as true, and deemed incorporated into the answer, Honeywell has not set forth the elements of either estoppel or waiver that are necessary in order to maintain these defenses against the government. With respect to estoppel, Honeywell has not pointed to any definite representation by the government, only a failure of the government to accept Honeywell’s offer of test results. See, e.g., Morns, 566 F.3d at 191-92 (<HOLDING>). Nor has Honeywell shown any reasonable

    ### Response:
    holding that fccs failure to respond to plaintiffs licensing waiver request for three years was not a definite representation of approval
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Guidelines overruled Becker’s holding that such burglary was categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Id. at 1112-13. We reasoned that our recognition in Aguila-Montes that § 459’s unlawfulness requirement was different than federal generic burglary’s unlawfulness requirement did not change the fact that the conduct prohibited by § 459 involved a substantial risk of force. Every violation of § 459 might not present that level of risk, but “the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury ‘in the ordinary case.’ ” Id. at 1112 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007)); see also United States v. Park, 649 F.3d 1175, 1179-80 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, we concluded that Becker’s

    ### Response:
    holding that  459 is categorically a crime of violence under guidelines  4b12a2 because the usual or ordinary firstdegree burglary in california involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical violence and injury to others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not deny that he possessed the sledgehammer during the burglary, see id. at 63. The fact that he did not use the sledgehammer as a weapon is irrelevant to the issue of possession. To hold otherwise would directly contradict the plain meaning of this provision of the Guidelines, and would lead to absurd results. For example, a burglar could enter a bank carrying several guns and explosives and remain exempt from the two-level sentencing enhancement so long as those “tools of the trade” were used only to break open the safes. Accordingly, we hold that U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(4) requires only possession of a dangerous weapon, regardless of whether the dangerous weapon was employed as such during the commission of a crime. Cf. United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Based on the facts of the case and the plain

    ### Response:
    holding that because defendant possessed a screwdriver during the bank robbery and a screwdriver is properly classified as a dangerous weapon the district court did not err by applying the enhancement to him regarding ussg  2b31b2e which applies if a dangerous weapon was brandished displayed or possessed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    based on a state ground independent from federal law, made apparent by Villa’s detailed reasoning and its numerous citations to California statutes and cases. Villa’s conclusion that state habeas relief is only available to those in custody stemmed from its interpretation of California Penal Code section 1473. Such an interpretation of a state statute constitutes an independent state ground, unrelated to federal law. Although Villa cites to a federal case, Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989), the discussion there was to provide examples of collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, similar to Villa’s deportation, which do not constitute “custody” for the purpose of California state habeas. 45 Cal.4th at 1070-71, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344, 202 P.3d 427 (<HOLDING>). Although Villa also cites Maleng for the

    ### Response:
    holding that collateral consequences such as the loss of the license to practice medicine sex offender registration inability to vote or inability to serve on a jury do not constitute constructive custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Chuangs, the relocation of their laboratory space unquestionably qualifies as an adverse employment action. Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 Ü.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Supreme Court has held that “this not only covers ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ in the narrow sense, but ‘evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment ... in employment.’ ” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Cf. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, the forcible relocation of the Chuangs’

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of a title vii retaliation claim an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    similarly concluded that Pinholster’s childhood head injuries resulted in organic, pre-frontal brain damage that changed his personality and explained his aggressive, violent, and antisocial behavior, while Dr. Stalberg characterized the injuries as possibly “devastating” and likewise connected them to Pinholster’s epilepsy. This additional medical evidence would have helped counter the State’s aggravation case in three respects. First, evidence that Pinholster’s brain damage may have influenced, or even caused, his behavior at the time of the crime may have led jurors to conclude that he was less morally culpable at the time of the offense, and at least one juror may have been inclined to refrain from voting in favor of a capital sentence. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (<HOLDING>). Evidence of organic brain injury in other

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance between life and death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and a duty he has imposed on himself to mail the SOC to the claimant’s “latest address of record”, 38 C.F.R. § 19.30; see Sehafrath, supra. Third, Santoro was decided in the context of the pro-claimant nature of VA’s administrative claims adjudication, and any extension of the holding in Santoro to limit VA’s statutory obligations in forwarding an SOC to a claimant would be at odds with the nature of such adjudication. See Jaguay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that “veteran-friendly nature of the veterans’ benefit system counsels us to construe the diligence requirement as it applies to behavior during the non-adversarial stage of a claim for benefits in favor of the veteran”); see also Santana-Venegas v. Principi 314 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, unlike the ZIP Code error in Santoro,

    ### Response:
    recognizing nonadversarial and proclaimant character of veterans benefits adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of ‘conscious shocking’ conduct.”) (quoting Natale, 170 F.3d at 263). The Individual Defendants point to their affidavits, which universally state that they did not act to intentionally deprive Mr. Watrous of his rights and were acting within what they believed to be the scope of their employment and in furtherance of their official roles. See Defs.’ 56(a)l, Ex. A at ¶ 104-11; Ex. B at ¶ 30-38; Ex. C at ¶ 30-38; Ex. D at ¶ 11-17. At the outset, the court notes that the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that actions taken without authority under state law, such as when a board lacks jurisdiction over property, give rise to a conclusion that the state entity lacked a rational basis for their actions, and that such actions violate substantive due process. See Brady, 863 F.2d at 216 (<HOLDING>); see also Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789 (“[I]f the

    ### Response:
    holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 2015). Specifically, a reasonable “acco ural impediments and nontrivial temporal delays that limit access to programs, services, and activities. See Celeste v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 373 Fed.Appx. 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that a mobility-impaired student was denied meaningful access because he was “forced [ ] to take a ten minute detour” in order to participate as the manager of his school’s football team). An accommodation is not plainly reasonable if it is so inadequate that it deters the plaintiff from attempting to access the services otherwise available to him. See Disabled in Action v. Bd of Elections in City of N.Y., 752 F.3d 189, 200 (2d Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). In short, providing meaningful access

    ### Response:
    recognizing that deterrence constitutes an injury under the ada quoting kreisler v second ave diner corp 731 f3d 184 188 2d cir 2013
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (plaintiff failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on right to privacy in medical condition); but see Poe, 282 F.3d at 189 (defendant police officer’s conduct in secretly videotaping unclothed female volunteer for a police training video “shocks the conscience” and was “unjustifiable by any governmental interest”). Furthermore, a prisoner’s interest in keeping a particular medical condition private varies with the condition. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir.1994)). This is not a case in which plaintiff has an unusual medical problem which, if disclosed unnecessarily to other inmates, would likely expose plaintiff to discrimination, intolerance, or potential violence. See id., 175 F.3d at 111-13 (<HOLDING>); see also Webb, 117 F.Supp.2d at 298

    ### Response:
    recognizing prisoners right to privacy in transsexuality and hivseropositive status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and cure,” the cont fact that the indemnity contract is actually a promise to pay money cannot be divorced from the overall purpose of the transaction, which was maritime, nor the fact that a maritime right was given up as consideration. See Deval Denizcilik Ve Ticaret A.S. v. Agenzia Tripcovich S.R.L., 513 F.Supp.2d 6, 9 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (distinguishing mere promise to pay money from promise to pay money that served as consideration to gain release of maritime cargo from possible lien). In this case, the LOI was “entered into in connection with [a] maritime commercial venture” and, thus, is a contract that is “maritime in nature.” Williamson, 542 F.3d at 49. Therefore, the Court has admiralty jurisdiction over a lawsuit alleging breach of that maritime contract. See id. at 49 (<HOLDING>); Deval, 513 F.Supp.2d at 9 (holding that court

    ### Response:
    holding that standard noncompete nondisclosure and lease contracts were still maritime contracts because of nature and character and connection to maritime commercial venture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at common law against a charge of non-sexual assault, nor did this court find any such case. Taken to its logical conclusion, appellant’s argument that consent should be a defense to assault where there is significant bodily injury would render non-prosecutable acts that are an affront to the public peace and order, such as a loan shark lending money on the condition that non-payment authorizes a beating or gang members who agree to settle old scores by a shootout. The absurd realities of recognizing consent as a defense to assault with significant bodily injúry are not farfetched. For example, in Brown, 364 A.2d at 28, the defendant was charged with assault after “severely beating [the victim] with his hands and other objects” after the victim had “indulged in some spiri 8) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted and

    ### Response:
    holding that victims consent to ritualistic beating as a part of the gang initiation is not relevant because the acts amounted to a reckless infliction of bodily injury and thus did not constitute a lawful act committed by lawful means and affirmed the conviction of manslaughter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises or operations, or the products and completed operations, for which you have been added as an additional insured by attachment of an endorsement, (emphasis added). (Doc. No. 1-9, p. 14). According to the language of these “other insurance” clauses, Amerisure contends that its umbrella policy would be excess to the Continental primary policy, and thus would only kick in after the limits of that policy have been exhausted. It appears to the Court that the language of the other insurances clauses would operate to render the Amerisure umbrella policy excess over the Continental primary policy. However, the Fourth Circuit has held that a contractual agreement between the insured . Co., 335 F.3d 429, 436 (5th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Star Ins. Co. v. Continental Resources, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that subcontractors primary and excess insurance policies must pay first and before contractors own insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    further investigation concerning suspects — the girls saw one man and defendant readily admitted he was the man they saw. It is clear from these facts that defendant was at all material times the exclusive focus of the investigation. Lastly, factor (4) cements our belief that defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation. Utah courts have placed great emphasis on the length and form of the questioning used during an interview. See, e.g., Mincy, 838 P.2d at 653; Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105. Courts have not found custodial interrogation where the questioning was merely investigatory. Mincy, 838 P.2d at 653. However, when the tone of the questions turns from investigatory to accusatory, custody is likely. Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105. See also State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986) (<HOLDING>). “The change from investigatory to accusatory

    ### Response:
    holding that the initial questioning was merely investigatory and miranda warnings were not necessary until after police found incriminating evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not be saved under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(2)(b)(A) to the extent is applied to self-funded plans, but nevertheless, ""there is no reason to think Congress would have meant such minimal application to noninsurers to remove a state law entirely from the category of insurance regulation”). 24 . See Ky. Ass'n, 538 U.S. at 337-38, 123 S.Ct. 1471 (concluding that the any-willing-provider statute at issue regulated insurance and likening the statute to a state law requiring all licensed attorneys to participate in ten hours of continuing legal education, which, the Court said, would be a statute regulating the practice of law). 25 . Id. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1471. 26 . See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 40:2010 (2001). 27 . 498 U.S. 52, 55 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990). 28 . Id. at 61, 111 S.Ct. 403 (<HOLDING>). 29 . 542 U.S. 200, 217-18, 124 S.Ct. 2488,

    ### Response:
    holding that the state statute returns the matter of subrogation to state law  ujnless the statute is excluded from the reach of the saving clause by virtue of the deemer clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Similarly, the Court’s finding that the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable under Washington law was based, in part, on the same class action waiver provision. Defendant filed its Notice of Interlocutory Appeal of the Court’s denial of its Motion to Compel Arbitration on June 22, 2010 (DE # 611), and the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal on July 9, 2010 (DE # 664). While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided the cases of Rent-A-Cent&r, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010) (finding valid delegation clauses which delegate to the arbitrator questions of arbitrability), and AT & T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (<HOLDING>). KeyBank moved for an indicative ruling under

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal arbitration act preempts state laws that classify collective or classaction waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For example, in Armada Supply, a foreign insurer had issued a certificate of insurance to a corporation qualified to do business in New York, for a cargo with the destination of New York. The contract was executed in Brazil. The Second Circuit upheld jurisdiction by applying the “contracts anywhere” wording in § 302(a)(1) in holding that the insurer “transacted business” in New York. Armada Supply, 858 F.2d at 849. The facts of this case clearly support jurisdiction under Armada Supply’s interpretation of the “contracts anywhere” language of § 302(a)(1). By providing insurance for a race horse quartered for nine months of the year within New York, Canadian “contracted to ... supply ... services in [New York],” Id.; cf. A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>). The Court is not persuaded by Canadian’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a financial guaranty payable in new york is a contract to perform services in new york subjecting foreign guarantor to jurisdiction under  302a1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court committed plain error in concluding that this calculus tips in favor of admissibility. As in Calderon, where we held that the Rule 403 calculus favored admissibility, in this case the other crimes evidence admitted by the district court “bore sufficient similarity to uphold the district [court’s] relevance determination.” As explained supra, both Nelson’s prior offenses and the instant offense involved the knowing possession of a weapon in an automobile. Moreover, the time span between Nelson’s prior convictions and the present offense does not render those convictions “too remote for proper consideration.” 127 F.3d at 1332. Specifically, Nelson’s convictions came 2 and 3 years prior to the instant offense, which is well within the temporal bounds of relevance. See generally id. (<HOLDING>). In addition, in this case the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that a six year span between the prior offense and the charged conduct did not render the previous conviction too remote to be relevant to the defendants intent in the case then at bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1966)[,] and its progeny.” Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 135, 677 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2009). “[T]he United States Supreme Court [has] established that ‘[i]f the individual states ... he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present,’ ” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 278 Va. 118, 123, 677 S.E.2d 45, 48 (2009) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628), or until “the suspect reinitiates the interrogation,” Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 270 Va. 42, 49, 613 S.E.2d 579, 584 (2005) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). See generally Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Determining whether a suspect actually

    ### Response:
    holding police should scrupulously honor a request for counsel emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are entitled to a foreign tax credit for their share of foreign income taxes paid by an S corporation. See I.R.C. §§ 901(b)(3), 1373(b) (1986). Vermont’s tax provisions contain no language expressly denying taxpayers the credit at issue. In light of Vermont’s § 5820 policy conforming our tax code to the I.R.C., absent an express provision to deviate from the federal tax scheme, like the newly enacted § 5916, shareholders are entitled to a tax credit for their share of “foreign” income taxes paid by an S corporation in another state, regardless of whether that “foreign” state recognizes S corporations. See White v. Commissioner, No. 6558, 1995 WL 495912, at *2 (Minn. T.C., Aug. 18, 1995); In re Baker, No. 805550 TSB-D-90(28)I, 1990 WL 169491, at *3 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Oct. 11, 1990) (<HOLDING>). While the federal legislation concerning S

    ### Response:
    holding that resident shareholder of s corporation is eligible for tax credit for taxes paid by corporation in another state and noting that this conclusion is consistent with the internal revenue code which provides that shareholders of an s corporation are entitled to a foreign tax credit for their share of foreign income tax paid by an s corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should not have been granted because he, a pro se litigant, was not informed of the requirement that he must file affidavits to preserve factual issues for trial. Not only did the district court treat plaintiffs verified complaint as an affidavit, but it also considered the evidence that plaintiff attached to his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding summary judgment. As this allowed plaintiff the opportunity to correct any deficiencies in his summary judgment evidence, and as plaintiff has not identified other information he would have presented, the judgment need not be reversed based on the failure to inform plaintiff of the summary judgment requirements. Cf. Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). III Although two of plaintiffs diaries were

    ### Response:
    holding pro se plaintiff should have been granted continuance to remedy his defective summary judgment materials by submitting affidavits or verifying his complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who “were deterred from applying to or enrolling in Boston University or will be so deterred in the future.” Plaintiffs Proposed Order, at 2. It is here that this Court will invoke its discretion to limit the unnecessary. Even if deterred applicants to BU have standing to sue the university, their inclusion in the class does little either to further the plaintiffs’ goal of obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief or to resolve the problem of mootness. Nothing is gained by conferring membership on individuals with learning disabilities who have been deterred. In the exercise of its discretion, this Court restricts the certified class to students with learning disabilities who are currently enrolled at BU. See Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 131 (1st Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172, 106 S.Ct. 2896,

    ### Response:
    holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is necessarily tentative, given the lack of extensive briefing on this question. But it cannot be dismissed as unnecessary-certainly not by the majority, which has resolved the question I am addressing (albeit implicitly and for the sake of argument) while declining to order further briefing on it. Thus, the discussion set forth here is a response to both Winward's insistence that an ""egregious injustice"" exception exists and the majority's invocation and implicit adoption of that exception. My point is simply that if we accept the propriety of the court's decision to evaluate and apply an extra-statutory exception, it would have to be under the constitution, and Winward's case would fail on its merits under that framework. 12 . See Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Zuniga, 772 A.2d 1028,

    ### Response:
    holding that aedpasthe federal analogue to utahs pcraoneyear limitation does not offend the federal suspension clause and citing eleventh second fifth and tenth circuit court cases in accord
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by an amendment, even if the amendment would otherwise be applicable to the defendant.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir.2008)). The original sentencing court in 1996 departed from a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment when it sentenced Velez to 292 months. Regardless of whether that court had the authority to sentence Velez below the mandatory minimum, and regardless of whether the district court had the authority to reduce his sentence to 235 months in his earlier 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, his original sentence was the result of a downward departure. Velez’s guideline range, even considering the amendments to § 2D 1.1(c), remains subject to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. See Mills, 613 F.3d at 1078 (<HOLDING>). Because Velez remained subject to the

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentence below a statutory minimum based on the filing of a substantial assistance motion did not eliminate the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum for purposes of sentence modification under  3582c2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not contest his discrimination claims on summary judgment contained in Counts I and III in his Complaint. The Court grants summary judgment accordingly. 7 . Defendants claim that Tawwaab’s Title VII retaliation claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because he did not check the ""retaliation” box on his E.E.O.C. Charge, and did not allege a claim of retaliation in the body of the Charge. (See Doc. No. 52-2, Ex. A-1 at 1.) However, the E.E.O.C. explicitly included retaliation in its reasonable cause determination. (See Doc. No. 63, Ex. 11 at 1.) As such, to the extent Defendant argues that Tawwaab’s retaliation claim is beyond the scope of his E.E.O.C. Charge, the Court does not agree. See E.E.O.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 364-66 (4th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). 8 .The analysis is the same for retaliation

    ### Response:
    holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even if counsel’s performance had fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland’s prejudice prong would not be satisfied. As discussed earlier, the evidence against Sheron was very strong. Even with the deficiencies alleged by Sheron, there is not a “reasonable probability” that the end result would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance at trial are denied. 2. As to the Sufficiency of the Evidence for Depraved Indifference Murder Under the Due Process Clause of the of the Fourteenth Amendment and relevant Supreme Court law, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to convict a defendant of a crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (<HOLDING>); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the consumer’s privacy interests, for it will ‘involve’ the plaintiff directly.”). Here, Pintos did not voluntarily seek credit. Rather, the debt arose by statute when the lien sale price of her vehicle failed to cover the towing and impound charges. See Cal Civ.Code § 3068.2. Pintos never sought to have her vehicle towed, and she incurred the resulting debt involuntarily. Consequently, no one granted her “credit” as define that PCA had a permissible purpose to obtain Pintos’s credit report because it, too, was engaged in debt collection. This reading of Hasbun was not unreasonable at the time. Hasbun was decided prior to the 2003 FACTA amendments, however, and it must be reevaluated in light of the 12956 amended FCRA. See United States v. McNeil, 362 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). By defining “credit” for purposes of the

    ### Response:
    holding that when congress amends statutes our decisions that rely on the older versions of the statutes must be reevaluated in light of the amended statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to a bank” and evidence that there was no loss is not a defense to either crime); Briggs, 965 F.2d at 12. Cf. United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir.2000) (expressing no opinion on bank’s civil liability when government failed to offer evidence of liability when a financial advisor misused client’s funds). We dismissed the risk of loss argument made by appellants in United States v. Briggs when we considered a similar scheme in which an employee diverted millions of dollars from a corporate account to a personal bank account using unauthorized wire transfers. See 965 F.2d at 11. Briggs, like McCauley and Chendeka, claimed never to have made any overt misrepresentations or false statements to any financial institution. See id. Yet, Briggs acted similarly to L Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 316

    ### Response:
    holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Reid’s affidavit because it is “conclusory” and because Reid provides no foundation for how he calculated the principal amounts due on the Notes. As the district court noted, Reid’s statements are based on his personal knowledge. See Fed.R.CivP. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration ... must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”). As an account manager at RBC Reid is responsible for monitoring and collecting the Atas-ca Oaks and Lake Houston Notes. Therefore, Reid is competent to testify on the amounts due on the Notes, and his affidavit satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(c)(4). See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 196-97 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse

    ### Response:
    holding that a loan analysts affidavit based on personal knowledge of certain loan records is admissible summary judgment evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tex.1995). However, appellant bears the burden to bring forth a sufficient record showing the trial court abused its discretion. Russell v. City of Bryan, 919 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Here, we do not know what arguments were presented to the trial court at the summary judgment hearing, and Cruikshank may not argue on appeal “any and every new [issue] that he can think of, nor can he resurrect [issues] that he abandoned at the hearing.” City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); Rayl v. Borger Boon. Dev. Corp., 963 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.) By failing to object in the trial court, appellant has waived the right to complain on appeal about the trial court’s ruling. Rayl, 963 S.W.2d at 113 (<HOLDING>); Inglish v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 928

    ### Response:
    holding that because appellant did not object to trial courts ruling excluding summary judgment proof the issue is waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3722 (“Generally the federal law is apparent on the face of the complaint; but sometimes the plaintiff will characterize his necessarily federal cause of action solely in state law terms. In these situations the federal removal court will look beyond the letter of the complaint to the substance of the claim in order to assert jurisdiction.”). Therefore, in the proper case, the Court may deem a federal question to exist despite the lack of any direct assertion of a violation of federal law in the original pleading filed in state court. The proper case, however, exists only where it is not possible to bring the action asserted by the Plaintiff in state court. Cf. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., Inc., 762

    ### Response:
    holding a state court complaint alleging a common law breach of contract action to be in fact a claim under erisa and thus removable as a federal question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that act, and is contrary to Act Ill’s purposes as repeatedly observed by this Court’s previous case law. Further, I respectfully believe that in this case, the majority’s casual borrowings from PERA and case law interpreting that act are made without any analysis concerning the specific texts of each of the two acts, the similarities of and differences between the classes of individuals covered by these acts, or the legislative intent behind the establishment of each of these acts. Additionally, the majority complete ly fails to take into account how the “linchpin” of Act 111—its “no appeal” mandate — would fare under the majority’s analysis of and approach to Act 111. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt), 540 Pa. 66, 656 A.2d 83, 89 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Although I disagree with the majority’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that because the services of police and fire personnel  are so vital to an ordered society and the interests of labor and management as well as those of the general public are served by swift nonappealable resolution of labor disputes concerning these critical public employees act ills explicit restraint on judicial activism is the linchpin of the act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the USDA prior to July 1, 1997, which alleged discrimination by the USDA at any time between January 1, 1981, and July 1, 1997. See § 741(e); 7 C.F.R. § 15f.2. “Eligible complaints” may be brought in a civil action or in an administrative proceeding. See § 741(a) & (b). The Viscontis’ discrimination complaint, submitted to the Office of Civil Rights on August 1,1997, is not eligible for consideration under § 741 because it was filed after July 1, 1997. In addition, the Viscontis’ letters dated October 31, 1988, June 17, 1991, and April 1, 1997, are not “eligible complaints.” Although these letters meet the time-filing requirements of § 741, none alleges discrimination, even when construed broadly. Cf. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In the October 1988 letter, addressed to the

    ### Response:
    holding that a charge of discrimination must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests quoting conley v gibson 355 us 41 47 78 sct 99 2 led2d 80 1957
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We hold only that the “other liability” language does not unequivocally express the will of the parties to waive immunity from prejudgment attachment. In so holding, we are in accord with the majority of courts (all district courts) that have addressed the issue. Security Pacific National Bank v. Iran, 513 F.Supp. 864, 879-80 (C.D.Cal.1981); New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F.Supp. 120, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y.1981), remanded on other grounds, 646 F.2d 779 (2 Cir.1981); E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 491 F.Supp. 1294, 1300-02 (N.D.Tex.1980); Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F.Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y.1979); Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F.Supp. 383, 392-93 (D.N.J.1979) (<HOLDING>). Contra, Reading & Bates Drilling Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the waiver of immunity from other liability did not explicitly waive immunity from prejudgment attachment but supporting the attachment on other grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    831, 838 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 187 (Alaska 2009)). 15 . Cowan, 255 P.3d at 974. 16 . Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 4 n.4 (Alaska 1980) (quoting Albert v. Declue, 526 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Mo.App.1975)) (first citing Knapp v. Wise, 122 Ariz. 327, 594 P.2d 1023 (App.1979); then citing Gospel Echos Chapel Inc. v. Wadsworth, 19 Ariz.App. 382, 507 P.2d 994 (1973); then citing Cole v. Burleson, 375 So.2d 1046 (Miss.1979); and then citing Swecker v. Dorn, 181 Mont. 436, 593 P.2d 1055 (1979)). 17 . Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830 (Alaska 1974). 18 . See Penn, 615 P.2d at 4. 19 . Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 22 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990)) (citing Peters, 519 P.2d at 831) (<HOLDING>); see also Nome 2000, .799 P.2d at 310 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that allowing moderate use of the resources on the property was not inconsistent with exclusive use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    11 Kan. App. 2d 655, 662, 732 P.2d 780, rev. denied 241 Kan. 839 (1987). The question of whether charges are multiplicitous is a question of law. This court’s review of conclusions of law is unlimited. See Perry, 16 Kan. App. 2d at 151. The district court erred in finding that the crime of aggravated kidnapping was not multiplicitous with the charge of aggravated indecent liberties. The evidence revealed that Morfitt placed his hands on A.S.’s breasts and then on her vaginal area. It was never alleged that these events were separated by time and space. A reading of the trial transcripts and A.S.’s deposition appears to indicate that the touching occurred at the same time and was, therefore, one continuous act of force. See State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, 532-33, 847 P.2d 1191 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that under the

    ### Response:
    holding charge of kidnapping multiplicitous with aggravated assault because it was one continuous act of force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    77, 81 (Mo.banc 1992). In Ward’s view, the inability of a person under the age of fourteen .to legally consent to sexual activity demonstrates that first-degree statutory sodomy, like first-degree sexual misconduct, requires proof of lack of consent. Thus, Ward concludes, first-degree sexual misconduct is included in first-degree statutory sodomy because the former may be established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove the latter offense. However, as Stokely confirms, the inability of a person under the age of fourteen to legally consent to sexual activity actually demonstrates that “[a]ge is the essential element” in statutory sexual offenses such as statutory sodomy, and thus the intent of the perpetrator and the consent of the victim are irrelevant. Id. (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Ybarra, 386 S.W.2d 384, 386

    ### Response:
    holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discretion in recommending the death penalty, and that his appellate counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to pursue this challenge before the North Carolina Supreme Court on direct appeal. Although Fisher is correct in his assertion that North Carolina’s “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance, standing alone, is unconstitutionally vague, see Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364, 108 S.Ct. 1853 (“To say that something is ‘especially heinous’ merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that the murder is more than just ‘heinous,’ whatever that means, and an ordinary person could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is ‘especially heinous.’ ”); see Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 974 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), this does not end our inquiry. In its prior

    ### Response:
    recognizing that north carolinas heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance requires a limiting construction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    debts, sell property, and to sue and be sued in their capacity as trustees. Id. at 289, citing, South Carolina Code (1932) § 7710 and § 7711. Section 3-516 of the Corporations and Associations Article of the Maryland Code is very similar to the sections of the South Carolina Code construed in Old Fort, providing similar powers and responsibilities to the directors of a corporation that has forfeited its charter. Like the Fourth Circuit in Old Fort, this court finds that the directors of a corporation that has forfeited its charter have the power to file a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code because Chapter 7 provides a process for orderly liquidation of an estate that is perfectly consistent with Maryland law. See In Re Rust Control, Inc., 1 B.R. 303 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Va.1979) (<HOLDING>). The timeliness of this petition is not at

    ### Response:
    holding that under virginia law a corporation with a revoked charter can file a voluntary petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to expert testimony, however, because its admission, at worst, amounted to harmless error. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ... ”). The quantity of drugs Jania claimed Venson dropped was a minor issue, and therefore the error in admitting Jania’s testimony would not have had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the determination of [the] jury.” Cerabio LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 410 F.3d 981, 994 (7th Cir.2005). Venson also does not argue that he was deprived of an opportunity to adequately cross-examine Jania, and “he questions neither the accuracy of the statements offered nor the qualifications of [Jania] to make them.” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 604 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court declines to grant a

    ### Response:
    holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Plaintiff to determine whether there is evidence that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity under the opposition clause of the PHRA. 1. Opposition Clause The opposition clause makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any employee “because [he] ... opposed any practice forbidden by this act.” 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 955(d). While the record reflects that Plaintiff opposed Defendant Wynn’s use of derogatory language by complaining to Defendant Sea-right and others, see supra Part I.A.2, the anti-retaliation provision does not prohibit retaliation for speaking out against prejudice that has no nexus to employment discrimination and the unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their race. See e.g., Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dept. 176 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Denham v. Saks, 2008 WL 2952308, 104 Fair

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs reports of his fellow police officers discriminatory treatment of minority citizens was not protected activity under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    properly abandoned as prescribed by statute.... ” Tucker v. Watkins, 251 Cal.App.2d 327, 59 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1967); Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba, 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 130 Cal.Rptr .2d 436, 458 (2002); San Diego Cnty. v. California Water and Tel. Co., 30 Cal.2d 817, 186 P.2d 124 (Cal. 1947);West’s Ann.Cal.Str. & H.Code § 901. If Hazel Green could assert a claim against the United States, whether the County owned or abandoned the road would be established as a fact over the course of the litigation. The fact that Hazel Green needs the County to assert its ownership of the roads in order to preserve its easement claim against the United States, only confirms that its interest is not sufficient to be asserted under the Quiet Title Act. See, e.g., Staley, 168 F.Supp.2d at 1214

    ### Response:
    holding that right of landowner abutting county road was not sufficient interest to assert a claim under the quiet title act and noting that ujnless plaintiffs can convince the county of boulder to join as a coplaintiff in this action the court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stephens had was a right to receive payments under a covenant not to compete. Therefore, the description contained in the security agreement, clearly referring to tangible property, did not describe or identify the collateral at issue here, intangible property. Orix cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that the phrase “all personal property” is a sufficient description under § 9.110. We have reviewed all of those cases and find that they are distinguishable. Six of the cases cited by Orix are inapplicable because in none of them do the courts hold that super generic descriptions (which were clearly descriptions of some kind of tangible property) were sufficient to cover intangible property. See Donald v. Madison Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1973) (<HOLDING>); In re Legal Data Systems, Inc., 135 B.R. 199

    ### Response:
    holding that description all inventory accounts machinery equipment finished products and products being manufactured also everything connected with said business in any way sufficient to cover trailers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 427, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) (Scalia, L, dissenting) (""If possible, [courts] should avoid construing the statute in a way that produces ... absurd results.”). 16 . Notwithstanding the enactment of New § 1-201(37), some courts continue to apply the Percentage Tests to determine whether the option price contained in a purported lease agreement is nominal. See, e.g., Triplex Marine, 258 B.R. at 670 (option price representing 10% of the original purchase price of the leased goods and 5% of aggregate rental payments made by the debtor held to be nominal); In re Super Feeders, Inc., 236 B.R. 267, 270-71 (Bankr.D.Neb.1999) (option price that is 5% of original property cost and 3.6% of total rental payments found to be nominal); Wakefield, 217 B.R. at 971 (<HOLDING>). See generally Dicker & Compo, 7 Am.

    ### Response:
    holding that option prices contained in two purported lease agreements are nominal where they constitute 10 of original equipment cost and total payments exceed the initial cost of the equipment under agreement 1  by approximately 50  and under agreement 2  by approximately 29
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    obtain a number of the relevant documents from Farnbacher. Accordingly, there is evidence that Farnbacher could have been persuaded to produce the documents earlier and, thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that Lion had the ability to comply with the trial court’s orders. Moreover, Lion lent the race car to Farnbacher in violation of the trial court’s turnover order. Therefore, Lion cannot now claim that it is unable to comply with the trial court’s discovery order as a result of Farnbacher’s unwillingness to assist. In a contempt proceeding, “the defendant’s own acts cannot be responsible for his inability to comply.” (Citation omitted.) Turner Advertising, supra, 252 Ga. at 103 (2); see also Kace Investments, LP v. Hull, 278 Ga. App. 477, 484-485 (2) (629 SE2d 26) (2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not grossly

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff could not complain that it was unable to comply with the trial courts order to respect the defendants easement because of its lease with a third party where plaintiff had entered into lease knowing that property was subject to an easement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vermax at oral argument, the propriety of the tax assessment essentially turns on one issue: Whether Vermax was the ultimate consumer of the raw materials it purchased and used in manufacturing its p ng Division, 860 P.2d 324, 327-28 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court held that, under the facts of that case, the contractor was not the ultimate consumer of the personal property because the owner of the project, not the contractor, purchased and also actually and constructively owned the personal property before it was converted into real property. The Thoru/p court made clear that one who does not own the property cannot become its ultimate consumer even if that entity converts the property into real property. Id.; see also Arco Elec. v. State Tax Comm’n, 860 P.2d 330, 331 (Utah 1993) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Vermax asserts that

    ### Response:
    holding contractor not responsible for use tax where tax exempt entity purchased the materials used
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    us revisit the integrity of his conviction, we decline to do so. Similarly, Appellant’s third contention suffers from the same fatal flaw as his second. During the pendency of Rash-id’s appeal of the forfeiture order, but after Rashid filed for bankruptcy, the United States recorded a lien on Rashid’s Philadelphia property. During the proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court, the Government conceded that Rashid had some interest in his Philadelphia property during the pendency of his appeal of the forfeiture order. The Government’s post-petition filing of its judgment was then improper under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). An injured debtor may only recover actual damages including attorneys’ fees for a willful violation of a stay and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive dam 3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Towers concerns a civil rather than

    ### Response:
    holding that restitution ordered pursuant to the vwpa was not a separate civil proceeding that required a jury trial but a criminal penalty that was an integral part of the sentencing process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. at 2795, and is ultimately unreliable. In the final analysis, the opinions of Drs. Monroe and Bellanti are based largely on hypothesis and speculation. This is not to say that the doctors are insincere in their opinions, or that their opinions may not some day be validated through scientific research and experiment. It may well be that the AvJet spill forever “sensitized” Ms. Cavallo to petroleum vapors and various other household chemicals. But the published scientific literature and test results simply do not support that conclusion at this time. And the price paid for this seemingly stringent standard of reliability is that, unavoidably, some legitimate injuries will be left unredressed. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2798-99 (<HOLDING>). X. THE BIDANSET STUDIES Dr. Bidanset has a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in practice a gatekeeping role for the judge no matter how flexible inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relief no later than ten days after the judgment is entered. Id. § 4(a)(4)(A)(vi); Searles v. Dechant, 393 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2004). In this case, Ms. Williams’s September 8 motion did not toll the time limit for filing a notice of appeal as to the court’s August 8 judgment because it was not filed within ten days. Accordingly, her time limit for filing a notice of appeal as to the August 8 judgment expired on October 10. Since she did not file her notice of appeal until December 8 it was untimely, and we therefore lack jurisdic tion to review the August 8 judgment and underlying Contempt Order. See id. at 1130 (noting that untimely notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court); Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The notice of appeal was timely, however,

    ### Response:
    holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court: there is uncertainty as to whether the Rehabilitation Act covers private organizations like the Girl Scouts. The relevant statutory language has been the subject of relatively few decisions, so this is not a case where a plaintiff obtusely failed to comply with well-established legal standards. Accordingly, Megan could reasonably have expected that the allegations in her original complaint would survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, given how difficult it might be to discover all of the Girl Scouts’ activities, the disputed issue is one that may require considerable time, effort, and money to litigate. It was reasonable for her to avoid that expense until she was sure that she failed to survive the motion to dismiss. Cf. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d at 560-61 (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks

    ### Response:
    recognizing that plaintiffs pleading burden is commensurate with the amount of information available to them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), and gave the parties a reasonable opportunity to present pertinent materials beyond those encompassed by the complaint. See Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher, 387 Mass. 889, 892 (1983). In particular, the at tachments to the department’s motion contained an affidavit of the defendant Michael T. Maloney who, by 1998, had become the Commissioner of Correction. The affidavit states, among other things, that “a comparable DDU for female inmates has not, and may never be constructed.” By adopting the department’s position as expressed in its memorandum in support of the motion, the motion judge considered this affidavit and other supplemental material in rendering her decision. See Brookline v. Medical Area Serv. Corp., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 245 n.7 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, by his submission of materials

    ### Response:
    holding that the motion judge by not excluding additional materials treated the motion as one for summary judgment despite the fact that the judgments entered were mislabelled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an injury exists. ii. Qualified Immunity Officers Smith and Herring plead the defense of qualified immunity. The standard for that defense is that governmental officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity, which shields them from civil damages, provided their conduct did not violate a clearly-established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. Hoard v. Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205, 211 (6th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant violated such a right. Id. In general, there is, and was at the time in question, no clearly-established right for an arrested person to be free of tight handcuffs. See Nemeckay, 894 F.Supp. at 314-18 (<HOLDING>). However, it is long-established that where

    ### Response:
    holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity despite their ignoring the arrestees complaints that the handcuffs were too tight
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court could not find, any cases in which a petitioner demonstrated a fundamental miscarriage of justice due to an intervening change in law regarding a mistaken legal characterization of a predicate offense under ACCA where the habeas petition was nonetheless barred by procedural default. While the issue is complicated, and the cases are like Shipp passing in the night, the Court concludes that where a predicate offense is improperly classified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA because of an intervening change in law which created a novel claim, “cause and prejudice must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 495, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (quotations omitted). The pro cedural default is excused as a fundamental 98 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Shannon, 410 F.3d at 1088-89 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a recent federal court of appeals decision was not a qualifying fact under  2255f4
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Her responses are distinguishable from those cases in which this Court has found error in the denial of cause challenges to jurors who repeatedly expressed a lack of impartiality or inability to follow the law. See Matarranz, 133 So.3d at 477-81, 485-88 (juror repeatedly indicated that she harbored a bias against criminal defendants because she,had previously been the victim of a burglary); Kop-sho, 959 So.2d at 170-72 (juror believed that defendant should testify on his own behalf and expressed disagreement with the right to silence); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 890-93 (Fla. 2001) (finding error in denying cause challenge to one juror who emphatically believed that the defendant’s failure to testify indicated guilt); see also Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the jurors in Matarranz, Kopsho,

    ### Response:
    holding that jurors who expressed residual doubt about the defendants right to silence should have been dismissed for cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence offered “for impeachment or to prove other controverted matters, such as ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures.” Pa.R.E. 407. Generally, courts have defined feasibility in this context more broadly than does Langston, to encompass not only technological possibility, but also considerations of cost and practicality and technological possibility. Given the scope of such definition, however, courts have advised that it should be applied cautiously in (5th Cir.1989)). Where, however, a defendant’s evidence and arguments are framed in categorical terms, are presented in the form of superlatives, or, more generally, upset the balance of fairness that Rule 407 seeks to maintain, courts have found the exceptions applicable. See, e.g., Wood, 70 F.3d at 1208 (<HOLDING>); cf. Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., 774 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that where the defendants expert described the product design using superlatives namely the safest design you could possibly put on the machine the plaintiff should have been permitted to impeach the expert by inquiring why the safest design possible was modified following the plaintiffs accident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plan, and Coan’s suit co 966, 973-74 (E.D.Mo.2010) (reasoning that participants adequately represented plan by naming multiple plaintiffs, those plaintiffs conceded they could only recover for the plan, and preclusion issues were not presently before the court), In re AEP ERISA Litig., No. C2-08-67, 2009 WL 3854943, at *1 (S.D.Ohio Nov. 17, 2009) (noting participant sought but was denied class certification), and Waldron v. Dugan, No. 07 C 286, 2007 WL 4365358, at *6-7 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 13, 2007) (declining to impose class- or derivative-action requirement on § 502(a)(2)). The most recent case to address Coan is Huizinga v. Genzink Steel Supply & Welding Co., where the court found no textual basis for the Coan holding. No. 1:10-CV-223, 2013 WL 4511291, at *8 (W.D.Mich. Aug. 23, 2013) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, No. 13 -2273 (6th Cir. Jan.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff is a plan participant and he is seeking to recover for the plan as a whole these are the only requirements on the face of the statute itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with an insured vehicle is an issue of first impression for our Court, but our courts of appeals have decided a number of cases establishing some guiding principles. In Latham v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., for example, the court held that when an unknown vehicle strikes another vehicle, which in turn strikes the insured, the requirements of the section are met and coverage is afforded. 482 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.). However, collisions with cargo that has fallen from an unidentified vehicle or with debris in the roadway have been held not to constitute “actual physical contact” with a “motor vehicle.” Deville, 988 S.W.2d at 333; Williams, 849 S.W.2d at 861; Smith, 2003 WL 21391534, at *3, 2003 Tex.App. LEXIS 5056, at *7 (<HOLDING>). Thus, our courts of appeals have reasonably

    ### Response:
    holding that a collision with the loading ramp of a trailer was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he would have had to carry the rifle with the intent to go armed. [The] warrant ... does not contain facts stating that [he] intended to go armed. Thus, he is factually innocent. This issue as framed brings to mind interesting issues such as whether the claim is justiciable in a post-conviction proceeding, see Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn.2009) (noting that the justiciability of free-standing actual innocence claims as part of a collateral attack was “ ‘left open’ and ‘unresolved’ ” in the wake of Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006))), and whether the otherwise valid guilty plea on weapon possession foreclosed the claim, see Pettus, 986 S.W.2d at 542 (<HOLDING>). We do not address these issues, however,

    ### Response:
    holding that the voluntary entry of an informed and counseled guilty plea constitutes an admission of all facts necessary to convict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to benefit his romantic interests at the expense of the City of Anniston. In Wiley, supra, the supreme court held that false statements that implied that a public official was misusing his office for his own personal gain were defamatory. 495 So.2d at 619. In Gray v. WALA-TV, 384 So.2d 1062 (Ala.1980), overruled on other grounds, Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085 (Ala.1988), the supreme court held that statements implying that a public contractor had “corruptly and illegally obtained, through political connections, a contract with the city and had not performed under the contract although having been paid to do so, and thereby dishonestly obtained public funds,” were libelous per se. 384 So.2d at 1065. See also Wofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349, 357, 30 So. 625, 628 (1901) (<HOLDING>); Advertiser Co. v. Jones, 169 Ala. 196,

    ### Response:
    holding that false statements impugning honesty of county commissioners in transacting public business were libelous per se
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    191 F.Supp.3d 1046, 2016 WL 3163049, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74192 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2016), that the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)—which Mr. Johnson challenges here—is unconstitutionally vague based on Johnson II and Dimaya. Nevertheless, the government asks the Court to reconsider its decision because, since Baires-Reyes was decided, several circuit courts have held that either the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) or § 16(b) (the statute at issue in Dimaya) is not void for vagueness. See, e.g., United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (§ 924(c)(3)(B)); United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (§ 924(c)(3)(B)); United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (§ 16(b)); see also United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). But see Baptiste v. AG United States, 841

    ### Response:
    holding before bairesreyes was decid ed that the residual clause of  924c3 is not unconstitutionally vague recognizing that the seventh and ninth circuits recently invalidated 18 usc  16b under johnson ii  s reasoning1 but declining to follow those cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have never been governed by the three-part extent-of-conflict analysis applicable to defendants seeking new court-appointed counsel. Unless the substitution would cause significant delay or inefficiency or run afoul of the other considerations we have men tioned, a defendant can fire his retained or appointed lawyer and retain a new attorney for any reason or no reason. See Miller v. Blacketter, 525 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir.2008) (in a case in which the defendant sought to replace his court-appointed attorney with retained counsel, evaluating “whether the trial judge’s decision was an unreasonable exercise of its discretion to balance Miller’s right to his chosen counsel against concerns of fairness and scheduling”); Bradley v. Henry, 510 F.3d 1093, 1096-98 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Conflict between the defendant and his

    ### Response:
    holding the state courts denial of a motion to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel to be an unreasonable application of gonzalezlopez because it was not justified by undue delay and the trial court wrongly assumed without questioning the defendant that she could not afford to pay retained counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are governed-by the Strickland standard, which declared that “legal representation violates the Sixth Amendment if it (1) falls ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ as indicated by ‘prevailing professional norms,’- and (2) the defendant suffers prejudice as a result.” Chaidez v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). The test is applied to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at any stage of the litigation. See Hill v. Lock-hart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In Strickland, the Supreme Court found that the district court had properly declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 701, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (<HOLDING>). Counsel, it explained, had not made an

    ### Response:
    holding trial counsels performance at sentencing where defendant received death sentence after initial guilty plea was neither unreasonable nor prejudicial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    today whether Demers would prevail under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Because Demers did not object to the challenged condition before the district court, he must not only demonstrate the existence of an error; he must also show that it is plain. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir.2005) (en banc). An error is plain if it is “obvious” or “clear under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. In light of Demers’s history of sexual abuse and lack of children, and because we have never held that a condition barring contact with minors is invalid without an exception for contact pursuant to prior approval, we do not believe that imposing such an unqualified condition constitutes an error that is clear under current law. See Ristine, 335 F.3d at 695 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even assuming that Demers could

    ### Response:
    holding that a condition banning possession of pornography did not constitute plain error because the current law concerning this issue is unsettled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Cleavinger v. Sax-ner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (observing that absolute immunity applies to administrative law judges and “certain others who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process”); Butz v. Econo-mou, 438 U.S. 478, 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). (c) Statute of Limitations We next address Ms. Lewis’s argument that the district court incorrectly applied the statute of limitations to her claim against Kimberly Martinez. The district court held that the three-year statute of limitations had run before Ms. Lewis filed her complaint on November 29, 2010, because she alleged that Ms. Martinez’s actionable conduct occurred on November 28, 2007. R. at 4. See Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The deadline fell on a Sunday, however, so

    ### Response:
    holding new mexico statute of limitations for filing a  1983 action is three years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    award punitive damages to punish a defendant for willful or malicious conduct and to deter others from similar behavior. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (citation omitted); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003) (“It should be presumed that a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.” (citation omitted)); Hudgins v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 221 Ariz. 472, 486, 489, ¶¶ 38, 50, 212 P.3d 810, 824, 827 (App.2009) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 48 To obtain an award of punitive damages,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that punitive damages should be awarded only in the most egregious cases and are not intended to compensate plaintiffs but to punish the wrongdoer and deter both the wrongdoer and others from future harmful conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the phrase “information in a DNA record” the legislature in section 411.15303) prohibited the release of a broader category of information than DNA records included in the state DNA database. Id. § 411.153(b). We therefore agree with the City that section 411.153(b) protects from disclosure information in a DNA record, even if that DNA record has not been forwarded to the director for inclusion in the state DNA database. See id. Were we to adopt the Star-Telegram’s interpretation of section 411.153, we would be left with the absurd result that only the DNA records of the convicted offender would be exempt from disclosure under the PIA. We do not believe this is what the legislature intended. See University of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 356 & n. 20 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). The City’s construction of section 411.153 is

    ### Response:
    recognizing that courts should not construe statutes in a way that leads to absurd results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Chapter Thirteen plans may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). Defendants concede that plaintiffs’ claims are secured by liens on their principal residences. Therefore, the key issue is whether those liens constitute “security interests” for purposes of the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2). The Bankr ich.1992) (finding antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2) inapplicable because creditor’s interest in the principal residence of the debtor was a “lien,” rather than a “security interest,” based on the fact that it arose nonconsensually under state tax act); In re Venable, 48 B.R. 853, 856 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Mitchell, 39 B.R. 696, 700

    ### Response:
    holding that citys tax hen on debtors principal residence was modifiable despite  1322b2 because not consensual and thus not a security interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authorization of an emergency procurement ... and ... this [was] a matter of public importance which could occur at any time....” Id. at 169, 666 S.E.2d at 240. However, in the present case, SCDOT has determined the inspection of private bridges is against its own policy. Thus, we find the matter will neither “affect future events [n]or have collateral consequences.” IV. Remaining Issues Finally, Appellants argue the circuit court erred in finding SCDOT was legitimately assisting a municipality and in failing to find SCDOT violated Article X, sections 5 and 11 of the South Carolina Constitution. Based on our resolution of the issues of standing and mootness, we need not reach this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the

    ### Response:
    holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when resolution of another issue disposes of the appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    spent on appellate work. The result is not that clear-cut, however. As Schumann holds, Section 330 is not the “usual” sort of fee-shifting statute in that it contains no “prevailing party” provision. See Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874 (11th Cir.1990). While a debtor or creditor may prevail in one or more of the many disputes which arise in the course of a typical Chapter 11 reorganization, almost everyone loses something____ The language of § 330 does not authorize the court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Rather the statute authorizes the court to award “reasonable compensation” for actual, necessary services rendered---- Id. at 882. See Port Royal Land & Timber Company v. Berkowitz, Lefkovits, Isom, Kushner, 924 F.2d 208 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Although it has been recognized that the

    ### Response:
    holding that bankruptcy court erred by not awarding fees for unsuccessful litigation even though the effort was found to have been actually made reasonable and necessary to the faithful representation of the bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review, see Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir.1999) (stating a grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo), we conclude dismissal was proper because the record before the district court showed Baker did not complete the third step of Pottawattamie County Jail’s grievance procedure, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (declaring, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted”); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (explaining the proper exhaustion of remedies “means using all steps that the [prison] holds out, and doing so properly ”); Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>), and nothing in the record indicates this step

    ### Response:
    holding an inmate must exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing suit and if exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing dismissal is mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of PWID marijuana within proximity of a school. Significantly, plea counsel stated at the plea proceeding that Husband was originally “charged with everything,” but she “was able to get the solicitor who had the case at the time to dismiss all of his cases.” A review of the plea proceeding also reveals that plea counsel argued for leniency on behalf of Husband by comparing his more limited involvement in the crimes to that of Petitioner. We believe plea counsel’s approach essentially pitted Husband against Petitioner, which was clearly detrimental to Petitioner’s interests. In light of the foregoing, we find Petitioner established that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected her plea coun sel’s performance. See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549,

    ### Response:
    holding petitioner in pcr proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsels performance given counsel jointly represented petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea  bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    avoid ‘unbridled discretion’ in the hands of a government official.” See Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1282. Although the Court concluded that the Ordinance is content-discriminatory when it includes section 1.0, the Court already has determined to enjoin the enforcement of that provision. To avoid providing redundant or unnecessary relief, therefore, the Court will conduct its analysis of whether the statute constitutes an invalid prior restraint as if the Ordinance does not include section 1.0. So viewed, the Ordinance is content-neutral. When an ordinance is content-neutral, the law is clear that the absence of specific time limits is not enough to compel the conclusion that officials lack adequate standards to guide their decision making. See City of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d at 1282 (<HOLDING>) (citing Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that a lack of time limits in a contentneutral ordinance does not equate to unbridled discretion absent evidence of a pattern of unlawful favoritism
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consider a continuum of placements fails. B. Substantive Arguments 1. Whether Sarah’s IEPs Addressed All of Her Needs Under the IDEA, an IEP must include “a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals, designed to — (aa) meet the child’s needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum; and (bb) meet each of the child’s other educational needs that result from the child’s disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(II). In view of this requirement, the Seventh Circuit has held that “[t]o meet the second, substantive criterion of Rowley, an IEP must respond to all significant facets of the student’s disability, both academic and behavioral.” Alex R., 375 F.3d at 613 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs argue that Sarah’s IEPs failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that iep that fails to address disabilityrelated actions of violence and disruption in the classroom is not reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    affirm Appellant’s convictions and sentences. All sitting. All concur. ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR MODIFICATION This matter is before the Court on the Appellee’s Petition for Modification, filed December 11, 2012, of the Opinion of the Court by Justice Scott, rendered November 21, 2012. Having reviewed the record and being otherwise fully and sufficiently advised, the Court ORDERS: The Appellee’s Petition for Modification is GRANTED; and the Opinion of the Court by Justice Scott, rendered November 21, 2012, is MODIFIED on its face and WITHDRAWN; and the attached opinion is SUBSTITUTED therefor. The modification does not affect the holding. All sitting. All concur. ENTERED: May 23, 2013. /s/ John D. Minton, Jr. 1 . Mere seconds later, Hayes and Robbins heard a collision 1th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant's

    ### Response:
    holding that the government may comment on a defendants prearrest premiranda silence as well as his postarrest pr emiranda silence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Express, Inc., 334 Pa.Super. 295, 483 A.2d 456 (1984). Although such statements may ultimately prove to be false or maliciously motivated, the same may be said of statements made by a party who consults with his or her attorney preliminary to instituting a civil action, or of statements made by counsel in preliminary conferences or negotiations on their client’s behalf. Nevertheless, such statements are deemed to be absolutely privileged because the policy concerns stated above outweigh the right of the defamation plaintiff to seek redress for harm caused by the statements. Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa.Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36, 41-42 (1991) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also Marino v. Fava, 915 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa.Super.2006), appeal denied, 592 Pa. 782, 926 A.2d 975 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Herein, Appellant admits Appellee’s allegedly

    ### Response:
    holding that statements an uncle made in an application to have his nephew involuntarily committed along with those he later made at the commitment hearing were absolutely privileged and could not form the basis for a defamation action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 1575, 1580-81, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 365 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 429 U.S. 890, 97 S.Ct. 247, 50 L.Ed.2d 173 (1976). 20 . See Amer. Cyanamid Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 606 F.2d 1307, 1320 (D.C.Cir.1979) (stating ""FDA may, on a case-by-case basis, define and narrow the statutory requirement of adequate tests by announcing and applying particular principles of scientific methodology."") 21 . SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). 22 . Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 6. 23 . Plaintiffs’ SJ at 31. 24 . See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) (<HOLDING>) 25 . See Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding driving licenses to be property protected by the 14th amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or that any Arizona resident other than the plaintiff had ever visited the site); id. (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir.1997), as holding that New York’s long-arm statute did not extend to the operator of a Missouri jazz club whose website merely had a hyperlink to a New York club of the same name); id. (quoting Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.1999), as declining to find jurisdiction where the defendant's website was accessible to forum residents, but where “[tjhere was no evidence that [the defendant] conducted business over the Internet by engaging in business transactions with forum residents or by entering into contracts over the Internet”); see also Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l

    ### Response:
    holding that a passive website that merely makes information available is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    279 (capitalization omitted). Looking to the contents of those documents rather than their captions, the court reasoned: “Neither document is a judgment or decree, ¡former] ORS 19.010(1), or the kind of order described in ¡former] ORS 19.010(2), which is treated as a judgment or decree for the purpose of being reviewed on appeal. Neither document qualifies as an order embraced within ¡former] ORS 19.010(4) which confers appellate jurisdiction in special statutory proceedings. Cf ORS 28.040 and 28.070. This appeal must be dismissed on our own motion for want of appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 280. In this case, the document from which appellants seek to appeal is not a final judgment within the meaning of ORS 19.205(1). Widing v. Estate of Glenn A. Widing, 149 Or App 4 8 P2d 196 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The order in this case does not prevent a

    ### Response:
    holding that an order denying an allegedly indigent plaintiffs motion for a fee waiver or deferral was appealable under former ors 190102a because the order closed the courthouse door
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (emphasis added). This domestic consumptive demand exception provided for in the latter half of the provision is crucial given the facts of this case. The parties agree that no domestic cocoa production industry exists in the United States sufficient to meet domestic consumptive demand. In such instances, the statute expressly prohibits application of any of the provisions found within it. As a result, the regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute, which merely direct how Customs will implement the directives of the statute, can neither be invoked nor relied upon by plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, any injury relying on 19 C.F.R. § 12.24 cannot be redressed by this court where the consumptive demand exception applies. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In other words, because of the undisputed

    ### Response:
    holding that where prayedfor recourse to interagency rule would not redress injury claimed by plaintiffs burden of proof regarding standing could not be met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violations under chapter 517, contained in section 95.11 titled “Limitations other than for the recovery of real property,” provides that all “actions ... shall be commenced” within two years “with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred.” § 95.11(4)(e). There, the two-year period is expressed in the language and structure of a statute of limitations (action “shall be commenced” within two years of discovery) and the five-year period is expressed in the language and structure of repose (“but not more than five years”). See, e.g., Puchner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 553 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). Other combined limitations/repose statutes

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellants claim was barred because it was commenced after the time periods prescribed by section 95114e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and rea sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, ... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."" Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). An appellate court "" 'is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research'"" Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at ¶11, 974 P.2d 269 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). 44 The Gorostietas complain of jury instructions 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28 in their statement of the issues but then completely fail to support this claim anywhere in their argument or their reply brief. We therefore do not address it. B. Excluding Statutory Language from Jury Instruction 145 The Gorostietas requested that seetion 41-6-80 of the Utah E.2d 443, 450 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Coleman v. Erie Thriftway Supermarket, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that statute establishes rebuttable presumption of reasonableness of charges but necessity must still be proven
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    49, United States Code.” Id. § 5(d)(2), 120 Stat. at 2013. The only contract described in section 5(d)(1)(A) is, as noted above, the Contract executed by Dallas, Fort Worth, the DFW Board, American, and Southwest on July 11, 2006. Accordingly, the court determines that the explicit references to the Contract in the language of the statute demonstrate Congress’s intent to incorporate the Contract into the WARA. c. Section 5 of the WARA Codifies Under Federal Law Specific Obligations Set Forth in the Contract Congress, by incorporating the Contract into the WARA, rendered the obligations set forth in the Contract matters of federal law. See Love Terminal Partners, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 897 (referencing section 5 of the statute); see also Love Terminal Partners, L.P., 527 F.Supp.2d at 558 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, during the state court litigation,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    individual rights before federal funding provisions will be read to provide a basis for private enforcement. Id. at 280, 122 S.Ct. at 2273 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 28 & n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 1545 & n. 21, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981)). “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28, 101 S.Ct. at 1545. Only twice since Pennhurst has the Supreme Court held that spending legislation gave rise to rights enforceable via § 1983. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous.

    ### Response:
    holding that health care providers could pursuant to  1983 enforce the boren amendment to the medicaid act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not decide, however, whether respondent’s dismissal deprived her of a liberty interest in pursuing a medical career. Nor need we decide whether respondent’s dismissal infringed any other interest constitutionally protected against deprivation without procedural due process. Assuming the existence of a liberty or property interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires. The school fully informed respondent of the faculty’s dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the danger that this posed to timely graduation and continued enrollment. The ultimate decision to dismiss respondent was careful and deliberate. These procedures were sufficient under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Gagne, 692 N.E.2d at 495 (<HOLDING>); Reilly, 666 N.E.2d at 445 (holding that,

    ### Response:
    holding that gagnes due process rights were not violated finding that gagne was aware he faced possible expulsion and that he had notice of the alleged misconduct and rejecting gagnes argument that his due process rights were violated by the deans reliance on evidence gathered after the hearing in determining the appropriate sanction where the evidence supported a finding that the dean did not rely on the latergathered evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a loaded firearm and a bottle of whiskey. According to the government, defendant admitted that the gun was his, that he had it for protection, and that he had intended to tell Geffre about it but was afraid he would get in trouble. The government states that, in a separate interview, defendant’s mother acknowledged that defendant had asked for the pistol, saying that he was going to clean it. The federal grand jury subsequently indicted defendant on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Defendant now .1990) (reversing conviction where deputy sheriff executed state search warrant on property rented by enrolled Indian and located within exterior boundaries of tribal lands); and State v. Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d 463 (S.D.1990) (<HOLDING>). The government argues that Baker and Ross are

    ### Response:
    holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counterclaimed asserting that the Fox Patent was invalid, that Ethicon’s devices infringed U.S. Surgical’s United States Patent Number 5,031,814 (the “Tompkins Patent”), and that Ethicon’s devices infringed U.S. Surgical’s United States Patent No. 5,156,315 (the “Green ’315 Patent”). On March 21 and 22, 1994, the Court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Final arguments were heard on April 4, 1994. We denied the Plaintiffs motion. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp., 855 F.Supp. 1500 (S.D.Ohio, 1994). The ease was set for Summary Jury Trial on April 10, 1994. On the eve of the summary jury trial, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Parties agreed that the Markman decision

    ### Response:
    holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of N.M., 1976-NMCA-039, ¶ 7; see also § 10-7E-8(A) (creating the PELRB). The PEBA does not expressly delegate any authority to the PELRB to hear complaints involving grandfathered public employers. But, by implication, the PELRB has the power to determine in the first place whether a public employer or aspects of its labor relations system meet the conditions.for grandfather status. See Deming Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 14 (“[T]he PELRB has ¶ 6 (“[Because the PEBA does not apply, the [PELRB] does not have jurisdiction.”), We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that the PELRB did not have jurisdiction to hear AFSCME’s complaints and that it did not act “in accordance with law” when it remanded the complaints to the LMRB. See Regents, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 16 (<HOLDING>). Complaints cannot be “remanded” to a tribunal

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion    not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to recover the monies owed under the Consulting Agreement.” R.65 ¶ 7. Although Segal did not file the C gument that disability payments under an insurance policy in which the debtor had a pre-petition interest were property of the estate under § 541(a)(6); although such payments were intended to be a substitute for earned wages, they were available only when a policyholder was incapable of performing services). 18 . This issue is arguably waived as Segal made a single reference to ""personal services"" in his 82-paragraph Answer in the underlying adversary proceeding, but did not raise this argument in his summary judgment opposition or at oral argument on the motion. See Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). the Consulting Agreement payments as wages

    ### Response:
    holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination. See Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1320; see also Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (“[T]he plaintiffs failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom [her] case.”). Here, the record contains enough non-comparator evidence for a jury to reasonably infer that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because she was pregnant. See Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir.2012). á) Discriminatory Comments The discriminatory comments of Ms. Thistlethwaite are strong circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory intent. A plaintiff can demonstrate a dis criminatory animus of a decisionmaker by showing that the decisionmaker made discriminatory remarks. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1362 (<HOLDING>). A discriminatory statement can be probative

    ### Response:
    holding that supervisors statement that he wanted aggressive young men like himself to be promoted was highly suggestive circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    definition of hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (“A statement is not hearsay if ... [it is] a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”). The Supreme Court has held that cocon-spirator statements do not fall within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause, and Crawford did not specifically foreclose the admissibility of such statements. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (admitting statements made unwittingly by a co-conspirator to a government informant and rejecting “any suggestion that admission of these statements against petitioner violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause”); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986) (<HOLDING>). There is no indication in Crawford that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the confrontation clause does not require a showing of unavailability as a condition precedent to the admission of the outofcourt statements of a nontestifying coconspirator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court entertained an interlocutory appeal from a pending inverse condemnation case initiated by SDDS in Fall River County seeking money damages as a result of the Referendum and Initiated Measure. Id. at 853-54. The court held in its opinion that Hughes County was the only appropriate venue for SDDS’s action. Id. at 854, 857. Presumably, SDDS’s suit for money damages is still pending at this time, but the case appears to have no bearing on the suit presently pending before this Court. 5 . In addition, the Court notes that S.B. 169 never became effective because, although passed by the legislature and signed by the governor, S.B. 169 was properly referred to a vote of the electorate and the electorate effectively vetoed the bill. See SDDS, Inc. v. State, 481 N.W.2d 270, 272 (S.D. 1992) (<HOLDING>). However, because the Referendum is precisely

    ### Response:
    holding that in south dakota a law does not become effective until passed by the legislature signed by the governor and if properly referred until approved by a majority vote of the electorate in the next general election
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)). A hostile work environment claim, which was not alleged here, would allow full review because it is likely comprised of a series of repeated acts, some of which may fall outside the filing period. However, “[a]n employer’s denial of a request for a reasonable accommodation,” which is what Dick alleged here, “is a discrete act of discrimination that is an independently actionable unlawful employment practice under the ADA [or the Rehabilitation Act].” Id. at 442 (emphasis added). Thus, because the district court was only considering DSU’s purported denial of Dick’s accommodation request, the district court did not err by failing to considered the entire record. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (<HOLDING>). C. Adverse Employment Action Dick argues that

    ### Response:
    holding that the court may only consider the discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did kill and murder (naming the person killed), and concluding as is now required by law[.]” Specifically alleging premeditation and deliberation is not required by the statute. Id. The indictment at issue stated that “on or about the 5th day of February, 2005, in the County named above the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did of malice aforethought kill and murder George Daniel Katsigiannis. This act was in violation of North Carolina General Statues Section 14-17.” Here, the indictment notified defendant that he was being charged with first degree murder and set out the requisite elements pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144. Defendant acknowledges that this issue has been decided against him. State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 14, 337 S.E.2d 786, 793 (1985) (<HOLDING>); State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 175, 531

    ### Response:
    holding the indictment in question complies with the short form indictment authorized by nc gen stat  15144 and is therefore sufficient to charge first degree murder without specifically alleging premeditation and deliberation or felony murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any official misconduct on the part of Chief Brady because no such intimidation, coercion, or improper “suppression” of evidence for Wade’s benefit ever took place. Appellants therefore have failed to conclusively establish that the gist of the Article was not more damaging to Wade’s reputation in the mind of the average reader than the truth. Furthermore, even if appellants had established a right to summary judgment on the basis of substantial truth, because the underlying facts regarding the alleged intimidation, coercion, and “suppression” of evidence are disputed, a material issue of fact exists on the issue of substantive truth precluding summary judgment. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see also Cram Roofing Co., Inc. v. Parker, 131 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that appellants did not meet

    ### Response:
    holding in regard to substantial truth defense that ojbviously if the underlying facts regarding the gist of the statement are disputed then a fact issue arises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Volkswagen’s papers was reasonable. We acknowledge at the outset that, although the district court did not explicitly consider whether the request to see the Volkswagen’s papers was reasonable in context, our conclusion that it was may conflict with the court’s dicta that Rugen had no basis to detain Hornbecker for reasons unrelated to the traffic stop. After all, the request came after Rugen learned that there was no outstanding warrant for Hornbecker and that Horn-becker’s license and registration were valid; it thus prolonged the detention beyond the point at which it might otherwise be expected to have concluded. But we are obliged in these circumstances to reach our own, independent judgment about the reasonableness of the request. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697-98, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (<HOLDING>). In assessing the reasonableness of Rugen’s

    ### Response:
    holding that ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion are subject to independent appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Rosases’ applications for cancellation of removal. PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. RYMER, Judge, dissenting. I would deny the petition because the Rosases used 72-hour border passes to transport their non-citizen children across the border with the preconceived intent to settle them here permanently. This was an illegal use of the pass, and I cannot say that the Immigration Judge’s determina tion that the Rosases thereby knowingly assisted another alien to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law is plainly contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E). Chowdhury v. INS, 249 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir.2001)

    ### Response:
    holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or, alternatively, that Unum waived that condition precedent. Separately, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the grace period provided by the Master Policy applies to Keith Matheny, and that Unum breached its contract by denying Plaintiffs claim without applying the grace period. (i). Estoppel The elements of estoppel are: (1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with a claim afterward asserted, (2) action by another in reasonable reliance upon that act, statement or admission, and (3) injury which would result to the relying party if the first p were allowed to contradict or repudiate the prior act, statement or admission. Colonial Imports, Inc. v. Carlton Northwest, Inc., 121 Wash.2d 726, 734, 853 P.2d 913 (1993). These elements must 83, 823 P.2d 499, 505-06 (1992) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds the Carew rule inapplicable.

    ### Response:
    holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the class representative: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,” 9 Class Action Reports 4 (1986), and authorizing $50,000 incentive award for class representative). Depending on the involvement of the class rep resentative, courts, including federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania, have allowed incentive awards in substantial amounts. See e.g., In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (approving award of $5,000 to each of several class representative); In re First Jersey Sec. Inc. Litig., MDL no. 681, 1989 WL 69901 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1989) (approving award of $24,000 to class representative); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 621 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (approving award of $20,000 to each of two class representative). Cf. In re U.S. Bioscience, 155 F.R.D. 116 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that payments to class

    ### Response:
    holding that awards of 2500 to majority of representatives and 5000 to deposed representatives were inappropriate where representatives had borne little risk by participating in litigation and provided services that could have been provided by any other class member
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Several factors work to Bockting’s disadvantage here. First, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to accept Laura’s credibility based on his endorsement alone; rather, he explained that “[t]he evidence shows that [Laura] was candid” (emphasis added), and he identified several specific instances where Laura made no attempt to conceal facts damaging to Autumn’s allegations (e.g., Autumn observing her parents engaged in sexual relations) or to her own reputation and credibility as a government witness (e.g., her drug and alcohol problems, her occupation as a nude dancer). See Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1276 (<HOLDING>). Second, the trial court significantly

    ### Response:
    recognizing that prosecutors must have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments and thus can argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence including that one of the two sides is lying
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was being requested”); Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2005-0620, 2006 WL 1120632, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006). (“This Court finds that the defendant’s letter sufficiently described the documents sought [for Rule 34 purposes].”). This Court’s research reveals that other federal district courts have ruled that informal requests are insufficient, at least in situations wherein the requesting party later sought to compel the informal Rule 34 request. See, e.g., Sithon Mar. Co. v. Holiday Mansion, Civ. No. 96-2262-EEO, 1998 WL 182785, *2 (D.Kan. Apr. 10, 1998) (finding that plaintiffs letter requesting documents, which was filed after the fact discovery period closed, did not satisfy Rule 34); Suid v. Cigna Corp., 203 F.R.D. 227, 228 (D.Vi.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Court notes that the inconsistent case

    ### Response:
    holding that correspondence between counsel cannot suffice as a rule 34 request that may be compelled through rule 37
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    year. Boston Mutual suggests that it was a relatively simple matter to ascertain how the vanishing premiums worked and how the downward spiral of the policy’s interest rate rendered the promise of vanishing premiums a nullity. Whether the plaintiff should have known that, and when, is quite another matter. We find the reasoning in Gaidon I persuasive in this regard: “Consumers vary in their level of sophistication and their ability to perceive the connection between a fluctuation in dividend/interest rates and a vanishing date, or to make the necessary arithmetic adjustments. The issue before us is not whether, as a matter of law, reasonable consumers would be misled in a material way, but whether that prospect is enough to create a question of fact. . . Gaidon I, 94 N.Y. 2d at 345 (<HOLDING>). On this record, and taking all reasonable

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment motion was sufficient to raise question of fact under new york consumer protection statute prohibiting deceptive insurance practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for withdrawal under rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(e). “ ‘Where a defendant seeks to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was coerced by his attorney, the trial court must either appoint conflict-free counsel or permit the defendant the opportunity to secure the same and, then, conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.’ ” Brown v. State, 835 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (quoting Lingenfelser v. State, 734 So.2d 472, 472-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)); see also Gunn v. State, 841 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Accordingly, the trial court should have appointed conflict-free counsel to represent Mr. Council and to adopt or revise the motion, which was drafted by a lawyer with whom Mr. Council had a conflict. See Tuhey v. State, 972 So.2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). The trial court also observed that the plea

    ### Response:
    holding defendant entitled to appointment of conflictfree counsel to assist with preparation of facially sufficient motion to withdraw plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1. Further, Wilson does not challenge the District Court’s determination that the Terms and Conditions were not unconscionable — a determination that in no way hinged on whether the specific versión of the Terms and Conditions submitted by Kellogg in this litigation is the correct one, but merely assessed the procedural context in which Wilson signed the agreement. These two concessions are fatal to Wilson’s claims. They confirm that an express contract — the Terms and Conditions (regardless of which precise version Wilson signed) — governed Wilson’s relationship with Kellogg, and thus that, as the District Court held, Wilson’s only two claims — for breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment — are unsustainable. See Hudson v. Mathers, 283 Mich.App. 91, 770 N.W.2d 883, 887 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. City of Detroit,

    ### Response:
    holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    13 of the Securities Act provides, in relevant part: No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77i(a)(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have' been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence .... 15 U.S.C. § 77m (emphasis added). The one-year limitations period begins to run “(1) when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, the facts constituting the violation — whichever comes first.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 637, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010) (citation omitted) (construing 28 US.C. § 1658(b)(1) of the Exchange Act); UBS I, 858 F.Supp.2d at 320 (<HOLDING>). Thus, “the limitations period commences not

    ### Response:
    holding merck applies to section 13 of the securities act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recognize any further liability, it could have relied upon the limitation of action clause within the policy. Hounshell v. American States Insurance Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 433, 424 N.E.2d 311, 314 (1981). Thus, we hold that the “negotiation type” of estoppel raised in Shea North, supra, is not applicable here. This, however, does not necessarily end our inquiry. The facts of this case lead us to question the wisdom of applying this clause in the circumstances presented here. At the outset, we note that the limitation for suit set by the clause establishes a significantly shorter time than the six-year period which ordinarily applies to actions on written contracts. See A.R.S. § 12-548; Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Simon, 1 Ariz.App. 274, 277, 401 P.2d 759, 762 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Ordinarily, we would question the inherent

    ### Response:
    holding that absent a policy limitation clause ars  12548 applies to actions on insurance contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the specific language of the charge filed with the agency, but rather, may encompass acts of discrimination which the MCAD investigation could reasonably be expected to uncover.” Davis v. Lucent Technologies, 251 F.3d 227, 233 (1st Cir.2001). Application of the scope-of-the-investigation rule requires a fact-specific inquiry into the similarities between the administrative charge and the civil complaint. See Powers, 915 F.2d at 38 (“claims are cognizable if they are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and grow out of such allegations” (internal quotation omitted)). Additional claims may proceed when they 1) allege the same type of discrimination and 2) are based on the same type of conduct as the administrative charge. See, e.g., Powers, 915 F.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Edwin v. Blenwood Associates, 9 F.Supp.2d 70,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could bring generalized civil claims even though administrative charge included only particularized claims since both complaints alleged age discrimination based on similar conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . [Chris] to; OR intentionally aided [Chris] to: r 1(a) Attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to [Kelly]; or Threaten to do bodily injury to [Kelly], accompanied by a show of immediate foree or Vlolence, and i(b). #. Use a dangerous weapon; and, 2. The [Defendant], a. I on supplemental instruction contradiets, or could reasonably be construed to contradict, the initial instructions arrived at in consultation with counsel and given to the jury before deliberation. See United States v. Mondestin, 535 Fed.Appx. 819, 823-24 (11th (per curiam) (vacating convictions after noting ""several problems that arise when a court fundamentally changes [a] jury instruction in response to a question raised during deliberations""); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (<HOLDING>). 127 Defendant claims that the district

    ### Response:
    holding that a supplemental instruction did not amount to reversible error when it merely clarified a point of law on which the jury had already been instructed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy, which specifically states that the application form is incorporated into the terms of the policy. See Gulf Policy, p. 1. The proposal form itself confirms the parties’ intent that it be part of the policy. It provides, “It is agreed by the Company and the Insured Persons that the particulars and statements contained in the Proposal Form and any information provided herewith ... are the basis of this Policy and are to be considered as incorporated in and constituting a part of this Policy.” Great American Proposal Form, p. 4. Ohio case law holds that language of this sort shows “unambiguously” that applications and any attached forms are incorporated into the actual policy. See Winston v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., No. C000251, 2001 WL 395154, at *3 (Ohio Ct.App. Apr. 20, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Personal Serv. Ins. Co. v. Lester, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that the first prong of the boggs test is satisfied when as here the policy includes an application that contains unambiguous language linking back to the policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under relevant statutes barred the University’s claims.”). Regional circuit law governs the question of waiver of a defense. Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir.2005). In the Fifth Circuit, “[although failure to raise an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) in a party’s first responsive pleading ‘generally results in a waiver ... ’ [w]here the matter is raised in the trial court in a manner that does not result in unfair surprise ... technical failure to comply precisely with Rule 8(c) is not fatal. Thus, a defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if he ‘raised the issue at a pragmatically sufficient time, and [the plaintiff] was not prejudiced in its ability to respond.’” Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 491-92 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Federal Circuit recently upheld a

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court properly allowed the defendant who asserted the disputed defense as a contested issue of law in the joint pretrial order to pursue the defense despite the defendants failure to comply with rule 8c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a R & R pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); D.P.R. Civ. R. 72(a); and Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Nonetheless, an adversely affected party may contest the Magistrate Judge’s R & R by filing its objections to the recommendations made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). In such respect, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), in pertinent part, provides that any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or spe Cir.1993) (stating that “[objection to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Borden v. Sec. of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The Court, in order to accept unopposed

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor.” Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991); accord Smith v. Kennedy (In re Smith), 235 F.3d 472, 478 (9th Cir.2000) (“It is widely accepted that property deemed exempt from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate revests in the debtor.”). As the Second Circuit has stated, “[q]uite simply, property that has been exempted belongs to the debtor.” Bell v. Bell (In re Bell), 225 F.3d 203, 216 (2d Cir.2000). This principle is consistent with the text of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines exempt property as property that, unlike all the debtor’s other property, does not belong to the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 52 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838 (<HOLDING>). The homestead exemptions available to the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appear nowhere else in the complaint, therefore no facts are alleged linking them to the alleged violations. Further, the plaintiffs’ causes of action themselves do not specify these individuals as supervisors properly liable under section 1983; the causes of action merely assign supervisory liability to “Superintendent Pedro Toledo Davila and other supervisory defendants ... ”. (Docket No. 1 at 16) As to those defendants whose supervisory liability is alleged only as a consequence of job title and a vague reference to “other” supervisory defendants in the listed causes of action, the plaintiffs’ pleadings have asserted nothing but legal conclusions, and are therefore insufficient to sustain the claims of supervisory liability. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, all claims against defendants

    ### Response:
    holding that while legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint they must be wellsupported by factual allegations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only when the plaintiff has sufficient information “to adequately plead th[ose] fact[s] and survive a motion to dismiss.” sontiac General Employees’ Retirement System. 637 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir.2011) (citing Merck, 130 S.Ct at 1796). Dismissal should only be granted “on the basis of inquiry notice when the complaint and ‘uncontroverted evidence clearly’ support such a finding.” In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d 650, 663 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 167-68 (2d Cir.2005)). See Staehr v. The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 412 (2d Cir.2008) (ruling that the issue of inquiry notice is “often inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss”). See, e.g., Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 42 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff must plead compliance with the

    ### Response:
    holding that inquiry notice was properly resolved as a matter of law where the sec documents themselves provided sufficient notice to plaintiffs of their claims because the documents disclosed numerous lawsuits and investigations against the company directly related to the claims plaintiffs brought against the company
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that prejudgment interest is potentially available made such determinations irrelevant. 491 F.Supp.2d at 308. At the parties’ request, the Court now addresses these issues, which have been fully briefed. As described above, the Court found that prejudgment interest was available against USPS because such an award is a normal incident to an award of damages for breach of contract. However, punitive damages differ from prejudgment interest in that “punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are generally not available for breach of contract.” Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002). See also U.S. for Use and Benefit of Evergreen Pipeline Const. Co., Inc. v. Merritt Meridian Const. Corp. (“Evergreen”), 95 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Durham Industries, Inc. v. North River Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    group” to mean “a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic,” for example, “sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). More recently, the agency clarified that “particularity and social distinction” are also required. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (BIA 2014). Particularity goes to “delineation”: it requires that “terms used to describe the group have commonly accep IA 2008) (concluding that Salvadoran youths who resist gang recruitment are not a cognizable social group because they do not share recognizable and discrete attributes); Matter of S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1309-10 (BIA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233

    ### Response:
    holding that a group of colombian citizens who feared kidnapping due to their wealth did not establish eligibility for asylum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Id. at 465; see id. at 651-53, 660-63). He conceded, with respect to the Lighting division, that “if ... there was no buyer, no independent buyer ... in 1984, it would [have been] inappropriate to apply a control premium in determining the fair value of those businesses.” (Id. at 539). Yet, he failed to consider whether such buyers actually existed. (Id.). Instead, he assumed they existed and engaged in a purely “theoretical exercise.” His conclusions, therefore, amount to no more than theoretical speculation. See, e.g., Estate of Godley v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 210, 215 (4th Cir.2002) (“A premium for control or discount for lack of control may be appropriate as a factual matter for several reasons.” (emphasis added)); Ahmanson Found, v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Eckelkamp v. Beste, 201 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1028

    ### Response:
    holding that district judge did not err in declining to apply a control premium where party advocating application of such a premium did not prove existence of prospective buyer who was willing to pay a premium
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgement of anybody’s right to speak freely.” Id. at 474, 117 S.Ct. 2130. The United Foods Court distinguished Glickman by asserting that the program in Glickman “mandated assessments for speech [which] were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy.” United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411-12, 121 S.Ct. 2334. Thus, after distinguishing Glickman, and finding that First Amendment interests were at stake, the Court proceeded to apply the tenets established in Abood and Keller, which established the “germaneness test.” United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413, 121 S.Ct. 2334. That test requires any coerced subsidized speech be germane to the larger purpose of the association at issue. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235, 97 S.Ct. 1782 (<HOLDING>); Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14, 110 S.Ct. 2228

    ### Response:
    holding that union can only finance speech not germane to collective bargaining with nonobjecting members funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Affirmed. See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098, 1108 n. 13 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Woodard v. Sunbeam Television Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that truth remains an available defense to defendants who can prove that the defamatory implication is true in a defamation by implication action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 108 (5th Cir.1997); Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1050 (5th Cir.1996). Moreover, ""whistleblowing” by public employees constitutes protected speech on a matter of public concern, “within the protective bosom of the First Amendment.” Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 337 (5th Cir.1986); accord Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1050-51. 17 . In Holt, we held that the spouse of a complainant does not acquire derivative standing to state a claim for retaliation merely by virtue of his relationship with the plaintiff. See Holt, 89 F.3d at 1226. The court explained that participation is the sine qua non for a retaliation claim. If the plaintiff par 1488, 1493-95 (D.Kan.1995) (same); Nelson v. University of Maine Sys., 923 F.Supp. 275, 278-80 (D.Me.1996) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, several of our sister circuits

    ### Response:
    holding that title vii principles govern retaliation claims arising under title ix and assuming that teachers have standing to raise retaliation claims under title ix based upon complaints raised on behalf of their students
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conclude N.D.C.C. § 16.1 — 11— 36 imposes a substantial burden on the LPND and candidates’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by restricting their access to the general elections ballot. However, this substantial burden is not necessarily undue or excessive. An undue burden, which essentially removes all realistic chance for a minor party or independent candidate to ever access the general election ballot, cannot be justified by any state interest, regardless of how compelling the interest may be. Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 787-88, 94 S.Ct. 1296; MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443, 449 (8th Cir.1977). Thus, a ballot access statute imposing an undue burden is necessarily unconstitutional. In alleging N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-36 is unduly burdensome, the LPND and candidates foc S.Ct. 1296 (<HOLDING>); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432, 91

    ### Response:
    holding a 1 signature requirement as within the outer boundaries of support the state may require before affording political parties ballot position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attorney. To further support their argument, they point to Attorney General Opinion No. 93-85, where it was stated that “[interested parties may then take legal action attacking the validity of the incorporation within the 90 days.” They also point to die letter from the Attorney General’s office to plaintiffs’ attorney where it was clearly stated that private individuals have the authority to challenge an election concerning the creation of a watershed district. However, Kansas law is to the contrary. It is settled law in Kansas that a private citizen does not have standing to challenge die le gality of the organization of a municipal corporation. See, e.g., Bishop v. Sewer District No. 1, 184 Kan. 376, 379, 336 P.2d 815 (1959); Elting v. Clouston, 114 Kan. 85, 86, 217 Pac. 295 (1923) (<HOLDING>); A.T. & S. F. Rld. Co. v. Wilson, Treas., 33

    ### Response:
    holding private citizens have no standing to question the legitimacy of the proceedings to organize a high school district nor enjoin a public official from canvassing the votes cast at an election held pursuant thereto
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of his debts the payment should apply in the event she prevailed on them all. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to support this argument, nor did the former wife ever make it at trial. She is therefore precluded from raising it for the first time here because it “must [have been] presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must [have been] part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved [for appeal].” Tillman v. State, 471 So.2d 32, 35 (Fla.1985). The former wife argues that the former husband in his financial affidavits admitted a $550,000 marital debt, completely disregarding that the affidavits themselves identify the amount as “estimated.” See West v. West, 399 So.2d 428, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (<HOLDING>). The former wife also argues that the $422,000

    ### Response:
    holding that estimated figures in a financial affidavit are permissible if not grossly overstated or reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employer could be held to be vicariously liable for their individual but separate acts of negligence. Under this analysis, we do not believe that the claims being asserted against Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center involve “the same subject matter” as the claims that were previously asserted against Doctors Laski, Cobb, Ball, Mulkey, Ford or Yarbrough. Therefore, under these circumstances, subsection 101.106(b) is inapplicable and does not operate to bar those claims. Furthermore, even if subsection 101.106(b) were applicable to the claims being asserted by Appellees, Mission Con-sol. does not support Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center’s attempt to use subsections 101.106(b) and 101.106(e) seri-atim to dismiss the entire suit. See Mission Consol, 253 S.W.3d at 657 (<HOLDING>). When a claimant files suit against both a

    ### Response:
    holding that recovery against an individual employee is barred and may be sought against the governmental unit only  when suit is filed against both the governmental unit and its employee id  101106e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relate to the market conduct examination and are dated prior to the issuance of the report, which started the statutory timeframe running. The only two items listed by the Commissioner that did not predate the issuance of the report are the report itself and communications between the Commissioner and First American attempting to schedule a settlement hearing during January 2011. None of these items were necessary for the narrow question of law presented to the trial court for judicial review — whether the Commissioner’s failure to issue its order within the statutory timeframe rendered it void. And, thus, the materials submitted by First American were sufficient for review. See Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty. Surveyor’s Office, 850 N.E.2d 957, 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. We, therefore, affirm the

    ### Response:
    holding the materials submitted were sufficient because the record should include all that is necessary in order for the reviewing court to accurately assess the challenged agency action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has not filed a proper claim with a primary payer, and Medicare is unable to recover from the primary payer, Medicare may recover from the beneficiary or provider or supplier that was responsible for the failure to file a proper claim. Id. § 411.24(¿). A “proper claim” is “a claim that is filed timely and meets all other claim filing requirements specified by the plan, program, or insurer.” Id. § 411.21. Far from preempting the state-law workers’ compensation regime, then, the regulations accept that Medicare may be unable to recover from a carrier because a beneficiary failed to file a proper claim under state law. ■ Our decisions in Waters and Blue Cross and Blue Shield reinforce this conclusion. Cf. Waters v. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 397, 398-401 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 995 F.2d at 73

    ### Response:
    holding that when state law or the terms of a primary plan limit ah individuals right to payment the governments reimbursement is equally limited no matter what theory is pursued  statutory right or subrogation  the government stands exactly in the medicare beneficiarys shoes when recovering from the available insurance funds emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the contents of Roberts’s phone call. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Requiring police to honor a lawyer’s unsolicited request to be present during interrogation would in effect create an “undifferentiated right to the presence of an attorney that is triggered automatically by the initiation of the interrogation itself.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 434 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 1147 n. 4. Miranda expressly rejected the idea that “each police station must have a ‘station house lawyer’ present at all times to advise prisoners.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. In sum, the necessity of a clear request for counsel in the Fifth Amendment context has remained paramount in application of Miranda, see, e.g., Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356 (<HOLDING>); Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. at

    ### Response:
    holding that unless suspect clearly requests counsel police do not have to halt questioning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    detain Sugar and Stark beyond what was strictly necessary to effectuate the traffic stop. Once Crivello checked Sugar’s license, examined the note authorizing Stark to use the RV and the registration, he had all the information he needed to issue the citation for the traffic violation. Rather than allowi defendant “was nowhere near the pick-up truck at the time it was stopped, detained and searched, and there is no evidence that [he] had any proprietary or possessory interest either in the vehicle, or its contents, or any right to exclude others from the vehicle, it would be difficult to posit a clearer failure to demonstrate any legitimate expectation of privacy on the part of the defendant”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 113-14 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The government does not dispute that Sugar,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate legitimate expectation of privacy where he could not show that he had the owners permission to use the car or demonstrate prior use or control of the car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). In Heck, the Court held that a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 if it calls into question the lawfulness of his conviction or confinement, unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. To grant Johnson’s requested relief would necessarily invalidate the Parole Board’s decision to revoke his parole. See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir.2006) (applying Heck to parole revocation decisions). Accordingly, he is precluded from attacking it through § 1983. The fact that Johnson was re-released on parole does not preclude the application of Heck. Id. at 177-78 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Johnson alleged that, once he was

    ### Response:
    recognizing that hecks favorable termination rule applies to all  1983 plaintiffs not just those in state custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    control program. Colette had some diet pills of her own (used before she was pregnant). I think I threw them all out because they made her nervous, but possibly there was an old container left in the medicine cabinet.... GX 4002.2; Htr. 998-99. 21. Jerry Leonard As already recounted, prior to the Government’s presentation of its evidence, this court ruled that the attorney-client privilege survived Stoeckley’s death, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998). Htr. 468. Subsequently, the Government asked the court to reconsider the matter of waiver of attorney-client privilege with regard to Leonard’s testimony, in light of a footnote in Swidler. Htr. 706-07; 524 U.S. at 409 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (<HOLDING>). The court directed Leonard to prepare an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that exceptional circumstances implicating a criminal defendants constitutional rights might warrant breaching the attorneyclient privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    individual’s statements to be involuntary. However, if this were true, incriminating statements by individuals suspected of illegal activities would rarely be admissible. The record also demonstrates that the challenged statement given by Mr. Eastom at his house was not obtained as a result of interrogation. Mr. Eastom’s being “confronted with seized contraband” did not involve any questioning. Instead, it appears that this “confrontation” was the police explanation to him of why they were in his home and the possible presence of the seized items in his living room. This is alone insufficient to constitute interrogation. Therefore, Mr. Eastom’s statements were not rendered inadmissible by the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969) (<HOLDING>). B. Exclusion of Rick Murray’s Testimony Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that the fifth amendment as construed in miranda v arizona required the exclusion of state merits given by the defendant while he was questioned on his own bed by four officers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Mr. Daneshvar worked for GTI since 1998. Although immaterial to our disposition, this apparent discrepancy is perhaps due to the fact that GTI had discharged him in 1997. Mr. Daneshvar successfully challenged that discharge as retaliatory, which in turn lead to his reinstatement in GTI’s employ by court order filed in 1998. See Daneshvar v. Graphic Tech., Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 1225 (D.Kan.1998). 2 . Mr. Daneshvar raises no error in the district court’s order granting summary judgment on his disparate workload claim and dismissing all his other claims, except his disparate wage and wrongful discharge claims, for failure to exhaust. Accordingly, we do not consider the court’s rulings on those issues. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n. 7 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Mr. Daneshvar relied on Ingels in the

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had finished its closing argument to raise it. We agree with the government that Cogswell did not object to the statement regarding his taking drugs to a party for someone else. The record shows that Cogswell’s objection made reference only to the statement regarding who lived at the apartment. Thus, his challenge to the former statement is subject to plain-error review. However, contrary to the government’s assertions, Cogswell timely objected to the statement regarding who lived in the apartment. Although he did not object to it immediately after the statement was made, we find that his objection, made at the end of the prosecution’s closing argument, was sufficiently timely to preserve the issue for appeal. See United States v. Mandelbaum, 803 F.2d 42, 44 n. 1 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we review de novo whether this

    ### Response:
    holding that the objection had been sufficiently timely when the defense waited until the governments rebuttal to object to a statement made during the governments closing statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e)). In assessing the record to determine whether any such issues of material fact exist, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 36 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (other citations omitted). Where the non-movant either does not respond to the motion or fails to dispute the movant’s statement of material facts, the court may not rely solely on the moving party’s Rule 56. 1 statement; rather, the court must be satisfied that the citations to evidence in the record support the movant’s assertions. See Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 143 n. 5 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides

    ### Response:
    holding that not verifying in the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment would derogate the truthfinding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a connection of logical relationship rather than immediateness.” United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903, 910 (4th Cir.1982). In Carmichael, the two defendants were charged together with conspiracy to buy votes in a federal election and with obstruction of justice for separately urging witnesses before a federal grand jury to give false testimony. Id. at 905-06. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that it was proper under Rule 8 to jointly try the defendants because the obstruction charges arose out of their efforts to conceal their vote buying conduct. Id. at 910. Other courts have specifically held that perjury may be part of the same series of acts or transaction “as the underlying conduct which was misrepresented.” United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1050 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) (citing cases). It is clear that the perjury

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants charged with conspiracy to grow marijuana could be tried with defendant who attempted to cover up scheme by false testimony before grand jury nearly four years after conspiracy ended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without the coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend if there is potentially a case under the complaint within the policy coverage. See National Union Fire Ins. Co., 939 S.W.2d at 141. Because the factual allegations contained within paragraph 5.4 indicate the plaintiffs may have a complaint within the coverage of the policy, we cannot say the underlying suit falls outside the scope of the policy. See id. SLIC also argues the plaintiffs’ underly- . ing petition does not include any allegations that fall within the scope of the terms “error” and “omission” as those terms are used in the policy. These terms, however, are not defined in the policy. We therefore give these terms their ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 708, 704 (Tex.1979) (<HOLDING>). An error is “an act or condition of ignorant

    ### Response:
    recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an analog radio communication system, an add-on radio, or service for analog radios. However, prior to making these purchases, Nextel did not inform them that it would be discontinuing analog service in the area in the immediate future, thereby rendering their equipment useless and obsolete. The plaintiffs also alleged that they were adequate class representatives. In Count I, H & J alleged a cause of action pursuant to the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice Act, § 501.201, et seq., Fla. Stat. (1995) [FDUTPA], In Count II, Asphalt alleged a claim for breach of contract. Based on H & J invoking its Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court struck H & J as class representative and dismissed its class claims with prejudice, but allo (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(<HOLDING>). Next, H & J and Asphalt contend that the

    ### Response:
    holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims lack merit, defense counsel was not ineffective by failing to object, and habeas relief is not warranted on the petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the lack of objection to to the prosecutor’s statements during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument. D. The petitioner next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to provide notice of the intent to introduce evidence of other acts as required by Michigan state law. Those other acts, the petitioner explains, consist of the victims’ testimony about uncharged acts of sexual abuse. The violation of the State’s notice requirement will not warrant relief from this Court. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (<HOLDING>). On direct review applying a plain-error

    ### Response:
    holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule 11, as it then existed, was modeled after its pre-1983 federal counterpart. In 1994 the text of Rhode Island Rule 11 read as follows: “Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be personally signed by at least one (1) attorney of record * * *. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the attorney that he or she has read the pleading; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” Although an objection to a discovery request is not a pleading, it could be argued that Super. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2) extended the reach of former Rule 11 to include the signing of objections to discovery requests. See Bergeson v. Dilworth, 132 F.R.D. 277, 287 (D.Kan.1990) (<HOLDING>). But even if former Rhode Island Rule 11 were

    ### Response:
    holding that the term other papers as defined in federal rules 7b2 and 11 refers to discovery motions interrogatories and requests for production and admissions and the responses thereto
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he requested that the court “summarily hear and determine the issue of the making of the agreement or provision and, according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application.” This language tracks the statute, which states: On application the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or about to be commenced, if it shall find that no agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law exists between the party making the application and the party causing the arbitration to be had. The court shall summarily hear and determine the issue of the making of the agreement or provision and, according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application. § 682.03(4), Fla. Stat. (2003); see generally Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>). In Jalis Construction, Inc. v. Mintz, 724

    ### Response:
    holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remains before the statute of limitations may be asserted as a defense.” 19 C.F.R. § 162.78(a). For penalty notices, Customs’ regulations provide that where “fewer than 180 days remain from the date of the penalty notice before the statute of limitations may be asserted as a defense,” Customs may shorten the time period allowed for response to a penalty notice. 19 C.F.R. § 171.12(e). In no event, however, may a party be given less than seven days in which to respond to either a pre-penalty or penalty notice. 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.78(a), 171.12(e). Both sides agree that Customs was entitled to limit MSI to a shortened response period. Furthermore, the seven day response time has been approved by this Court in other cases. See United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co., 19 CIT 13, 21 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Although MSI was given seven days, it was

    ### Response:
    holding defendant was afforded substantive and procedural due process at the administrative level when he was given seven days to respond to a prepenalty notice for negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must make a significant effort, based on reasonable investigation and logical argument, to ably present the defendant’s fate to the jury and to focus the attention of the jury on any mitigating factors. Mitigating factors brought out at trial might be emphasized, a coherent plea for mercy might be given, or new evidence in mitigation might be presented. But counsel may not treat the sentencing phase as nothing more than a mere postscript to the trial. While the Strickland threshold of professional competence is admittedly low, the defendant’s life hangs in the balance at a capital sentencing hearing. Indeed, in some cases, this may be the stage of the proceedings where counsel can do his or her client the most good. Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir.1989) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). What does the general statement about

    ### Response:
    holding counsels performance was ineffective where counsel failed to present any evidence in mitigation and offered a rambling and incoherent argument that cannot even charitably be called a plea for mercy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the current case does not involve a trespass or nuisance claim, but instead involves an MCPA deceptive practice claim. There has been no intrusion by way of trespass or nuisance onto appellant’s property, justifying the application of the continuing harm doctrine. Here, appellee’s actions of sending numerous e-mails did not delay the accrual of appellant’s MCPA action to a further date. Further, appellee did not have a continuous and ongoing duty or relationship with appellant, as in Litz, that would excuse appellant from having brought suit within three years from December 1, 2012. See id. at 649, 76 A.3d 1076. In addition, unlike Litz, it is clear on the face of the complaint that appellant’s MCPA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. See Litz, 434 Md. at 649, 76 A.3d 1076 (<HOLDING>). There is no reason that appellant should be

    ### Response:
    holding it was unclear from face of litzs complaint that her allegation of negligence was barred by the applicable statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune. Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 n. 7 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352, 20 L.Ed. 646). A clear absence of all jurisdiction means a clear lack of all subject matter jurisdiction. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-52. See also Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir.1980) (“a judge who acts in the clear and complete absence of personal jurisdiction loses his judicial immunity”), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 68 L.Ed.2d 326 (1981); O’Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 369 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy judges clearly had subject

    ### Response:
    holding that a judge who convicted defendant for contempt an act within the courts jurisdiction but without the affidavit required by statute to confer jurisdiction over the offense charged was still entitled to immunity his act was merely in excess of his jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of power of attorney) by the inclusion of: (1) the language quoted in section 5602(a)(1) (relating to form of power of attorney); or (2) other language showing a similar intent on the part of the principal to empower the agent to make a limited gift. (c) Unlimited gifts. — A principal may authoriz principal may empower an agent to make limited gifts by inclusion of the language, “To make limited gifts.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5602(a)(1). The class of permissible donees for a limited gift consists solely of the “principal’s spouse, issue and a spouse of the principal’s issue.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5603(a)(2)(i). An agent cannot make any gift under power of attorney unless the power of attorney specifically states the agent is authorized to do so. Metcalf v. Pesock, 885 A.2d 539 (Pa.Super.2005) (<HOLDING>). When Appellant Mr. Fein performed the

    ### Response:
    holding broad language in power of attorney authorizing agent to purchase sell or otherwise dispose of principals real property interests was insufficient to empower agent to make gift of property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purposes of the Fourth Amendment where the investigating officer did not take the license over to the squad car to run the warrants check. See id. at 124. Instead, the officer ""stood beside the car, near where [the defendant] was standing, and used his walkie-talkie"" to contact the dispatcher. Id. This cireumstance, among others, resulted in the determination that the consensual encounter did not escalate into a level two seizure. See id. Thus, in this case, Patrick's momentary use of Adams's identification for a warrants check does not compel the conclusion that a level two seizure occurred, especially because Patrick did not hold onto the identification any longer than was necessary. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); People v. Jackson, 39 P.3d 1174, 1188

    ### Response:
    holding that police acted permissibly in approaching airtine traveler and asking for identification but when police retained travelers documentation while asking him to accompany them to a separate room for questioning police illegally seized traveler
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for them. See MCL 552.13(1) (granting the trial court authority to order one spouse to pay the other spouse’s attorney fees in order “to enable the adverse party to carry on or defend the action.”); see also MCR 3.206(C). Although the trial court correctly noted that there were precedents that indicate that a trial court can order a party to directly pay fees to an attorney, those precedents do not alter the fact that the payment is invariably for the benefit of the client or the client’s estate. See DePew v DePew, 373 Mich 162; 128 NW2d 533 (1964) (noting that the trial court had jurisdiction to order the husband to pay his wife’s attorney fees even after the parties’ reconciled and dismissed the complaint), and Stackhouse v Stackhouse, 193 Mich App 437, 439-445; 484 NW2d 723 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if the trial court had

    ### Response:
    holding that the death of a dependent spouse does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to order the surviving spouse to pay the dependent spouses attorney fees and that the attorney may request the fees in his own name
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was that of Sergeant Crouch, there is not any evidence in the record substantiating Voyles’s claim of privacy. In addition, several factors indicate that Voyles did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his work computer and the materials stored in it. For example, the computer was owned by the Arlington School District and located at the teacher’s desk in a classroom computer lab. Voyles clearly did not have a property or possessory interest in the school’s computer. Moreover, while it is unclear if Voyles’s computer files were protected by a password, the computer at issue was available for use by substitute teachers. Thus, Voyles lacked complete dominion or control over the unit. See Rogers v. State, 113 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Further, the computer was not placed in the

    ### Response:
    holding defendant who gave personal computers hard drive to technician to repair lacked sufficient dominion or control over the pornographic jpeg files when he asked technician to back them up
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of his application to UNC, he would receive in-state residency status for tuition purposes. The Ort letter re-emphasized that “your athletic scholarship may be immediately reduced or cancelled if you fail to meet UNC, ACC, or NCAA continuing eligibility requirements; become ineligible to participate in your sport;... or engage in misconduct warranting disciplinary penalty.” Ort renewed Plaintiff’s scholarship on 19 June 2009 and 30 June 2010 using similar form letters. i. No Breach of ASA Plaintiff has not alleged UNC or Thorp breached the terms of the ASA. In North Carolina, a plaintiff must allege injury to a contractual interest to have standing to maintain a contract-based claim. See Beachcomber Props., L.L.C. v. Station One, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 820, 824, 611 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Plaintiff has alleged no

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Deemer Clause: A Legislative Savior for Self-Funded Health Insurance Plans Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 767, 787 (1992) (“While an employer has the choice to fund its own benefit plan or to purchase a plan from an insurance company, the only distinguishable difference ... in the nature of the benefit plan is the source of the funding. Even when an employer chooses to fund its own benefit plan, the plan provides a benefit schedule, assumes liability through a contractual document for payment of claims accorded by the bene 916. The cases on which Aetna relies for this proposition concern risk-shifting provisions that were just one element of a broader contract whose primary object was not risk-shifting. See Jellins, 174 P.2d at 631 (<HOLDING>); Garamendi, 7 Cal. Rptr.3d at 919-20 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that a contractual promise to perform maintenance on and procure insurance for a truck was not insurance because the major part of party as service to party b is the supplying of labor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in part by the use of the non-employee spouse’s separate property interest in the fund. The enti 552 (N.Y.App.Div.2006) (reversing the provisions of the QDRO that deviated from the judgment of divorce and the parties’ stipulation with respect to death and survivor benefits, early retire ment subsidy benefits and restraints on plaintiffs conduct as a participant in the pension plan). The better view, which is in accord with our Iowa case law contemplating economic protection of both parties in retirement, is to value the pension upon maturity. See In re Marriage of McLaughlin, 526 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (awarding proportionate shares of a pension if and when payable, while striving to assure similar retirement security for both spouses.) See also Duggan, 659 N.W.2d at 561 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, to exclude Cassandra from

    ### Response:
    holding that post dissolution costofliving increases are marital property as they stemmed from employment during the marriage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Taking Stone’s allegations as true, Lockley retaliated against Stone by hindering her professional development, impeding her physical transfer to a new office, and limiting her telecommuting privileges once she arrived in Houston. Especially in light of the less stringent standards applied to pro se pleadings, this is enough to state a claim for retaliation. Cf. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (“[T]o retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.”); Rodriguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps of Puerto Rico, 743 F.3d 278, 285 (1st Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); Crawford v, Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff stated claim for retaliation where employer denied her certain assignments and subjected her to repeated unpleasant and inequitable treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim of disparate treatment is that she was removed or excluded from a number of committees in favor of non-Black administrators, including Paul Dale. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that she was excluded from a position on the 1998-1999 PVCC Cultural Diversity Committee (“Diversity Committee”). Placement on the 1998-99 Diversity Committee is the only contested committee assignment that is not time-barred. In contrast to her allegations about office location and signage, Plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to show that exclusion from committee assignments could constitute an adverse action. Plaintiffs supervisors have indicated that committee work was a “building block” upon which Plaintiff could reasonably expect her future advancement to depend. See Bryson, 96 F.3d at 916-7 (<HOLDING>). Specifically, when Plaintiff asked Kranitz

    ### Response:
    holding loss of committee work may constitute adverse action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is permissive.” Based on this canon of statutory construction, the grievance procedure in the Act appears to be permissive and not mandatory. Wal-Mart’s argument that the Act was meant to provide an exclusive remedy would be stronger if, for example, Section 28-1-10 stated, instead of the language quoted above, that “any person seeking to redress a violation of any of the rights guaranteed by this Act shall file an action under this Act pursuant to the administrative procedures it provides.” Or the New Mexico Legislature could have said something like: “No person who claims to be a victim of a violation of any of the rights guaranteed by this Act may pursue a remedy except as provided in this Act.” Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-21, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (<HOLDING>). It is not uncommon for our legislature to

    ### Response:
    holding that remedial scheme afforded by federal tort claims act was not exclusive absent explicit congressional declaration that it was
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    practice.” Rather, the employer has acted because it believed that the employee made false and malicious allegations, and thus did not believe that the employee was engaged . in protected “opposition.” Of course, if the employer has no good reason to conclude that the employee’s allegations were knowingly false and malicious, then there will be a genuine issue as to whether the employer’s stated reason for termination is a pretext for unlawful retaliation for protected activity. But whether a judge or jury might later disagree with the employer’s good faith conclusion about falsity is not dispositive, because whether the employer discriminated unlawfully depends on the employer’s beliefs and motivation. See Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted); Scroggins v.

    ### Response:
    holding that title vii plaintiff must show that retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Erbium or Thulium lasers used with a fiber with a low enough hydroxyl ion concentration to transmit laser energy in the 1.4-2.2 micrometer wavelength range through an optical fiber to a surgical site, while “preventing the laser energy ... from being highly absorbed in the fiber material.” '780 Patent, col. 6:5-7. The specification goes on to provide an example of the kind of fiber covered: A fiber which is suitable for use with the illustrative embodiment is a fused-silica fiber part no. 822W manufactured by the Spectran Corporation located in Sturbridge, Mass. '780 Patent, col. 6:7-10. Cardiogenesis responds that plaintiffs construction fails to meet the requirements of § 112, ¶ 6 because the specification does not disclose the process for making “specially pu 1366 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364,

    ### Response:
    holding that generically defining the structure as core logic without explaining its circuitry or how it is modified did not render the claim indefinite because the patented invention could function with any core logic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unlawfulness of an arrest may not be raised as a defense to a prosecution under this section ... [unless] the officer used more force than is reasonably necessary to effect the arrest so that his conduct constitutes an assault on the person arrested.” KRS 520.090. Federal case law is also instructive. In United States v. Beauchamp, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that “if a suspect’s response to an illegal stop is a new and distinct crime, such as flight or use of force, any evidence recovered incident to the arrest for the subsequent crime is not tainted by the unlawfulness of the initial detention.” 659 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir.2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1017 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1431

    ### Response:
    holding that if a suspects response to an illegal stop is itself a new distinct crime then the police constitutionally may arrest the suspect for that crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of process — may effectively bind the interests of absent parties is, of course, a topic that has given rise to some of the monuments of federal jurisprudence. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877); International Shoe Co. other example of instances in which the interests of an absent party may be constitutionally affected by a state court judgment. What makes binding absent parties in class actions constitutionally acceptable is either that: (1) under the provisions of Chancery Court Rule 23(b)(3), absent class members, in effect, elect not to opt-out of the class and thus can be said effectively to consent to the foreign court exercising jurisdiction over their'property (See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2974, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985))(<HOLDING>), or (2) that under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) the

    ### Response:
    holding that an absent member of a subsection 23b3 class can be bound by the results of litigation about which that member was notified and given an opportunity to be heard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    benefit. We find that this federal doctrine as urged here imposes far too heavy a burden on class certification where the purported injuries to class members are so minimal as to preclude the likelihood they would be individually asserted. Although we have misgivings about the aseertainability doctrine’s use at the certification stage in any class action, we decline to consider its application in cases other than those involving low value co not benefit the chief goal of our court rules — the fair and efficient administration of justice; the Third Circuit’s experiences suggest the doctrine is practically unworkable in application and is being exploited by defendants in unsuitable cases to evade liability. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 P.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). In rejecting the applicability of the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that when what is small is not the aggregate but the individual claim  thats the type of case in which class action treatment is most needfulf and emphasizing that a class action has a deterrent as well as a compensatory objective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    gas well data that the company gathered and furnished to its subscribers for a monthly charge, but the record showed that the same information was also communicated by telegraph and over the telephone, rather than in printed reports. Id. at 790-91. The scouting company challenged the tax assessment, arguing on appeal that “the essence of the transaction involved in this instance is the performance of a service for oil companies, namely, a scouting service.” Id. at 792. At that time, the sales tax had not been extended by the legislature to cover services. Id. Therefor t nontaxable engineering services bundled with sale of telecommunications equipment was not taxable); Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Austin Multiple Listing Sen., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, no writ) (<HOLDING>). As this Court explained in San Antonio SMSA,

    ### Response:
    holding essence of transaction was processing of realestate data rather than printing of weekly listingservice book
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was proper as to this claim. 3. Third, the appellant asserts that counsel did not “procure the necessary expert assistance to effectively challenge the State’s case.” (C.R. 215.) a. The appellant alleges that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not procuring a DNA expert. In relation to this claim, his entire argument in his petition consisted of the following: “Trial counsel was ineffective for not procuring a DNA expert to challenge the State’s expert who testified about the blood found on items admitted into evidence. It is well-established that DNA evidence has an awesome persuasive and prejudicial effect at a criminal trial, and for this reason, the standard for admission of DNA evidence must be strictly followed. Ex parte Hutcherson, 677 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Ala.1996) (<HOLDING>). “... For this reason, DNA evidence can only

    ### Response:
    holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1980). 35 . Blood, 68 P.3d at 1255 (citing S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, Inc., 159 F,3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1988)). 36 . Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); Blood, 68 P.3d at 1255 (citing Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1997)). 37 . 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (emphasis added). 38 . We disagree with the dissent’s analysis about what would have happened had Hudson actually raised a UTPA counterclaim in the collection litigation. If Hudson had raised the UTPA simply to defend and reduce t 11-310 CV, 2012 WL 506568, at *3-5 (Tex. App. Feb. 16, 2012) (applying federal law and finding waiver when the two claims were based on the same contract). 40 . Midwest Window Sys., Inc., 630 F.2d at 537 (<HOLDING>). 41 . PPG Indus., Inc., 128 F.3d at 110. 42 .

    ### Response:
    holding claims waived because they all grew out of their unsatisfactory business relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the breasts, buttocks, or vulva of the victim; (2) Defendant was a person who, by reason of his relationship to the victim, was able to exercise undue influence over the victim and used this authority to coerce the victim to submit to the sexual contact; (3) the victim was at least 13 years old but less than 18 years old; (4) Defendant’s act was unlawful; and (5) the act happened in New Mexico. UJI 14-926 NMRA. On appeal, Defendant challenges only the second element, contending that there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that he was in a position of authority over Jessica and Stephanie and that by reason of this position, he was able to exercise undue influence over the girls. This Court must determine whether a rational jury could have found this element bey 45 P.3d 54 (<HOLDING>); State v. Corbin, 111 N.M. 707, 710, 809 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that but for faulty jury instruction uncles conviction for criminal sexual contact with a minor by person in position of authority would have been upheld
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2001) (“We do not doubt Congress’ power to mandate adequate and effective substitutes for habeas review.”). Accordingly, if the review available in the Courts of Appeals under the REAL ID Act is an adequate and effective substitute for the writ, the Act does not violate the Suspension Clause. Although this Court has not yet addressed the question, other Circuits, with which we now join, have determined that the provision of the REAL ID Act at issue here is not unconstitutional because “it provides, through review by a federal court of appeals, an adequate and effective remedy to test the legality of an alien’s detention.” Alexandre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir.2006); see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that because the real id act created a remedy as broad in scope as a habeas petition the act is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    effect on commerce. Cf. United States v. Amato, 495 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir.1974) (sustaining a Hobbs Act conviction when the evidence showed that the defendants’ actions caused a business operating in interstate commerce to shut down temporarily). Zuñiga also argues that his conviction must be reversed because the indictment failed to allege that the crimes had an adverse impact on commerce. That allegation is meritless. Count 1 of the indictment charged in the plainest of terms that the appellants conspired “to unlawfully interfere with interstate commerce by robbery.” That was enough to put the appellants on fair notice of the interstate commerce element of the crimes charged in counts 1 and 2. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 81 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her adoptive family, the Deuprees, had asked Hamilton to leave her out of the 1967 proceedings, because they thought it unlikely that she would win and were worried that their then 14-year-old daughter would be subjected to embarrassing publicity because of her status as the illegitimate child of a famous country western singer. Nonetheless, Hamilton zealously litigated Ms. Stone’s interests, but to no avail. The Alabama court determined that Hank Williams, Jr. was the sole heir of his father, and further held that appellant, as a natural child who had been adopted by another family, had no rights in any proceeds from the Williams, Sr.’s songs or their renewal rights. In reaching this conclusion, it relied on De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956) (<HOLDING>). After the disruptive first few years of her

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must look to state law to determine childs legal status for inheritance before evaluating the childs renewal rights under the copyright act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    willingness to take the stand ""compelled [him] to be a witness against himself"" in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause. We therefore do not consider the argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (providing that ”[t]he appellant's brief must contain ... appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”); United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 274 (4th Cir.2006) (applying Rule 28 in criminal case). Instead, Williams argues that the district court's ruling conditioning his ability to perform the demonstration on his willingness to be subjected to cross-examination violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (<HOLDING>). This argument is entirely without merit.

    ### Response:
    holding that a state defendant has a sixth amendment right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendments due process clause to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    If a credit reporting agency is negligent in failing to comply with FCRA, it is liable only for “actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(l). Selvam does not allege that he applied for or forwent applying for any credit after the date on which Experian was informed to delete the LVNV Funding account, July 7, 2012 and before the GECRB/Care Credit accounts were deleted in December 2012. Because Selvam does not allege any way in which he was damaged by the alleged inaccuracy during the time period he alleges Experian had “reason ... to question the accuracy of the ... GE information,” Appellant Br. 21, he does not plausibly allege he suffered any actual damages. See Casella v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 56 F.3d 469, 475 (2d Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). A credit reporting agency may also be liable

    ### Response:
    holding that where there is no evidence that during the period in which the credit reporting agency carried the inaccurate information that it provided plaintiffs credit report to any third party no rational trier of fact could infer that any potential creditor or other person in plaintiffs community learned of any helpful information from the defendant credit reporting agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attempt to avoid liability by asserting policy exclusions which are inconsistent with the coverage noted in the certificate of insurance. One commentator indicates that some courts do not give these exclusions effect: Certificates of insurance are often inconsistent with the related policy, and a prudent indemni-tee should assume exclusions in the policy exist that do not appear on the certificate. In some jurisdictions, certificates do not govern coverage while in others, an exclusion of which a certificate holder is unaware will not be given effect. Douglas R. Richmond, et at, ""Expanding Liability Coverage: Insured Contracts and Additional Insureds,"" 44 Drake L.Rev. 781, 796 (1996). See also, Brown Mach. Works & Supply Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 659 So.2d 51, 56 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141,

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurance company that does not deliver a policy to a certificate holder is estopped from asserting exclusions contained in the policy but not revealed in the certificate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nor the transcripts, including the docket sheets, suggest that the State obtained written waivers. The State points out that both judgments contain the following recital: “A jury having been waived the trial proceeded before the Court.” These recitals, however, do not state that the waivers were written and do not specify that appellant personally waived her right to a jury trial. The recitals may merely reflect counsel’s remark to the trial court, “We intended to try both cases before the Court, in the spirit of judicial economy.” Under these circumstances, we conclude that the recitals are insufficient to raise the presumption that there was a waiver meeting the requirements of article 1.13(a). Id.; cf. Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 449-50 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g) (<HOLDING>). Because the Clerk of the County Courts

    ### Response:
    holding presumption of regularity raised by recital in person and in writing in open court having waived his right of trial by jury but presumption would not rise from recital no jury having been demanded citing samudio 648 sw2d at 314
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court that it would be a “waste of judicial resources to require the FERC to issue its own subpoena to McGraw-Hill, to compel production of the same documents, based upon the [sic] essentially the same set of facts.” Id. at 21. As a compromise, the Commission proposes that if another agency should request the documents from the Commission, the court could conduct an ex parte, in camera review of that agency’s need for the information and its exhaustion of alternative sources. App.’s Mot. at 23. McGraw-Hill retorts that if any other agency wants the requested documents, it can request them itself, rather than obtaining them extra-judicially through the Commission. Resp.’s Reply at 6. The Commission’s position is without precedent in this jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carey, 492 F.2d at 636 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,

    ### Response:
    holding that the balancing test should be conducted on a casebycase basis in accord  with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct prevents the petitioner from timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir.2005). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is warranted. Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286. Thus, Charest’s burden is to show extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond his control and unavoidable even with his own exercise of diligence. We have considered the instant issue on numerous occasions and consistently held that equitable tolling is not justified by mere attorney negligence, where the petitioner has not exercised his ovra due diligence. See Steed, 219 F.3d at 1300 (“An attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period or mistake is not a basis for equitable tolling.”); see also Helton v. Sec. for the Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269,

    ### Response:
    holding equitable tolling was not warranted where counsel misadvised client as to the deadline to file a habeas petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the ""natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because we have interpreted § 3146 as

    ### Response:
    holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 usc  1513b for retaliating against a witness victim or informant was an intent to retaliate internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defense to any suit, ... the threat to bring suit under such circumstances can at best be described as a 'misleading' representation, in violation of [the FDPCA].”); Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 383, 393 (D.Del.1991) (""[T]he threatening of a lawsuit which the debt collector knows or should know is unavailable or unwinnable by reason of a legal bar such as the statute of limitations is the kind of abusive practice the FDCPA was intended to eliminate.”); Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F.Supp. 1480, 1489 (M.D.Ala.1987) (""By threatening to sue [a debtor] on her alleged debt, [the debt collector] violated [the FDPCA]”). 53 . See Kimber, 668 F.Supp. at 1488. 54 . 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 55 . See, e.g., McCorriston v. L.W.T., Inc., 536 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1277-78 (M.D.Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Pescatrice v. Orovitz, 539 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding bona fide error defense barred claim for fdpca violation which arose from mistake of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability, and it lacked any reasonable probability of generating a profit. We review de novo the tax court’s “general characterization of a transaction for tax purposes.” Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 581 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978). The facts underlying that characterization, however, are subject to clear error review. Id. i. Law to Apply In the Tenth Circuit, the economic substance doctrine dictates whether the Commissioner may rightfully disregard a transaction as lacking economic substance. Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.2010); Keeler v. Comm’r, 243 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir.2001); Jackson v. Comm’r, 966 F.2d 598 (10th Cir.1992); James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905 (10th Cir.1990); see also Casebeer v. Comm’r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The doctrinal framework is fairly

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must disregard transactions that are designed to comply with the literal terms of the tax code but are unlikely to produce nontax economic benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between Southworth and Ashe constituted “misconduct” warranting vacation of the arbitration award. The contact, however, was trivial. Significantly, Southworth’s casual remark was made to a witness and not to a party. See Rule 29. The remark itself, moreover, discounts the existence of a past or current relationship of any sort between the two men. See Canon II. In addition, at no point in these proceedings has there been allegation that the actions of the arbitrator actually prejudiced defendants. See G.S. § 1-567.13(a)(2). Next, this Court has previously considered the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Commonwealth Coatings and determined it to be too narrow with respect to the intent and public policy purposes of our North Carolina General Assembly. Ruffin 140-41, 374 S.E.2d at 172 (<HOLDING>); Wildwoods of Lake Johnson Associates v. L. P.

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitrators failure to disclose his prior business dealings with defendant some twenty years earlier did not amount to misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirement. Averitt concludes from this limited indication of purpose that the statute was originally intended to cover only bonds issued under Title 6 of the U.S. Code, which has since been repealed. Averitt does not point, to any authoritative source, however, to support this theory or its contention that we should construe “any bond authorized by the law of the United States” to exclude injunction bonds. This Circuit has not yet had occasion to decide whether an injunction bond is the type of bond contemplated by Section 1352. At least two other circuits, however, have implicitly held that parties aggrieved by a wrongfully issued injunction may sue to recover on an injunction bond under Section 1352. See Buddy Systems, Inc. v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); Atomic Oil Co. v. Bardahl Oil Co., 419 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no jurisdiction under section 1352 but only because the bond had been dissolved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state in more than a random, fortuitous, or attenuated way.” ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625 (4th Cir.1997); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). In essence, a defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state, and a court’s exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. C. While the fact that Aboud’s contacts with Virginia were made on behalf of MBT complicates the traditional due process inquiry, her connection to the Commonwealth is sufficient to support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. In the typical case, the contacts of a company are not attributed to a corporate agent for jurisdictional purposes. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (<HOLDING>). On the other -hand, Aboud is not immune from

    ### Response:
    holding that employees contacts with theforum are not to be judged according to their employers activities there
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to them; also the writing or document embodying such decision.”). Title 38, U.S.Code, does not define the word universally to cover all sections contained within the title, and section 5112 does not define it for purposes of that section. As illustrated by section 5111(d), which defines “award” for the purpose of that section only, the definition of “award” may refer to different types of awards, such as “an original or reopened award” or “an increased award.” 38 U.S.C. § 5111(d); see also, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1117(h)(2)(A) (specifying “the original award of compensation or service connection” (emphasis added)). Thus, the plain meaning of the term “award” in sections 5112(b)(9) and (10) is ambiguous and does not, standing alone, reveal congressional intent. See Heino, 683 F.3d at 1378 (<HOLDING>); see also Fountain v. Shinseki, 27 Vet.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain meaning of the term the cost referred to in section 1722aa2 of title 38 uscode was ambiguous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “average.” The teacher recommended diagnostic testing. [AR 354]. In fourth grade, plaintiff “was so far behind that I had him tested for possible special class placement. I hope that this is more suitable for him. He has difficulty relating with peers.” Plaintiff was administered the Wide Range Achievement Test (“WRAT”), which measures reading recognition, spelling, and arithmetic computation. [AR 354; JS 7 n. 2], As a fourth-grader, plaintiff tested at grade levels 1.3, 1.1, and 3.0 in the three areas measured. Shortly after that test was administered, an Individual Educational Plan (“IEP”) was written and approved. The nature of the IEP and whether or how it was implemented cannot be ascertained from the record; however, plaintiff testified that he had attended specia (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Bailey, 230 F.3d at 1065-1066 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the record was not inconsistent with mental retardation meeting section 1205 where the claimant dropped out in tenth grade obtained a ged and could read write add and subtract but had problems with multiplication and division
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). DISMISSED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that if a petitioner wishes to preserve an issue for appeal he must first raise it in the proper administrative forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    role in the corporation. Lollo, 35 F.3d at 35. Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the district court properly focused its analysis on the Lollo factors and, after a bench trial, concluded, in light of those factors, that the high degree of intention — which goes beyond the mere presence of a personal liability clause in the signed agreement — was not met. We see no reason to reverse the district court. We note further that the New York Court of Appeals has observed that “where individual responsibility is demanded the nearly universal practice is that the officer signs twice — once as an officer and again as an individual.” Salzman, 10 N.Y.2d at 67, 217 N.Y.S.2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 74. We have never held that two signatures are required. See Lotto, 35 F.3d at 35 (<HOLDING>). But we think that the appearance of only one

    ### Response:
    holding collective bargaining agreement imposed personal liability on signing officer under the facts of that case despite absence of separate signature of the officer in his personal capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (discussing plain error standard of review), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 20, 2001 (No. 01-6398). In Promise, we applied Apprendi to drug offenses in §§ 841 and 846 and held that “the specific threshold [drug] quantity must be treated as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense, i.e., charged in the indictment -month sentence was “longer than that to which he would otherwise be subject.” White, 238 F.3d at 542. We therefore find no plain error under Apprendi. Nor do we find plain error in the district court’s application of the enhancement for being a leader or organizer, USSG § 3131.1(a) (2000), which Turnbull alleges violates Apprendi. United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 200-01 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied 532 U.S. 937, 121 S.Ct. 1393,

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi does not apply to judges exercise of sentencing discretion within statutory range so long as defendants sentence is not set beyond maximum term specified in substantive statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1988); and Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir.1988). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to re 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818, 116 S.Ct. 75, 133 L.Ed.2d 35 (1995). See also McCallumHighlands v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir.1995), revised on rehearing, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir.1995): ""we resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. See 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059, 112 S.Ct. 936, 117 L.Ed.2d 107 (1992), (<HOLDING>); and McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085,

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1535, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005). Exhaustion occurs when the petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state courts by arguing both the federal legal principles and the salient and operative facts of the claim, thereby giving the state courts a “meaningful opportunity to pass upon the substance of the claims later presented in federal court.” Chambers v. McCaughtry, 264 F.3d 732, 737-38 (7th Cir.2001) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Exhausting all state remedies includes presenting each claim on appeal to the Illinois appellate court and in a petition to the Illinois Supreme Court for discretionary review. See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); Hadley v. Holmes, 341 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Exhaustion is not required, however, when the

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in Section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijua na....” (Emphasis added). 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (1999). Adjudications are not convictions. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.13(a) (Vernon 1996) (providing that ""an order of adjudication or disposition in a proceeding under this title is not a conviction of crime”). Because this statute addresses convictions and not adjudications, it is certainly arguable that this statute does not apply to juvenile defendants. 30 . See Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d at 888-89 (<HOLDING>). 31 . See Hernandez, 986 S.W.2d at 821. 32 .

    ### Response:
    holding that deportation is collateral consequence and deportations admonishments are not constitutionally required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this court to govern appeals in dependency-neglect cases. We have further explained that the purpose of Rule 6-9 is to expedite the appellate process in dependency-neglect cases by curtailing extensions and establishing time lines. Ratliff v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 371 Ark. 534, 268 S.W.3d 322 (2007) (per curiam). hRule 2(a)(2) provides that an appeal may be taken from “[a]n order which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken, or discontinues the action.” Although the right to appeal the denial of a motion to intervene is not specifically set forth in this rule, this court has recognized that such an order is appealable pursuant to Rule 2(a)(2). See Duffield v. Benton County Stone Co., 369 Ark. 314, 254 S.W.3d 726 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Billabong Prods., Inc. v. Orange City Bank,

    ### Response:
    holding that an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right is allowed under rule 2a2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendants’ story was not credible: Why go biking in Vermont when you can bike in Arizona? However, October is prime foliage season in Vermont, and a plan to bike there hardly seems suspicious at that time of year. Contrast Chhien, 266 F.3d at 4-7 (conflicting stories were given to police questions by passenger and driver, a consensual frisk revealed $2,000 r Missouri traffic law, I conclude that Officer Crivello did not have reasonable suspicion for holding the defendants until the canine arrived. While Officer Crivel-lo’s hunch turned out to be true, the fact that the defendants were from a source state heading across the country for a bike trip on a known drug pipeline do not give rise to reasonable suspicion because too many people fit this description. See Yousif, 308 F.3d at 828 (<HOLDING>); see generally Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,

    ### Response:
    holding that the facts that defendant had outofstate license plates and was traveling on a highway that was a known drug trafficking corridor alone cannot justify the stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recognized as necessary for the protection of Plaintiffs property— that is, testing, segregating, reporting results on, and directing the release or destruction of Plaintiffs carcasses—and then allegedly negligently rendered those services. Plaintiff argues that FSIS’s negligent performance of those services increased its risk of harm and that it relied upon FSIS to perform the services undertaken non-negligently. The government can be held liable under Section 323 only if the FSIS inspected the meat at Plaintiffs facility for the benefit of Plaintiff. See Patentas, 687 F.2d at 716 (“The government may be held liable under section 323 only if the Coast Guard inspected [the vessel] for the benefit of appellants.”); see also Barnes v. United States, 448 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot meet

    ### Response:
    holding that missouris good samaritan rule which incorporates section 323 comes into play only where the plaintiff is the intended beneficiary of the defendants action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    product rules that would not so dilute the power of the population statistics. By last year, the NRC had abandoned advocating for the ceiling principles. Id. at 35. The NRC, however, has continued to reject an unmodified product rule and has instead provided several alternative formulas all of which provide conservative estimates of profile frequencies. The recommended adjustment to the product rule that is relevant to the DNA analysis conducted here is the faetor-of-ten adjustment. Id. at 34 (‘We conclude that, when several loci are used, the pr ified product rule, using the factor of ten calculations, to be admissible); State v. Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329, 922 P.2d 294 (1996) (finding modified ceiling principle to be admissible); State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152, 1181 (1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S.Ct. 1578,

    ### Response:
    holding product rule in admissible because prosecution failed to establish independence of alleles
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facts sufficient to show that Gutman took non-judicial actions against him, or that Gutman’s judicial actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[a] judge is not deprived of immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are done maliciously, or are in excess of his authority”). 3. The district court 'also properly dismissed Read’s claims against Senior Assistant Attorney General Foote on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. Read failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Foote’s actions did not relate to Foote’s preparation for the initiation of a judicial proceeding, or the presentation of the state’s case. See Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 882, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). 4. Dismissing Read’s claims against members

    ### Response:
    holding that government attorney performing acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of litigation is entitled to absolute immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on stolen tickets because that testimony was misleading and prejudicial. A trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony is reviewed under a manifest error standard. United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 464, 74 L.Ed.2d 614 (1982). Without expert testimony on the usual value of stolen tickets, it would have been impossible to determine the specific value of the stolen goods. United States v. Luckey, 655 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir.1981). Evidence showing the potential value of the airlines tickets is particularly appropriate when filling out the tickets does not require any special expertise or equipment. Cf. Jalbert v. United States, 375 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899, 88 S.Ct. 899, 19 L.Ed.2d 221 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Under these standards, the trial court did

    ### Response:
    holding that the value of stolen blank money orders may be established by circumstantial evidence showing the market value for filled in money orders and the fact that the defendants had the necessary equipment to fill in the money orders and to make the completed orders appear valid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purpose of tattooing is to produce the tattoo, and the tattoo cannot be created without the tattooing process any more than the Declaration of Independence could have been created without a goose quill, foolscap, and ink. Thus, as with writing or painting, the tattooing process is inextricably intertwined with the purely expressive product (the tattoo), and is itself entitled to full First Amendment protection. We are further persuaded by the fact that the process of tattooing is more akin to traditional modes of expression (like writing) than the process involved in producing a parade, which the Supreme Court has held cannot be meaningfully separated from the parade’s expressive product in terms of the constitutional protection afforded. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we have no difficulty holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that parades are  a form of expression not just motion and noting the inherent expressiveness of marching
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the class with small individual claims, the costs of litigation and lack of notice would mean that small or unsophisticated claimants would go unprotected. It must be remembered that Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement expressly compares class actions “to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” ... When the claims of the class members are small, denial of a class action would effectively exclude them from judicial redress. 1 Newberg § 4.27, at 4-107 to 4-109 (emphasis in original). The class action device may allow plaintiffs “to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.” Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 809, 105 S.Ct. at 2973; see MacNeal v. Columbine Exploration Corp., 123 F.R.D. 181, 187-88 (E.D.Pa.1988) (<HOLDING>). 93. Additionally, as a class increases in

    ### Response:
    holding that class action was superior to individual suits where class members had relatively small interests and might not have the wherewithal to bring suit to protect their individual rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    de Victoria, 66 M.J. 67, 71 (C.A.A.F.2008). To invoke jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the relevant United States Attorney must certify that a federal appeal is taken because the evidence excluded is substantial proof of a material fact. The military justice system includes essentially the same requirement. See R.C.M. 908(b)(3). In addition, the Judge Advocate General’s representative must decide whether to file the appeal. R.C.M. 908(b)(6). Here, we must determine whether the appellee’s statements to SA KS, standing alone, are “substantial proof of ... faet[s] material in the proceeding.” Art. 62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ. We conclude that they are. Admissions of an accused represent a unique source of strong evidentiary weight. See United States v. Wuterich, 67 M.J. 63, 78 (C.A.A.F.2008) (<HOLDING>). While the Government had n o consider this

    ### Response:
    recognizing the unique nature of an accuseds admissions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    support the jury’s finding of a conspiracy and the district court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial. VI The jury found that Rubsamen tortiously interfered with Joey Clark’s inheritance and awarded $3 million in damages to him. Rubsamen contends that there is no evidence of any tortious interference with Carolyn’s wills, nor any evidence of property that would have passed by will. Accordingly, she requests that the jury’s verdict be set aside. Rubsamen notes that the Texas Supreme Court has not recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance, but that Texas’s appellate courts do recognize it. In re Russell, — S.W.3d -, -, 2009 WL 3855950, at *5 (Tex.App.El Paso Nov. 18, 2009, no pet.); King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex.App.Houston 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The cases to have considered the cause of

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim for tortious interference with inheritance exists under texas law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a conviction for a crime, for challenging the lawfulness of such judgment or the proceedings upon which it is based.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, to construe the legislature’s silence in ORS 161.610 (2001) as somehow authorizing a challenge to the constitutionality of his 1983 sentence would be inconsistent with the legislature’s expressed intent that, in the absence of direct appeal, post-conviction relief is the exclusive remedy for challenging the validity of a constitutionally infirm sentence. Furthermore, the broader historical context of ORS 161.610 (2001) provides that, once final judgment in a criminal case is entered, its validity and regularity are presumed. Capos v. Clatsop County, 144 Or 510, 525, 25 P2d 903 (1933); see also State v. Young, 122 Or 257, 263-64, 257 P 806 (1927) (<HOLDING>). Again, we decline to interpret the

    ### Response:
    holding that unless a determination by a court in a criminal case is directly attacked it remains the determination of the court whether decided rightly or wrongly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no economic persecution where petitioner did not present any testimony or other evidence of his income in China, his net worth at the time of the fines, or any other facts that would make it possible to evaluate his personal financial circumstances in relation to the fines imposed by the government). In the absence of such evidence we cannot conclude that the agency erred in finding that Wang failed to establish past persecution. Wang also argues that he established a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his statement that Chinese officials threatened him with “some charges.” Wang, however, failed to detail how the vague threat of “some charges” establishes that he reasonably fears persecution upon return to China. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no clear error in the

    ### Response:
    holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be persecuted his fear was speculative at best
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without the defendant’s consent and dismissal is not in the interest of justice. Ervin, 158 Wn.2d at 752-53. Hall’s conviction was final, and he had almost completed his full sentence for felony murder before that finality was brought into question by the State’s motion. The State argues that double jeopardy protections should not bar retrial here because jeopardy did not terminate with Hall’s felony murder conviction. ¶9 The State first asserts that Hall’s reliance on cases of acquittal terminating jeopardy are inapplicable. It points out that the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1975), stated that the “first jeopardy continues until he is acquitted or his conviction becomes final.” Wilson, 420 U.S. at 343 n.11 (<HOLDING>). It appears the State is arguing that Hall’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the government may appeal a postverdict ruling without violating double jeopardy where the appeal does not result in a new trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    describing the “same rate"" representation made to White Mountain Advisors, the SAC alleges that ""BNYM made this false representation [presumably referring to the “same rate” representation] systematically.” It then noted that the Bank had a policy with respect to ERISA plans. SAC ¶ 84. This is insufficient to allege with particularity that the Bank directed the statement of its ERISA policy to ERISA clients. 257 . United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Community Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 511 (6th Cir.2007). 258 . The Court need not decide whether representative examples need not be pled if the SAC were adequately to allege that a representation was disseminated to ERISA clients through a particular mechanism. The SAC fails to make such allegations here. 259 . Autuori, 212 F.3d at 118 (<HOLDING>). 260 . Remington Rand Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that there may be liability for mail fraud where defendant omits information it has duty to disclose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disciplinary penalty when he was deprived of the right to earn good-time credits, contravenes the federal and state constitutions. In my view, appellant was deprived of a liberty interest. When a claimant asserts that government action has wrongly deprived him of a liberty interest and the claim is fact intensive, a hearing to develop the factual basis of the claim is a necessary part of the review guaranteed by due process. Id. at 557-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (“This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.”); see also Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm’n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if a hearing is required to develop the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that due process requires a trialtype hearing for factspecific adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    involves a determination that the substantive content of state or federal legislation is incompatible with the Constitution regardless of the procedures used to implement it. The underlying rationale is that there are certain types of government activity which are incompatible with individual rights as set forth in the Constitution. Similarly, in some § 1983 claims, as here, the question is not whether a government official employed proper procedures in taking action which allegedly injured a person; rather, the question is whether the official’s action improperly (unconstitutionally) impinged on an individual’s right to personal autonomy to the extent that that autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution. See also, Gil-mere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 5 . This substantive due process claim

    ### Response:
    recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are readily observed in the transcript that was used for the second direct appeal which undermines his claim that this issue was demonstrably unavailable at the time of his second direct appeal. Appellee’s Brief at 23. In his reply brief, Perryman argues that the State misunderstands the issue, and that “[w]hat made the claim unavailable for direct appeal was the unknown reason for ‘why’ Perryman’s transcript was a mess, which required a post-conviction evidentia-ry hearing to make that determination.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10. He asserts that during the post-conviction hearing, it was shown that trial counsel did not know about any recording problems in the trial court, the presiding judge did not so inform counsel, and the result is that Perry-man was left with a transc ) (<HOLDING>); Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 726

    ### Response:
    holding that in postconviction proceedings complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal and that it is wrong to review the petitioners fundamental error claim in a postconviction proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    territorial waters. See Howard, 41 F.3d at 530 (noting that “the law in question was expressly designed to cover wrongful deaths occurring outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.”). Finally, we consider the effect of the Director’s support for Tracy’s interpretation. We deem reasonable interpretations of the Director to have “at least some” persuasive force if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue and the Director’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136, 117 S.Ct. 1953, 138 L.Ed.2d 327 (1997); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944); Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 697 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). According to the Director, “[i]n the absence

    ### Response:
    holding that the directors litigating position was not entitled to chevron deference but did warrant skidmore respect on certain issues where the arguments were persuasive and the agencys manual and practice had for some time consistently advanced a reasonable position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a money judgment which can be enforced in Texas or elsewhere. In re Cannon, 993 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999) (orig.proceeding). Whether a court has jurisdiction over a person is a question of law. Hotel Partners v. Craig, 993 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1994, writ denied). When filing a special appearance, the defendant has the burden to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex.1996). Here, appellant alleged as the sole jurisdictional basis the trial court’s “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this case as a result of prior proceedings.” Unless negated by appellee, this was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. See, e.g., In Interest of Kuykendall, 957 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); see also Garza v. Garza, 666 S.W.2d 205,

    ### Response:
    holding father waived error where he failed to contest mothers assertion that court had jurisdiction based upon prior proceedings even though the prior proceeding was a registration of a kansas judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to determining whether the enhancement is warranted, but the government is not required to make a prima facie showing that the weapon was capable of being fired while it was in the defendant's ""possession” to justify the enhancement. When one looks down the business end of the barrel of a shotgun, one naturally assumes it is both loaded and operable. 10 . 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) provides for a mandatory minimum of 20 years and the sentence ""may be up to life imprisonment’' for persons convicted of ""engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.” 11 . Frazier's and Thomas's presenten ce reports indicate that both have a prior drug felony conviction. Therefore, the maximum sentence they could have received without violating Apprendi was 30 years. See Arias, 252 F.3d at 979 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Defendants argue the jury’s verdict was

    ### Response:
    recognizing that defendant with prior conviction may be sentenced to 30year sentence under  841b1c without offending apprendi
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they get out of county and they request a court reporter and they think the court reporter is coming in the room, ... because that’s what automatically happens ... in their home county. And about halfway through the hearing they look around, and nobody is taking the record, and they find that you have to ask twice in this particular county or you have to ask nicely or there [is] some additional requirement.... The problem was that the Court discussed, and a number of the members are gone now that were there, but the concern that a lawyer would be expecting that he had jumped through the hoops only to look around and find that it wasn’t good enough. That was the concern. Id. at 5410-11. At the conclusion of the 2572429, at *1 (Tex.App.-East-land Oct. 13, 2005, no. pet. h.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>); Nabelek v. State., No. 14-03-00965-CV,-

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as the center of the private lives of our people.” Id. at 115, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (quotation marks omitted). In the Court’s estimation, the right that a nonconsenting co-occupant has to privacy outweighs any interest the con senting co-oceupant has in allowing the premises to be searched. Id. As Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident. Id. at 120,126 S.Ct. 1515. [¶ 20] Randolph, however, does not require law enforcement to affirmatively seek the consent of physically present co-tenants who may object. Id. at 121-22, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (<HOLDING>). Here, a uniformed officer entered the camp.

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no need to affirmatively seek the consent of a potentially objecting cotenant when consent has been given by another cotenant unless law enforcement has removed the potentially objecting cotenant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fatal gaps in an expert’s analysis or assertions that are simply incorrect.” Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 912 (Tex.2004). Here, Dr. Mims testified that he is a board certified neurosurgeon and has been practicing for over twenty years. As a neurosurgeon, Mims, treats back injuries. Mims participated in both of Burke’s back surgeries, and testified that he has performed the same types of surgeries many times on other patients. Specifically, Mims testified that he has performed Burke’s first surgery about 1500 times, and the second surgery about 150 times. Mims took a medical history from Burke and examined him on multiple occasions. The record therefore includes evidence that Burke’s injury was within Mims’s realm of expertise. Cf. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 719 (<HOLDING>); Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 149

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of mechanical engineer in products liability case involving automobile because expert did not have specific experience regarding subject matter of lawsuit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on remand in the analysis of actual or potential conflicts between [the California provision] and federal law.”). 5 . We have held that harboring requires making a non-citizen’s illegal presence in the United States “substantially easier or less dif ficult."" United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir.2007); see, e.g., United States v. Hinojos-Mendez, 270 Fed.Appx. 368, 369 (5th Cir.2008) (acting as a lookout at an apartment complex); Shum, 496 F.3d at 390 (providing false identifications and failing to file social security paperwork for employees); United States v. Ramirez, 250 Fed.Appx. 80, 83 (5th Cir.2007) (barring officers from bedroom where illegal non-citizens were hiding, providing non-citizens with necessities including food and shelter, and attempting 3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted and vacated on other

    ### Response:
    holding that  1324 preempted a local ordinance prohibiting renting housing to illegal aliens
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    355, 367, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). New York has legislatively identified four situations in which a limitations period may be tolled, Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir.1993) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 204(a), 204(b), 207, 208), none of which apply to the instant case. Limitations periods are also subject to equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, both of which if satisfied can save a plaintiffs otherwise time-barred § 1983 claim, unless applying either doctrine would be inconsistent with the text or policies underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 1040, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002) (equitable tolling); Leon, 988 F.2d at 310 (equitable estoppel); see also Dillman v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). These doctrines, when applicable, usually

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this motion that no warning was given. The question before the Court is whether on this evidence, a finding of vessel negligence may be sustained. Since the 1972 amendment of Section 5(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, liability may no longer be premised on unseaworthy conditions but requires proof of negligence by the vessel. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). In determining whether negligence has been established, the federal courts look to uniform land-based principles. See, e. g., Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3rd Cir. 1977). The courts have been vigilant in guarding against any expansion of vessel liability which might restore the situation the 1972 amendment was intended to cure. See, e. g., Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>). It is important at the outset to define the

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the vessels motion for directed verdict and judgment n o v where a longshoreman was injured while knowingly engaged in loading a vessel in a dangerous manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff Michael A. Park appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. We affirm. 1. Plaintiffs state law claim for negligent investigation is preempted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, because the duty to investigate comes from the collective bargaining agreement. Hawaii Administrative Rule § 12-60-2(b)(l)(B)(viii) does not create an independent, statutory standard of care. See Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawaii 154, 925 P.2d 324, 343 (1996) (stating that a statute must prohibit or proscribe conduct in order 0, 827 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Articles 28 and 30 of the collective

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim based on statements made during a formal grievance procedure was preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Court finds that testimony about that patient’s motivation would be quite probative of whether Defendant was issuing prescriptions out side the usual course of professional practice. Second, the Court notes that its ruling pertains only to the government’s case in chief. If the Defendant were himself to open the door in some way that would make the non-hearsay purpose for the proffered patient testimony relevant — such as presenting evidence or argument that Defendant’s patients chose to visit his practice for other reasons — the testimony may become admissible. Under these circumstances, the probative value of testimony that the patients in fact had other motivations would become significantly probative. See United States v. Johnson, 730 F.2d 683, 691 (11th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). If the government contends that this has

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court properly ruled that once defense counsel opened the door on crossexamination evidences probative value was enhanced such that it outweighed its prejudicial effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to consider two different courses of action that would deter future misconduct like this since “[qjuite as important as assuring a fair trial ... is assuring that the circumstances that gave rise to the misconduct won’t be repeated in other cases.” Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1324. If a request by the defense is made, one option on remand may be for “the district court to determine whether to retry the defendant! ] or dismiss the indictment with prejudice as a sanction for the government’s misbehavior.” Id. at 1325. The remedy of dismissal with prejudice, which is strong medicine for the entire prosecutorial group, is available pursuant to a district court’s supervisory powers over the attorneys who practice before it. Id.; see also United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Second, the district court may want to

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing an indictment with prejudice where the prosecutor showed reckless disregard for the prosecutions constitutional obligations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The Due Process Clause forbids the state from itself depriving citizens of those rights, but it does not require the state to provide aid, even when it may be necessary. Id. at 195-96, 109 S.Ct. 998. (“The Clause is phrased as a limitation of the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.... Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the state protected them from each other.”). Nevertheless, there are limited circumstances where the state has created a danger or has a special relationship with an individual, when it will be required to protect a person’s right to personal inviolability from private or public abuse. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir.2004). Preservation of the Issue At sentencing, Defendant argued that calculation of his base offense level should not include the criminal acts alleged in Counts Three, Four, and Five of his indictment, on which the jury could not reach a verdict, because “a jury was not convinced that Mr. Williams” committed those crimes. (R. 128, PageID 510-11.) Defendant also argued that the district court should consider the disparity between Defendant’s possible sentence with and without the career offender enhancement when making its sentencing decision. The parties and the court discussed these objections at length, and the objections were therefore properly preserved for review. Cf. Bostic, 371 F.3d at 871 (<HOLDING>). Defendant concedes, however, that although

    ### Response:
    holding preservation of objection at sentencing requires defendant to object with that reasonable degree of specificity which would have adequately apprised the trial court of the true basis for his objection internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant on the disparate treatment claim in Count I. However, because of the temporal remoteness between the plaintiffs last request for an accommodation in October 2004 and her termination in October 2005, Count III will be dismissed. Compare Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C.Cir.2007) (finding that “a reasonable finder of fact could infer causation” where “less than a month” elapsed between protected activity and adverse employment action), with Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (finding that 20-month period between employer’s knowledge of plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action “suggests, by itself, no causality at all”), Coons v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887-88 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>), and Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205,

    ### Response:
    holding that where a request for an accommodation was made one year prior to demotion the distant time sequence was inadequate to show a causal link and plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of retaliation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    receipt of the notice to submit in writing any and all objections to the deductions to the director [of the department of corrections], who shall consider the objections prior to transmitting the deducted amount to the clerk of the district court.” Id. We think the legislature inserted the notice-and-opportunity-to-object language in section 904.702 to give the department of corrections authority to determine how a section 610A.l(l)(a) order for costs and attorney’s fees would be collected. Without such authority, the order might be unfair, or even confiscatory. As with the “reasonably able to pay” standard in criminal restitution, we think this authority is necessary to allow a section 610A.l(l)(a) order to pass constitutional muster. See State v. Love, 589 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1998) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, when the district court orders a

    ### Response:
    holding that 1 prisoners have protected property interest in prison allowance subject to deductions authorized in iowa code section 904702 and 2 department has discretion in allocating the allowances but may make only those deductions authorized by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rarely interferes with competition enough to violate the antitrust laws. See Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir.2005) (stating, in the context of a section 1 case, that "" ‘deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned’ ”). But in some cases, such defamation, which plainly is not competition on the merits, can give rise to antitrust liability, especially when it is combined with other anticompetitive acts. See LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 153, 162; Int’l Travel, 623 F.2d at 1268, 1270; Caribbean, 148 F.3d at 1087. 15 . UPMC argues that we may not consider hirings made outside the limitations period in determining whether the new hirings were anticompetitive. Not so. Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 217 (<HOLDING>). 16 . West Penn also claims that UPMC's

    ### Response:
    holding that it is proper to consider prelimitations period conduct in determining whether conduct within the limitations period violated the antitrust laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the rest. In such instances, only items seized under the invalid portions of the warrant must be suppressed.” United States v. Krasaway, 881 F.2d 550, 553 (8th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Timley, 443 F.3d 615, 622 (8th Cir.2006) (“[W]here the warrant is invalid only in part, the warrant is ‘severa-ble,’ and items seized pursuant to valid portions of the warrant need not be suppressed”). Here, no computer hard drives, disks or stored data were seized. See Gov’t Ex. 2, Attachment A, Bates Stamp Nos. 000024-27. As such, even if this portion of the warrant were severed, the evidence seized from the residence would clearly fall within valid portions of warrant, and suppression of the evidence seized in this case is not required. See Krasaway, 881 F.2d at 553 (<HOLDING>). Nyberg’s particularity argument is rejected.

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants motion to suppress was properly denied because the actual items seized fell within the valid portions of the warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    companies. Finally, Plaintiff concludes that if Commerce had applied adverse facts available against the Affiliated Companies, it would have issued an affirmative collapsing determination. Though this argument is appealing, its conclusion is dependent upon the validity of each of its parts. If one of the parts is faulty, the underlying conclusion cannot stand. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the record is sufficient to support Commerce’s collapsing determination, thus rendering the first part of Plaintiffs argument faulty. Accordingly, this court finds that Plaintiffs conclusion cannot stand. Commerce has a long history of collapsing affiliated parties — a practice that has been affirmed by this Court. See AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 34 F.Supp.2d 756, 765 (CIT 1998) (<HOLDING>). This Court, though, has restricted the

    ### Response:
    holding that although there is no explicit reference to collapsing in the uraas legislative history  this history reflects congressional awareness of collapsing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. United States, 59 Fed.Cl. 765, 769 (2004). The government has not demonstrated that it or Mr. Potter would be harmed by a difference of three hours of deposition time in one day. V. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that (a) the Reidhill Motion is granted, (b) the Ross Motion is denied, (e) the New Witnesses Motion is denied, and (d) the Potter Motion is granted. 1 . See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996). 2 . In the preliminary phases of the case, the government was adjudged liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract, and genuine disputes of material fact were determined to exist respecting certain of plaintiffs' claims for damages. See Globe Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 55 Fed.Cl. 247 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Globe Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 59

    ### Response:
    holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ORDER UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED and the case REMANDED for consideration of the issue of attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. The plaintiff, represented by appellants, Federman and Sherwood and Holzer and Holzer, brought a securities fraud class action against the defendants under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1994 and under Rule 10b-5. The defendants moved to dismiss on the basis of, inter alia, a three-year statute of repose and a one-year statute of limitations. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (<HOLDING>). In opposition, the plaintiff made no

    ### Response:
    holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violate the “merit principle” pursuant to HRS § 76-1. 3. PSD’s suspension policy was not a “rule” subject to HAPA’s rule-making requirements. Appellants argue that PSD improperly promulgated a “rule” in violation of HAPA, HRS §§ 91-1 et seq. (2012 Repl.), when it implemented its unwritten suspension policy in 2006. In general, “[a] state agency must conform to the requirements of HAPA when acting in a rule-making capacity.” Rose v. Oba, 68 Haw. 422, 425, 717 P.2d 1029, 1031 (1986). HRS § 91-1(4) Os and only applies to PSD’s internal promotion decisions. The suspension policy is, therefore, purely an “internal management” function that does not affect the “private rights of or procedures available to the public.” See Waugh v. Univ. of Hawai‘i, 63 Haw. 117, 131, 621 P.2d 957, 968 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Because PSD’s suspension policy is not a

    ### Response:
    holding that the area of concern raised by appellant is exempted from public rulemaking procedures because the rules of practice which appellant claims the university should be required to promulgate would affect only the staff and faculty of the university and not the private rights of or procedures available to the public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court set forth a two-part test: “(1) the injury must have occurred in a common area under the control of the landlord; and (2) the landlord must have had actual or imputed knowledge of the particular dog’s vicious propensities.” Id. In the case sub judice, however, unlike in Linebaugh and Baker, the injury did not occur in the common area, but rather entirely within Morton’s apartment where Tevin was playing. Importantly, where injuries have resulted from a dog attack occurring on portions of the premises where the tenant, not the landlord, had exclusive control, several cases have indicated that a landlord may not be held liable. See, e.g., Goddard by Goddard v. Weaver, 558 N.E.2d 853, 854-55 (Ind.Ct.App.1990); Zwinge v. Love, 37 A.D.2d 874, 325 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (N.Y.App.Div.l971)(<HOLDING>); Denagy v. Doscher, 40 Misc.2d 643, 243

    ### Response:
    holding that motherowner of home in which attack occurred was not hable for attack by dog owned by sontenant where there was no evidence that she exercised dominion and control over the dog
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    State v. Martinez, which noted that the prosecutor’s comment about the defendant being “predisposed to commit these crimes” was “clearly improper.” 2001 UT App 90, ¶ 11 n. 2. ¶44 Bradley contends that his ease is “strikingly similar” to Martinez. We disagree. In Bradley’s case, the State did not explicitly express that the defendant was predisposed to commit sexual abuse. The State only noted that the testimony of J.B. “must” be considered. J.B.’s testimony was properly admitted evidence and the jury was actually instructed by the trial court to “weigh[ ] all the available evidence” to determine Bradley’s guilt on the charges. The State merely urged the jury to consider evidence already determined admissible in a pretrial hearing. Cf. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 25, 992 P.2d 951 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the State acted properly and in

    ### Response:
    holding that intentionally calling to jurors attention matters that they should not consider in reaching a verdict is clear misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    majority’s view, that term must be equally unambiguous in the context of witnesses in § 6322(a)(2), for one statutory term cannot have two distinct meanings. As noted, Hall sensibly agrees with the government that “summoned” in § 6322(a) must have the same meaning in both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). See Oral Arg. at 4:30; Br. Def.-Appellee United States, at 34-35. If the majority’s opinion is to be read— as I believe it must — that “summoned” in § 6322(a) invariably means having received any court-issued summons, then the majority’s opinion necessarily abrogates those administrative decisions that interpret “summoned” flexibly to accommodate the limitations of the court leave system. See, e.g., In re Entitlement of Emp.-Defendant to Court Leave, 62 Comp.Gen. 87, 1982 WL 26713 (1982) (<HOLDING>); In re Pasake, 59 Comp.Gen. 290, 1980 WL 17976

    ### Response:
    holding that court leave under  6322 is not available to a federal employee who is summoned to appear as a defendant in the court action concerned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    every reason to believe that he had complied with the requirement to file with that agency within 300 days.” Id., 225 F.Supp.2d at 489. We further reasoned that “Plaintiff would know that he was protected from exceeding the 300-day statutory period as of the date he learned that a charge number had been assigned to his case.” Id., 225 F.Supp.2d at 490. In Zysk, then, we spoke of the docketing of the charge not as that which rendered the complaint effective, but rather as an indicator to the plaintiff that the charge had in fact been timely filed. Although the assigning of a charge number within the limitations period is a fairly good indicator that an effective charge has been received on time, but see Michelson v. Exxon Research and Eng. Co., 808 F.2d 1005, 1010-11 (3d Cir., 1987) (<HOLDING>) , it is not, and Zysk does not stand for the

    ### Response:
    holding that where the writings on file were insufficient to constitute an effective charge a charge had not been effectively filed despite the fact that the eeoc had assigned the case a charge number
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in practicing a patented process” is liable for contributory infringement if: (1) the component constitutes “a material part of the invention”; (2) the alleged infringer knows that the component is “especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of [the] patent”; and (3) the component is “not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 850-851 (Fed.Cir.2010) (discussing the legal elements of a contributory infringement claim). As with induced infringement, a plaintiff must also show direct infringement by a third party in order to succeed on a claim of contributory infringement. See Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). D-Link Systems and ZyXEL

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff must prove that the end users directly infringed its patent in order to succeed on its claim of contributory infringement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). “[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the [practice] bears more heavily on one race than another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). This framework has been applied in a number of cases in this and other circuits involving allegations of discriminatory police enforcement practices. See, e.g, United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir.1996) (applying selective enforcement test to criminal defendant’s claim that officer tended to escalate traffic stops of young black males into drug investigations); United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 955, 117 S.Ct. 372,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was required to demonstrate discriminatory effect to sustain defense based upon theory that police enforced bicycle headlight law only against black offenders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “to put back in good condition after damage, decay, etc.; mend, fix”). Thus, the classic cases involved, for example, repairs by a railroad company to existing tracks on which an accident had occurred. See Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 263. Over time, however, the subsequent repairs rule was not so closely limited, and “[a]t common law, the courts analyzed many different remedial actions under the rubric of ‘repairs.’” Leonard Packel and Anne Bowen Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence § 407-1, at 242 (West 1999). Accordingly, courts began to describe the doctrine as the “subsequent remedial measures rule,” to reflect its broader application to, for example, post-accident warnings, safety precautions and changes in procedure. See, e.g., Baron, 202 Pa. at 282, 51 A. at 979 (<HOLDING>). See generally 63 Am.Jur.2d Products Liability

    ### Response:
    holding the doctrine applicable to bar the admission of evidence including testimony concerning the implementation of postaccident changes in procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ]; [McNary u] Haitian Refugee Center, supra, [498 U.S. 479] at 494, 111 S.Ct. 888 [112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991)]; Ringer, 466 U.S., at 617, 104 S.Ct. 2013; Salfi, supra, at 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, including, where necessary, the authority to develop an evidentiary record. Proceeding through the agency in this way provides the agency the opportunity to reconsider its policies, interpretations, and regulations in light of those challenges. Nor need it waste time, for the agency can waive many of the procedural steps set forth in § 405(g), see Salfi, supra, at 767, 95 S.Ct. 2457, and a court can deem them waived in certain circumstances, see Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 330-331, 96 S.Ct. 893, even though the agency technically holds no “hearing” on the claim. See Salfi, supra, at 763-767, 95 S.Ct. 2457 (<HOLDING>); Eldridge, supra, at 331-332, and n. 11, 96

    ### Response:
    holding that secretarys decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the appellees exhaustion was in effect a determination that the agency had rendered a final decision within the meaning of  405g
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unconstitutional. For example, the maximum sentence authorized for possession of more than two ounces, but less than one-half pound of .marijuana, is two years imprisonment.. While a sentence of two years and one day for such' a crime would be an illegal sentence, it would likely not be grossly disproportionate. 5 . We have previously held that the mastermind of a homicide can be more culpable than even a codefendant who actually delivers the killing blow. See State v. Piper, 2006 S.D. 1, ¶ 90, 709 N.W.2d 783, 816 (""Piper plánned and directed the plot from its inception. He cites to no authority which holds less culpable the masterminds of a murder plot while more severely punishing those who assist'in carrying it out.”); State v. Page, 2006 S.D. 2, ¶ 111-12, 709 N.W.2d 739, 775 (<HOLDING>). 6 . Rehabilitation ""is not a bright-line rule

    ### Response:
    holding defendant who instigated incident resulting in homicide more culpable than codefendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from the Caymans to New York was attached as an exhibit to the declaration. Nigeria argues that the district court erred in considering both the errata sheet and the declaration. According to Nigeria, the errata sheet was neither timely nor proper under FRCP 30(e), and the declaration was a sham “generated solely to create an issue of fact.” Nigeria’s evidentiary arguments rest on a misunderstanding of the procedures a district court must follow in making a juris dictional ruling under the FSIA. Summary judgment procedures do not control. Rather, where a plaintiff alleges that his claim is based on a foreign state’s commercial acts, the defendant has the initial burden of establishing that it is a sovereign state. See Export Group v. Reef Industries, 54 F.3d 1466, 1470 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was entitled to immunity because it established that it was an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state unless one of the fsias exceptions applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and we will not repeat those facts here. Blair v. Woodford, 319 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2003). That order stayed our consideration of Blair’s habeas claim pending the outcome of Blair’s direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, which by that point had finally begun. Id. at 1088-89. In 2005, the California Supreme Court rendered its decision affirming Blair’s conviction and sentence in full. People v. Blair, 36 Cal.4th 686, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145 (2005). We then resumed our proceedings. In a motion filed with us in 2005, while Petitioner’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his petition was pending, Petitioner asked for a hearing to determine whether he was competent to continue pursuing habeas relief. See Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In an unpublished order, we remanded the case

    ### Response:
    holding that a deathsentenced state prisoner has a right to a competency determination in federal habeas proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a juvenile and the juvenile’s biological or legal parentsf.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1100(1) (2007). Article 11 is entirely silent on the amendment of petitions or motions in termination proceedings. The only right of amendment permitted in Chapter 7B proceedings is for the amendment of a petition in juvenile, abuse, neglect or dependency proceedings, and this right is limited to “when the amendment does not change the nature of the conditions upon which the petition is based.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-800 .(2007). Accordingly, we will not superimpose a right to amend a petition or motion for termination of parental rights to conform with the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing and the trial court erred by allowing the amendment. See Peirce, 53 N.C. App. at 380, 281 S.E.2d at 203 (<HOLDING>). II. Notice of Grounds for Termination Since

    ### Response:
    holding the legislative intent was that gs chap 7a art 24b now article 11 of chapter 7b exclusively control the procedure to be followed in the termination of parental rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that an “administrative decision” as defined under 3 — 101 should be equated with the term “final order,” we would nonetheless conclude that no “final order” was entered in this case. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 1996). As we pointed out earlier, when the chief legal counsel sustained the default, she essentially entered a finding of liability against Pinkerton for its failure to appear. We conclude that a determination of liability by default without a determination of damages does not meet the statutory definition of an administrative decision “which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 1996); see also Skrypek v. Mazzocchi, 227 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 590 N.E.2d 990 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Stotlar, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 728 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that a default judgment becomes a final order after damages are set thereby fixing the rights of the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    company’s affairs.""); Murdock, supra note 4, at 470 (""The most common form of alternative remedy is the buy-out of the minority shareholder.”). 31 .The remedy of receivership is harsh or drastic when compared to other remedies such as compelling dividends or a buyout because it replaces the shareholders' chosen managers with court-chosen managers. 443 S.W.3d at 903; Balias, 748 S.W.2d at 257. But this does not mean that even a receivership for dissolution will cause the corporation to cease to be a going concern. The majority shareholders may well purchase the corporation from the receiver, essentially buying out the minority shareholder. 32 . Murdock, supra note 4, at 426. 33 . See Texarkana Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Phillips, 408 S.W.2d 537, 539-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texar-kana 1966, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 34 . The Court believes the Model Act compels

    ### Response:
    holding that a shareholder was not entitled to a remedy for oppression because the directors decisions were not inconsistent with the honest exercise of business judgment and discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purposes until he or she repeats a command. To the contrary, in determining whether there has been a show of authority, courts must examine all of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the interaction with law enforcement. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400. In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart identified such factors as “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). Here, three marke 3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). On this record, the officers’ approach

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no show of authority when two officers repeatedly asked an individual where is your girls house but where the two officers were still in their car neither officer displayed his weapon there was no physical touching and no indication as to the language or tone of the officers voice that might have signaled a clear show of authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). A “complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (footnote omitted), see also Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but th ng an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years. Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). “A Man Called Horse” was released in April

    ### Response:
    holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those transfers which a debtor would transact anyway as a function of its day to day operations. Under this reading of § 1146(c), it is unlikely that the debtor’s transfers in NVR Homes would have been eligible for § 1146(c) relief. More significantly, however, limiting eligible transfers to those “under a plan confirmed” limits such transfers to those over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction, i.e., those which concern the debtor and property of the debtor’s estate. Several courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have relied on this meaning of “under a plan confirmed” to exclude transfers between third parties over which the bankruptcy court may otherwise lack jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mensh v. Eastern Stainless Corp. (In Case of Eastmet Corp.), 907 F.2d 1487, 1489 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Kerner Printing Co., Inc., 188 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that while nondebtor purchase money deed of trust can be described as part of the same transaction by which the buyer acquired debtors real property that does not elevate the deed of trust to status of something under a plan confirmed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    together and cumulatively with other instances permitting an inference of discrimination, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act. In particular, the evidence supports an inference of a pattern or practice of discrimination in the “the terms, conditions, or privileges” of rental, or interference with exercise of rights of a tenant, through withholding repair and maintenance, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) or § 3617. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (prohibited actions under § 3604(b) include “[flailing or delaying maintenance or repairs ... because of race”); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 780-782 (7th Cir.2009) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); see also Radcliffe v. Avenel Homeowners

    ### Response:
    holding that violation of  3604b and  3617 may be based upon postrental management and administration of rental units by condo association
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the day, ladies and gentlemen, you represent the conscience of the community, and I’m asking you to award an amount of money that is so significant and substantial that it will do justice that everyone will know that justice is done, not just the Nelson family, ... but everybody that’s in this community. Do not let [this man] die in [vain]. Id. at 83-84. Such language is inflammatory, particularly to the extent that it attributes improper motives to Appellants. Thus, we admonish counsel to refrain from needlessly inflaming the passions of the jury. See Young, 761 A.2d at 563 (noting that “an appeal to passion or prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced” and equating a verdict obtained by such arguments to “one obtained by false testimony”); see also Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 939 (<HOLDING>); Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1007 (“Strict liability

    ### Response:
    recognizing a central premise that negligence concepts have no place in pennsylvanias strict liability law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no evidence that S. Jacobson misled AHP or failed to divulge any information. A. Jacobson sanctioned the redirection of certain business directly to Olympus as part of the parties’ anticipated merger. S. Jacobson’s activities with Olympus after his resignation from AHP were similarly not breaches of his fiduciary duty or improper. AHP has not shown that he used any knowledge gained solely as a director to the detriment of AHP. AHP’s “Eighth Claim for Relief,” (Doc. No. 5-1 at 13), is DISMISSED. 9. Olympus, S. Jacobson, and Davis’s Civil Conspiracy Olympus argues that AHP’s civil conspiracy claim relates only to fraud. If true, AHP’s conspiracy claim would be dismissed based on the Court’s dismissal of AHP’s fraud claim. See Strickland v. Hedrick, 194 N.C.App. 1,19, 669 S.E.2d 61 (2008) (<HOLDING>). AHP argues that its conspiracy claim could

    ### Response:
    holding that where summary judgment is granted on the underlying tort claims a conspiracy claim must also fail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides evidence of diminished market value. Even taking into account “East Texas vernacular,” as the court of appeals did, William Justiss’s testimony is speculative. He never stated his familiarity with market values, and his passing reference to “what the price of land is bringing” is not enough. His testimony provides only his guess as to his property’s diminu- • tion in value, and such speculation will not support a judg cussed a 2001 sale of nearby property, that reflects only their property’s value after the nuisance, not how much the value had changed — á necessary element of permanent nuisance damages. We conclude that the landowners’ bare conclusions provide no evidence of the damage caused by the nuisance. See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>). Joe Donald Mashburn provided the most detail,

    ### Response:
    holding that bare baseless opinions will not support a judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufac-tured state.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(21). In this case, the threshold question in determining whether the Debtors qualify for Chapter 12 relief is whether they are “engaged in a farming operation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(18). For the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 101(21), “[ajlthough certain modes of farming are specified, the definition of ‘farming operation’ is not limited to those operations specifically enumerated.” In re Borg, 4 Mont.B.R. 178, 180 (Bankr.Mont.1987). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also held the examples of farming operations listed under § 101(21) “are not exclusive ... of other activities that might constitute ‘farming operations.’” Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. McNeal (In re McNeal), 848 F.2d 170 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Dakota Lay’d Eggs, 57 B.R. 648, 653

    ### Response:
    holding that a chicken coop cleaning and fertilizer business did not constitute a farming operation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    herself, the collections officer, and the F urisdiction to transfer, “if it is in the interests of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. In this case, however, the “interests of justice” do not require transfer, because Plaintiffs challenged the assessments for 1997 and 1998 in United States Tax Court, and that court found Plaintiffs liable. Montagne, T.C. Memo. 2004-252. Further, Plaintiffs had an opportunity to challenge the collection actions for 1996, 1998, and 1999 in Tax Court and did so. Montagne v. Comm’r, Docket No. 19709-02L (Sept. 26, 2003). Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata precludes Plaintiffs from now challenging those final judgments in a United States District Court. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have had an

    ### Response:
    holding that res judicata applies when the parties are identical or in privity the first suit proceeded to a final judgment on the merits and the second claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides in pertinent part that an “interested party may object to a solicitation ... for bids or proposals for a proposed contract” or to “any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or proposed procurement.” As just discussed, the government does not dispute that Weeks meets the “prospective bidder” prong of the interested party test. We have not had occasion to discuss what is required to prove an economic interest, and thus prejudice, in a case such as this, where a prospective bidder/offeror is challenging a solicitation in the pre-award context. In such a case, it is difficult for a prospective bidder/offeror to make the showing of prejudice that we have required in post-award bid protest cases. See, e.g., Statistica, 102 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). The reason of course is that, in a case such

    ### Response:
    holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process grounds where, as here, the order becomes an element of a criminal offense. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838-39, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987). To do so successfully, he must satisfy each of the three requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which provides that: [A]n alien may not challenge the validity of [a] deportation order ... unless the alien demonstrates that — (1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2000); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839 & n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 2148 (<HOLDING>). III. Denial of Due Process Gonzalez-Roque

    ### Response:
    holding that a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judicial review but declining to enumerate which procedural errors are so fundamental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judicial review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to provide supplemental briefing on whether Nelson could still pursue a workers' compensation claim. The parties agreed that he could. We do not decide this issue because Alaska Concrete was not a party in the superior court or this appeal. 44 . Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 761 P.2d 119, 122 (Alaska 1988). 45 . Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998). 46 . See State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 405 (Alaska 2007) (distinguishing between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges). 47 . We acknowledge that it has been more than two years since Nelson was injured, but this does not necessarily preclude him from receiving benefits under the workers' compensation act. See Jonathan v. Doyon Drilling, Inc., 890 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Alaska 1995) (<HOLDING>). Here, Nelson did not file a written claim for

    ### Response:
    holding that twoyear period for requesting hearing after employers controversion only applies to employees written claim for workers compensation benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the “procuring agent” doctrine. The defendant relies on State v. Baldwin, 867 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). In Baldwin, the intermediate appellate court held that the “procuring agent” doctrine was viable as a defense when a defendant is charged with the sale of drugs. Baldwin, however, is distinguishable from the present case as the offense in Baldwin predated the Tennessee Criminal Reform Act of 1989. With the passage of the Criminal Reform Act of 1989, the legislature made procuring or delivering a controlled substance the same crime as selling a controlled substance. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-417; see generally Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620 (Tenn.1997); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (<HOLDING>). It is illogical to surmise that the

    ### Response:
    holding premeditated murder and felony murder are the same crime with various means of commission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be present. Atwood contends that regardless of his trial counsels’ failure to request his presence, the trial judge had an obligation to invite him to, and secure his presence at, the meeting in which the jury was informed of the threatening phone call. The law is clear in that a defendant’s right to be present at all phases of the trial is not absolute, and can be waived. See, e.g. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (recognizing a trial judge’s discretion to remove “disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants”); See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 454, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912) (indicating that right can be waived by the voluntary absence of the defendant); United States v. Gunter, 631 F.2d 583, 589 (8th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853, 855

    ### Response:
    holding that where defendants counsel objected to the trial judges evidentiary rulings in evidentiary hearing but did not object to the defendants absence any claim of error due to defendants absence had been waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    meant him to have available.” Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-50, 96 S.Ct. at 2557-58. It should be noted that Machinists does not necessarily render a state law invalid merely because it might have some effect on labor-management relations. In Garmon, the Court recognized that states may enact statutes having only a peripheral impact on matters governed by federal labor law if they address concerns “deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.” Garmon, 359 U.S. at 254, 79 S.Ct. at 785. However, this exception is a narrow one and is limited to legislation directly aimed at topics of vital local concern such as health or welfare benefits and the prevention of violence or tortious acts. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 3177-78, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983) (<HOLDING>); New York Telephone Co. v. New York State

    ### Response:
    holding that causes of action for employers misrepresentation and breach of contract to replacement workers are not preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and more worthy of protection than are public figures who run the risk of closer public serutiny, but ""enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication."" Although Carpenter voluntarily participated in the controversy over the show's cancellation, the limited and discrete nature of her participation did not warrant the degree of exposure she received. Application of defamation standards to the IIED claims of private figures exposes to retaliation any private individual exercising her own free speech rights to complain about media program content. In such cireum-stances, no one could ever safely complain about the media without risking public attack. It would chill listeners' desire to voice their opinions. This result is inconsistent with the value pl 1988) (<HOLDING>); Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 941 (Alaska

    ### Response:
    holding that newspaper columnist on natural resource and mining issues injected herself into public controversy on those issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not cause harm. Implicit in the Negligence Complaint, therefore, must be an allegation that the lead paint somehow separated from the wall or ceiling, and entered the air, or fell on the floor, furniture or fixtures in the apartment. One possibility is that lead dust flaked off the walls and was inhaled by Ashley Allman. Another is that the lead paint chipped, and that Ashley Allman ingested those chips. Although flaking, peeling, chipping, crumbling and falling are not among the listed methods of disseminating pollution, it is arguable, and several courts have found, that the presence of lead dust or chips in an apartment qualifies as “discharge,” “dispersal,” or even more generally, as “release.” See, e.g., Oates by Oates v. State, 157 Misc.2d 618, 597 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Ct.Cl.1993) (<HOLDING>), appeal withdrawn after settlement, 206 A.D.2d

    ### Response:
    holding lead paint poisoning covered by the pollution exclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that of the client. Until judgment, or in this case settlement, the attorney has the right to recover fees for services rendered, but not to obtain a share of the income produced by the client’s claim. See Covington v. Rhodes, 38 N.C.App. 61, 64, 247 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1978). The attorney does not, as Mrs. Young suggests, own the claim itself. Accordingly, we join the majority of those circuits to have addressed this issue and decline to adopt the Cotnam exception. See Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2000); Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir.1995); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed.Cir.1995); O’Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 707, 1962 WL 1147 (1962), aff'd 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.1963). See also Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 418-19, 1995 WL 730447 (1995) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir.1997). Rather,

    ### Response:
    holding without mentioning cotnam that settlement portion paid to attorneys pursuant to contingent fee was income to client
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of her advertising efforts for ACVSMR, but provides no details regarding the number of people targeted or the frequency of distribution of these ads. See Lyons Aff. ¶ 17. Lyons also maintains a listing in The Bloodhorse Source, “a major advertising directory for the equine industry.” Id. at ¶ 16; Lyons Aff., Ex. C, Horse Racing and Breeding Information from The Blood-Horse, ECF No. 95-1. In addition, Lyons reports that “lectures, seminars, [and] speaking engagements” advertise her mark. Lyons Aff. ¶ 17. This sketched portrait does not depict the type of pervasive and continuous advertising scheme that is probative of secondary meaning. See Unleashed Doggie Day Care, LLC v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., No. 10-10742-DJC, 2011 WL 6812642, at *8 (D.Mass. Dec. 28, 2011) (Casper, J.) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a website is a potential

    ### Response:
    holding that small businesss purchase of a print advertisement and telephone book listing along with a reported 56851 spent on advertisements during a ten year period were insufficient to establish secondary meaning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    however, the only conduct by the nurses which even tangentially relates to Ms. Escobedo’s national origin is the English-only instruction related to the operating rooms. But, as we have noted, Ms. Escobedo has not alleged that it was a vehicle to effect any discriminatory animus harbored by the nurses, let alone provide evidence of such intent or effect; to the contrary, Ms. Escobedo testified that she got along well with the nurses and they supported her in disputes with her supervisors. This evidence before us thus simply does not permit an inference of “overt” discrimination as required by our precedent' and we cannot say that the combination of the two incidents could reasonably be found to have created a hostile atmosphere. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); cf. O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1098, 1102 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to present a triable issue as to a hostile work environment where the derisive environment in the workshop was universal  he was not singled out for abuse  and he failed to show the derisive atmosphere stemmed from racial animus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The state’s response essentially conceded that this case fell under the exception to the two-year time limitation found at Rule 3.850(b)(1), which applies when “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence,” but asserted that the motion should be denied on the merits. Before accepting a guilty or nolo conten-dré plea, the trial court is required to determine that the plea is voluntarily entered. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(a). Ordinarily, the trial court should place the defendant under oath and determine that the defendant unde e Jimmy Ryce Act on appellant are collateral consequences of the plea. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal.App.4th 626, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Florida courts have come to this conclusion

    ### Response:
    holding any commitment defendant might suffer under the sexual violent predator act would not be a direct consequence of his plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1, 6 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). 17 . Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04. 18 . Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 428-303(a) (tort liabilities of an LLC are ""solely” the liabilities of the company and members are not liable ""solely by reason of being or acting as a member or a manager.”); 425-117(c) (same as to LLPs). 15 . Id. 19 . 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 20 . In re Jercich, 238 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir.2001). 21 . Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998). 22 . Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1209 (quoting In re Bammer, 131 F.3d 788, 791 (9th. Cir.1997) (en banc)). 23 . Sung v. Hamilton, 710 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1043-44 (D.Haw.2010) (quoting Tsuru v. Bayer, 25 Haw. 693, 1920 WL 830, *2 (Haw. Terr. 1920)). 24 . Cal-Micro, Inc. v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 329 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Ormsby v. First Am. Title Co. (In re Ormsby),

    ### Response:
    holding that federal law defines fiduciary capacity and fraud or defalcation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    longer had to indemnify under Coverage A. Second, WQIS’s interpretation of the Policy is supported by the overall structure and purpose of the Policy. WQIS argues that the parties could not have intended its obligation to indemnify defense costs under Coverage C to continue after the Coverage A limit was exhausted. Such an interpretation of the parties’ intent could result in WQIS’s paying for defense costs far in excess of the $5 million limit on liability, and it would require WQIS to have responsibility for reimbursing defense costs even when it no longer had an interest in defending or minimizing liability for the incident. A reasonable person could conclude that this could not have been what the parties intended. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Third, to the extent extrinsic evidence is

    ### Response:
    holding that contracts should be interpreted to avoid absurd results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a security interest in real property that is the [Debtors’] principal residence.” Compare [Claim No. 11-1] with § 1322(b)(2). All parties concede this fact. Thus, the question is whether § 1322(c)(2) allows the parties to sidestep the anti-modification provision of § 1322(b)(2) and lower the Mortgage’s interest rate. Section 1322(c)(2) grants debtors the ability to modify a home mortgage in situations where “the last payment on the original payment schedule ... is due before the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.” This Court finds that the phrase “the last payment on the original payment schedule” is unambiguous and thereby follows Congress’s will — namely, prohibiting modification of mortgages in bankruptcy plans. See In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 295 (5th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Perry, 235 B.R. 603, 608 (S.D. Tex.

    ### Response:
    holding that  1322c2 refers to the final payment under the original mortgage schedule and not the most recent payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of counsel.” United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir.1993), see also United States v. Jordan, 516 Fed.Appx. 681, 682 (10th Cir.2013) (applying Gordon where counsel explained the wrong maximum sentence); United States v. Triplett, 402 Fed.Appx. 344, 348 (10th Cir.2010) (same); United States v. Kutilek, 260 Fed.Appx. 139, 147-48 (10th Cir.2008) (applying Gordon where counsel explained the wrong mandatory minimum). Moreover,"" even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Garcia cannot show prejudice. His assertion that counsel’s error rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary is undercut by his statement in advance of plea, in which he acknowledged that he faced a sentence of ten years to life in prison. See United States v. Silva, 430 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garcia does not sufficiently

    ### Response:
    holding that where a defendant acknowledged awareness of the consequences of his plea agreement counsels erroneous explanation of the consequences was not prejudicial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ultimately, the condemnor was successful in its argument that it owned virtually all of the 2,241 acres that it wanted to take. Id. Because the condemnor never tried to abandon its efforts to gain ownership of the 2,241 acres it originally sought to condemn, we find Zucht to be a different case than the one before us. The State further argues that, assuming its condemnation petition against Parcel C was dismissed, the trial court nevertheless had nothing to sever into a cause of action relating solely to Parcel C. The trial court, however, did have something to sever, namely, the Tammingas’ statutory right to compensation for their expenses in defending themselves against the State’s efforts to condemn Parcel C. See General Land Office v. OXY U.S.A, Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court did not err

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff has no right to a nonsuit when the defendant has counterclaimed for affirmative relief independent of the plaintiffs claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stressed the expert witness’ thesis that Jamaicans had “taken over” the local drug traffic. Id. The court held that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors’ emotions by arguing that people “just like” the defendants (Jamaican e) are present, courts have found prejudice. See Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532. When they are absent, however, courts have often found no prejudice. See United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir.1989) (reference to “Cuban drug dealers” was prosecutor’s only reference to Cubans and, within context of the entire trial, it was not “so inflammatory as to prejudice the defendant.”). Accord United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1079 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 114 S.Ct.- 1071, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994). See also Kirvan, 997 F.2d at 965 (<HOLDING>). The court finds neither factor in this case.

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no prejudice where the racial reference was for purposes of identification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Boyd’s allegation, in claim XII, paragraphs 110-116, of his petition, that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt was erroneous. 11. Boyd’s allegation, in Claim XIII, paragraphs 117-120, of his petition, that the manner of execution used by the State of Alabama is unconstitutional. 4. “Cumulative Effect” of Alleged Trial Errors In Issue VIII of his appellate brief, Boyd also argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors raised in his petition and listed above resulted in a denial of his right to due process. This specific claim was not presented to the circuit court in Boyd’s Rule 32 petition and is raised for the first time on appeal. Ac cordingly, it is not properly before us for review. See, e.g., Arrington v. State, 716 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.Crim.App.1997)(<HOLDING>). See also, e.g., McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an appellant cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition which was not raised in the rule 32 petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in question, immediately entitled to a benefit while others, though designated by the participant, only stand to become entitled to a benefit upon some contingency such as the participant’s death. In both situations, the threshold requirement of having been designated by the participant (or by the terms of the plan) would be satisfied. In this case it was not. Because Mrs. Park died without applying for pension benefits, Mr. Park (who, as her spouse, is the beneficiary designated by the terms of the plan), is the only person eligible to receive her pension benefits. (See Plan Document, attached as Ex. B to Mendes Aff., at 86-87.) If Mrs. Park had submitted an application to receive her pension benefits before she died, as required for 35 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)). The Estate was, during Mrs. Park’s lifetime,

    ### Response:
    holding that the son of a pension plan participant who had not been designated to receive any of his fathers pension benefits stood no closer to beneficiary status than any other person
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any aggravating factor that exposes a defendant to greater punishment than the punishment authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict must be submitted to a jury. Here, any aggravating factors that expose Defendant to the death penalty will be established by a jury, thereby avoiding any Hurst issue. Conclusion For the abovementioned set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion in its entirety. (Dkt. No. 291). AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Although the Court has reviewed the voluminous social science and legal academic literature Defendant submitted relating to juror’s purported inability to follow a court's instructions and other aspects of the death penalty, the Court declines to apply such literature to its analysis in the face of controlling Supreme Court pre , 450 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The Court finds that Defendant’s argument

    ### Response:
    holding studies cited do not establish that the concepts of aggravating and mitigating factors as used in the fdpa bear such a degree of intrinsic incomprehensibility as to render them incapable of clarification through adequate juty instructions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clause, the Supreme Court has explained that it “think[s] it fair to say from a review of the cases cited dealing with the term ‘donation,’ as found in this proviso of the Constitution, that the word has been applied, in its ordinary sense and meaning, as a ‘gift,’ an allocation or appropriation of something of value, without consideration to a ‘person, association or public or private corporation.’ ” Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 28, 303 P.2d 920, 926-27 (1956). The Supreme Court of New Mexico has stricken transactions under the Anti-Donation Clause in circumstances involving an outright gift of money or property to a private entity with no exchange of adequate consideration. See Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 100 N.M. 342, 348, 670 P.2d 953, 959 (1983)(<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Mechem v. Hannah, 63 N.M. 110,

    ### Response:
    holding that a tax credit to liquor licensees against taxes owed to the state was an unconstitutional subsidy of the liquor industry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such as “[d]efendants have not undertaken the above practices and activities in isolation, but instead have done so as part of a common scheme and conspiracy,” D.E. Ill at ¶ 67, and “[e]aeh Defendant and member of the conspiracy, with knowledge and intent, agreed to the overall objective of the conspiracy, agreed to commit acts of fraud to relieve Class Plaintiffs of their rightful compensa tion, and actually committed such acts.” D.E. Ill, at ¶ 68. These are the kinds of “formulaic recitations” of a conspiracy claim that the Court in Twombly and Iqbal said were insufficient. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966 (noting that “a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality”); Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950-51 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs also allege that “[i]n order for

    ### Response:
    holding that iqbals bare allegation that defendants ashcroft and mueller agreed to adopt a discriminatory policy was not entitled to the presumption of truth and should be ignored under twombly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under Cal.Penal Code § 273.5(a) (West 1999). During jury selection, Johnson made a motion objecting to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove two male jurors. Johnson’s motion was made pursuant to People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (Ca.1978), the California state case procedurally analogous to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The trial court rejected the Wheeler motion. The state court of appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for review. In April 2003, Johnson filed his § 2254 petition for habeas corpus in federal court, again arguing that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (<HOLDING>); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31, 114

    ### Response:
    holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[t]o the extent that the parties are asking the court to, in advance of trial, advise them as to what it considers to be the controlling law in the state of Iowa, the court will enter this advisory ruling.” The district court determined Iowa Code section 657.1(2) authorizes Access Energy to assert a comparative fault defense only against Dalar-na’s claim for future damages, if any, awarded in lieu of injunctive relief. We granted Access Energy’s application for interlocutory appeal. II. Standard of Review. Whether Access Energy’s motion is characterized as a motion for summary judgment or, under the former rule, as a motion for adjudication of law points, our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.907; see also Weber v. Warnke, 658 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>); Fin. Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkeye Bank &

    ### Response:
    recognizing motions for adjudication of law points were reviewed for errors at law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”). In deciding whether the government satisfied its initial burden, the defendant’s relevant conduct includes “acts that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Moreover, in the context of a conspiracy case such as Gunn’s, the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement may be applied “if the firearm[ ] [is] found in a place where acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place.” United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Hansley, 54 F.3d 709, 716 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court properly concluded

    ### Response:
    holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    15, 526 F.2d 560 (1975); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P.A. 52, 275 F.2d 472 (1959); Marianao Sugar Trading Corp. v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 275, 283-86, C.D. 1481 (1952), aff'd, 41 C.C.P.A. 236, C.A.D. 557 (1954). Furthermore, cases plaintiff cites which forgive or deem satisfied exhaustion of administrative remedies when exhaustion is futile, are distinguishable. They address decision making outside Customs’ § 1514 jurisdiction and/or discretionary exhaus tion principles. These cases do not stand for the proposition that applicable statutorily-mandated exhaustion requirements, such as those found in 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), may be deemed futile. The only issue remaining is whether U.S. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 365-66, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 140 L.Ed.2d 453 (1998) (<HOLDING>), by finding jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

    ### Response:
    holding hmt on exports unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (emphasis added). Prior to the passage of the Securities Reform Act, the Second Circuit had the strongest pleading requirements for scien-ter amongst the circuits. Following the Act’s passage, the Second Circuit has repeatedly interpreted the Act’s heightened pleading requirements as echoing the standards previously adopted by the Second Circuit for pleading scienter in securities fraud cases. See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir.2001); see also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir.) (interpreting the Reform Act as effectively raising the pleading standard to that previously existing in the Second Circuit and no higher), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012, 121 S.Ct. 567, 148 L.Ed.2d 486 (2000); Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, in the Second Circuit,

    ### Response:
    holding that the reform act heightened the re quirement for pleading scienter to the level used by the second circuit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they were appointed “to hear damage claims brought under” § 1605A, in accordance with the requirements of § 1605A(e)(l). To hold otherwise would improperly eliminate the retroactive effect expressly provided for in the NDAA. There is thus no need to “resort to speculation or judicial default rules” when the NDAA creates “a clear mechanism by which cases that were previously decided or pending under § 1605(a)(7) may be brought within the reach of the revised terrorism exception § 1605A,” In re Terrorism Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d at 111, and the Court will not undermine the intent of Congress' — expressed in § 1083(c)(2) — to fashion a distinction between provisions of § 1605A that is in plain conflict with the statutory text. See Brown v. Secretary of Army, 78 F.3d 645, 648 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, the government’s

    ### Response:
    holding where congressional command of retroactivity can be found in relevant statutory text no further inquiry is necessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the harm inflicted” must fail. (Id. 15.) To the extent that CIH argues it lost the opportunity to settle tax claims under the Brazilian government’s amnesty program “rather than risk payment of substantial interest and penalties,” (PL Mem. 15), this argument is purely speculative and does not demonstrate prejudice, as BT may ultimately win all of the pending tax claims. See Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir.2010) (stating that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955)); U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Stewart Title Ins. Co., 37 A.D.3d 822, 832 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep’t 2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, CIH has failed to allege that it

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants allegations of prejudice on ground that plaintiffs allegedly untimely notice prevented defendant from participating in foreclosure action so as to mitigate its liability and protect its interests were purely speculative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Compel Immediate Payment by Debtor of Outstanding Obligations to Landlord Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3); (2) Modify Adequate Protection Order Based on Debtor’s Contempt of Court and Other Developments Subsequent to its.Entry, ECF 440 at 13; Landlord’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 32. However, Landlord did argue in its proposed conclusions of law: Since Debtor’s license to collect subrents existed only “so long as” no Default existed under the Lease — and given the law of the case that a “Default” occurred in December 2012 — it is clear that Debt- or’s license automatically expired upon such Default. E.g., Hamilton v. Dixon, 168 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1007, 1013, 214 Cal.Rptr. 639 (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 40 Cal.3d 488, 220 Cal.Rptr. 818, 709 P.2d 837 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Landlord is entitled to apply

    ### Response:
    holding that tenants interest in a sublease terminated upon the landlords termination of the lease and affirming order that landlord entitled to receive 12 months of rent deposited by subtenant with court subsequent to termination of lease and prior to denial of petition for relief from forfeiture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the doctor demonstrate that the plaintiffs progress did not ensure a speedy recovery. Over the course of a year, the plaintiffs doctor noted that she showed “intermittent mild improvement,” id., Ex. 34, and slow improvement, id., Ex. 36, yet she also suffered relapses and “even the simplest demands regarding her work situation cause[d] such distress that [the plaintiff] [was] unable to cognitively process the demands,” id., Exs. 36, 40. “Coming to work regularly” is an essential function of performing one’s duties. Carr, 23 F.3d at 529. As such, indefinite leave is “something an employer is not required to grant.” Sampson v. Citibank, F.S.B., 53 F.Supp.2d 13, 18 (D.D.C.1999), aff'd without opinion, 221 F.3d 196 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Bramwell v. Blakey, 2006 WL 1442655, at *7

    ### Response:
    holding that an employer need not wait indefinitely for  medical conditions to be corrected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005) (noting that the elements of a Section 10(b) claim and a Rule 10b-5 claim are the same). The date on which a violation ends is simply not a necessary element of proving a violation. Maxxon and Mabie also argue that, without a jury finding as to the end-date of the violation, the district court could not properly calculate disgorgement. Disgorgement being remedial rather than punitive, see S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 & n. 25 (2d Cir.2006), some end-date determination is certainly necessary so that the defendant is not required to disgorge profits not “causally connected to the violation.” Arnold S. Jacobs, Disclosures & Remedies Under the Securities Latos § 20:109 (footnote omitted); cf. S.E.C. v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 52-55 (1st Cir.1983) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). However, here, the district court did

    ### Response:
    holding that disgorgement was appropriate only as to the profits made prior to the time insider information was made public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    record attachments refuting his claim, we reverse and remand. On July 30, 1999, the appellant was sentenced as a youthful offender to four years’ incarceration followed by two years’ probation. On April 29, 2005, the appellant’s probation was extended by six months due to a technical violation. On September 22, 2005, an affidavit of violation of probation was filed and the appellant’s probation was revoked on October 24, 2005, resulting in a prison sentence. When imposing a sentence for a violation of probation, a court must provide credit for time previously served on probation when necessary to ensure that the total time served does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense at issue. See State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742 (Fla.1994); Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>); Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statement. Id. at 869. The trial court in this case followed the requisite protocol and held a jury-oüt hearing prior to admitting the reports in question. During the hearing, Dr. Garcia testified, “I need to know what went where[,] how many times, [and] associated symptoms that go along with it, so I can diagnose [the] child appropriately and provide medical help appropriately.” While Dr. Garcia did not personally perform the examinations, she reviewed every report completed by the center. The trial court found it “clear” that Dr. Garcia’s testimony established that the physical examinations were “in large part, if not totally, for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment.” We agree with this conclusion. Dr, Garcia also testified during voir dire examination that the cent . 1997) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that defendant implies (as he

    ### Response:
    holding that statements were admissible because the sixyearold victim was old enough to understand the nature of the medical examination and the reason therefor her statement to the physician and her trial testimony were consistent in all pertinent respects she was examined immediately after the allegations and nearly four years prior to trial and there was no indication that the victim was motivated to be untruthful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under state law to discovery in federal courts. See id. Making the case for a privilege here even stronger than in Jaffee, federal authorities also favor recognizing a privilege for reporters’ confidential sources. As noted earlier, we ourselves have limited discovery of reporters’ sources in both civil and criminal litigation, see Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 707; Carey, 492 F.2d at 636; Ahn, 231 F.3d at 37, as have other federal courts, see, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 593-99; Burke, 700 F.2d at 76-77; Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 436-37, including some acting on the basis of Rule 501, see, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir.1979) (recognizing a qualified common law privilege in civil litigation); but see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 398 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Justice Department

    ### Response:
    holding that no scholars privilege exists under the first amendment or common law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substance of the evidence is apparent from the context in which the question was asked.’ ” State v. Glass, 2000 ND 212, ¶ 8, 620 N.W.2d 146 (quoting State v. Jensen, 2000 ND 28, ¶ 17, 606 N.W.2d 507 (citing N.D.R.Ev. 103)). The substance of the evidence is not demonstrated when Lemons’ counsel stated only that J.R. would provide “credible exculpatory evidence.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lemons’ motion for a continuance. See Erban, 429 N.W.2d at 413 (concluding no abuse of discretion when trial court denied a continuance when a subpoenaed witness could not be located and the defendant failed to advise the court of the expected content of the witness’s testimony if called at trial); see also Flattum-Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2001 ND 121, ¶ 15, 630 N.W.2d 71 (<HOLDING>). C [¶ 15] Even though Lemons failed to

    ### Response:
    holding no abuse of discretion when the moving party failed to make an offer of proof by showing what the witness would testify to if present
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Board of Review and Best International Green Film at Berlin’s Cinema for Peace. See Berlinger Decl. ¶ 18. 27 . Mastro Decl. Ex. G, at 1. 28 . Berlinger Decl. ¶ 33. 29 . Mastro Decl. Ex. G, at 2. 30 . Id. Ex. G, at 3. 31 .Id. Ex. G, at 4. 32 . Chevron Mem. at 3. 33 . Id. 34 . 28 U.S.C. § 1782. 35 . Schmitz v. Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting In ers granting Chevron § 1782 applications). 53 . No. M-19-70, 2009 WL 3754191 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2009). 54 . Id. at *1. 55 . 28 U.S.C. § 1782. 56 . Gonzales v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 194 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir.1999); see also von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir.1987). 57 . Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 35. 58 . Chevron Reply Mem. at 10. 59 . von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142; see Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 35 (<HOLDING>). 60 . Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36. Under In re

    ### Response:
    holding that journalists privilege attached to nbc dateline footage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 11 . The Paul Court explained: It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either ""liberty” or ""property” as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recogn .1993) (""Notwithstanding the preference state law grants to foster families seeking to adopt their foster children, this priority does not rise to the level of an entitlement or expectancy.”); Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence test.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 457, 117 S.Ct. 2130, 138 L.Ed.2d 585 (1997). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). We consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Secretary's decision. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir.2001). 20 . In so holding, we necessarily determine that no reasonable person could conclude on this record that Kennewick Man is ""Native American"" under NAGPRA. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998) (<HOLDING>). 21 . As pointed out by amici Texas Historical

    ### Response:
    holding that under the substantial evidence standard the reviewing court must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the agencys conclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    use the spring-hinged door closers, and her future plans (as stated at the time the complaint was filed) are much more specific than the vague invocations that troubled the Supreme Court in Lujan: much of her extended family lives in the area and the Overland Park Courtyard Marriott is close to them. Furthermore, Scherr’s discussion of her cousin’s then-upcoming wedding is sufficient to support a plausible inference that Scherr would have liked to return to the hotel but for its continued use of the spring hinges. Given Scherr’s past travel history and her affirmative de sire to stay at the hotel but for the alleged violations, on these facts, Scherr has standing to sue the Overland Park Courtyard Marriott. See D’Lil v. Best W. Enci-na Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Scherr’s standing to sue the Overland Park

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff established standing when she demonstrated her intent to return to a city and to stay at the hotel she was suing if it were to be made accessible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nowhere in his motion to remand and accompanying brief does he raise any argument for remand based on section 1445(c). Nor does he cite section 1445(c), as required by this court’s local rules. See L.R. 7.2(a)(4) (requiring all briefs to “refer to all statutes, rules and authorities relied upon”) and L.R. 7.3(b) (requiring that all motions “shall state with particularity the grounds therefor” and “cite any statute or rule of procedure relied upon”). Rather, his entire motion rested on the argument that Cemex failed to meet the federal jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement. (See Docs. 7 & 8.) A party cannot claim that just because it moved to remand a case it may later argue every possible reason for doing so. See Denman v. Snapper Div., 131 F.3d 546, 548 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Lunsford’s reference to REDA in setting forth

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of remand was proper where plaintiff failed to raise the proper objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unambiguously, and with defined conditions.” In re Kolb, 366 B.R. 802, 812 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2007). There has been widespread judicial dialogue on the meaning of the term “projected disposable income.” Compare In re Kibbe, 361 B.R. 302, 312 (1st Cir. BAP 2007); In re Lanning, 380 B.R. 17 (10th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Chriss-Price, 376 B.R. 648, 651-52 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 2006) (J. Harrison); In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718 (Bankr.N.D.Texas 2006); In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006); (all holding that projected disposable income is different from disposable income) with In re Dalton, 2007 WL 4554024 (Bankr.S.D.Miss., Dec. 19, 2007); In re Musselman, 379 B.R. 583 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2007); In re Kolb, 366 B.R. 802, 812 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2007); In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). The court in Musselman asks: While the use of

    ### Response:
    holding that projected disposable income for abovemedian debtors is disposable income as defined by  1325b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    through reasonable efforts.” Fed.R.Evid. 807(B). In this case, Schering introduced its five surveys, which polled a total of approximately 1166 physicians, to establish statistical facts about what Zyrtec representatives were saying to a much larger group of almost 250,000 physicians nationwide. These facts were relevant to establish the type of irreparable injury necessary for a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 416; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907-09 (2d Cir.1990). The reliability of this statistical inference was therefore critical to Schering’s case. As the district court noted, it would, moreover, be unreasonable to hale all 1166 physicians into court to establish this kind of inference. Schering, 1999 WL 144921, at *5 (<HOLDING>). Rule 807(B)’s so-called “necessity” criterion

    ### Response:
    holding that this number is without doubt too large a number to bring into court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court has appellate jurisdiction to review only final orders of removal that have been timely appealed. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Petitions requesting appellate review of a BIA decision “must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). The statutory time limit is “both mandatory and jurisdictional.” Prekaj v. INS, 384 F.3d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256,1258 (9th Cir.1996)). Sunarto failed to seek review of the BIA’s October 30, 2007 decision within thirty days of the issuance of that decision. Moreover, Sunarto’s filing of a motion did not toll the time period for seeking appellate review of that decision. See, e.g., Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 389-90, 115 S.Ct. 1537,131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, to the extent that Sunarto

    ### Response:
    holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the BAA had jurisdiction and a statutory duty to ""hear"" taxpayer's appeals. See §§ 39-2-125(1)(f), 89-10-114.5(1), C.R.S. 2008; 5050 S. Broadway Corp. v. Arapahoe County Bd. of Comm'rs, 815 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Colo.App.1991) In such administrative appeals, the BAA is not limited to a review of any previous action taken, but instead is authorized to conduct de novo evidentiary proceedings on the merits of the abatement and refund claims. See D.C. Burns Realty & Trust v. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 849 P.2d 900, 903 (Colo.App.1992). Nevertheless, even when the BAA has subject matter jurisdiction to hear such appeals, the substantive limitations on abatement and refund elaims found in other statutory provisions remain applicable. See 5050 S. Broadway Corp., 815 P.2d at 968-71 (<HOLDING>). Here, the BAA stated that it had ""heard""

    ### Response:
    holding that baa had jurisdiction to hear the appeal but affirming baas denial of abatement and refund claims as unauthorized under statutory scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court did not unreasonably delay was a reasonable determination based on the facts in the record. Factually, we agree with Crockett that the record shows that the trial judge had the telephone number for the defense counsel, the sheriff successfully contacted defense counsel by telephone for the previous jury notes, and defense counsel asserted that they remained available by telephone during the time period of the third question. Crockett argues that this demonstrates “there were means and opportunity to tell defense counsel about the third note.... However, they were not told.” The Illinois Appellate Court’s findings of fact did not contradict Crockett’s version of the facts — the court never claimed that defense counsel were unavailable or had Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y.App.Div.1985) (<HOLDING>); People v. Hall, 101 A.D.2d 956, 957, 477

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not reversible error for a trial court to fail to answer a jurys question for fifty minutes after which the jury returned a verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 3735.1; see also Commonwealth v. Caine, 453 Pa.Super. 235, 683 A.2d 890 (1996) (en banc) (“[h]omicide by vehicle while driving under the influence consists of three elements; [1] a driving under the influence conviction, [2] the death of another person, and [3] the death as a direct result of driving under the influence”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, the statutory elements of DUI are completely subsumed within the crimes of both homicide by motor vehicle while DUI and aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI. As such, for sentencing purposes, Appellant’s DUI conviction merged with both her homicide by motor vehicle while DUI and aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI convictions. See also Commonwealth v. Schmohl, 975 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Pa.Super.2009) (<HOLDING>). In the case at bar, by sentencing Appellant

    ### Response:
    holding that dui conviction merges with aggravat ed assault by vehicle while dui conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inference may be drawn only when there is independent evidence of the fact about which the party refuses’ to testify.” Id. June Fujinaga’s testimony was necessary to determine whether June had a legitimate claim to the funds at issue. June Fujinaga was the only person in possession of the information regarding the legitimacy of June’s claim to the funds; however, she refused to testify regarding that issue; depriving the SEC of its opportunity to obtain evidence on that question. Additionally, there was independent evidence of June’s receipt of illicit funds. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference from June Fujinaga’s assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 3. Once the SEC carried its burden under

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    934 F.Supp.2d at 13-15. Plaintiffs assert that because the Court found the first part of the agency’s order to be invalid, the Court must declare the entire order invalid: according to plaintiffs, the Court “is not permitted to deconstruct a challenged agency action and uphold only those portions of the agency’s actions which the Court finds to be lawful.” Pis.’ Opp. & Cross-Mot. at 8-9, citing Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C.Cir.2009) (Randolph, J., concurring). But the APA specifically provides that a reviewing court may hold unlawful an “agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and the definition of agency action “includes the whole or a part of” an agency order. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (emphasis added); see also Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). So the Court rejects plaintiffs’ contention

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may reject only part of a rule found to be invalid because it would  exceed the statutory scope of review for a court to set aside an entire rule where only a part is invalid and where the remaining portion may sensibly be given independent life
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    & Constr. Co., 36 Wn. App. 607, 613, 676 P.2d 545 (1984). ¶38 Fred Lind Manor argues that in Washington, “ ‘[1] imitation of actions provisions in a contract prevail over general statutes of limitations unless prohibited by statute or public policy, or unless they are unreasonable.’ ” Resp’ts’ Br. at 43 (quoting Ashburn v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 42 Wn. App. 692, 696, 713 P.2d 742, review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1016 (1986)). Fred Lind Manor is correct. ¶39 As noted, Washington courts have established that a contract’s limitations provision will “prevail over general statutes of limitations unless prohibited by statute or public policy, or unless they are unreasonable.” Ashburn, 42 Wn. App. at 696; State Ins. Co. v. Meesman, 2 Wash. 459, 463, 27 P. 77 (1891); 5 d 334, 341 (D.V.I. 2003) (<HOLDING>). The Ninth Circuit has held that even one-year

    ### Response:
    holding that a 30day limitations provision is substantively unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case. This ease is set for trial November 8th, next week. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 gives a district court discretion to shorten or enlarge the time for bringing a hearing on pretrial motions or to excuse a party’s noncompliance with deadlines for bringing a hearing. In this case, however, the district court, in effect, refused to hear Ruperd’s motion to suppress at a later time as a sanction for his failure to appear. Nothing in I.C.R. 12 gives the district court the discretion to treat a defendant’s failure to appear as a waiver of his or her right to have a hearing on a timely motion. While Idaho appellate authority is silent on this particular issue, authority exists from other jurisdictions that have addressed it. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 166 P.3d 223, 224 (Colo.Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 280, 837

    ### Response:
    holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (requiring the court to “determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis”) (internal- citations and quotations omitted). To overturn an award decision as arbitraiy or capricious, the court must determine that the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [the decision] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856; see also John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d at 1372 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Plaintiffs allegations that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the court may set aside agency action only in extremely limited circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    480 U.S. 531, 546 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (standard for permanent injunction is essentially same for preliminary injunction, except actual success replaces need to show likelihood of success on merits). An action at law only allows recovery of “bid preparation costs in a suit for damages, but not loss of anticipated profits,” leaving a bid protestor irreparably harmed. Essex Electro Eng’rs, Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl.Ct. 277, 287 (1983), aff'd, 757 F.2d 247 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 203 Ct.Cl. 566, 575 n. 5, 492 F.2d 1200, 1204 n. 5 (1974) (acknowledging existence of damages remedy sometimes reason for denial of injunctive relief in federal district court); M. Steinthal & Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1302 (D.C.Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs showing that it would be

    ### Response:
    holding that availability of damages which do not include lost profits does not warrant automatic dismissal of injunction regardless of strength of claim on merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court has taught us to do, a court may avoid speculation as to whether an appellant should or should not have known that the time for appeal had begun to run.” 770 F.2d at 230 (footnote omitted). Following this direction, we hold that because a judgment concluding Johnson’s § 2255 proceeding has not been set forth on a separate document, an effective judgment has not yet been entered in his case. . iv Our conclusion that a qualifying Rule 58 judgment has not yet been entered means that Johnson’s time to appeal from the denial of his § ■ 2255 motion has not yet begun to run, much less run out. For that reason, not only was Johnson’s FRAP 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time for appeal not untimely, it was not necessary. See Pack v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 130 F.3d 1071, 1072 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court’s August 4,

    ### Response:
    holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is an issue of contract interpretation, particularly well-suited for summary judgment. See Gov. Sys. Advisors, Inc. v. United States, 847 F.2d 811, 812 n. 1 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citing P.J. Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed.Cir.1984)). Neither party addresses that issue of contract interpretation directly, but defendant necessarily assumes that pay “in lieu of notice” may satisfy a requirement of “notice.” This assumption is reasonably implicit in defendant’s argument because, without it, defendant’s request for summary judgment based on pay in lieu of notice makes no sense. And there is authority to support defendant’s implicit assumption. Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 866, 112 S.Ct. 193,

    ### Response:
    holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 487 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006). Moreover, although Zhisong argues that “the landscape of the law applicable to [his motion to reopen] has sufficiently shifted,” and that “China’s application of its birth policies has shifted,” he submitted no evidence of changed country conditions with his motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings ... shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”). The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zhisong was not prejudiced by the IJ’s failure to address his argument that he had adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. See Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The BIA properly found that Zhisong failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employment following graduation, and any other social or economic relationships with the Commonwealth and other jurisdictions. Domiciliary status shall not ordinarily be conferred by the performance of acts which are auxiliary to fulfilling educational objectives or are required or routinely performed by temporary residents of the Commonwealth. Mere physical presence or residence primarily for educational purposes shall not confer domiciliary status. A matriculating student who has entered an institution and is classified as an out-of-state student shall be required to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that he is in the Commonwealth for the purpose of attending school and not as a bona fide domiciliary. Id. (emphasis added); see also Ravindranathan, 258 Va. at 274 (<HOLDING>). Recently, in George Mason Univ. v. Floyd, the

    ### Response:
    holding that vcu was not required to bear the burden of presenting evidence that the plaintiff was not a domiciliary of virginia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those, initiatives . . .”); see also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 164-165 (1978). The TSSAA no doubt serves the public, particularly the public schools, but the mere provision of a service to the public does not render such provision a traditional and exclusive public function. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 842 (1982). It is also obvious that the TSSAA is not an entity created and controlled by the government for the purpose of fulfilling a government objective, as was Amtrak in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 394 (1995). See also Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U. S. 230 (1957) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, no one claims that the State of

    ### Response:
    holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the initial 7 — 5 deadlock, it appears all too possible that some jurors who might have believed that Mr. Cambareri did not shoot Papalia were willing to convict him of manslaughter for not rendering assistance. For that reason, we must carefully scrutinize the modification of the Allen charge given in this case. See Dixon v. State, 603 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (a modified Allen charge takes on increased significance when there is a “lack of overwhelming or clear evidence of guilt”). We agree with defense that the charge given in this case was deficient in several respects which together constitute fundamental error requiring a reversal. First, the instruction gave the jury an initial time limit of thirty minutes. See Gahley v. State, 567 So.2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Second, the trial court told the jury that

    ### Response:
    holding when giving an allen charge the trial court must avoid coercive deadlines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court is not in a position to determine the exact amount and the time of receipt of any commission that will be owed to the Trustee under the Plan. In other words, at this point the Court is unable to assess the adequacy of the Trustee’s compensation. Noting that the Debtors have stated that they are unopposed to the Court ordering reasonable administrative payments to the Trustee, the Court hereby elects to employ the broad statutory grant of authority given to it under 11 U.S.C. § 105. At the point the Trustee determines that his compensation is inadequate and/or untimely, he may request additional compensation by filing an appropriate application with the Court. See, e.g., Stahn v. Haeckel, 920 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2258, 114 L.Ed.2d 711 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The Court thereupon, after notice and an

    ### Response:
    holding that bankruptcy court has discretionary power pursuant to 11 usc  105a to order preconfirmation plan payments in a chapter 12 proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs standing to bring a claim under the CLRA for any misrepresentations she relied upon relating to the Osteo Bi-Flex Regular Strength product that she purchased. It is less clear whether Plaintiff has standing to bring claims under the UCL and the CLRA as to the Osteo Bi-Flex products that she did not purchase and the advertising she did not view. The court in Bayer Corp. provided, in dicta, that a plaintiff “cannot expand the scope of his claims to include a product he did not purchase or advertisements relating to a product that he did not rely upon.” Bayer Corp., 2010 WL 476688, at *5. Some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have followed this view. See, e.g., Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-01044-JSW, 2011 WL 159380, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 475 Fed.Appx. 113, No. 11-15263, 2012

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff has standing to bring ucl and clra claims for the drumstick ice cream products purchased but dismissing plaintiffs claims for the dibs ice cream product which plaintiff never alleged he purchased or suffered a loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the State to revoke appellant’s probation. Nevertheless, we conclude the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to appellant’s cases. To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a criminal law must contain two critical elements: first, the law must be retrospective; and second, it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). A law is retrospective if it changes “the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Id. The completed “acts” in a probation revocation case are those that make up the underlying offense. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (<HOLDING>). The prohibition against ex post facto laws

    ### Response:
    holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he bears the burden of establishing temporal proximity by a preponderance of the evidence. Taylor, 703 F.3d at 336. Nicholson has failed to produce evidence even approximating when he made his complaint in 2008, and therefore cannot establish a pri-ma facie case of retaliation with respect to his 2008 complaint. The only other protected activity evidenced in the record is Nicholson’s March 27, 2009 EEOC charge. After he filed this charge, Nicholson asserts that Clarksville engaged in adverse employment activities by declining to promote him in May and October of 2009, by ch on’s protected activity on March 27, 2009, and the denial of promotion in May 2009, may be sufficient to show a.causal connection. See Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 306 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); but see Warf v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans

    ### Response:
    holding that a lapse of two months as is the case here is sufficient to show a causal connection and the district court erred in holding otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    far as we can tell from the case law, the phrase ""losses occurring thereafter” does not appear to be a standard insurance-industry term; we are aware of no reported decision that construes that precise phrase as it appears in a surety bond or other insurance contract. 13 .Accordingly, the term ""loss” as used in the Increase Rider must be understood as meaning something other than ""damages” (per Black's Law Dictionary, ""money claimed” or ""ordered to be paid”) and something other than ""default."" Cf. Metric/Kvaerner Fayetteville v. Fed. Ins. Co., 403 F.3d 188, 198 (4th Cir.2005) (""[A]n insurance policy should be construed to give different meanings to different terms utilized therein.”). 14 . We recognized, however, that “a limited exception exist , 274 Mass. 135, 174 N.E. 324, 328 (1931) (<HOLDING>). 16 .Similarly, in Md. Cas. Co. v. Grays

    ### Response:
    holding that loss to bank occurred without regard to its possible remedies when its funds in fact were diverted  through the fraud and dishonesty of its treasurer and that the bank could sue on its bond without proof that it had then sustained some actual defined loss not merely nominal as the result of the transaction in question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition”). The next contour of the right involves the “special relationship” and parallel between involuntary dependence on state-licensed foster care and other similar situations. As discussed supra, the First Circuit has not had occasion to address this specific question. This Court relies on the numerous cases from other Circuits, combined with First Circuit principles from Germany, 868 F.2d at 15 and Monahan, 961 F.2d at 991-92, to hold that in 1996, an objectively reasonable DCYF official should have understood the existence of a special relationship between DCYF and minor children once the state takes legal custody and places them in a foster home. See Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-21 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Alas, there is a third and final layer to the

    ### Response:
    recognizing special relationship in  1983 cases and citing second circuit doe foster care case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to their § 924(e) convictions it removed the condition underlying the original legality of their unenhanced § 841 sentences. Whether those § 841 sentences actually became illegal at that moment may be too metaphysical a question to answer. But given the interdependency, the appellants could not — at the moment of launching their challenges — have entertained any reasonable expectation in the finality of their § 841 sentences. Rhodes, 106 F.3d at 432 n. 3. It makes no difference that these defendants challenged their § 924(e) sentences under § 2255, while in Rhodes the challenge occurred on direct appeal. In both the defendant “voluntarily” brought the challenge, id., and that controls. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2078-79, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Appellants make much of certain language in

    ### Response:
    holding that fact that conviction has been overturned at defendants behest removes double jeopardy bar to increased sentence after retrial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with respect to this aspect of Wilkinson's claims, nor could they have done so successfully. The defendant URI has long been held amenable to suit. See University of Rhode Island v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200 (1st Cir.1993) and Vanlaarhoven v. Newman, 564 F.Supp. 145 (D.R.I.1983) (both holding that URI is not an alter ego of the state, and thus it cannot invoke the defense of sovereign immunity). Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the commission would qualify as an arm or an alter ego of the state, it could not avoid a claim seeking to vindicate a protected property interest in statutory employment benefits by invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 16; see also Pellegrino v. The Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 788 A.2d 1119 (R.I.202) (<HOLDING>). 15 . The memoranda included (1) a memorandum

    ### Response:
    holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    herein demonstrates that they acted in good faith, without knowledge of a violation of a security interest, provided new value, and did not acquire oil in satisfaction of an antecedent debt. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Downstream Purchasers are entitled to summary judgment as buyers in the ordinary course. C. Tort and Equitable Claims The Producers have alleged a number of common law claims in addition to their statutory lien claims. Specifically, the Producers allege claims based in conversion, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, money-had-and-received, fraud, and accounting and disgorgement. The Court finds, and the Producers acknowledge, that most of the tort and equitable claims are dependent on the lien analysis. See In re Black Diamond Mining Co., at *28 (<HOLDING>). Because the Court finds that the Producers

    ### Response:
    holding that the secured partys contract and quasicontract claims fail as a matter of law because they are subject to the buyers ucc defenses and its right to recoupment and setoff under the agreements between the buyer and the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    There, the Florida Supreme Court explained that the parties did not argue that a statement noting the plaintiff’s death within a response to the trial court’s case status order was sufficient to constitute a suggestion of death. However, the court then went on to opine that it did “not construe [the] response as a formal suggestion of death as contemplated by ... rule [1.260].” 600 So.2d at 1101 n.4. While not the holding of the case, such language strongly implies that a passing reference to a party’s death in a document that was not filed for the purpose of notifying the litigants of the death is not sufficient to start the ninety-day time period set forth in rule 1.260(a)(1). Federal courts hold similarly. See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    quotation marks omitted); see Glinka v. Murad (In re Housecraft Indus. USA, Inc.),.310 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir.2002) (applying Commodore to derivative suits by a secured creditor). “This approach permits a reasoned and practicable division of labor between the creditors’ committee [and individual creditors] and the debtor in possession or trustee.” In re Commodore Int’l, 262 F.3d at 100. Critically, however, it “also provid[es] bankruptcy courts with significant authority both to manage the litigation and check any potential for abuse by the parties.” Id. As our sister circuits that permit derivative standing have recognized, the bankruptcy court plays a vital gatekeeper role in determining whether derivative standing is appropriate in a given case. See, e.g., Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 580 (<HOLDING>); Fogel, 221 F.3d at 965 (recognizing

    ### Response:
    recognizing derivative standing that bankruptcy courts can authorize
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were discharged on August 1, 1994. The Defendant contends that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) the Taxes should be excepted from the discharge as the Plaintiffs either filed a fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat the Taxes. Section 523(a)(1)(C) of Title 11 provides “(a) A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt — (1) for a tax or a customs duty — (C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax....” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C). The Defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Whether a debtor has willfully attempted to

    ### Response:
    holding all exceptions to discharge under  523a must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1262, 1266 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.2008). Instead, ""the canon of construction in favor of Indian tribes can trump the deference to agencies’ interpretations courts ordinarily give under Chevron and its progeny.” Maniilaq Ass'n, 72 F.Supp.3d at 232. There is good reason to believe that the canon trumps Auer deference as well. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2001) ("" ‘Whenever doubt or ambiguity exists in federal statutes or regulations, such doubt is resolved in favor of the tribes.’ ” (emphasis added and brackets omitted) (quoting Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563 (10th Cir.1984) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Navajo Health Found.— Sage Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Burwell, 100 F.Supp.3d 1122, 1175-76 (D.N.M.2015) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, such deference may be doubly

    ### Response:
    holding that the secretary is not entitled to deference when construing the acts implementing regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “threatenf] unlawful harm” or to “harm[ ] another by an unlawful act” means to threaten or inflict a harm that is unlawful as a crime, tort, or violation of a law, administrative regulation, or other legal duty. That statutory understanding expresses a clear mandate of public policy that serves to protect public officials holding legislative office in the exercise of official duties relating to legislative matters. We conclude further that because the clear mandate of public policy derived from these statutes to protect public employees is the basis for a civil action for wrongful discharge, rather than a criminal charge, in analyzing the wrongful discharge claim, that public policy is broader in scope and application than the statutes themselves. Consequently 4, 898-900 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In this case, MacDougall does not claim that

    ### Response:
    holding that termination of an employee for refusing employees request to engage in political lobbying activities violates clear mandate of public policy under pennsylvania law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Leaffer v. Zarlengo, 44 P.3d 1072, 1078 n. 6 (Colo.2002). These principles teach that words or provisions should not be added to a rule, see People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 73 (Colo.2006), and that the inclusion of certain terms in a rule implies the exclusion of others, see Zab, Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 136 P.3d 252, 261 (Colo.2006) (Eid, J., concurring). Applying these principles, we hold that costs and fees cannot be assessed when the court imposes punitive sanctions against a contemnor, because C.R.C.P. 107(d)(1) does not expressly authorize their assessment. We find the rule’s silence dispositive in light of the language in C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2) permitting the assessment of costs and fees when a remedial sanction is imposed. See In re Lopez, 109 P.3d 1021 (Colo.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Eichhorn v. Kelley, 56 P.3d 124

    ### Response:
    holding that costs and fees cannot be assessed when a court imposes punitive sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ruled as to whether the precise Eleventh Amendment immunity test also applies to the determination of citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “a similar rule controls the determination of diversity jurisdiction when individual state officers or agencies are named in lieu of the state” as the Eleventh Amendment analysis. Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir.1981). The weight of authority from other circuits supports this similarity. Maryland Stadium Authority v. Ellerbe Bechet Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 260-61 (4th Cir.2005) (adopting the same four factor Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis for diversity jurisdiction analysis); University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Tradigrain, Inc. v. Mississippi State Port

    ### Response:
    holding that although the question of diversity jurisdiction is distinct from that of immunity the analysis of citizenship determinations for eleventh amendment immunity and diversity jurisdiction are the same
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 16(a) in order to make “the acquisition of a derivative security as a reportable event, whether or not the security is presently exercisable,” id. at 81,264. Although the new regulations, if applicable, clearly would have a significant impact on our analysis, we are obligated to evaluate this case according to the SEC rules operative at the time of the disputed transactions, as long as those rules were not inconsistent with the dictates of § 16 of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(l) (1992) (Section 23(a)(1) of the Act) (“[n]o provision of this chapter imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or order of the [Securities and Exchange] Commis sion”). See also, Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 694-95 (2d Cir.1957) (<HOLDING>); Colema Realty Corp. v. Bibow, 555 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that  23a serves to immunize from  16b liability those corporate insiders who structure their option transactions in good faith reliance on existing sec rules and regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J.A. 3656 (emphasis supplied); and • “What I’m alluding back to is what occurred prior to 1986 when the guidelines started to work. If this case had come up then, what would the sentence have been and why? And what is happeningmow? The sentences now are draconian. What are we accomplishing by these extremely excessive sentences that seem to be dictated?” j.A. 3699 (emphasis supplied). Although the district court at times alluded to the fact that it had discretion, at the same time it bemoaned that such discretion was- highly disfavored. See J.A. 3654 (“I have some discretion but hardly.”); id. at 3655-56 (“I will try to use some discretion, apply the factors in Title 18, Section 3553(a), and give some consideration to the guidelines____I’m going to consider them.”). But see id. at 3733 (<HOLDING>). In the end, we cannot gloss over the district

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the court has to take into consideration  the nature and circumstances of the  defendant but at the same time the court failed to see any attributes that are given pointwise in the sentencing guidelines for doing good
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    care provider with respect to the negligent treatment, can shift through indemnification the responsibility for an enhanced injury. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal.App.2d 69, 38 Cal.Rptr. 490, 493-94 (1964); Gertz, 302 N.E.2d at 43-44; Hunt v. Ernzen, 252 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1977); New Milford Bd. of Educ. v. Juliano, 219 N.J.Super. 182, 530 A.2d 43, 45 (1987); Musco v. Conte, 22 A.D.2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 594 (1964); see also Amrep Southwest, Inc. v. Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc. (In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litigation), 119 N.M. 542, 545-46, 893 P.2d 438, 441-42 (1995) (discussing circumstances in which traditional indemnification arises between parties not in pari delicto). But see Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz.App. 428, 498 P.2d 502, 509 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Teepak, Inc. v. Learned 237 Kan. 320, 699

    ### Response:
    holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it retrospectively.” Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 954-55 (R.I.1994) (quoting VanMarter v. Royal Indemnity Co., 556 A.2d 41, 44 (R.I.1989)). Here, no specific language in the 1994 amendments supports defendants’ position that these enactments retroactively stripped Wilkinson of his full-status employment. In the absence of such language, or indeed any evidence to the contrary, this Court will apply the general rule that “statutes operate prospectively from and after the effective date of the statute. It is only in the event that a statute contains clear and explicit language requiring retroactive application that a statute will be interpreted to operate retrospectively.” Avanzo v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 625 A.2d 208, 211 (R.I.1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the 1994 amendments affecting the

    ### Response:
    holding that attempt by governmental entity to apply a statute changing welfare eligibility requirements by establishing a limit on the length of time a totally incapacitated adult might receive benefits should not have been applied to existing recipients by counting benefit months prior to the effective date of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    566 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e)(""If a mobile home is attached in such a manner [indicating an intention that it be a permanent part of the real estate] to a homestead, it is entitled to homestead protection.”) (citations omitted); Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, 448 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e)(“All homesteads, excluding the .land, consist of an aggregation of chattels. It is their attachment to realty which gives them homestead character.”); Clark v. Vitz, 190 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1945, writ ref'd)(approving use of homestead exemption for mobile trailer affixed to debtor’s ""homestead lot” and used as an extension of family’s brick house). 12 . Gann, 210 S.W.2d at 260. See Cullers, 1 S.W. at 315 (<HOLDING>). 13 . In re Ross, 210 B.R. 320, 323

    ### Response:
    holding that a mill and gin could be considered part of an exempt homestead if they were part of the exempt realty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could refer the matter back to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. See id. In accordance with the First Circuit’s ruling, this Court will fash ion a remedy, if any is appropriate, in light of the contempt powers of the bankruptcy court, as the First Circuit so directed. An analysis of the rulings of the other circuits is not necessary to resolve the message emanating from the First Circuit. See, e.g., Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir.2002) (“Contempt is the appropriate remedy and no further remedy is necessary.”); Cox v. Zale Delaware, Inc., 239 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir.2001) (“[A] suit for violation of section 524(c) can be brought only as a contempt action under section 524(a)(2).”); Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 425 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). This case was remanded to this Court for

    ### Response:
    holding that violations of  524 cannot be remedied pursuant to  105
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on appeal. Another Fourth Circuit panel followed Pecker's lead in Morris v. Rice, 985 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.1993). Morris expressly found, citing Haskins and Moore, that ""the plaintiff may limit and tailor his request for de novo review, raising questions about the remedy without exposing himself to a de novo review of a finding of discrimination.” Id. at 145. However, neither Haskins nor Moore supports such a broad right. Similarly, in dictum, the Ninth Circuit has cited Haskins and other cases as allowing partial de novo review, with apparent approval. Girard v. Rubin, 62 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir.1995). However, Girard offers no analysis, and appears to be in some tension with other Ninth Circuit precedent. See Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., Inc., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); cf. Williams v. Herman, 129 F.Supp.2d 1281,

    ### Response:
    holding that in a private employees title vii action administrative findings were not binding in a trial de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order specifically states it was entered into to resolve a disputed claim and constitutes no admission on the part of Walgreen. The stipulation and consent order was therefore “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim,” and for that reason the document was irrelevant. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 508, at 588-89 (1994) (explaining that one of the underlying principles excluding settlements and offers of settlement is that “the evidence is irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (emphasis added)); see Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Iowa 1984); see also Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1246-47 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of five prior antitrust actions brought against the defendants was irrelevant on issue of defendants motive to conspire and noting that simply because the defendants were named in past antitrust cases involving similar allegations does not make it more probable that the defendants had a motive to carry out their conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or the court at any stage of litigation, including after trial and the entry of judgment. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). 2 . In the district court complaint, Central Pines alleges a takings claim as an alternative to the quiet title action. Although Central Pines subsequently filed the same takings claim in the Claims Court, it never moved to dismiss the takings claim before the district court, and thus a takings claim was pending when Central Pines filed its complaint at the Claims Court. 3 . To the extent plaintiffs rely on the discussion in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474, 127 S.Ct. 1397, 167 L.Ed.2d 190 (2007), to aid their argument, that case is disting S.Ct. 1237, 1248, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (<HOLDING>); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510-11, 126 S.Ct. 1235

    ### Response:
    holding copyright statutes registration requirement a nonjurisdictional condition although previously held to be jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.""). 30 . Thus, all three active District Judges in this District appear to agree that non-guideline sentences are appropriate in cases involving crack. 31 . For the reasons stated in note 35 infra and elsewhere in this Memorandum, this Court believes this view is inconsistent with the holding of Booker/Fanfan. 32 . Because the Guidelines are now advisory, pre-Booker/Fanfan authority in this Circuit holding that the recommendations of the Sentencing Commis cation of the 100:1 ratio in determining an appropriate sentence under § 3553, this Court takes no position on whether the crack/powder disparity is unconstitutional. See United States v. Berrios, 132 F.3d 834, 842 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); accord. United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that crackpowder disparity was constitutional stating that ujntil the en banc court of this circuit the us supreme court or congress itself accepts this assertion of disparity and finds it untenable challenges to the sentencing guidelines based on the disparity between sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine will continue to fail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facts that we have relied upon for affirmance. The hearing officer’s decision is amply supported by her conclusion that Buyer made initial use of the product in New Mexico when it transferred title to the materials to Taxpayer after they were rendered inert and made disposable. Taxpayer does not dispute this. The hearing officer found it significant that the neutralized materials remained in New Mexico. Again, Taxpayer had an opportunity to contest whether the neutralized materials had in fact remained in New Mexico. That being the case, we will not reverse the decision on the basis of Taxpayer’s claim that the hearing officer considered facts not offered by a party and that were subject to dispute. See State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 116 N.M. 194, 206, 861 P.2d 235, 247 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>).; In re Estate of Heeter, 113 N.M. 691, 695,

    ### Response:
    holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment are not grounds for reversal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that DAI invoked the judicial process when its affiliates brought the 1988 federal action and the bankruptcy action. The franchisees second argument is that DATs affiliates acted as an agents for DAI in filing the bankruptcy proceeding so that DAI could stay Sims’s arbitration proceeding. The franchisees contend that the district court correctly concluded that DAI invoked the judicial process through its affiliates, insisting that the affiliates were DAI’s alter egos or at least its agents. This argument brings up an issue we addressed in Lawrence, and which the Second Circuit has addressed in greater detail since — whether a party can invoke the judicial process if it litigates a non-arbitrable claim against a parly with whom it has arbitrable claims. Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1165 (<HOLDING>); Distajo II, 107 F.3d at 132-33 (“only prior

    ### Response:
    holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we will sustain it. Mantime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex.1998); Gonzalez, 940 S.W.2d at 796-97. In conducting our review, we are mindful that the jury was not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence, and we may not reverse the judgment merely because we conclude the evidence preponderates toward an affirmative answer. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex.1988); McMillon v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 963 S.W.2d 935, 938-39 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). When a party complains of the jury’s failure to find a fact, we may reverse only when the great weight of the evidence supports an affirmative answer. Winkle v. Tullos, 917 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied), citing Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>). ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE In a medical

    ### Response:
    holding that the court of appeals has authority to review jurys failure to find in same manner as it reviews jury findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability and negligence ... to failure to warn and manufacturing-and-design defect.” Lemelle, 698 F.Supp.2d at 682-83 (noting that state law product liability claims are preempted by the MDA); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation, 592 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1152 (D.Minn.2009) (collecting cases); see also Funk, 673 F.Supp.2d at 531 (dismissing claims for strict liability, negligence, and violations of the DTPA); Delaney, 2009 WL 564243, at *2-*7 (concluding that Plaintiffs claims for failure to warn, defective manufacture, defective design, negligence and recklessness, breach of warranties, and fraud were preempted because they imposed different or additional requirements upon the Trident System); Horowitz v. Stryker, 613 F.Supp.2d 271 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>); but see Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs negligence defective manufacturing defective design breach of warranty and failure to warn claims were preempted by the mda and fdca defined below
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mental illness. After a series of appeals and remands, the district court reviewed the claim on the merits and denied it. Abdur’ Rahman v. Bell, No. 3:96-0380, 2009 WL 211133, at *16 (M.D.Tenn. Jan. 26, 2009). Fifth, Abdur’Rahman alleged that the prosecutor lied to defense counsel about the 1972 conviction. According to Ab-dur’Rahman, the prosecutor told defense counsel that an FBI agent could testify that Abdur’Rahman killed the other prisoner as part of a drug turf war and defense counsel was too intimidated to put on evidence about the crime. The district court addressed the merits and found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at *17. Sixth, Abdur’Rahman clai .2d 46, 2015 WL 5774557 (2015); Lambrix v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1260-61 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 64, 190

    ### Response:
    holding that martinez did not apply to case where ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were reviewed on the merits in a  2254 proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for recusal, creating the so-called ‘appearance of justice’ rule.” DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427, 428 (2d Cir.1988) (citation omitted). The federal test of impartiality “is what a reasonable person, knowing and understanding all the facts and circumstances, would believe.” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir.1988).... With regard to § 455(b)(1), any “alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 16 L.Ed.2d 778, 86 S.Ct. 1698 (1966). Accord People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403, 407, 521 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666, 516 N.E.2d 200, 202-03 (1987) (<HOLDING>) (citing Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 583, 86 S.Ct. at

    ### Response:
    holding new york state judges to same disqualification standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a defendant who is erroneously prosecuted pursuant to the wrong statute, yet whose conduct constitutes a criminal act under a different statute, may be re-tried under the correct offense. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 404, 107 S. Ct. 1825, 1827, 95 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1987). However, such a retrial is only permitted when the offenses have not merged. Compare Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 765 F.2d 394, 397 (3d Cir. 1985) (vacating conviction for rape in the third degree, which was not charged in the information, because offense had not merged with charged offense of rape in the first degree and failure to formally allege age element of third degree rape in information altered defendant’s trial strategy) with State v. Midgeley, 15 N.J. 574, 105 A.2d 844, 847-48 (N.J. 1954) (<HOLDING>). However, the issue of whether the offense of

    ### Response:
    holding that offense of burning an unoccupied building merges with offense of burning a dwelling house
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that she reasonably believed occurred. There is no evidence that she engaged in any protected activity. In fact, Hoosier admits she did not complain to anyone about discrimination. Without more, Hoosier’s claims that she engaged in protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action is deficient, and there are no disputed issues of material fact sufficient to defeat Greenwood’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Greenwood is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Hoosier’s retaliation claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set (7th Cir.2009) (“An isolated or ‘stray remark’ is typically insufficient to create an inference of discrimination.... ”); Kir-ley v. Bd. of Ed. of Maine Township High School, 2013 WL 6730885, *8 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 13, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Hogg v. Fraser Shipyards, Inc., 407 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he must demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his ... part.” Id. at 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (internal quotations and citation omitted). With these principles in mind, we have carefully reviewed Mr. Geronimo’s brief, the record of these proceedings, and the district court’s order. First, the district court correctly recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely is not properly applied to decisions on collateral review. See United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir.2005) (“Blakely does not apply retroactively to convictions that were already final at the time the Court decided Blakely, June 24, 2004.”). We have ruled the same regarding Booker. See United States v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Second, the district court properly noted Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding neither booker nor blakely can be applied retroactively
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    59 Haw. at 35-36, 575 P.2d at 472-73. 5 . The factors favoring adherence to principles of stare decisis include ""considerations of certainty and the equal treatment of similarly situated litigants.” Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 257, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 1596, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). When addressing a second appeal in the same case, overruling the decision reached in the first appeal will not result in disparate treatment of similarly situated litigants. 6 .The fact that the composition of the court has changed since Ross I was decided, although in and of itself not a sound reason to reconsider that decision, is not a bar to reconsideration •under the ""law of the case” doctrine. Cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Haw. 40, 429 P.2d 829 (<HOLDING>), granting petition for reh'g of 50 Haw. 1, 427

    ### Response:
    holding that change in composition of the court was not a bar to a grant of rehearing particularly when there was a three to two division on the original opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disagreement with Dr. Sears’ professional judgment. But lacking any evidence that the dentist’s treatment plan was obviously inadequate, see Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441-42 (7th Cir.2010), or a substantial departure from standard practice, see Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2010), Hoeft cannot make out a claim of deliberate indifference. As for his claim against Hasten, Hoeft insists that exposing prisoners to loud noises does constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Compare Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment in favor of official who subjected prisoner to constant “ ‘screaming, wailing, crying, singing and yelling’ ” by other inmates), with Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574,-1577 n. 2,1580 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). But he has no answer to the district court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that music and loud talking broadcast over prison intercom throughout 24hour period did not offend contemporary standards of deeency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an “inventive concept” that “ensure[s] that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the [ineligible concept] itself.” 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1303). In applying Section 101 analysis at the pleading stage, the mov ., 50 F.Supp.3d 1306, 1314 (C.D.Cal.2014) (citation omitted) (applying clear and convincing evidence standard to Section 101 challenge). However, the appropriateness of attaching a presumption of validity to a patent subject to a Section 101 analysis has been questioned. See Ultramercial, Inc, v. Hulu, LLC (“Ultramercial II”), 772 F.3d 709, 720-21 (Fed. Cir.2014); see also TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., No. 11-cv-4039 SAS, 166 F.Supp.3d 432, 446-47, 2016 WL 817447, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016) (<HOLDING>). b. The ’038 Patent’s claims are directed to

    ### Response:
    holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    foreseeable.” Id. at 76; cf. Simpson, 880 So.2d at 1051 (¶ 14); Summers, 759 So.2d at 1214 (¶ 47). “Without knowledge of her husband’s deviant propensities, a wife will not be able to foresee that he poses a danger and thus will not have a duty to take measures to prevent the assault.” Chaney, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d at 76. So we find, in order to establish Perl-man’s duty to protect A.F. from Adkins’s criminal acts, Faul had to produce ev aul offered no proof Perlman should have known of Adkins’s deviant propensities. 1120. In Glover, the minor rape victim’s supervisor knew that the two young men who assaulted her had violent tendencies and had expelled one of them from the youth program the victim attended. Glover, 968 So.2d at 1279 (¶ 40); see also Pamela L., 169 Cal.Rptr. at 284-85 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Summers, the injured student

    ### Response:
    holding wife unreasonably exposed neighbors children to danger because she invited the children over in spite of knowing her husband had molested children in the past
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of discrimination.”) (quotations omitted); EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 466 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that Congress approved of damages as a tool for eradicating discrimination “when it added the remedies of compensatory and punitive damages by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991”). Circuit City’s arbitration agreement, which limits punitive damages to the greater of $5,000 or the sum of a claimant’s backpay and front pay awards, eviscerates Congress’s intent to utilize punitive damages as a tool for combating discrimination, particularly in cases where no backpay or front pay is awarded. Even if Morrison were to receive the maximum amount of b t, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104, 1108 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 259, 98

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs cannot dispute that this case presents manageability issues, but Briseno declined to adopt an administrative feasibility prerequisite and affirmed “the well-settled presumption that courts should not refuse to certify a class merely on the basis of manageability concerns.” Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1128. While administrative feasibility is not a prerequisite to class certification, manageability is still a factor to be considered in a court’s superiority analysis. “Manageability concerns must be weighed against the alternatives and will rarely, if ever, be sufficient to prevent certification of a class.” Trosper v. Styker Corp., No. 13-cv-00607-LHK, 2015 WL 5915360 at *17, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117453 at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1128 (<HOLDING>). FAS raised the same arguments two years ago

    ### Response:
    holding courts must balance the benefits of class adjudication against its costs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    328, ¶ 32-33 (11th Dist.). {¶ 14} We agree that claims for faulty workmanship, such as the one in the present case, are not fortuitous in the context of a CGL policy like the one here. In keeping with the spirit of fortuity that is fundamental to insurance coverage, we hold that the CGL policy does not provide coverage to Custom for its alleged defective construction of and workmanship on the steel grain bin. Our holding is consistent with the majority of Ohio courts that have denied coverage for this type of claim. The majority view is that claims of defective construction or workmanship are not claims for “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” under a CGL policy. E.g., Bogner Constr. Co. v. Field & Assocs., 5th Dist. No. 08-CA-11, 2009-Ohio-116, 2009 WL 91300, at ¶ 51 and 44 (<HOLDING>); Paramount Parks, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate ‘something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith’ on his part.” Id. (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029). In this instance, Mr. Hernandez has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and, therefore, we deny his request for a COA and dismiss his appeal. In his COA application, Mr. Hernandez does not specifically discuss the district court’s resolution of any of his habeas claims, much less explain how reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of that resolution. According ly, we deem Mr. Hernandez’s challenge to the district court’s resolution of his claims to be waived. See United States v. Springfield, 337 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Thomas v. Frech, 400 Fed.Appx. 315,

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    retain jurisdiction to review due process challenges,” but “[a] petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that Congress chose to remove simply by cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in constitutional garb.” Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). Anderson has not raised a colorable constitutional claim, as he is simply re-characterizing an allegation that the IJ abused his discretion as a constitutional issue. Moreover, even if colorable, Anderson’s claim fails. Anderson’s right to due process was not violated as the IJ continued proceedings for over a month in order to allow him an opportunity to pursue his case. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Anderson argues that the BIA based

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no due process violation where the ijs finding was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“If the court determines at any - time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). As a result, courts have generally found it to be error when a Court dismisses a claim sua sponte based on a defense that has already been waived. See, e.g., Haskell v. Wash. Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir.1988) (“Since it is a waivable defense, it ordinarily is error for a district court to raise the issue sua sponte.”)-, Simuell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15,19 (3d Cir.1976) (“In the absence of any such statutory authority, it is inappropriate for the trial court to dispose of the case sua sponte on an objection to the complaint which would be waived if not raised by the defendant(s) in a timely manner.”); Wagner v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 307 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir.1962) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion Accordingly, we hold that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    signed. 84. The Court finds that Durham’s § 113(f)(1) contribution claim was timely filed and is not barred by CERCLA’s statute of limitations. B. Durham’s State-Law Claims 85. Defendants have also asserted as an affirmative defense that Durham’s state-law claims under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-16 and § 22a-452 are barred by the applicable state statute of limitations. Defendants have raised three possible statute of limitations that could apply to Durham’s state-law claims: (i) Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577, the three-year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions; (ii) Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to injuries to real or personal property caused by negligence or reckless or wanton misconduct; and (iii) Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52 441 (D.Conn.1994) (<HOLDING>)- 87. This Court has previously rejected the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from reliable sources on the Internet may be judicially noticed). 3 . Instead of contesting whether Section 98 may apply to witnesses covered by Section 1987(b), Plaintiff argues only that Marin is not the type of witness eligible for a written notice pursuant to Section 1987(b). Opp. at 9-10. However, this argument is inapposite because'the applicability of Section 1987(b) to Marin in the instant case does not alter the Court’s analysis of the plain meaning of Section 98, 4 . Additionally, the Court notes that Marin had authorized H&H to accept service on her behalf, see Compl., Ex. 1, and that as a result, had Plaintiff served. H&H, the service would have been binding upon Marin. See Tresway Aero, Inc. v, Superior Court, 5 Cal.3d 431, 441-42, 96 Cal.Rptr. 571, 487 P.2d 1211 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 5 .Defendants have filed an unopposed request

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant was estopped from asserting improper service where the defendants conduct caused the allegedly improper service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to create unrest through his abuse of the grievance process. King IV, 2009 WL 3424221, at *9 (“To the extent that Defendants were motivated in transferring King based upon his manipulation of other prisoners to file grievances to achieve King’s own goals, they did not retaliate against him on the basis of any protected conduct.”). Embedded in this conclusion is both a legal error and a factual one. The legal problem is that the district court, following analysis from this court, already concluded as a matter of law that King’s assistance to other prisoners in using the grievance system was protected conduct. R. 158 (Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. & Order at 14). Abusive or manipulative use of a grievance system would not be protected conduct. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, to conclude now that King was in

    ### Response:
    holding no first amendment right to file frivolous grievances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    depends upon the nature and character of the relief sought. Erie Ins. Group v. Fisher (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 380, 382, 15 OBR 497, 498-499, 474 N.E.2d 320, 322-323; Gunsaullus v. Pettit (1888), 46 Ohio St. 27, 29, 17 N.E. 231, 231-232. When the relief sought is equitable, R.C. 2311.04 confers no right to a jury trial. Erie Ins. Group, supra, 15 Ohio St.3d at 382, 15 OBR at 498-499, 474 N.E.2d at 322; City Loan & Sav. Co. v. Howard (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 185, 186, 16 OBR 195, 197, 475 N.E.2d 154, 156. When the pleadings seek a mixture of legal and equitable relief, the right to a jury trial depends upon the action’s primary and predominant objective. See, e.g., Murello Constr. Co. v. Citizens Home Sav. Co. (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 333, 334, 29 OBR 461, 461-462, 505 N.E.2d 637, 638 (<HOLDING>); Huntington Natl. Bank v. Heritage Invest.

    ### Response:
    holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acted to extend the time for closing. For example, defendant never indicated to the escrow office that the time for performance under the agreement had expired. Rather, she went to the escrow office on June 13, 2003, to sign closing documents, and she deposited a check for taxes and closing costs with the escrow company. Also, plaintiff sent defendant a letter on June 24, 2003, stating that closing was postponed until the lis pendens issue was resolved, and, thereafter, the parties stayed in contact with each other regarding the agreement by phone. In light of the conduct of the parties, it is apparent that neither party sought to enforce the May 31 deadline, even if that had been the intent of their original agreement. See Patterson v. Amundson, 201 Or App 486, 496, 119 P3d 264 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Secondly, there is no evidence that plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that by his actions the seller waived the time is of the essence provision in leasewithpurchase agreement by not demanding a timely closing indeed the seller negotiated with the buyers about the condition of property for over a year accepted the buyers monthly payments for nearly seven years and never reinstated the time is of the essence provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirement of deference to the Secretary’s interpretation disappears when the Secretary’s interpretation is inconsistent with clear Congressional intent. Hall v. Secretary, Health, Educ. and Welfare, 600 F.2d 556, 561 (6th Cir.1979). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the [Secretary], must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If this court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, finds that “Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 n. 9; See e.g., Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 733 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Appellant correctly argues that this court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that absent unusual circumstances this court must apply the plain meaning of a statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1681m(d)(l), quoted above, especially subsections (B) and (C), assumes that an unsolicited “written solicitation made to the consumer regarding the transaction” include the firm offer of credit. This reading of the statute is confirmed by the legislative history of § 1681b(c)(l)(B)(i) which indicates Congressional intent that the opt-out provision be included in the first “prescreening or direct marketing solicitation.” The required opt-out language, in turn, presumes that a firm offer of credit has been made. See Sen. Rep. 103-209, at 25-26 (1993) (1993 WL 516162). For similar reasons, the Court finds Defendant’s standing argument, which is based upon the fact that Plaintiff did not call Defendant, to be without merit. See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 211 F.R.D. at 336 (<HOLDING>). The Court cannot conclude at this stage of

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs who alleged that their own personal credit information was disclosed for an improper purpose established their standing to sue under the fcra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[t]he Model Instructions, ... are not binding on the district courts of this circuit, but are merely helpful suggestions to assist the district courts.” Norton, 846 F.2d at 525. The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed this view in Jones, 23 F.3d at 1409. Accordingly, we are required to scrutinize the ISBA’s instructions and will not hesitate to disapprove faulty jury instructions. See, e.g., State v. Beets, 528 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1995) (finding a uniform instruction regarding the offense of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse was not a correct statement of the law); State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 58 (Iowa 1992) (concluding uniform criminal jury instructions did not correctly state elements of assault causing bodily injury); State v. Deanda, 218 N.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Iowa 1974) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v.

    ### Response:
    holding uniform instruction given on entrapment was erroneous as among other things it ignored the factual evaluation to be undertaken on a case by case basis and failed to focus on the crucial question involved in the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its posts even though the bolts he had ordered were too short, to dismiss his crew at noon without remedying the situation, and to leave the plank unbolted' ten feet above ground over a long weekend without posting a prominent warning, reflect judgments “grounded in social, economic, and political policy” and shielded by the discretionary function exception. Our sister circuits have recognized this, concluding that similar non-policy-based government acts are not protected by the discretionary function exception. Indeed, as one court has noted, a holding that “torts stemming from garden variety decisions fall outside the discretionary function exception is consistent with a primary motive behind the [Federal Tort Claims Act].” Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 755 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Since “[tjhe question” as to whether the

    ### Response:
    holding asserted negligence in failure to provide adequate lighting or warning in federally controlled parking lot not shielded by discretionary function exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the different policy interests underlying witness immunity, noted: With no sanction for incompetent preparation, however, an expert witness is free to prepare and testify without regard to the accuracy of his data or opinion. We do not see how the freedom to testify negligently will result in more truthful expert testimony. Without some overarching purpose, it would be illogical, if not unconscionable, to shield a professional, who is otherwise held to the standards and duties of his or her profession, from liability for his or her malpractice simply because a party to a judicial proceeding has engaged that professional to provide services in relation to the judicial proceeding and that professional testifies by affidavit or deposition. Marrogi v. Howard, 805 So.2d 1118, 1133 (La.2002) (<HOLDING>). Many courts, of course, have been

    ### Response:
    holding that witness immunity does not bar a claim against a retained expert witness for negligence performance of his duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    D. Thompson Trucking, Inc. v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 870 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir.1989). Res judicata is appropriate if: 1) the parties to both actions are identical (or at least in privity); 2) the judgment in the first action is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the first action concluded with a final judgment on the merits; and 4) the same claim or cause of action is involved in both suits. See United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir.1994). The first and second elements of res judicata are not disputed. Ellis first argues that the dismissal of the Northern District suit as time-barred was not a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes. We have rejected this claim. See Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Thompson, 870 F.2d at 1045-46 (stating that

    ### Response:
    holding in res judicata context that dismissals for want of jurisdiction are not decisions on the merits while those on limitations are
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was prejudiced by the bystander’s conduct. See Williams, 651 S.W.2d at 821. In Williams, we noted that the defendant did not make a bystander’s bill describing the event, did not subpoena any jurors to testify at the hearing on his motion for new trial, and did not present any juror’s affidavit as to how the incident may have affected the verdict. Id. We concluded that “it was incumbent upon the appellant to establish, by competent evidence, the probability of injury to himself as a result of the outburst.” Id.; see also Landry, 706 S.W.2d at 111-12 (noting that Landry failed to point to any particular verbal outcry or demonstrate how victim’s family’s emotional responses reasonably could have interfered with jury’s verdict); Ashley v. State, 362 S.W.2d 847, 850-51 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962) (<HOLDING>); Guse v. State, 97 Tex.Crim. 212, 214-15, 260

    ### Response:
    holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the two claims are governed by different causation standards. We recognize the difference in legal standards, but conclude that it is not material to the disposition of this case. While, as noted earlier, the “significant factor” test for the Burk tort claim does not require but-for causation, it imposes much more than some de minimus burden on the plaintiff. It “requir[es] a showing of more than a mere causal link,” in that “a factor may be a cause without being significant.” Elzey v. Forrest, 739 P.2d 999, 1001-02 (Okla.1987). The plaintiff “must do more than show that [age] was only one of many possible factors resulting in his discharge.” Wallace v. Halliburton Co., 850 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Okla.1993); see White v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1419-20 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). It is not necessary to set out our evaluation

    ### Response:
    holding trial court erred by instructing jury that employer would be liable under burk if plaintiff showed improper motive was a factor in the decision to discharge him rather than a significant factor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.10(2)). When notice is given under C.P.L. § 250.10(2), the prosecution may apply to the trial judge for an order directing the defendant to submit to an examination by a psychiatrist selected by the prosecution. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.10(3). The purpose of the C.P.L. § 250.10 notice provision is to “prevent disadvantage to the prosecution as a result of surprise.” People v. Berk, 88 N.Y.2d 257, 263, 644 N.Y.S.2d 658, 661, 667 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y.1996) (quoting Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 F.Supp. 97, 103 (S.D.N.Y.1978), aff'd, 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1979)). “Finally, preclusion may be an appropriate sanction when a defendant has deliberately failed to file notice until after the statutory period has run.” Ronson, 463 F.Supp. at 104 (<HOLDING>) and We do not find that Ronson deliberately

    ### Response:
    holding that total preclusion unwarranted under the unusual circumstances of this case in which both sides experienced substantial delay in securing evidence with regard to an insanity defense a continuance would have provided the state with sufficient opportunity to obtain evidence to refute the defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (describing attorney’s duty of candor to the tribunal); Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous ... ”). Simply put, once Mr. Lof-tus’s claim lost legal merit, Mr. deLone had a duty to withdraw the ease. As an officer of the court, Mr. deLone was not free to press on with a meritles review of an appellate court’s decision from the Supreme Court does not license an attorney to ignore the precedential value of that decision in other pending cases, as though it had no force or effect. See Ithaca College v. National Labor Relations Board, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.1980)(<HOLDING>). In light of the factors cited by the Court

    ### Response:
    holding that decision cannot be ignored simply because review is being sought
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at one time and place. Vance, Green, and Canion involved only one illegal act. Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes, permits conviction and sentence for separate criminal offenses committed within one criminal transaction: (4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense.... (b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. See also Nicholson v. State, 757 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, the multiple convictions were based on

    ### Response:
    recognizing that there is no double jeopardy bar precluding separate charges where the defendant threw a brick through the rear sliding door of a house followed immediately by his throwing a brick through a front window
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court make findings of fact or conclusions of law. When there is no request for findings and the trial court does not make specific findings of fact, “we ‘must assume that the trial court found every fact necessary to support its [ruling] and must affirm if any reasonable construction of the evidence justifies the decision.’ ” In re Estate of Shumway, 197 Ariz. 57, 61, ¶ 9, 3 P.3d 977, 981 (App.1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Stevenson v. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. 44, 46, 643 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1982)), vacated in part on other grounds, 198 Ariz. 323, 9 P.3d 1062 (2000). The foregoing proposition pre sumes, however, that the trial court did not otherwise abuse its discretion by misapplying the law. Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 455-56, 652 P.2d 507, 528-29 (1982) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 Bearing in mind that the Restrictions

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the trial court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denied, 347 U.S. 928, 74 S.Ct. 531, 98 L.Ed. 1080 (1954); Ex parte Samber, 13 N.J.Super. 410, 412-13, 80 A.2d 487 (Law Div.1951) (courts have inherent power to suspend sentences for a reasonable length of time); Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 445-46, 82 A. 424 (Ch.1911) (court has common law power to suspend sentence). Illustrative of instances where the Legislature has precluded the courts from exercising their inherent common law power to impose suspended sentences are the cases dealing with mandatory minimum terms. See State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 80-81, 455 A.2d 1074 (1983) (discussing minimum mandatory imprisonment under the Graves Act reflects the legislative intent to expressly preclude suspended sentence); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 174-75, 199 A.2d 809 (1964) (<HOLDING>). The State argues that the 1973 repeal of

    ### Response:
    holding the minimum mandatory threemonth custodial sentence for second offenders under former dwi provisions of njsa 39450 reflects the intention to prohibit suspended sentences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2-3 (Wash. April 18, 1997) (order denying discretionary review). By treating the foregoing passage as preclusive on the issue of whether Dictado’s petition was properly filed, the majority transforms § 2244(d)(2) into a merits-based tolling provision, contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and contrary to the nearly-unanimous judgment of federal courts that have interpreted the provision. See supra note 1. If. a state permits prisoners to file successive petitions or petitions outside the limitations period, and the prisoner complies with the basic procedural requirements for filing such petitions, federal courts should not interfere with that state policy, but should deem the petitions “properly filed.” See Lovasz, 134 F.3d at tions, 36 F.Supp.2d 317, 318-319, 320 (E.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Morgan v. Gilmore, 26

    ### Response:
    holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inconsistent with the Commission’s regulations are preempted. 47 U.S.C. § 276(c). That fact does not absolutely preclude us from identifying a broader scope of implied preemption within § 276, but we see no cause for doing so here. Although we discern in § 276 a clear intent to create a comprehensive federal plan for payphone regulation, Congress left it to the Commission to decide how to structure the regulations and enforcement mechanisms. Congress did not express a preference for absolute national uniformity or exclusive federal enforcement, leaving those decisions to the Commission and expressly allowing for the operation of state law if consistent with the Commission's chosen plan. Cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Thus, in keeping with

    ### Response:
    holding that an express provision preempting all state laws relating to railroad safety was broad and would preempt state claims that cover the same subject matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the opinion of the court, this asserted injury does not arise out of a violation of the Lanham Act. Instead, it seems to stem from the defendants’ threat to sue the plaintiffs under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement if they attempt to enter the U.S. market with their SMIRNOV vodka products. However, the court doubts that the threat to sue another party under the Lanham Act can give rise to a violation of that same Act. Instead, in the opinion of the court, this asserted anti-competitive harm is better recognized, if at all, under other statutes. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1257-58 (9th Cir.1982); Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F.Supp. 702, 704-07 (E.D.Mich.1992); cf. Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 438 F.Supp. 82, 87 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). For these reasons, the court

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the test to determine whether a trademark is being used to confer a monopoly in a certain product is properly conducted under section 2 of the sherman act 15 usc  2 which requires a showing that the defendants actions have led to or resulted in a dangerous probability that it will gain a monopoly over the product in issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract partner or tortfeasor, the post-petition tortfeasor cannot generally be held to have notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy, and of the risk that it will be haled into bankruptcy court. Granted, one court, in a Chapter 7 case, has found that the mere fact that a tort claim arises from post-petition conduct can support a holding that the claim is a core proceeding in bankruptcy. Matter of O’Sullivan’s Fuel Oil Co., 88 B.R. 17, 20 (D.Conn.1988). However, I am unpersuaded that the fact that a claim arises post-petition can, without more, transform the claim into a core proceeding. See In re CIS Corporation, 172 B.R. at 758 (conversion action is non-core even if asserted post-petition); cf. also In re Lipstein, 94 Civ. 7100 (LLS), 1995 WL 675486, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1995), (<HOLDING>). C. Whether the Bankruptcy Court May Conduct A

    ### Response:
    holding that tort claims that could have been brought outside the bankruptcy environment are noncore without discussing whether claims were brought pre or postpetition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    However, Mr. Horler is seeking only the production of certain documents relating to the decedent's estate, and is acting only as a fiduciary for the estate. If the Surrogate’s Court determines that a Temporary Administrator should be appointed, that person will have an identity of interest with Mr. Horler. Finally, our decision to abstain on Colorado River grounds is influenced, in part, by the special expertise of the Surrogate’s Court in matters related to the probate and administration of wills. Although this case may not fall within the so-called “probate exception” to federal court jurisdiction, since jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to a federal statute rather than diversity of citizenship, Ashton v. Josephine Bay & C. Michael Paul Foundation, 918 F.2d 1065, 1071-72 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), abstention is particularly appropriate in

    ### Response:
    holding case for exercise of federal jurisdiction stronger in interpleader action than in diversity action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in or related to a case under title 11” to the Bankruptcy Court. § 157(a). In A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.1986), the Fourth Circuit defined “related to” jurisdiction under § 1334(b): An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate. Id. at 1002 n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)). Subsequent decisions have clarified that “related to” jurisdiction is to be broadly interpreted. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 960 F.2d 396, 403 (4th Cir.1992); In re A.H. Robins Co., 182 B.R. 128, 133 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 86 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.1996). As Judge

    ### Response:
    holding that  1334b is to be liberally construed especially where the question at hand involves the interpretation of a plan of reorganization
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any sentence within the boundaries of the plea agreement, Mr. Sines could not, at the hearing, attempt to carve out the sentence that he would have liked to receive. Mr. Sines also argues that he is not appealing the sentence imposed, but has merely requested modification of his supervised release pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. Under the plea agreement, Mr. Sines has agreed to waive his right to appeal the sentence “on any ground” or to contest the sentence in any collateral attack. His attempt to dress his collateral attack in the clothing of a modification of supervised release must fail. Allowing him to challenge the sentence in this manner would gut the effectiveness of most waivers of appeal and waivers of collateral attack. Cf. Behrman, 235 F.3d at 1051 (<HOLDING>). Although we hold that Mr. Sines waived the

    ### Response:
    holding that a general  constitutionalargument exception to waivers in plea agreements would vitiate most waivers of appeal and all waivers of collateral attack
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intent to violate the order.”). As noted above, this Court has departed somewhat from that common formulation and has described criminal contempt as “[la] the willful [2a] disobedience toward, or [lb] open [2b] disrespect for,. [3] the rules or orders of a court.” Poindexter, 389 S.W.3d at 117. Although broader, perhaps, than the version limited to willful violations of reasonably specific court orders, we agree with the Cabinet and the dissenting Court of Appeals judge that our version of the contempt elements is likewise limited, as the Supreme Court said, to the “violation of] specific duties ... arising directly from the parties’ participation in judicial proceedings,” not to a party’s duties generally under the substantive law. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nicely, 326 S.W.3d 441 (Ky.2010) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513

    ### Response:
    holding that probationers substantive violation can be the basis of probation revocation but should not be punished as a contempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the jury; 3) the reasons given for exercising the eight strikes have been approved by this Court; and 4) Snow did not raise any evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the State. ¶ 28. We have noted that the acceptance of other African-American as jurors is no defense to a Batson claim. Conerly v. State, 544 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Miss.1989). The pivotal issue here becomes not whether the State used all of its peremptory challenges against African-Americans, nor whether there where two African-Americans on the jury, but whether we may disturb the trial court’s finding that the State did not use its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner against African-American venirepersons. See Govan v. State, 591 So.2d 428, 430 (Miss.1991); Sudduth v. State, 562 So.2d 67 (Miss.1990) (<HOLDING>). We answer this question in the negative. ¶

    ### Response:
    holding that is not the fact that a jury is all white or all black that violates batson rather it is the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fashion. See PSCNY, 813 F.2d at 465. The second time, FERC posited directly — with only the flimsiest of support — its theory that investors need over six months to ascertain and take into account the market interest rates prevailing at any given time. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 46 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,089, at 61,-383-84 (1989) (Order on Remand); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 49 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,392, at 62,419-23 (denying rehearing of Order on Remand). I heartily agree with the court’s rejection of the Commission’s more recent explanation. At the very least, FERC was obliged to offer some convincing evidence in support of its facially implausible economic assumption, cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (<HOLDING>), and some explanation why accepting that

    ### Response:
    holding that for summary judgment purposes if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense  plaintiffs must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substantive rules of law.” In re Arbitration between Silverman & Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 461 N.E.2d 1261,1266 (1984) (cited by the plurality, ante at 494, 610 A.2d at 371). Simply put, unless the parties expressly state otherwise in their arbitration agreement, mistakes of law do not serve as a valid basis for judicial review, regardless of the arbitrator’s intent or any error produced by a failure of that intent. Lentine, supra, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 420, 278 N.E.2d at 635. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal.App.3d 428, 277 Cal.Rptr. 694, 712 (Ct.App.), review granted, 281 Cal.Rptr. 765, 810 P.2d 997 (1991), the court set forth the general rule that errors of law, even those appearing on the face of an arbitr A.2d 189,191-92 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86,

    ### Response:
    recognizing general rule that arbitrators mistakes of law not grounds for vacating award absent showing of denial of a hearing fraud misconduct corruption or similar irregularity leading to an unjust inequitable or unconscionable award
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his unexhausted claims. The court denied the motion to stay for failure to identify his unexhausted constitutional claims. It also denied Mr. Benson’s motion to amend due to the timeliness requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the absence of a statutory or equitable basis for tolling the applicable limitations period. Finally, the court denied Mr. Benson’s § 2254 petition for failure to establish that he was in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. A state prisoner may only appeal the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus after receiving a COA from either this court or the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (<HOLDING>). We can issue a COA “only if the applicant has

    ### Response:
    holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the defendant is a central, often dispositive issue in these “he said, she said” trials, the rules of evidence should be used sparingly to exclude relevant, otherwise admissible evidence that might bear upon the credibility of either party. Id. We review the trial court’s decision to bar the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). To preserve error, including a constitutional error, for appellate review, the appellant must make a timely, specific objection to the trial court and obtain a ruling on the objection. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1; Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); see Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). The point of error on appeal must correspond

    ### Response:
    holding errors based on the constitutional rights to confrontation and due process may be waived by failure to object at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person “could foresee a lawsuit” and would either contact his attorney or his liability carrier. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Old World Trading Co. (1993), 266 Ill.App.3d 1, 7, 203 Ill.Dec. 264, 268, 639 N.E.2d 584, 588, appeal denied (1994), 158 Ill.2d 566, 206 Ill.Dec. 847, 645 N.E.2d 1369. Id. Each of Plaintiffs insurance policies issued by Defendant contained notice provisions requiring Plaintiff to notify Defendant of an occurrence “as soon as practicable” or “as soon as possible.” In addition, the policies required Plaintiff to immediately forward all demands, notices, or summonses relating to any lawsuit. Therefore, the Court must determine whether, under the facts and l-Globe Ins. Co., 70 Ill.App.3d 296, 300-01, 388 N.E.2d 253, 256-57, 26 Ill. Dec. 629, 632-33 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, because Plaintiff failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that a six month delay was unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicata or claim preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and bars further litigation on all matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the action. See Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23, 520 N.E.2d 151, 152-53 (1988). The purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule is “to prevent multiplicity of actions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of common matters.” Carteret Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Jackson, 812 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir.1987). “The scope of ‘transaction or occurrence’ is liberally interpreted, as the court determines whether ther antitrust violation to be compulsory counterclaim to earlier suit for patent infringement); Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co., 827 F.2d 1246, 1251-53 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). There are several noteworthy caveats to these

    ### Response:
    holding former employees claims for defamation abuse of process breach of employment contract and intentional interference with business relationship to be compulsory counterclaims to employers prior state court action for appropriating confidential consumer information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a judgment in that spouse’s favor. To enable judges to respond adequately to the needs of spouses, the legislature gave broad discretion to judges to award attorney’s fees and did not limit in a strict manner the time in which attorney’s fees could be awarded. The only statutory requirement is that the suit must be pending. Indeed, one of the statutory provisions allows the trial judge discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs “at any time” in a pending suit for divorce. Code § 20-103. O’Loughlin does not hold that the divorce suit is not pending when the mandate has issued and is before the circuit court on remand. It also does not address the authority of the circuit court judge to award attorney’s fees pursuant to Code § 20-103 while the suit is still pending on reman .App.1991) (<HOLDING>). As long as the remand order is still pending,

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate attorneys fees were incurred during the divorce proceedings and were awardable by the trial judge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2004 MT 326, ¶ 14, 324 Mont. 114, ¶ 14, 102 P.3d 16, ¶ 14 (citations omitted), Alvin argues that Steinbeisser, at ¶ 47, entitles the non-acquiring spouse to an equitable share of “only that portion of gifted property that appreciated in value because of his or her efforts. However, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that “[i]n determining the exact distribution of an asset acquired by gift or bequest during the marriage, no set formula can be established as to how the assets should be equitably distributed.” In re Marriage of Herrera, 2004 MT 40, ¶ 32, 320 Mont. 71, ¶ 32, 85 P.3d 781, ¶ 32 (citing Herron, 186 Mont. at 402, 608 P.2d at 100) (see also Morse v. Morse, 174 Mont. 541, 546, 571 P.2d 1147, 1150 (1977)); Biegalke v. Biegalke, 172 Mont. 311, 315, 564 P.2d 987, 989 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Each case has to be decided on its own

    ### Response:
    holding that the courts exercise of its discretion in adjusting property rights between husband and wife must be reasonable under the circumstances of the case and there is no fixed formula or ratio to be applied in each instance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court, and [its ruling on the motion] will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discre tion.” Clement v. Merchants Nat’l Bank of Mobile, 493 So.2d 1350, 1354 (Ala.1986). Wal-Mart argues, among other things, that it is fundamentally unfair to allow White’s expert to conduct a physical examination, but to prevent Wal-Mart’s expert from conducting a physical examination. White responds by stating, among other things, that because Dr. Hinton has already formed an opinion based on White’s medical records, Wal-Mart has failed to establish good cause for a physical examination, as required by Rule 35. Thus, White asks us to deny the mandamus petition because, he argues, Wal-Mart has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to the 4, 267 (E.D.Mo.1996) (<HOLDING>). Rule 35(a) requires not only that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had not placed his mental condition in controversy because he was not complaining of any definable psychological symptoms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be consistent with the overall legislative scheme. See, Prohaska v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 138 F.Supp.2d 422, 448 (W.D.N.Y.2001); Sita v. Danek Medical, Inc., 43 F.Supp.2d 245, 260 (E.D.N.Y.1999). Plaintiff is correct in his contention that violations of the FDCA and the New York State Education Law § 6815 can constitute negligence per se if the violations are shown to have proximately caused his injuries. See, e.g. Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir.1979)(hold-ing that violations of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 352, and the New York Education Law § 6815, for misbranding a product by providing false or misleading labeling, is negligence per se, provided plaintiff shows that the violations proximately caused the injuries and death of the decedent); Prohaska, 138 F.Supp.2d at 448 (<HOLDING>); Sita, 43 F.Supp.2d at 262 (recognizing that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a cause of action exists under negligence per se when the underlying claim is for misbranding or otherwise illegally omitting product warnings required by the fdca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    237 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir.2006); United States v. Cousins, 469 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007). Four have concluded to the contrary. United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 195 (3d Cir.2006); United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 480 F.3d 713, 722 (5th Cir.2007), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3585 (Apr. 18, 2007) (No. 06-1381); United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir.2006), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 828, 169 L.Ed.2d 625 (2008) (No. 06-7517); see also United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999, 1006 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The government, which has an obvious

    ### Response:
    holding notice no longer required even for traditional departures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 376-77). Moore attempts to distinguish Farns-worth on the basis that the offense at issue in that case was labeled “vehicular manslaughter” and therefore, as a version of manslaughter, was already specifically enumerated as a crime of violence in the commentary to USSG § 4B1.2. See USSG § 4B1.2, cmt. n. 1 (listing “manslaughter” as an example of a “crime of violence”). However, this is foreclosed by the lan guage in Farnsworth expressly declining to reach this issue. 92 F.3d at 1009 (“[W]e do not reach the government’s argument that all vehicular manslaughter is ‘manslaughter/ and therefore a crime of violence, for purposes of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.”) Famsivorth clearly holds that “eaus[ing] death by driving while under the influence of drugs or a r.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179,

    ### Response:
    holding dwi intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle in a public place is clearly not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995) (upholding statutory scheme that permitted a judge to impose a death sentence after ""considering"" advisory jury verdict without specification of weight to be accorded to the jury's recommendation). 23 The defense notes other instances when, if the issue is raised, the State is required to negate the existence of a claimed mental condition. See, e.g., duress, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9; consent, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-10; the defense of self, property and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 to -8; and passion/provocation, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4. 24 We are particularly concerned by the imposition of a clear and convincing burden of proof on a defendant in a capital cause. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (<HOLDING>). FISHER, J.A.D., concurring. I Georgia’s 1986

    ### Response:
    holding that oklahomas requirement that a defendant prove his incompetency by clear and convincing evidence violated due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of facts, as discussed in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340, 348, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991). Plaintiffs, however do not apply this analysis to the contents of the works in question nor do they in any way demonstrate that it is original, copyrightable work created by Garcia Goy-co himself, as opposed to all of the other contributors. Not all works can be copyrighted. Merely because the works were deposited in the Copyright Office and have certificates of registration, does not mean that they were copyrightable subject matter. Expression in the public domain may not be monopolized by mere copyright registration. See e.g., Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 237 F.Supp.2d 376, 384 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“Tufenkian ”) (<HOLDING>); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d805 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding as a matter of law that adaptations of subject matter or expressions in the public domain cannot support a finding of copyright infringement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not imply a concession that there was probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, to search Defendant's home. 7 . In Dunaway, the defendant was not formally arrested, although the Court went on to hold that the formality of the seizure was not relevant. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court in later cases referred to Dunaway as having been arrested. Taylor, 457 U.S. at 693, 102 S.Ct. 2664; Harris, 495 U.S. at 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 1640. 8 . The officers administered Miranda warnings before questioning Harris in his home. However, as Brown clarified, Miranda warnings do not suffice to purge the taint of police conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254. 9 . But see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>). O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, concurring: I

    ### Response:
    holding that a later statement was admissible despite illegal detention at home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the area in which appellant committed the crime. The prosecutor stated: If you’re not seeing that (the selling of cocaine on the street) every day, the danger is to pretend that it doesn’t happen or it’s not affecting you, it’s not my problem, I don’t five on Cherrydale, that’s not my house, that is not my neighborhood. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(a)(1). A defendant’s failure to object to a jury argument forfeits his right to complain about the argument on appeal. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); see also Bias v. State, 937 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Appellant did not object to this part of the

    ### Response:
    holding there is no issue presented for review when no objection is made even though the complained of argument might be incurably harmful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    R. 130, Ex. 20 (Zamiara/Berghuis Email). Zamiara also included a copy of the original screen that would have shown the markings from Chaffee that the prisoner had no major misconducts and was “manageable in Level II.” Rather than causing Berghuis to question the increase in security level, she “chewed out” Chaffee and instructed him to fix the screen. R. 171 (Trial Tr. I at 133:11-19; 147:24-148:3; 149:7-11). Although this was hardly an exemplary course of conduct, the record does not establish that this “fix” was necessary to maintain King’s security status at the higher level, or had any impact on his security level. As a result, we cannot say that Warden Berghuis’s actions constituted active participation in maintaining a constitutional violation. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81 (<HOLDING>) (citing Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding triable issue of whether supervisor could be liable for abandoning duties despite actual knowledge of breakdown in proper procedures by department
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the Guidelines and § 3553(a). United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2054, 164 L.Ed.2d 804 (2006). This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a threshold matter, VanBuren improperly treats the district court’s reentry of judgment as substantive proceedings subject to challenge under Booker. Clearly, the district court vacated VanBuren’s sentence and reimposed the same sentence in order to reinstate his direct appeal rights. Because VanBuren was effectively sentenced pre-Booker, the reasonableness standard of review is inapplicable. See United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 667-69 (4th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In reviewing VanBuren’s 1998 sentencing

    ### Response:
    holding that a court is free to merely correct a prisoners sentence without the need for a formal resentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    term of insurance has passed, we will return your premium when we discover this and will not pay any benefits. If the true age has been stated on the application or policy, and insurance has been issued, the insurance shall be in force and benefits shall be payable. If age is misstated in such a way that you are not eligible for coverage hereunder, our liability will be limited to a ’s attempt to use waiver and estoppel to force an insurer to pay benefits after accepting premiums. Ideal Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 593 F.Supp. 466 (N.D.Ga.1983) (finding that pilot flight hour requirement was an exclusion and waiver and estoppel could not be used to force insurer to pay where pilot failed to meet requirement); Kessler v. Georgia Int’l Life Ins. Co., 165 Ga.App. 60, 299 S.E.2d 131 (1983) (<HOLDING>). While these courts have sought to structure a

    ### Response:
    holding that estoppel doctrine could not support an effort to force insurer to pay under a credit disability policy where insured was not gainfully employed at time of application in contravention of policy provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court will analyze Defendants’ argument under the two-step approach laid out in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.1999). First, this court must determine whether a party who has not been joined is necessary to the action. Id. In a nearly identical situation in Johnson v. Price, 191 F.Supp.2d 626, 630 (D.Md.2001), this Court held that a daughter who was not named in her father’s wrongful death action was a necessary party under Rule 19(a). Since Maryland law restricts plaintiffs to a single wrongful death action, this Court reasoned that the decedent’s daughter was a real party in interest and her rights needed to be adjudicated. Id. at 629; see also Williams v. Work, 192 Md.App. 438, 995 A.2d 744, 755 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2010) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, this Court found that in the

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the levee district, and residents of the counties elected the commissioners. This was an important factor in the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the Levee Board did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. McDonald, 832 F.2d at 907. Local versus Statewide Interests: Water and soil conservation is undeniably a statewide concern. See Bennett v. Brown Cty. Water Improv. Dist., 153 Tex. 599, 272 S.W.2d 498, 502-03 (1954). While CWA is primarily concerned with protecting the water supply within its district, this is part of a larger statewide concern. The fact that the state has divided itself into districts for the purpose of addressing its concerns does not make the need for water and soil conservation any less a statewide issue. See Clark v. Tarrant Cty., 798 F.2d 736, 745 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The statewide nature of CWA’s interests is

    ### Response:
    holding that probation department was arm of the state and that dividing the responsibilities into  districts is merely an administrative tool for handling a statewide state program
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deadlines and explaining that ""the only protection a property owner had against government delay was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ...,” yet courts declined to find due process violations despite lengthy delays in commencing forfeiture actions). 7 . Cassella, supra note 6, at 125. 8 . Cassella, supra note 6, at 144. 9 . But cf. United States v. One 1991 Ford Mustang LX, VIN 1FACP44E6MF151861, 909 F.Supp. 831 (D.Colo.1996) (denying government’s request for retroactive extension of time limit and refusing to consider whether government had good cause for request when government filed complaint for forfeiture two days after expiration of filing deadline imposed by 21 U.S.C. § 888(c)); United States v. One White 1987 Tempest Sport Boat Named “El Matador”, 726 F.Supp. 7 (<HOLDING>). 10 . See United States v. Borromeo, 945 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that government was not entitled to extension of time limit under 21 usc  8811 to rectify oneday delay in filing where government was aware of the circumstances contributing to the delay prior to the expiration of the time limit and could have requested an extension before the deadline expired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    granting relief to Wilson on his claim that the trial court improperly considered the QCRB report in its sen tencing decision. As the state PCR court held, Wilson invited the trial court to take this action when he assured the court that he had no problem with its consideration of the report in camera. J.A. 594-95. Under South Carolina law, “the failure to object to proceedings below waives the presentation of those issues on appeal,” or “in post-conviction absent an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.” See, e.g., Cummings v. State, 274 S.C. 26, 260 S.E.2d 187, 188 (1979); Miller v. State, 269 S.C. 113, 236 S.E.2d 422 (1977) (same). The preclusive effect of an invitation of error is, if possible, more severe. See State v. Robinson, 149 S.C. 439, 147 S.E. 441, 443 (1929) (<HOLDING>). This procedural rule is long-standing and has

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel is   in no position to complain as to matters  not only without objection on his part but when solicited by him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that the Addenda are not parol evidence, but rather, are part of the original Release and Settlement Agreement, and that it was therefore proper for the court to consider those documents. That argument however, is incorrect. These documents were not executed contemporaneously with the Release and Settlement Agreement and cannot be said to be part and parcel of that Agreement. More to the point, these documents did not serve to explain an ambiguity but instead created an ambiguity which would not otherwise exist in the Release and Settlement Agreement. Neither the Addenda nor the “memorandum of settlement” can be relied upon to “explain” an agreement which, by its terms, required no explanation. Wickenheiser v. Ramm Vending Promotion, Inc., 560 So.2d 350, 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). The intent of the parties was to be

    ### Response:
    holding evidence that would contradict add to or subtract from or affect the construction of a valid complete and unambiguous written instrument is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). 3 . State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 4 . Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 5 . Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493; Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28. 6 . Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. 7 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)). 8 . Id. a 59 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, 212 (1979) (noting warrant check permissible if stop not extended solely for that purpose); Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1190 (<HOLDING>). 60 . But see Tucker, 183 S.W.3d at 509

    ### Response:
    holding detention of passenger for warrant check violated fourth amendment absent reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arbitration situs in the contract. Plaintiff reasons that, if the Court compels arbitration, this arbitration must take place in Georgia’s northern district. The Court, however, cannot rewrite the parties’ contract and provide an arbitration situs that was not enumerated in the forum selection clause of the arbitration agreement. See Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419-20 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037, 105 S.Ct. 513, 83 L.Ed.2d 403 (1984) (reversing district court’s order compelling arbitration in Illinois in contravention of forum-selection clause in contract’s arbitration clause designating Texas as the arbitration situs); National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 641 F.Supp. 211, 213 (S.D.Miss.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 329, 98 L.Ed.2d 356 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Section 4 and the federal policy favoring

    ### Response:
    holding that  4 does not empower court to rewrite venue provisions of arbitration clause or to order arbitration within district absent contractual provision so indicating
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the disqualification issue. The mandamus proceeding was assigned to a different panel of this t a time when there was no final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (enumerating the types of interlocutory appeals that may be taken). His notice of appeal was filed prematurely, but it was deemed effective when the trial court finally dismissed the case for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(a) (“In a civil case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal.”); cf. Brooks v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 14-12-01048-CV, 2013 WL 3477288, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). Hendricks also amended his notice of appeal

    ### Response:
    holding that a premature notice of appeal from an interlocutory summary judgment was deemed effective when the trial court granted a severance and rendered the summary judgment final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protections. In response, the State first contends appellant waived the right to assert a double jeopardy argument on appeal. The general rule is that a plea of guilty precludes a later attack on appellant’s conviction and/or sentence premised on double jeopardy grounds. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). -However, there is an exception to this general rule when (1) the entered plea was a general plea as distinguished from a bargained plea; (2) the double jeopardy violation is apparent from the face of the record; and (3) the record does not indicate a waiver of the double jeopardy violation. Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607, 609 (Fla.1994). A “straight up” or “open plea” does not amount to a bargained for plea. Williamson v. S DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Further, section 893.03(2)(a)(4), Florida

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    79, ¶ 17, 292 Wis. 2d 43, 717 N.W.2d 676. In considering the concurrence, we reiterate that the court did not rewrite Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) in Thiel and we do not rewrite the statute in the present case. Instead, Thiel interpreted § 948.11(2) (a), and we apply Thiel's interpretation of the statute. Thiel's interpretation of the statute is the law, at least until modified either by the legislature through amending the language of the statute or by this court overruling its prior interpretation. 23 That the instructions were misleading in the present case without use of the word ""knowing"" does not mean that the instructions given in the present case would necessarily be misleading in another case. Jury instructions must fit the facts of the particular case. See Burris, 2011WI32, ¶ 64 (<HOLDING>). The error in the present case is that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that language approved by the court may raise questions if incorporated in a jury instruction in a case with different facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inclusive of costs.” At the time of the offer, plaintiff had incurred $762 in costs and $5,790 in attorney fees. Plaintiff did not accept the offer of judgment. Defendant then moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs failure to file a police report of his injury within the time required by the statute precluded his claim. The trial court granted the motion, and we affirmed the ensuing judgment of the trial court without opinion. Wilson v. Tri-County Metro. Trans. Dist., 200 Or App 291, 114 P3d 1157 (2005). On review, the Supreme Court ultimately determined that plaintiffs failure to provide notice to the police of his accident did not bar his claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. Wilson v. Tri-County Metro. Trans. Dist., 343 Or 1, 16, 161 P3d 933 (2007) (<HOLDING>). On remand, plaintiff prevailed after a jury

    ### Response:
    holding the statutory notification requirement unenforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Again, Metellus answered affirmatively. The prosecutor inquired whether Elozar and Ocer participated in the home invasion and burglary that occurred January 10, and Metellus agreed. As to the home invasion of January 13, Metellus agreed that Ocer and Elozar participated in that offense. The prosecutor showed Metellus a picture of Elozar, and Metellus identified Elozar as the same man who had participated in the robberies with him. 2 . Metellus, through counsel, advised the court that he was not seeking to vacate the plea agreement and did not object to the sentence that was imposed. 3 . The constitutional protection against double jeopardy may be waived pursuant to a bargained-for plea agreement. Melvin v. State, 645 So.2d 448 (Fla.1994); Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); Blair v. State, 805 So.2d 873, 878 (Fla. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    implications or that preempt State law.” 65 Fed.Reg. at 81103 (emphasis added). Further, despite our specifically asking the FDA to address whether their current position can be reconciled with the December 2000 statement, the Colacicco Amicus brief is completely silent on the 2000 statement. See Letter to Counsel for the Government Re: Follow-Up Questions for the Amicus Brief, Colacicco v. Apotex, Civ No. 05-5500 (Doc. No. 44) (E.D.Pa. May 4, 2006); Colacicco Amicus at 20. Nonetheless, although consistency of an administrative agency’s , position is a factor, as Chevron made clear, there is no longer any justification for not giving deference to an agency’s interpretation of law merely because it is not the agency’s longstanding position. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (<HOLDING>). “On the contrary, the agency, to engage in

    ### Response:
    holding the fact that the agency has from time totime changed its interpretation  does not  lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agencys interpretation of the statute an initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone see also horn 376 f3d at 179 we cannot agree with plaintiff that the fdas position is entitled to no deference  simply because it represents a departure from its prior position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    degree, is at least the equivalent of a college degree.” Paragraph 38: The sentence “I believe that I could easily have learned all the Microsoft appli cations mentioned, but was never given the chance to, because Mary Huber-Thompson hired Tara Elayer, a younger applicant for the job.” Paragraph II: The sentence “I believe that the decision to terminate me was only made when I was able to return to work in May of 1999 and requested that I be placed in the last job for which I was selected, namely the receiving clerk position.” Further, it is well established that Plaintiff cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by making conclusory statements without evidentiary support. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989); see also Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393

    ### Response:
    recognizing wjhen the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not rule on an issue not before it, a position it has taken on other occasions. In AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295 (Minn.1984), the court considered whether an employee threatened with discharge from the corrections board had a right to both a Veterans Preference Hearing under Minn.Stat. § 197.46 (1982) and arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. The court did not address whether the corrections board could be a ""political subdivision"" of the state under the Veterans Preference Act even though the board had no power to tax, because neither party asked the court to address that issue. See Winberg v. University of Minnesota, 485 N.W.2d 325, 331 (Minn.App.1992) (Huspeni, J., dissenting), rev’d 499 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn.1993) (<HOLDING>). 7 . In a third case, Acrometal Cos. v. First

    ### Response:
    holding that the university was not a political subdivision of the state because it had no power to tax or cause taxes to be levied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the newly rezoned residential area. Additionally, neither party has furnished the applications, if any, for exceptions or variances, and/or the rulings regarding any such application. Both parties agree that the comprehensive rezoning by its terms as applied to the subject property prohibits the desired use. 5 . Much of our discussion, infra, refers to that branch of ""taking” law arising from regulation of uses as opposed to ""actual physical takings.” Justice Marshall in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3175, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), described an actual physical taking as: Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests____ [T|he government does not simply take t. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928) (<HOLDING>); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,

    ### Response:
    holding that an ordinance requiring cedar tree farmers to cut down a number of their trees to prevent the spread of an infectious disease to apple orchards was valid on the grounds that one class of property had a greater value to the public than the other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with — indeed, contrary to — her prior deposition testimony that she could not perform the “picker” job, either with or without reasonable accommodation. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained,' It is well-settled that “[pjarties to a motion for summary judgment cannot create sham issues of fact in an effort to defeat summary judgment.” American Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 F.3d 108, 111 (8th Cir.1997). Consequently, a party should not be allowed to create issues of credibility by contradicting his own earlier testimony. Ambiguities and even conflicts in a deponent’s testimony are generally matters for the jury to sort out, but a district court may grant summary judgment where a party’s sudden and unexpla 18-22 (N.D.Iowa May 6, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Waitek v. Daikon Shield Claimants Trust, 908

    ### Response:
    holding that the court could not conclude that the plaintiffs deposition testimony was so contradictory of the statements contained in plaintiffs affidavit as to foreclose the affidavits use for summary judgment purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only on constitution» al grounds, since they reflect the public policy of the state). 30 . See, eg., Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 7 P.3d 973, 977 (App.2000) (""'The injured insured may recover UIM benefits when the total damages sustained exceed the limits of the tortfeasor's liability policy even when the insured has settled with the tortfeasor for less than the liability limits.""); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bencomo, 873 P.2d 47, 49 (Colo.App. 1994) (construing the UIM policy language ""used up by payments of judgments or settlements"" to allow the injured insured ""to claim [UIM] benefits for the difference between the tortfeasor's policy limits and his [UIM] policy limits""); Taylor v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 90 Hawai'i 302, 978 P.2d 740, 750. (1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Rucker, 442 N.W.2d 113,

    ### Response:
    holding exhaustion clauses to be void as against hawaiis public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one-year statute of limitations was not tolled as to all initial TILA disclosures because “nothing prevented [plaintiff] from comparing the loan contract, Fidelity’s initial disclosures, and TILA’s statutory and regulatory requirements.” Hubbard, 91 F.3d at 79. This is another way of saying that the mere existence of TILA violations and lack of disclosure does not itself equitably toll the statute of limitations. This is sensible, because it is in line with the generally applicable principles of equitable tolling, and because a contrary rule would render the one-year statute of limitations meaningless, as it would be tolled whenever there were improper disclosures. See also Cardiello v. The Money Store, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7107, 2001 WL 604007, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pettola v. Nissan Motor Accept.

    ### Response:
    holding equitable tolling requires fraudulent conduct beyond the nondisclosure itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citations omitted). Seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs “only if, in view-of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980) (opinion of the Court by Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., Powell, J., Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, “[e]ven when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage— provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 251. See also Brooks, 337 N.C. at 143-44, 446 S.E.2d at 586-87 (<HOLDING>), and State v. Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 186-88,

    ### Response:
    holding that no seizure occurred when an officer approached a parked car and initially asked the occupant where his gun was after seeing an empty holster on the seat
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    among those plaintiffs, all those who still have OSSProxy installed on their computer (or who had it installed at any time after August 23, 2009) are within the limitations period. Third, it is unlikely that any of the remaining plaintiffs were sufficiently aware of OSSProxy’s operations to trigger the limitations period. Violations of the ECPA, SCA, and CFAA require only collecting information without the plaintiffs’ consent. No plaintiff would be aware of the information OSSProxy was collecting unless he analyzed the computer code of the program itself. Few potential class members likely fall into this category. The statute of limitations issue thus does not provide reason to deny class certification. Cf. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 420 (5th Cir.2004) (Smith, J.) (<HOLDING>). In addition, eomScore asserts that the issue

    ### Response:
    holding that the limitations issue does not preclude class cer tification in a civil rights ease when doubtless most class members  remain unaware of defendants discriminatory practices because to hold that each class member must be deposed as to precisely when if at all he learned of defendants practices would be tantamount to adopting a per se rule that civil rights cases involving deception or concealment cannot be certified outside a two or threeyear period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the conditions contained in the subcontracts. [Shaw] also assumes all obligations and liabilities of, and all claims against, the [Debtor] under the subcontracts as if [Shaw] were the original party to the subcontracts. The [Debtor] is relieved of liability for all claims in connection with performance of the contracts, before or after May 3, 2002, in accordance with the terms of the Sale Order. Paragraph (b)(9) provides further that the TSCA and Tank Contracts “shall remain in full force and effect, except as modified by this Agreement.” The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. The TSCA and Tank Contracts were novated by the Sale Order even without the subsequent Novation Agreement. American Flint Glass Workers Union v. Anchor Resolution Corp., 197 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). As discussed above, the Sale Order nullified

    ### Response:
    holding that assumption and assignment pursuant to section 365 effects a novation by operation of law whether or not the obligee consents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but see Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F.Supp.2d 52, 54 & n. 1 (D.D.C.2001) (dismissing plaintiffs' World-War II era claims as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)), aff’d on other grounds, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C.Cir.2003), vacated and remanded by-U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2835, 159 L.Ed.2d 265 (2004); Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F.Supp.2d 248, 284 (D.N.J.1999) (same). 6 . Plaintiff does not contend that it has been deprived access to the federal judiciary, and even under the liberal reading this Court must give its complaint, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to establish that the delayed justice it has experienced rises to the level of a denial of access. See Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 699-700, 707 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See also Raiser v. Daschle, 54 Fed.Appx.

    ### Response:
    holding the delays of more than six years did not amount to the denial of access to the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2001). The Supreme Court reached this conclusion not based on the obvious superficial differences between a man and woman, but because assessing a mother's and a father's status as a biological parent under the law is quite different, meriting differential treatment. Id. 43 . Although contributions to ballot issues are arguably similar to independent expenditures, the Supreme Court did not address this type of 44 . We recognize that in some instances there is a danger of quid pro quo or pay-to-play arrangements in contract awards under ballot issues. Our holding, however, is that the appearance of impropriety in the contribution to a ballot issue is not compelling enough to support Amendment 54's restriction on subsequent sole source contracts. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 908 (<HOLDING>). This definition is essential to understanding

    ### Response:
    recognizing the acceptable regulation of the ap45 an example of a similar approach can be found in citizens for responsible government state political action committee v davidson 236 f3d 1174 119496 10th cir200046 we note that we have already found the majority of section 16 constitutional while we remove references to sole source government contracts for overbreadth the government contract summary and its disclosure requirements for all government contract holders are constitutional in and of themselves therefore we address section 16 in relation to the amendment as a whole later in part viiicwe also note that section 13 titled applicability and effective date is no longer pertinent47 see supra parts iii  iv48 see supra part vi49 see supra part iii50 see supra part iii51 see supra part v52 see supra part iii53 see supra part vjustice martinezdissentingi agree with the majority although on a somewhat different basis that the prohibition of all contributions from sole source government contractors in section 15 of amendment 54 is overbroad because it extends to any elected official of any political subdivision of the state see maj op at 628 i also agree that the union pac prohibition of section 245 violates the equal protection clause see maj op at 685 however analyzing the amendment as a whole and in light of its stated purpose those provisions that are constitutionally offensive can be severed from the rest of the amendment leaving behind a meaningful enactment albeit reduced in seope cf city of lakewood v colfax unlimited assn inc 634 p2d 52 7071 colo1981 discussing severability doctrine the majority on the other hand fragments its analysis and weighs a number of the provisions against a far narrower purpose than preventing the appearance of impropriety in doing so the majority confusingly appears to hold nearly every provision invalid on independent constitutional grounds while declaring in a footnote that it is only the amendment as a whole that is unconstitutional thus severely hindering any future attempt to address the appearance of impropriety in campaign contributions therefore i respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority nullifying amendment 54 in its entiretyamendment 54 suffers from two critical constitutional deficiencies the first involves the overbreadth of section 15 which states that sole source contractors may not make contributions for the benefit of any political party or for the benefit of any candidate for any elected office of the state or any of its political subdivisions emphasis added this provision of amendment 54 is overbroad if it restricts a substantial amount of protected expressionpolitical contributionsin relation to its plainly legitimate sweeppreventing the appearance of impropriety in awarding nobid government contracts see virginia v hicks 539 us 113 11819 123 sct 2191 156 led2d 148 2008 a crossjurisdictional ban of the scope suggested by the language of amendment 54 although certainly tailored to rooting out appearances of impropriety is simply too fervent in its pursuit of that objective by extending to contributions to any elected official of any political subdivision section 15 unconstitutionally restricts a substantial amount of protected expression in relation to its legitimate sweep see idhowever i disagree with the majority that in order to avoid overbreadth the amendments prohibitions must be tailored to only those government officials who have some control over awarding nobid contracts see maj op at 627 limiting the scope in such an overlynarrow manner ignores the issue of appearances altogether and focuses only on actual impropriety instead by simply striking the language or any of its political subdivisions the seope of section 15 is narrowed to apply only to contributions made to political parties and candidates for elected offices of the state severing the language in this manner resolves the overbreadth and addresses the stated purpose of amendment 54 which is to prevent both actual and apparent impropriety although this is far narrower in operation than what the sponsors of the amendment had in mind such a narrowing prevents a total invalidation of section 15 the heart of amendment 54the second critical deficiency of amendment 54 pertains to the definition of contract holder in section 245
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ordered Flick to return to her house. Leonard followed Flick to her home, where he handcuffed her and held her at gunpoint. Leonard confessed to firing three shots into Flick’s head from close range. Leonard also told police that just before he shot Flick, he had been on top of her with his pants down because they had “decided to [have sexual intercourse] on the floor.” Although Leonard’s confession suggests that Flick had consented, there was substantial evidence of forcible sexual con duct, and a rational trier of fact could find Leonard guilty of attempted rape. See, e.g., State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 576, 660 N.E.2d 724; State v. Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 274-275, 643 N.E.2d 524. But cf. State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 114-115, 666 N.E.2d 1099 (<HOLDING>). Police found Flick’s body lying in a pool of

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that victims body was found naked that victim had been seen pushing the defendant away before she was shot and that there were possible finger marks on one of the victims thighs was insufficient evidence to support attemptedrape conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the form and content of that writing. Morgan makes clear that a debtor must satisfy these state procedural requirements in order to perfect a homestead exemption in bankruptcy. In other words, Morgan establishes that when a state opts out of the federal exemption scheme, the debtor’s right to an' exemption is subject to state rules of procedure. See Morgan, 689 F.2d at 472; see also Dominion Bank, 780 F.2d at 417 (Hoffman, D.J., concurring specially) (“[.Morgan] rested on Virginia’s having opted out because, by so doing, bankruptcy exemptions depend on Virginia law both for substance and for procedure.”); In re Pinner, 146 B.R. at 660 (noting that exemptions of bankruptcy debtors in North Carolina depend on state law for both substance and procedure); In re Swift, 96 F.Supp. at 46 (<HOLDING>). But cf. Matter of Crowell, 138 F.3d 1031,

    ### Response:
    holding that virginia statute limiting time to set apart homestead exemption permissibly regulated procedure in bankruptcy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We have never ruled on the question of whether service on a partner’s attorney, when the partnership has not specifically designated the attorney to receive service, can constitute service on the partnership. Several jurisdictions which have ruled on this issue have held that service on a defendant’s attorney will not effect service on the defendant unless that defendant has authorized the attorney to receive such service. See, e.g., Santos v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir.1990) (“[Sjervice of process on an attorney not authorized to accept service for his client is ineffective.”) (citing 4A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1097 (2d ed. 1987)); Leonard v. Stuart-James Co., Inc., 742 F.Supp. 653, 662 (N.D.Ga.1990) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the analysis in those cases and

    ### Response:
    holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I conclude that Michaud failed to pursue available reasonable avenues to complain about the alleged harassment. Thus she cannot succeed in holding Leslie Fay liable for the mistreatment of its low level supervisor, Guarilia, particularly since there is no convincing evidence that Guarilia used whatever small authority he had to effect changes in Michaud’s working environment. She still used her office and porter and she still had regular lunch times and breaks. His unreported demeaning of her physical condition is insufficient to foist liability on Leslie Fay, for his snide comments could just as easily have been made by a coworker as a supervisor; in other words, he did not use his position to abuse her. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Because Michaud has not shown that Leslie Fay

    ### Response:
    holding that employer not liable for hostile work environment caused by plaintiffs lowlevel supervisor absent notice or the failure to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 94) (explaining that he did not believe, prior to the July 1, 2008 meeting, that Plaintiff would be terminated but that, prior to the meeting, he “didn’t know about two others — about two major factors: the 2007 payments and the financial statement”). In light of the affidavits and the admitted actions taken by Plaintiff without approval of the TCPFA as a whole, the Court finds no genuine question of fact as to whether (1) Miller’s recusal, or (2) any further evidentiary hearings would have prevented Plaintiffs termination. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that he would been terminated anyway. See Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon, 894 F.Supp. 614, 622 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (finding as a matter of law that “a pre-termination hearing would not have staved off’ the plaintiffs termination) (<HOLDING>).” V. § 1983 Liberty Interest Claim In his

    ### Response:
    holding therefore that although defendants failure to provide plaintiff with sufficient notice of termination and a pretermination hearing violated his right to procedural due process defendants motion for summary judgment should be granted insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from recovering more than a nominal amount
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). See, e.g., ZiLOG, Inc. v. Corning (In re ZiLOG, Inc.), 450 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir.2006) (“A party who knowingly violates the discharge injunction can be held in contempt under section 105(a) of the bankruptcy code.”); Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1189-90 (“Although the availability of civil contempt sanctions under § 105(a) has a checkered past in our circuit, the recent precedent makes clear that this remedy is available.” (footnote omitted)); Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); State of Cal. Employment Dev. Dep’t. v. Taxel

    ### Response:
    holding that  524a may be enforced by the bankruptcy courts contempt power under  105a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in this matter indicates that, while Plaintiff may have worked primarily and predominantly on vessels in drydock or otherwise on land, some of the exposures to benzene did occur on navigable waters. The Court does not, however, find merit to Defendants’ contention that in such “mixed exposures” situations, the presence of some exposures on navigable waters allows the Court to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s potential claims. Upon examination of the authorities cited by Defendants in support of this proposition, the Court finds that those cases in fact hold that admiralty jurisdiction exists in mixed exposure cases only to the extent of those exposures which have occurred on navigable waters and have expressly met the locality test. See Woessner, 757 F.2d at 638 (<HOLDING>); Harville v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the locality requirement for admiralty jurisdiction was met only to the extent that the claims arose from exposures that occurred on navigable waters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    174 F.3d at 748. Connie argues, however, that jeopardy attached in her case because George had already been tried at the time the indictment against her had been dismissed. Connie’s argument is misplaced, as she cannot assert George’s jeopardy rights. Connie’s trial had been severed from George’s and had not yet begun when the original indictment was dismissed and the superseding indictment filed. Accordingly, jeopardy did not attach to the charges against Connie. Finally, Connie asserts that the illegality of the original indictment somehow ert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024, 119 S.Ct. 2371, 144 L.Ed.2d 775 (1999). On appeal, George concedes that the panel decision in Singleton has been overruled and acknowledges this court’s decision in United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1045, 119 S.Ct. 1348,

    ### Response:
    holding that  201c which penalizes an individual for giving anything of value in exchange for testimony does not apply to the united states government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    677 A.2d 350 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996); City of Lancaster v. Lancaster County, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 476, 599 A.2d 289 (1991). 33 . Although two appellee briefs were filed, one on behalf of the Pierce plaintiffs and one on behalf of the Clifton plaintiffs, we will present their arguments collectively. 34 . Although not directly addressing the contours of a facial challenge, we have addressed the differences between facial and as-applied challenges in a number of scenarios, often for procedural purposes. See, e.g., Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners v. City of Philadelphia, 594 Pa. 468, 937 A.2d 385, 392 n. 7 (2007) (""[A]s-applied challenges require applica tion of the ordinance to be ripe, facial challenges are different, and ripe upon mere enactment of the ordinance.”); Beattie, 907 A.2d at 527-29 (<HOLDING>); Lehman v. Pa. State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 839

    ### Response:
    holding that court can exercise equity jurisdiction over taxpayers challenge that property assessment system is unconstitutional facially or asapplied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is expressly made subject to “management’s reasonable discretion,” Ex. A at 6, and the word “encourages” is permissive, not mandatory language. The D.C. Court of Appeals has found that the use of such permissive language in a personnel manual is, as a matter of law, insufficient to create contractual rights. Perkins v. Dist. Gov’t Employees Fed. Credit Union, 653 A.2d 842, 843 (D.C.1995) (determining that language stating that employer “in [its] discretion ... may” take certain actions was insufficient to conclude that the parties intended to create a contract). The cited provisions cannot be considered to be “rationally at odds” with the Handbook’s disclaimer of contractual intent. See Hopkins v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, No. 10-900, 2010 WL 5300536, at 4 (D.D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, under District of Columbia law,

    ### Response:
    holding that compensation and performance guidelines were not rationally at odds with handbooks disclaimer language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    traditional contract. See Big Horn Coal, 916 F.2d at 1502; Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (“Unlike the commercial contract, which is designed to be a comprehensive distillation of the parties' bargain, the collective bargaining agreement is a skeletal, interstitial document.""). 2 . The record suggests that some of the debtors filed for bankruptcy before they had completed the ninety days of employment required to become participating employees. See, e.g., 4 Aplt.App. 887. Trustees correctly note that this does not prevent these debtors' interest in the SARs from becoming property of the bankruptcy estate, 4 Aplt.App. 967. See, e.g., DeNadai v. Preferred Capital Markets, Inc., 272 B.R. 21, 30-31 (D.Mass.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, absent these debtors' continued

    ### Response:
    holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supra, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1220; see also Gamble, supra, 218 N.J. at 431-32, 95 A.3d 188. The protective sweep exception in the automobile setting does not turn solely on the 53 (2003) (same). We disagree, however, with the trial court’s conclusion that Officer Ceei’s search of the car was a valid protective sweep. There is no doubt that Officer Ceci’s concerns that defendant and Henderson could be armed were justified. Prompted by the dispatcher, the officer properly relied on information provided by the NCIC database, which is used nationwide to protect police officers “who are at risk when they approach individuals during a traffic stop.” Sloane, supra, 193 N.J. at 434, 939 A.2d 796 (citing United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>)). The setting in which the stop took place —

    ### Response:
    recognizing that concerns for officer safety warrant criminal history check during traffic stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    filed recently by this Court, we rejected the argument that Richardson and Trujillo required the application of intermediate scrutiny when deciding the constitutionality of another statute of repose, NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-27 (Repl.Pamp.1990) (placing a ten-year limitation on actions for injuries resulting from “the defective or unsafe condition of a physical improvement to real property”). Both Richardson and Trujillo addressed the constitutionality of damage caps, which limited the amount of damages an individual otherwise entitled to recover damages could collect. See Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 623-32, 798 P.2d at 573-82 (addressing the constitutionality of NMSA 1978, Section 41-4-19(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1986), the Tort Claims Act’s damage cap); Richardson, 107 N.M. at 699, 763 P.2d at 1164 (<HOLDING>). Both cases recognized that an individual’s

    ### Response:
    holding that nmsa 1978 section 411111 replpamp1986 the damage cap in the dramshop act was unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    us in the investigation, settlement, and defense of any claim or lawsuit. Failure to cooperate with us may result in the denial of the claim.” The letter contains two conclusory statements that the plaintiff provided false information during the presentation of the claim and also states that she breached the cooperation clause of the policy. But all of the facts recited in the letter relate only to the provision of allegedly false information on the topic of where plaintiff was previously licensed. Compare Jertson v. Hartley, 342 Mass. 597, 601-602 (1961) (detailing false information that insurance company pointed to as evidence of noncooperation as provided in connection with claim); Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Vella, 366 Mass. 651, 654-655 (1975), quoting from Jertson, supra (<HOLDING>); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 364

    ### Response:
    recognizing that intentional furnishing of false information of a material nature is breach of cooperation clause and discussing misrepresentations provided during investigation and trial of claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    breached their parental duties to Niclas and that such conduct resulted in his death. (Doc. 32 at ¶ 35 (alleging that the Vanhorns while acting as Niclas’s host parents “were acting in loco parentis”).) To the extent such duties may have existed, they would only have arisen through the Vanhorns’ responsibilities as Niclas’s host family. (See Medical Release, Doc. 40-1 at 17; Participation Agreement, id. at 18; Liability Release, id. at 28-29); see Avenoso, 2006 WL 490340, at *5 (noting that the plaintiffs own affidavit confirmed the conduct occurred in the course and scope of the volunteer activity). That is the case even if World Experience was not aware of the individualized choices the Vanhorns made on a day-to-day basis regarding that role. See Elliot, 2007 WL 757891, at *3 (<HOLDING>). The Vanhorns were acting within the course

    ### Response:
    holding that the individual supervising a sixteen yearold when he drowned at a la quinta inn while on a trip with a community youth basketball team was immune pursuant to the volunteer protection act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Smith (In re BCE West, L.P.), 319 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir.2003) (“Our analysis under the general rules of statutory construction begins with the language of the statute itself.”) (citation omitted). The statute and implementing regulation, Regulation Z, both substantively contemplate mandatory tender at some procedural point. Regulation Z makes this completely mandatory as to money (which Plaintiff here has previously received in the form of a loan), while appearing to qualify the obligor’s return of property with an equitable option of returning the property’s reasonable value. The broader statutory scheme does not contradict this. Multiple cases have agreed. See, e.g., Merriman v. Beneficial Mortgage Co. of Kansas, Inc. (In re Merriman), 329 B.R. 710, 718 (Bankr.D.Kan. 2005) (<HOLDING>); Kratz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86479 at *8,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the reciprocal payment obligations of the lender and borrower under tila section 1635b and regulation z section 22623d
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of subsidiary). Courts are powerless to compel arbitration in the absence of a contract in which both parties have agreed to submit their grievances to arbitration. Acevedo v. Caribbean Transp., Inc., 673 So.2d 170, 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). It is hornbook law that to be bound one must be a party to a contract, and ensual foundation is wholly consistent with federal policy. The requirement also makes perfect sense. Subject matter jurisdiction over an action or series of claims can be conceptualized as conferring a personal right on the parties to have that action, or those claims, adjudicated in a judicial forum. See e.g. Pacemaker Diag. Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 100, 83 L.Ed.2d 45 (1984) (<HOLDING>); accord, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the federal litigant has a personal right subject to exceptions in certain classes of cases to demand article iii adjudication of a civil suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to attend all court hearings including trial and arraignment and was required to contact Pretrial Services on a weekly basis, and he was prohibited from traveling outside of New Jersey. Id. Here it is uncontradicted that the plaintiff surrendered pursuant to an arrest warrant; therefore, the legal process requirement is met. She had her liberty restricted in the following manner: she surrendered pursuant to an arrest warrant and attended her arraignment, she was required to post $500.00 bond, and she was further required to attend all proceedings pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.Pro. 526. Gallo, controls and we find that the plaintiff had her liberty sufficiently restricted to be considered “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. See also Williams v. Fedor, 69 F.Supp.2d 649, 670 (M.D.Pa.1999) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Murray cites Bristow v. Clevenger,

    ### Response:
    holding that the requirements inherent in the criminal process  that the accused submit to processing and appear in court as required  are sufficient restraints on liberty to constitute a seizure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    part of the adjudication of property issues in the course of the divorce proceeding. Richard’s obligation was subsequently reduced to a writ of execution in the amount of $4,869.70. This debt falls squarely within, the exception to discharge created by section 523(a)(15) because it is a debt to a former spouse that was incurred in the course of a divorce proceeding, see 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(15), and it was therefore not extinguished by the discharge. [¶ 12] Additionally, before Richard obtained the bankruptcy discharge, the court ordered him to pay $353.44 to Suzan for the costs she incurred in bringing her contempt motion. This payment obligation is also a debt described in section 523(a)(15) and therefore was not discharged. See In re Prensky, 416 B.R. 406, 411-12 (Bankr.D.N.J.2009) (<HOLDING>). B. Debts Payable Directly to Creditors [¶ 13]

    ### Response:
    holding that a debt for attorney fees incurred by an exspouse in a postjudgment divorce contempt proceeding was nondischargeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its obvious effect on plaintiff. As her supervisor, Lewis knew that plaintiff’s absenteeism had increased since his actions commenced. Further, plaintiff frequently described to Lewis her anxiety regarding her financial situation, a predicament at least partially caused by Lewis’s refusual to perform mandatory salary reviews. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Lewis’s harassment constituted extreme and outrageous conduct, and that it caused emotional distress which no reasonable woman could endure. See Pyle v. Pyle, 11 Ohio App.3d 31, 463 N.E.2d 98 (1983). Further, as established in the previous section, the defendant is liable for the tort of its supervisor under the theory of respondeat superior. See Stranahan Bros. Catering v. Coit, 55 Ohio St. 398, 45 N.E. 634 (1896) (<HOLDING>). Damages Plaintiff may recover back pay in an

    ### Response:
    holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preserved for review. Even if Polite had preserved this issue for review, we believe that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to secure admission of the statement under section 90.803(5). The hearsay exception for past recollection recorded provides: Section 90.803(5) Recorded Recollection The provision of s. 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (5) Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge, but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory and to reflect that knowledge ) (<HOLDING>); Montano v. State, 846 So.2d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA

    ### Response:
    holding audiotape recordings were inadmissible as past recollection recorded where witnesses did not testify that the recordings accurately reflected their memories of events when made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    honored Kenny’s request [for a raise] and [he] sent a memo to Mr. Struminger regarding an increase in [Carter’s] pay during a rerouting period that they were not prepared to do at which time his pay would have gone up ... [Struminger] indicated that that was not our pay structure and that he couldn’t make modifications to our pay structure for an individual. (Id., Gwaltney Dep. at 182-83.) Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence that VLS’s inability to recalculate the routes he supervised was tied to his resistance to Miller’s firing of Tawwaab. Carter is unable to point to any situation where an individual who did not engage in protected activity received an increase in pay due to a route recalculation. See, e.g., Obi v. Anne Arundel County, Md., 28 Fed.Appx. 333, 336 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As such, Plaintiff has failed to put forth

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff failed to rebut the defendants proffered reason for increasing employees level of pay by failing to show that plaintiffs treatment was disproportionate with individuals who did not engage in protected activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the motion was made primarily to withhold evidence from the anticipated grand jury hearings and, therefore, not made ‘solely for the return of property.’ ” Uresti, 724 F.2d at 1159. The trial court found and we agree that Appellants’ motion is primarily intended to withhold evidence from the Oklahoma grand jury. Not only did Appellants indicate to the trial court that they were seeking suppression, but also they failed to demonstrate a business need for return of the property as Appellees provided Appellants with copies of all of the seized items. Finally, the fact that Appellants are simultaneously seeking a suppression remedy under Franks strongly suggests that this motion is not intended solely or primarily for the mere return of property. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (<HOLDING>). This is a suppression case. We agree with the

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    asserts that Doe 24.5.180.56’s copyright registration argument is frivolous because Plaintiff has alleged that it has a currently pending copyright application for the Work in the United States Copyright Office, Id. (citing Complaint at ¶ 20), and the Ninth Circuit has found that the United States Copyright Office’s receipt of a complete copyright application satisfies the registration requirement of a copyright infringement action. Id. at 4 (citing Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir.2010)). F. Voluntary Dismissal of Doe Defendants 1-5 On August 10, 2011, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Does 1-5 from the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. III. MAGISTRATE JURISDICTION UNDER 3d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiff has consented to magistrate

    ### Response:
    holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter default judgment in an in rem forfeiture action even though property owner had not consented to it because 28 usc  636c1 only requires the consent of the parties and the property owner having failed to comply with the applicable filing requirements was not a party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is sought, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(i), and the wiretap must not be a “subterfuge search,” actually directed at crimes other than those specified in the application, United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir.1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Garrison argues that the wiretaps targeting him were not intended to develop evidence of drug crimes, as claimed, but actually a subterfuge for investigating the murder of “an Aurora confidential informant.” (ECF No. 611 at 2, 4, 35-38.) ’ | If true, this would be a material omission, supporting a Franks challenge. Thus, if Garrison wishes to attack the wiretap applications with' evidence outside of what the issuing judge considered, he must show he is entitled to a Franks hearing. See Oregon-Cortez, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1170-72 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. McDowell, 520

    ### Response:
    holding as much
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Bernabe. Some time later, they came out and walked to Renteria, Appellant, and Bernabe’s car. After they talked, the confidential informant walked to his truck. While walking to his truck, the confidential informant gave the signal that he had seen the money. The confidential informant drove away, leading iable because some staged drug buys he had participated in before did not lead to arrests and because he did not meet the informant at the originally planned location. Sergeant Brawner testified that it is common for drug buys not to be completed because the other person never brings the drugs or the money. He explained that this does not mean that the informant was wrong or gave bad information. The trial court was entitled to credit this testimony. See Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, it was the trial court’s province

    ### Response:
    holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ruling on Cynthia’s motion to reconsider, the court entered a decree giving the Moores a judgment on their motion for summary judgment. Cynthia filed her notice of appeal on March 14. Our rules require appeals to our court must be taken within, and not after, thirty days from the entry of the order, judgment, or decree being appealed. Iowa R.App. P. 6.101(1)(6 ). A failure to file a timely notice of appeal leaves us without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Doland v. Boone County, 376 N.W.2d 870, 876 (Iowa 1985). The Moores contend Cynthia should have filed her notice of appeal thirty days from February 1, 2007, the date of the court’s original ruling. Under most situations, they would be correct. See Flynn v. Lucas County Mem’l Hosp., 203 N.W.2d 613, 614-15 (Iowa 1973) (<HOLDING>) superseded by statute on other grotmds as

    ### Response:
    holding a ruling on a motion for summary judgment adjudicating the rights of a party is a final judgment subject to appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    receipt requested, but this applied only to mail within the state. Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 90 (July 24, 1967). Rule 4(h) was amended in 1977 to allow for service by registered or certified mail anywhere in the United States. Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 266 (March 31, 1977). 26 . AS 09.05.015(a)(3) provides: A court of this state having jurisdiction over the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action according to the rules of civil procedure (3) in an action claiming injury to person or property in or out of this state arising out of an act or omission in this state by the defendant{[.] 27 . Hawai'i 1, 967 P.2d 1059 (1998). 28 . Id. at 1060, 1061. 29 ._ Id. at 1064. 30 . Id. 31 . Id. at 1062-63. 32 . E.g., Dew v. Appleberry, 23 Cal.3d 630, 15 Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F.Supp. 240, 241-42

    ### Response:
    holding that californias tolling statute could not constitutionally be applied to a nonresident entering into a sales transaction with a resident since the nonresident was engaged in interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the court will grant summary judgment to Amtrak on all claims. 1 . That court was abolished in 1997, and its jurisdiction transferred to this court. See 45 U.S.C. § 719(b)(2). 2 . Amtrak also notes that affirmative covenants are commonly considered to be encumbrances. See, e.g., Boyle v. Lake Forest Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 765, 769 (S.D.Ala.1982) (stating that ""an affirmative covenant running with the land” is an ""encumbrance”); Magraw v. Dillow, 341 Md. 492, 671 A.2d 485, 490 (1996) (""The word [encumbrance] has no precise meaning but includes ... covenants running with the land at the time of conveyance ....”) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); O’Neill v. Van Tassel, 137 N.Y. 297, 33 N.E. 314, 315 (1893) (<HOLDING>); Blain v. Taylor, 19 Abb.Pr. 228

    ### Response:
    holding that a covenant running with the land which compels the owner to rebuild and repair a wall in the same manner as when originally constructed  cannot be regarded in any other light than as a perpetual incumbrance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on potential traffic citations. Because the Fourth Amendment establishes “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures,” however, the wrong that the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent is completed when a motorcyclist is cited without probable cause. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354, 94 S.Ct. 613, 623, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (“The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy of one’s person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of these areas of an individual’s life. That wrong ... is fully accomplished by the original search without probable cause.”); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964,

    ### Response:
    holding that given the fundamental right involved namely the right to be free from unreasonable searches the plaintiff had sufficiently shown likelihood of irreparable harm for preliminary injunction purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can be considered even if child living elsewhere at time of events). Between December 2006 and September 2007, she was kicked out of the Rose Home shelter for violent conduct, she then attempted suicide, and then resided at various points in time in a hospital, in a shelter, or was homeless. Although none of her conduct at that time was directed at harming R.A., endangering conduct is not limited to actions directed toward the child. See In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 844 (endangering acts need not be directed at or actually cause injury to child). The trial court could reasonably determine that Jordan’s propensity for violence against herself and others, want of self control, and transient lifestyle would endanger R.A. by giving him a life of instability and uncertainty. See id. at 845 (<HOLDING>); In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 358, 367

    ### Response:
    holding trial court could have considered mothers desire to hurt herself and her history of noncompliance with her medication schedule as factors endangering child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pleaded no facts to indicate otherwise. (See Doc. # 13). Under Alabama Code § 35-10-12, “any person or entity who, before initiating foreclosure proceedings, becomes a holderoí a promissory note secured by a mortgage and thereby is entitled to the payment of the mortgage debt may validly foreclose upon a borrower’s default.” Sturdivant, 159 So.3d at 55 (citing Perry, 100 So.3d at 1094, Ala. Code § 35-10-12) (emphasis in original). In other words, “[a] holder of a note secured by a mortgage is entitled to enforce the terms of the note.” Id. (citing Perry, 100 So.3d at 1094). The holder of a mortgage in Alabama is not required to be qualified to do business in Alabama in order to enforce the mortgage. See Midwest Homes Acceptance Corp. v. Langdon, 287 Ala. 521, 253 So.2d 29, 30-31 (1971) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Defendant may foreclose on

    ### Response:
    holding that alabama law per mits foreign corporations to lend money to residents of alabama and to take security for such loans in the form of mortgages on real property located within the state and to enforce such obligations in the courts of alabama
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    franchise, like the reserve clause discussed in Flood, is an integral part of the business of professional baseball and falls within the exemption. In the past, we have deemed it proper to look to decisions made under corollary federal statutes “of a similar character for the principle by which to construe our own statute.” Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. at 517, 121 N.W. at 399. Accordingly, we hold that the conduct of the Twins being investigated by the Attorney General is exempt from Minnesota, as well as federal, antitrust laws. Enforcement of the CIDs against the Twins is therefore outside the scope of the Attorney General’s authority because no enforcement action could follow. See Phoenix Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 521 F.Supp. 828, 830 (D.Ariz.1981) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Because as a matter of law

    ### Response:
    holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    less arbitrary and more equal sentences.” State v. Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 345; see also State v. O’Connor, supra, 105 N.J. at 408-410 (discussing the specific procedures that a sentencing court must follow in order to comply with the statutory scheme). Our review of these policies leads us to conclude that a term of imprisonment as a condition of probation is permissible where the presumption of non-imprisonment governs a defendant’s sentence. In reaching this result, we reject defendant’s contention that the term imprisonment as used in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e means any imprisonment, and that the presumption against incarceration therefore bars imposition of a split sentence. See State v. Hess, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 327-28; see also State v. Jones, 197 N.J.Super. 604, 609 (App.Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). In our view, a sentence of imprisonment under

    ### Response:
    holding that the term imprisonment    means any imprisonment in a case involving the presumption of incarceration of njsa 2c441d
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the United States nor the District of Columbia may be held liable based on the MVSRA in this case. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court shall GRANT Defendant United States’ [13] Motion to Dismiss and GRANT Defendant District of Columbia’s [6] Motion for Summary Judgment. The United States and the District of Columbia shall be dismissed from further proceedings in this case. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Sullivan individually filed an Answer to Sheppard’s Complaint on March 6, 2009. 2 . All parties agree that the law of the District of Columbia, the situs of the accident and the alleged negligence, governs Sheppard’s claims against the United States and the District of Columbia. Cf. Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Although Sheppard repeatedly remarks that

    ### Response:
    holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    addressed to another party (the promisee) that the promisor will perform some action or refrain from some action in the future. Kacak, 869 N.E.2d at 1242. Here, we agree with Sterling that the Invoice 2 and 3 verification letters wherein Hammert's confirmed that NSE's work, product or service was complete and accepted and there were no joint check requests, offsets, credits, debits or counterclaims of any kind, and that the job was not subject to any payment bonds, contractors bonds, or other bonded obligations were promises that Hammert's would not assert claims or defenses to reduce the value of the invoices. As to the second argument that there is no detrimental reliance in this case, our review of the designated material reveals stries, 90 Mich.App. 429, 280 N.W.2d 827, 829 (1979) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we

    ### Response:
    holding that account debtor that completed verification letter estopped to deny liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    father attempts to appeal from the order granting mother rule 60(b) relief in this separate abuse and neglect proceeding (circuit court file 01-025). Neither the order, the memorandum opinion, nor the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on that motion appear in this file or are a part of the record made by father. However, they are included in the appendix to the State’s brief. Procedurally, it appears father has failed to perfect his appeal from that order and present it to this Court for review. At any rate, we reach the merits of this argument. B. Merits of Argument [¶ 7.] SDCL 15-6-60(b) permits a court, among other things, to relieve a party from a final judgment within a reasonable time for any reason justifying relief. Matter of J.M.J., 368 N.W.2d 602, 607 (S.D.1985) (<HOLDING>). “Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy which

    ### Response:
    holding denial of a petition to vacate a termination order was reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barring Dodson from relitigating that issue would not offend “the primary purposes of collateral estoppel,” which are “to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, promote judicial economy, and protect litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation.” Riverdale Dev. Co., LLC v. Ruffin Bldg. Sys., Inc., 356 Ark. 90, 146 S.W.3d 852, 858 (2004) (quotation omitted). As all of the elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied, Dodson II precludes relitigation of whether, upon dissolution of Dodson and Lay’s marriage, UAMS acquired full authority to control the disposition of the embryos. That finding forecloses Dodson from establishing a constitutional deprivation based on her alleged right to control the disposition of her embryos. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn.1992) (<HOLDING>). The bulk of Dodson’s § 1983 claim is founded

    ### Response:
    holding that disputes involving the disposition of frozen embryos should be resolved first by looking at progenitors prior agreement concerning disposition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    litigation conduct_” Id. at 916. Nevertheless, other courts have recognized that the procedural straight jacket imposed by the mandatory dismissal approach tends to advance form over substance and, in some cases, may produce unjust or prejudicial consequences. See, e.g., In re Benny, 842 F.2d at 1147 (overruling an objection based on lack of jurisdiction when the issue was not raised until 18 months after commencement of the involuntary chapter 7 case and more than one year after the voluntary conversion to a chapter 11 case); Bank of America, N.A. v. Weese, 277 B.R. at 242 (reversing an order of dismissal where dismissal of the joint involuntary petition would have jeopardized recovery of millions of dollars fraudulently transferred to an offshore trust); In re Gale, 177 B.R. at 536 (<HOLDING>). The same concerns noted in these cases are

    ### Response:
    holding that the the reluctance to honor form over substance should be particularly acute when dealing with a bankruptcy petition as dismissal and the subsequent filing of a new petition could have a significant impact on the trustees ability to challenge prepetition property transactions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from “discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer.” Cf Samples v, Fla. Birth-Related Neurological, 40 So.3d 18, 22 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (declining to apply principle that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed where the statutory language was unambiguous). The language that the legislature enacted is “discovery of the transfer,” and it is that understanding we are obliged to follow. The decision in Schmidt took the remedial-purpose argument a step farther and reasoned that interpreting the savings clause in accord with its plain language is so inconsistent with that purpose that it leads to absurd results and thus justifies departing from the clear text of the savings clause. 319 P.3d at 427; see also Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 448 (Fla. 2006) (<HOLDING>). We cannot agree. The text of section 726.110

    ### Response:
    holding that a literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appellant’s brief at 5 (capitalization omitted). , Appellant’s -argument relies heavily on the United States,(Supreme Court’s holding in Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), which he maintains extends a constitutional right to refuse to consent to chemical testing. Since both of appellant’s issues aver that appellant was exercising a constitutional right by refusing to consent to chemical testing, we must first determine whether McNeely establishes a constitutional right to refuse to submit to chemical testing in a DUÍ investigation. Our cases prior to McNeely indicate that no such constitutional right is afforded. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1141-1142 (Pa.Super.2007) (en banc), appeal denied, 603 Pa. 679, 982 A.2d 509 (2007) (<HOLDING>). In McNeely, unlike in the instant appeal, the

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    warrant for the property or person specified within fourteen days. The Fourth Amendment itself does not contain requirements about when a search or seizure must occur or the duration of the search. United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir.2005). However, unreasonable delay in the execution of a warrant that results in the lapse of probable cause will invalidate a warrant. Id,. Whether it is unconstitutional to conduct a forensic examination of information stored on a hard drive after the deadline specified in I.C. § 19-4412 and I.R.C.P 41(c) is a matter of first impression in Idaho. Washington Criminal Rule 2.3(e) provides that a search warrant must be executed within a specified period of time not to exceed ten days. In State v. Grenning, 142 Wash.App. d 809, 820 (2009)

    ### Response:
    holding a delay in search of a computer constitutional because a written return listing the electronic devices to be examined was filed within the statutorily required time frame
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who were sentenced for offenses which occurred after the effective date of the 2002 amendment to the SRA. Varga, 151 Wn.2d at 187. Our task was to determine whether, following the 2002 amendment to the SRA, it was proper for the sentencing judges to include convictions which would have washed out based upon prior statutes and court opinions. Id. We interpreted the 2002 amendment to the SRA as a clear expression from the legislature within the statute itself to redefine “criminal history” to be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively. Id. at 191, 193. In Varga, we stated, “[h]ere endment does not apply retroactively to revive defendant’s 1975 offense that washed out under former version of the SRA); see In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 111 Wn.2d 353, 361, 759 P.2d 436 (1988) (<HOLDING>); cf. State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 216, 743

    ### Response:
    holding 1986 sra amendment to wash out provision which took effect after defendants sentencing not applicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    labels torn off by mailroom staff. The mailroom staff took this action in reliance upon CDOC policy, which provides that mail may be censored if it contains “decorative stamps or stickers on the envelopes or contents.” R., Vol. I at 190-91. Whitington alleged this prevented him from writing back to the friend who had sent him the mail, thus purportedly violating his “right to due process and his first amendment right to write his friend.” Id. at 95 ¶ 124. “Correspondence between a prisoner and an outsider implicates the guarantee of freedom of speech under the First Amendment and a qualified liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1996). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409-19, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the instant case, the Commonwealth Court has been noting the new standard and either applying it directly or remanding for its application. See, e.g., T.T. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 48 A.3d 562 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012); A.S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 148 C.D. 2012, 2012 WL 8667590 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed 12/14/12); C.H. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 815 C.D.2012, 2012 WL 8681510 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed 11/13/12); D.J. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 1980 C.D.2011, 2012 WL 8699997 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed 9/17/12); J.M. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 52 A.3d 552 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012). 4 . Prior Commonwealth Court decisions have also required only substantial evidence in other administrative cases where loss of reputation and employment were at risk. See, e.g., Boguslawski v. Dep’t of Educ., 837 A.2d 614 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (<HOLDING>); and Ruane v. Shippensburg Univ., 871 A.2d 859

    ### Response:
    holding that revocation of a teachers certificate for immorality and intemperance was supported by substantial evidence notwithstanding his acquittal on criminal charges for improperly touching a child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the FDCPA. Second, he contends, the court erroneously found that the Firm’s failure to answer his First Request for Admissions did not constitute technical admissions that bound Gustino, the Firm’s sole practitioner and owner, for purposes of summary judgment. These arguments regarding the propriety of summary judgment are nonstarters, however, because a party may not appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits has occurred. Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188-84, 131 S.Ct. 884, 888-89, 178 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011) (“May a party, as the Sixth Circuit believed, appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits? Our answer is no.”) (footnote omitted); Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). An order denying summary judgment is “simply

    ### Response:
    holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    109 A. 707, 709 (R.I.1920) (“The memorandum is not the agreement on which the complainant brings suit. It is only a memorandum of the agreement.”). Because the agreement between the parties was ambiguous, the interpretation of that agreement is a question of fact which cannot be decided by this Court at the summary judgment stage. See ADP Marshall, 710 F.Supp.2d at 212. BJ’s also contends that, because Cappalli was a BJ’s member, she was bound by BJ’s rules of membership, including those contained in the P & C’s, regardless of her knowledge of those rules. The cases cited by BJ’s in support of this argument, however, all involve associations very different from the one at issue in the present case. See Post v. Belmont Country Club, Inc., 60 Mass.App.Ct. 645, 805 N.E.2d 63, 67 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Supreme Tent of Knights of

    ### Response:
    holding that a member of a golf club was charged with knowledge of an indemnity clause in the clubs membership handbook
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even if he were to prevail on the merits, it is far from clear to us that he would be entitled to withdraw only one portion of his plea. A plea agreement is a bargain, and generally, a defendant is not entitled to change only one part of that bargain. See State v. Turley, 149 Wn.2d 395, 400, 69 P.3d 338 (2003) (recognizing that, generally, a plea agreement is a package deal). The arguments before us have been couched in terms of whether the trial court erred in accepting the plea, not in terms of whether Easterlin should be allowed to withdraw some portion of his plea. Our disposition makes it unnecessary for us to resolve these perplexities. 2 We recognize that this was not so clear at the time Easterlin filed his appeal. See State v. Holt, 119 Wn. App. 712, 728, 82 P.3d 688 (2004) (<HOLDING>) (citing State v. Eastmond, 129 Wn.2d 497, 503,

    ### Response:
    holding the connection is an element
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appropriate to consider also whether the communication pertaining to a private figure touches upon a matter of public concern. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-56, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1985); see also Haueter, 61 Wn. App. at 583. If the plaintiff is a private figure and the defamatory message addresses a matter of purely private concern, the plaintiff need not show actual malice to recover damages. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763. We have previously reasoned a negligence standard should apply in private figure — private matter defamation cases. Haueter, 61 Wn. App. at 583; see also Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wn.2d 529, 534-35, 716 P.2d 842 (1986) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, if the plaintiff is a

    ### Response:
    holding that a private figure plaintiff offended by a statement about his private affairs should not be held to convincing clarity standard of proof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regarding prior inconsistent statements with a directive to the jury that it was the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, stating: “You are the sole judges of the facts and credibility of the witnesses and of the weight which you will give the testimony of each witness. After making your own judgment, give the testimony of each witness such weight, if any, as you think it deserves.” This instruction explicitly informed the jury that it was entitled to give a witness’s testimony no weight at all, if it so chose. Accordingly, the trial justice, though not using the precise words proffered by defendant, adequately instructed the jury about its authority to discredit the testimony of a witness who had been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement. See Adefusika, 989 A.2d at 477 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, “[w]e perceive neither error nor

    ### Response:
    holding that although the trial justice did not adopt the specific language that defendant requested be used in instructing the jury    the trial justice adequately and accurately instructed the jury as to that element of the charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    holding, the Gorman court reasoned: as a condition precedent to the enactment of the ordinance in question the legislature required under the provisions of section 16-701, supra, that a petition be presented to the city commission signed by the owners of not less than one-half in value of the property in the area sought to be annexed as shown by the last assessment and that said area must be contiguous to the city. Id. at 64, 216 P.2d at 403-04 (emphasis added). Therefore, according to the court, the admitted failure to satisfy the requirement of contiguity in A.R.S. § 9-471 (A) was also a failure to meet a condition precedent, and thus the City of Phoenix never possessed jurisdiction to annex. Id.; see also City of Erlanger v. Am. Isowall Corp., 607 S.W.2d 128, 131-32 (Ky.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); People ex rel. Karns v. Village of

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure to comply with sections requiring contiguous property or consent resulted in void annexation ordinances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    repeatedly retained by benefits plans may have an incentive to make a finding of ""not disabled"" in order to save their employers money and to preserve their own consulting arrangements. But the assumption that the opinions of a treating physician warrant greater credit than the opinions of plan consultants may make scant sense when, for example, the relationship between the claimant and the treating physician has been of short duration, or when a specialist engaged by the plan has expertise the treating physician lacks. And if a consultant engaged by a plan may have an incentive to make a finding of ""not disabled,"" so a treating physician, in a close case, may favor a finding of ""disabled.” Nord, 538 U.S. at 832, o., No. 02-10067-CIV, 2004 WL 2674352, at *4 (S.D.Fla. August 31, 2004) (<HOLDING>). However, plaintiff has cited no authority,

    ### Response:
    holding that it was wrong for an administrator to require a claimant suffering from fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome to submit objective medical evidence in support of her claim for benefits when the plan did not require such evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is that [w]hether in a particular case that standard [plaintiff’s burden of preponderance of the evidence] has been met with respect to the element of causation is normally a question of fact for the jury; the question is to be removed from the jury’s consideration only where it is clear that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue. In establishing a Prima [sic] facie case, the plaintiff need not exclude every possible explanation [...]; it is enough that reasonable minds are able to conclude that the preponderance of the evidence shows defendant’s conduct to have been a substantial cause of the harm to plaintiff. Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Pa.1978) (emphasis added); see also Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hosp., Inc., 502 Pa. 241, 465 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding where reasonable minds may differ questions of causation are for the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Finally, eBay has shown that it did not do anything that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. Clearly, “a use is not nominative if it creates a likelihood of confusion about the mark-holder’s affiliation or sponsorship.” Chambers v. Time Warner, No. 00 Civ. 2839(JSR), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3065, at *10, 2003 WL 749422, at *3, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2003); see also Dow Jones, 451 F.3d at 308 n. 14; Courtenay Commc’ns Corp. v. Hall, 334 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir.2003); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir.1998). However, the mere use of a trademarked term to describe something is not enough to suggest sponsorship or endorsement. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1155 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 803 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that even without explicit disclaimer no endorsement or sponsorship was suggested when there was no evidence in the record that rights holders were associated with the alleged infringers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    -, 131 S.Ct. 134, 178 L.Ed.2d 81, and cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 136, 178 L.Ed.2d 83 (2010); United States v. Molina, 469 F.3d 408, 416 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir.2006); see United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 517, 519 (5th Cir.2005) (dictum) (""After circulating this opinion to all members of the court, this panel has benefit-ted from and incorporated into the opinion many of their comments.... Booker contemplates that, with the mandatory use of the Guidelines excised, the Sixth Amendment will not impede a sentencing judge from finding all facts relevant to sentencing.”). 8 . At least five other circuits share our position, with no circuit appearing to take the opposite view. United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1017-18 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 280, 178

    ### Response:
    holding sentences need only be below the statutory maximum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future — because even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official government policy. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (City Council passed resolution firing plaintiff without a pretermination hearing). Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). The Pembaur Court explained that the “[a]uthority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment,” id. at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, and that ultimately “whether an official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law.” Id. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The court must identify who speaks with final

    ### Response:
    holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 61, Comment g (Tent.Draft No. 1, 1973).' There is no allegation that the Court of Claims was not a court of competent jurisdiction to decide the issues before it. As a court established under Article III of the Constitution (28 U.S.C. § 171), its judgments are entitled to full judicial weight. 2 . In its recent opinion in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), the Court held that a wrongful death action by the widow of a seaman injured as a result of the unseaworthiness of the defendant’s vessel was not merged into a judgment obtained by her husband for personal injuries that he suffered as a result of the unseaworthiness. The Court concluded: “Moragne [v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (<HOLDING>)] created a true wrongful-death remedy —

    ### Response:
    recognizing action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was legally and factually sufficient to establish that the property was contraband and that the seizure was valid. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Garza, 395 S.W.2d at 823. Accordingly we overrule appellant’s thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth issues. VIII. Conclusion Having overruled appellant’s fifteen issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1 . The property is located within one thousand feet of Cunningham Elementary School. See Tex Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.134(b)(1) (Vernon Supp.2006). 2 . The original search and arrest warrant established the proof necessary to issue the subsequent seizure warrant for the seizure of the real property in compliance with article 59.03. See State v. Anderson, 917 S.W.2d 92, 99-100 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). 3 . An ex post facto law (1) punishes as a

    ### Response:
    holding that personal knowledge gained by a police officer from a previous search may establish probable cause necessary for second search warrant if affidavit sets forth sufficient underlying facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forms the basis of this case is unambiguously described by that provision. (Footnote omitted; citation omitted). The majority noted: [W]e do not consider the propriety of a prosecution for any of the numerous fact patterns which might arise under other alternative additional portions of the statute, including some of the horribles, as paraded by the appellee, which seem to have frightened the trial judge. We may say, however, that ordinary rules of construction which require that a statute be read so as to avoid unconstitutional results, and absurd ones, would preclude any determination that it would be a felony for a visitor to carry a personal letter or a five dollar bill in his pocket or, indeed, to wear clothing while at a jail. See State v. Hardee, 504 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable construction of this

    ### Response:
    holding statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to mere possession of money on jail premises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2d ed.1995). 11 . See, eg., Ruiz, 89 F.3d at 326 (""[The courts of several states have struggled to decide whether [successor liability law] is a part of corporate law or tort law.""). 12 . See Webb v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 750 F.2d 368, 374 (5th Cir.1985). 13 . 89 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir.1996). 14 . See, e.g., Ede v. Mueller Pump Co., 652 F.Supp. 656, 658 n. 1 (D.Colo.1987), disagreed with on different grounds, Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 579-80 (10th Cir.1989); Reed v. Armstrong Cork Co., 577 F.Supp. 246, 248 (E.D.Ark.1983); Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., 472 F.Supp. 136, 141-42 (E.D.Mich.1979), declined to follow on other grounds, Johnson v. Ventra Group, Inc., 191 F.3d 732, 746 (6th Cir.1999). 15 . See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litigation (Bell), 517 A.2d 697, 699 (Del.Super.1986) (<HOLDING>); American Nonwovens, Inc. v. Non Wovens Eng'g,

    ### Response:
    holding that corporate law should apply because key question was legal effect of contracts between corporations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    single operational light and that the officer erroneously focused on whether both tag lights were functioning instead of on whether the tag was “clearly legible.” He contends that as long as he had a single operational light and the tag was “clearly legible,” he was not violating the statute and the officer did not have probable cause to stop him. We agree. In Gordon v. State, 901 So.2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), police officers conducted a traffic stop of Gordon’s car on the mistaken belief that driving with an object hanging from the rearview mi establish that Langello’s car was not equipped as required by law, and it made no attempt to establish that the car was unsafe. Accordingly, the stop was not authorized under section 316.610(1). See Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284, 290 (Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because the police did not have probable

    ### Response:
    holding that a stop for a cracked windshield is permissible only where an officer reasonably believes that the crack renders the vehicle in an unsafe condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    voluntary dismissal will not entitle him to toll the statute of limitations. See Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal.3d 353, 359, 142 Cal.Rptr. 696, 572 P.2d 755 (1977); Thomas v. Gilliland, 95 Cal.App.4th 427, 433, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 (2002). Thus, Johnson’s voluntary dismissal of his state court action is not an event to which equitable tolling applies. V Based on the foregoing, the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s claims against the defendants under § 1981 and under California Civil Code §§51 and 51.5 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s FEHA claims for failure to comply with the statute of limitations are AFFIRMED. 1 . Also named as defendants in thi Cal.3d 72, 81, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.4th

    ### Response:
    holding that female children excluded from membership in the boys club could bring claims against the organization
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and not complete diversity, this Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the unnamed plaintiffs who are real 'parties in interest as to the damages claims. The Supreme Court, Seventh Circuit, and district courts in this and other circuits have taken a different approach to assessing real-party-in-interest questions, pursuant to which courts examine the State’s interest in the action as a whole in deciding real-party-in-interest questions. See Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 463, 65 S.Ct. 3 use there was “absolutely no indication that the Attorney General sought to bring this class suit in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction * * * [t]his court will not disregard the presence of the Attorney General, the only plaintiff presently before the court”); Lann, 167 Ill.Dec. 252, 587 N.E.2d at 524-25 (<HOLDING>). As many courts have held, a State is not

    ### Response:
    holding that the state was a real party in interest when the attorney general filed suit under the illinois consumer fraud act on behalf of residents who were specifically aggrieved by violations of the act because the attorney general decides whether to bring the litigation and maintains control of it in her role as protector of the public and not as personal representative of the consumers for whom she seeks restitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the revised section 1441 unequivocally states: Congress kept the diversity jurisdiction and kept § 1441(c) as well, but made it inapplicable in diversity cases. Under the amendment, a removal under § 1441(e) is henceforth permitted only. in a federal question case, i.e., a case in which jurisdiction of the claim that furnishes the removal basis is one that arises under federal law. ‡ ¡K ‡ ‡ Whatever the reason for the 1990 amendment, the diversity case may no longer invoke removal under subdivision (c); only the federal question claim — a claim arising under federal law — will henceforth support a subdivision (c) removal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, Commentary on 1990 Revision (West Supp.1993). See 14A Charles A. Wright, et al, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3724 (Supp.1993) at 99-100 (<HOLDING>). Further, there is an alternative basis to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that  1441c limits removal to situations in which a federal question is joined with a separate and independent claim of a nonfederal nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    workers’ compensation cases by the court that has jurisdiction over the claim. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 50-6-204(a)(5), 50-6-225(a)(a). Because the statute relied upon by NHC, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-124(d), does not expressly state that appeals of decisions made by an employer’s utilization review program are solely or exclusively through the Commissioner’s utilization review program, it must be construed harmoniously with the provisions that allow appeals in workers’ compensation matters. Moreover, we believe that granting employees recourse through the Commissioner in addition to judicial review is consistent with the remedial purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (1999); see also McCall v. Nat’l Health Corp., 100 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tenn.2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    restitutionary provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664. This proposition presents a pure question of statutory interpretation and, as such, invites de novo review. See, e.g., Gifford, 17 F.3d at 472; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992). A. Conceptualizing the Problem. This ease falls into a grey area that separates two established legal principles. On one hand, although once problematic, see infra p. 35, it is by now settled that a government entity (local, state, or federal) may be a “victim” for purposes of the VWPA (and may be awarded restitution) when it has passively suffered harm resulting directly fro h Cir.1993) (similar) (dictum); United States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Finley, 783 F.Supp. 1123,

    ### Response:
    holding that money used by undercover government agent to purchase false identification documents is not recoverable under the vwpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of medical techniques and practices. As a result, Title VII is not applicable to the contention that the infertility exclusion has a greater impact on women because they are the ones who are required to undergo a majority of the treatment. The plaintiffs second argument fails because the plaintiff has not provided evidence that female participants in plaintiffs medical plan and their dependent spouses incurred disproportionately more of the costs of infertility treatments than did male plan participants and their dependent spouses. Plaintiffs evidence of the disparate impact caused by the Plan’s infertility exclusion is probably sufficient to demonstrate a discriminatory impact between male and female employees. Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., 939 F.2d 610, 612-14 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). However, the plaintiffs failed to analyze the

    ### Response:
    holding that medical evidence and a statistical study by the military was sufficient evidence to prove a discriminatory impact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to its being refiled. During this period of time, no progress was made toward confirmation of debtor’s Plan, which had been filed on January 12, 1995. On June 9, 1995, the UST filed a motion to establish a deadline by which an Amended Plan would be filed. By Order entered June 13, 1995, the debtor was given twenty days in which to file an Amended Plan. No Amended Plan was ever filed. The UST and Barbara Meyer filed motions to convert the case to Chapter 7 or, alternatively, to dismiss the case for failure to file an Amended Plan. The Court held a hearing on July 14,1995, on said motions. At that time, Mr. Desselle appeared and agreed that a confirmable Plan could not be filed, and he asked the Court to dismiss the case, rather than convert to Chapter 7. Since it appeared R.I.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Poseidon Pools of America, Inc., 180

    ### Response:
    holding that the detail provided in a fee application is of paramount importance to the courts determination that the requested fees should be allowed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the legislature's instream flow and RICD provisions,"" maj. op. 125. One of the problems the legislature sought to address in limiting the availability of RICDs was the concern that private parties could tie up excessive amounts of water in the stream, with little financial outlay. See Upper CGun-nison, 109 P.8d at 600-01. Diverting water for purposes of a flow-through right, by contrast, requires an appropriator to invest in a diversion structure. Thus, despite its concerns about the notion of instream appropriations, the legislature did not abrogate this court's holding in City of Fort Collins that an appropriator may divert water from a natural stream for beneficial uses including recreational, piscatorial, and wildlife uses. Compare City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d at 920, 930-31 (<HOLDING>), with § 87-92-103(7) (defining ""[dliversion""

    ### Response:
    holding that fort collinss nature dam which diverted water from the poudre river into its historic channel past a nature center removes  water from its natural course and puts that water to a beneficial use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have said so. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”). Where a federal statute provides for an unqualified right of review, it is impermissible to imply either an additional administrative requirement originating in state law (i.e. a finality requirement) or to recognize an exhaustion requirement by implication. See W. Radio Serv. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 530 F.3d 1186, 1195, n. 6 (9th Cir.2008) (citing AT & T Commc’n Sys. v. Pac. Bell, 203 F.3d 1183, 1184 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) ). Therefore, despite DRN’s and PADEP’s

    ### Response:
    holding that exhaustion is not required because the structure of the federal statute shows that congress did not intend to incorporate varying state exhaustion requirements into federal law as a prerequisite to federal district court review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an action at law [or] suit in equity.... 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There are two ways in which an individual may be held liable under § 1983 — he may be sued for his own personal actions (“direct liability”), or, under certain limited circumstances, for the actions of his subordinates (“supervisoral liability”), see, e.g., Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.1988). When a government official is sued under a theory of direct liability, he may seek summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. To even be potential ly eligible for summary judgment due to qualified immunity, the official must have been engaged in a “discretionary function” when he performed the acts of which the plaintiff complains. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (<HOLDING>). It is the burden of the governmental official

    ### Response:
    holding that qualified immunity extends to government officials performing discretionary functions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testified that he was competent to opine about such blood spatter patterns based on his training as a crime scene analyst, and attorney Smith testified that he did not make an additional objection because it was not necessary for Richards to be an expert to testify as he did. Ultimately, the postconviction court determined that Everett failed to show that attorney Smith was deficient. We agree. To the extent that Everett claims that attorney Smith was deficient for not making a subsequent objection about Richards’ qualifications, such argument is without merit. At the time of Everett’s trial in 2002, Florida district courts had held that a party was not required to reassert his objection after it had been overruled. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 616 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. State, 599 So.2d 158, 159-60 n. 1

    ### Response:
    holding that where defendant sought to exclude evidence prior to trial and again just prior to witnesss testimony at issue it was not necessary for defendant to object to testimony when it was actually put before jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other enumerated instances of bad faith are sufficient to support the fee award. We begin by emphasizing that the district court assessed the fees pursuant to the court’s “inherent power” to “manage [its] own affairs.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1389, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). It is beyond serious dispute that a district court may use its inherent powers to assess attorneys’ fees against a party that has “ ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,”’ Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1622, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-64, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Winnepesaukee Realty, et al, 990

    ### Response:
    recognizing bad faith exception to general rule that federal courts cannot ordinarily make feeshifting awards
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defenses of modification and novation rested, in part, on the existence of an agreement between Schleider and Beal Bank. Beal Bank argues there is no evidence Schleider and Beal Bank agreed on the material terms so as to create a binding contract, such as would support modification or no-vation. We agree. When the parties leave an essential term open for future negotiation, there is no binding contract. T.O. Stanley, 847 S.W.2d at 221. In the present case, there is no evidence Schleider and Beal Bank agreed on the duration of an extension of the loan, a new maturity date, the rate of interest that would apply, or the amount and number of additional payments. Thus, there is no evidence of a binding agreement in the present case. See T.O. Stanley Boot, 847 S.W.2d at 221-22 (<HOLDING>); Gerdes v. Mustang Exploration, 666 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding alleged contract to make 500000 line of credit available failed for indefiniteness when no evidence was introduced regarding interest rate of alleged loan or repayment terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Constr. Co. v. Industrial Dev. Board of the Town of Vincent, 590 So.2d 218 (Ala.1991); Ex parte Warrior Basin Gas Co., 512 So.2d 1364 (Ala.1987). See, also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). The 1995 customer agreement contains a broadly worded arbitration clause that is clear on its face — it covers “any” and “all” controversies that may arise between Merrill Lynch and Ms. Kirton — and, like unambiguous statutes, it leaves no room for interpretation. See, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 103 (Ala.1995) (discussing the ride that general principles of contract law apply to the interpretation of an arbitration provision); Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So.2d 1285, 1286 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>); Ex. parte Lorance, 669 So.2d 890, 892-93

    ### Response:
    holdingthat the language of an arbitration clause applying to all claims demands disputes or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise  concerning the vehicle was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consented and approved a memorandum from defendant Marelia countermanding the attempt by plaintiff to reassign parking spaces), 40 & 42 (stating that all defendants consented and approved the taking over by defendant Marelia of the responsibilities of plaintiff), 49-50 (stating that the defendant Justices ordered plaintiff removed from the Administrative Board). Taking all inferences in the favor of plaintiff, as required at this stage of the proceedings, this Court concludes that the allegations of the involvement of defendants in the various specific actiohs taken against plaintiff, combined with the general allegation of intentional disparate treatment because of his race, is sufficient to defeat the motion by defendants to dismiss as to this count. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1478 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); District Council J7, Am.

    ### Response:
    holding that the necessary involvement can be shown in two ways either through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pursuant to Rule 404(b) pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir.1992) (applying abuse of discretion standard to Rule 404(b) admission of extrinsic offense to prove identity or modus operandi). To determine whether the evidence is more probative than prejudicial, a district court must engage in a “ ‘common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense,’ including prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well as temporal remoteness.” United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1332 (11th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir.1978)); see also United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044, 1048 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Prior convictions for drug trafficking are

    ### Response:
    holding that no brightline rule could be adopted with respect to temporal remoteness because the issue is very factspecific
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sexual assault case. “In criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right ... to call for evidence in his favor.” Va. Const., art. I, § 8. “The opportunity to present a complete defense ‘would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on . . . credibility . . . when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence’.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 316, 322, 469 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1996) (citation omitted). “Combined, the rights to compulsory process, confrontation, and due process give the defendant a constitutional right to present evidence.” Id. at 322, 469 S.E.2d at 93 (citing Neeley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 349, 356, 437 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1993)). Brown v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 199, 212-13, 510 S.E.2d 751, 757-58 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The right of a defendant to present evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court in a sexual assault case erred by refusing to allow evidence of prior testimony by the complainant in an unrelated rape prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Information Solutions, Inc., 155 F.Supp.2d 356, 361 (E.D.Pa.2001) (the plain language of § 1681t(b)(l)(F) clearly eliminated all state causes of action against furnishers of information, not just ones that stem from statutes that relate specifically to credit reporting). Second Approach — Other district courts have determined that § 1681t(b)(l)(F) does not preempt common law tort claims, and such claims may be brought but have reached this conclusion by two different avenues. The first group contends that 1681t(b)(l)(F) applies to state statutes only, and that § 1681h(e) applies to common law torts. A discussion of this rationale is set out in McCloud v. Homeside Lending, 309 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341 (N.D.Ala.2004); and Jeffery v. Trans Union, LLC, 273 F.Supp.2d 725, 726-28 (E.D.Va.2003) (<HOLDING>). The second group adheres to the rationale

    ### Response:
    holding that  1681he not  1681tblf applies to the defamation action so if a plaintiff pleads malice or willful intent to injure the action for violation of a state statute is not preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other state law claims. Doc. 1. On February 21, 2013, Defendant Billy Bowden (“Bowden”) moved to dismiss the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the Court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. Doc. 8. On May 28, 2013, the Court denied Bowden’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Court does have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. Doc. 16. Plaintiff now seeks to amend its Complaint to add Consilium as a defendant to the suit. Docs. 36-38. Defendants oppose the amendment. Doc. 41. II. Motion to Amend Under Rule 15(a), courts freely grant leave to amend when justice so requires. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (stating a court should freely grant leave to amend); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (<HOLDING>). “Whether leave to amend should be granted is

    ### Response:
    holding leave to amend should be freely granted absent a showing of undue delay bad faith undue prejudice or futility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ADEM was requiring action by Mobile Gas. McFadden, therefore, acted as a consultant in anticipation of litigation and the documents created by McFadden were created when Mobile Gas was anticipating and responding to litigation. See Atlantic Richfield Co., (No. 93-CV-0950E(H), Aug. 21, 1997) [ (not reported in F.Supp.) ] (documents are created in anticipation of litigation when they are prepared with a subjective belief that litigation might ensue and when the subjective belief is objectively reasonable). “Federal Courts have extended the work-product protection to documents prepared by environmental consultants in response to an inquiry from a governmental environmental agency. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf/Torf Environmental Management), 357 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir.[2004]) (<HOLDING>); Atlantic Richfield Co. .... (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that certain dual purpose documents created in response to the epa information request and consent order were protected from discovery by the work product doctrine as they were created because of potential litigation with the epa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    himself to be a representative of Wellington VA. Merel and G & M argue, however, that they never knew that Wellington VA legally existed and therefore could not have been representing its interests. Under Illinois law an attorney-client relationship can be formed outside of the normal course in two situations. First, such a relationship can be created during an initial meeting based on “ ‘the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.’ ” Herbes v. Graham, 180 Ill.App.3d 692, 699, 129 Ill.Dec. 480, 536 N.E.2d 164 (2d Dist.1989) (quoting Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.1978)), see also King v. King, 52 Ill.App.3d 749, 10 Ill.Dec. 592, 367 N.E.2d 1358 (1977) (<HOLDING>) (disapproved on other grounds). There is no

    ### Response:
    holding that because counsel met with clients now exhusband prior to the parties divorce for a mere thirty minutes to discuss his marital difficulties the husbands financial situation and his plans for the future an attorneyclient relationship existed between counsel and the ex husband that precluded counsel from representing the exwife two years later in a support matter against the exhusband even though the exhusband never hired the lawyer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the effect of withdrawing the fact from contention. While recognizing that there appear to be no published Massachusetts cases specifically addressing whether sale proceeds of an exempt asset remain exempt, the Debtor, citing Reed v. Yochem (In re Reed), 184 B.R. 733 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1995), and In re Feiner, No. 02-12235-JNF, Slip op. (Bankr.D.Mass. March 7, 2003), argues that “the substantial majority of courts have [sic] considered this issue and ruled, consistent with the clear wording of the statute, that a post-petition transformation of exempt property into a form of property which could not be exempt under state law, does not render the property suddenly available to creditors.” He concludes, based upon S & C Home Loans, Inc. v. Farr (In re Farr), 278 B.R. 171 (9th Cir. BAP 2002)(<HOLDING>), that the net sale proceeds from the Property

    ### Response:
    holding that only property exempted under  522 is protected from the reach of holders of nondischargeable debts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    .” (Emphasis added). The defendant is not seeking a waiver of a court rule, however, but of a statute of limitation. RAP 18.8(a) does not allow the court to waive or alter statutes. RCW 10.73.090 imposes a constitutionally valid “time limit” as a means of controlling the flow of postconviction collateral relief petitions. This court recently reiterated its observation that collateral relief “ ‘undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of the trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders. . . I ” In re Personal Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 809, 792 P.2d 506 (1990) (quoting In re Personal Restraint of Hews, 99 Wn.2d 80, 86, 660 P.2d 263 (1983)); In re Personal Restraint of Well, 133 Wn.2d 433, 441-42, 946 P.2d 750 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In order to file a second personal restraint

    ### Response:
    holding that the 1996 personal restraint petition of an individual committed in 1980 pursuant to an insanity plea was procedurally barred because it was filed after the oneyear time bar set forth in rcw 1073090 and because the grounds for relief did not fall within the exceptions to the limitation period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    respect to privileges.” Accordingly, we find the exclusionary clause of La.Code Evid. art. 1101(B)(8), when considered in pan mate-riae with La.Code Evid. art. 104, may be read to generally exempt hearings on motions to suppress evidence from the rules of evidence except with respect to privileges. Thus, La.Code Evid. art. 1101(B) may be read harmoniously with the provisions of La.Code Evid. art. 104(A). Furthermore, even though this Court has never elaborated on the interplay of Articles 104 and 1101 of the Code of Evidence, our research shows we have recognized hearsay rules do not apply in hearings on motions to suppress evidence. State v. Castleberry, 99-1388 (La.4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749; see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-75, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (<HOLDING>) After reviewing the jurisprudence and the

    ### Response:
    holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    given when justice so requires.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a). A motion to amend should be denied “only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the decision of a district court to grant or deny a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. See id. We agree with HCMF’s contention that the proposed amendment set forth a new legal theory. HCMF originally claimed that it had a federal right under the Boren Amendment itself for DMAS to pay reasonable and adequate rates of reimbursement. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In the proposed amendment, HCMF sought to

    ### Response:
    holding that boren amendment created substantive federal right enforceable by health care providers to reasonable and adequate rates
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1002-03, 1022-24. Consistent with this perspective, absent a statute allowing for survival, a deceased claimant’s personal injury claim could not be asserted by heirs or an estate. See McClure v. Johnson, 50 Ariz. 76, 81, 69 P.2d 573, 575 (1937). Many courts concluded that whether a claim would survive the claimant’s death should also determine whether it could be assigned during the claimant’s life and applied this test to both personal injury and other claims. See, e.g., Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 213, 7 L.Ed. 108 (1828) (dicta noting that “mere personal torts, which die with the party, and do not survive to his personal representatives, are not capable of passing by assignment.”); United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 37 Ariz. 554, 559-60, 296 P. 262, 264 (1931) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 10 This “survivability” test did not itself

    ### Response:
    holding that claims for property damage would survive and thus were assignable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an application to compel arbitration only if it is “made under Section 171.021 [of the TAA]....” The TAA does not authorize an interlocutory appeal when the subject arbitration agreement is governed by Colorado law or the UAA. Therefore, J.D. Edwards is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to order that Doskocil’s fraudulent inducement claim proceed to arbitration. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to do so. 1 . Doskocil also sued Grant Thornton L.L.P., but that company is not a party to this original proceeding. 2 . 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 3 . In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex.2001). 4 . Id ., 514 U.S. 52, 64, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 28 . 9 U.S.C. § 2. 29 . Tex Civ. Prac. &

    ### Response:
    holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aspects. First, when an abstract concept has no claimed practical application, it is not patentable. The Supreme Court has held that “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.” Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. at 507, 87 U.S. 498. In Benson, the claim was for a method of converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals that was “not limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.” 409 U.S. at 64, 93 S.Ct. 253. Since the claim would therefore “wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself,” the claim was unpat-entable because its “practical effect” was to “patent an idea” in the abstract. Id. at 71-72 93 S.Ct. 253. See also AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1358 (<HOLDING>); State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (same);

    ### Response:
    holding that a mathematical algorithm must produce a useful concrete and tangible result to be patentable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for determining whether an action will be significant. See supra. One such factor is “the degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a). Here, the Forest Service concluded that the project “may affect, is likely to adversely affect” the NSO, due to direct owl disturbance and disruption of breeding, as well as destruction and degradation and increased fragmentation of NSO habitat (much of which is designated NSO critical habitat and/or within existing NSO activity centers). (See EA at 26-32, AR 385-391.) At a minimum, this finding is an important factor supporting the need for an EIS. See also Ocean Advocates, 361 F.3d at 1125 (<HOLDING>). Second, the Forest Service’s conclusion that

    ### Response:
    holding that the presence of one intensity factor may be sufficient to deem the action significant in certain circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the question of whether Wal-Mart’s assertion that Mazur was on probation has a basis in fact. Mazur does not allege that Hamacher invented the incident in order to cause Mazur to be put on probation, much less that Eldridge placed Mazur on probation for an incident she knew did not happen; nor does the record provide support for such a claim. 5 . Mazur also alleges that Hamacher called him a “stupid moron plate-head” on one occasion. However, Mazur himself stated that he did not hear from Bell that Hamacher had called him a “plate-head moron” until after Wal-Mart terminated him. Therefore, this comment could not have contributed to Mazur experiencing a hostile work environment. See Langlois v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Mich., Inc., 149 Mich.App. 309, 385 N.W.2d 778, 782 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Bell testified in her deposition that

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court held that although the Constitution allows for pendent party jurisdiction, Congress had not conferred pendent jurisdiction through the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 555, 109 S.Ct. 2003. In response, the Federal Court Study Committee recommended Congress to supersede Finley by confer ring pendent party jurisdiction to conserve judicial economy by providing a single forum for matters arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Federal Court Study Committee Report (April 2, 1990). Congress adopted the recommendation, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) expressly provides that “supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.” Id. See also Musson Theatrical Inc. v. Federal Ex. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In my orders of joinder, I joined the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that finley had been superseded by 28 usc  1367a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    time, and ... that is often the case in prosecutions involving an aiding and abetting theory and in prosecutions involving a conspiracy charge.” Trial Tr. at 7511 (July 22, 2009) (citing O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 19.07, at 881 (5th ed. 2000)). Case law overwhelmingly supports the principle that an alibi instruction is not appropriate where defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime is not necessary to support conviction. United States v. Thomas, 34 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming refusal to give alibi instruction where the “evidence fully justified [defendant’s] conviction on the accomplice or conspiracy theory, regardless of whether he was [at the scene of the crime]”); United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 871-71 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Anderson, 654 F.2d 1264,

    ### Response:
    holding that an alibi instruction would not have been appropriate where the government offered both direct participation and accessory theories explaining that a conviction may be based on aiding and abetting even if defendants offered persuasive alibis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Brause v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 21 P.3d 357, 360 (Alaska 2001), challenged its constitutionality, but because we held that their claim was not ripe for adjudication, we did not consider the statute's constitutionality. Id. Its constitutionality was not raised in ACLU. 41 . AS 25.05.013 was enacted in 1996. Ch. 21, § 2, SLA 1996. The legislature in 1998 adopted the resolution that proposed the Marriage Amendment. - Voters approved the Marriage Amendment in 1998. S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998). 42 . - As we observed in ACLU, a state constitutional amendment that expressly denied benefits to same-sex couples would arguably offend the federal Constitution. 122 P.3d at 786 n. 20 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (<HOLDING>)). 43 . The published statement supporting

    ### Response:
    holding that an amendment to the colorado constitution that repealed all local and statewide laws prohibiting sexualorientation discrimination violated the federal equal protection clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The failure to make a timely objection in the trial court constitutes a waiver of any error. People ex rel. Barrett v. Board of Commissioners, 11 Ill. App. 3d 666, 668 (1973). The record indicates that respondent himself had regularly noticed matters for hearing in this case to be heard before Judge Pirrello in his Winnebago County courtroom. Where the parties consent to holding court in different places, they cannot complain on appeal. Patchen v. Patchen, 364 Ill. 178, 181-82 (1936). Moreover, the validity of an order is determined by where it became effective, and the fact that an order is signed by a judge in a county other than where he is presiding over a case does not affect the validity of the judgment. See People ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm, 17 Ill. 2d 131, 137-38 (1959) (<HOLDING>). We therefore find no merit to respondent’s

    ### Response:
    holding that kane county judgment rendered by the presiding judge in de kalb county but ultimately filed in kane county was valid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he was the target of a federal investigation. 645 F.3d 85, 108 (2d Cir.2011). Persico is distinguishable from the case at bar, however. In Pérsico, there was no pending state criminal proceeding at the time the defendant engaged in witness tampering. Thus, there was no dispute that the particular proceeding contemplated by the defendant was the imminent federal grand jury proceeding. Here, Shavers and White were clearly contemplating their upcoming hearings in Pennsylvania state court, and not any federal proceeding, when they sought to tamper with potential witnesses. For that reason, we hold that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a § 1512(b)(1) violation beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 811-12 (5th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). As such, we will vacate Shavers’s convictions

    ### Response:
    holding that the government had not produced evidence that the defendant intended to influence an official proceeding because the evidence showed only that he intended to influence the state civil proceedings that he had brought against his insurance agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478 (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.2005)). As indicated in the preceding section, “[a] municipality ‘may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.’ ” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018). The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983. See Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18 (<HOLDING>); Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7

    ### Response:
    recognizing that monel s holding has been extended to private corporations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a legislative capacity. That, plaintiffs contend, is precisely what the board did in the instant case and hence they have no claim to legislative immunity. For the reasons that follow, we agree. The Seventh Circuit has provided little guidance on applying the so-called functional approach to absolute legislative immunity; so, we shall begin our analysis by reference to guidance from the Supreme Court and the approaches of the other federal circuit courts. In a context not involving legislative immunity, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424, 64 S.Ct. 660, 667, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line

    ### Response:
    holding that the emergency price control act of 1942 did not unconstitutionally delegate the legislative power of congress to the office of price administration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    enjoyment of the servitude. The rule stated in this section governs the relationship among the servitude beneficiaries____[0]nce repair or maintenance is reasonably undertaken by one or more of the servitude beneficiaries, the others have a duty to contribute to the reasonable costs. The responsibility of each user should reflect a fair proportion of the costs. The basis of fair apportionment will vary depending on the circumstances. Factors that may be relevant include the amount and intensity of actual use and the value of other contributions made by the users to improvement and maintenance of the easement or profit. 11 . This court has previously relied on § 4.13 of the Restatement (Third). See Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, 220 Ariz. 401, 409, ¶ 20, 207 P.3d 654, 662 (App.2008) (<HOLDING>) (review denied Apr. 20, 2009). 12 . But see

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    foreclosing their rights.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 70 S.Ct. 652. The Bar Order required the Debtors to notify all known claimants by mail and unknown claimants by publication of the Bar Date. In addition to publishing notices in the national editions of The New York Times, U.S.A Today and The Wall Street Journal, the Debtors published notice of the Bar Date in, among other regional papers and publications, the Dallas Morning News, the Austin American Statesman, the Amarillo Globe Times, the Houston Chronicle, the San Antonio Express News, the Fort Worth Star Telegram, the Lubbock Avalanche, the Harlengen Valley Star, the El Paso Herald Post, the Wichita Falls, the Midland/Odessa Group, and the Abilene Reporter. The Debtors’ publication notices w R. Co., 112 B.R. 920 (N.D.Ill.1990) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Placid Oil Co., 107 B.R. 104

    ### Response:
    holding publication notice in the wall street journal adequate under bankruptcy law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    engage in “judicial line drawing.” Id. at 931 (“ ‘[A]t what point does the right [of publicity] collide with the right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment?’ ”). Upon considering whether the First Amendment takes precedence over a claimed right of publicity, courts “balance the magnitude” of restricting the expression at issue “against the asserted governmental interest in protecting” the right of publicity. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972. As such this court must examine the importance of CBC’s right to freedom of expression and the consequences of limiting that right. Id. These consequences must be weighed against the effect of infringing on the Major League baseball players’ claimed right of publicity. Id. See also Gionfriddo, 94 Cal.App.4th at 410, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307 (<HOLDING>); TCI, 110 S.W.3d at 372 (holding that it is

    ### Response:
    holding that the public interest in expression must be weighed against the plaintiffs economic and noneconomic interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deliberations.” (citing Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wn.2d 836, 840, 376 P.2d 651, 379 P.2d 918 (1962))). ¶10 Later case law specified what matters inhere in the verdict and cannot be considered: The mental processes by which individual jurors reached their respective conclusions, their motives in arriving at their ver diets, the effect the evidence may have had upon the jurors or the weight particular jurors may have given to particular evidence, or the jurors’ intentions and beliefs, are all factors inhering in the jury’s processes in arriving at its verdict, and, therefore, inhere in the verdict itself, and averments concerning them are inadmissible to impeach the verdict. Cox v. Charles Wright Acad., Inc., 70 Wn.2d 173, 179-80, 422 P.2d 515 (1967); see also Gardner, 60 Wn.2d at 841-42 (<HOLDING>). ¶11 Reynoldson argues that the facts that the

    ### Response:
    holding that allegation that jurors  had omitted to consider important evidence or issues  or had by any other motive or belief been led to their decision  is insufficient to support a motion for a new trial quoting 8 john henry wigmore evidence in trials at common law  2349 at 681 mcnaughton rev ed 1961
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a prior restraint on expression must also contain certain procedural safeguards as set forth in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59, 85 S.Ct. 734, 739, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992); Lady J. Lingerie, 176 F.3d at 1364-65. Because we conclude that section 2.51 lacks one of the procedural safeguards required under. Freedman, we do not address whether the regulation is a permissible time, place, or manner restriction. B. IS 36 C.F.R. § 2.51 an, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality opinion’s requirement of the first two Freedman safeguards); Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 & n. 14, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2680-81 & n. 14, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In FW/PBS, the Supreme Court explained that

    ### Response:
    holding that a contentneutral law requiring professional fundraisers to obtain a license before soliciting donations was subject to the procedural safeguards of freedman
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of liability in this case assumes that WDEA implicitly creates such a remedy. Indeed, she has not identified any other contractual, regulatory, or statutory provision — besides WDEA itself — to suggest that Costco was obliged to rehire her after her 2007 termination. Instead, her claims rest on the premise that her success in the prior WDEA lawsuit imposed a legal duty on Costco to rehire her. That premise is not supported by Montana case law. If anything, the relevant Montana Supreme Court cases suggest that an employer cannot be held liable under WDEA for its “failure to recall or rehire” a former employee unless that employer has some independent legal duty— such as a contractual obligation — to do so. See Kneeland v. Luzenac America, Inc., 289 Mont. 201, 208-10, 961 P.2d 725 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Arnold v. Boise Cascade Corp., 259 Mont. 259,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs wdea claim was without merit where plaintiff was unable to identify any basis for his claim that the employer had a duty to rehire him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ‘knowingly and intentionally committed an act in conscious disregard for the rights of others.’ ” Beuster, 435 F.Supp.2d at 479 (quoting Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 848 F.Supp. 213, 219 (D.D.C.1993)). As for malice, “Plaintiff must allege that a defendant published material while entertaining serious doubts as to the truth of the publication or with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity [or actual knowledge of falsity].” Id. at 480 (citing Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541,1551 n. 8 (4th Cir.1994)). Pursuant to Rule 9(b), “malice, intent, knowledge, and other , condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Beuster, 435 F.Supp.2d at 480 (citing Rule 9(b); Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir.2005)) (<HOLDING>). Magruder claims that Educational Credit

    ### Response:
    holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Jones took the money for her own use and intended to deprive the government of it. The jurors may also have inferred that after hours Jones used her keys to destroy the receipts evidencing the cash collection. Upon execution of the search warrant, the investigator found at Jones’s home a twenty-eight-foot extension ladder, identical to the one purchased by Jones with the government credit card. Jones explained that she had used her own funds to purchase the ladder found in her home and that she had later purchased an identical ladder for the library because she was so pleased with the model. The jury was free to reject that explanation and infer from the evidence that Jones rented the large van to move the ladder home and use it to paint her house. See Strickland, 509 F.2d at 276 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the jury may have doubted that

    ### Response:
    holding that criminal intent may be inferred from the defendants false explanation of the possession of stolen items
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and that its scientists did, in fact, consider contrary opinions, including the Beschta report. It is not an adequate alternative, however, to merely include scientific information in the administrative record. NEPA requires that the EIS itself “make explicit reference ... to the scientific and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the statement.” See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24; see also Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir.1980) (“We find no indication in [NEPA] that Congress contemplated that studies or memo-randa contained in the administrative record, but not incorporated in any way into an EIS, can bring into compliance with NEPA an EIS that by itself is inadequate”); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) Nor does the fact that the Forest Service’s

    ### Response:
    holding environmental assessment ea inadequate where ea contained virtually no reference to any material in support of or in opposition to its conclusions deficiency not cured by support contained in administrative record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts have utilized their inherent authority to prevent and sanction abuses of judicial power. See In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd., 40 F.3d at 1090 (bankruptcy court had inherent authority to sanction debtor’s president for bad faith filing of bankruptcy petition); Engel v. Bresset (In re Engel), 246 B.R. 784, 789-90 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2000)(§ 105 authorizes bankruptcy court to exercise its inherent powers to sanction attorney’s bad faith filing of inaccurate schedules); First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Largo v. Froid (In re Froid), 106 B.R. 293, 296 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1989) (power to correct abusive practices acknowledged but no sanctions entered against creditor who filed and prosecuted discharge complaint); Mortgage Mart, Inc. v. Rechnitzer (In re Chisum), 68 B.R. 471, 473 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (<HOLDING>). “The sanctioning of a party requires specific

    ### Response:
    recognizing power of bankruptcy court to impose sanctions on parties and counsel who willfully abuse the judicial process but not finding sanctions appropriate against debtor and his attorney for their repeated bankruptcy filings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also indicated in response to insurer’s motion for summary judgment that she was a customer at defendant’s business, and she produced a receipt showing that she had bought three smoke detectors that day. The court largely dismissed plaintiffs latter evidence, reasoning that, even if it accepted plaintiffs contention that she was a customer, her “primary reason” for visiting defendant was social, not business-related. Thus, she was properly considered a licensee. ¶ 10. We have held that, where the facts do not conclusively establish a plaintiffs status, and a factfinder may infer multiple purposes for a plaintiffs presence on a defendant’s premises, the question of whether the dominant purpose was business or social remains a question of fact for the jury. Farnham, 2003 VT 23, ¶ 11 (<HOLDING>). We need not reach the question, however, of

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment against plaintiff was premature because determination of whether plaintiff was a trespasser invitee or licensee was question of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the original taxpayer. See Defs.’ Reply at 2-3. This distinction, however, is of no consequence. The IRC- does not require the United States to assess and sue the original taxpayer prior to assessing a transferee. To the contrary, the IRC allows the United States to assess and sue either a transferee or a “transferee of a transferee” so long as the relevant time limitations are followed. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(1)(A) (discussing the liabilities of a transferee) with 26 U.S.C. § 6901(c)(2) (discussing the liabilities of a transferee of a transferee). In the present case, J. Brickman, a transferee of the original titution of a suit to enforce tax liability extends the life of an assessment lien beyond the six-year period); Hector v. United States, 255 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>); Ettelson, 159 F.2d at 196 (holding claim

    ### Response:
    holding that suit filed within six years of assessment tolls the limitation period indefinitely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir.1993)). A taxpayer who is not in bankruptcy cannot compel the IRS to allocate payments. Appellant appears to be arguing however, that the bankruptcy court has the authority to compel the IRS to allocate payments to the tax and interest rather than penalty. Appellant’s argument that the IRS’s application of this prepetition payment to the penalty is an avoidable transfer is a back door route to requiring the bankruptcy court to order the IRS to allocate the payment to tax and interest. Several courts, including the Supreme Court, have addressed the issue of the bankruptcy court’s authority to order the IRS to reallocate payments. See United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549, 110 S.Ct. 2139, 109 L.Ed.2d 580 (1990) (<HOLDING>). But see IRS v. Kaplan Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order the irs to apply the payments to trust fund liabilities if the bankruptcy court determines that this designation is necessary to the success of a reorganization plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    805, 810 (7th Cir.2000). For his unreasonable seizure claim, Cady argues that the district court erred in concluding that the officers had a rea- sonable basis on which to approach him and that his actions, appearance, and calls from residents did not constitute enough suspicion for a permissible Terry-stop. We agree with the district court, however, that permissible encounters between police officers and citizens are not limited to situations involving possible criminal activity, but also include situations in which persons may need help or are in danger of harming themselves or others. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n. 9 (noting that police encounters are often initiated for reasons other than prosecuting crime, such as helping an intoxicated person find his way home). h Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because the possibility that a citizen is

    ### Response:
    holding that 20minute detention was not unreasonable where suspect gave misleading answers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Furthermore, a “judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment”. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943). This is especially true with regard to immigration matters; as this court noted previously, “federal immigration laws are exceedingly complex”. Marcello v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 851, 857 (5th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, because the “principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory scheme”, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999), remand is appropriate in order for the BIA to review its decision in the light of Theodros. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (<HOLDING>). III. For the foregoing reasons, the BIA

    ### Response:
    holding a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The father, relying on Opinion of the Clerk No. 21, 375 So.2d 1066 (Ala.1979), argues that the mother failed to properly institute her contempt action because she did not file her contempt action separately or pay a separate filing fee. Although it appears that the opinion the father relies upon supports his contention, as does Opinion of the Clerk No. 25, 381 So.2d 58, 59 (Ala.1980) (“The basic differences between contempt proceedings and proceedings to modify a final decree preclude the inclusion of a petition for rule nisi and a petition to modify in the same pleading.”), we note that both opinions predate the adoption of Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P., which now governs contempt proceedings arising out of civil actions. See Ex parte Boykin, 656 So.2d 821, 827 n. 5 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Rule 70A expressly provides that contempt

    ### Response:
    recognizing that as of july 11 1994 contempt proceedings arising from civil actions are no longer governed by rule 333 ala rcrim p and instead are governed by rule 70a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    M.M. that he was suspended and called his mother to pick him up. M.M was then instructed by the administrative dean to go to the indoor waiting room outside of her office. The school resource officer was-.contacted after M.M. continued to engage in disruptive behavior in the waiting room. Despite instructions from both the dean and the school resource officer that he must remain in the waiting area, M.M. walked outside into an adjacent open-air courtyard (near the back of the school campus), where he was arrested for trespass. M.M. argues that he cannot be found guilty of unlawfully entering or remaining on school property because he was expressly authorized (actually required) to remain on campus until his mother arrived. Cf. E.W. v. State, 873 So.2d 485, 487-88 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). In essence, M.M. argues that as long as he

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant remained unlawfully on school property because as a minor appellant could not leave school without parental consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    September 1993, (see First Am.Compl. ¶¶ 10, 12), and since Reebok has confined its defense in this action to that secret, it would be inequitable in the extreme to allow plaintiff to play fast and loose with its legal theories and, thereby, threaten or actually derogate the integrity of the judicial process. Additionally, and based on the foregoing, the Court finds that these assertions, which contradict the prior sworn testimony of Liu are sham, as they have been made solely in hopes of creating an issue of fact. See Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that, upon finding subsequent contradictory affidavit is “sham,” district court may reject affidavit on summary judgment); Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); McCray v. Casual Corner, Inc., 812 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pertaining to procedural matters are enforced in the same manner as a Supreme Court rule as long as the procedural matter addressed is not inconsistent with a Supreme Court rule. State v. Teer, 275 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Mo. banc 2009); see also Mo. Const art. V, § 5 (granting the Supreme Court power to “establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law”); Gillespie v. Rice, 224 S.W.3d 608, 612 (Mo.App. W.D.2006) (“Missouri Supreme Court Rules are to be given the same effect as statutes.... ”). The application of a statute of limitations “must be specifically asserted by the time the case is decided.” Reynolds, 323 S.W.3d at 453; see also Patel v. Pate, 128 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) (<HOLDING>). “The trial court ha[s] no obligation to rule

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute of limitations defense first raised in a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiffs evidence was untimely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at *9. Other U.S. federal courts have found that a trademarked name as part of a product’s title does not convey information about a product’s origin as long as defendants employed their own source designations elsewhere on the product. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir.2003) (denying application of Lanham Act to photos of Barbie with “Barbie” in photo descriptions because the photographer put his own name on the photos and produced them on his own web-site); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996-97 (2d Cir.1989) (finding that the film title “Ginger and Fred” did not mislead as to sponsorship because, in part, it indicated that it was created and directed by Italian filmmaker Federico Fellini); Thoroughbred Legends, 2008 WL 616253 at *9 (<HOLDING>). The test, then, is whether the alleged

    ### Response:
    holding that a movie studios name on the dvd cover  and not a horses name in the title of the film  conveyed information about the films source andor origin
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir.1997), that does not mean it is improper for the ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities at all, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (specifically listing the claimant’s daily activities as one of the factors to consider in evaluating the claimant’s symptoms). The ALJ, when evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms, can also consider such things as: (1) the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of pain and other symptoms; (2) precipitating and aggravating factors; (3) adverse side-effects of medications, and (4) treatment or measures taken by the claimant for relief of symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) — (iv); see also Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that an aljs determination on side effects was proper where the claimant did not complain about side effects nor did the record disclose any concerns about side effects by the doctors examining the claimant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New Jersey’s version of the Uniform Partnership Act, to incur third-party debt on behalf of the partnership has not been considered in any reported New Jersey opinion. However, case law from other jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act are instructive on this point and “in interpreting New Jersey’s version of the Uniform Partnership Act it is appropriate to refer to the application of the statute in other states.” Conklin Farm v. Leibowitz, 140 N.J. 417, 658 A.2d 1257, 1261 (N.J 1995). See also Seventy-Three Land, Inc. v. Maxlar Partners, 270 N.J.Super. 332, 637 A.2d 202, 203 (1994) (explaining that in instances where courts of other jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act and have considered an issue redge Co., 339 Pa. 26, 14 A.2d 325, 328 (1940) (<HOLDING>); Chelsea Nat’l Bank v. Lincoln Plaza Towers

    ### Response:
    holding that a bank guarantee is usually not given in the ordinary course of partnership business therefore all the partners must authorize by express authority or ratification a guarantee of third person debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Crow, 772 F.Supp. 1254, 1256 (M.D.Fla.1991) (plaintiffs must proffer evidence providing a basis to recover punitive damages prior to pleading in complaint); McCarthy v. Barnett Bank, 750 F.Supp. 1119, 1127 (M.D.Fla. 1990) (plaintiffs pled specific acts under § 768.72 to adequately support a claim for punitive damages); Frio Ice, S.A. v. Sunfruit, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 1373, 1383 (S.D.Fla.19689) (punitive claim stricken for failure to provide evidence showing reasonable basis for recovering punitive damages); Lancer Arabians, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 723 F.Supp. 1444, 1446-47 (M.D.Fla.1989) (section 768.72 ""is clearly substantive because it sets the standard for establishing a claim for punitive damages”) (citation omitted); Brennan v. Minneola, 723 F.Supp. 1442, 1443 (M.D.Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>); Dah Chong Hong, Ltd. v. Silk Greenhouse,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that section 76872 is substantive law even though the state statute was preempted by federal civil rights law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1. Rule 44.1 provides courts with broad authority to conduct their own independent research to determine foreign law but imposes no duty upon them to do so. See Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 205 (1st Cir.1988) (“[Rule] 44.1 empowers a federal court to determine foreign law on its own, but does not oblige it do so.”). Thus, the party claiming foreign law applies carries both the burden of raising the issue that foreign law may apply in an action and the burden of proving foreign law to enable the district court to apply it in a particular case. Cf. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 96 F.3d 216, 221 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Where a party fails to satisfy either burden,

    ### Response:
    holding that party waived conflicts of law issue because it failed to fulfill its obligation under rule 441 to provide the district court with reasonable notice of his intention to raise an issue of foreign law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    388, 404 (6th Cir.1998) (en banc). Consequently, a claimant must plead plan ambiguity in this Circuit to state a claim for estoppel relative to an ERISA claim for benefits. Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 456 (6th Cir.2003). Putney did not plead in his complaint, nor did he present any evidence before the district court, that the Plan was in any way ambiguous. The district court did not err in holding that the Plan is not, in fact, ambiguous, and in dismissing Putney’s promissory estoppel claim under Rule 12(b)(6). D. O.R.C. § 3999.32 is a criminal statute that provides for criminal penalties for noncompliance. Putney therefore has no standing to invoke that statute. See Biomedical Innovations, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 103 Ohio App.3d 122, 658 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (citing Atlantic & Great W. Ry. Co. v. Dunn,

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    6 . Pkiintiff cites the following Tennessee cases: Home Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 106 Tenn. 513, 62 S.W. 145 (1901), Fourakre v. Perry, 667 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn.App.1983), Cavalier Ins. Corp. v. Osment, 538 S.W.2d 399 (Tenn.1976), and Crumley v. Travelers Indem. Co., 225 Tenn. 667, 475 S.W.2d 654 (1972). None of these cases involve waiver of an arbitration provision based on untimely demand and prejudice. Defendant does not make an argument with respect to waiver. 7 . Plaintiff cites Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 856 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.Ct.App.1993), and Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Weed, 420 So.2d 370 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982). 8 . Cotuts apply the same law to appraisal clauses and arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Meineke v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 181 Ariz. 576, 580, 892 P.2d 1365, 1369 (App.1994) (<HOLDING>) (citing Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Insurance

    ### Response:
    holding that since appraisal is analogous to arbitration  we apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opposing a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff is only required to show a genuine issue of material fact.” Appellant’s Br. at 20 (citing Lynd v. Adapt, Inc., 200 Mich.App. 305, 503 N.W.2d 766 (1993)). It is settled, however, that a court must consider the burden of proof applicable at trial in determining whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To avoid summary disposition, then, Talhelm must show that there is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that she was about to report Pike to a public body for a violation or suspected violation of law when she was terminated. Lynd says nothing different. 503 N.W.2d at 767 (<HOLDING>). With respect to the merits, Talhelm’s

    ### Response:
    holding without discussing the plaintiffs burden of persuasion that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    definition of incarceration but explaining that residence in non-secure community treatment center or- halfway house is not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Phipps, 68 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1995) (home detention not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Gordon, 346 F.3d 135, 138-39 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 711-14 (11th Cir. 1998) (community treatment center not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1161-65 (6th Cir. 1997) (home detention not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (community treatment center not imprisonment for guideline purposes); but see United States v. Rasco, 963 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). .The IDOC record for the 1996 conviction also

    ### Response:
    holding that confinement in community treatment center after parole revocation was part of original term of imprisonment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment, ECF No. 71, be GRANTED on all counts. The parties will have fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable William J. Zloch, United States District Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (providing procedure for review of Magistrate Judge Report and Recommendation). Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by Judge Zloch of any issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from challenging, on appeal, the factual findings accepted or adopted by this Court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 145-53, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295,

    ### Response:
    holding that party waives appellate review of magistrate judges factual findings that were not objected to within period prescribed by 28 usc  636b1 citing united states v walters 638 f2d 947 94950 6th cir1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    days elapsed during which there was a cessation of operations. The work performed by Yates prior to the expiration of the primary term constituted drilling operations, in accordance with the completion clause. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Yates staked and surveyed the location, applied for and received a permit to drill the well, and began preparing and building the well location prior to the expiration of the primary term. These activities have been held to be sufficient to constitute the engagement and commencement of drilling operations. See, e.g., Petersen, 356 S.W.2d at 219-20 (hiring contractor to drill well, employing surveyor to survey well, and staking and leveling well location constituted engagement in drilling operations); Oelze, 90 Ill.Dec. 1, 481 N.E.2d at 802-03 (<HOLDING>); D’Lo Royalties, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 389

    ### Response:
    holding that obtaining a drilling permit clearing brush leveling a well site and digging slush pits functioned as commencement of drilling operations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    58 . Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc. v. Rhodes, 578 F.Supp.2d 652, 664 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (citing Harris v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.2002)). 59 . ICD Holdings S.A. v. Frankel, 976 F.Supp. 234, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 60 . Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, S.p.A., 347 F.3d 448, 462 (2d Cir.2003) (citations omitted) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 15,26). 61 . Id. (citations omitted). 62 . Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 147). 63 . See Plaintiff ee Complaint ¶ 44. 72 . SPA at 30. 73 . See Complaint ¶ 29. 74 . See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (""Def. Mem.”) at 10. 75 . See Cenveo Corp. v. Diversapack LLC, No. 09 Civ. 7544, 2009 WL 3169484, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). 76 . See Complaint ¶ 46. 77 . See Eternity

    ### Response:
    holding that where an spa does not mention former employees but only current employees and a complaint only alleges that former employees were solicited there is no breach of a nonsolicitation clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    way that Jones’s recent medical treatments or pain therapy were connected to BPP. It does assert that “[t]he seriousness of my medical condition coupled with the aggressive treatment which followed, left me intensely ill, physically, as well as it [sic] drastically hindered my academic ability as I was unable to successfully concentrate on the material during the previous exams.” At the same time, the e-mail says that despite his medical challenges, Jones had performed his job well during the last two years. Jones did not refer to or attach any medical records or certifications in support of his statements. NLI executives were not on notice that the symptoms Jones described in his email were caused by a disability. See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 260-62 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The employer was aware that during 2006-2008

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff did not adequately request accommodation when she failed to inform superiors that her anger management problems were due to bipolar disorder because she never adequately put the employer on notice of her disability id at 260 and gave no notice of the aspect of her illness relevant to the accommodation she sought id at 262
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the statute at issue relies on individualized assessments by those enforcing it, as numerous other penal statutes do, it does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Accordingly, the Court finds that Va. Code § 46.2-1054 is neither facially void for vagueness nor unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant. Pursuant to Va. Code § 16.1-131.1, this matter is remanded for pr v. McConnell, 68 Va. Cir. 471, 478 (Charlottesville City 2005); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Steven, 134 F.3d 526, 528-29 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding the Virgin Islands’ driving while intoxicated statute, V.I. Code Ann., tit. 20, § 493, which is similar in substance to the Virginia statute, not unconstitutionally vague). 3 See Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 573-77 (Ind. 2014) (<HOLDING>). 4 See generally Juares v. Commonwealth, 26

    ### Response:
    holding that indianas public intoxication statute ind code  71513 which is similar in substance to the virginia statute is not unconstitutionally vague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protection. Under Wilson and Chevron, we recognize that the Attorney General through the BOP, determines presentence credit, and not the courts. We review solely the constitutional consequences or effect of placing defendants prior to adjudication of guilt and sentencing and postsentence convicts serving their sentences in a halfway house under identical conditions and giving only the post-sentence convicts sentence credit. Because neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class is involved, we review this governmental decision for a rational basis. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 44-42, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); see United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1006, 110 S.Ct. 1301, 108 L.Ed.2d 478 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Under this review standard, Dawson prevails

    ### Response:
    holding that a rational basis analysis is applicable to equal protection claims of presentence defendants residing in a halfway house
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.1968)). Each movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists; if both parties fail to carry their respective burdens, the court must deny the motions. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1023 (3d Cir.2008). When reviewing each motion, the court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; United States v. Hall, 730 F.Supp. 646, 648 OMUD.Pa.1980). B. Sta .1998) (<HOLDING>). III. Discussion Plaintiffs’ objections (Doc.

    ### Response:
    holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sentence and renders it superfluous. While it is indisputable that the relationship between the two sentences is awkward, reading the last sentence broadly does not necessarily render the first sentence null. Considered in light of § 9613(f)(l)’s purpose, which was to codify (and hence supplant) the federal common law contribution suit implied from § 9607(a), see supra, the last sentence can logically be understood as a clarification of how the new statutory contribution suits fit into the court-interpreted CERCLA scheme. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 685, 687 (noting that the final sentence was necessary “to eliminate the uncertainty in case law prior to [§ 9613(f)(l)’s] enactment as to whether contribution was available under CERCLA at all”); see also Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 776 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Nick’s argues that the term

    ### Response:
    holding that  9613f1 is the exclusive vehicle for responsible parties to obtain contribution from other responsible parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a' declaratory judgment action in which the resident plaintiff seeks a declaration of the defendant’s intellectual, property rights. This is precisely the situation in the present case. Hanson alleges no injury flowing from Con/ Span’s'purported Texas contacts, and thus, specific jurisdiction is improper. Id. In Hanson’s second argument, Hanson alleges that it “feels the effect” in Texas of the contracts it breached in other forums. Specifically, Hanson alleges “Hanson’s Texas headquarters did not realize the revenues from those contracts, and Hanson could be sued in Texas as a result of their breach.” These facts may have been sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in California, see Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), but in the Fifth Circuit, the rule is

    ### Response:
    holding that in the ninth circuit the effects test established in colder v jones 465 us 783 104 sct 1482 79 led2d 804 1984 is met when a foreign defendant does a wrongful act to a foreign resident without regard to whether the actual act is targeted at the forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    class definition based on census tract information rather than zip codes. At the outset, we note that these arguments rely upon differences in procedural rules. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 (classifying joinder as a federal procedural rule), 26(c) (authorizing a district court, as a matter of procedure, to create orders limiting discovery). However, because federal subject matter jurisdiction attaches pursuant to the All Writs Act, procedural matters in this case, as well as any future case im pacting the prior judgment in Canady I, are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c) (authorizing application of the Federal Rules to state court actions removed to federal court); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 134-35, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252,

    ### Response:
    holding that the expansive language of rule 81c indicates a clear intent to have the federal rules  apply to all district court civil proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance. Id. Instances of alleged harassment are considered cumulatively, rather than in isolation. Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010). In support of her hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff alleges the following: fellow male officers on occasion defecated in the women’s restroom and failed to flush the toilet, so that the feces were later found by Plaintiff; Captain Mitchel commented that “the only reason why a woman is in the fire service is to cook and do clerical work” and stat 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>) and Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276-77 (severe and

    ### Response:
    holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Litigation Fund was “adjudicated,” constitute payments to the Plaintiffs in consideration of potential liability and thereby render Central Texas a “settling person”? (Or more broadly, was the Litigation Plan a settlement between Central Texas and the Plaintiffs?) We answer “yes.” The tender of the $5 million to the bankruptcy court (half of which went to the Litigation Fund) and Central Texas’ direct annual payments to the Litigation Fund, were indirect payments to the Plaintiffs in consideration of Central Texas’ potential liability to the Plaintiffs, and the subsequent payments from that fund to the Plaintiffs were not contingent on the outcome of an adversarial or uncertain proceeding. Cf. Gilcrease v. Garlock, Inc., 211 S.W.3d 448, 452-55 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>) (citing McNair v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas

    ### Response:
    holding that postsettlement bankruptcies of settling parties did not make settlements contingent and that defendant was entitled to credits even though settlements had not been paid and distinguishing settlements contingent on other litigation and uncertain bankruptcy proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federalism if federal courts failed to take into account that an adequate state forum for all relevant issues has clearly been demonstrated to be available prior to any proceedings on the merits in federal court.” Id. at 437, 102 S.Ct. 2515, citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975). Although Middlesex involved a somewhat different procedural posture than Judge Griffen’s case by virtue of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s sua sponte review of the issue and their amendment of the rules granting interlocutory review of constitutional challenges, Judge Griffen’s decision not to follow the proper procedure by which to challenge the Commission’s holding does not alter the analysis. See Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Like the Supreme Court in Middlesex, this

    ### Response:
    holding that a party cannot circumvent younger by choosing not to pursue state appellate remedies and by instead choosing to initiate an action in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a judgment in the case. This extension of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the court’s ability to enforce a judgment rendered against the judgment debtor. As the Court remarked in Peacock, ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is “at its core, a creature of necessity.” 516 U.S. at 359, 116 S.Ct. 862. Thus these proceedings can reach third parties so long as it is necessary to reach assets of the judgment debtor under the control of the third party in order to satisfy the original judgment and thereby guarantee its eventual executability. In many ways this case gives the appearance of fitting within this traditional paradigm of enforcement jurisdiction. After all, the claim is in part that the assets of CDC were in effect transferred from the judgment , 454 F.2d 871 (1st Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). While it is true that one might envision

    ### Response:
    holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Officer Kaiser had no involvement in the safe cell, but that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether he was an integral participant in the linescan room events. The district court also properly determined that Officer Vazquez may have been an integral participant in the linescan room. Neither the video evidence nor Officer Vazquez’s own affidavit resolved whether he entered the linescan room with enough time to participate in the tasering or the strikes. We cannot say that the district court erred in applying the integral participation doctrine to Officer Hanlon for his wrist lock of Atencio, because his wrist lock was instrumental in controlling Aten-cio, which allowed the other officers to commit the excessive force against him. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 n.12 (<HOLDING>). However, the district court erred in denying

    ### Response:
    holding that officer was liable as an integral participant for his help in handcuffing plaintiff because it was instrumental in the officers gaining control of him which culminated in excessive force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States, 432 U.S. 137, 155, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977); United States v. Hebeka, 89 F.3d 279, 282 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 999, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996). If this step is inconclusive then to determine whether a defendant has been subjected to successive prosecutions for the same offense, the court must apply the same elements test. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 900 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Forman, 180 F.3d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir.1999). The same elements test consists of examining the two statutes in question and determining whether each statut 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985)(<HOLDING>). If violation of one of the statutes entails

    ### Response:
    holding that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    upon the interaction of individuals in a collective process.”). With regard to the Secretary’s second argument, although the Board found Mr. Arneson’s testimony “credible,” it also found the lapses in time between service and his first medical treatment “particularly significant” and “weighting] against his claim.” R. at 16-18. As Mr. Arneson argues, if the Board found his testimony concerning the continuity of his symptoms credible, such lapses in time would not weigh against his claim. The Board also stated that Mr. Arneson’s statements were “not competent medical evidence.” R. at 17. This is true. But if the Board found his testimony credible, Mr. Arneson would not need competent medical evidence to substantiate his claim. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488, 495-96 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313,

    ### Response:
    holding that per 38 cfr  3303b medical evidence of nexus is not required for benefits if the veteran demonstrates continuity of symptoms between his present disability and service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the earth but not forming part of a watercourse or lake ... most commonly derive[d] from rain, springs, or melting snow”), and correctly found that damage caused by surface water was unambiguously excluded from Lucky Leather’s insurance policy with Mitsui. Lucky Leather’s attempt to fit the water damage into the exception to the surface water exclusion contained in its insurance policy with Mitsui is unavailing. It makes no difference that the surface water that damaged Lucky Leather’s inventory pooled on the ground after exiting a neighbor’s drainage pipe; the drainage pipe did not back up or overflow, but rather expelled rain water onto the ground precisely as designed. See Cardio Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 212 Cal.App.4th 69, 76, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 (2012) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). 2. Even if we were to find

    ### Response:
    holding that a lay person would understand the language in the exception cited by lucky leather to include both water that comes up out of a sewer drain or sump backs up and water that spills over from a sewer drain or sump overflows due to a blockage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides no basis for believing the court itself understood its finding to be one of constitutional fact or even of constitutional significance. The trial court’s order, therefore, cannot provide the foundation for Judge Mack’s constitutional argument that “recognition” means endorsement of the sort absolutely forbidden by the Constitution. (3) Turning to the constitutional question itself, I agree with Judge Mack that regulations literally compelling someone to speak moral or ideological statements are directly and extremely intrusive upon the individu al’s freedom of belief and expression; probably no countervailing state interest could render such compulsions constitutional. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (<HOLDING>); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding states cannot force schoolchildren to say pledge of allegiance to flag
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brands to ensure consistency”). However, because private label goods offer a strong value benefit, if a national customer wishes to purchase such goods and have them available across all of its locations, it can do so most efficiently through a broadliner with national geographic scope. See Hr’g Tr. 600 (George Holm of PFG stating that one reason national customers prefer to contract with Sysco or USF is that “[w]here they have a preference for a private brand, [] it is the same product [across] their system”). ’ c. Defendants’ Operations Both Sysco arid USF operate dedicated sales groups from their national headquarters that are responsible for negotiating and managing contracts with customers who use multiple distribution centers. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 572-74, 86 S.Ct. 1698 (<HOLDING>). Sysco refers to these customers as “corporate

    ### Response:
    holding that centralized station security services operated on a national level is a relevant product market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    SPD specifically provides that while “HEB expects to continue the Plan indefinitely ... no amendment or termination of the Plan will affect any claim for expenses incurred prior to the date the amendment or termination is adopted, except as provide by law.” In other words, HEB’s right to terminate the Plan does not deprive Swinton of benefits already accrued under the Plan. Second, if HEB terminates the Plan, it will leave Swinton with all of his common law rights against HEB as a non-subscriber. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 406.033(a). Third, assuming HEB’s promise to provide benefits under the Plan is illusory, the parties formed a unilateral contract when HEB actually provided, and Swinton accepted, benefits in return for Swinton’s promise not to sue. See Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647 n. 6 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the fact that the plan administrator

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a unilateral contract can be formed when only one promise is illusory because the nonillusory promise can serve as an offer which the promisor who made the illusory promise can accept by performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court, the jury’s factual finding that defendant’s actions were consistent with his police training (and that he believed them to be consistent) indicates that those actions would not be found “clearly unlawful.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Accordingly, the District Court judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff also appeals from the District Court’s May 11, 2001 order granting summary judgment dismissing his claim of malicious prosecution. Regardless of the merits of the District Court’s approach to this question, a jury has now determined that defendant had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and that finding negates one element necessary for success on a malicious prosecution claim. See, e.g., Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 115 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We reject plaintiffs remaining contentions

    ### Response:
    holding that question regarding district courts decision on summary judgment was moot in light of jury verdict negating another element of the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3. By answering the following questions you will determine the damages, if any that Elena Plana sustained as a result of the incident in question. The jury cannot be faulted for doing exactly what it was instructed to do. As the verdict form instructed, when the jury found that the subject accident was not the legal cause of Elena’s injury, it proceeded no further, except to sign the verdict form. Because counsel for the plaintiffs agreed to the wording of the verdict form, instructing the jury to go no further if it concluded that Mr. Sainz’s negligence was not the legal cause of Elena’s injury, the plaintiffs are precluded from asserting that the zero damage award entered by the jury was error. See Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Freeman, 709 So.2d 549, 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); Papcun v. Piggy Bag Disc. Souvenirs, Food &

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff waived the issue of nominal damages by agreeing to the verdict form that instructed the jury to skip the damages issue if its answer to the causation question was no 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confronted with the witnesses against him,” and includes the right to cross-examine those witnesses. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). At the time the Appellate Division issued its opinion, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence permitted testimonial hearsay to be admitted against a defendant, provided it bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.” See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Furthermore, clearly established Supreme Court law guided lower courts as to when and how confessions of co-conspirators could be introduced at trial in a manner that did not offend the Confrontation Clause. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203 & 211,

    ### Response:
    holding that the admission of a pretrial confession of a nontestifying codefendant that incriminates the defendant violates that defendants right to confront witnesses even if a limiting instruction is given
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    systems. Id. Citing Dauberb, the Colorado Supreme Court stated, “Such a fine distinction is not required under CRE 702’s liberal standard for admissibility.” Id. Since a kit is simply one tool for carrying out the PCR/STR methodology, challenges to the reliability of any particular kit — like challenges to other procedures— go to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility. Shreck, 22 P.3d at 80-82 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Ewell, 252 F.Supp.2d 104, 111 (D.N.J.2003) (Cofiler and Profiler kits “merely provide the materials necessary to perform the PCR amplification process, and thus, the kits need not independently meet the Daubert standard of admissibility”); United States v. Williams, 2008 WL 5382264, *15 (C.D.Cal.2008) (unpublished; non-precedential) (<HOLDING>). The Court notes that the Shreck court’s

    ### Response:
    holding court need not undergo daubert analysis for reliability of a new pcrstr test kit because the pcr str methodology remained the same when different kits were used which analyzed more loci than prior testing kits in fact kits analyzing more loci were more accurate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    71, 74 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam) (same). In this case, although quantity was alleged in the defendants’ indictments, the District Court instructed the jury that it need not consider the quantity of drugs trafficked by the defendants. Therefore, because we are remanding this case for resentencing so that the District Court may consider “foreign drugs,” when recalculating the sentences the District Court must do so in accord with the principles of Apprendi. Thus, although the District Court may find, by a preponderance of the evidence standard, the quantity of drugs trafficked by the defendants and use this quantity in its calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines, the resulting sentence cannot exceed the statutory maximum. See United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the statutory maximum for

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi has not affected the district courts authority to determine facts for sentencing at or below the statutory maximum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the trial of any criminal proceeding in which the United States are parties or are interested, may compel such person to give recognizance, with or without sureties, at his discretion, to appear to testify therein.... 28 U.S.C. § 659 (1928) (repealed 1948) (emphasis added). However, the court was “unable to accept” the legislative history because it “should ... be hesitant to say that the Supreme Court intended Rule 46(b) to be so designed that federal law-enforcement agencies can be frustrated by the flight of a prospective witness whose testimony is indispensable to the securing of an indictment.” Bacon, 449 F.2d at 940 (emphasis added). When there is clear evidence about the intent of the drafters, there is no reason to be “hesitant” as to what the drafters intended. Id. (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The court’s concern about

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the advisory committee note expressly states that the rule is substantially a restatement of existing law 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Civ. 1:00CV00395, 2000 WL 1456292, *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept.6, 2000) (""[RJegardless of whether an unserved resident defendant may be ignored in determining removability under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), the citizenship of all named defendants, whether served with process or not, must be considered in determining whether complete diversity exists,”); In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 889 F.Supp. 271, 274 (E.D.Tex.1995) (""Section 1441(b) ... did not change the removal requirement set forth in [Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 59 S.Ct. 347, 83 L.Ed. 334 (1939)] that a court, in determining the propriety of removal based on diversity of citizenship, must consider all named defendants regardless of service.”); Thigpen v. Cheminova, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.Miss.1997) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The court in Workman v. National Supaflu

    ### Response:
    recognizing that service of process irrelevant in the initial determination of diversity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their right to” contact the Law Offices to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor, and that “[i]f anything, [Defendants] expanded the rights available to plaintiffs by not limiting the means by which they could make such requests.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4-5.) Several district courts have confronted this precise issue in recent years. As far as this Court can tell, all of them have held that a debt collector’s failure to include the “in writing” requirement violates subsections (a)(4) and (5) of Section 1692g. See, e.g., Welker v. Law Office of Daniel J. Horwitz, 699 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1170 (S.D.Cal.2010); Beasley v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., No. 5:09-CV-43-D, 2010 WL 1980083, at *6-7, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52010, at *18-19 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2010) (<HOLDING>); (Nero v. Law Office of Sam, Streeter,

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to include in writing requirement violated  1692ga4
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the public policy of the Commonwealth, we examine the precedent wit 1363 (3rd Cir.1979) (applying Pennsylvania law and finding a public policy violation for firing a worker for refusing to submit to a polygraph test, when a statute forbid such testing). Where the termination has not implicated a clear mandate of public policy, this Court and the Superior Court have not permitted a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge. See McLaughlin, 561 Pa. 307, 750 A.2d 283 (finding that an at-will employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine based solely upon alleged retaliatory termination of her employment in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Tourville, 353 Pa.Super. 53, 508 A.2d 1263 (<HOLDING>); Martin, 354 Pa.Super. 199, 511 A.2d 830

    ### Response:
    holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity. See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting ""father” in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include ""putative father”); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223

    ### Response:
    recognizing dual paternity where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of childs birth he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    third-party corporation and doctor for interference with some of Lovelace’s employment agreements. 2005-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 2, 6, 138 N.M. 70, 116 P.3d 861. {16} We are dealing with an attack on the validity or fairness of a merger negotiated by a corporation’s own directors. Here the claims for relief are against the directors for damages allegedly suffered by shareholders directly in the form of an unfair share price paid in order to merge the corporation out of existence. {17} Of particular concern, any derivative causes of action which may have existed before the merger are lost after the merger is consummated given the requirement for continuous ownership to maintain a derivative suit. See White ex rel. Banes Co. Derivative Action v. Banes Co., 116 N.M. 611, 614, 866 P.2d 339, 342 (1993) (<HOLDING>). If Plaintiffs claims are viewed as only

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    existing ethics laws. A declaration that the bans are unconstitutional as applied, however, would only prevent them from being applied to covered individuals in a fashion similar to that alleged by the current Plaintiffs; it would not render them inoperative. In order for Plaintiffs to obtain a declaration that the Amendment is unconstitutional as applied, there must be an actual application or at least a reasonable possibility of enforcement or threat of enforcement. See Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1248 n. 2 (Colo.1999) (finding that “as the statute had not yet been enforced, the trial court correctly ruled that the challenge was facial only”), aff'd, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); see also High Gear & Toke Shop v. Beacom, 689 P.2d 624, 629 n. 4 (Colo.1984) (<HOLDING>). Courts have repeatedly found that where a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    GRANTING MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 GADOLA, District Judge. A. Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, use of a fir (E.D.N.C. 1996) (<HOLDING>), and Mixon v. United States, 926 F.Supp. 178

    ### Response:
    holding that constitution and courts jurisdiction allow for twolevel increase on resentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actually no intent to perform the contract.”) (emphasis added). Before the district court on summary judgment, ABS based its argument relating to AdvancePCS’ intent to defraud at the time the statement was made on evidence that AdvancePCS ultimately did not fulfill its promise and that “reflecting back,” one of ABS’ witnesses, Blixt, believed “that at the time defendant had no intention of honoring the agreement it committed to.” R.134 at 26-27. On this evidence, ABS has not created a genuine issue of triable fact as to AdvancePCS’ intent. Illinois law does not allow the plaintiffs to proceed on a fraud claim when the evidence of intent to defraud consists of nothing more than unfulfilled promises and allegations made in hindsight. See Bower v. Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Before this court, ABS further contends that

    ### Response:
    holding that proof that a promise was not kept alone is insufficient to make out a claim of promissory fraud since there is no proof that the defendants made the promise never intending to keep it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ”) (quoting Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. at 584,119 S.Ct. 1563). Defendants proffer three arguments (styled as jurisdictional grounds) for dismissing Plaintiffs complaint: “(1) plaintiff lacks Article III standing, (2) its claims are barred by legislative immunity, and (3) its complaint presents a non-justiciable political question.” See Mem. of Points and Auths. in Support of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2. While these claims may appear jurisdictional, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Speech or Debate Clause or the Political Question Doctrine raises threshold jurisdictional questions. In fact, at least with regard to the Political Question Doctrine, there is authority suggesting that this doctrine goes to the merits. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32-33 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in order to avoid an unnecessary

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal based on the political question doctrine is properly entertained pursuant to rule 12b6
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not exercise judicial power is astonishing. That proposition is contrary to the Constitution, case law, and common sense. ¶ 60 This “new extrinsic evidence” cannot be used to contradict the plain language in both Article V, section 1, and Article VIII, section 13. “ ‘The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience.’ ” Ohms, 881 P.2d at 850 n. 14 (quoting State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n. 4 (Utah 1983)) (citing University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead,

    ### Response:
    holding that if constitutional provision is clear then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 235. 133 . See, e.g., id. at 228-31; Franklin, 147 F.Supp.2d at 47. 134 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228-29. 135 . Id. at 229 (quoting Boston & Maine Corp. v. Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 866 (1st Cir.1993)). 136 . See id. at 231. 137 . Id. 138 . See id. at 231 n. 14 (stating that the court has not yet adopted a ""complex scheme” exception to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)). 139 . See id. 140 . Id. (citing Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir.2003) (“[A] plaintiff should not be able to avoid the specificity requirements of Rule 9(b) by relying upon the complexity of the edifice which he created.” (citation and quotation marks omitted))). 141 . Id. at 231. 142 . 147 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.Mass.2001). 143 .Id. at 49. 144 . See Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 232 & n. 14 (<HOLDING>). 145 . See id. at 234. 146 . See id. 147 . See

    ### Response:
    holding that a qui tam relator may not present general allegations in lieu of details of actual false claims in the hope that such details will emerge through subsequent discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    receipt of actual notice of the fact, then fails to read it or remember it, either by his own negligence or by his conscious choice. The party providing unequivocal notice of changes in employment terms cannot force the other party to assimilate and understand the information in the notification. Akpan further contends there is evidence that this agreement is not in compliance with the requirement in the Texas General Arbitration Act that arbitration agreements be written. See Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Pamph. 1997). However, Akpan has attached a copy of a writing, which he admits receiving, to his affidavit. This writing sets forth in unequivocal language the terms of Burlington’s arbitration policy. Akpan contends 95, 699 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Both employers as well as employees may

    ### Response:
    holding a unilaterally issued employer policy created an enforceable right for atwill employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a reasonable attorney fee for the requesting party’s attorney” if the person holding an apparent adverse interest fails to comply with the request). At the time of the trial court proceedings in this case, section 649.5 limited attorney fees to a maximum of forty dollars. The parties do not rely on section 649.5. Of course, rule 1.413 applies in civil cases generally, not just quiet-title actions. The amount of the sanction should be sufficient to motivate the. victims of frivolous filings to enforce the rule. See Rowedder, 814 N.W.2d at 592. Yet we are mindful that large monetary sanctions may discourage advocacy and lead to additional rounds of litigation to recover attorney’s fees. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S 384, 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Mark S. Cady, Curbing Litigation Abuse and

    ### Response:
    recognizing rule lls central goal of deterrence but noting concerns that it will spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ordered a temporary parenting plan pending a full hearing of Boling’s modification petition. But after denying the modification petition following a full evidentiary hearing, the court erred when it ordered an amended temporary parenting plan that imposed even more severe restrictions on Watson’s visitation with M.R. ¶43 We do not hold that a trial court lacks equitable discretion to order the gradual reunification of a parent and child following denial of a modification petition when the best interests of the child require it. A trial court retains its common law equitable powers over matters relating to the welfare of minor children to the extent consistent with the Parenting Act of 1987, chapter 26.09 RCW. In re Marriage of Possinger, 105 Wn. App. 326, 333-34, 19 P.3d 1109 (<HOLDING>), review denied, 145 Wn.2d 1008 (2001). Under

    ### Response:
    recognizing a trial courts common law authority to enter an interim rather than permanent parenting plan at the time of entry of a dissolution decree even in the absence of express statutory authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as has been done with Nebraska’s statute of repose. However, I leave this to the Nebraska Supreme Court to more definitively resolve in the event that they need to do so, and simply recognize that our opinion is only controlling in this case. Thus, I do not necessarily agree with the analysis made by the majority opinion on the substantive aspect of the statute of repose, but I assume that it is a substantive provision for purposes of this dissent. 2 . Courts frequently apply the law of the jurisdiction where an allegedly defective product was assembled or placed into the stream of commerce, or where the plaintiff is domiciled, rather than the law of the state where the accident or injury occurred. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 250 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d 115, 120

    ### Response:
    holding texass substantive law should apply rather than the law of the state where the accident occurred because texas has a particularly strong interest when the defective product in question was manufactured and placed in the stream of commerce in texas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their family name would have been insufficient to confer standing upon them at the time. Cf. Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 700-01 (7th Cir.1989) (finding that a family’s asserted interest in retaining control over the use of its surname, separate and apart from the sale of the family business which bore that name, failed to amount to a “reasonable interest” protected under the Lanham Act). 16 . Although the plaintiffs allege that they are bringing their cancellation claims under Sections 14 and 37 of the Lanham Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1119, the court believes that the former provision only relates to those applications filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to cancel a registered mark. See id. at § 1067; see also Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 758 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the court only considers the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the section does not  authorize suits for cancellation in the district courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    distinction between tribal trust land and reservations for the purpose of tribal sovereign immunity. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 511, 111 S.Ct. 905. This view is consonant with other federal court holdings that an Indian reservation includes trust lands. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649, 98 S.Ct. 2541, 57 L.Ed.2d 489 (1978) (finding “no apparent reason” why lands held in trust should not be considered a “reservation” under § 1151(a)); HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1249-54 (10th Cir.2000) (same); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir.1986) (considering tribal trust land to be Indian country under either § 1151(a) as a “de facto” reservation or § 1151(b) as a dependent Indian community); United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 822-23 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Petitioners note that, for several years, EPA

    ### Response:
    holding that trust land is a reservation under  1151a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.P., 232 F.R.D. 692, 693 (M.D.Fla.2005) (refusing to require production of employer’s employment records pursuant to an overbroad subpoena as overly intrusive and unnecessary where defendant failed to provide any reason to suspect the plaintiffs credibility). Second, providing factually inaccurate information in employment documents, or having a poor employment history, will not, in and of itself, necessarily, be admissible at trial or be likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(1); see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 536, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, “extrinsic evidence is not

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of pri or poor work performance was inadmissible propensity evidence under rule 404b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Canterbury, supra, 464 F.2d at 787)). See Procanik, supra, 97 N.J. at 364, 478 A.2d 755 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting) (indicating physician’s general duty of disclosure encompasses material information relating to continuation of pregnancy); Carolyn Lee Brown, Genetic Malpractice: Avoiding Liability, 54 U. Cin. L.Rev. 857 (1986) (noting in wrongful birth cases importance of condition of th cases serves to protect the individual’s right of self-determination and personal autonomy, because that duty is premised on principles of civil tort law, the scope of disclosure in a wrongful birth context is' not coextensive with or measured by the woman’s constitutional right to decide the fate of her pregnancy. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (<HOLDING>). The physician’s duty to warn is thus limited

    ### Response:
    holding that woman has constitutionally protected right to determine for any reason or no reason to terminate her pregnancy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2007). Thus we must address the legal question of whether the IJ properly applied the evidentiary standard. The IJ found that Sillah’s testimony was “[injsufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he last arrived in the United States on May 29, 2002.” The IJ’s conclusion rests on his supporting finding that Sillah could not remember the name of the person whose fraudulent passport and visa he used and claimed he was never questioned by an immigration officer either upon departing Sierra Leone or upon entering the United States, and because his testimony as to his entry date lacked corroboration. Given that Sillah’s testimony was undisputed and must be accepted as true, the IJ’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). II. The IJ found, in the alternative, that

    ### Response:
    holding that no corroborating evidence required from asylum applicants who have testified credibly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    will decree reformation of a written instrument if it is conclusively shown that the words of the writing do not correctly express the meaning that the parties agreed upon.”). 10 . See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Fred S. Post, Jr., Co., 747 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn.1988); Lebo v. Green, 221 Tenn. at 314, 426 S.W.2d at 494; Dickens v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 170 Tenn. at 414, 95 S.W.2d at 914; Greer v. J.T. Fargason Grocer Co., 168 Tenn. at 244-45, 77 S.W.2d at 443-44; Barnes v. Barnes, 157 Tenn. 332, 338, 8 S.W.2d 481, 482 (1928). 11 . See 27 Williston on Contracts § 70:21, at 260 (""If the parties reach agreement as to only part of a prospective bargain, ... reformation is still an appropriate remedy.""); Cerberus Int’l, Ltd. v. Apollo Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1141, 1152 (Del.2002) (<HOLDING>). 12 . The prior agreement need not rise to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the party seeking reformation must prove a specific prior understanding that differed materially from the written agreement and that this understanding need only be complete as to the issue involved and need not constitute a complete contract in an of itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not”) of future persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Tariq v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir.2007). If that individual can show past persecution, as Ahodikpe attempted to do here, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. See Irasoc v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 727, 729-30 (7th Cir.2008). Ahodikpe concedes that the two earliest incidents were “brief encounter[s]” outside of the scope of persecution. He argues that the third incident amounted to persecution, and he emphasizes the severi ty and duration of his detention at the passport office. He notes for the court that he was beaten in a hidden room and held until nightfall. Yet that episode still falls sho 005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, without more information, Ahodikpe’s

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of multiple interrogations and 24hour detention did not compel finding of persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Open Records Act documents related to a.pending criminal investigation and remand the cause for consideration of whether those documents are among those documents covered by § 12-21-3.1(b). MOTION TO DISMISS CROSS-APPEAL DENIED; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. HOUSTON, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur. 1 . The Court in Randolph noted that the question whether a public corporation might be subject to the Sunshine Law as a ""board, body, or commission to which is delegated any legislative or judicial function” would ""have to await another day.” Randolph, 833 So.2d at 609 (opinion on rehearing). 2 . Consolidated is not using Rule 4(a)(2) to appeal an issue that was otherwise not appealable. See FDIC v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Consolidated states that the Alabama Code

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 4a3 fed rapp p the federal rule equivalent to rule 4a2 ala rapp p does not give a party an appeal of right where one did not exist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.03(c); One Hundred Ninety-One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars, 827 S.W.2d at 432. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue. Y. Appellant’s Constitutional Challenges In his third and fourth issues, appellant contends that because the warrant and subsequent seizure were invalid, the seizure violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. Because we have concluded that the warrant was valid despite its title and that the proper procedures were followed in executing the seizure, appellant’s due process rights under federal and state law were not violated. See Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 362-63 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1198, 117 S.Ct. 1556,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence obtained from valid search warrant did not violate constitutional due process provisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consenting to a search and the nature of the detention, and (4) any police use of “coercive or punishing conduct” to obtain the consent. Id. Whether consent to search was given is ordinarily a question of fact; however, when the validity of that consent is based on “the application of an overriding legal principle,” we review the validity de novo. United States v. Guimond, 116 F.3d 166, 169 (6th Cir.1997). The magistrate judge found, and the district court agreed, that Lewis’s consent to the search of the hotel room was freely and voluntarily given. Lewis does not challenge this finding on appeal. Lewis instead claims in his appellate brief that his consent to the search of his hotel room “was invalid because the consent rson in United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent to the filing of the appellate

    ### Response:
    holding that the physical fruits of a miranda violation must be suppressed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officer to find that an inmate “committed the prohibited act(s) charged, and/or a similar prohibited act{s) as described in the [notice],” id. § 541.8(a)(1) (emphasis added). Santiago-Lugo also asserts that he should have received notice that the “kite” would be used against him at his hearing. But nothing in Wolff’s due process requirements requires advance notice of specific evidence that will be used against a prisoner at a disciplinary hearing. AFFIRMED. 1 . The district court also relied on one Supreme Court decision, see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 988, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002), but that reliance was misplaced. The Porter decision held that an inmate had to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit under the Pri 1th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that one of our prior panel precedents was undermined to the point of abrogation by begay v united states 553 us 137 128 sct 1581 170 led2d 490 2008 even though begay addressed a different crime and a different sentencing law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 3161(e) “by analogy.” See United States v. Crooks, 804 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir.1986) (“Crooks I ”), modified by Crooks II, 826 F.2d at 5. Here, unlike in Vo, Crooks II, or Van Brandy, the relevant time period is the one between Pete’s arrest and his indictment, which is governed by § 3161(b). But the STA makes no distinction regarding the applicability of the exclusions under § 3161(h)(1) to the pre-indictment period (governed by § 3161(b)) and the pretrial period (governed by §§ 3161(c) and (e)), and nothing in Vo, Crooks II, or Van Brandy suggests such a distinction. We therefore hold that the automatic exclusion of time for interlocutory appeals under § 3161(h)(1)(F) is applicable pre-indictment under § 3161(b). Cf. United States v. Robinson, 887 F.2d 651, 656 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143,

    ### Response:
    holding that the exclusion of time under  3161h1d from the thirtyday preindictment time limit under  3161b of the sta is automatic and no causal connection is required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be the beginning, not the end, of the investigation.” Id. ¶ 22. There was no indication that Defendant was known to the Affiant, a member of the local narcotics task force, to be involved with illegal drugs. There is no indication in the affidavit that the Affiant checked law enforcement databases to determine whether Defendant had prior arrests or convictions for drug-related offenses or that the Affiant otherwise attempted to develop information linking Defendant or the addressee to illegal drugs. The Affiant did not attempt to speak with Defendant’s neighbors, nor did he attempt a “knock and talk.” Applying Nyce and the following cases, State v. Anderson, 107 N.M. 165, 169, 754 P.2d 542, 546 (Ct.App.1988), State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 786-88, 779 P.2d 971, 973-75 (Ct. App.1989) (<HOLDING>) overruled on other grounds by State v.

    ### Response:
    holding that officers observation of heavily taped detergent box coupled with odor of deodorizing agent and suspects withdrawal of consent to further search did not supply probable cause to believe that detergent box contained illegal drugs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    document, that she understood it, and that she agreed to it. And in 2001, she again signed a contract agreeing to the terms of the Program. She now alleges that she never received a copy of the Program. Under Puerto Rico law, “the onus was on her” to obtain and read a copy before signing it. Rodriguez-Bird v. Santander Sec. Corp., No. 09-2238, 2010 WL 2541708, at *2 (D.P.R. June 17, 2010). Further, it is a general and well established principle of contract law that “one who is ignorant of the language in which a document is written, or who is illiterate,” may be bound to a contract by negligently failing to learn its contents. 1 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 4:19 (4th ed.2010) (footnote omitted); see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Kwetkauskas, 63 F.2d 890, 891 (3d Cir.1933) (<HOLDING>); Stern v. Moneyweight Scale Co., 42 App.D.C.

    ### Response:
    recognizing principle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the City lacked the necessary jurisdiction to undertake the annexation, it was null and void. ¶ 11 In an analogous United States Supreme Court case, land owners contested the attempted annexation of noncontiguous lands by a town. Ocean Beach Heights, 302 U.S. at 614, 58 S.Ct. 385. The Court held that the controlling statute did not permit the annexation of noncontiguous lands. Id. at 617, 58 S.Ct. 385. Having failed to comply with the statute, the Court found that the town lacked both de jure and de facto authority to tax lands within the purportedly annexed area. Id. at 617-19, 58 S.Ct. 385. Accordingly, the Court held that the town could not “restrain the petitioners from defending against levy and collection of the taxes de, 213 Ariz. 1, 7-8, ¶ 31, 137 P.3d 309, 315-16 (App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Peterson, 477 P.2d at 155 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that petitions failure to avow the absence of a prior competing petition as required by ars  9471a6 rendered it defective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and bégin with a new panel. Relator further contends that respondent’s order was violative of another mandatory statute, Article 35.15(c), because reinstating the stricken veniremembers on the jury denied the State its minimum number of peremptory strikes. Finally, relator contends that the State may not be limited to any less than the three peremptory strikes allowed by law under any circumstances. MANDAMUS In order to be entitled to the extraordinary relief of mandamus, the relator must establish two essential requirements: (1) that the act sought to be compelled is ministerial as opposed to discretionary and (2) no other adequate remedy at law is available. Steames v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). The pri Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (<HOLDING>), and to criminal defendants, Georgia v.

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must entertain a challenge to a private litigants racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    substantial relationship Pursuant to the substantial relationship test, courts have granted disqualification when the issues have been “identical” or “essentially the same.” Gov’t of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.1978); Hammond v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 933 F.Supp. 197, 201 (N.D.N.Y.1996); United States Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 605 F.Supp. 1448, 1457 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 908 F.Supp. 1226, 1244 (S.D.N.Y.1995); Pereira v. Houze Glass Co. (In re Graff Marketing Corp.), 42 B.R. 801, 806 ( direct dealings and the overlap of the en gagement with the events that are the subject of the subsequent action.” Pereira v. Houze Glass Co. (In re Graff Marketing Corp.), 42 B.R. 801, 806-07 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). See also Interco Sys. Inc. v. Omni Corporate

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney could be disqualified on the basis of general business and financial representation even where there was no evidence that the attorney participated in the transaction at issue because the current lawsuit concerned commissions alleged to have been earned pursuant to the former clients relationship with its current adversary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of its community as a legitimate exercise of its inherent police power. ZONING BASED ON AESTHETICS IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE CITY’S POLICE POWER This Court and other courts of this state have repeatedly found that measures designed to enhance or maintain the aesthetic appeal of a community are a valid exercise of a local government’s police power and these measures bear a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose. “Florida has long recognized that local governments may legislate to protect the appearance of their communities as a legitimate exercise of their inherent police power.” City of Sunrise v. D.C.A. Homes, 421 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (emphasis added); see also City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adver. Ass’n of Lakeland, Fla., 414 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Fla.1982) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that zoning solely for aesthetic purposes is an idea whose time has come it is not outside the scope of the police power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    56 . Although the two foot excess groundwater level condition found by the court is based on only seven points on the construction site (at which March 1984 levels and actually encountered levels were recorded), the court believes, based on the other evidence presented, that these seven points are representative of the high groundwater level conditions across the site. 57 . The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has held that a one to 1.5 foot difference in groundwater levels between the levels encountered and the levels indicated in a document given to bidders was material and constituted a changed condition. Johnson, Drake and Piper, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 9824 and 10199, 65-2 BCA ¶ 4868, at 23,071-72; see also Peter Reiss Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 9801, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5598, at 26, 153 (<HOLDING>); Beacon Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 7675, 1963 BCA

    ### Response:
    holding that a three foot rise in the water level was a material difference and constituted a changed condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constrained as an independent, zealous, and loyal representative of the organization. See A.B.A. Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.3 cmt. 1 (2013); A.B.A. Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.13(b) (2013); cf. Kay, 499 U.S. at 436 n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1435; Baker, 473 F.3d at 325. Even a lawyer for an organization he founded and runs must fulfill his professional lawyering responsibilities to that organization. He may not merely serve his own preferences, moods, or tastes. He is legally and ethically required to be loyal to client interests, as distinct from his own. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C.2001) (“[T]he attorney owes a fiduciary duty to his client and must serve the client’s interests with the utmost loyalty and devotion.”). An attorney who 593 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Mordkofsky, 901 F.2d 158, 164

    ### Response:
    holding that a oneperson corporation cannot avail itself of the fifth amendment privilege to resist grand jury subpoena of corporate records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    embolden, or help others in committing a erime is not enough to qualify as 'encouragement' as that term is commonly used."" Id. Thus, ""(there must be evidence showing ... some active behavior, or at least speech or other expression, that served to assist or encourage ... in committing the crime."" Id. 116. 113 Under the Group Crime Enhancement statute, ""it is not enough that others were present when the crime was committed{[; rjather, the quality of their involvement must rise to the level of participation described"" in the statute: aiding or encouraging. See State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120, 123-24 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (""Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice when he neither ... encourages [nlor assists in perpetration of the crime.""); see also id. at 124 (<HOLDING>). Although another person's ""mere presence at

    ### Response:
    recognizing that if the legislature had intended to enhance the sentences of those who commit crimes merely in the presence of two or more other persons the statutory language would read differently
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Income Security Act. Three years later, on July 31, 2001, Latimer filed a notice of removal in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Appellees filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) requesting the federal district court to remand the matter to state court. Appellees based their motion on the well-settled rule that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) authorizes only defendants to remove suits from state to federal court. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). The federal district court granted Appellees’ motion, concluding that removal was not authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because Latimer is not the defendant in this action. See Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 356 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Latimer then brought this appeal. From our

    ### Response:
    holding that for removal purposes the plaintiff is the party who first invokes the aid of a court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Kennedy, J„ concurring). In this case, appellant was charged and convicted under the Texas statute prohibiting possession of child pornography. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 43.25, 43.26(a). In Texas, it is an offense to knowingly or intentionally possess “visual material that visually depicts a child younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was made who is engaging in sexual conduct” if the person “knows that the material depicts the child” engaging in sexual conduct. Id. § 43.26(a). Unlike the CPPA, however, the plain language of the statute indicates that it prohibits only possession of material that depicts an actual child, not material that merely “appears” to depict a child. Id.; see also State v. Anderson, 151 Ohio App.3d 422, 784 N.E.2d 196, 200 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the statute also

    ### Response:
    holding that the language of the ohio statute prohibits only images depicting actual children and thus does not violate the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basis of a single incident, the plaintiff must show the particular illegal course of action was taken pursuant to a decision made by a person with authority to make policy decisions on behalf of the entity being sued. Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir.1996). In their complaint Yanaki and Moss allege that a policy of Kennard that has deprived them of their constitutional rights is shown “by the fact that two Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputies, one of whom is a Sergeant, were willing to assist in the illegal actions to deprive Moss and Yanaki of their rights.” However, assuming Ken-nard is the “final policymaker” for § 1983 purposes, they fail to allege any conduct by Kennard or by Salt Lake County officials apart from the conduct of Kopp and Herlin. See Melton, 879 F.2d at 724 (<HOLDING>). Neither do they allege that Kennard approved

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a municipality may be liable under  1983 if the final policymaker takes the unconstitutional action or when a widespread practice exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. Clarence Jones appeals r section 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004); however, we find no error in the imposition of that cost. See Griffin v. State, 980 So.2d 1035 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm Jones’s convictions

    ### Response:
    holding that the retroactive application of a statute authorizing the assessment of a cost to a defendant who committed the felony pri or to the statutes enactment did not violate ex post facto laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (following Grayson). If the sentencing court believes that a defendant offered perjured testimony, the court may take that into account in imposing sentence. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (“It is rational for a sentencing authority to conclude that a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more threatening to society and less deserving of leniency than a defendant who does not so defy the trial process.”); see also Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55 (same); Noyes, 157 Vt. at 119, 596 A.2d at 343 (same). ¶ 7. The same principle applies if the sentencing court finds that a defendant suborned perjury. Fuller v. State, 860 A.2d 324, 333 (Del. 2004); see United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Fabiano v. Wheeler, 583 F.2d 265, 270 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that federal sentencing guidelines allow sentencing court to enhance sentence based on finding of suborned perjury even if there is no necessary inconsistency between jury verdict and alleged perjured testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or whether the deceased acted in a rage or frenzy or due to an uncontrollable impulse.” But all of the decisions relied upon by the special concurrence, holding (or arguably holding) that the suicides in question were not unforeseeable as a matter of law, involved a custodial or doctor-patient relationship between the majority likens the doctor-patient relationship to the duty of care that a police officer owes to the general public, it does not discuss any of the “prison cases” that specifically address potential liability of police officers for suicide. Regardless, neither line of jurisprudence applies here because, unlike in both the hospital and prison contexts, Sanders was never in Sahlberg’s custody or under his supervision or control. 45 See Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 190, 192-93 (<HOLDING>); Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193-94 (2) (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir.1983)). Thus, we review the jury verdict under the plain error standard, examining only whether the plaintiff has “presented any evidence in support of his claim.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff must show that he received disparate treatment because of his race, and that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason for his treatment was a pretext for racial discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 677 (1973). McKenzie has presented some, albeit minimal, evidence of treatment different from similarly situated nonmembers of his protected class. See Williams v. Trader Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). He has therefore met the plain error

    ### Response:
    holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-567.3(a) (1999). In the instant case, defendant sought a dismissal based on “the terms and provisions of the parties [sic] Employment Agreement which provides for binding arbitration” as follows: The parties shall attempt amicably to resolve disagreements by negotiating with each other. In the event that the matter is not amicably resolved through negotiation, any controversy, dispute or disagreement arising out of or relating to this Agreement (a “Controversy”) shall be settled exclusively by binding arbitration[.] Defendant’s motion is one “ ‘showing’ an agreement described in G.S. 1-567.2,” id., and, as such, constitutes an application for arbitration within the meaning of section 1-567.3(a). Cf. Adams v. Nelsen, 313 N.C. 442, 447, 329 S.E.2d 322, 325 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court was required to

    ### Response:
    holding that motion to dismiss which conspicuously omitted any reference to an arbitration agreement was not the proper method to stay litigation and compel arbitration as it was not a motion showing an agreement to arbitrate under section 15673
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authority. Mangold Midwest Co. v. Vill. of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 357, 143 N.W.2d 813, 820 (1966). Among other powers, they may enact ordinances and regulations to promote the health, safety, and welfare of residents. Minn.Stat. §§ 410.07, 412.221, subd. 32 (2010). However, the state may “limit the power of a city to act in a particular area,” for example by fully occupying a field of legislation and preempting local regulation in that field. City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.2008). The legislature’s purpose in enacting the state building code was to set forth a uniform standard for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair of buildings throughout the state. Minn.Stat. §§ 326B.101, .121, subd. 1(a); see also City of Morris, 749 N.W.2d at 7 (<HOLDING>). Prior to its adoption, municipalities

    ### Response:
    recognizing the purpose of a uniform statewide building code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ALJ had the support of substantial evidence. C Crediting the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that the plaintiff could perform a substantial number of jobs in the national economy. The plaintiff contends that the jobs listed by the vocational expert are not pertinent here. All of the custodial and truck driving jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles are listed at the medium exertional level, he says, and the jobs in question are semi-skilled rather than unskilled. The plaintiff comes close to arguing that only the Dictionary of Occupational Titles can be used as a basis for defining the characteristics of jobs occurring in the national economy. The plaintiffs argument does not withstand scrutiny. See Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Social Security regulations themselves

    ### Response:
    holding that a vocational expert need not correlate job titles in the dictionary with titles taken from state job summaries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contest,” 403 F.3d at 1057, Col. 2, Ln. 35: Replace “they” with “the Defendants” 403 F.3d at 1058, Col. 1, Ln. 26-30: Replace “and that the Defendants’ misrepresentation induced a disparity be tween the transaction price and the true investment quality of the stock at the time of the transaction. See id. at 938-39.” with “and that the Defendants’ misrepresentation was directly related to the actual economic loss it suffered. McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 821 (9th Cir.1992). Defendants’ misrepresentation concealed PCI’s financial situation. As a result of its dire financial situation, PCI eventually went bankrupt, which caused Livid to lose the entire value of its investment in PCI. See, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198-99 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>).” 403 F.3d at 1058, Col. 1, Ln. 30-31: Delete

    ### Response:
    holding that sufficient evidence of loss causation exists when the content of the alleged misstatements or omissions caused the financial harm actually suffered by the plaintiffs internal quotation marks omitted citing and quoting suez equity investors lp v torontodominion bank 250 f3d 87 96 2d cir2001
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interfered with his access to any aspect of the grievance program. Cf. O’Connor v. Featherston, No. 01 Civ. 3251(HB), 2002 WL 818085, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2002) (finding “substantial or reasonable” attempt to exhaust sufficient in light of defendants’ conduct); Gonzalez v. Officer in Charge of Barber Shop on Duty on May 13, 1999, No. 99 Civ. 3455(DLC), 2000 WL 274184, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2000) (ruling that assertions that inmate had been “frustrated” in his attempts to file grievances required denial of motion to dismiss); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir.2002) (“[W]e have held that inmates cannot be held to the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA when prison officials have prevented them from exhausting their administrative remedies.”); Brown, 312 F.3d at 112 (<HOLDING>). b. Conversion is Required as Nonex-haustion

    ### Response:
    holding that a thwarted remedy is not available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contributions, and contract termination is not among them. See Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1505 (3d Cir.1992). 1. Defendant’s Attempted Termination of the CBA Defendant failed to terminate the CBA. The CBA contained an “Evergreen Clause” which stated that renewal was automatic barring “written notice duly given to the other party...” CBA at 44. Defendant cites no case law to suggest that Bentz’s failure to sign the renewal assent form constitutes proper termination merely because Bentz intended so. Furthermore, Bentz sent the March 1994 letter to the Funds, not the Union, even though the CBA required written notice to the other “party.” The Funds were not a party to the CBA. See generally Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 80 S.Ct. 489, 4 L.Ed.2d 442 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Courts consistently conclude that contracts

    ### Response:
    holding that absent specific language to the contrary benefit funds are separate from union signatories to cbas and that employers obligations to funds are separate from obligations to unions under cbas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932)). Each crime must require proof of an element the other does not. The elements required to prove unauthorized possession of a firearm under title 14, section 2253(a) of the Virgin Islands Code (“Section 2253”) are (1) that the defendant was unauthorized to possess a firearm, or did not have a license for the weapon; and (2) that the defendant had at least constructive possession of the firearm. See United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 630, 36 V.I. 367 (3d Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. Virgin Islands, 46 V.I. 534, 539-40

    ### Response:
    holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evaluating whether alternative, potential remedies preclude a Bivens action, the Court has consistently stressed that only remedies crafted by Congress can have such a preclusive effect. For example, in Carlson, the Court held that where “defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declarefs] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and view[s] as equally effective,” no Bivens remedy is available. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19, 100 S.Ct. 1468. Likewise, in Bush v. Lucas, the Court held that the Bivens remedy for an alleged First Amendment violation was precluded by an “elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step” by Congress. 462 U.S. at 388, 103 S.Ct. 2404; see Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460 (<HOLDING>). In Malesko, however, the Court implicitly

    ### Response:
    holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    release and accepted the pitiful sum of $50 in settlement of the injuries received by him he was in the hospital of the railway company, at St. Louis, hundreds of miles away from his family and friends and advisers, surrounded by tire paid employés of the railway company, almost a monomaniac upon the subject of once more obtaining employment with the railway company; and the assurances from the claim agent that the sum accepted and the release signed by him only related to the slight injury mours & Co., 116 Hawai’i 277, 172 P.3d 1021, 1033-35 (2007) (same), Phipps v. Winneshiek County, 593 N.W.2d 143, 145-46 (Iowa 1999) (same), and Roth v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 120 S.W.3d 764, 771-76 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (same), with Taylor v. Hopper, 207 Cal. 102, 276 P. 990, 991-92 (1929) (<HOLDING>), and Shallenberger v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff must rescind a settlement and return the consideration received thereunder before bringing a suit for fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the lender""). 17 . Id. at 94. 18 . 286 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 89) (internal alteration omitted). 19 . Id. at 1061-62; Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 90. 20 . Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 89; Albrecht, 286 P.3d at 1063-64. 21 . Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 87-88, 94. 22 . AS 34.20.070(b). 23 . Hagberg v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 585 P.2d 559, 562 (Alaska 1978). 24 . Id. at 560. 25 . Id. at 561-62. 26 . State v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 414 (Alaska 1982); see also Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., LLC, 249 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2011). 27 . 660 P.2d at 413 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 28 . 815 P.2d 857, 859-60 (Alaska 1991). 29 . Id. at 860. 30 . Id. at 861. 31 . Id. 32 . Id. 33 . Id. 34 . 994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999) (<HOLDING>). 35 . 101 P.3d 1047, 1048 (Alaska 2004). 36 .

    ### Response:
    holding that the utpa does not cover a timber sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those claims. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s order concerning Perry’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing argument, and we remand for further proceedings. In his motion, Perry argued that counsel’s inaction at closing prejudiced him because the failure to timely object to the prosecutor’s remarks, including the phrase that the defense witnesses were all a pack of liars, waived appellate review of the issue. In its order, the trial court found that this allegation should have been raised in Perry’s direct appeal. Additionally, the court found that the remarks were proper comments on the evidence. We disagree with both findings. See Henderson v. State, 727 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). A claim that counsel was ineffective for

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutors remarks referring to defense witnesses as a pack of liars were improper but not fundamental error court unable to review on appeal because trial counsel failed to preserve error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which is that the new rule announced in Alleyne applies retroactively on collateral review. See id. Jeanty does not meet Bryant’s third requirement because Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review. See id. First, neither Alleyne itself nor any later Supreme Court decision holds that Alleyne is retroactive. See United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d 1245, 1250 n. 3 (11th Cir.2014). Second, the Alleyne Court explained that its holding was an application of the rule established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, see Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2163 (applying Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000)), and we have repeatedly held that Apprendi’s rule does not apply retroactively on collateral review. See, e.g., Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to  2241 petitions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel’s contemplated course of action on his behalf. However satisfactory telephonic appearance and written correspondence may be in other proceedings, or where one’s client it not mute, it is beyond peradventure that petitioner’s counsel here was precluded from representing his client in any meaningful sense of the term. While longer continuances might have solved the preparation problem here, the short continuances granted by the IJ were categorically insufficient. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality .... ” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849-50, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), quoted in Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 862 (<HOLDING>); see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 91 (noting that

    ### Response:
    holding that while reviewing courts usually defer to discretion of trial judge in granting or denying a continuance grant of two short continuances where alien requested time to find a lawyer is an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the entity responsible for funding the plan. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that United States authorized to recover Medicare payments via action against any entity required or responsible to pay primary). In this case, it is undisputed that Deluxe, and not John Hancock, is the party responsible for funding the group health plan through which Santana claims benefits. The Plan is self-funded by Deluxe; all claims under the Plan are paid with Deluxe funds whereas John Hancock provides administrative services, but no funds, to the Plan. Therefore, as a matter of law, Santana cannot maintain an action against John Hancock for purportedly failing to pay Plan benefits primary to Medicare. Cf. Health Ins. Assoc. of America, Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 417 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1095, 130

    ### Response:
    holding that insurance companies acting as thirdparty administrators to group health plans not subject to medicare recovery actions brought by government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demanding his resignation were possible outcomes of the meeting. Cf. Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir.1992) (relied upon by Plaintiff) (reasoning that the plaintiff did not have sufficient notice that “his employment [was] in jeopardy of termination” where the plaintiff could have reasonably inferred that meeting was for the sole purpose of discussing contract modifications and performance objectives, “rather than a proceeding to discuss the appropriateness of a termination decision”). Second, the Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that twenty-four hours was an insufficient notice period. The Tenth Circuit has indicated that there is no set length of time that must be provided and that termination immediately following notice may be sufficient. See West, 967 F.2d at 368 (<HOLDING>); Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1459

    ### Response:
    holding that employee had sufficient notice because she knew in advance of her termination that the county attorney proposed to eliminate her job
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    53 . See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9, 122 S.Ct. at 2010 (stating that nonnamed class member would be allowed to appeal only the trial court’s overruling of his objections to the class-action settlement); City of San Benito, 109 S.W.3d at 752 (following Devlin and concluding that nonnamed class members are allowed to appeal the trial court's overruling of their objections to the class-action settlement). 54 . See PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272-75 (Tex.2012) (concluding that a judgment violates due process, is void, and subject to collateral attack to the extent that it purports to adjudicate claims as to a person over whom personal jurisdiction has not been established, for example through failure to serve a defendant with process); In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 566 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Derivative

    ### Response:
    holding that a complete failure to serve a defendant with process deprives the trial court of personal jurisdiction violates due process and results in a judgment that is void as to that defendant and subject to challenge at any time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Immediately on redirect, the State then asked Lynch-Stanley, “Does the length of the delay in the disclosure have any — in your opinion, does it erode the credibility of the disclosure?” Smith objected, but the trial court overruled the objection. Lynch-Stanley then responded, “[I]t really doesn’t [erode the credibility]” and “[W]hen you’re looking at credibility, you’re looking for other types of things, but not necessarily the length of disclosure.” By coaxing a response from Lynch-Stanley that inherently implicated the credibility of the victim’s three-year delay in disclosure, the State was able to present a comment on the victim’s veracity — a comment that has been expressly prohibited by our supreme court in State v. Jennings. See 394 S.C. 473, 480, 716 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2011) (<HOLDING>); id. at 480, 716 S.E.2d at 94-95 (noting there

    ### Response:
    holding that it is improper for an expert to comment on the veracity of a childs accusations of sexual abuse citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    II. D.W. contends that the court should have suppressed his statements to Officer Farris because they were made without the officer having advised D.W. of his Miranda rights. He also argues that his statements during the interview with Detective Bookard should also have been suppressed because the purported waiver -of his Miranda rights was not voluntary, an argument D.W. raises for the first time on appeal, and because police engaged in the type of two-step interrogation prohibited under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). The rights established under Miranda are triggered only when an individual is in custody and under interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether an individual is in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that safeguards are required in the case of incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to RSMo 2000. 2 . Movant and Victim's mother were married in 1990 and Victim was born just prior to their marriage. Although Movant’s name is on Victim’s birth certificate, Movant is not her biological father. 3 . Movant was represented in his direct appeal by Craig A. Johnston of the Office of State Public Defender (“Appellate Counsel”). 4 . It is clear that appellate counsel is never obligated to raise “every possible issue contained in [a] motion for new trial or assert a frivolous claim. Moreover, [counsel in direct appeals is] permitted to strategically winnow out non-frivolous issues in favor of other arguments.” Cole, 223 S.W.3d at 931. 5 . ""It is recommended that the trial court question the defendant directly.” Britt, 286 S.W.3d at 862 n. 2.; see also Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 655

    ### Response:
    holding that the best practice for a trial court is to question the defendant personally on the record to ensure that the defendant understands the right understands what is lost in the waiver has discussed the issue with defense counsel and voluntarily intends to waive the right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not the motivating factor for his termination. A jury instruction error ""is not harmless if it could have ‘reasonably ... affected the outcome of the trial' or if the jury 'quite possibly’ relied on an erroneous instruction.” Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 396 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hill v. Reederei F. Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2006), and Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2008)). Here, the difference between ""but-for” and ""mixed-motive” instruction goes to the central issue before jury; Why was Egan fired? There is no question that a significant change relating to this critical issue could have reasonably affected the outcome of the trial. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 588 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Arguably, the District Court could have

    ### Response:
    holding that the improper use of a mixedmotive instruction in a butfor case shifted the burden of persuasion on a central issue in the case and therefore the error cannot be harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. As a preliminary matter, the State contends that the Defendant waived this issue by not raising it before the Court of Criminal Appeals or in his brief requesting permission to appeal. The Defendant addressed the propriety of the attempt jury instruction within his argument- challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in his appellate brief before the Court of Criminal Appeals and his brief submitted with his application pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Within that argument, he addressed relevant case law and cited to the record. Accordingly, the Defendant sufficiently raised this issue at both levels to allow this Court’s review of the issue. See Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 333-37 (Tenn.2012) (<HOLDING>); Ramirez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 414

    ### Response:
    recognizing that failing to list an issue in the appropriate section of the appellate brief may result in waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the habeas petition not as an ineffective assistance of appellate claims, but as ineffective assistance of trial counsel and trial court error claims. Although the Ohio Supreme Court arguably addressed the merits of claims 33(a) and (b) during the Mumahan application, it addressed them in the context of appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue on appeal, rather than as an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. The Ohio Supreme Court similarly addressed claim 43, rather than reviewing it as the trial court error claim raised in the habeas petition. Because the claims were raised in state court under a different theory than the petitioner raised them in the federal habe- as petition, they are procedurally defaulted. See Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). No reasonable jurist would dispute this

    ### Response:
    holding that to exhaust a claim a petitioner must present it to the state courts under the same theory in which it is later presented in federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be the case on appeal. In the event that the sum exceeds the actual, reasonable fees and expenses, there is no explanation as to why the trial court feels that the excess should be awarded to the estate. See Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 103 N.C. App. 500, 501, 405 S.E.2d 774, 775 (upholding Rule 11 sanction awarding $2,918.82 in attorneys’ fees and expenses and an additional $1,000.00 to be paid to the clerk of superior court as an additional sanction), disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 118, 409 S.E.2d 595 (1991). Only if the trial court includes findings of fact regarding how it came to choose the particular sanction imposed can this Court determine whether or not the sanction represents an abuse of discretion. Cf. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 287, 607 S.E.2d 678, 682 (2005) (<HOLDING>). We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that even under an abuse of discretion standard the trial court must    make sufficient find ings of fact and conclusions of law to allow the reviewing court to determine whether a judgment and the legal conclusions that underlie it represent a correct application of the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Appeals has continued to apply this non-apportionment rule. See Grand Rapids Asphalt Paving Co. v. City of Wyoming, 29 Mich.App. 474, 185 N.W.2d 591, 594-95 (1971) (citing Chaussee and Early); see also Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Site Dev. Inc., No. 313971, 2014 WL 2600566, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. June 10, 2014) (citing Grand Rapids and rejecting liquidated damages without evidence that the other party was the sole cause of delay). Both federal and other state courts, however, have been shifting away from the strict application of this rule. One federal court in Michigan did not follow the rule when delay could be apportioned and liquidated damages were per diem, as they are under Bailey’s contract with the State. In re Constr. Diversification, Inc., 36 B.R. 434, 437 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (<HOLDING>). More recently, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the

    ### Response:
    holding that michigans nonapportionment rule does not apply where responsibility for discrete days can be apportioned under a per diem liquidated damages provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over another partici pant, if he exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization. United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 345 (5th Cir.2012) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 525, 184 L.Ed.2d 339 (2012). The court in Delgado explained that because the defendant “eontrol[led] a large quantity of drugs and the truck used to transport them,” and “made arrangements for their transportation and delivery,” the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Id. According to Delgado, a § 3B1.1 adjustment may be based on either control over people or management of assets. Id. We have followed and applied Delgado’s interpretation of § 3B1.1, cmt. n.2. See United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 208-09 (5th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, we are bound by Delgado. See United

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts finding of an aggravating role was plausibly supported by evidence that the defendant signed important documents including paychecks and sent correspondence as the owner of an organization engaged in health care fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Heidelberg, 144 S.W.3d at 542-43; Cantu, 994 S.W.2d at 732-33; Barnum, 7 S.W.3d at 794. B. Merits Assuming, without deciding, that appellant’s objection in his motion for new trial sufficiently preserved his Eighth Amendment complaint for review, we address the merits of appellant’s argument regarding whether appellant’s sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. VIII. Generally, a sentence within the statutory range of punishment for an offense will not be held cruel or unusual under the Constitution of either Texas or the United States. Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Hill v. State, 493 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) (<HOLDING>); Baldridge, 77 S.W.3d at 893-94. Here,

    ### Response:
    holding that 75year sentence was not cruel or unusual because it was within statutory range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that defendants were acting under color of state law. Thus, the question presented here is whether defendants’ conduct deprived plaintiff of her Equal Protection rights. For the reasons set forth infra, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find age discrimination in this case and, accordingly, grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim. a. Legal Standard Age-based employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are analyzed under the three-step, burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Kearney v. Cnty. of Rockland ex rel. Vanderhoef 185 Fed.Appx. 68, 70 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 888 F.2d 4,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs equal protection claim pursuant to 42 usc  1983 for agebased employment discrimination fails for the same reasons that her adea and nyshrl claims fail under mcdonnell douglas analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs seek clarification whether certain Plaintiffs (ie., Rocco and Bridie Doino, Barry and Vicki Karlin, and Barbara Saunders (¶¶ 44, 55, 63)) are excused from presenting their vehicles for repair or adjustments because their vehicles were “totaled in SUA-related incidents.” {See Opp’n at 15. ) In Plaintiffs’ view, these occurrences rendered performance impossible and therefore excused their performance. Id. In response, Defendants merely note that these Plaintiffs, like those who sought replacement or refund, failed to “seek repair” as required by the terms of the warranty. (Reply at 4.) California law has long recognized that impossibility of performance will excuse a party’s performance under a contract. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 291, 156 P. 458 (1916) (<HOLDING>). However, even accepting Plaintiffs’ argument,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that impossibility but not mere difficulty excuses a partys performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actually enclosed. (c) Peaceable possession of real property held under a duly registered deed or other memorandum of title that fixes the boundaries of the possessor’s claim extends to the boundaries specified in the instrument. Id. § 16.026. Adverse possession ' requires proof of actual possession of the disputed real property that is open and notorious, peaceable, under a claim of right, adverse or hostile to the claim of the owner, and consistent and continuous for the duration of the statutory period. Perales, 2010 WL 3212125, at *6; Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 187 S.W.3d 201, 213 (Tex.App.-Texar-kana 2006, pet. denied) (citing Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 193-94 (Tex.2003)); Terrill v. Tuckness, 985 S.W.2d 97, 107 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Whether adverse possession has been

    ### Response:
    holding that to be adversepossession must be actual visible continuous notorious distinct hostile and of such character as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the occupant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in relevant part, 535 F.3d 1058, 1079 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). 2. No-action alternative. Citizens’ contention that the Service failed to consider a valid no-action alternative, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d), is without merit. Because the Service was uncertain how it would ultimately implement the Regional Forester’s 2001 Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) Decision, it constructed two no-action alternatives. Alternative 1 would have continued uses allowed under the Service’s most recent travel planning document, and Alternative 2 attempted to model future management actions that might be taken to implement the 2001 OHV Decision. We find nothing unreasonable about the Service’s formulation of these no-action alternatives. See Kilroy v. Ruckelshaus, 738 F.2d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). In fact, we find it ironic that, despite

    ### Response:
    holding that by discussing both the status quo and an alternative reflecting a potential policy shift that might be implemented in light of recent legislative changes the agency satisfied the noaction alternative requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Whether a given user is sophisticated is generally an issue of fact. See, e.g., Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn.2004); Conwed Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 287 F.Supp.2d 997 (D.Minn.2003). 6 . ""Universal'' certification is the highest certification an HVAC technician can obtain from the EPA, and it allows those certified to work on, and purchase, refrigerant for large commercial air conditioning systems. 7 . In applying this defense, courts have differed as to whether a defendant must establish one or both of these factors, as well as what is required to establish those factors. See, e.g., In re Manbodh Asbestos Litigation Series, 2005 WL 3487838, at *11, 14 (V.I.Super.2005) (requiring both); Taylor v. American Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); O’Neal, 10 F.3d at 252 (allowing defense

    ### Response:
    holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies prior to urging a retaliation claim growing out of an earlier charge.” Id. at 414. The Gupta opinion gives several reasons for permitting such retaliation claims to proceed: It is the nature of retaliation claims that they arise after the filing of the EEOC charge.' Requiring prior resort to the EEOC would mean that two charges would have to be filed olding that retaliation claim may be raised for the first time in federal court); Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832 (5th Cir.) (reasoning that because other Title VII claims were properly before court, jurisdiction existed over retaliatory termination claim as well), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260, 111 S.Ct. 2916, 115 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1991); Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005, 112 S.Ct. 640,

    ### Response:
    holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    referring to those remote times was stale, and, on that ground as well, it provided no reason for the magistrate to believe that either possession of pornography or indecency with a child was taking place at appellant’s residence on the date the affidavit was issued. See Sgro, 287 U.S. at 210, 53 S.Ct. at 140 (requiring proof in affidavit to be of facts “so closely related” to time of issuance of warrant as to “justify a finding of probable cause at that time”); Davis, 202 S.W.3d at 157 n. 23 (“It is the officer’s identification of the chemical odor with the manufacture of methamphetamine that lends sufficient specificity as to make reasonably available the inference that such activity is going on at that particular premises at that particular time.”); Peltier, 626 S.W.2d at 32 (<HOLDING>). The only facts referenced in the affidavit

    ### Response:
    holding affidavit insufficient to support probable cause when one cannot learn from the affidavit when the past activities occurred and when the observations were made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are distributed, but the cumulative effect of “highgrading” on each type of land may determine whether species will retain viable, well-distributed populations in the Tongass. Cf. Resources Ltd., 35 F.3d at 1306 (“[O]ne does not need control over private land to be able to assess the impact that activities on private land may have in the Forest.”). At least in the particular circumstances of this case, the cumulative impacts on wildlife viability from continued “highgrading” by non-federal entities, as well as by the Forest Service to the extent permissible under NFMA, ought to be considered in a single, programmatic EIS. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (9th Cir.1990); see also LaFlamme v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm., 852 F.2d 389, 401-02 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). A cumulative effects analysis in a

    ### Response:
    holding that a cumulative impacts analysis was insufficient where the agency had examined single projects in isolation because there were several foreseeable similar projects in a geographical region that added to the cumulative impacts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    study did not completely comply with the requirements of its Noise Guidebook is not, of itself, sufficient to show that its reliance on the study was not in accordance with law or arbitrary and capricious. In Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986), the Supreme Court held that “not all agency publications are of binding force” — in other words, the guidelines in question must be “the kind of agency law the violation of which is remediable at all.” Generally, to be legally binding on an agency, its own publications must have been “promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority and in conformance with the procedural requirements imposed by Congress.” See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789-90, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685, (<HOLDING>); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding social security administration claims manual is not binding agency rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court and our circuit have applied the doctrine in several cases where, like this one, a potentially illegal search was followed by a search conducted in accordance with a valid search warrant premised on evidence of probable cause developed independently of the initial search. See, e.g., Murray, 487 U.S. at 541-43, 108 S.Ct. 2529 (remanding case for consideration of the inevitable-discovery doctrine where police conducted an initial, illegal search and later conducted a second, legal search in which they seized marijuana); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-16, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Keszthelyi, 308 F.3d 557,

    ### Response:
    holding that contraband would have been inevitably discovered where agents conducted a warrantless search while obtaining a search warrant and later conducted a second legal search in which agents discovered contraband
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requires that “(1) the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits, (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the court withholds injunctive relief, (3) the balance of hardships to the respective parties favors the grant of injunctive relief, and (4) l. 26, 36-37 (2012); Magnum Opus Techs., Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed.Cl. 512, 544 (2010); Global Computer Enters. v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 350, 452 (2009); Red River Holdings, LLC v. United States, 87 Fed.Cl. 768, 791 (2009). Neither the balance of hardships to the respective parties or public interest favor injunctive relief. Any harm to SAIC would be outweighed by the harm to the government if injunctive relief were granted, and injunctive relief would not be in the best interests of national security. PGBA, 389 F.3d at 1228-29 (<HOLDING>). SAIC retorts that reevaluation is not

    ### Response:
    holding that 28 usc  1491b4 does not deprive a court of its equitable discretion in deciding whether injunctive relief is appropriate  and does not automatically require a court to set aside an arbitrary capricious or otherwise unlawful contract award and affirming the denial of injunctive relief in a postaward protest despite finding that the procuring agency committed prejudicial error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    makes payment on a submitted false claim, the FCA statute of limitations starts running on the date payment was made, rather than on the (earlier) date the claim was submitted. See, e.g., United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 888 F.Supp. 419, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (six-year statute of limitations period of § 3731(b)(1) begins to run on date of submission of claim for payment, or, if the claim is paid, from the date of payment); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1157 (2d Cir.1993) (noting the same in dicta); United States ex rel. Duvall v. Scott Aviation, 733 F.Supp. 159, 161 (W.D.N.Y.1990) (“DOt is the payment not the request which triggers the statute”); United States v. Klein, 230 F.Supp. 426, 441 (W.D.Pa.1964) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 356 F.2d 983 (3d Cir.1966). Cf. United

    ### Response:
    holding that 31 usc  235 the predecessor to  3729 did not become operative until final payment had been made on the false claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    credit. This appeal followed. LAW/ANALYSIS Foggie asserts the circuit court erred in (1) failing to find substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that he is entitled to permanent total disability compensation benefits, (2) affirming the Commission’s finding that General Electric is entitled to credit for an unrelated award of 10% permanent partial disability to Foggie’s leg, and (3) failing to reject General Electric’s claimed credit for Foggie’s alleged service-related disability. General Electric contends, however, the order of the circuit court is interlocutory and therefore not directly appealable. We agree with General Electric, and thus dismiss this appeal. Appellate review of workers’ compensation decisions is governed by the Administr , 316 S.E.2d 385, 385 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. Whitt, 279 S.C. 343, 343, 306 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding the order of the circuit court did not involve the merits of the action and was therefore interlocutory and not reviewable by the supreme court for lack of finality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Howard E. Leasure appeals from the district court’s denial of his request for sentence modification. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Leasure contends that he is entitled to re-sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. This contention is foreclosed by Carrington v. United States, 470 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Leasure also contends that he is entitled to

    ### Response:
    holding that  3582c does not apply to a person seeking resentencing under united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and direct the trial court to modify its September 10, 2008 order consistent with this opinion, and direct that Bradshaw is not responsible for amicus attorney fees for work performed in connection with the habeas corpus matter. We deny Bradshaw’s petition, in part, with regard to denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his request for attorney’s fees. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to act in accordance with this opinion. 1 . C.S.B. will turn 17 in January 2009. 2 . See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.375 (Vernon 2002) (providing relator is not amenable to civil process while in Texas for sole purpose of compelling return of child through habeas corpus proceeding); Marshall v. Wilson, 616 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1981) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Section 157.374 of the Texas Family Code

    ### Response:
    holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Zapata approach, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 7.44, cmt. 2 (West 2010), but nothing in our opinion in Hasan relied on any unique facets of Massachusetts law in determining the appropriate standard of review, see Hasan, 729 F.2d at 374. Therefore, because Hasan does not cabin itself to special litigation committee motions under Massachusetts law, or to special litigation committee motions explicitly brought under Rule 56, it further supports reviewing de novo the district court’s decision in this case. Additionally, consistent with the Erie doctrine, federal law governs the standard of review of a summary judgment motion in a diversity case. Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 165-66 (6th Cir.1993); but see K & T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Because reviewing a summary judgment motion

    ### Response:
    holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Debtor attended Penn between 1997 and 2001. 4 . There are seven (7) such notes dated between May 22, 1997 and September 27, 2000 written under the PENN Guaranteed Loan Program in principal amounts that aggregate $32,092. In addition, attached to Penn's proof of claim is a promissory note in favor of Penn dated August 31, 2000 in the amount of $1,500.00. 5 . As of the date of confirmation, two (2) separate claims secured by the Debtor’s residence were filed. These two (2) claims totaled $263,606.93. The Debtor’s confirmed plan provides for those claims through the surrender of the secured property. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C). On August 14, 2007, presumably because a sale of the property had occurred resulting in no payment to the junior lienholder, one of the two claimants (TRF 86) (<HOLDING>). See generally In re Parker, 334 B.R. 529,

    ### Response:
    holding that university violated automatic stay by withholding chapter 13 debtors student transcript but that such action at bar did not rise to the level of contempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    7511(a) may appeal to the board. Section 7511(b), however, specifically excludes those employees “(2) whose positions] ha[ve] been determined to be of a confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy-advocating character by—... (C) the President or the head of an agency for a position excepted from the competitive service by statute.” Here, it is undisputed that Attorney General Reno’s Order in 1996 determined that the position of Trustee was of a “confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy-advocating character.” This designation of the Trustee position is unreviewable by the courts because it is an “inherently discretionary judgment call” committed to the Attorney General. Cf. Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we must only determine whether United

    ### Response:
    holding that the denial of security clearance is unreviewable by this court in part because it is an inherently discretionary decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in her file, the CRA must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a). Experian has provided a de tailed account of the procedures that it used in reinvestigating TOLIVER’s dispute regarding the L nreasonable for a CRA to contact only the creditor for verification of a consumer’s dispute when the CRA knew of a personal dispute between the creditor and the consumer). Because Toliver has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the accuracy of several of the entries in her Experian credit report, the § 1681i(a) claims related to those entries must fail as a matter of law. See DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>). Because Toliver has not established a genuine

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim brought under  1681ia must fail absent a genuine issue of material fact as to accuracy and noting that the weight of authority in other circuits indicates that without a showing that the reported information was in fact inaccurate a claim brought under  1681i must fail
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him that he could refuse consent and because Boggs threat to “wait for a couple hours for a search warrant” was improper coercion. Police officers, however, need not inform someone of the right to refuse consent, United States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1257 (7th Cir.1996), and they may express their intention to obtain a warrant so long as it is a genuine intention and not merely a “pretext to induce submission,” United States v. Scheets, 188 F.3d 829, 840 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In further support of his contention that he was coerced, Smith identifies several reasons to explain that he did not feel free to refuse the officer’s request and leave the scene. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Only two of these merit any discussion.

    ### Response:
    holding that whether an encounter is consensual hinges on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    passed an enactment that declared ‘AH future, apportionment shall be drawn so as -most to burden Party X’s. rights to fair, and effective representation, though still in accord with one-person, one-vote principles,’ we would surely conclude the Constitution had been violated.”); id. at 326, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“State action that discriminates against .a political minority for the sole and unadorned purpose of maximizing the power, of the majority plainly violates the decisionmaker’s duty to remain impartial”); id. at 345, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he increasing efficiency of partisan redistricting has damaged the democratic process to a degree that our predecessors only began to imagine.”); id. at 360, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>). On its most fundamental level, partisan

    ### Response:
    holding that redistricting plan violates constitution if it amounts to an unjustified use of political factors to entrench a minority in power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    10 to 15 cents higher than that.” Rudnick Aff. II at 9. First, the Court questions Mr. Rudnick’s conclusion that Haagen-Dazs is the price leader where Winter Hill’s October 14, 1987 order guide contains the following suggested retail prices for 16-ounce packages of frozen desserts: Howard Johnson — $1.79, Dole — $1.98, Tofutti — $2.79, Haagen-Dazs-$1.89, Frusen Gladje — $2.08, Mousse d'Jour — $1.99, and Steve's — $2.19. Affidavit of Michael L. Baily, Exhibit B. Second, and more importantly, this conclusory statement of the pricing differentials in the super premium ice cream market, which is not supported by specific factual data, is insufficient evidence that Haagen-Dazs is in fact the price leader in the market. Cf. United States v. Hall, 424 F.Supp. 508, 533-34 (W.D.Okla.1975) (<HOLDING>), aff’d, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.) cert, denied,

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion requesting a trial judge to disqualify himself and the affidavit in support thereof were insufficient in part due to their conclusory nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the paramount right of government to protect by zoning the public health, safety, morals and welfare."" McQuillin, supra § 25.166. Variances ""are designed to afford a protective device against individual hardships, to provide relief against unnecessary and unjust invasions of the right of private property, and to provide a flexibility of procedure necessary to the protection of constitutional rights."" Id. at §25.160. ¶ 45. The unnecessary hardship standard ""is neither the same nor as demanding as a takings analysis."" 3 Yokley, supra § 21-5 at 86 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis in original). However, the ""no reasonable use"" test for unnecessary hardship in a use variance case has something of a constitutional ring to it. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)(<HOLDING>). This is generally not true of the test for

    ### Response:
    holding that a zoning regulation which deprives property of all economically beneficial or productive use is a categorical regulatory taking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    primarily on two cases it argued to the circuit court, Bendall v. White, 511 F.Supp. 793 (N.D.Ala.1981), and American Casualty Co. v. Griffith, 107 Ga.App. 224, 129 S.E.2d 549 (1963). In Bendall, the plaintiff obtained a $900,000 judgment against the defendant, White. White and the plaintiff entered into a “nonexecution” agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed not to execute the judgment upon White’s personal assets but to pursue only the coverage afforded under White’s insurance. The court relied on Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 267 Or. 397, 517 P.2d 262 (1973), to conclude that an agreement not to execute relieved the insured from the legal obligation to pay the judgment. In Griffith, the minor defendant settled the plaintiffs d 524[, 529] (Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>); Coblentz v. American Surety Co., 416 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs agreement to collect only against a defendants insurance company was merely a covenant and did not constitute a release of the defendants from liability and stating that the defendant is still legally obligated to the injured party and the insurer still must make good on its contractual promise to pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    597 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Okla.Ct.App.1979) (same), cert. denied (Okla. July 16, 1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1957) (same). In rare cases, the evidence may be so one-sided as to allow resolution of the employment-status issue as a matter of law. See Frankle, 234 Minn. at 51, 47 N.W.2d at 489 (adopting this approach, but limiting its application to circumstances in which the underlying facts are undisputed and support only one inference); Ledoux v. Joncas, 163 Minn. 498, 500-01, 204 N.W. 635, 636-37 (1925) (affirming an employment-status decision as a matter of law because “whether there is any evidence tending to support a given finding, and whether the evidence conclusively establishes a particular fact, are questions of law”); see also Santiago, 794 P.2d at 141 (<HOLDING>); Fleming, 139 Cal.Rptr. at 581 (same);

    ### Response:
    recognizing the issue may be decided as a question of law if the facts are undisputed and support only one inference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    use provision of § 16-8-107(1), C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.) is raised for the first time on appeal. His objection to the witness’ testimony in the trial court was based on relevancy under CRE 401 and 403 and, alternatively, the witness’ inability to recall clearly the defendant’s statements. Having failed to r, that permits an appellate court to address issues not raised below where plain error requires consideration of the issues. Larkin, 177 Colo. at 161, 493 P.2d at 3 (requiring serious prejudicial error); see also People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 953 n. 11 (Colo.1987) (noting that failure to object in district court on grounds asserted on appeal is deemed to waive the objection unless the alleged error rises to plain error); Dorador v. Cronin, 199 Colo. 85, 86, 605 P.2d 53, 54 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 71, 450

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court will not pass on issues that have not been presented for determination in district court except in case of plain or fundamental error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document is a continuing offense. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858. B. The Nature of the Crime Involved The defining characteristic of a continuing offense is that it involves o g that punishment of “any alien crewman who willfully remains in the United States in excess of the number of days allowed” is a continuing offense because the crewman continues to violate the statute “until he physically leaves the United States”); United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where a deported alien enters the United States and remains here with the knowledge that his entry is illegal, his remaining here until he is ‘found’ is a continuing offense.... ”); United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 343-44

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Leslie M. James appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging various claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm. We treat the district court’s July 29, 2014 order as denying a second motion for reconsideration, and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion- because James failed to establish grounds for such relief. See id. at 1263 (grounds for reconsideration); see also Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). We lack jurisdiction to consider James’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a fed r civ p 60b motion where movants reiterated arguments raised previously and did not present any basis to vacate the challenged order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Easton, Inc., 142 Md. 526, 121 A. 475, 478 (1923). Void ab initio, the ersatz amendment has not improved with age. Nor did filing with the Department of State breathe life into a dead letter. The Millers' claim of authority over the assets can be traced ultimately to the initial, ultra vires amendment, which bears some legal resemblance to a wild deed. Title to land cannot be conferred by a wild deed of comparable vintage. See Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So.2d 114, 118-120 (Fla. 1970). Until enactment of the Marketable Record Title Act, a forged or otherwise void deed was a nullity which could never start the running of a statute of limitations, see Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858, 864 (Fla.1961), even if recorded. See Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 434, 198 So. 88, 90 (Fla.1940) (<HOLDING>). 11 . While the Church has standing to assert

    ### Response:
    holding recording afforded no protection to the claimants thereunder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    439 F.Supp. 290, 294-95 (D.Kan.1976) (concluding that the Feres doctrine did not bar prisoner’s claim under the FTCA because at the time of the tortious acts alleged in the complaint he had been given a bad conduct discharge revoking all military privileges, he was receiving no pay or other form of compensation from the military, and was not performing any military tasks). 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) The plaintiffs’ action is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which provide .1999) (finding that § 1997e(e) does not apply to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims); Lewis v. Sheahan, 35 F.Supp.2d 633, 637 n. 3 (N.D.Ill.1999) (stating that § 1997e(e) does not bar plaintiffs right of access claims); Self-Allah v. Annucci 1998 WL 912008, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.14, 1998) (<HOLDING>); Friedland v. Fauver, 6 F.Supp.2d 292

    ### Response:
    holding that  1997ee is not applicable to plaintiffs first amendment claims because the statutory section applies to situations where the underlying claim involves an injury to a prisoners physical wellbeing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    above, Plaintiffs April 20, 2011 Motion For Leave To File Its Supplemental And Amended Complaint is granted in part and denied in part. The court hereby grants Plaintiff leave to supplement the September 4, 2009 Complaint to allege a claim for damages incurred through December 31, 2009. An evidentiary hearing regarding the damages claimed in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint will commence on October 24, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. in the National Courts Building at 717 Madison Place N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The court has issued four opinions in a previous case filed by SMUD, No. 98-488C, seeking damages prior to January 1, 2004 for the same breach of contract claim at issue in this case. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 495 (2005) (""SMUD I"") (<HOLDING>); Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is singular, and the sentence in which it is used contains no language that would expand the singular to plural. The parties did not use the word “a beneficiary” or “one of the beneficiaries” so as to show that Defendant had reserved the right to name more than one beneficiary. The clear and unequivocal meaning of the language is that Defendant was to name the parties’ son as the singular, thus only, beneficiary of his group life insurance policy. Id. at *2. Upon review, the Eighth Di d 1494, 1496-1497 (11th Cir.1986) (concluding that a divorce decree which required the insured to name his children as “irrevocable beneficiaries” of an insurance policy nullified the insured’s attempt to name another beneficiary); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Spain, 556 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kamey, 5

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a divorce decree which obligated the divorcing husband to name the children of his first marriage as the irrevocable beneficiaries of an insurance policy precluded him from naming his new wife as a beneficiary entitled to a portion of the insurance benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can be made to accommodate the sect’s sincere religious practice.” Id. at 423, 126 S.Ct. 1211. The Court held that “RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ... [to the] particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” Id. at 430-31, 126 S.Ct. 1211. The Court explained that RFRA requires courts to “look[] beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[ ] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” Id. at 431, 126 S.Ct. 1211. We agree with the district court that O Centro Espirita and Antoine are not clearly irreconcilable. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 900(<HOLDING>). First, in Antoine we considered whether

    ### Response:
    holding that circuit precedent is binding unless the relevant court of last resort has undercut the prior casess theory or reasoning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice____” Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Judge Winkelstein’s opinions contain a comprehensive discussion of the facts, inferences drawn, and their application to the law. The judge set forth in detail the arguments advanced by plaintiff and his reasons for rejecting each argument, made credibility assessments where necessary, and explained his legal conclusions. We affirm substantially on the basis of the cogent and exhaustive opinions of Judge Winkelstein, which we have determined to be well supported by the evidence and legally unassailable. See ibid, (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. 1 Mikalu, LLC, settled prior to

    ### Response:
    holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    buckle ought to be designed to separate only with a maximum amount of force (several thousand pounds) rather than a minimal amount of force. The rationale for the FMVSS 209 standard as it exists, however, is that a partially latched buckle should, given the ejector spring, the retractor system, and any movements of the user, ""pop out” during ordinary use, and thus ""inform” the user that the seatbelt was not properly latched in the first instance. 3 . The six buckle mechanisms were taken from a 1989 Geo Metro, a 1993 Suzuki Sidekick, two 1994 Isuzu Rodeos (from which a total of three buckles were removed), and a 1993 Geo Storm. The latchplate used in the testing was removed from a 1991 Subaru Justy. 4 . Kumho thus modifies United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) Jones did recognize, however, that Daubert’s

    ### Response:
    holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    34] Even if the confession was newly discovered, Cookson did not show clearly and convincingly that it would, have changed the outcome of the trial. The motion court found that Vantol’s confession was not credible. This finding is supported by the evidence of the versions of the confession that Vantol made to the defense team and to the police; Vantol’s visits to Cookson in jail and the timing of those visits; Vantol’s recantation; and his mental and psychological characteristics. Furthermore, the version of Vantol’s confession that he gave to the police implicated Cookson in a murder for hire scheme, which, as the trial court noted at Cook-son’s sentencing, would have made Cook-son guilty of murder and supported a life sentence. See State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 149 (Me.1990) (<HOLDING>). 3. Murder Weapon [¶ 35] Cookson has also

    ### Response:
    holding that an aggravating circumstance that justifies a life sentence is a planned deliberate killing including a killing for hire
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a qualified Medicaid provider implicates a protected property interest and that total debarment from government contracting implicates a corporation’s protected liberty interest. See ABA 40 F.Supp.3d at 165, 2014 WL 1863944, at *8 (citing Trifax Corp. v. District of Columbia, 314 F.3d 641, 643 (D.C.Cir.2003); Patchogue Nursing Ctr. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (2d Cir.1986)); see also Vencor Nursing Centers v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C.1999); Cleanmaster Industries, Inc. v. Shewry, 491 F.Supp.2d 937, 943 (C.D.Cal.2007). A provider’s property interest in Medicaid participation is nonetheless only triggered when it is decertified, its provider number is terminated, and it is correspondingly terminated from the program. See ABA 40 F.Supp.3d at 165-66, 2014 WL 1863944, at *8-9 (<HOLDING>). Providers, furthermore, have no property

    ### Response:
    holding temporary suspension pursuant to credible allegation of fraud does not trigger due process protections
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was relevant to our seizure determination. See 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir.1991). But, in making our seizure determination, we also relied on the fact the suspect was in a car followed for several blocks by a police car with its overhead lights activated before it pulled over and he exited and verbally responded to the officers' show of authority before fleeing on foot. Id. at 1565-67. Moreover, it does not appear, as here, the suspect in Morgan continued to elude police for days before his apprehension. While we indicated in Morgan that momentary yielding to a show of authority may be relevant to a seizure determination, we recognize other circuits have held momentary termination of movement does not constitute a seizure. See United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 359

    ### Response:
    holding to constitute a seizure a suspect must do more than halt temporarily he must submit to police authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    government to treat similarly situated people alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection. See Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 21 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1994). Thus, the first step in an equal protection case is determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that she was treated differently than others who were similarly situated to her. See, e.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 940-41 (5th Cir.1991). Absent a threshold showing that she is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim. See id. at 941 (<HOLDING>). Thus, before we may reach the merits of their

    ### Response:
    holding that black residents failed to state an equal protection claim where they did not allege the existence of a similarly situated group of white residents who were treated differently
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shareowners to advance their own “purely personal rather than corporate ends.” Wm. Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick Developers S., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir.1991) (citing Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 656-57, 389 N.Y.S.2d 327, 357 N.E.2d 983 (1976), and Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417, 420, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966)). The question of “[w]hether the corporate veil should be pierced requires a fact specific inquiry; there are no bright-line rules.” DER Travel Servs. v. Dream Tours & Adventures, Inc., No. 99 CV 2231, 2005 WL 2848939, at *8 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 28, 2005); see also MAG Portfolio Consult, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Group LLC, 268 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir.2001); Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131 at 139 (<HOLDING>) (quoting American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo,

    ### Response:
    holding that the infinite variety of situations that might warrant disregarding the corporate form is not an easy task because disregarding corporate separateness is a remedy that differs with the circumstances of each case 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the underlying felony and demonstrates a reckless indifference to human life. 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. 1676. If the death penalty is not disproportionate for this type of defendant, it follows inexorably that the death penalty is not disproportionate for Sampson — a defendant who (the jury found) intentionally murdered his victims. In all events, neither Tison nor En-mund was concerned with the evaluation of a specific aggravating factor. The im~ plausibility of Sampson’s attempted application of these cases to an aggravating factor is underscored by the fact that the Supreme Court implicitly has approved the use of other aggravating factors not directly related to a capital defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime. See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (<HOLDING>). We therefore reject Sampson’s claim that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the validity of aggravating factors such as escape from confinement and prior felony conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to an emergency call with his emergency lights and siren activated. The video recording and the testimony of Troopers Hallett, Lee, and Dunaway established that Hallett slowed or stopped as he reached the intersection. Hallett stated that he slowed almost to a stop and looked “left, right, and across” before entering the intersection. Lee stated that Hallett stopped at the intersection and looked to the left before entering the intersection with “due caution.” Dunaway stated that Hallett slowed at the intersection and entered “cautiously.” This evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Hallett did not act with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of the public. See City of Pasadena v. Kuhn, 260 S.W.3d 93, 99-100 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); City of San Angelo Fire Dep’t v. Hudson, 179

    ### Response:
    holding evidence did not establish officers actions were taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard where evidence showed officer was responding to emergency had activated his emergency lights and siren slowed down before proceeding through intersection and collided with vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense. 4 . The Eighth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. See United States v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157, 1164 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stone, 112 F.3d 971, 973

    ### Response:
    holding that crimes of general applicabilitythat is actions that congress has declared illegal regardless of where they occurare not affected by the enactment of  1162 and remain within the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the federal courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    out of the 1972 and the 1991 agreements. However, the trial court held, and we agree, that the 1972 and 1991 agreements were ineffective to create a contractual or business relationship with Drummond and United. Without evidence indicating that the 1972 or 1991 agreement was effective and binding, Drummond cannot prove that anyone wrongfully interfered with the purported relationship. However, we also note that the trial court held, and we agree, that Drum- mond and United had an ongoing business relationship — a tenancy at will that flowed from the expired original leases. A tenancy at will is a sufficient business or property interest to support a claim of tortious interference under the proper circumstances. See, e.g., Hall v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 454 So.2d 1338, 1344 (Ala.1984) (<HOLDING>). However, those proper circumstances are not

    ### Response:
    recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with atwill employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before we address these questions, a brief review of the law’s development in this area is appropriate. The Evolution of Negligence Claims in the Medical Setting Under traditional legal principles, our courts recognized that not every negligence action asserted against a hospital or doctor was one for medical malpractice. Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 958 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997). Indeed, the courts recognized that some claims against medical providers sounded only in ordinary negligence. Drawing this distinction had several important consequences. For example, although medical malpractice claims typically required expert proof, claims asserting ordinary negligence did not. See, e.g., Peete v. Shelby Cnty. Health Care Corp., 938 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, distinguishing a medical

    ### Response:
    holding that expert proof was not required for an asserted claim of ordinary negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    apply the good-cause exception to waiver because the defendant made no showing of cause in his opening brief and declined to make such a showing in a reply brief even though the government affirmatively argued that the defendant had waived his suppression arguments). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying McCoy’s motion to suppress. II. Final Judgment McCoy next argues that the district court’s final judgment of conviction was tainted by an erroneous jury instruction. Specifically, McCoy argues that reversal is warranted because Instruction 26 — the aiding-and-abetting instruction — contained language similar to the aiding-and-abetting instruction that the Supreme Court rejected in Rosemond v. United States, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1251-52, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, a challenged jury instruction

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts aidingandabetting instruction for 18 usc  924c prohibiting the use or carry of a firearm during any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime was flawed because it failed to explain that the defendant needed advance knowledge of a firearms presence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rise to an inheritance. See Dillman v. Dillman, 409 Ill. 494, 502, 100 N.E.2d 567 (1951) (‘Heirs’ “designates all those persons, whether many or few, upon whom the law would cast the inheritance in case of intestacy”) (citations omitted); Black’s Law Dictionary 903 (10th ed. 2014) (An inheritance is generally “[property received from an ancestor under the laws of intestacy[,]” or by bequest or devise”). No one disputes that Cronin was survived only by his sister’s descendants, the Debtor and her siblings. He also died without a valid will. As a result, any funds that the Debt- or received from Cronin’s estate is an inheritance. As the Debtor became entitled to acquire the Inheritance on December 17, 2011 when Cronin passed away, see In re Chenoweth, 3 F.3d 1111, 1112 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), the Debtor was entitled to the Inheritance

    ### Response:
    holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to apply a pollution exclusion on grounds of ambiguity. Id. at 852. The question is whether the language in the Policies is sufficiently unambiguous to identify pet coke’as one of the “petroleum products” covered by Exclusion K. Beemsterboer asserts that the term “petroleum products” in Exclusion K is ambiguous given the vast number of products made from petroleum, including all types of plastic products. Beemsterboer asserts that because the term “petroleum products” is vague, the Court should refuse to apply Exclusion E on the grounds of ambiguity. Continental appears to concede this point, as it fails to reply to Beemsterboer’s argument in its summary judgment briefs. See Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that Exclusion E is ambiguous

    ### Response:
    holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2003) (recognizing that ""the concomitant dangers of the internet and the need to protect both the public and sex offenders themselves from its potential abuses""). Also, Patton's inter net restriction is tailored to him as a sex offender and serves the legitimate needs of law enforcement to monitor and restrict his activities with children for this initial period following his conviction. On the other hand, we note that the internet restriction as applied to Patton does not prohibit him from searching for employment, gaining additional education, or reading a newspaper. The condition prohibits Patton from accessing only those internet-related activities used by children, which are directly related to his position as a sex offender on probation. N.E.2d 267, 275 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). See Harris v. State, 836 Patton, 990 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an internet restriction on a parolee reasonably related to the states goals of reintegrating the parolee into his community protecting the general public and preventing future crime does not unduly infringe upon the parolees first amendment rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    371, 378-79, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786-87, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)): More recently, the Court has refined the exception: “An important government .interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation.” Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 1787-88, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988). Over the years, the Court has broadened this exception considerably, frequently holding a post-deprivation hearing to be sufficient. Compare Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. at 2705 n. 7 (describing use of exception as “rare”), with e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979) (<HOLDING>), and Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 100

    ### Response:
    holding that states interest in preserving integrity of sport of horse racing justifies lack of predeprivation hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    149, 152 (4th Cir.1996) (citing Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989)). III. A. Requesting Dr. Schuster to Reconsider His Opinion Upon remand, Guardian asked Dr. Schuster to ignore Mrs. Hung’s evidence regarding headache. The district court characterized this instruction as a credibility determination within the plan administrator’s discretionary powers. We disagree. While a plan administrator may resolve conflicts between medical reports, she may not withhold or edit inconsistencies within a patient’s medical history to obtain a definitive medical report. Courts have repeatedly held that a claim administrator’s resolution between competing medical opinions is not an abuse of discretion so long as the decision is reasonable. See, e.g., Booth, 201 F.3d at 345-46 (<HOLDING>); Elliott, 190 F.3d at 606 (same); Sheppard &

    ### Response:
    holding that the plan administrator did not abuse her discretion by denying benefits when faced with conflicting medical reports
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a claim for interest or court costs and attorney fees available under section 8371. I note the Seventh Amendment does not grant a party the right to submit equitable claims to a jury merely because legal claims also are present. See Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1245 (3d Cir.1994) (no jury right attaches to equitable claims), petition for cert. denied — U.S. Corp., — , 115 S.Ct. 508, 130 L.Ed.2d 416 (1994); see, e.g., Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508, 79 S.Ct. 948, 955, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (instructing that a district court should permit a jury to resolve legal claims presented in an action prior to the court ruling on the equitable claims); but cf., Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963) (<HOLDING>). In its brief, plaintiff concedes — and I

    ### Response:
    holding  in the context of admiralty law  that when a suit would become unnecessarily complicated if part is tried by a jury and part by a judge only one trier of fact should be used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Daniel Espinoza Villanueva and Candelaria Hernandez Villanueva, husband and wife and natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming an immigration judge’s denial of their applications for cancellation of removal and its order denying their motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s August 6, 2002 order dismissing the Villanuevas’ appeal because they failed to file their petition for review within 30 days of the issuance of that order. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). We review the denial of a motion to

    ### Response:
    holding the finality of a bia order is not affected by a subsequent motion to reconsider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the portion of the statute under which Balderas-Rubio was convicted now corresponds to subsection (A)(4). For ease of explanation, we will hereinafter refer to this portion of the statute as “Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1123(A)(4).” 3 . The district court provided little analysis for its determination that Balderas-Rubio's prior conviction was a crime of violence, and it is therefore unclear how the district court arrived at that determination. But to the extent the district court based its determination solely on the description of Balderas-Rubio’s conduct set forth in the bill of information, without first examining the conduct proscribed by Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1123, the district court's analysis was flawed. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Diaz, 438 F.3d 529, 534-37 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The government’s assertion that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a court may look to the charging document in making a crime of violence determination but only where the statute provides disjunctive methods of committing the offense and the court needs to determine which of the statutory alternatives is involved in the particular case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the lien as it existed pre-bankruptcy was never challenged, the Rule 3012 motion by the FSA was sufficient to begin the process that eventually ended in the stripping down of the lien. We need not determine precisely when an adversary proceeding is required, for it is sufficient to hold that where a creditor files a proof of claim and initiates the valuation process, the debtor is not required to bring an adversary proceeding to strip down the creditor’s lien. See Halverson v. Estate of Cameron (In re Mathiason), 16 F.3d 234, 238 (8th Cir.1994) (recognizing that actions of a party may effectively transform contested motion into adversary proceeding); In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462-63 (allowing extinguishment of Ken without adversary proceeding); cf. Cen-Pen Corp., 58 F.3d at 92-93 (<HOLDING>). IV. The government also claims that this

    ### Response:
    holding that ken survives where vakdity is at issue and no proof of claim is filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    extend coverage. 324 Md. at 60, 595 A.2d 469. The court also made clear that while the policy definition of “bodily injury” includes sickness and disease, “bodily injury” also includes damage to the body which may be detectable only on a subelinical or microscopic level. See id. at 60-61, 595 A.2d 469 (citing cases for the proposition that “nothing in the policy language expressly requires that the injury be diagnosed or identified within [the policy] period, or that the injur J. 437, 478-79, 650 A.2d 974 (N.J.1994) (adopting the continuous-trig ger theory for activating insurers’ obligation to respond in the context of progressive indivisible injury resulting from exposure to asbestos products); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., PMA 534 Pa. 29, 626 A.2d 502 (Pa.1993) (<HOLDING>); Associated Aviation Underwriters v. Wood, 209

    ### Response:
    holding that all stages of asbestosis disease process were bodily injury triggering insurers obligation to indemnify
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    838 F.2d 55 (2d Cir.1988). Let the Clerk send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the attorneys for the Petitioner and the Respondent. SO ORDERED. Dated: April 23, 3003. 1 . This decision may be cited in whole or in any part. 2 . Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 3 .Of two African Americans that were prospective jurors, the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge as to one. Beverly Patterson was not selected but Mr. Lampley was. The prosecution indicated that it did not want Patterson because she was unemployed, aged between thirty and forty, and did not exhibit anything in her background that demonstrated that she made important everyday decisions. 4 . See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-150, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Senkowski, 2003 WL 169788, at *1

    ### Response:
    holding that section 636b1c does not require any review at all by the district court of an issue that is not objected to
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is complied with or not.”); see also The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.1932) (“[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure.”). However, when a defendant has departed from rules of its own making governing the conduct of its employees, a plaintiff may thereby demonstrate breach of an appropriate standard of care. Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir.1980) (“When a defendant has disregarded rules that it has established to govern the conduct of its own employees, evidence of those rules may be used against the defendant to establish the correct standard of care.”); Babcock v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 83 Ill. App.3d 919, 38 Ill.Dec. 841, 404 N.E.2d 265, 275 (1979) (<HOLDING>); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on

    ### Response:
    holding defendants rules which constitute guidelines for the operation of its trains can be used as evidence of defendants standard of care
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶ 5, 714 A.2d 829. Bay Bridge therefore has not joined this appeal. 2 . Under Article Nine, the plaintiff was entitled to sell the collateral securing the defendants’ debt in a manner and under terms that were commercially reasonable, to apply the proceeds of that sale to satisfy the defendants’ indebtedness, and to claim any remaining deficiency against the defendants. See 11 M.R.S.A. § 9 — 504(1)—(3) (1995). Article Nine also allowed the defendants to seek an order enjoining the sales, or to seek damages from the plaintiff, if the manner or terms of the sales were commercially unreasonable. See 11 M.R.S.A. § 9-507(1) (1995). The defendants did not avail themselves of these protections under Article Nine. 3 . See Butte County Bank v. Hobley, 109 Idaho 402, 707 P.2d 513, 514 (App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Ruidoso State Bank v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 288,

    ### Response:
    holding that article nine remedies remain available to secured party who becomes a judgment creditor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the law of the case, and the parties are bound thereby. 5 . Although it does not expressly say so, the mandate in Smith I plainly ordered a retrial on punitive damages against a specific party: B & W. Punitive damages may only be awarded against the defendant the jury has found liable for compensatory damages in the first stage of a bifurcated trial, and here, that defendant was plainly B & W. Given that the court of appeals remanded the case for a retrial of punitive damages on a specific claim against a specific defendant, the circuit court could not, on remand, conduct a trial involving issues beyond punitive damages, or in which punitive damages were awarded against another party, or on a different legal basis. See, e.g., Denny v. Guyton, 331 Mo. 1115, 57 S.W.2d 415, 417-21 (1932) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Smiths also attempted to present

    ### Response:
    holding that where supreme court in prior appeal reversed and remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary to determine the issue of accounting only trial court on remand could not consider defendants new defenses to joint venture and fraud claims determined in first trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not provide a privilege against disclosure of student records.”); Victory Outreach Ctr. v. City of Philadelphia, 233 F.R.D. 419, 420 (E.D.Pa.2005) (authorizing the release of personally identifiable information contained in educational records pursuant to a subpoena in a civil suit); Anderson by Anderson v. Seigel, 175 Misc.2d 609, 668 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1005 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1998) rev’d in part 255 A.D.2d 409, 680 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (“it is well settled that academic and school records generally are not protected by any privilege”); Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247, 1255 (1992) (“[FERPA] did not ... create a privilege against disclosure of student records to be invoked by the school, the student, or his or her parents”); Reeg v. Fetzer, 78 F.R.D. 34, 36 (W.D.Okla.1976) (<HOLDING>); Gaumond v. Trinity Repertory Co., 909 A2d

    ### Response:
    holding that educational records are not privileged under ferpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Racketeering — here, money laundering. The government and defendants agree that Guideline offense level 23 for section 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) is not relevant or applicable given the evidence at trial. While this conclusion does not seem ordained by the relevant Guidelines provisions, there is no reason to force a more harsh sentence than the government seeks. The evidence at trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants conspired to violate both section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and section 1957. A sentence that correctly reflects this determination is necessary. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.2(d) and cmts. 4 & 5 (where a jury verdict does not establish which offenses were the objects of a conspiracy, the court makes the determination); see also United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 168 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Base offense level 20 is the highest

    ### Response:
    holding constitutional ussg  lb12d
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Fortini, 257 F.3d at 47. At first blush, this “involuntary waiver” claim may seem like nothing more than a recasting of the competence claim. But competence and voluntariness are separate (though complementary) inquiries. “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity” whereas the focus of a voluntariness inquiry is on “whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). Although the right to present a defense is of constitutional dimension, it is not absolute. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has tended to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the right does not extend to committing perjury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    serves the goals of punishment” pursuant to the rule in Halper. 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. The rule in Halper, however, does not apply to the facts of this case. Halper concerned a defendant’s conviction and punishment for making false Medicare claims totalling $585. In a subsequent False Claims Act (FCA) suit, the government sought $130,000 in damages. The Court held that the civil sanction in the FCA action constituted punishment and violated double jeopardy principles because it was not rationally related to the actual loss the government sustained. In this case, because HHS did not assess monetary damages Halper*s analysis contrasting the amount of money damages with the amount the government lost does not apply. See United States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 578 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, as we stated in Reed, Halper is

    ### Response:
    holding that halper does not apply when a monetary damage award has not been imposed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    record at trial, and have been raised on appeal. As for the remainder of the unrecorded bench conferences, the defendant has not demonstrated any specific prejudice which he suffered as a result of those conferences not being transcribed; nor does anything in the record suggest that the conferences had a discernible impact on the proceedings. See Hoffman, 768 So.2d at 587 (finding that where defendant could point to no specific prejudice, the failure to record bench conferences did not constitute reversible error); Castleberry, [98-1388 (La.4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749] 758 So.2d at 772-73 (stating that absence from the record of four unrecorded bench conferences did not deny defendant effective appellate review); State v. Brumfield, 96-2667, pp. 14-16 (La.10/28/98), 737 So.2d 660, 669-670 (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted). 98-0541 at p. 15, 802

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial courts failure to have each bench conference and ruling properly transcribed was not reversible error when the defendant failed to show that he was prevented from presenting any relevant evidence and failed to establish that any prejudice resulted from the absence in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the court considers most appropriate.” Holbrook v. Dykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1996). “Rejection of an expert’s testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Geico Cas. Co. v. Beauford, No. 05-697, 2007 WL 2412974, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Aug. 21, 2007). While the Court’s role is admittedly limited, it cannot “toss the [sic] ‘the decision to receive expert testimony ... off to the jury under a let it all in philosophy.’ ” Boyar v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 954 F.Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C.1996) (quoting Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 569 (D.C.Cir.1993)); see also Tyger Constr. Co. v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 143 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Libby, 461 F.Supp.2d 3, 18

    ### Response:
    recognizing that court may not abdicate its responsibility to ensure that only properly admitted evidence is considered by the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such provisions. As for undermining “the very nature of insurance,” it bears repeating that the relevant risk here is the risk the Excess Insurers and GenCorp agreed to when they consented to the “follow form” provisions. It is not disputed that there were no known losses at that time. Although, as noted, fortuitous loss is implicit in the concept of insurance, see Lee R. Russ, 7 Couch on Insurance § 102:7 (3d ed.1997); risk can exist with respect to past events, such that retroactive coverage, and noncoverage, is a permissible subject of an insurance contract. C. Notice GenCorp argues that several of the Excess Policies specifically require that the Exces cannot benefit from its own breach. See, e.g., Market Street Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (applying Wisconsin law); Morgan v. Crowley,

    ### Response:
    holding that a contracting party cannot be allowed to use his own breach to gain an advantage by impairing the rights that the contract confers on the other party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (""[T]he primary responsibility for deciding the appropriate amounts of [punitive] damages rests with the jury.”). Here, a jury could well have determined that Ameritech's conduct was egregious and warranted a large punitive damages award, and the district court's award of punitive damages at or near the statutory maximum was not in error. 5 . In response to the dissent, we want to emphasize that our opinion should not be read to imply that Ameritech, or any employer, can use a provision in its collective bargaining agreement to shield itself from liability under Title VII. An employer has a clear responsibility under Title VII to act reasonably to end sexual harassment and to protect its employees from harassing behavior, see Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>), and Ameritech’s obligations in that regard

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Valdivieso Ortiz, 807 F.2d 6, the First Circuit was unclear about whether it had based its denial of a familial association claim on the lack of specific intent or the fact that the child at issue was an adult, in subsequent cases the First Circuit has clarified that even in cases involving minor children, specific intent is required. See Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1062 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Ortiz as requiring specific intent, and dismissing familial association claim as to minor children); Manarite ex rel. Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 960 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Ortiz as requiring specific intent). One circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, has stated in dicta that specific intent is necessary. See Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1259, 1260 n. 5 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). One circuit, the Ninth Circuit, has

    ### Response:
    holding that a parentchild relationship between two independent adults does not invoke constitutional companionship interests and noting in dicta that even if it were to hold that right existed mere negligence does not implicate the due process clause and the mother had not alleged that the officer who shot her adult son acted with more than negligence concerning her rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir.1987); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.1981) (upholding jury verdict against police officer who, without justification, brandished his revolver eighteen inches from a motorist’s head, with the motorist’s wife in the precise line of fire, and then threatened to shoot), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 1646, 71 L.Ed.2d 876 (1982), we have never adopted this approach and we need not decide the propriety of such an approach in the instant case. The facts here simply do not demonstrate egregious governmental conduct. Second, Mr. Bella’s complaint makes no allegations of improper motives or malice. Nor can malice be inferred from the officers’ actions of firing at and boxing in the Gazelle helicopter. See Landoh-Rivera, 906 F.2d at 797 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Mr. Bella concedes that the officers

    ### Response:
    holding that where the fleeing suspect was armed had threatened to kill his hostage and had commandeered a car and abducted its driver the decision to shoot toward the hijacked vehicle by itself falls far short of demonstrating reckless or callous indifference toward the hostages rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his products liability action against Barr Laboratories (“Barr”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, proceedings below, and specification of appellate issues. Insofar as Sorrentino seeks recovery on his own behalf, New York public policy bars this lawsuit. See Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 25, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs injury is a direct result of his knowing and intentional participation in a criminal act he cannot seek compensation for the loss, if the criminal act is judged to be so serious an offense as to warrant denial of recovery.”) (internal citation omitted). The murder of Sorrentino’s wife, of which he has been convicted, is a sufficiently serious offense to bar recovery. See id. at 26-27, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (<HOLDING>). Further, Sorrentino, who has not been

    ### Response:
    holding that attempting to construct a pipe bomb is sufficiently severe
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439, 77 S.Ct. 408, 412, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957) (“The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401, 91 S.Ct. 668, 672, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (deploring “traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways”); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657, 672, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1715, 1722, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (“The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars”); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-19, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2620-2621, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Id. 459 U.S. at 558-59, 103 S.Ct. at 919-20.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the compelling interest in highway safety
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “implicates” Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant does not explain why the trial court’s ruling violated those rights. We decline to address defendant’s undeveloped constitutional claims and limit our discussion to the single constitutional argument that he made in his brief. See State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 254 n 3, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999) (declining to reach undeveloped constitutional claims). 1 12 Given our disposition of defendant’s federal claim, we do not decide whether defendant may convert-what appears at bottom to be an unequal treatment claim against the state into a due process claim that the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary. See Rock, 483 US at 62 (<HOLDING>). 13 The witness presumably meant to say that

    ### Response:
    holding that absolute prohibition against hypnotically refreshed testimony arbitrarily infringed federal right to present defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ¶ 25. The parties cite several cases in which we have addressed tolling upon the filing of a complaint. Clark Sand Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 60 So.3d 149 (Miss.2011); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. McLemore, 54 So.3d 833, 839 (Miss.2010); Hill v. Ramsey, 3 So.3d 120, 123 (Miss.2009); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 521 (Miss.2009); Owens v. Mai, 891 So.2d 220, 223 (Miss.2005); Watters v. Stripling, 675 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 1996), Erby v. Cox, 654 So.2d 503, 505 (Miss.1995); W.T. Raleigh Co. v. Barnes, 143 Miss. 597, 109 So. 8, 9 (1926); and Nevitt v. Bacon, 32 Miss. 212, 66 Am. Dec. 609 (1856). However, none of these cases addresses subsequent dismissal for want of prosecution. ¶ 26. Benny also cites persuasive precedent in which other courts have found no tolling of 9, 60-61 (Fla.Ct.App. 1968) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 30. Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d)(1)

    ### Response:
    holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    value.” Exh. 3 to Rigney Decl. This statement raises the possibility that the cost of repair will not fully compensate Plaintiffs for Defendant's breach. Under such circumstances, a plaintiff may be entitled to both diminution in value and cost of repair. See Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 197 P. 105 (1921) (in action by contractor to recover payments for construction work, affirming district court's damages award of contract price minus: 1) the cost to fix those defects that were remediable; and 2) the diminution in value resulting from defects that could not be remedied). The Court need not reach this issue, however, because Plaintiffs have presented no admissible evidence that the defects at issue here are irremediable. See Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (<HOLDING>). In particular, the letter cited above is

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.R.D. 471, 472 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (Connor, J.); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 322 F.Supp. 377, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y.1971) (Tyler, J.) (describing “waiver by implication”). The inquiry courts use to determine whether a party has waived his right to challenge venue is fact specific. See Sherman, 86 F.R.D. at 472. As a result, “[tjhere is no clear boundary ... [indicating] what action a party may take during the pretrial stage and still invoke its venue objection and what conduct on its part will constitute waiver of that defense.” Id. However, a party’s repeated representations to the court that it is the proper forum may waive its right to subsequently raise the claim that venue lies elsewhere. See Orb Factory Ltd. v. Design Science Toys, 6 F.Supp.2d 203, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Sweet, J.) (<HOLDING>); Altman, 322 F.Supp. at 379 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a partys repeated representations that venue was proper in one forum waived its right to bring a subsequent motion under 28 usc  1406a challenging venue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    essential purposes. Missouri law limits the rights of parties to contractually limit available remedies “[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 400.2-719(2). If Mid-West had accepted AM’s offer to replace the Eagle press, and the replacement press had the same deficiencies that Mid-West complains of in the original press, this position would have validity/ However, we will never know whether the replacement press offered by AM would have complied with the warranties made. Mid-West’s refusal to accept AM’s offer to replace the press precludes Mid-West from recovering on this theory. Cf., e.g., Transport Corp. of America, Inc. v. International Bus. Machs., Inc., 30 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir.1994) (applying Minnesota law) (<HOLDING>). The Court has carefully considered Mid-West’s

    ### Response:
    holding that remedy of repair and service did not fail of its essential purpose when seller provided warranty service on the product and accomplished repair
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    status in the far future. May v. Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd. (In re May), 368 B.R. 850, 858 (Bankr.D.Neb.2007)(reeognizing, when applying the totality of the circumstances test, that forgiveness of the unpaid balance of the debt at the end of the ICRP period “may or may not result in tax liability for the debtor”). As many courts have recognized, predictions of tax liability at the conclusion of the ICRP period are necessarily speculative. Jones v. Bank One Texas, 376 B.R. 130, 142 n. 11 (W.D.Tex.2007)(noting that “forecasting such tax liability under whatever tax laws will be in effect in 25 years is shéer speculation”); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Stanley, 300 B.R. 813, 818 n. 8 (N.D.Fla.2003)(same); Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 738 (Bankr.D.Mass.2006) (<HOLDING>); Archibald v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.

    ### Response:
    holding that future tax liability is uncertain because in 25 years a debtor might pay off the debt or if insolvent might enter into the offer in compromise program and reach a settlement agreement with the internal revenue service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to sever the offending terms. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, however, a contract expressly states that an unconscionable provision is not to be severed from the remainder of the agreement, the Court must enforce the non-severability clause according to its terms. See Chalk v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1098 (9th Cir.2009) (recognizing that while “[i]n the usual case” the court must consider whether an unenforceable term “should be severed from the arbitration agreement as a whole,” where the “arbitration agreement itself includes a provision prohibiting severance” the court must invalidate the entirety of the arbitration agreement “in accordance with [the] severability clause”); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 986-87 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). This is because courts “must ‘rigorously

    ### Response:
    holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    yet by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, “ ‘the underlying principle is that when a promise of immunity induces a defendant to ... cooperate with the government to his [or her] detriment, due process requires that the prosecutor’s promise be fulfilled.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir.1994)). With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of the merits of defendant Kozak’s motion to dismiss. B. The Existence Of A Cooperation Agreement In This Case Applying basic contract principles to the alleged cooperation agreement in this case, in order to dismiss the indictment, the court must find that an agreement existed between the government and Kozak, that Kozak has substantially performed her part of the agreement, and that Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938

    ### Response:
    holding that cooperation agreement defendant entered into with the government did not include defendants testifying at trial where there was no meeting of the minds as to that point
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trust. Their right to occupy is merely contractual and subject to revocation, which makes them at most tenants at will of the relevant property. ... [W]e believe and hold that a person who occupies premises with the permission of the owner has a sufficient interest in the realty to support a claim for a homestead exemption under Arkansas law.... It is important to realize, however, that such a homestead exemption would be good only to the extent of the interest owned. Id. at 813. Although the Richardson case is not binding on our court, it was decided based on Arkansas law and offers persuasive support for our decision. Indeed, other jurisdictions have extended the homestead exemption to revocable trusts in other circumstances. See Redmond v. Kester, 284 Kan. 209, 159 P.3d 1004 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Engelke v. Engelke, 921 So.2d 693

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3) (b) (532 SE2d 677) (2000). 23 Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 351-352 (10) (496 SE2d 674) (1998); see also King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 267 (18) (e) (539 SE2d 783) (2000) (addressing defendant’s improper attempt to have prospective juror prejudge what weight she might give to a specific item of mitigating evidence). 24 Mize, 269 Ga. at 652 (6) (d). 25 Barnes, 269 Ga. at 351-352 (10). 26 Carr, 267 Ga. at 554 (6) (a). 27 Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 840 (2) (514 SE2d 426) (1999). 28 Id. 29 Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 495 (1) (422 SE2d 188) (1992). 30 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963). 31 Carter v. State, 252 Ga. 502, 506 (6) (315 SE2d 646) (1984); Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 258-259 (1) (290 SE2d 911) (1982). 32 Woods v. State, 265 Ga. 685, 687 (3) (461 SE2d 535) (1995) (<HOLDING>). 33 Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 819 (14)

    ### Response:
    recognizing trial courts discretion in weighing the allegedlyimproper prejudicial aspects of photographs of victims against the photographs probative value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of detective agencies engaged to guard the property of their employer’s clients, security guards have not been granted police powers by statute and therefore are not state agents in any traditional sense for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Huger, supra, 285 Md. at 353, 402 A.2d 880; Leach v. Penn-Mar Merchants Ass’n, 18 Md.App. 603, 610, 308 A.2d 446, cert, denied, 269 Md. 761 (1973). Without governmental powers, security guards are acting as private citizens when protecting property, and their private status is not altered because their interest in protecting property coincides with the public’s interest in preventing crime generally. The Attorney General of Maryland has also recognized that licensed security guards are not state agents. See 50 Op. Att’y Gen. 309 (1965) (<HOLDING>). See Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 413 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that since security guards act upon the authorization of their employer that authorization can be no broader than that which the employer possesses namely the authority of a private citizen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Applying that rationale, the Court held that the power of the Secretary of HHS to oversee state compliance with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and to withhold funds from a noncompliant state, did not amount to the type of carefully crafted scheme that is sufficient to demonstrate Congress’s intent to foreclose the availability of a § 1983 action. The remedies available under the CWA, federal oversight and withholding of funds from noncompliant states, are very similar to the remedies addressed by the Court in Blessing — so similar that we think the Court’s decision practically compels our conclusion. We therefore hold that the Directors are not entitled to . Eleventh Amendment immunity on this ground. See also Joseph A ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); cf. Suter, 503 U.S. at 360, 112 S.Ct. 1360

    ### Response:
    holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he cannot now claim that the delay caused by his actions constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.""); Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491-92 (9th Cir.1991) (A petitioner ""should not be able to benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of [his constitutional] rights.""); see also Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F.Supp. 408, 431 (D.Utah 1984), aff'd 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.1986) (The procedures that led to delay in executing the petitioner ""serve[d] the important state interest of keeping the post conviction process moving forward at the same time it preserve[d] petitioner's due process rights.... To accept petitioner's argument would create an irreconcilable conflict between constitutional guarantees and would be a mockery of justice.""). 234 . Allen, 435 F.3d at 957-58. 235 . See id. (<HOLDING>). The Allen court was far from alone in

    ### Response:
    holding lackey claim barred under the aedpa as a successive habeas corpus petition because the petitioner could have raised the claim in prior petitions filed respectively when incarceration had persisted for six or nine yearsthe claim did not become ripe only after fourteen years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sean Michael Park appeals pro se from the district court’s order imposing mone tary sanctions against him for filing an improper notice of removal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees against Park as a sanction after giving him notice and an opportunity to respond, and finding, after an evidentiary hearing, that Park misrepresented that he was an intervening party and signed defendant’s name without her authorization on the notice of removal. See id. at 43-46, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (<HOLDING>); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c) (stating that a

    ### Response:
    recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assistance of counsel and withholding of material, exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. This Court affirmed the order of denial. See Downs v. State, 453 So.2d 1102 (Fla.1984). On August 18, 1987, the Governor signed a death warrant and Downs petitioned this Court for writ of habeas corpus and stay of execution, alleging a change in the law regarding mitigating circumstances. This Court granted the writ, stayed the warrant, and vacated Downs’ sentence of death with instructions for the trial court to hold a new sentencing proceeding in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (<HOLDING>). See Downs v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1069

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court must consider both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted). In that context, with intention-based constitutional claims in mind, the Supreme Court held that a supervisor’s “mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose” does not amount to the supervisor’s violating the constitution. Id. at 1949. However, “the factors necessary to establish a Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ] violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” Id. at 1948. Here, the underlying constitutional right of the inmate is to be free from the use of excessive force by his jailers. In such a case, I conclude that the traditional Colon categories of supervisory liability still apply. See Jackson v. Goord, 664 F.Supp.2d 307, 324 & n. 7 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). Following Iqbal, other judges in the Second

    ### Response:
    holding colon standard is unaffected by iqbal in deliberate indifference case because iqbal involved discriminatory intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to which Padilla was subjected. They argue, however, that it was clearly established that Padilla possessed such rights because any reasonable official would have understood during 2001 to 2003 that a citizen detained as an enemy combatant had to be afforded at least the constitutional protections to which convicted prisoners and ordinary criminal suspects were entitled. That argument is foreclosed by al-Kidd, which compels us “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id. at 2084. Granted, it may sometimes be permissible to rely on cases involving one type of detainee to establish clearly established constitutional rights of another type of detainee. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-46, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16,

    ### Response:
    holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the sense of having all restraints on his liberty removed, he was “released outright” as to the charges involved in this case. Only because he had been incarcerated on prior felony charges and had not yet served out his sentences was Defendant returned to custody. He was not “held to answer” on the charges in this ease, but rather, was held to continue his prior sentences. This constitutes “outright release” for the instant offenses since he was not indicted until July 2 and August 14,1997. It would be anomalous indeed to hold that an escapee must be released from detention, unless he is immediately indicted for the offenses surrounding his escape, in order to try him for these offenses. Such an outcome would necessitate the filing of charges before the prosecut ka Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Bailey v. Anchorage, 955 P.2d 947

    ### Response:
    holding that arrest of a parolee for parole violation does not trigger the speedy trial period for the underlying offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was convicted of an offense involving 50 grams or more of crack (Neal’s Counts One and Two), the statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment was ten years and the statutory maximum was life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(l)(A)(iii) (2007). The FSA lowers the mandatory minimum sentence to five years of imprisonment and lowers the statutory maximum to 40 years. See § 841(b)(l)(B)(iii). The 360-month (30-year) sentences Neal received on Counts One and Two do not exceed the lower statutory maximum under the FSA, and there is no indication in the record that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had the lower statutory minimum and maximum sentences of imprisonment been in place at the time of sentencing. Cf. United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 405 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Neal’s substantial rights were not

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that a sentence imposed under the prebooker mandatory guideline regime was at the bottom of the mandatory range is not enough to create a reasonable probability that the defendant would have received a different sentence upon resentencing under an advisory guidelines system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    marks omitted)); Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 722 N.W.2d 283, 304 (Minn.2006) (""[We conclude that ... defense costs are [to bel apportioned equally among insurers whose [duty to defend is] triggered. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err when it apportioned defense costs equally among insurers whose policies were triggered.""); Ames v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 79 N.C.App. 530, 340 S.E.2d 479, 486 (1986) (""We hold both [insurers] had a duty to defend [the insured] and thus the defense costs should be shared equally.""); Tex.Prop. & Cas. Ins., 982 S.W.2d at 607 (""[Wle hold that under Texas law, an insurer's duty to defend its insured . is not reduced pro rata by the insurer's 'time on the risk' or by any other formula.""). 11 . 931 P.2d 127, 140-42 (Utah 1997). 12 . Id. (<HOLDING>). 13 . Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral

    ### Response:
    holding that insurance providers would be allocated defense costs according to the period of time they provided coverage and the insured would be allocated defense costs according to the period of time it had no insurance coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rationales that might support the agency action. And once in court, Forest Guardians could expect that, under Chenery, the Forest Service would be limited to defending the project on the basis of the administrative rationale. Our holding is even stranger when considered in light of some of our other prece dents involving projects approved during the transitional period. Between 2000 and 2004, the Forest Service approved a number of forest projects, using the criteria of the 1982 rules. After this court held that the “best available science” standard of the 2000 transitional rules was applicable to these projects, the Forest Service began to defend these agency decisions under the new standard. See Ecology Center, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 451 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In Utah Environmental Congress v. Troyer, a

    ### Response:
    holding that when the forest service made transitionperiod decisions under the 1982 rules rather than the best available science standard those decisions were arbitrary and capricious
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conscious disregard of the consequences.” Vallejos, 116 So.3d at 552. The fact that a street light on a highway is not functioning creates a certain level of danger by increasing the possibility that diminished lighting conditions may play a role in causing an accident. The widening of the highway, however, meant that a portion of the street lights would be out of service at any one time. The undisputed evidence indicated the heavy e e for almost a year and half without incident. There had been no accidents, no near accidents, no work stoppages, no highway closings, and no other specific problems caused by the non-functioning light. This is not a case where the employer ignored prior dangerous mishaps. See Pyjek v. ValleyCrest Landscape Dev., Inc., 116 So.3d 475, 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>); Sullivan v. Streeter; 485 So.2d 893, 895

    ### Response:
    holding the issue of gross negligence was a jury question where a fence worker was crushed by a recently installed palm tree that fell before was replanted and fell again on worker
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... that the government’s representatives ... acted in bad faith. To the contrary, its filing an intent to publish before actually publishing notice is evidence of good faith.” Id. This Court agrees that Plaintiff is not abusing the judicial process. Rather, by filing a notice of intention to publish, Plaintiff evidences its good faith. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise any inherent authority to prohibit publication of notice of the lawsuit. Both parties acknowledge trial court rulings finding that the court does not have the authority to prohibit the Government from publishing such a notice. See id. at *6 (concluding that the court does not have the power to prohibit the Government from publishing a similar notice); United States v. McLimore, CA No. IP94-1244-C (S.D.Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, other courts have apparently

    ### Response:
    holding without memorandum that the court lacks authority to restrain the government from publishing notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brought that case within the Hubbard rule, rather than the Grant rule of deferral, and therefore required a remand to address the claims of ineffectiveness raised when new counsel entered an appearance. O’Berg, 880 A.2d at 606-07 (Saylor, J., dissenting). Justice Saylor’s dissenting opinion also suggested that because PCRA review is unavailable to defendants serving short sentences, due process concerns of fundamental fairness are answered by allowing short-sentence defendants to raise ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal. Id. at 606. 7 . Notably, in addition to reviewing this Court's consideration of the Bomar exception in post-Grant cases, our recent decision in Holmes generally limited Bomar to its pre-Grant facts and reaffirmed the rationale of Grant. See Holmes, 79 A.3d at 576 (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding this general rule, we created

    ### Response:
    holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to pcra review trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon postverdict motions and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    murder” because, under New Mexico law, the crime of conspiracy “requires both an intent to agree and an intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy.” Id. at 788. The court noted that depraved-mind murder, as defined at that time by statute and case law, “is an unintentional killing-resulting from highly reckless behavior,” and, citing the Model Penal Code, concluded that it could not be the object of a conspiracy. Id. The Supreme Court of Connecticut al , 853-54 (2002) (noting that Kansas does not recognize the crime of conspiracy to commit felony murder because conspiracy requires a specific intent and one cannot intentionally conspire to commit a crime which requires either negligence or no mens rea); Conley v. State, 146 Ga.App. 739, 247 S.E.2d 562, 565 (1978) (<HOLDING>). As previously noted, Section 903 of our

    ### Response:
    holding that one cannot conspire to commit voluntary manslaughter which is a killing in the heat of passion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over the bankruptcy estate extends to the Aetna D & O Policy and its proceeds”); see also In re marchFIRST, Inc., 288 B.R. 526, 532 (N.D.Ill.2002) (enjoining shareholders from prosecuting class action against directors and officers on basis that it might diminish asset of estate: proceeds of D & O policy); In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 302 B.R. 439, 450-52 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2003) (using § 105 equitable power to enjoin D & O insurer from obtaining declaratory ruling that policy void due to D & O’s fraud as impairing debtor’s ability to reorganize). Other cases focus less on the effect on the estate and more on the terms of the policy to determine if the proceeds are indeed property of the bankrupt. See, e.g., In re Louisiana World Exposition, 832 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.1987)(<HOLDING>); In re Daisy Systems Securities Litigation,

    ### Response:
    holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the litigants] actually relied on [an] old rule [or] how they would suffer from retroactive application of a new one,’ ” Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 n. 9, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991)). Third, even assuming that the risk contribution doctrine imposed retroactive liability and that judicial decisions in the civil law area were subject to constitutional challenge on retroactivity grounds, the doctrine does not violate either the Due Process or Takings Clause. As to the former, a civil statute that imposes retroactive liability -will be found to violate due process only if it is “arbitrary and irrational.” Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (<HOLDING>); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest

    ### Response:
    holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we reverse the judgment of the Worker's Compensation Board. However, issues still remain as to whether Milledge's other medical problems including the amputation of her leg were causally connected to the ankle injury. Accordingly, on this issue we remand this cause to Worker's Compensation Board for further proceedings. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur. 1 . ""[Mleaning by 'neutral' neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment."" Larson, supra, § 3.05, at 3-6. 2 . See, e.g., Circle K v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 165 Ariz. 91, 796 P.2d 893, 898 (1990) (expressly adopting the positional-risk doctrine); Little Rock Convention & Visitors Bureau v. Pack, 60 Ark.App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 477

    ### Response:
    holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Attachment “A,” 814 F.Supp. 31, 31 (E.D.Tenn.1992) (“[T]he Court finds that Sporicidin’s disinfecting products are devices within the meaning of the FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) because they are intended for the mitigation and prevention of disease in man.... ”); United States v. 22 Rectangular or Cylindrical Finished Devices, 714 F.Supp. 1159, 1166 (D.Utah 1989) (“[T]he FDA’s inclusion of surgical instrument sterilizers within its device jurisdiction is rational.... ”). In summary, the wor t a device, because the FDA does not require dentists to sterilize their hand-pieces. Defendant again misunderstands the scope of the FFDCA. Because Steri-Safe satisfies the intended-use requirement, it is a “device” whether or not the FDA requires sterilization. See Drown, 198 F.2d at 1006 (<HOLDING>). Finally, defendant argues that SteriDot

    ### Response:
    holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though the fda did not require the use of such a machine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where formation of an opinion on a subject requires knowledge, information, or skill beyond what is possessed by the ordinary juror.' ”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Carter, 403 Pa.Super. 615, 589 A.2d 1133, 1134(1991)). The Welding Companies specifically contend Donoughe was wrongly decided and encourage this Court en banc to overrule that panel decision. We decline to do so, except to the extent it treats favorably a plaintiff’s expert causation testimony based upon the any-exposure theory. Donoughe, 936 A.2d at 57, 64. Moving forward, Donoughe shall not be cited with approval to the extent that it provides or implies that the any-exposure theory of specific causation is admissible in an asbestos action. 17 . The doctrine is not without exception. See, e.g., DGS, 898 A.2d at 601 n. 10 (<HOLDING>) (citing Davis v. Berwind Corp., 547 Pa. 260,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for subsequent changes to an otherwise safe product where such alterations are reasonably foreseeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the testimony of CBAC’s chief financial officer that MCD receives lease payments exceeding $50,000 per month. These rent payments are made pursuant to leases, the form of which is attached to the Development Agreement. The lease form, however, does not show that MCD is the landlord of these leases. Instead, it shows that the landlord under the lease agreement is a Series LLC. There is also no evidence in the record to establish that MCD is entitled to, or did retain any payments of rent under the leases. The fact that CBAC may forward rent to MCD for distribution to the Series LLC’s does not establish that MCD received a substantial direct benefit under the Development Agreement. See, e.g., In re Golden Peanut Co., LLC, 269 S.W.3d 302, 311 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2008) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Courts that have applied direct benefits

    ### Response:
    holding fact that estate may ultimately distribute cash to heirs does not convert estates claim to claim by heirs for purpose of estoppel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    construed, however, the record is clear that the district court was fully aware of both Jones’s role in the conspiracy and his arguments regarding the proper effect of his prior incarceration on his sentence when it denied resentencing. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113 (finding no “rigorous requirement of specific articulation by the sentencing judge” of its consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors). Jones argues that the district court erred proeedurally by failing to consider his post-sentencing rehabilitation. A district court on a Crosby remand, however, is obligated to consider whether to resentence based on “the circumstances existing at the time of the original sentence.” Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117 (emphasis added); United States v. Ferrell, 485 F.3d 687, 688-89 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Jones’s argument that the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court is not to consider evidence of postconviction rehabilitation in deciding whether to resentence under crosby
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs.”); ORS 161.665(4) (“The court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs under this section unless the defendant is or may be able to pay them.”). Defendant failed to preserve that claim of error but urges us to review and correct the error as “an error of law apparent on the record.” ORAP 5.45(1); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991). The state concedes that the trial court committed plain error when it incorrectly imposed attorney fees in the absence of evidence in the record indicating defendant’s ability to pay. We accept the state’s concession that the trial court plainly erred in imposing attorney fees of $629 on this record. See State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Further, we conclude that, for reasons

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court commits plain error by imposing courtappointed attorney fees where the record is silent as to the defendants ability to pay the fees ordered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    immunity. The parties did, however, sign a waiver provision whereby both parties waived all immunities. MBF believed that CNI obtained the required approval for this waiver provision—but regardless of what MBF may have thought, board approval was not obtained, and CNI’s charter controls. In short, without board approval, CNI’s sovereign immunity remains intact. 3. Equitable Doctrines MBF also argues that even without board approval, CNI waived sovereign immunity based on equitable doctrines because CNI signed the agreement representing that it waived sovereign immunity. We disagree. Courts have held that unauthorized acts of tribal officials are insufficient to waive tribal-sovereign immunity. See Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that tribal entity was not equitably estopped from asserting immunity because misrepresentations of the tribes officials or employees cannot affect its immunity from suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a legacy is deemed specific, courts prefer to construe a bequest as general or demonstrative. Chalkwater v. Dolly, 108 Md.App. 539, 672 A.2d 673, 676 (1996). Appellant argues that the testator’s intent must be ignored in determining whether a specific bequest is adeemed. Appellant correctly notes that this is the rule in the majority of states. In re Estate of Hume, 984 S.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Tenn.1999). But this rule applies only after a court determines that a bequest is specific. Id. (concluding that the specific bequest was adeemed). The theory behind ademption by extinction is that when a testator makes a specific bequest, he or she intends the bequest to fail when the designated asset is no longer part of the estate. Wasserman v. Cohen, 414 Mass. 172, 606 N.E.2d 901, 902-03 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a testator’s intent is relevant in

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of ademption seeks to give effect to a testators probable intent by presuming he intended to extinguish a specific gift of property when he disposed of that property prior to his death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we hold the evidence is factually insufficient to meet the standard. Conclusion Although the medical testimony in this case might well have been valid, the Legislature has mandated that more than con-clusory opinions by experts is required before a person may be involuntarily com mitted for inpatient mental health services. Because the evidence adduced by the State at trial is insufficient to establish the elements of section 574.034 of the Health and Safety Code, we sustain C.E.’s second issue. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . Although C.E.’s commitment period expired on October 20, 2002, this appeal is not moot. See State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1980) (<HOLDING>). 2 . On appeal, C.E. also contends the trial

    ### Response:
    holding doctrine of mootness does not apply to appeals from involuntary commitments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.’ ” Frye, 153 Ill. 2d at 32, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965). Courts narrowly construe the theory, however, and limit the scope of the duty to the extent of the undertaking. Buerkett v. Illinois Power Co,, 384 Ill. App. 3d 418, 427-28 (2008). For example, the Chicago Housing Authority, in voluntarily hiring a security company to patrol the premises, did not assume a duty to protect the decedent, a social guest, from criminal conduct and could have been liable at most for negligent hiring. Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Ill. 2d 204, 209-10 (1979); see also Frye, 153 Ill. 2d at 34 (<HOLDING>). We reject the Gattos’ argument that State

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant pharmacist had undertaken a duty to accurately warn of a drugs side effects with respect to the warning actually given but not a duty to warn of all possible side effects of the medication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of material fact for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of pointing to the part of the record that shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). III. Discussion As noted above, the present

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonmoving party must come forward with significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    education, intelligence, and physical capacities would otherwise permit the employee to perform.” See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Iowa 2000). Burress was fifty years old at the time of the hearing, had a high school degree, and had spent his life working as a manual laborer or skilled trade person. Dr. Jochims found a twenty percent impairment to the body as a whole. He explained that Burress is restricted from bending, climbing l 758, 765-66, 10 N.W.2d 569, 573-74 (1943) (considering claimant’s functional disability of seventy-five to one hundred percent, age of sixty-five, limited education, and non-performance of physical labor since injury to uphold award of permanent total disability); Diederich v. Tri-City Ry., 219 Iowa 587, 594, 258 N.W. 899, 902 (1935) (<HOLDING>). Based on the similar evidence here, we hold

    ### Response:
    holding claimant suffered permanent total disability where functional disability was only twentyfive or thirty percent claimant was fiftynine years of age claimant had little or no education and the injury kept the claimant from performing physical work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. E.g., Plaintiffs Exh. 5. In analyzing an identical definition of “occurrence”, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has held: “In deciding whether there was an occurrence ... the focus of the inquiry is on the property damage, asking whether it was expected or intended from the insured’s point of view.” Lumbermens Mut. Cas. v. Belleville Inds., 407 Mass. 675, 679, 555 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1990). The inquiry focuses on the foreseeability of the damage caused by the discharge, not on the foreseeability of the discharge itself. See A. Johnson & Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 933 F.2d 66, 72 n. 9 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The court must evaluate Lumber-mens’ duty to

    ### Response:
    holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a first offender record of an adverse witness in a civil case was admissible to impeach the witness by showing the witness had been convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude. In Witcher, unlike Favors, the Supreme Court was not concerned with a “balancing of rights” but instead based its ruling on the express language of the statute and the obvious intent of the General Assembly. The court thus reasoned that since there was no “conviction” in a case given first offender treatment, the first offender record could not be used to impeach an adverse witness by showing that the witness has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Compare Hightower v. General Motors Corp., 255 Ga. 349, 351 (338 SE2d 426) (1986) (<HOLDING>). By examining the Supreme Court’s decisions in

    ### Response:
    holding first offender plea admissible to disprove or contradict testimony of the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fine. As to those assignments, we affirm. We reject defendant’s remaining two assignments of error without published discussion. Defendant was charged in a single indictment with one count of first-degree sodomy, three counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and three counts of first-degree encouraging child sexual abuse. One week before trial, he demurred to the indictment on the ground that the sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse counts—which were based on his alleged abuse of a single victim—and the encouraging child sexual abuse counts—which were based on his alleged duplication of child pornography—were not properly joined in the indictment under ORS 132.560. See State v. Poston, 277 Or App 137, 144-45, 370 P3d 904 (2016), adh’d to on recons, 285 Or App 750, 399 P3d 488 (2017) (<HOLDING>). The trial court denied the demurrer both on

    ### Response:
    holding that the basis for joinder of crimes must be alleged in the charging instrument by alleging the basis for joinder in the language of the joinder statute or by alleging facts sufficient to establish compliance with the joinder statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and disposed of, § 853 defines, more fully than § 982, what property is subject to forfeiture. The procedure for forfeiture of assets in a criminal case such as this is further governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. In order for a court to enter a judgment of forfeiture following a finding of guilt, the Government must first have notified the defendant, either through the indictment or the information, of its intent to seek forfeiture as part of any sentence. Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 32.2(a). If this notice requirement is satisfied, the government may then pursue a forfeiture order by demanding either a money judgment, specific property, or substitute property. See Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 32.2(b)(1)(A) & (b)(2)(A); United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 42 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Davis, 177 F.Supp.2d 470,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the plaintiff stockholder so as to be aligned as a defendant is “a practical, not a mechanical determination, and is resolved by the pleadings and the nature of the dispute.” Smith, 354 U.S. at 97, 77 S.Ct. 1112. Indeed, “[t]he [complaint] and answer normally determine whether the management is antagonistic to the stockholder.” Smith, 354 U.S. at 96, 77 S.Ct. 1112. In this regard, the Supreme Court has recognized that antagonism is present “whenever the management is aligned against the stockholder and defends a course of conduct which [the shareholder] attacks.” Smith, 354 U.S. at 95, 77 S.Ct. 1112. This would be the case, for example, when the plaintiff stockholder complains that the management of a corporation has committed a breach of fiduciary duty or fraud. See id. (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). This is precisely the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that when antagonism is present the charge normally is cast in terms of fraud breach of trust or illegality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pet. ref'd); see also People v. Sanchez Cortorreal, 226 A.D.2d 737, 642 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (N.Y.App.Div.1996) (finding no “improvident exercise of discretion” when three jurors witnessed altercation between victim’s and defendant’s families outside courthouse because jurors were questioned in camera and said they could still render impartial verdict). In Williams, after a jury found appellant guilty, his family “began a disturbance in the courtroom” in the presence of the jury. Williams, 651 S.W.2d at 821. The disturbance was a “ ‘melee’ ... between [appellant’s] family and police officers, and, at some point, the appellant joined in the fracas.” Id. The trial court instructed the jury “not to let what m.App.2003); Matthews v. State, 960 S.W.2d 750, 757 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The defendant has the burden to show that the

    ### Response:
    holding outburst by victims brother during defense counsels crossexamination of witness called by state not so prejudicial as to preclude cure by instruc tion when trial court immediately admonished jury not to consider the statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such co-conspirators as witnesses at trial. Jackson, 757 F.2d at 1491; Konefal, 566 F.Supp. at 706. If the Government intends to call such co-conspirators as witnesses, the Jeneks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, expressly makes statements of Government witnesses, including co-conspirators, not discoverable until such time as the witness testifies. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). This broad interpretation of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) was not followed in the instant case. Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 90; Eisenberg, 773 F.Supp. at 680-83. The weight of authority does not support extending Rule 16(a)(1)(A) beyond its literal mandate requiring disclosure of a defendant’s own statements. See, e.g., United States v. Mayberry, 896 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1418 (D.C.Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 174,

    ### Response:
    holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Based on this exchange, Pepe-Frazier contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court’s denial all not be required, nor exces urer, 320 Ga. App. at 592 (6) (b). 22 OCGA § 16-6-4 (c); see also OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) (“Aperson commits the offense of child molestation when such person... [djoes any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person . . . .”). 23 We note that Pepe-Frazier was indicted on a charge of statutory rape related to the allegations of having vaginal intercourse with the victim, hut the jury acquitted him of this charge. 24 See, e.g., Jessie v. State, 294 Ga. 375, 377 (2) (a) (754 SE2d 46) (2014) (<HOLDING>). 25 Cf. Nguyen v. State, 296 Ga. App. 853,

    ### Response:
    holding that the decision to pursue an all or nothing strategy was not patently unreasonable and accordingly that counsel was not ineffective in his strategic decision not to request a jury charge as to the lesserincluded offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supreme court’s duty to forward it), it surely was not filed “properly,” as § 2244(d)(2) requires. “[J]ust because [an] application is pending, does not mean that it was properly filed. For example, if an application is erroneously accepted by the clerk without the requisite filing fee, it will be pending, but not properly filed.” Christian v. Baskerville, 232 F.Supp.2d 605, 607 (E.D.Va.2001). “[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.” Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8, 121 S.Ct. at 364; see, e.g., Hurley, 233 F.3d at 1298 (<HOLDING>). For the reasons discussed in the previous

    ### Response:
    holding that a state application for relief had not been properly filed because it was not accompanied by an oath as required by state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that express advocacy existed only because the advertisement “explicitly exhorted” voters to defeat then-President Carter. Thus, there is no doubt the Commission understands that its position that no words of advocacy are required in order to support its jurisdiction runs directly counter to Supreme Court precedent. II. In the face of the unequivocal Supreme Court and other authority discussed, an argument such as that made by the FEC in this case, that “no words of advocacy are necessary to expressly advocate the election of a candidate,” simply cannot be advanced in good faith (as the disingenuousness in the FEC’s submissions attests), much less with “substantial justification.” See e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568-71, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2551-53, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (<HOLDING>). It may be that “[images and symbols without

    ### Response:
    holding that views expressed by other courts on the merits and in particular a string of losses together with the actual merits of the governments litigating position are central to issue of whether position was substantially justified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    specific job categories or job progressions. Plaintiff relies instead on a statistical analysis of a company-wide data pool and makes no attempt to narrow the data pool to the locations or specific position in which she worked. As this Court noted in the order denying class certification, the probative value of Plaintiffs statistical evidence is therefore highly questionable, in significant part due to the treatment of factors such as experience, education and specific promotion processes. Cooper v. Southern Company, 205 F.R.D. 596, 613-14 (N.D.Ga.2001). The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment. See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and for a new trial to determine whether and to what extent the collision was the proximate cause of Appellant’s injuries and what amount of damages, if any, should be awarded to Appellant. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. No additional motions for rehearing will be entertained. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith. KAHN and CLARK, JJ., concur. 1 . The jury answered ""No” when asked on the verdict form whether there was ""negligence on the part of Defendants, Comcast of Greater Florida/Georgia, Inc. and Troy C. Koonce, which was a legal cause of injury to Plaintiff, Cindy Sorel Ebner.” 2 . In some cases, the first two elements have been grouped together as ""the issue of liability.” See, e.g., Westchester Exxon v. Valdes, 524 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the last two elements are

    ### Response:
    holding that the record here fails to establish the first two elements which the court identified as the duty of care and a breach of that duty and as a result a directed verdict  on the issue of liability was warranted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interpreted] to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted). Verizon contends that Fleming first raised HRL and NYCHRL claims in her Amended Complaint and that the three-year period should be measured from the filing of that pleading. According to Verizon, the Amended Complaint cannot relate back because Plaintiffs Title VII claims were time-barred in the Pro Se Complaint. However, the Pro Se Complaint alleges the same “severe scrutiny” that Plaintiff timely sets forth in the Amended Complaint as a continuing violation under Title VII. As such, the Pro Se Complaint was not wholly untimely, and the cases on which Verizon relies are inapposite. See Henderson v. Bolanda, 253 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Papenthien v. Papenthien, 16 F.Supp.2d 1235,

    ### Response:
    holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    she is clearly covered by the State Farm policy because she is the daughter of the named insured. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(a)(iii) (Supp.1999). However, if Phillip Toledo was driving, he would be covered only if he received permission from the named insured, Linda Motuapuaka, or her spouse, if any. See id. § S1A-22%-3038(1)(a)(@)(A). {29 As plaintiffs concede, paragraph 47 of the stipulation is an agreement as to the legal effect of the insurance policy. However, the insurance policy is a written instrument, and the construction and ""legal effect of written instruments is necessarily a question of law, and hence is one that must be determined by the court."" Verdi v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 510, 196 P. 225, 228 (1921); see also Swift, 243 U.S. at 289, 37 S.Ct. 287 (<HOLDING>). Thus, paragraph 47, as to the legal effect of

    ### Response:
    holding that court must decide case on basis of facts admitted unaffected by stipulation made by counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.M. 165, 169, 754 P.2d 542, 546 (Ct.App.1988). “Unsupported intuition is [also] insufficient.” Cohen, 103 N.M. at 562, 711 P.2d at 7. Only when traffic is heavy may an officer move a vehicle to the secondary area without reasonable suspicion. Bolton, 111 N.M. at 38, 801 P.2d at 108. 2. Tenth Circuit Cases {12} The Tenth Circuit has allowed agents, without individualized suspicion, not only to inquire of citizenship and immigration status, but have held that the agents “may briefly question individuals ‘concerning such things as vehicle ownership, cargo, destination, and travel plans.’ ” United States v. Massie, 65 F.3d 843, 848 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Chavira, 9 F.3d 888, 889 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The stop, however, must be “brief and

    ### Response:
    holding that an inquiry into trip destination is permissible even in the absence of suspicious circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. State, 144 Ga. App. 406 (1) (240 SE2d 919) (1977). “[E]ven competent proof of an offense not involving moral turpitude, or incompetent proof of an offense involving moral turpitude, such as a mere indictment or a charge or an arrest or a trial and acquittal, are not legal methods of impeachment. [Cits.]” Whitley v. State, 188 Ga. 177, 179 (5) (3 SE2d 588) (1939). Accord Strickland v. State, 166 Ga. App. 702 (305 SE2d 434) (1983). “Our Supreme Court has declared that crimes involving moral turpitude are ‘restricted to the gravest offenses, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind. (Cit).’ [Cits.]” Seaboard &c. R. Co. v. West, 155 Ga. App. 391, 393 (271 SE2d 36) (1980). Accord Hall v. Hall, 261 Ga. 188 (402 SE2d 726) (1991) (<HOLDING>). While the state contends, without benefit of

    ### Response:
    holding that dui is not such an offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp., 307 Ga. App. 369, 371 (705 SE2d 219) (2010). Automobile insurance policy exclusions are not per se void as against public policy. See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 193 Ga. App. 175, 176 (2) (387 SE2d 405) (1989). Public policy may justify enlarging an insurer’s risk where acts of the undisputed insured driver are concerned, but not necessarily so where an unauthorized driver who is not an insured under the policy is involved. This [Cjourt has previously affirmed declaratory judgment for the insurer where such an unauthorized and thus uncovered use of the vehicle occurred. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rogers v. Travelers Indem. Co. &c., 202 Ga. App. 77, 79 (2) (413 SE2d 254) (1991); see also Ison v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 230 Ga. App. 554, 555 (496 SE2d 478) (1998) (<HOLDING>). Citing Woody v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding that driver exclusions which are clear unambiguous and supported by consideration are enforceable and do not violate public policy or compulsory insurance laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statements can be admitted as substantive evidence “if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is ... [inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition.” § 90.801(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). The law is well-established that “a statement given under oath during a police investigation is not a statement given at an ‘other proceeding1 and consequently is not admissible as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a).” Pearce v. State, 880 So.2d 561, 569 (Fla. 2004) (citing State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1986)); see also S.L. v. State, 993 So.2d 1108, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). Here, Ordonez’s prior inconsistent statement

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers testimony as to the victims prior inconsistent statements made to him on day of the alleged crime were not admissible as substantive evidence and could not be used to support a finding of guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prior to the end of the underlying litigation could create a conflict between the insurer’s duty to defend and its interest in avoiding coverage). Further, Hartford’s claim regarding the duty to defend will be adjudicated in the context of this lawsuit, and if that claim is resolved in its favor, Hartford’s duty to indemnify will also be extinguished. Hartford directs the Court to several cases which it contends support the proposition that a declaratory judgment on the duty to indemnify may be entertained before liability has been determined in the underlying action. The Court has reviewed the cases identified by Hartford and finds them to be distinguishable from the circumstances here. For example, several cases cited by Hartford are cases involving 725 A.2d 743 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In these cases, there is no duty to defend,

    ### Response:
    holding that factual allegations in underlying complaint constituted knowing endangerment as a matter of law and thus there was no duty to defend or indemnify under the knowing endangerment coverage exclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can serve to benefit both the parents and the child by moving to permanency in a more timely fashion, reducing the time all must wait in litigation limbo until their case is finally resolved. While both the parents’ and child’s interests in the parent-child relationship are great, so is the State’s interest in resolving matters on appeal that have already been fully litigated . The combination of trial counsel’s opportunity to raise possible issues for appeal and the appellate court’s ability to review the full record and transcript of the underlying proceeding protects both the parents and child against the risk of erroneous deprivation. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, 47 L.Ed.2d at 34; see also United States v. Marines, 535 F.2d 552, 556 (10th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ibarra, 116 N.M. 486, 864 P.2d 302,

    ### Response:
    holding a summary calendar does not violate due process as long as defendant is able to properly present issues on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a security for UCC purposes); Haught v. Lante Corp., 1991 WL 148198, at *2-3; Medesco, Inc. v. LNS Int’l, Inc., 762 F.Supp. at 923; In re Domestic Fuel Corp., 70 B.R. at 462; In re Sandefer, 47 B.R. 133, 138 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1985); Data Consultants, Inc. v. Traywick, 593 F.Supp. 447, 457 (D.Md.1983); Katz v. Abrams, 549 F.Supp. at 671; Dionisi v. DeCampli, 1991 WL 118185, at *3, amended by Dionisi v. DeCamp 1037, 1040-41 (La.Ct.App.1991) (finding that Chapter 8 of Louisiana’s UCC applies to an option contract between former bank president and majority stockholder of bank to repurchase a “maximum number of shares” of stock in connection with a contract of employment and that such stock is a security within the meaning of Chapter 8); Thomas v. Prewitt, 355 So.2d 657, 659-60 (Miss.1978) (<HOLDING>); Young v. Young, 240 Va. 57, 393 S.E.2d 398,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of frauds found in chapter 8 of mississippis ucc applies to the sale of shares of stock in a corporation comprised of only twelve shareholders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    52 (Mo.App. E.D.2008) and Richardson v. Missouri State Treasurer, 254 S.W.3d 242 (Mo.App. E.D.2008) provide the proper framework for analyzing this case. In Highley, we held unsupported by competent and substantial evidence the Commission’s finding that the claimant’s last injury combined with her prior disabilities did not render her unemployable in the open labor market. Highley, 247 S.W.3d at 56. We declined to apply the so-called Alexander rule in Highley because we concluded that the Commission did not make a credibility determination when it failed to resolve differences in the evidence in favor of the testimony of a particular expert, and instead merely pointed out “flaws” in the expert testimony. Id. at 57; see also Corp v. Joplin Cement Co., 337 S.W.2d 252, 258 (Mo.1960) (<HOLDING>). Richardson expands upon Highley and

    ### Response:
    holding that where the record reveals no conflict in the evidence or impeachment of any witness the reviewing court may find the award was not based upon disbelief of the testimony of the witnesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    became effective in June 2013, and the parties agree that it was not retroactive to Phillips’s January 2012 termination. Because we ultimately conclude that the overbreadth challenge must fail on the merits, we do not address the City’s argument that this challenge is moot in light of the Gallegos Act. 4 . The Hatch Act also applied until recently to state and local employees whose positions were paid for even in part by federal funds. See S.Rep. No. 112-211, at 3-5 (2012), 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 750, 752-55. 5 . The state's attorney general had interpreted the statute to apply only to partisan political activity. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 617-18, 93 S.Ct. 2908. 6 . Other circuits have addressed these challenges similarly. See, e.g., Otten v. Schicker, 655 F.2d 142, 143, 145 (8th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); see also Wilbur v. Mahan, 3 F.3d 214, 219

    ### Response:
    holding that a police officer who sought nomination for a senate seat overlapping with his police district could lawfully be prevented by police regulation from seeking that seat
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    refusal to reinstate Lucas to the hiring hall, the Board applied the more deferential O’Neill standard. This was error because a heightened duty of fair dealing applies to a union’s operation of an exclusive hiring hall. B. Although ordinarily we would remand to the Board so that it could reconsider its decision under the correct legal standard, see Perkins v. Marine Terminals Corp., 673 F.2d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir.1982), remand is not necessary in this case. In dismissing Lucas’s complaint, the Board, contrary to the ALJ, found that the evidence supported the Union’s necessity defense. Having made this critical factual determination, it is our responsibility to determine whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Compare Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 914 F.2d at 1320 (<HOLDING>), with Perkins, 673 F.2d at 1105 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that where the board had already made the necessary factual evaluation underlying the legal standard to be applied it then becomes the courts responsibility to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the boards findings were supported by substantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the parties would have to engage in further discovery. Counsel for both parties represented to the circuit court that they had an agreement to allow discovery on this cause of action if the circuit court denied summary judgment on it. Both counsel further agreed to allow the County the option of submitting another summary judgment motion on the wrongful discharge claim after the completion of discovery. “Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must not be granted until the opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery.” Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d 433, 439 (2003) (citation omitted). Finally, Cunningham has demonstrated the likelihood of uncovering additional relevant evidence during discovery. See Dawkins, 354 S.C. at 69, 580 S.E.2d at 439 (<HOLDING>). Cunningham testified in his deposition that

    ### Response:
    holding that when the nonmoving party requests a delay in ruling on a summary judgment motion until further discovery may be completed the party must demonstrate the likelihood that further discovery will uncover additional relevant evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    656, 658, 562 S.E.2d 60, 62-63 (2002) (internal quotation omitted)). “Whenever, during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law.” In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147-48, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979). As a general proposition, the “[r]epeal of a challenged law generally renders moot the issue of the law’s interpretation or constitutionality.” See Property Rights Advocacy, 173 N.C. App. at 183, 617 S.E.2d at 718 (citing State v. McCluney, 280 N.C. 404, 407, 185 S.E.2d 870, 872 (1972) (<HOLDING>). However, the repeal of a challenged statute

    ### Response:
    holding that the repeal of a statute renders moot the question of its constitutionality and that the constitutionality of the new act does not arise on this appeal and    will be decided if and when it is presented
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    R.App. P. 28(j), cite Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.2012), in which we applied Garcetti and affirmed the grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff, a former state-university librarian who claimed that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for his First Amendment speech. Observing that the plaintiffs speech commenting on a book recommendation was not related to classroom instruction and “only loosely, if at all, related to academic scholarship,” this court held that his speech was pursuant to his duties as head librarian and as a committee member selecting books for freshman students, and thus not protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 739. Savage relied on cases including Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education of Tipp City, 624 F.3d 332, 342-44 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). B. Decisions of other Circuits applying

    ### Response:
    holding that the first amendment does not protect primary and secondary school teachers inclass curricular speech even to the extent academic freedom as a constitutional rule could somehow apply to primary and secondary schools that does not insulate a teachers curricular and pedagogical choices from the school boards oversight as opposed to the teachers right to speak and write publicly about academic issues outside of the classroom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence of “(1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is on account of one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3)is committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.” Afriyie, 613 F.3d at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 936 (“As with asylum, to show past persecution, an applicant for withholding of removal must show that government forces have either directly persecuted him or were unable or unwilling to control private persecutors.”). The only nexus required to establish a past-persecution asylum claim is that the applicant’s persecution be “on account of’ one of the statutorily enumerated grounds. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In other words, the second (“on account of’)

    ### Response:
    holding that the applicant must provide some evidence direct or circumstantial that the persecutor was or would be motivated to persecute him because of a protected ground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) The district court did not abuse its discretion in conducting voir dire on the effect of pre-trial publicity. See United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1522-23 (9th Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). The court’s inquiry revealed that a limited number of jurors had been exposed to the publicity, and that few had formed opinions about the guilt of defendants. Cf. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 635-39 (9th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>). The voir dire was adequate to ensure a

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court should have engaged in a more detailed inquiry when pretrial publicity was vast a third of potential jurors had an opinion about the guilt of the defendant and all jurors selected had been exposed to pretrial publicity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ” Id. at 287, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343, 117 S.Ct. 1353). “Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” Id. at 284, 122 S.Ct. 2268. The defendant may defeat this presumption by demonstrating “that Congress shut the door to private enforcement either expressly, through specific evidence from the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Id. at 284 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520-21, 110 S.Ct. 2510; Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Applying these principles here, we agree with

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no enforceable private right where the statute itself creates a remedial scheme that is sufficiently comprehensive  to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nonetheless, may be insufficient to coerce the particular defendant and, when that happens, duress is not present for that defendant. Ibid. The jury, therefore, must assess the sincerity of the defendant’s asserted perception of an imminent threat of harm. The second component of the defense is objective in nature: a defendant’s level of resistance to the particular threat must meet community standards of reasonableness. The jury must evaluate a defendant’s response to the threat by applying the standard of the “person of reasonable firmness.” N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9a. The norm presupposes an ordinary person without “serious mental and emotional defects.” See McAllister, supra, 41 N.J. at 353-54, 196 A.2d at 792; State v. Van Dyke, 361 N.J.Super. 403, 417, 825 A.2d 1163, 1172 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35, 834 A.2d 407

    ### Response:
    recognizing duress as establishing standard measured by the societal objective norm of the person of reasonable firmness rather than by the particular attributes which characterize defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to ... (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). See also Sowell, 251 F.3d at 683 (“A successful gender-based wage discrimination claim ... requires the plaintiff to prove that her employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’ ”) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (concerning the Equal Pay Act), and citing EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 669 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>)). “The consideration of equal pay standards is

    ### Response:
    holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To establish plain error, Mata must demonstrate there is (1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) the error affects her substantial rights. United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174 (10th Cir.2005); Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732. If these three prongs are met, we may exercise our discretion to correct the error if Mata establishes “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed ings,” i.e. the fourth prong of plain error review. Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1174; see also Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 736-37. The first two prongs of the plain error standard have been met — there was error and the error was plain. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732. However, contrary to Mata’s arguments, the error was “non-constitutional Booker error.” Id. at 731-32 (<HOLDING>). Mata admitted at her change of plea hearing

    ### Response:
    holding nonconstitutional booker error occurs when the district court applies the guidelines in a mandatory rather than advisory fashion even though the resulting sentence was calculated based solely upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    26, 2011, the District Court granted Boeing’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, applied a charging lien in favor of Surkin’s firm, and dismissed the action with prejudice. On August 11, 2011, the District Court clarified its May 26, 2011 order and granted Sur-kin’s motion to compel compliance with it. On September 12, 2011, Kelly appealed. II. Discussion A. Jurisdiction Boeing contends that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after the May 26, 2011 order, which dismissed the action with prejudice. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring notice of appeal in civil case to be filed within 30 days of entry of order or judgment being appealed); see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed, however, that Kelly timely

    ### Response:
    holding 30day limit to be mandatory and jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we hold that the jury was authorized to conclude that the appellant had acted maliciously and without probable cause in prosecuting him for shoplifting. See generally OCGA § 51-7-40. 3. The appellant further contends that it was immune from liability pursuant to OCGA § 51-7-60 (1), which provides that the owner or operator of a mercantile establishment cannot be held liable for damages for false arrest or false imprisonment “where it is established by competent evidence . . . [t]hat the plaintiff had so conducted himself or behaved in such manner as to cause a man of reasonable prudence to believe . . . at or immediately prior to the time of the detention or arrest [he] was committing the offense of shoplifting. . . .” Cf. Turner v. Bogle, 115 Ga. App. 710, 713 (155 SE2d 667) (1967) (<HOLDING>). This contention is also without merit. “The

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the city itself. There are, however, no personal immunities available vicariously or otherwise to municipal actors under § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). It appears that the district court also applied state statutory immunities for child abuse investigations to the federal constitutional claims and concluded that the City is immune from a § 1983 action under a state immunity statute. Again, the district court erred. Immunity under § 1983 is governed by federal law; state law cannot provide immunity from suit for federal civil rights violations. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980); Good v. Dauphin County Social Serv., 891 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the City of Escondido has the benefit

    ### Response:
    holding that state law providing immunity from suit for child abuse investigators has no application to suits under  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    introduced letters from PMG apparently setting forth appellant’s deficient attendance record. The trial court cannot rely on this hearsay evidence alone to support a revocation of probation. See Glenn v. State, 568 So.2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (reversing order revoking probation which relied solely on facts of which testifying witness had no personal knowledge). However, we must also consider the non-hearsay testimony of appellant which relates to the first three scheduled appointments with PMG. See Corona v. State, 642 So.2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (considering non-hearsay admission of probationer that he made no attempt to comply with condition of probationer’s noneom-pliance is the result of an arrest for an unrelated offense. See Drayton v. State, 490 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. State, 587 So.2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to file a monthly report was not deliberate violation of probation where probationer was incarcerated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be completed beforehand. Dallas County v. Coskey, 247 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied). We agree that Section 311.034 does not apply to the post-suit notice requirements of Section 89.0041. See Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 89.004; Coskey, 247 S.W.3d at 755-56. Moreover, legislative intent to make Section 89.004 jurisdictional could have been provided for by statute in light of the apparent inconsistency between Section 89.0041 and Section 311.034. It is not this Court’s job to insert words in a statute when the word is absent. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1995). Other courts have followed the same line of reasoning set out in Coskey. See County of Bexar v. Bruton, 256 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 281 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that section 890041 is not a jurisdictional requirement rather a requirement to maintain suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party’s ease, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. III. DISCUSSION A Title VII Claims 1. DISCRIMINATORY DENIAL OF PROMOTION In an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff can offer either direct evidence of discrimination or indirect evidence whose cumulative probative force would support to a reasonable probability the inference that “but for” plaintiffs race, she would have been promoted. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 n. 10, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) (<HOLDING>); see also Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that claims under  2000e2 are resolved by the but for standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    filed charges.” 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). In considering whether plaintiffs may apply the continuing violations doctrine to discrete acts occurring pursuant to a policy of discrimination, the Second Circuit subsequently held that “[discrete acts ..., which fall outside the limitations period, cannot be brought within it, even when undertaken pursuant to a general policy that results in other discrete acts occurring within the limitations period.” Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 157 (2d Cir.2012). Plaintiffs allegations of overtime violations occurring between November 2004 and August 2006 constitute discrete- acts. See, e.g., Consoli v. St. Mary Home/Mercy Cmty. Health, No. 13 Civ. 1791, 2014 WL 3849978, at *4 (D.Conn. Aug. 5, 2014) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 12

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs allegations related to denial of overtime were discrete acts timebarred and not individually actionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021, 113 S.Ct. 657, 121 L.Ed.2d 583 (1992) (stating that cases raised question whether a private suit under RICO may be brought against a utility to recover for excessive charges for electrical power). This Court refuses to extend the filed rate doctrine to this case, where the utility and certain of its customers are on the same side of the case. The filed rate show their rates, and no utility may “charge, demand, collect or receive from any person a greater or less compensation for any service rendered or to be rendered than that prescribed in its filed schedules.” KRS 278.160; see also Boone County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Owen County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 779 S.W.2d 224, 225-26 (Ky.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). All utilities have the right to “demand,

    ### Response:
    holding that under krs 278160 public utility could not be estopped from collecting undercharges even where the customer was negligently underbilled to hold otherwise would result in underbilled customer receiving rate preference in contravention of statutory scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    curiam); see also Singleton v. United States, 128 F.3d 833, 838-39 (4th Cir.1997); Brookhurst, Inc. v. United rebate refunds as tax amounts that increase a taxpayer’s assessable deficiency). But see Bilzerian, 86 F.3d at 1069 (stating, in dicta, that “once a tax liability is paid, no erroneous refund— whether rebate or non-rebate — can revive it”). This principle has already been applied in this case. The Greers originally paid their 1979-1981 tax liabilities in full; their underpayment for those years was the result of rebate refunds made after they submitted amended returns in 1982 claiming carryback tax benefits from their Madison investment. Those rebate refunds were erroneous because the IRS later disallowed the tax benefits on which they were premised. Cf. Beer, 733 F.2d at 436 (<HOLDING>). By assessing the amount of the 1982 rebate

    ### Response:
    holding that refunds issued based on a claimed exemption that was later disallowed are erroneous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the issue of whether punitive damages are excepted from discharge under this section. The BAP, however, has resolved this question in In re Ellwanger. In that case, the BAP held that under section 523(a)(2), “a wholly private penalty cannot be the basis for a nondischargeability judgment.” Ellwanger v. McBroom (In re Ellwanger), 105 B.R. 551, 555 (9th Cir.BAP 1989). Other bankruptcy courts addressing the issue have generally found that section 523(a)(2) does not bar discharge of punitive damages. See, e.g., Larson v. Norris (In re Larson), 79 B.R. 462 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1987); Haile v. McDonald (In re McDonald), 73 B.R. 877 (Bankr.N.D.T 428 (9th Cir.1985) (section 523(a)(6) bars discharge of both punitive and actual damages); Brawer v. Gelman (In re Gelman), 47 B.R. 735 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1985) (<HOLDING>). Palmer argues that there is no basis in

    ### Response:
    holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that both actual and punitive portions of judgment for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity were nondischargeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Revenue, 309 U.S. 304, 306-09, 60 S.Ct. 566, 567-69, 84 L.Ed. 770 (1940). It establishes four requirements for a document to serve as a tax return: (1) it must purport to be a return; (2) it must be executed under penalty of perjury;' (3) it must contain sufficient data to allow calculation of tax; and (4) it must represent an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law. See In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1033 (6th Cir.1999). Only the fourth prong of the Beard test is at issue in this case: whether Justice’s Forms 1040 represented an honest and reasonable effort to comply with the tax law. At least three other circuit courts have held that delinquency in filing is relevant to the fourth Beard factor. See In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>);.. In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 906 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding that the debtors belated filing was not a reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the tax law relying significantly on the debtors delinquency in failing to file his tax returns until after the irs assessment thus defeating the main purpose of the selfreporting requirement of our tax system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of tax preference shall be properly adjusted where the tax treatment giving rise to such items will not result in the reduction of the taxpayer’s tax under this subtitle for any taxable years. Petitioners suggest that section 58(h) exhibits a clear congressional effort “to apply the tax benefit rule in a broad and comprehensive manner where the application of the minimum tax deprives taxpayers of benefits to which they are otherwise entitled.” Section 301(g) of the 1976 Act provided, however, that section 58(h) was effective only after December 31, 1975. The years for which petitioners were liable for the minimum tax (1972 through 1975) all predate the effective date of section 58(h). See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 334, 685 F.2d 1346, 1351-1352 (1982) (<HOLDING>) (hereinafter Occidental I). Accord First

    ### Response:
    holding that section 58h was inapplicable to years beginning prior to december 31 1975
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    71 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995). However, Glacier Bay is inapplicable. That case involved a lawsuit against the United States alleging negligence in the preparation of nautical charts. Id. at 1449. The plaintiffs in Glacier Bay attempted to assert that the term “third party” as used in section (h) could include the United States, but the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument based on the plain reading of the statute. Id. at 1455. Thus, the holding is simply not relevant to the claims and arguments presented here. S.J. Louis also cites several eases that uphold an owner or operator’s liability for an oil spill under section 1321(b), even where a third party’s “act or omission was the immediate cause of the spill.” E.g., United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning behind these cases is not

    ### Response:
    holding that an owner or operator of a discharging facility is liable to a section 1321b6 civil penalty even where it exercised all due care and a third partys act or omission was the im mediate cause of the spill
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512, 41 S.Ct. 189, 191, 65 L.Ed. 376 (1921) (expressly reserving question whether ""property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent” may be forfeited); Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 361-63, 2 L.Ed. 643 (1808) (""a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed”). 15 . See, e.g., Clagett, 3 F.3d at 1357 (property owners have right to adequate notice prior to administrative forfeiture); United States v. Rogers, 984 F.2d 314, 317 (1993) (recognizing possibility of due process challenge to forfeiture statute in specific case of prosecutorial misconduct); One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d at 420 (<HOLDING>); Wiren, 542 F.2d at 763 (recognizing due

    ### Response:
    holding that vindictive prosecution claims in civil forfeiture proceeding may raise due process questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and [(4)] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. City of Seattle, 160 Wn.2d 32, 48, 156 P.3d 185 (2007) (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S. Ct. 1076, 51 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1977)). “If a local taxing scheme fails any one of these four requirements, it is invalid.” Id. ¶57 The parties disagree whether the first requirement, of a “substantial nexus with the taxing state,” is satisfied. That “substantial nexus” requirement actually involves two separate, though related, nexus requirements: the first concerns the “taxpayer’s [general] business activities within the State,” or general business nexus, and the second concerns the specific transaction at issue, or specific transactional nexus. Gen. Motors, 377 U.S. at 441 (<HOLDING>); Norton, 340 U.S. at 537 (where corporation

    ### Response:
    recognizing the test for business nexus is distinct from transactional nexus and its test for dissociation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “in essence, holds that the Idaho Legislature can legislate away the rights of individuals protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Many jurisdictions have held that it is unnecessary to charge aiding and abetting in the charging document and that there is no due process violation when a court gives an aiding and abetting jury instruction even when aiding and abetting is not charged in the charging document. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We have also held a number of times in different contexts that aiding and abetting is embedded in every federal indictment for a substantive crime.”); United States v. Dodd, 43 F.3d 759, 762 n. 5 (1st Cir.1995) (stating it is not necessary to plead an aiding and abetting charge because that charge , 629 (1994) (<HOLDING>); People v. Rivera, 84 N.Y.2d 766, 622 N.Y.S.2d

    ### Response:
    holding defendants due process rights were not violated by a jury instruction on aiding and abetting it is unnecessary for the state to charge aiding and abetting in the charging document in order to pursue that theory at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mr. Cooper. All of the information that was disclosed by the government at sentencing was known by the government when it made the plea agreement. Given this knowledge, it is difficult to understand how the government could, in good faith, proceed to enter into an agreement with Mr. Cooper that could not, consistent with its ethical duty of disclosure, be fulfilled. Second, Jimenez recognized that the agreed sentence must still be recommended by the government. Although the Jimenez court noted that “the government attorney undeniably demonstrated a clear lack of enthusiasm for the recom mended sentence, an unenthusiastic recommendation is still a recommendation,” id. at 364; see also United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2103, 2104, 85 L.Ed.2d 462 (1985) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), it is clear under the facts of that case that

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant generally has no right to an enthusiastic recommendation unless the plea agreement commits the government to make the recommendation enthusiastically
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code Construction Act, the legislature expressly stated its intent regarding its use of the word “including” in statutory provisions, providing: “ ‘Includes’ and ‘including’ are terms of enlargement and not of limitation or exclusive enumeration, and use of the terms does not create a presumption that components not expresse slature’s use of the word “including” as a means of illustration and not exclusion. For instance, in Leach v. State, the court of appeals applied § 311.005(13) to the defendant’s community supervision condition, which tracked statutory language in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and held that the word “including” did not “creat[e] a presumption against further inclusion of terms not expressly stated.” 170 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Wilburn v. State, the court of

    ### Response:
    holding that because including was a term of enlargement the defendant had violated his community supervision by going within 1000 feet of a grassy area where children played even though this location was not specified in the list of prohibited premises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (denying due process); (3) the evidence did not establish proof evident, presumption great; and (4) the trial court refused to set bond based on facts not in the record. The State was ordered to respond, and Bleiweiss filed a reply. We grant the petition based on Blei-weiss’s argument (2) — that, after the evidence was presented, the court made its finding that the proof was evident and the presumption great and denied counsel’s request to make argument on the same. We believe that the failure to allow argument of counsel, in this case, amounted to a basic denial of petitioner’s right to be heard at an adversarial judicial proceeding that could deprive him of his liberty — the most fundamental of all due process rights. See Chalk v. State, 443 So.2d 421, 422-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (<HOLDING>); J.M.S. v. State, 921 So.2d 813, 815-16 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that patients constitutional due process rights were violated when his trial counsel was not allowed to present a closing argument prior to involuntary commitment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    solicitude for this reasonableness requirement must be shown here because physical confinement, whether criminal or civil, implicates a “fundamental liberty interest” and because the length of the confinement is potentially unlimited. As the Supreme Court commented in Zadvydas: A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to “depriv[e]” any “person ... of ... liberty ... without due process of law.” F and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances ....” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (emphasis added). Cf. United States ex rel. Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 708, 709 (2d Cir.1949) (<HOLDING>). The Zadvydas Court was troubled by the

    ### Response:
    holding that bail of 25000 for an immigrant in deportation proceedings was unreasonable and noting that the amount of bail in each case must be individual as to the amount reasonably designed to insure the aliens necessary attendance upon the proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the heirs. Claims for pain and suffering abate upon the death of the injured person. Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 216, 796 P.2d 87, 93 (1990) (quoting Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1987)). However, the heirs of a person who has been killed by a tortfeasor have a separate cause of action against the tortfeasor under Idaho’s wrongful death statute: When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of suc Eng’g & Supply Co., Inc., 93 Idaho 888, 477 P.2d 511 (1970); Russell, 65 Idaho at 534, 148 P.2d at 223 (<HOLDING>), superseded in part by statute, I.C. § 5-327.

    ### Response:
    holding that the cause of action created by ic  5311 does not benefit the estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Both Sections 553 and 605 provide an array of civil and criminal remedies for the unauthorized interception and subsequent transmission of cable signals. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(c), 60 tering, No. 01 CIV. 5483KMW-RLE, 2002 WL 1000286, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002) (determining that defendant’s unauthorized interception and broadcast of a boxing match violated Sections 553 and 605 of the FCA); Kingsvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd v. 2182 La Caridad Rest., Inc., No. 01 CIV. 7595CHB), 2002 WL 654137, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.18, 2002) (<HOLDING>); Time Warner Cable ofN.Y. City v. Taco Rápido

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants unauthorized interception and broadcast of a boxing match violated sections 553 and 605 of the fca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prevails. The hearing officer found that because the video was shown at Union meetings, it was clear to viewers that it was partisan propaganda, and not Board-issued material. We agree with the Board’s finding that the video did not improperly imply that the Board supported the Union. k- Union “bribery” of employees Finally, Maremont claims that the Union impermissibly “bribed” the employees with T-shirts and other benefits. The evidence in this case does not support this objection. The hearing officer found that “[t]he overwhelming majority of employees who testified at [the] hearing testified consistent with the testimony of Union officials that employees were not required to sign [the “Vote Yes’ petition] in order to receive campaign items.” See Dickinson Press, 153 F.3d at 286 (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION For all of the reasons stated

    ### Response:
    holding that although the distribution of economic inducements generally constitutes objectionable conduct a union may distribute inexpensive campaign propaganda such as tshirts at a union meeting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it does provide that “none of the funds contained in this Act ... may be made available ... to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party in or defends an IDEA proceeding which was initiated prior to the date of the enactment of this Act in an amount in excess of $4,000 for that proceeding.” Pub. L. No. 111-8,123 Stat. 524 (2009). The Act, therefore, lifted the fee cap for proceedings initiated after its March 11, 2009 enactment date, but barred the use of its funds to pay fees incurred in proceedings initiated before that date. See id.; see also Blackman, 633 F.3d at 1090. Because the plaintiffs fee claim is based on an administrative proceeding ini tiated in 2008, i.e. before the enactment of the 2009 Act, it is still subject to the fee cap. See Blackman, 633 F.3d at 1090 (<HOLDING>). d. Summary of Fees Allowed Requested Amount

    ### Response:
    holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“APA”); (2) Fifth Amendment due process; (3) the Higher Education Act (“HEA”); and (4) common law due process. The Court finds there is insufficient likelihood of success on the first two claims, but “serious questions” on the merits of the third and fourth claims. 1. Administrative Procedures Act Plaintiffs’ APA claim has little likelihood of success. The APA allows judicial review for persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,” and defines “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United States .... ” 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 702. By its own language, the APA does not extend to an entity that is not a federal agency, such as the ABA. See National Wildlife Federation v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); accord Sierra Club v. Model, 848 F.2d 1068,

    ### Response:
    holding nonagency defendants were properly joined as indispensable parties under rule 19 but recognizing no apa cause of action could stand against them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no authority for the proposition that this distinction is relevant to Section 51.014(a)(8), and we are aware of none. Thus, the court of appeals erred in concluding it was without jurisdiction to hear McLellan’s appeal. IV. Conclusion With respect to the trial court’s denial of Texas A & M’s plea to the jurisdiction, we affirm the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment holding that Koseo-glu’s breach of contract claims against Texas A & M were barred by sovereign immunity. But because Koseoglu’s pleadings are incurably defective, remanding the cause to the trial court will serve no legitimate purpose. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals’ remand order and dismiss Koseoglu’s claims against Texas A & M with prejudice. See Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 636 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). With respect to McLellan’s appeal, having

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is with prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not been passed upon in the first instance by the district court, we decline to reach the issue.”). ASSE is correct that the State Department could fail to meet its burden of demonstrating substantially justified administrative proceedings in the absence of a due process violation. (See Dkt. 54 at 15.) However, the fact that a due process violation has not been definitively found precludes $12,218 U.S. Currency from applying. Furthermore, there is no indication from subsequent cases that $12,218 U.S. Currency establishes a seminal, categorical Ninth Circuit rule for EAJA fees. Rather, that statement has only been cited twice. All three cases—$12,218 U.S. Currency and its two citations—presented particularly egregious due process violations. See $12,218 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d at 1519 (<HOLDING>); Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that government was not substantially justified in its litigation position where government conducted a poor investigation of claim failed to verify claimants story unreasonably delayed pursuing and processing litigation of forfeiture claim for thirteen months and where court ultimately found at trial which occurred four years after initial seizure that seized property had independent source and had not been used illegally
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.), 19 F.3d 1291, 1294 n. 2 (9th Cir.1994) (“Washington Public ”). There is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. D’Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 904 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992). Thus, although a court can adjust the lodestar upward or downward based on certain factors, adjustments are “the exception rather than the rule.” Id. at 1383-84. “Reasonableness is the goal, and mechanical or formulaic application of either method, where it yields an unreasonable result, can be an abuse of discretion.” Coordinated Pretrial, 109 F.3d at 607; see also Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt, 886 F.2d at 271 (<HOLDING>). When using the percentage-of-the-fund

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    saw Roberson emerge briefly from the residence. A records check discl nding probable cause to issue a search warrant where the affidavit established that the affiant was an experienced narcotics investigator; the defendant had prior drug trafficking convictions; information from a confidential informant indicated that the defendant engaged in drug trafficking on a regular basis and maintained drugs and weapons at the location to be searched; periodic surveillance corroborated the informant’s information; and marijuana and cocaine residue, and packaging materials, were found inside trash bags left on the defendant’s lawn within twenty-four hours before preparation of the affidavit); United States v. Wingate, 191 F.3d 454, 1999 WL 775917, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Sept.24, 1999) (table decision) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that traffic around the searched residence the presence of a known drug dealer and trash pulls that revealed cut straws torn plastic baggies marijuana stems and one baggie with cocaine residue constituted substantial basis for magistrates probable cause determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have reached the same result: To the extent Plaintiff argues that her challenge to [the MA organization] Kaiser’s secondary payer rights cannot “arise under” the Medicare Act because Kaiser does not have a federal cause of action to enforce such rights, see Parra, 2011 WL 1119736, at *5, she is mistakenly conflating the question whether Kaiser has a private right of action under federal law with the question whether she can challenge a benefits determination without exhausting her claim administratively. The fact that Kaiser has to resort to state law processes to collect secondary payer reimbursement when a beneficiar t an HHS Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is without jurisdiction to adjudicate certain common law claims seeking damages. See Matthews v. Leavitt, 452 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). But see id. at 153 n. 10 (“We intimate no

    ### Response:
    holding that statute does not provide for the adjudication by the alj of a state law breach of contract action for damages that is independent of the aljs determination of entitlement to benefits under the terms of the applicable agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that all fair and reasonable minds would find it impossible under the contract); OK Lumber, 123 P.3d at 1078-79 (concluding that arbitrator had not exceeded powers by resolving a matter of disagreement under the lease); Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Pub. Safety Emps. Ass'n, 732 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Alaska 1987) (deciding that the arbitrator had properly interpreted the issues submitted and that the arbitrator had not exceeded his authority). 31 . Ahtna, 894 P.2d at 663. 32 . See id. at 658. 33 . See id. at 659. 34 . See id. 35 . See id. 36 . See id. 37 . See id. at 662. 38 . Id. at 663. 39 . Id. (emphasis in original). 40 . Id. 41 . - Id. at 662 (second alteration in original). 42 . Id. 43 . See id. at 662-63; see also OK Lumber Co. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 123 P.3d 1076, 1078-79 (Alaska 2005) (<HOLDING>). 44 . The Aleut Corporation further claims

    ### Response:
    holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because it was necessary to interpret the contract to resolve the parties dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a constitutional right to self-representation in civil cases. He also argues that his right to liberty protects him from being compelled to contract with an attorney. We are unaware of any U.S. Constitutional decision that declares citizens to have a right to self-representation in civil proceedings. Yet, arguing against such a right is nearly frivolous. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pleadings drafted by pro se litigants shall be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982) (self-representation in civil cases is a right of “high standing”); see also McBrearty v. Kentucky Community and Technical College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Ky.App.2008) (<HOLDING>); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869

    ### Response:
    holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “two to three times every single week,” every week for one year. Thus, appellant purchased, and personally possessed upon its receipt, at least a quarter of a kilogram of crack each week, which amounts to at least 13 kilograms of crack for the year. It is well settled that the possession of drugs in a quantity “greater than the supply ordinarily possessed by a narcotics user for his personal use, is a circumstance which, standing alone, may be sufficient to support a finding of intent to distribute.” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973). Appellant’s possession of 13 kilograms of crack over the course of a year is certainly sufficient to infer he intended to distribute it. See, e.g., Gregory v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 100, 110, 468 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, when viewed in the light most

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that the accused possessed 37 grams of crack was sufficient to prove he had the intent to distribute it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1. Gagik Kyurkchyan (Petitioner), and derivatively, Tatevik Kyurkchyan and Arevik Truni raised his challenge to the Immi gration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility determination and denial of his Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim in his brief to the BIA, thereby exhausting these issues. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir.2004). 2. The IJ’s finding that Petitioner was not credible with regard to his political activities is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of his asylum claim. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2004) (denying reliéf where petitioner was unable to provide details of his political activities); see also Valderrama v. INS, 260 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). As long as one of the identified grounds

    ### Response:
    recognizing that discrepancy regarding political activities went to the heart of petitioners claims where those activities formed the basis of the persecution claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the arbitration provision. See D. Wilson Constr., 196 S.W.3d at 781; Teal Constr., 46 S.W.3d at 420. Also contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, there is no requirement that the incorporated document containing the arbitration clause must necessarily be attached to the contract for the clause to be enforceable. We recognize that neither court in the above-cited eases specifically addressed that question. See D. Wilson Constr., 196 S.W.3d at 781; Teal Constr., 46 S.W.3d at 420. However, the absence of any such discussion suggests that whether the document was attached was not dispositive. See D. Wilson Constr., 196 S.W.3d at 781; Teal Constr., 46 S.W.3d at 420; see also In re Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 196 S.W.3d 311, 319 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Significantly, the incorporated A201- • 1997

    ### Response:
    recognizing that incorporated document containing arbitration clause is not necessarily required to be attached to the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not be approved. This being the case, he was like a defendant who is summoned by process of court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal.” (citing Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 495, 53 S.Ct. 721, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1933))). It would make little sense to require the trial court to invite and consider objections from shareholders, but then prevent objecting shareholders from appealing the trial court’s decision to deny their objections and approve the settlement. Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 67. Moreover, requiring an objector to intervene in the litigation in order to appeal the trial court’s denial of his objection would create “more work for all involved with no corresponding benefit.” City of San Benito, 109 S.W.3d at 755; see also Devlin, 536 U.S. at 8, 122 S.Ct. 2005 (<HOLDING>). The defendants themselves recognized as much

    ### Response:
    recognizing that requiring an objector to intervene in a class action in order to appeal the approval of a settlement would only add an additional layer of complexity before the appeal of the settlement approval may finally be heard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    all of which would render uneconomical an individual suit by a single disgruntled customer. As one treatise states: “[I]ndividual actions or a test case may be an inferior alternative to the class action when the economics of the situation make it impossible for the aggrieved members to vindicate their rights by separate actions.” 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1778 (Supp.1983). See Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 225 [294 A.2d 7]. In a case in which the proofs regarding the defendant’s conduct will be identical whether or not a class action is certified, and the maintenance of a test case may be prohibitively expensive for an individual consumer, the class action emerges as the superior method of adjudication. See Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, the common issues in Katz [v.

    ### Response:
    holding class action superior where individual claims do not warrant separate suits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    According to the Supreme Court, an intervenor’s interest must be one that is “significantly protectable.” Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531, 91 S.Ct. 534, 542, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971). In defining the contours of a “significantly protectable” legal interest under Rule 24(a)(2), we have held that, ‘“the interest must be a legal interest as distinguished from interests of a general and indefinite character.’ * * * The applicant must demonstrate that there is a tangible threat to a legally cognizable interest to have the right to intervene.” Harris, 820 F.2d at 601 (citations omitted). This interest .is recognized as one belonging to or being owned by the proposed intervenor. United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1185 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting New Orleans P .1980) (<HOLDING>); Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131

    ### Response:
    holding that two attorneys who claimed an interest in the same funds sought by the united states in a suit against a congressman were entitled to intervene whether their claim sounded in contract or tort in law or equity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?” See Haddle, 525 U.S. at 125, 119 S.Ct. 489. The Supreme Court ruled only on that issue. See Haddle, 525 U.S. at 126, 119 S.Ct. 489. The Eleventh Circuit had already previously rejected the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not before the Supreme Court, it would be a mistake to draw any inference from the Court’s silence on the issue. See United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir.1981); National Electrical Contractors Association v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 632 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the antitrust context. See Nelson, 200 F.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit extended the doctrine to

    ### Response:
    holding a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and agents to restrain trade in its own products
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (“Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.”). It noted our decision in Wyner that the SEHO does not have jurisdiction to enforce its own orders but that 'California’s CRP provides an avenue to enforce those decisions. The district court assumed “technically correct,” however, the Porters’ argument that Wyner did not make resort to the CRP obligatory but rather held only “that issues of non-compliance with an SEHO order may be brought before the [CRP].” Porter, 123 F.Supp.2d at 1196 (emphasis in original). Th IDEA establishes “elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards,” evidencing that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures ... as it did upon the measurement of C.1985) (<HOLDING>). Requiring exhaustion of California’s CRP to

    ### Response:
    holding that state may not subject children and their parents to an additional step not required by the eha
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Red Sox” while the Bon Jovi song is about a town and “without the video, there would be no connection to baseball.” In an effort to show lyrical similarity, plaintiff relies on “reports” from Jonathan Yasuda (“the Yasuda Report”), a law student with an undergraduate degree in music, and Mark Ferraguto (“the Ferraguto Report”), a musicology Ph.D. candidate. Both reports identify purported similari ties between the structure and rhyme scheme of the Steele Song and the Bon Jovi Song. Even assuming those individuals are qualified to render opinions on the subject, their conclusions do not create a genuine issue of material fact concerning substantial similarity. A common rhyme scheme or structure does not qualify as original expression protectable under federal copyright law. See id. at 23 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, considered as a whole,

    ### Response:
    holding that a particular harmonic progression is a stereotypical building block of musical composition which lacks originality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    namely, the power to rescue a person even against his will in life-threatening circumstances. We do not, however, accept that the phrase “any and all” gives the Coast Guard carte blanche authority to engage in forcible evacuations in less than life-threatening emergencies. A forcible evacuation from a private vessel constitutes a seizure of the person. Under the circumstances, the body of case law developed under the “emergency aid” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement both lends support for evacuation authority and cabins it. That exception requires an objectively reasonable belief by safety officers that a true emergency exists and there is an immediate need for assistance or aid. See, e.g., McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., Inc. 77 F.3d- 540, 545 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that exigent circumstances exceptions by their nature turn upon the objective reasonableness of ad hoc factspecific assessments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indeed, it says nothing whatever about judicial power.” Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. at 606 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, a court may choose between granting injunc-tive relief favoring the status quo under section 1415(j) (amending section 1415(e)(3)(A)) or changing a child's placement and the financial responsibility for such a placement under section 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (amending section 1415(e)(2)), See Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 695 F.2d 949, 955 n. 5 (5th Cir.1983) (stating that the stay put provision “does not place a statutory bar to the district court’s grant of equitable relief that may result in a change of funding of the child’s placement, or a modification of the placement”); Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 918 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). C. Hearing Officer’s Authority In this case,

    ### Response:
    holding that the stay put provision establishes a strong preference but not a statutory duty for maintenance of the status quo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California state prisoner Falao Toalepai appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 motion as untimely. Toalepai seeks to challenge his jury trial conviction for one count of first degree murder with a deadly weapon in violation of Cal. Pen.Code §§ 187 and 12022(b). We do not reach the merits of Toalepai’s appeal because we hold that we lack appellate jurisdiction. A timely filed notice of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). Although ignored by the parties, we are “required to consider the timeliness of the appeal.” Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 457 (9th Cir.1983); see also Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). On February 16, 2000, the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court may not construe an untimely notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such indices as the clerks had prepared were made accessible to the public. By modern times the record keeping practices of the clerks offices had, with predictable idiosyncratic exceptions, crystallized into a general pattern for closed criminal cases. Closed criminal case files were referenced in docket sheets; the docket numbers for these cases were assigned in various inconsistent and changing ways over the years but were largely in chronological order; the docket sheets for the cases were gathered together in chronological order in docket books.... All of the relevant documents ... were open to the public. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F.Supp. 89, 92-93 (D.Mass.1993). This basic pattern was characteristic of many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Werfel, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (<HOLDING>); Carley v. Lee, 58 Ariz. 268, 119 P.2d 236,

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of a case involving the availability for public inspection of criminal docket books that files in the possession of the clerk of the criminal court of the city of new york are public records which may be fully examined by any person unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the court or by the terms of a statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    clear precisely what they mean and the facts of a particular case often prove to be crucial. Indeed, because of today’s environment of global travel, job mobility, and multiple residences, the meaning of the phrase has been blurred even further. The majority of cases interpreting the words in the context of determining the validity of service of process appear to have focused on their literal meaning.” 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1096 (3d ed.2002). Other courts have addressed the phrase “usual place of abode” in the context of service of process. A person can have more than one “usual place of abode,” provided that each contains sufficient indicia of permanence. National Dev. Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 980 F.2d 258 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, courts look at the facts of each

    ### Response:
    holding that one of several houses throughout the world among which the defendant divided his time constituted a dwelling house or usual place of abode for purpose of service of process regardless of the facts that it was not the defendants principal domicile and that he spent comparatively little time there
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argue that the harassment that they suffered when younger and the threats to their lives from Mr. Sibuea’s mother’s family constitute past persecution. We agree with the IJ that these incidents do not rise to the level of persecution. “Although persecution is not defined in the INA, we have held that a finding of persecution requires the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive and must entail more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty.” [Wiransane, 366 F.3d at 893] (internal quotation omitted). Compare Tulengkey, 425 F.3d at 1281 (finding no past persecution where alien was robbed, fondled, and suffered a minor head injury); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 704-05, 708 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); and Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding no past persecution where alien had twice been detained for twoday periods during which he was beaten and interrogated whose parents home had been searched whose work locker had been repeatedly broken into and who had been assigned poor work tasks denied bonuses and conscripted into the army where he was constantly harassed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the late charge specified in the contract, but rather that the charge should be deemed unenforceable because “it was grossly disproportionate to any damages that may be sustained by the late payment of any cable bill.” Id. at *1. Wells Fargo contends that, as in Hall and Sanchez, there is no dispute in the instant case that the Loan Agreement contained an enforceable obligation that Sundance pay a prepayment premium and that the parties simply disagree as to the calculation of that prepayment. Sundance, however, cites a series of cases for the proposition that Section 725.04 clearly applies to claims to recover overpayments that were unenforceable based on the parties’ contract. See, e.g., Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp., 249 F.Supp.2d 703, 710-12 (D.Md.2003) (<HOLDING>); Saglio v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that section 72504 barred application of voluntary payment defense to payment of excessive commissions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinion, UMMC is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because plaintiffs have failed to come forward with proof to demonstrate that defendant’s articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretext for gender discrimination. Clearly plaintiffs can satisfy the first two elements of their prima facie case: they are female and, having been employed by UMMC as cytotechnologists for a number of years during which they received favorable evaluations, obviously were qualified for their positions. Moreover, contrary to UMMC’s urging, plaintiffs have alleged and offered proof that they suffered an adverse employment action, namely, a denial of the opportunity for overtime and accompanying compensation. See Johnson v. Manpower Prof'l Servs., Inc., 442 Fed.Appx. 977, 982 (5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 292

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of overtime pay is an adverse employment action because it relates to  compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    24 . Webb, 24 P. at 618. 25 . Id.; see also Chilton v. Union Pac. Ry., 8 Utah 47, 29 P. 963, 964 (Terr.1892) (""Human capacity can make but vague and indefinite estimates of [the] value in dollars and cents [of the loss of the society, the advice, the kindness, and good treatment of a husband and father], but justice demands that it shall be done.""); Brack's Law Dic. tionary 315 (2d ed.1910) (defining ""[plecuniary damages"" as damages ""[sluch as can be estimated in and compensated by money; not merely the loss of money or salable property or rights, but all such loss, deprivation or injury as can be the subject of calculation and of recompense in money""). 26 . Webb, 24 P. at 618. 27 . Id. 28 , Pool v. S. Pac. RR., 7 Utah 303, 26 P. 654, 656 (Terr.1891). 29 . See Webb, 24 P. at 618 (<HOLDING>); see also Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 107

    ### Response:
    recognizing that survivors may recover for the loss of expected services even if the deceased was under no legal or moral obligation to render service or support but the circumstances shown render it probable it would have been rendered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a prima facie ADEA claim can no longer stand. Since Lyon was decided, the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have each recognized a prima facie ADEA violation in analogous situations. See Jankovitz v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 421 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir.2005) (stating that a retirement plan is “discriminatory on its face” because “it is undisputed that an employee is ineligible for early retirement benefits [under the plan] if he or she is over the age of 65”); Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.2004) (finding prima facie case of age discrimination under ADEA when age “is the effective trigger for eligibility” for retirement policy); Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1111, 120 S.Ct. 930,

    ### Response:
    recognizing prima facie disparatetreatment claim when it is unquestionable that the employees would have received greater disability retirement benefits but for their older ages at hire
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    commercial emails from those accounts. Depending on the co 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the “evil-meaning mind” requirement with respect to that element of the crime). Although Defendants ask the Court to consider online deception an innocent peccadillo or even a positive good, that is not the view of this statute, which is particularly aimed at deception. Nor is it appropriate for reasons of policy. Deception, even where it is not criminal, is neither innocent nor worthy of any constitutional protection — particularly in the commercial context. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) (<HOLDING>). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433

    ### Response:
    holding that trickery or deceit was one factor rendering a civil defendants conduct more reprehensible and supporting an award of punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    word “outweigh” in the statutory definition of “substantial evidence” refers to the clear and convincing burden of proof, and not the preponderance of the evidence standard because, only by adopting this conclusion can the Law protect a person’s fundamental right to his or her reputation. If I were to conclude that the General Assembly intended for the word “outweigh,” as used in the Law, to refer to the lowest possible burden of proof, then I also would have to conclude that the General Assembly intended to deprive accused persons of a fundamental right without due process. As explained, I must presume that the legislature’s intent was otherwise because, quite simply, where fundamental rights are involved, the lowest burden of proof does not suffice to afford due process. Cf. Santosky (<HOLDING>). Thus, to the extent that DPW applied a lesser

    ### Response:
    holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions that will interfere with a debtor’s bankruptcy case. See In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 601 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (noting that “a temporary stay prohibiting a creditor’s suit against a nondebtor ... may be permissible”). We have repeatedly emphasized, however, that a bankruptcy court may not exercise its “broad equitable powers” under § 105(a) “ ‘in a manner that is inconsistent with the other, more specific provisions of the [Bankruptcy] Code.’ ” In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099, 1103 n. 4 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 601). In other words, a bankruptcy court’s exercise of its authority under § 105(a) may not contravene or disregard the plain language of a statute. See, e.g., In re Alderete, 412 F.3d at 1207 (<HOLDING>); In re Tuttle, 291 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that the bankruptcy court lacked the power under  105a to grant the partial discharge of student loan debt when the debtor did not show undue hardship as required by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    status as a charter county meant Section 260.247 did not apply to the County, and 2) failure to join indispensable parties. Both parties filed memoranda of law, and the trial court entered a judgment granting the County’s motion to dismiss on 25 June 2008. In that judgment, the court analyzed whether Section 260.247 applied to the County’s actions, determined it did not, and held that Haulers had failed to state a claim. Haulers appeal. Jurisdiction Writ of Mandamus The parties dispute the threshold question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of Haulers’ petition for a writ of mandamus. The general rule is that no appeal lies from the dismissal or the denial of a petition for writ of mandamus. See Harkins v. Mitchell, 911 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Mo.App. E.D.1995) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Ashby Road Partners, LLC v.

    ### Response:
    holding no appeal permitted from dismissal of writ petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Iowa R.Civ.P. 88(d), promulgated long after McKeown, a jurisdictional defense is not waived simply because it was omitted in a pre-answer motion to dismiss. The federal rule, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), is to the same effect. Under this rule, either the court or any party may raise an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time, and the Eleventh Amendment is regarded, at least for this purpose, as going to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Raper v. State of Iowa, 940 F.Supp. 1421, 1426 (S.D.Iowa 1996), aff'd, 115 F.3d 623 (8th Cir.1997). In general, “a state official may waive the state’s immunity only where specifically authorized to do so by that state’s constitution, statutes, or decisions.” Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska v. State of Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). See State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 364

    ### Response:
    holding that the conduct of an assistant attorney general of nebraska in answering a complaint and filing a counterclaim did not amount to waiver of the eleventh amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facts. Emanuel, 412 So.2d at 1189. ¶ 62. The State stresses that the record reflects that a competency hearing was held on April 3, 1998. Dr. Lott testified that he had interviewed Snow on September 12, and September 21, 1997 and was of the opinion that Snow was competent to stand trial. Dr. Lott also stated that, in addition to the ability to confer with his attorneys, Snow had a working knowledge of the legal process and exhibited “street savvy.” He testified that Snow understood that he faced charges of capital murder and escape and also understood how the trial would work. Finally, Snow told Dr. Lott that he trusted and could work with his attorneys. ¶ 63. The State submits that Snow did not in any way refute the finding by Dr. Lott. See generally Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 660 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the State urges that in finding

    ### Response:
    holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are supposed to have, we find the Ninth Circuit’s more recent decision- in Grotemeyer v. Hickman more convincing. Grotemeyer, 393 F.3d 871. Similar to the case at hand, the Grotemeyer concluded that even a juror’s specialized professional training is not beyond the bounds of permissible personal experience. Id. at 878, 880. Specifically, the court held that the opinions of a jury foreman, who was a physician, that defendant was mentally ill and would receive treatment as part of a sentence was not extraneous information. See also Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1331 (11th Cir.2002) (nursing student juror’s statements explaining scientific tests conducted' on hair and blood samples at issue in murder case not extraneous); Cocconi v. Pierre Hotel, 146 F.Supp.2d 427, 432 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (<HOLDING>). Juror No. 6’s conduct did not amount to the

    ### Response:
    holding it was not improper for corporate travel consultant to convey her occupational knowledge of the new york hotel industry to fellow jurors because such information concerns the general reputations of wellknown public places and in any event was not prejudicial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a criminal investigation into the escape.” Id. These allegedly defamatory remarks arose out of Director Brown’s handling of the plaintiffs’ discipline following an internal investigation designating them responsible (in part) for the jail break. “A supervisor’s explanation of his handling of adverse employment actions, even if made outside the formal process, falls within the scope of the CMPA because the explanation relates to a ‘personnel issue.’ ” Sanders, 16 F.Supp.2d at 15 (discussing and quoting Stockard v. Moss, 706 A.2d 561, 565 (D.C.1997)). They fall strictly within the employment adverse action context contemplated by the CMPA. The latter’s remedies are, therefore, exclusive. See Sanders v. Dist. of Columbia, 16 F.Supp.2d 10, 12-15 (D.D.C.1998); Johnson, 368 F.Supp.2d at 47 (<HOLDING>). The court, therefore, concludes that

    ### Response:
    holding that statements to the washington post seeking to explain and justify the removal of law enforcement officers by explaining the administrations belief that those officers negligence was responsible for the detainee escapes fell within the scope of the cmpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to come to the common-sense conclusion that when someone has both drugs and a firearm on their person, the gun is present to further drug trafficking. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED. * Lomax also appeals the district court’s enhancement of his sentence under the armed career criminal provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), claiming that the application of § 924(e) violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because his prior convictions were not alleged in his indictment. Lomax's contention is without merit because Apprendi expressly excluded prior convictions from its holding. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; see also, e.g., United States v. Skidmore, 254 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir.2001)

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi does not affect enhanced sentence under  924e and citing cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violate the Due Process Clause is further bolstered by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972), and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 134 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1996). In Jackson, the Court approved of the detention of a criminal defendant deemed incompetent, but limited that detention to “the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” 406 U.S. at 738. In Medina, the Court held that a state may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, impose on the defendant the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a lack of competency. 505 U.S. at 439, 450-51; cf. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 363 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Supreme Court has, at least

    ### Response:
    holding that the due process clause prohibits states from requiring defendants to prove their incompetency by clear and convincing evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458 (3rd Cir.1989). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-350, 352-353, 95 S.Ct. 449, 452-453, 454-455, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.) (emphasizing that “[w]hile the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is ‘private,’ on the one hand, or ‘state action,’ on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer”; and explaining that state action is involved in cases consisting of “the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State” or “traditionally associated with sovereignty”); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE Case and the Public-Private Penumbra 18 (1968) (<HOLDING>). History illuminates that a bank setoff is at

    ### Response:
    recognizing that unrestrained private action selfhelp repossession has resulted in general and serious denial of values constitutional due process was meant to protect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officer saw the weapon as soon as he took a step or two into the kitchen. But the court did not say that expressly, and neither did the testimony. All that Mara-diaga said was that Moon found the gun “on top of the refrigerator,” App. 102; Moon did not himself testify. Moreover, although there was evidence that the apartment was small and that the kitchen was “adjacent” to the dining room, there were no findings or testimony regarding the details of the apartment’s layout: we do not know how far it was from the dining room table to the kitchen’s threshold or how far it was from that threshold to the refrigerator. Nor do we know whether the path to either location was direct or obstructed. Nor — because we do not know how, or how well, s v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 839-40 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Compare United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that inevitability was not established by an officers testimony that if she had not mistakenly thought that the defendants bag had been abandoned she would have used her narcotics dog to sniff the bag and establish probable cause for a warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consent is obtained during custody, see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 240, n. 29, 93 S.Ct. 2041, ‘custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate ... coerced ... consent to search.’ ” Barnett, 989 F.2d at 555 (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). Here, Agent Blanco’s testimony contradicted Merced-Morales’ allegation of being coerced and held at gunpoint. The trial court observed both witnesses and determined that Agent Blanco’s testimony was more credible. Where, as here, “there are two competing interpretations of the evidence, the district court’s choice of one of them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Cruz Jiménez, 894 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 974 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding trial judges denial of a suppression motion is entitled to considerable deference because he had opportunity to hear testimony observe witness demeanor and evaluate facts first hand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over her. On the other hand, consent to jurisdiction sometimes occurs unwillingly or even inadvertently. As the Court wrote in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, “[a] variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent e e as they may appear. We have held that a party who files a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) does not thereby waive any jurisdictional defenses he has previously or concurrently asserted, Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir.1967), nor has a party who files a permissive counterclaim under Rule 13(b) when objection to “personal jurisdiction ... [is] asserted in the same pleading.” Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1330 n. 1 (9th Cir.1984); cf. Teyseer Cement Co. v. Halla Mar. Corp., 794 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In general, we have held that a party has

    ### Response:
    holding there was no consent to in personam jurisdiction where the defendants counterclaim followed a restricted appearance in a quasi in rem admiralty proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    576 Pa. at 661, 841 A.2d at 1010. But the consequences of imposing Appellant’s duty on the public— including customers laundering bar rags in a public laundromat — based on the instant record, is less clear. Appellant has not referred us to anything in the record substantiating its bald claim that the public consequences are “modest.” Cf. Thierfelder, 617 Pa. at 337-38, 52 A.3d at 1277; Althaus, 562 Pa. at 555, 756 A.2d at 1170. We are, therefore, reluctant to render a social policy judgment and impose a Commonwealth-wide duty based solely on Appellant’s unsupported characterization of the burden on the public. Cf. Seebold, 618 Pa. at 653, 57 A.3d at 1245. We are in accord with the trial court’s holding. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10; see also Seebold, 618 Pa. at 650, 57 A.3d at 1243 (<HOLDING>). At best, without more, this factor does not

    ### Response:
    recognizing de novo standard of review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Rule 59. Cf. Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 164, 579 P.2d at 1387 (“We do not believe Rule 59(m) was intended to limit the discretion of a judge to order a new trial,”); see also Bilby, 87 Ariz. at 374, 351 P.2d 647 (concluding that failure to comply with Rule 59(m) does not require that the new trial motion be denied with prejudice and that the verdict and judgment be reinstated because “[s]uch a result is entirely unwarranted by the terms and purpose of the Rule”). Second, we reject the notion that § 12-613’s “fair and just” damages provision mandates greater deference to juries in wrongful death cases than in personal injury actions. The standard for remittitur is the same in wrongful death and personal injury cases. See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 409 P.2d 714 (1966) (<HOLDING>); cf. Begay v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 505,

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of common law assault, to which consent is a defense,” citing Guarro, 237 F.2d at 581. Appellant’s argument is misguided as Guarro involved a non-violent sexual touching, which, as already discussed, is not analogous to an assault stemming from a street fight in which one of the participants suffered significant bodily harm. Appellant cites no other case in which consent was held to be a viable defen in original). 6 . People v. Jovanovic, 263 A.D.2d 182, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 168 n. 5 (1999) (""[A]s a matter of public policy, a person cannot avoid criminal responsibility for an assault [(sadomasochistic activity) ] that causes injury or carries a risk of serious harm, even if the victim asked for or consented to the act.”); State v. Fransua, 85 N.M. 173, 510 P.2d 106, 107 (Ct.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Even if Hickman were the applicable law,

    ### Response:
    holding that consent is not a defense to the crime of aggravated battery even though the defendant alleged that the victim  procured the weapon and invited the defendant to shoot him because the public has a stronger and overriding interest in preventing and prohibiting such acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    post facto violation under the United States Constitution. Id. at 1241. The Superior Court also determined that Appellant was not entitled to withdraw his plea even though he and the trial court may have been under a mistaken impression as to the length of Appellant’s registration obligation. The court based its determination on the conclusion that the registration requirements of Megan’s Law are a collateral as opposed to a direct consequence of the criminal conviction. The court noted that this Court has consistently held that a defendant’s lack of knowledge of collateral consequences to the entry of a guilty plea does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary. Commonwealth v. Leidig, 850 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa.Super.2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A.2d 92 (1989) (<HOLDING>); and Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639

    ### Response:
    holding that a plea was valid even though the defendant had not been informed that as a foreign national who had immigrated to this country he would face deportation as a result of the plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in light of the disclosed documents and any prejudice resulting from Defendant’s failure to do so is not attributable to the government’s violation of the principles set forth in Brady. See United States v. Delgado, 350 F.3d 520 (6th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 538 (6th Cir.2000)). Defendant’s argument that the belated disclosure of the documents prejudiced the entire defense, including voir dire and the opening statement is meritless. First, Defendant presents his argument on this issue in a perfunctory manner, providing no explanation of how the disclosed material would have altered his defense. Second, the pertinent information in the disclosed documents was, for the most part, already available to Defendant. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (<HOLDING>). Defendant was already aware that the

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no brady violation unless a reasonable probability exists that the disclosed evidence would have altered the result of trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sound and vital canon ... that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes ... are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.” Bryan, 426 U.S. at 391, 392 (citations omitted). Thus, any statutory ambiguity as to whether the State can enforce a warrant against the Tribe should be read to protect Indian sovereignty. Reading the plain language of the statute and applying long-established canons of construction relevant to Indian law cases, the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted Public Law 280 to extend jurisdiction to individual Indians and not to Indian tribes. See Id. at 389, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (interpreting Public Law 280 and observing that “the 1, 211-12, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Defendants assert that because tribes are no

    ### Response:
    holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to set aside the jury’s verdict. In her Motion for Sanctions. Hylind claims Xerox committed various discovery violations over the life of the case. Many of these claims appear to have been previously raised and rejected. See September 30, 2004 Order [Paper No. 115]; December 5, 2006 Order [Paper No. 200], They are rejected here again. To the extent this motion raises new claims, they are denied as untimely. See Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that while sanctions rule “does not establish any time limits within which a motion for sanctions must be filed, ... unreasonable delay may render such a motion untimely,” and denying post-trial motion for sanctions based on discovery violations); Mercy v. County of Suffolk, New York, 748 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). VI. Conclusion Summing up: Plaintiffs Motion

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions should be promptly made thereby allowing the judge to rule on the matter when it is still fresh in his mind and that the motion should normally be deemed waived if it is not made prior to trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employees. Because the 133$ percent schedule would also prevent a plan from ever increasing benefits for all employees by more than one-third of the value of the original benefits, the schedule provides that “any amendment to the plan which is in effect for the current year shall be treated as in effect for all other plan years” and that “any change in an accrual rate which does not apply to any individual who is or could be a participant in the current year shall be disregarded.” Id. Thus, in determining whether a new benefit formula violates the 133$ percent rule, one does not compare the new formula with the old formula; rather, the backload-ing question must be answered by considering the new formula on a stand-alone basis. See Langman v. Laub, 328 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiffs’ anti-backloading claim

    ### Response:
    holding that 133 percent test is irrelevant to acrosstheboard increases in benefit rates made at some future time on behalf of all current employees regardless of period of service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and his request for adjustment of status, we are reluctant to “rule on the merits of an issue that the BIA has not itself addressed.” Ray, 439 F.3d at 591. To remedy an otherwise intractable injustice, we grant Granados-Oseguera’s petition for review, and remand this case to the BIA to reconsider Granados-Osegu-era’s motion to reopen in light of his IAC claim. PETITION GRANTED, in part; DISMISSED, in part; DENIED, in part. 1 . Granados-Oseguera also challenges the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision without opinion and the IJ’s hardship determination. We are without jurisdiction to consider either of these issues as Petitioner did not petition for review within 30 days of the BIA’s affir-mance. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); see Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we have upheld the BIA's

    ### Response:
    holding that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the underlying final order upon petition for review of a motion to reopen where the petitioner did not earlier seek review of that underlying final order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the district court erred in doing so. 2 . Ms. Williams requested this court to accommodate her asserted difficulties with written and verbal communications by accepting her district court briefs as her appellate brief. By an order dated September 26, 2005, this court granted the request in part. Accordingly, we have considered those portions of Ms. Williams’ district court briefs she incorporated by reference in her appellate briefs. 3 . The district court also noted that Ms. Williams sought to rely on her own “medical opinion of why her disc disease is disabling.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 37, at 21; see also id. at 23 (rejecting Ms. Williams' attempt ""to argue that her own medical opinions of the meaning of this MRI are more persuasive than Dr. Jatana’s opinions of this MRI”); id. at 24 (<HOLDING>). Ms. Williams has not argued on appeal that

    ### Response:
    holding alj properly relied on treating physicians wellsupported opinion especially when the contradictory evidence is plaintiffs own medical opinions about her condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n. 5, 116 S.Ct. 873, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996) (Stevens, J.)(characterizing adequacy of representation as a constitutional requirement); Lile v. Simmons, 143 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1277 (D.Kan.2001) (Vratil, J.)(“Due process requires that the Court ‘stringently’ apply the competent representation requirement because class members are bound by the judgment (unless they opt out), even though they may not actually be aware of the proceedings.”). “The requirement of fair and adequate representation is perhaps the most important of the criteria for class certification set forth in Rule 23(a).... ” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 455 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1294 (D.N.M.2006) (Armijo, J.). See Cobb v. Avon Prods., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 652, 6 . 574, 579 (W.D.Va.1999) (Michael, J.)(<HOLDING>). On the other hand, “only a conflict that goes

    ### Response:
    holding that a class of all high school female athletes could not be certified  even if the alleged conduct of the defendant school system was discriminatory  when some female athletes did not share the same goals or interests as the named female plaintiffs because those unnamed female athletes were satisfied with andor benefitted from the alleged discriminatory treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    largely due to the needs of codefendants, rather than any slothfulness on the government’s part. That is an important integer in the speedy trial calculus. Id. at 22. To top things off, Rodríguez-Matos has shown no prejudice to her ability to present her defense. We therefore hold that her Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights were not abridged. E. Sentencing. The appellants broach a series of challenges to their sentences. As we must remand the case for resentencing on count 4, see supra Part III(B), we do not address any sentencing arguments specific to that count. 1. Booker. The appellants’ most pervasive sentencing theme posits that resen-tencing is required in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (<HOLDING>). As none of the appellants preserved the issue

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional the mandatory application of the federal sentencing guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The statute further requires that the diagnosis of psychological injury “must be made by a psychologist, or psychiatrist duly licensed to practice in the jurisdiction in which treatment is rendered____” I.C. § 72-451(5). Idaho Code § 72-714 governs hearings in the Industrial Commission. Sub-seetion (3) provides that “[t]he commission, or member thereof, or a hearing officer, referee or examiner, to whom the matter has been assigned, shall make such inquiries and investigations as may be deemed necessary.” I.C. § 72-714(3). This Court has interpreted this statute as permitting the Commission to demand additional evidence if it finds that satisfactory evidence on a question of material fact is lacking. See, e.g., Hartman v. Double L Mfg., 141 Idaho 456, 458, 111 P.3d 141, 143 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Lay v. Idaho State Seh. & Colony, 64 Idaho

    ### Response:
    holding that statute grants the commission the authority to request that the parties present adequate evidence  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is akin to the private interests in Mitchell and Fuentes. In those cases, a creditor alleged an interest in the delinquent debtor’s property and wished to freeze that property before the parties’ rights could be adjudicated. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601-02, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 1897, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69-70, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1988-89, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). The only difference here is that the Government, rather than a private creditor, asserts the interest. In both Mitchell and Fuentes, the Court noted that, even though the status of the property was contested, the defendant retained an interest, and due process therefore required a prompt hearing on the propriety of the deprivation. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 606-07, 94 S.Ct. at 1899-1900 (<HOLDING>); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81-82, 92 S.Ct. at

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute entitling the defendant to an immediate hearing following issuance of a writ of sequestration effected a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “narrowly tailored” when it does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). As a threshold matter, Appellants do not appear to dispute the District’s substantial interest in promoting the tourism industry and economy. The District attracts approximately fifteen million visitors each year and supports more than 66,000 tourism-related, full-time jobs, which generate some $2.6 billion in wages. See Edwards, 765 F.Supp.2d at 18. Undoubtedly, promoting a major industry that contributes to the economic vitality of the District is a substantial government interest. See Smith v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 177 F.3d 954, 955-56 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City &

    ### Response:
    recognizing floridas substantial interest in promoting tourism  one of floridas most important economic industries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hereafter made or executed in which the words “trustee” or “as trustee” are added to the name of the grantee, and in which no beneficiaries are named, the nature and purposés 62) (recognizing that while all of the tract was in common ownership of a single owner, no easement could arise in favor of one lot in tract over another lot); Hidalgo County Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. 16 v. Hippchen, 233 F.2d 712 (C.A.5 Tex. 1956),(recognizing that for an easement to exist the dominant and servient estates must be held by different owners); Marshall v. Callahan, 241 Mo.App. 336, 229 S.W.2d 730 (1950) (recognizing that to acquire an easement there must be a dominant and a servient estate and they must not be lodged in the same person); Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 59 N.E.2d 712 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Caswell, 1 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that where there is common ownership of two parcels there could be noeasement in favor of one lot operating as a burden to the other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defense of the suit against him. However, Rule 15.03 requires more than simply showing that the potential new defendant had been made sufficiently aware of the commencement of the action. “The second requirement is that each potential new party must have known that but for a misnomer or mistake concerning his or her identity, the action would have been brought against him or her.” Rainey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 821 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) (citing Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tenn.1986)). “A ‘mistake’ within the meaning of this rule does not exist merely because a party who may be hable for conduct alleged in the original complaint was omitted as a party defendant.” Smith, 776 S.W.2d at 109; see also Lease, 722 S.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). It is the plaintiff that has the burden of

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to add her husband as a defendant did not relate back because her failure to sue her husband was not due to misnomer or mistake involving the identity of the proper party but because the law at the time of the complaint did not allow one spouse to sue another in tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any sort of overall check on the garnett machine.”). Even if InsulVail owed Charter a tort duty to install the insulation so as not to isolate the wet sprinkler system from heat, as we explained previously, Mid-Century has failed to show in the appellate record any breach of that duty caused the damage here. b. Duty to report or replace preexisting insulation that had fallen InsulVail did not have a duty to report or replace preexisting insulation that had fallen. Failure to report or replace amounts to nonfeasance. Courts have been reluctant to impose liability in cases of nonfeasance. See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo.1987) (en banc). No special relationship exists between InsulVail and Charter that would give rise to a duty. See Lewis, 25 P.3d at 1256 (<HOLDING>). Further, the contract between Charter and

    ### Response:
    holding a plumbercustomer relationship is not special for nonfeasance duty purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to all of the Generic Manufacturers. In order for this theory to work, we would have to interpret the complaint as alleging: (1) the plaintiff ingested every single generic version of propoxyphene available, (2) every single generic version of propoxyphene contributed to the plaintiffs injuries, and (3) points (1) and (2) are true with respect to each of the plaintiffs in this case. Common sense suggests that Plaintiffs never meant to allege this scenario. Beyond the complaints’ failure to identify the responsible defendant, it falls short for another reason. Under Iqbal, “eonclu-sory statements” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” do not insulate a complaint from a motion to dis ll Atlantic conspired with its competitors, see 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (<HOLDING>). For these reasons we affirm the district

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vezey, 171 P.3d at 1128-29)). 16 . Without specifying a time frame, Kenneth's evidence implies that much of the work he did to address the mold problem predated the separation. One of Maryna's friends testified that there was black mold up the walls of the bedroom when she regained possession of the house; he did not state that this was a recent development, though that could be implied from his testimony. 17 . See Fortson v. Fortson, 131 P.3d 451, 464 (Alaska 2006) (declining to reach issue of alleged error in superior court's classification of ftems as non-marital where any error was minor in relation to the entire estate at issue and probably had no ""appreciable effect on the ultimate determination of equitable distribution""); Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 376 (Alaska 1996) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681, 686

    ### Response:
    holding that although the superior court clearly erred in finding certain statements of the wife to be false there was enough other evidence bearing on her credibility that it was highly improbable that the superior court would have assessed her credibility more favorably but for the errors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between Gant and Edwards, compare supra n ght of the defense to exercise peremptory challenges, which ordinarily is exercised by counsel, can require direct consultation with the defendant and something more than second hand descriptions of the prospective jurors' responses to questions during voir dire.”); cf. United States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (9th Cir.1994) (rejecting a Rule 43(a) challenge brought by a defendant who ""was absent from the peremptory challenge conference” on the ground that the defendant ""was present for the jury voir dire” and ""had the opportunity to discuss his misgivings with counsel during and immediately following voir dire, prior to exercising his peremptory challenges”). 35 . See, e.g., Cohen v. Senkowski, 290 F.3d 485, 490 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gayles, 1 F.3d 735, 738 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitutional right to be present is satisfied so long as the defendant is given an opportunity to register his opinions with counsel after juror questioning and is present when the exercise of strikes is given formal effect even if the defendant is not present when his lawyer actually exercises the peremptory challenges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the exclusion from evidence of the audio recordings in question -will hamstring, if not destroy, the State’s case. If the audio recordings are not admitted into evidence, the State will have to rely for its proof on the transcribed deposition of a codefendant who was murdered eight days after giving his deposition to Mr. Morgan’s attorney. The trial court has ruled that this deposition is admissible in evidence and that it may be read into the record at Mr. Morgan’s second trial. However, absent the audio recordings, the deposition testimony of the eodefendant will be substantially uncorroborated. Under these circumstances, we conclude that this is a case where certiora-ri review is “an apt remedy.” Pettis, 520 So.2d at 253; see also State v. Rolack, 104 So.3d 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). IV. DISCUSSION Partially inaudible or

    ### Response:
    holding that review by certiorari was available to remedy a trial court order that improperly struck two of the states witnesses as a sanction for the states failure to disclose the address of one of the witnesses in discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    landowner from taking advantage of § 4406(l)’s small lot exception to treat [76 Elm Street] separately from [84 Elm Street], For the purposes of development, therefore, the parcels had merged into one property subject to a 20,000 square foot minimum lot size requirement at the time Nowicki purchased them in 1996. Id. at 420-21, 819 A.2d at 680. Notwithstanding that conclusion, we remanded the case to the environmental court so that it . could consider, in the first instance, Nowicki’s argument that the right-of-way between 76 and 84 Elm Street effectively separated the parcels, preventing the merger that otherwise took place by operation of law in 1981. Id. at 426, 819 A.2d at 684; see Wilcox v. Vill. of Manchester Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 159 Vt. 193, 197, 616 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1992) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 4. The court took evidence on the issue and

    ### Response:
    holding that in some circumstances a rightofway because of location and function may separate two parcels so that they cannot be used as one lot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel and have new court-appointed counsel. Id. at 35-36. The appellate court found knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and also found that his choice was voluntary. Id. A clear choice between two alternative courses of action, however, does not always permit a defendant to make a voluntary decision. The Wilks court emphasized that ”[i]f a choice presented to a [defendant] is constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be voluntary.” Id. at 36. 87 . Cf. Birdwell, 10 S.W.3d at 78 (noting that assuming delay based on a defendant’s proceeding pro se ""could effectively insulate denials of self-representation from meaningful appellate review”). 88 . See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533-34. 89 . See In re Arnett, 804 F.2d 1200, 1203 (11th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>); Spencer v. Ault, 941 F.Supp. 832, 852 (N.D.

    ### Response:
    holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is ""not obligatory”); Orlando Food Corp., 140 F.3d at 1441 (stating that ""[r]esort to this aid to statutory construction [that use provisions are generally deemed more specific than eo nomine provisions] is not obligatory, however, as it is merely a 'convenient rule of thumb for resolving issues where the competing provisions are otherwise in balance.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Siemens Am., Inc., 68 C.C.P.A. 62, 653 F.2d 471, 478 n. 6 (Cust. & Pat.App.1981)). The general ""rule of thumb” has no application where — as here — one tariff provision (in effect) ""specifies a single article for proper classification” and the competing provision ""is a broad provision encompassing a variety of articles with specific and independent uses.” Len-Ron Mfg. Co., 334 F.3d at 1313 (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even assuming that it were

    ### Response:
    holding eo nomine tariff provision covering vanity cases to be more specific than tariff provision covering articles of a kind normally carried in the pocket or in the handbag
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have struggled with the question of whether a party who suffers damages due to defective work should be awarded the cost of repair or rather, whether damages should be calculated based on the diminution in value of the structure that resulted from the defective work. See Shell v. Schmidt, 164 Cal.App.2d 350, 360, 330 P.2d 817 (1958) (reviewing case law addressing when cost to repair, as opposed to diminution in value, is used as a measure of damage, and holding that burden was on defendant to establish that award of cost of repair was so economically wasteful as to warrant award of diminution in value). California courts generally hold that the appropriate measure of damages for construction contracts is cost of repair. See Kitchel v. Acree, 216 Cal.App.2d at 123, 30 Cal.Rptr. 714 (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Kvistad, 19 Cal.App.3d 836, 842, 97

    ### Response:
    holding that the measure of damages for breaching a building construction contract is ordinarily such sum as is required to make the building conform to the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cases. If the Debtors cannot do so, the Court will grant the Movants relief from the stay as to the Bowdon and Ocala Premises following a further hearing to be held in these cases on the basis that the Bowdon and Ocala Premises are not necessary for an effective reorganization. The Court will also exercise its discretion to condition the continuation of the automatic stay with regard to the Bowdon and Ocala Premises on the Debtors’ setting aside an amount sufficient to account for the likelihood that, regardless of what the State Court decides, the Debtors will owe to some entity administrative rent for the post-petition use of the Bowdon and Ocala Premises. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A); see also In re Greenfield Dry Cleaning & Laundry, Inc., 249 B.R. 634, 644-45 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 483 B.R. 424,

    ### Response:
    holding that licensor was entitled to administrative expense priority claim where debtor remained in possession postpetition of real property under a license agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indicate that the named owner of the certificate of deposit may have transferred it to a third party.” Id. Clearly, the principal reason the bank required Brier’s possession of the CD as a precondition to payment was to protect itself from claims asserted by potential third-party transferees of the CD. But “[n]o such protection would be necessary if the certificate were not * * * transferable.” Id. For this reason, we hold, the bank, by expressly incorporating the holder’s possession and endorsement as a precondition to payment, implicitly recognized that Brier’s CD was indeed “of a type” that was transferable in the ordinary course of business, notwithstanding the “nontransferable” legend. See General Electric Co. v. M & C Manufacturing, Inc., 283 Ark. 110, 671 S.W.2d 189, 190 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Citizens National Bank of Orlando v.

    ### Response:
    holding as matter of law that nontransferable cds were article 9 instruments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was pending. We are left with a situation in which the putatively excludable period quite obviously did not preclude the government from proceeding to file the indictment, raising the question whether the delay in doing so “resulted] from” the pendency of the certiorari petition. Whether the time period used in pursuing an interlocutory appeal is automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(E), even if the appeal did not actually cause any delay, is an open issue in this court, but just barely so. Applying parallel “delay resulting from” language, we have held that pretrial motions, excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F) of the STA, need not actually cause any delay for the time during which the motions are pending to be ex-cludable. See United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks and internal citations

    ### Response:
    holding that a pretrial motion triggers an automatic exclusion under  3161h1f even though no actual delay results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mentioned one doctor but not the other, and both doctors asserted that the report was “so deficient that it [did] not constitute an expert report.” Id. Though noting the report did not name one of the doctors, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals rejected the doctors’ argument and, citing Ogletree, held that it lacked jurisdiction over both interlocutory appeals because the order denying their motions to dismiss included an order granting an extension. Id. at 455. In Nexion Health at Oak Manor, Inc. v. Brewer, the healthcare defendant asserted that the plaintiffs expert report did not address causation and was not merely deficient but no report at all. 243 S.W.3d 848, 851 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2008) (opinion on rehearing), rev’d on other grounds, In re Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>); Tenet Hosp., Ltd. v. Gomez, 276 S.W.3d 9,

    ### Response:
    holding no jurisdiction when trial court granted extension even though appellants argued expert report was so woefully deficient on necessary elements so as to constitute no report and report was missing experts curriculum vitae
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court on March 1, 2016. While Plaintiffs/Appellants bided their time, the date of the election drew ever closer. T5 The Legislature has not provided any statutory timeframe for a pre-election constitutional challenge to legislative referendums, as it has done with initiative petitions in the form of 84 0.8. Supp. 2015 § 8(B) In fact, Title 34 makes no mention of constitutional challenges to legislative referendums at all. The same is not true of challenges to the ballot titles of legislative referendums, where 34 0.8. Supp. 2015 $ 10 specifically prohibits appeals concerning the ballot titles of constitutional and legislative enactments proposed by the legislature. T6 Regardless, this Court has previously stressed the importance of timeliness , 197 Okla. 291, 170 P.2d 208 (<HOLDING>). T8 The lengthy delay between the Governor's

    ### Response:
    holding concerning election matters that time is of the essence and that it was the duty of the petitioner to proceed with utmost diligence in asserting in a proper forum his claimed rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Please avoid this by making payment. Please send full payment.” Id. at 2. While the statutory validation language was highlighted at the bottom of the same page, the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, stating: “Although the letter does not clarify what constitutes continuation of the collection process or what ramifications stem from such a process, the least sophisticated consumer can be left with only one impression — that the cessation of this ominous ‘collection process’ will occur only if full paymen n urgent, restrictive time limit within which plaintiff must make payment. Cf. Russell, 74 F.3d at 32. It even used the permissive language of “we may recommend legal proceedings against you” rather than issuing a direct demand or a threat. Cf. Kramsky, 00-CIV-2936 at 5 (<HOLDING>); Sokolski, 53 F.Supp.2d at 311 (hold ing that

    ### Response:
    holding that the language by not addressing this matter you will cause the collection process to continue implied that undesirable consequences would follow if she faded to pay in full
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his qualitative spiritual experience.” Id. at 1212. Such decisions make clear that inmates do not forfeit their free exercise rights when the burden on their religious practice results from discipline imposed for violating prison rules. Of course, McEachin does not allege that his free exercise rights were infringed in the course of legitimate disciplinary measures. He claims that he was disciplined for failing to obey an order expressly given to him by a corrections officer who knew that completion of the task would require plaintiff to abandon religious prayers in which he was then engaged. Precedent' suggests that inmates have a right not to be disciplined for refusing to perform tasks that violate then-religious beliefs. See, e.g., Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). B. Appointment of Counsel Given that McEachin

    ### Response:
    holding that muslim plaintiff had a clearly established right to refuse to handle pork while performing kitchen duties and reversing the district courts grant of summary judgment to prison official defendants who disciplined the plaintiff for declining to help prepare pork chops
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    probable cause in the context of a criminal case. In Scott v. State, 272 Ark. 88, 92-93, 612 S.W.2d 110, 112-13 (1981), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated: There has traditionally been an exception to the right of confrontation where a witness who testified at a prior trial is unavailable at a later judicial proceeding. State evidentiary rules can fall within this exception if two tests are met. First, the witness must be “unavailable”.... Next, the evidence must be reliable.... [A]dmission depends upon the circumstances surrounding the hearing. In the case of a preliminary hearing admission depends upon what kind of hearing is involved and whether it is a “full fledged” hearing or a limited one. (Citations omitted.) Compare Hamblen v. State, 44 Ark. App. 54, 866 S.W.2d 119 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In Scott v. State, supra, the court found

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony of childs mother during temporarycustody probablecause bearing regarding defendant fathers shaking of child where defendant proceeded without counsel was admissible under hearsay exception for former testimony because the defendants motive to develop the testimony in the chancery case was very similar to his motive in the criminal case ie to avoid any implications of child abuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violated professional probation; and refused to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings. Respondent has not participated in Minnesota’s disciplinary proceedings, and we therefore deem her misconduct conclusively established. See Roff, 581 N.W.2d at 34-35 (finding that an attorney’s misconduct was conclusively established by another state’s final adjudication where the attorney failed to participate in Minnesota’s disciplinary proceedings). We have held that “misappropriation of client funds is particularly serious misconduct and usually warrants disbarment absent clear and convincing evidence of substantial mitigating factors.” In re Rhodes, 740 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Minn.2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d 734, 742-47 (Minn.2011) (<HOLDING>); In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 272 (Minn.2006)

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors the attorneys clients did not suffer actual harm and the attorney established several mitigating factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    merits of its misappropriation or breach of duty of loyalty claims. The determination that JSG is likely to succeed on its breach of contract claim is sufficient to support a preliminary injunction. 5 . After considering the relevant factors, the court concludes that a bond in the amount of $25,000 is proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. This bond is lower than might otherwise be required because the duration of the preliminary injunction is limited in several respects. If France can show, however, that the bond should be increased, she may move separately for appropriate relief. See, e.g., Gryphon Master Fund, L.P. v. Path 1 Network Techs., Inc., 2007 WL 1723703, at *8 (N.D.Tex. June 14, 2007) (Fitzwater, J.) (<HOLDING>); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Eckerd Drug of Tex.,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant could move separately to have bond increased
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 789. Each of the analogous Title IX cases involved a plaintiff who had expressly sought relief under Title IX. Id. (citing Bougher, 713 F.Supp. 139, 146; Mabry v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Ed., 597 F.Supp. 1235, 1239 (D.Colo.1984), aff'd on other grounds, 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.1987)). The Pfeiffer decision also cited two non-Title IX cases that precluded § 1983 claims even though the plaintiff had not brought statutory claims into which the constitutional claims could be subsumed. Id. (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (discussing the Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.); Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>)). The crucial consideration in the preclusion

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff may not cavalierly bypass the comprehensive process fashioned by congress in the adea by merely asserting a violation of a constitutional right rather than the statutory right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an unfair practice under ICRA and providing treble damages for willful violations of workers’ rights); 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 178, §§ 25-27 (reducing paperwork in ICRA proceedings); see also 1991 Iowa Acts ch. 184 (empowering the commission to award relief for discrimination in housing, creating a private cause of action in district court for housing discrimination, and permitting an award of actual and punitive damages for instances of housing discrimination). 3 . Some states have statutes dealing with employment discrimination that do not create a private cause of action in district court. See, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. §§ 45-19-38 to -39, (West 2003) (providing for resolution of complaints by a special master with an opportunity to appeal to a district court); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 143-422.2 (2001) (<HOLDING>); S.C.Code Ann. §§ 1-13-90, -100 (2005)

    ### Response:
    recognizing a public policy against discrimination but not providing for an independent cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her ex-husband’s $8,000 interest in her pension plan should be discharged in her bankruptcy proceeding. B. Application of Persuasive Caselaw to the Case at Bar In granting summary judgment for Husband, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that, although payment of pension proceeds would occur in the future (at retirement), a property interest was transferred by force of the August, 1992 Order and, as such, Husband’s interest was not a “debt” subject to discharge under 11 U.S.C.A. § 523. The case-law cited above, although not controlling on this Court, is persuasive ng that state divorce judgment awarding debtor's wife 38% of husband’s military retirement pension granted the wife a nondischargeable property interest in that portion of the pension), Williams v. Califf, 195 B.R. 499 (N.D.Ala.1996) (<HOLDING>); Walston v. Walston, 190 B.R. 66

    ### Response:
    holding that exwifes interest in debtors retirement income was her sole and separate property and was therefore not subject to chapter 7 discharge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stated in the invitation for bids. It relies on the following statutory language: Bids shall be evaluated based on the requirements set forth in the invitation for bids, which requirements may include criteria to determine acceptability such as inspection, testing, quality, workmanship, delivery and suitability for a particular purpose. Those criteria such as discounts, transportation costs and total or life-cycle costs that will affect the bid price shall be objectively measurable, which shall be defined by regulation. The invitation for bids shall set forth the evaluation criteria to be used. No criteria may be used in bid evaluation that are not set forth in the invitation for bids. Section 13-1-105. It further relies on Planning & Design Solutions, 118 N.M. at 712, 885 P.2d at 633 (<HOLDING>). {26} However, the statutory requirement that

    ### Response:
    holding city violated procurement code by improperly adding to evaluation criteria after receiving bids the factor that local firms would be favored
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    X (""The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 4 . The court's cursory review of the dockets of the suits and appeals filed by plaintiff in federal court did not reveal any other dismissals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 5 . While the Court of Federal Claims is not generally considered to be a ""court of the United States” within the meaning of title 28 of the United States Code, the court has jurisdiction to grant or deny applications to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 2503(d) (deeming the Court of Federal Claims to be ""a court of the United States"" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915); see also Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 274, 277-78 (2006)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that congress enacted the court of federal claims technical and procedural improvements act of 1992 authorizing the court to among other things adjudicate applications to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 usc  1915
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    improper because the appeal procedure of Section 2451 is the exclusive means of contesting the validity of school district expenditures. However, Bennett asserts that an appeal under Section 2451 is not the exclusive remedy because the auditors failed to recognize “hidden expenses” for the “dugouts” project. Bennett claims these missed expenditures caused the auditors to overlook the bidding requirements of Section 751 of the Code, 24 P.S. § 7-751. Under Section 751(a), a school board must open to public bidding any construction or maintenance project on A.2d 904 (1980) (concluding that a township supervisor’s exclusive remedy was to file an appeal to the township auditors’ report within the statutory appeal period of 45 days); Gribble v. Miller, 3 Pa.Cmwlth. 520, 284 A.2d 825 (1971) (<HOLDING>). Although most of these cases involved the

    ### Response:
    holding that a taxpayers action in assumpsit was barred because of his failure to file an appeal from the report of borough auditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, the felon-in-possession statute has an express jurisdictional element, which would ensure that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. McAllister, 77 F.3d at 389-90 n. 4. On numerous occasions, we have held that McAllister has not been overruled or called into question by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1271, 1273-74 (11th Cir.2001) (reaffirming our holding that § 922(g) is constitutional under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, and stating that “nothing in Morrison or Jones [v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) ] alters the reasoning upon which McAllister is moored.”); United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that morrison does not change the holding in mcallister and that  922g is a constitutional exercise of congresss commerce power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Transport 22 percent at fault and Clemmer 78 percent at fault for plaintiffs damages. Combined Transport appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had erred in excluding the evidence of Clemmer’s intoxication. The Court of Appeals held that that evidence was relevant to two issues: “Although Clemmer admitted that she was negligent, the jury was required to consider evidence of the circumstances relating to the accident to determine whether Combined Transport’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing decedent’s death and, if so, to apportion fault between defendants. Clemmer’s intoxication was relevant to those determinations. See Lyons v. Walsh & Sons Trucking Co., Ltd., 183 Or App 76, 84, 51 P3d 625 (2002), aff'd, 337 Or 319, 96 P3d 1215 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court erred in

    ### Response:
    holding that wlhether any particular cause or any individual actors conduct is sufficiently substantial to warrant the imposition of liability depends properly on a consideration of the whole
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where the accused had an opportunity to challenge the grand jury but failed to do so, and thus implicitly recognizing that a propter affectum challenge may be made pre-indictment); Williams, 69 Ga. at 28 (propter affectum challenge to the plea “came too late” but recognizing that “[i]f, however, it be deemed important in a particular case to fight the prosecution in limine, diligence requires that the challenge be made before the bill is found”); Smith v. State, 62 Ga. App. 498, 500 (1) (8 SE2d 797) (1940) (citing Williams and Lascelles with approval and finding no evidence to support plea in abatement or any allegation that the defendant had no opportunity to challenge the grand jurors before the indictment was found); Stapleton v. State, 19 Ga. App. 36 (1) (90 SE 1029) (1916) (<HOLDING>). 4. Brown Timely Challenged Grand Juror Bias

    ### Response:
    holding that challenge was propter affectum and should have been urged before the indictment was found
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robinson’s due process rights if a suitable postdeprivation remedy existed for him to contest the forfeiture of his property. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. Illinois courts have created a common-law right for property owners who did not receive notice as re e exists, nor does he contend that it is an inadequate remedy. In fact, Robinson even attempted to avail himself of the remedy by filing a motion to vacate with the court that presided over his dismissed criminal charges. The fact that Robinson’s attempt was unsuccessful does not establish that the motion to vacate is inadequate to protect his right to due process. See Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 693 n.5 (7th Cir.2003) (citing plaintiffs’ state lawsuit as proof of the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies); Hamlin, 95 F.3d at 585 (<HOLDING>). If Robinson believes that the state trial and

    ### Response:
    holding that postdeprivation remedy must be meaningless or nonexistent to be inadequate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts ... relating to proceedings before those courts.”). Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs allegation is true, accrual of his claims would be postponed by the accrual suspension rule. The District Court, however, issued its Opinion on June 29, 1990. Lewis I, 1990 WL 454624, at *1. Therefore, even if the Government concealed the fact that Plaintiff was discharged under a clemency regulation, Plaintiff should have known of the facts giving rise to his claim by June 29, 1990. See Ingram v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“[A] plaintiffs ignorance of a claim that he should have been aware of is not enough to suspend the accrual of a claim.”) (citation omitted); see also Catawba Indian Tribe, 982 F.2d at 1572 (<HOLDING>); Young, 529 F.3d at 1385 (It is a “Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    August 17, 1992. (Proposed Pretrial Order, p. 6, ¶ 3). The court accepts this contention as true. Boeing argues that because plaintiff filed her administrative sex discrimination claim in August 1992, any allegedly discriminatoiy conduct, in order to be actionable, must have occurred within the 300-day period immediately preceding August 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). According 705 (10th Cir.1992) (“If the plaintiff establishes a pattern of continuing discrimination beginning before the [applicable statutory] period and extending into that period, the plaintiff may recover for those earlier acts.”). It does not make actionable an “isolated” or “unrelated” incident of discrimination that occurred outside that period. Allen v. Denver Public School Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 984 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610,

    ### Response:
    holding that because nonpromotion claim involved an event unrelated to other alleged violations and occurred outside the statutory period it was prohibited as untimely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this court should remand for a new trial on damages only. We agree that damages, if any, arising from Ms. Wilson’s bad faith claim should have been considered by the jury as a part of damages incurred by St. Paul as a result of Mr. Martin’s and Club Services’ negligence. The district court relied primarily on two cases establishing that, in Oklahoma, agents like Mr. Martin and Club Services cannot be hable for breach of the covenant of fair dealing. See Hays v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 583, 590 (10th Cir.1997) (“Under Oklahoma law, the alleged knowledge and acts of the agent at the time of the application [are] not imputed to the principal for purposes of determining whether the principal acted in bad faith.”); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 912 (Okla.1982) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding that an agent as a stranger to an insurance contract cannot be held to breach an implied covenant of fair dealing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in controversy requirement to establish diversity jurisdiction. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301, 94 S.Ct. 505, 512, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 1057-58, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). But, plaintiffs no longer have to comply with the Zahn rule because Zahn was effectively overruled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Only the named plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement. Although the Third Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, see, e.g., Packard, 994 F.2d at 1045-46 n. 9, a plain reading of section 1367(a) clearly permits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over class plaintiffs’ claims that do not meet the amount in controversy requirement. See In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Deep v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 944

    ### Response:
    holding that a plain reading of section 1367 overrules zahn
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    VII). Like Primeaux II, in the present case, we need not decide outh Dakota. See Brown, 949 F.2d at 1012 n. 7 (“[u]nder the FTCA, the law of the place of the alleged tort governs the scope-of-employment question”). Under South Dakota law, the scope of employment inquiry is based upon a foreseeability test that evaluates whether a sufficient nexus exists “between the agent's employment and the activity which actually caused the injury.” Leafgreen v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 393 N.W.2d 275, 280 (S.D.1986) (Leafgreen). In addition, South Dakota has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), including § 229, which focuses on the relationship of the employee’s conduct to the employer’s business. See Deuchar v. Foland Ranch, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 177, 180 (S.D.1987) (Deuchar) (<HOLDING>). The Restatement also provides a list of

    ### Response:
    holding that south dakota is guided by the principles articulated in the restatement second of agency including  229
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of patriotic or political importance, it is understood that: the reasonable observer will see one religious code placed alongside ... political or patriotic documents, and will understand that the [government actor] pro-motets] that one religious code as being on a par with our nation’s most cherished secular symbols and documents. This is endorsement.... American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky v. McCreary County, Kentucky, 145 F.Supp.2d 845, 851 (E.D.Ky.2001), quoted in McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 459. Thus, this Court has condemned transparent attempts to “secularize” displays of the Ten Commandments by surrounding them with other patriotic documents and symbols. McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 460 (citing Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>)). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of

    ### Response:
    holding that a display consisting of bill of rights preamble to indiana constitution and ten commandments would signal to reasonable observer that the state approved of such a link and was sending a message of endorsement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damages, however, is not “property” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. As explained earlier in this ruling, a demand is not the same as an entitlement. See supra Section I.A.2. Even if plaintiff s demand represented a genuine obligation of the government, the failure to pay such a monetary obligation would not amount to a taking. Cf. Adams v. United States, No. 00-447C, 2003 WL 22339164, at *8 (Fed.Cl. Aug. 11, 2003) (explaining that plaintiffs statutory right to underpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act is not a property interest for purposes of the Takings clause, but rather an ordinary obligation to pay money under a compensation statute), aff'd, 391 F.3d 1212, 1220, 1224 (Fed.Cir.2004); Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Cannon v. District of Columbia, 873

    ### Response:
    holding that general obligation to pay money under a disputed provision of the tax code was not a taking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the absence of expressed Congressional intent, we must assume that Congress intended to convey the language’s ordinary meaning. See United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P. C., 935 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir.1991) (“The words of a statute should be given their normal meaning and effect in absence of showing that some other meaning was intended.”); United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.1989) (“In the absence of a contrary indication, the court must assume the drafters of a statute intended to convey the ordinary meaning attached to the language.”). If the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, then a court may look beyond the plain language to the legislative history for guidance. See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 920 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Observant of this well-established analytical

    ### Response:
    recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case, the defendant’s preliminary burden to obtain a hearing pursuant to Franks is the same as in a case involving affirmative misrepre sentations. See, e.g., Calisto, 838 F.2d at 714-15. In determining whether the omission was critical to the finding of probable cause, however, a court must decide if probable cause would have existed had the omitted information been disclosed. United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir.1993); Calisto, 838 F.2d at 715. Probable cause for a search warrant exists when the totality of the affidavit demonstrates “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In the case of a drug dealer, there is often

    ### Response:
    holding that direct evidence linking a crime to the particular place to be searched is not required to support a finding of probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274, 276 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080, 100 S.Ct. 1031, 62 L.Ed.2d 763 (1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir.1968); Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 WL 804238, *3, 1997 Tex.App. LEXIS 6685, *8 (addressing Utah law on issue). We believe the standard relied upon in these cases is correct, and we formally adopt the same. Elaboration on the contours of the standard is needed, however. ¶ 19 Under the “active participation” standard, a principal employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its independent contractor’s work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work. See Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla.1973) (<HOLDING>). Such an assertion of control occurs, for

    ### Response:
    holding that under active participation standard principal employer must directly influence manner in which work is performed no duty arises from passive nonparticipation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 812 (identifying pharmacists as the audience); Mylan Labs. Inc. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 808 F.Supp. 446, 459 (D.Md.1992) (distinguishing between advertisements targeted at the public and those targeted at pharmacists) rev'd on other grounds, 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir.1993). 20 . Defendants argue that the survey evidence is barred pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and the Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 702, and 703. The court has reviewed Dr. Reisetter's survey and Defendants’ arguments against admissibility, and finds that the survey is sufficiently relevant and reliable to warrant consideration. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P'ship, 34 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to consider survey evidence even though the survey was imperfect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not create property interests. See id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701; Rowe, 938 S.W.2d at 354. Instead, property interests are created and defined by “rules or mutually explicit understandings that support [an individual’s] claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). As established above, the medical staff bylaws do not entitle the defendants to a hearing when the hospital enters into an exclusive provider contract. The bylaws, therefore, do not give the defendants a reasonable expectation that they will be given notice and a hearing before their clinical privileges are terminated if the hospital enters into such a contract. See, e.g., Bleeker v. Dukakis, 665 F.2d 401, 403 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, the bylaws clearly

    ### Response:
    holding that this lack of any reasonable expectation of continued employment suffices to establish the lack of property in the constitutional sense and hence the lack of a viable due process claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by-pass the UCC provision regarding revocation of acceptance by claiming that the non-conforming gloves it knowingly accepted violated an implied warranty. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted concerning this counterclaim. Defendant contends in its sixth counterclaim that Plaintiff committed unfair and/or deceptive trade practices violative of Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 501.201 et seq. As a matter of law, the Court believes that the statute is limited to “consumer transactions”, and not to sophisticated commercial transactions such as in the matter presently before the Court. The statute is not intended to protect parties such as Defendant that have substantial previous experience in such transactions. See Black v. Department of Legal Affairs, 353 So.2d 655, 656 (Fla.Ct.App.1977) (<HOLDING>). The Court believes there is no genuine issue

    ### Response:
    holding that purpose of statute is to protect unwary consumers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    do not consider the likelihood that the Commission would apply the Ordinance to other persons who cooperate with military recruiters by renting them office space, running their advertisements, and so forth. We also intimate no opinion as to whether the application of the Ordinance to such persons would run afoul of the supremacy clause. 9 . Lambda has represented to this court that 48 municipalities, 11 counties, and 7 states currently have ordinances that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 10 . Likewise, we reject the Task Force’s assertion that the fact that Congress chose not to enact such a mandatory ""right of access"" somehow determines the question before us. Cf. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 155, 102 S.Ct. at 3023 (<HOLDING>). 11 . The record does indicate, however, that

    ### Response:
    holding that the conflict between state and federal law does not evaporate because the federal home loan bank boards regulation simply permits but does not compel federal savings and loans to include dueonsale clauses in their contracts the california cotuts have forbidden a federal savings and loan to enforce a dueonsale clause at its option and have deprived the lender of the flexibility given it by the board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the instant offense while under a criminal justice sentence despite his intervening deportation. Federal law, not state law, governs whether a defendant is under “any criminal justice sentence.” See Carrasco-Mateo, 389 F.3d at 247. In Carrasco-Mateo, the appellant argued that because he was deported, he was no longer under New York parole. Id. at 246. The First Circuit concluded that whether a defendant is on parole is a question of federal law. Id. at 246-47. The appellant asserted that because New York no longer exercised custodial or supervisory authority over him, his term of parole had ended. Id. at 247. The court relied on immigration law in rejecting this argument, stating that “Congress directed the Attorney General that a deportation action should proce (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. CueroFlores, 276 F.3d 113,

    ### Response:
    holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judge.” Germain v. State, 363 Md. 511, 522-23, 769 A.2d 931 (2001) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1184 (6th ed.1990)). 2 . A ruling on a motion to enforce a plea agreement is a collateral order, and therefore, immediately appealable. See Rios v. State, 186 Md.App. 354, 364-66, 974 A.2d 366 (2009). 3 . Falero’s question is: Did the Circuit Court err when it ordered the binding plea agreement vacated? 4 . See Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 12.1, at 42 (April 2005), http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Guidelines/manual_05.pdf. 5 . Indeed, some courts have held that appearance at sentencing is an implicit term whether or not it is communicated to the defendant. See United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 115 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960

    ### Response:
    holding that by jumping bail and failing to appear the defendant violated the plea agreement and the governments obligation to move for a downward departure based on substantial assistance ended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the meaning of this definition. Criminal penalties are provided in 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a): “A person willfully violating this sub-chapter or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter ... shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprison[ed for] not more than five years, or both.” 5 . Peck has completed his prison term since his petition was denied, see supra note 1, and is presently serving a three-year term of supervised release. Although he is no longer in prison, a term of supervised release, which carries with it the possibility of revocation and additional jail time, satisfies the ""in custody” requirement of § 2255. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240-43, 83 S.Ct. 373, 375-77, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (parole); cf. Scanio v. United States, 37 F.3d 858, 860 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Neither Frady nor Campino precisely

    ### Response:
    holding that upon expiration of period of supervised release habeas petitioner was no longer in custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been expressly declared a professional service under KRS 413.245 at the time MLS performed its contract with GDD, land surveying is frequently necessary for the performance of engineering services. See KRS 322.010(4)(a)(5) (defining engineering work in part as “the services of a professional engineer who engages in the practice of land surveying incident to the practice of engineering that does not relate to the location or determination of land boundaries.”) In this regard, the relationship between engineering and land surveying is similar to the relationship between paralegals and lawyers and doctors and nurses — both relationships which have been held to be encompassed within the professional services statute of limitations. See Underhill v. Stephenson, 756 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Ky.1988) (<HOLDING>); Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51 P.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that nursing is a professional service subject to krs 413245
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because this action was one triable of right by a jury, the district court did not have the power to declare the jury advisory only. Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c) does not apply to actions triable of right by a jury. See, e.g., Goodgame v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 75 F.3d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir.1996) (post-Landgraf jury-tried case); Thompson v. Parkes, 963 F.2d 885, 888-89 (6th Cir.1992) (where parties agreed and district court ordered matter would be tried as jury case, case must be treated as if right to jury trial existed and district court could not treat jury verdict as advisory and, even if no right to jury trial existed, it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury verdict advisory after verdict is returned); Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 607 F.2d 705, 708-09, 711 (6th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defines consumer goods as goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 15 . Deb. Ex. # A. 16 . Id. 17 . See, e.g. Beard v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 41 Ark.App. 174, 850 S.W.2d 23, 28 (1993) (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Solway, 825 F.2d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir.1987); In re Garden Nat'l Bank of Garden City v. Cada, 241 Kan. 494, 738 P.2d 429 (1987); John Deery Motors, Inc. v. Steinbronn, 383 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1986)). 18 . Barkley Clark, Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 4,08(2) at 4-98 (1988). 19 . Springfield Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Harmon, 858 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo.Ct.App.1993). 20 . Id. at 246 (Flanigan, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 21 . See In re Carter, 203 B.R. 697 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1996)

    ### Response:
    holding that a banks failure to give notice to the debtors of the time and place of the sale of their cattle deprived the bank of a deficiency claim even though the bank sought relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court prior to repossessing the cattle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir.1997))); id. (“A purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance cannot rise to the level of a materially adverse employment ae tion.” (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.1996))); Mishk v. Destefano, 5 F.Supp.2d 194, 202 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“Plaintiffs ... transfer from [one] Unit to [another] Unit does not satisfy the adverse employment action standard in the absence of any allegation or evidence that the new position was somehow inferior to plaintiffs previous position.”). Although some contrary authority exists in cases dealing with an involuntary transfer to an identical job in an inconvenient location, see, e.g., Medwid v. Baker, 752 F.Supp. 125, 138-39 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (<HOLDING>), I have found no case in which denial of a

    ### Response:
    holding that whether an involuntary transfer from new york to los angeles was adverse was a question of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    found no Alabama cases directly on point with respect to this issue, we have found three cases from other jurisdictions with similar situations. In all three of those cases, the omission of the accused’s name from the body of the charging instrument was found not to be fatal. See State v. Nixon, 977 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997) (noting that the defendants had waived their challenge to the indictment because ‘[t]he omission of the defendants’ names in the body of the indictment neither relates to subject matter jurisdiction nor failure to allege an offense,’ but nevertheless holding that ‘[sjince the defendants were named on the cover sheet ... it is clear that they were the persons referred to in the body of the indictment’); State v. Geary, 884 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); and Hill v. State, 523 P.2d 1114, 1116

    ### Response:
    holding that failure of indictment to include the defendants name was not fatal because the original complaint that initiated the prosecution properly listed the defendants name and the record indieated that the defendant  knew what he was charged with and what facts the charge was based upon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Demarest v. Athol/ Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 82, 94-95 (D.Mass.2002) (finding it “highly probable” that filming of a public official on street outside his home by contributors to public access cable show was protected by the First Amendment, and noting that, “[ajt base, plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest”); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F.Supp. 634, 638 (D.Minn.1972) (<HOLDING>); cf. Schnell v. City of Chi, 407 F.2d 1084,

    ### Response:
    holding that police interference with television newsmans filming of crime scene and seizure of video camera constituted unlawful prior restraint under first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the jury before deliberations because he suffered actual damages as proven by the evidence introduced in support of his excessive force claim. In support of this contention, he cites Westcott v. Crinklaw, in which we stated that “[t]he law is clear that a nominal damage instruction is not appropriate when there is proof of actual injury.” 133 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir.1998). Miller’s reliance on Westcott is misplaced. In Westcott we held that the district court erred in instructing the jury on nominal damages because the evidence conclusively established that the plaintiffs deceased husband suffered fatal injuries and that the plaintiff sustained actual damages. Id. In that case, Westcott sued a police officer for excessive force in the shooting death of her husband. Id. at 659 00) (<HOLDING>); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 536 (7th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to nominal damages for race discrimination claims can be waived if such damages are not timely requested
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sur-' vive arbitrary and capricious review, it must be made in consideration of all the hearing officer's evidentiary findings. T 44 In other contexts, we have recognized that an inquiry into what is reasonable necessarily requires an examination of the underlying circumstances. See, e.g., Herr v. People, 198 P.3d 108, 114 (Colo. 2008) (""What ° constitutes a reasonable effort [to secure a ruling on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion] by the defendant is dependent on the unique circumstances of the case."" (emphasis added)); Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Colo. 1984) (""[The standard applicable to establish the tort of bad faith remains one of reasonableness under the circumstances."" (emphasis added)); Spensieri v. Farmers All. Mut. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 268, 270 (Colo. App. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with these cases, Black's Law

    ### Response:
    holding that when an attorney fee award is made under a statute that does not define reasonable the award should be determined in light of all cetreumstances emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court to allow false testimony to go unchallenged. Additionally, we find no evidence that the agents acted in bad faith when they approached Cummings and told him they thought he was lying. Indeed, the district court—which, we emphasize, had the opportunity to evaluate Cummings’s testimony first-hand—found that the government had good reason to accuse Cummings of perjury: [I]n light of what the government’s level of knowledge was, and you have to put it in context how, I hate to say silly, but his testimony was for a number of reasons far-fetched to begin with...-. The government ... had very good reason to approach [Cummings] and say we think you lied. (Sentencing Transcript at 11-12). We cannot conclude that this finding was clearly erroneous. See Buie, 923 F.2d at 12-13 (<HOLDING>). The testimony of the government witness,

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts good faith finding is reviewed for clear error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the officer is likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the threat of liability for espect is whether the individual is exercising judgment similar to that of a judge. See id.; McCray, 456 F.2d at 4 (noting that “a defense counsel, a court stenographer, and a jailer all have important duties in the judicial process, but none is afforded judicial immunity because none exercises judicial or quasi-judicial discretion which requires the protection of absolute judicial immunity” (internal citations omitted)). This Court has indicated that judges are “granted immunity from liability for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions[.]” Parker, 337 Md. at 280, 653 A.2d at 440 (internal quotation omitted); Mandel, 320 Md. at 107, 576 A.2d at 768 (<HOLDING>). A judge loses this absolute immunity only

    ### Response:
    holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evading review and (2) is sues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, might prevent future litigation”); Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawaii 323, 172 P.3d 1067, 1071 n. 4 (2007) (noting the public interest and capable of repetition yet evading review exceptions are ‘“separate and distinct’”); Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008) (acknowledging exceptions to mootness doctrine “ ‘(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest’ ”); Smith v. Hannaford Brothers Co., 940 A.2d 1079, 1081 (Me.2008) (<HOLDING>); DeCoteau v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co., 636

    ### Response:
    recognizing three exceptions to the mootness doctrine including when  the appeal contains questions of great public concern that in the interest of providing future guidance to the bar and the public we may address or    the issues are capable of repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or determinate nature 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tae Woong Venture, Inc. v. Westward Seafoods, Inc., 963 P.2d 1055, 1065 n. 4 (Alaska 1998). 5 . Neal & Co., Inc. v. Association of Village Council Presidents Reg. Hous. Auth., 895 P.2d 497, 502 (Alaska 1995). 6 . Alaska Diversified Contractors, Inc. v. Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist., 778 P.2d 581, 584 (Alaska 1989). 7 . Hayes v. Charney, 693 P.2d 831, 834 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 53 (Alaska 1971)). 8 . Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328, 1329 n. 2 (Alaska 1995). 9 . Ostrow v. Higgins, 722 P.2d 936, 939 (Alaska 1986). 10 . - Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d 584, 588 (Alaska 1990). 11 . See Honig v. Students of the California Sch. for the Blind, 471 U.S. 148, 149, 105 S.Ct. 1820, 85 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding appeal moot where tests that had been ordered under the preliminary injunction had already been car ried out
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    697 (1960), for the proposition that an individual has a justifiable expectation of privacy in a friend’s apartment. Id. at 352 n. 11, 88 S.Ct. 507. In Jones, the defendant who had a key to his friend’s apartment, where he kept a suit and shirt and may have slept a night in the past but not recently, was found to have standing to maintain a motion to suppress the fruits of a search of the apartment in part because “anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality .... ” 362 U.S. at 259, 267, 80 S.Ct. 725. Katz was decided in 1967, and was considered by Congress and the President when Title III was enacted in 1968. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. Since Katz was decided, Justice Harlan’s tw 1 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In any event, for the purpose of defining the

    ### Response:
    holding that captain has reasonable expectation of privacy in all areas of his ship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jessie’s death pertained only to charges against Jackson and Neeley and not to any of the other defendants. The court also instructed the jury that it could hold a defendant liable for Jessie’s death only if “the defendant you are considering was part of the distribution chain that led to her death.” (R. 796 at 36.) Rule 14 does not require severance in every joint trial in which there is a risk for prejudice; “rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s sound discretion.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. And as the Supreme Court has held, less drastic measures than severance, “such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.” Id.; see also United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 702 (7th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, the court’s jury instructions did just

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts use of limiting instructions and other measures defused any risk of prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before BRYNER, C.J., and COATS and SINGLETON, JJ. SINGLETON, Judge. Patrick M. Marrs was charged with driving while intoxicated. AMC 09.28.020(A). The trial court suppressed the evidence of the results of his breathalyzer test on the assumption that the police had denied Marrs’ rights guaranteed him by AS 12.25.-150(b) and Criminal Rule 5(b). See, e.g., Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983) (<HOLDING>). The municipality petitions for review,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute and the rule give a person suspected of drunk driving a right to contact his attorney prior to deciding whether or not to take a breathalyzer examination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the bottom of the guidelines and were to run concurrent with each other. Cooper moved to correct sentencing errors because the scoresheets improperly included 23 points for robbery with a firearm when they should have only included 9 points for the lesser included offense of robbery. The trial court failed to rule on this motion within the time allowed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2)(B). As such the motion is deemed denied. “All defendants are entitled to be sentenced under a correctly scored and calculated score sheet.” Fortner v. State, 830 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). It is undisputed that Cooper was not sentenced under a correct score sheet with respect to the charges of burglary of a dwelling and dealing in stolen property. The second district A 2001) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. State, 773 So.2d 660 (Fla. 5th

    ### Response:
    holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This Court has stated that the only way to effectuate notice on CMGT in April of 2004, would have been through proper service on the Illinois Secretary of State or the Delaware Secretary of State. The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated that “[a] district court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been properly served with process.... ” United States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.2008). The Court further reminded district courts that “the service requirement is not satisfied merely because the defendant is aware that he has been named in a lawsuit or has received a copy of the summons and the complaint.” Id.; see also Equity Residential Props. Mgmt. Corp. v. Nasolo, 364 Ill.App.3d 26, 301 Ill.Dec. 467, 847 N.E.2d 126, 134 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Spehar has failed to establish that any of

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants actual knowledge that an action is pending or that service has been attempted is not the equivalent of service of summons and will not relieve the plaintiff of its burden or vest the court with jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the time of the offense. The court apparently followed the rule that application of the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, see United States v. Bell, 991 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir.1993); USSG § lBl.ll(b), although the endurance of that rule is an open question in this circuit after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), now that the guidelines are merely a starting point that a court must consult and take into account. See United States v. Anderson, 570 F.3d 1025, 1033 n. 7 (8th Cir.2009) (assuming, without deciding, that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to a district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines after Booker); compare, e.g., United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094,

    ### Response:
    holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    239 (533 SE2d 129) (2000). 7 Young, 274 Ga. at 848; see also Kaminer v. Canas, 282 Ga. 830, 838 (4) (653 SE2d 691) (2007) (“We find OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) to be an extremely harsh limitation in application because it has the effect, in many cases,... of cutting off rights before there is any knowledge of injury. Nonetheless, the legislature has the power, within constitutional limitations, to make such provisions.” (punctuation omitted)). 8 OCGA § 9-3-71 (a). 9 OCGA § 9-11-8 (a) (1) (A). 10 McCord v. Lee, 286 Ga. 179, 180 (684 SE2d 658) (2009). 11 Beamon v. Mahadevan, 329 Ga. App. 685, 687 (1) (766 SE2d 98) (2014) (punctuation omitted) (quoting McCord, 286 Ga. at 180). 12 Id. (punctuation omitted) (quoting McCord, 286 Ga. at 180). 13 Kaminer, 282 Ga. at 832 (1); see also id. at 831-32 (1) (<HOLDING>); Frankel v. Clark, 213 Ga. App. 222, 223 (444

    ### Response:
    holding that in cases of misdiagnosis the injury begins immediately upon the misdiagnosis due to pain suffering or economic loss sustained by the patient from the time of the misdiagnosis until the medical problem is properly diagnosed and treated and that tjhe misdiagnosis itself is the injury and not the subsequent discovery of the proper diagnosis punctuation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    corollary to the power to recognize a sovereign in the first place. For instance, recognizing an established sovereign’s former colony as a new, independent sovereign seems a straightforward exercise of what even Zivotofsky would concede to be the recognition power. But such recognition necessarily entails a boundary determination — the colony, once formally recognized as part of one sovereign’s territory, is effectively recognized as belonging to another. Indeed, precedent binding on this court confirms that the recognition power includes authority to determine territorial boundaries. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 212, 82 S.Ct. 691 (“[T]he judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation has sovereignty over disputed territory----”); Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30, 62 S.Ct. 552 (<HOLDING>); Williams, 38 U.S. at 420 (“[Wjhen the

    ### Response:
    holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    401. Evidence of how events of the charged offense unfolded and progressed is necessary for the jury to have a full picture and understanding of what took place. Mann v. State, 718 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Consequently, the State was entitled to prove all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the sexual assault, everything that Houston said and did, including how he used the nude photographs to lure Nicky to where she was sexually assaulted and how he tried to use them to get her to submit to the sexual assault. In fact, had they been available at trial, the State could have introduced the photographs into evidence because Houston had used them as a ploy and inducement to commit the sexual assault. See White v. State, 137 Tex.Crim. 481, 131 S.W.2d 968, 969 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because evidence of the photographs

    ### Response:
    holding that a book of lewd photographs seized from the defendant at his arrest was admissible in his trial for attempted rape if he had used the book in any way in committing the charged offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if an employer affirmatively agrees to safeguard equipment. See Pirocchi v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 865 F.Supp. 277, 280-281 (E.D.Pa.1973) (finding that “77 P.S. §§ 481 and 501 were not intended to extend immunity from suit to employers and insurance carriers whose acts may cause independent economic injury that is separate and distinct from the physical injury suffered by an employee in the course of his employment. The argument advanced by [defendant] would extend tort immunity to negligent conduct which is based on acts or omissions that are unrelated to the cause of the physical injuries covered by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes. We do not believe the legislature intended such an extension.”); but see, Jones v. Carborundum, 515 F.Supp. 559, 562 (W.D.Pa.1981) (<HOLDING>) There is no allegation made in the proposed

    ### Response:
    holding that 77 pa stat ann 481b clearly states  the employer  shall not be liable to a third party this is plainly a rule of substantive tort law not of procedure it excludes all liability whether for damages contribution or indemnity and whether sought in a separate independent action at law or by joinder pursuant to current liberal rules of civil procedure in an action brought by the employee against a third party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.D.C.C. ch. 50-25.1, and possible criminal violations. She claims that, after she reported the possible abuse, she was subjected to a “hostile” work environment and was ultimately terminated in retaliation for making the reports. [¶ 31] The trial court analyzed Dahl-berg’s retaliation claim under the burden-shifting framework for federal discrimination claims announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. The trial court said Dahlberg’s reports involved alleged lack of supervision by Luther Hall employees, which resulted in resident-on-resident sexual abuse, but the court decided Dahlberg had no legal duty to report the alleged “inadequate supervision.” The court decided Dahlberg failed to show th 793, 795 (N.D.1987) (<HOLDING>). Compare Jose, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 21, 599 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not provide a present benefit to the child, but “adds to an accumulating burden which falls upon the parent when he is least able to bear it.”). 3. One-Factor-to-Consider Rule Some jurisdictions hold that an obligor’s incarceration is only one factor to consider in determining whether to modify child support. These cases generally require that the determination be made on a case-by-case basis, considering such additional factors as whether the obligor has other assets or income; the obligor’s past and future ability to earn income; the length of the obligor’s incarceration; and the applicable public policies, such as the best interest of the child, the unclean hands doctrine, and the nature of the crime. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 512, 903 P.2d 254, 257-58 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Oberg v. Oberg, 869 S.W.2d 235, 238

    ### Response:
    holding that while incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis for child support modification the foregoing factors should be considered in making the determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58, 61, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990). The deem-er clause provides: “Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts____” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Subsections 668.5(3) and 668.5(4) are state laws that regulate insurance. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58-61, 111 S.Ct. at 407-09 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we conclude that Hy-Vee, as a

    ### Response:
    holding pennsylvania statute regulating subrogation is a law regulating insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    felony distribution of cocaine base. Thus, the only charge in which the aggregation issue is relevant is the charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The court next observes that possession of cocaine base is not a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine base because the elements in a section 846 conspiracy to possess charge do not require proof of the defendant’s possession of cocaine base. See Patterson v. United States, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9529, at *21-22 (W.D.N.C. May 12, 2005) (noting that Fourth Circuit indicated in unpublished opinion that simple possession is not lesser-included offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute); see also United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 377 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit, in United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of any other right, founding the claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the premises in question ... and there has been & continued occupation and possession of the premises included in the instrument ..., or of some part thereof, for ten years, under the same claim, the premises so included are deemed to have been held adversely ... Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 511 (McKinney’s 1962) (hereinafter “RPAPL § 511”). Plaintiff submitted evidence that the Snees had kept tugs and barges on the foreshoré since 1974. PL 12/17 Br. at 8. Furthermore, the deed to his property stated that he held title to the foreshore. Pl.Ex. 1. In New York, however, “the State’s sovereign title is inalienable except by grant.” Hawkins v. State, 644, 646-647 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1951) (<HOLDING>) Plaintiff could not adversely possess the

    ### Response:
    holding that tidal lands  which the town holds in a governmental capacity may not be alienated and hence may not be the subject of acquisition by adverse possession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had produced no evidence that the wife’s access to the apartment was limited. Similarly, in United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 171, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), we upheld the consent given by the owner of a shack who had permitted the defendant to stay there for one month. We noted that the shack had only one habitable room, that both the defendant and the owner left personal property in that room, and that the defendant had a key to the shack. In Yarbrough, we stated that the owner “had complete access throughout the property in general, and to the room lived in by [the defendant] in particular. It was as much his own place as it was [the defendant’s].” Id. at 1534. See also United States v. Sealey, 830 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that a wife validly consented to a search of the garage when she was married to the defendant was part owner of the home and had unlimited access to all areas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    about structures that may obstruct the proper general take-off or landing flight way since it has a duty to provide safe premises for airplane use). ¶ 11 A landowner’s obligation to invitees, however, is not limitless. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A cmt. e (1965) (noting that the duty ceases when the person ceases to be an invitee). Once an invitee safely leaves the premises, the landowner-invitee relationship terminates, as does the landowner’s duty to the invitee. See Riddle v. Ariz. Oncology Servs., Inc., 186 Ariz. 464, 468-69, 924 P.2d 468, 472-73 (App.1996) (affirming dismissal of claim against employer arising from auto accident that occurred after employer sent impaired employee home early); Wickham v. Hopkins, 226 Ariz. 468, 472, ¶ 17, 250 P.3d 245, 249 (App.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Price v. Canadian Airlines, 429

    ### Response:
    holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    car “entitle[s] [police] to conduct an investigatory stop in order to determine whether the car’s owner [is] in violation of state law requiring permanent tags within thirty days of a vehicle’s purchase.” The problem with McDonald is that it cited no authority for the purported statement of South Carolina law (for that matter, neither did the United States cite any authority when it briefed that case). We have made an independent search, and we find nothing in South Carolina’s law to support the statement in McDonald. At this point, we can only conclude that McDonald misstated the law of South Carolina. Of course, any state law that authorized a search or seizure would be subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 382 (4th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Amendment does not allow a

    ### Response:
    holding that statute authorizing customs officials to board vessels must be interpreted in a manner consistent with limitations imposed by the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agreement’s language about an employee’s rights’. 8 F.3d at 380-381. In the same vein, in DiPuccio, the court flatly held that plaintiffs ADA claim “cannot be preempted in the same manner as plaintiffs state law claims (could be) ... ” DiPuccio, 890 F.Supp. at 692. The court rejected defendant’s contention that Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), controlled and that plaintiff should have pursued his remedies through the arbitration process of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The Ohio court noted that “It was significant that the circumstances of Gilmer did not involve any tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights.” Id.; See also, Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP, 828 F.Supp. 525 (N.D.Ill.1993) (<HOLDING>). 828 F.Supp. at 531. Defendant also argues

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs title vii claims were not preempted by section 301 despite collective bargaining agreement and stating that the purposes of  301 are not subverted when a federal court hears a claim brought under a federal statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the admitted fact.” Id. In- the underlying cause, the Department sought to terminate the “parent-child relationship” between F.M., Jr, and F.M., and the trial court’s order terminated that “parent-child relationship.” The term “parent-child relationship” is statutorily defined to include “the father and child relationship.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.025 (West 2014). One of-the pleadings F.M., Jr. filed in the underlying cause was an “Affidavit of Respondents Testimony” in which F.M., Jr. refers to himself as F.M.’s father, stating he “does not deny that he is the father of son [F.M.].” This statement constitutes a judicial admission that F.M., Jr. is F.M.’s father. See In re K.P., No. 09-13-00404-CV, 2014 WL 4105067, at *13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 21, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); In re K.W., 138 S.W.3d 420, 429-30 (Tex.

    ### Response:
    holding fathers pleadings representing himself to be the father of the children constituted a judicial admission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(b) (Law.Co-op 1990 & Supp.1995). 29 . See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see also Travelers, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1675. 30 . See, e.g., Travelers,- U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1677; Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 113 S.Ct. 580, 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97, 103 S.Ct. at 2899-2900. 31 . See La Rev.Stat.Ann. § 40:2202(5)(c). 32 . See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 40:2202(5)(a) (emphasis added). 33 . See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 40:2202(3)(a). 34 . See id. ("" ‘Group purchaser’ may include: ... Entities which contract for the benefit of their insured eemption by ERISA's insurance savings clause), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 579, 126 L.Ed.2d 478 (1993); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Nielsen, 917 F.Supp. 1532 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 42 . A brief was filed in support of Ieyoub’s

    ### Response:
    holding that alabamas equivalent of the any willing provider statute is preempted by erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or replace defects in goods ... the buyer is deprived of the benefits of the limited remedy and it therefore fails its essential purpose. Defendant contends its warranty had expired before the machine malfunctioned, and the latent nature of the design defect does not toll the warranty period. Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s one-year warranty period is unenforceable. This is so, according to plaintiff, because the mold is undetectable for the first three years of operation and a one-year warranty period would cause the warranty to fail of its essential purpose. To support its contention that any express or implied warranties had expired before plaintiff experienced problems, defendant cites Buckeye Resources, Inc. v. DuraTech Indus. Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 5190787, *3-4 (S.D.Ohio) (<HOLDING>); Sonner v. Mullinax Ford North Canton, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff was barred from seeking remedy because express warranty expired in accordance with time limits elucidated in the limited repair and replace warranty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not implicated where there was “no causal relationship between the damages alleged by [pjlaintiff and any failure by [defendant] to register as a motor carrier”); see also D.V.C. Trucking, Inc. v. RMX Global Logistics, No. Civ. A. 05-CV-00705, 2005 WL 2044848, at *4 (D.Colo. Aug. 24, 2005) (concluding, in an unreported decision, that section 14707 had no application to the case where the complaint itself alleged that defendant was registered); see also Ford v. Allied Van Lines Inc., No. CIV. 3:96CV2598(AHN), 1997 WL 317315, at *3 (D.Conn. June 3, 1997) (concluding, in an unreported decision, that section 14707 was not applicable to the case where plaintiff did not allege a failure to register); cf. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Monroe Bus Corp., 309 F.Supp.2d 104, 108-10 (D.D.C.2004) (<HOLDING>); Hall, 2002 WL 1835469, at *10-11 (concluding

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on a claim brought against them under section 14707 where the claim alleged a failure of defendant to register as required by section 13901
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.3d at 1114-15. On March 21, 2012, the mother’s appointed counsel filed a notice of appearance. In Simmons v. Simmons, 99 So.3d 316, 320 (Ala.Civ.App.2011), this court held that “[an attorney’s] filing a notice of appearance on behalf of [his or her client] constitute[s] a waiver of service of process by [the client].” On March 28, 2012, the mother’s counsel attempted to “amend” the notice of appearance to disavow any waiver of service of process, but a notice of appearance is not a “pleading,” see Rule 7(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., to which the exception to waiver of the defense of insufficiency of service of process outlined in Rule 12(h)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., for “amended pleadings” is applicable. Cf. D.M.T.J.W.D. v. Lee Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 109 So.3d 1133, 1140 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (<HOLDING>). Finally, even assuming that counsel’s notice

    ### Response:
    holding that mother did not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it in her first responsive pleading ie her answer to dhrs  petition to terminate her parental rights because the mother sought leave to amend her answer to include the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction  dhr did not object to that motion and  the juvenile court allowed the mother to amend her answer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    utilitarian, not an expressive, purpose and do not incorporate artwork created by Plaintiffs”). This is not always an easy task, because there are “inherent line-drawing problems associated with distinguishing among artwork with presumptively expressive content (such as [paintings, photographs, prints, and sculptures]), merchandise with potentially expressive content (such as ‘the crafts of the jeweler, the potter and the silversmith’), and merchandise ""with no expressive content.” Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 85 (quoting and citing Bery, 97 F.3d at 696). Moreover, some objects are otherwise utilitarian, but can become “inextricably intertwined” with “pure elements of speech” when they are sold to disseminate political, religious, or philosophical messages, Gaudiya, 952 F.2d at 1064-65 (<HOLDING>); see also One World, 76 F.3d at 1011-12

    ### Response:
    holding that religious and political groups sale of merchandise and literature was fully protected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must demonstrate that (1) he was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) defendant is an employer under the FMLA; (3) plaintiff was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) plaintiff gave notice to defendant of his intention to take leave; and (5) plaintiff was denied benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA. Rice v. Wayne County, 2010 WL 4861556 at *2-3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125939 at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010). It is undisputed that plaintiff took leave three times, once for her son’s surgery and twice for a personal , 2010 WL 4366897 at *6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114835 at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010) (“Plaintiffs theory of interference by termination is merely a retaliation theory in disguise”); Di Giovanna v. Beth Israel Med. Center, 651 F.Supp.2d 193, 203 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, plaintiffs FMLA interference

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs interference claim really is no more than an effort to dress his retaliation claim in barely different clothing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and take them into account when sentencing,” id. at 757, 767, 125 S.Ct. 738, and we continue to review the district court’s application of the guidelines de novo, United States v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir.2005). Applying these standards, we find no error in the district court’s imposition of the six-level enhancement. C. Sentencing — Overstated Criminal History Andreano next argues his criminal history score was overstated and the district court erred in denying a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. He contends his criminal history is largely comprised of minor offenses making it significantly less serious than most defendants in the same criminal history category, and because the district court misinterpreted United States v. Hutman, 339 F.3d 773 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>), it failed to recognize its authority to

    ### Response:
    holding a downward departure  may be appropriate for a relatively young defendant with a brief criminal career
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ought to have sought advice on this issue, not merely inferred that their experts would support their decision. Defense counsel are not required to consult an expert every time they seek to submit documentary evidence. Such a standard would be absurd. They may generally rely -on their own judgment regarding the submission of exhibits. However, Strickland presents a fact- and case-specific test. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (noting that Strickland “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence,” as each mitigation case is unique (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992))); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 394, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>), And this is no ordinary piece of evidence.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the supreme courts longstanding easebycase approach to determining whether an attorneys performance was unconstitutionally deficient under stricklmd v washington
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    petition for review of any decision or determination relating to the liability of any person for any unpaid money or claim collectible by the Department of Revenue, for or on behalf of the City or the School District of Philadelphia, including, but not limited to, any tax, water or sewer rent, license fee or other charge, and interest and penalties thereon, shall be filed with the Tax Review Board within 60 days after the mailing of a notice of such decision or determination to the petitioner. (Emphasis added). The failure to timely appeal an administrative agency action is a jurisdictional defect. Falcon Oil Co., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Res., 148 Pa.Cmwlth. 90, 609 A.2d 876 (1992). See also Robinson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 525 Pa. 505, 582 A.2d 857 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The word “shall” by definition is mandatory,

    ### Response:
    holding tardy filings go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to entertain a cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employ attorneys who can lawfully give legal advice to litigants or potential litigants, the elected District Clerks of Texas’ many counties rarely .employ attorneys for such purposes and are not constitutionally obligated to furnish prisoners with the sort of legal advice the Clerks of the federal courts provide to pro se litigants. The defendant’s rejection of plaintiffs submissions was based upon an objectively reasonable reliance upon a constitutionally valid state statutory scheme that imposes perfectly appropriate burdens upon prison inmates who wish to proceed In Forma Pauperis in the state trial courts. All of the plaintiffs requests for relief in this cause are without merit. Plaintiffs motion for default'judgment iv.P. 56(e). See also Cormier v. Pennzoil, 969 F.2d at 1561, (<HOLDING>). 68 . See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Metro Area includes counties in Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia. See Dep’t of Labor, May 2011 Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Area Definitions, available at http://www.bls. gov/oes/current/msa — def.htm. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ assertion, the Commission Agreement was not to be performed exclusively in Washington, D.C. Because the contract was to be performed in multiple states (and there is no reason to believe that one predominated over the others), the choice-of-law analysis reverts back to the place where the contract was made. East West argues that the Commission Agreement was made in Virginia-a contention that Defendants do not contest and therefore concede. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec Inc., No. 1:08cv918, 2010 WL 1667285, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23, 2010) (<HOLDING>) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Virginia

    ### Response:
    recognizing the general principle that a party who fails to address an issue has conceded the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. State, 589 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (stating that because state’s counsel had no way of knowing whether defendant would testify, it was not error to comment on defendant’s failure to testify during voir dire). Appellant’s tenth point of error is overruled. In point of error eleven, appellant avers the trial court erred by permitting the State to refer to its client as the “law-abiding citizens of this county.” Appellant asserts that because the State only represents “law- abiding citizens” and is prosecuting him in this case, the comment suggests appellant’s guilt, and is therefore improper. Because appellant failed to preserve his complaint for our review, he has waived this point of error. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s eleventh point of error is

    ### Response:
    holding under former rule 52a appellant must object to alleged error in the trial court or such error is waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s dismissal of the charges with prejudice. {17} To the contrary, in the City’s written response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the City specifically argued that the district court did not need to review the legal issue of the propriety of the municipal court’s dismissal of the charges with prejudice, and it made no arguments regarding whether the dismissal was improper under a de novo standard of review. Without taking any additional evidence or holding a hearing, the district court simply entered a ruling and denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. In its order, the district court did not address the propriety of the lower court’s dismissal with prejudice or whether a second trial de novo was appropriate. See State v. Lizzol, 2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 24, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886 (<HOLDING>). The district court only stated that it was

    ### Response:
    recognizing the specific need for an appropriate double jeopardy review when an appeal is taken by the state from a lower courts dismissal of the criminal charges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court to tie up a st arred suit where tax purchaser sought to undo tax sale because purchaser was, in effect, seeking a refund of taxes). To the contrary, it appears that Mr. Johnson would be quite content to allow the County to keep the taxes he paid on the property (or more precisely, that Z Financial paid, but that Mr. Johnson presumably reimbursed to Z Financial when he bought the certificate of purchase) and to put the property back on the tax rolls, provided that the County issue him a tax deed. It is the defendants, not Mr. Johnson, who argue that the County is not entitled to the revenue because the property is tax exempt. If Mr. Johnson were to receive his requested relief, the Illinois coffers would be increased, not decreased. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 94, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (<HOLDING>); Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 558 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding tia inapplicable to suit challenging the constitutionality of state tax credits where the relief sought would increase not decrease states revenue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    83 L.Ed. 104 (1938); see also Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29, 37 S.Ct. 492, 61 L.Ed. 966 (1917) (“A court that renders judgment against a defendant thereby tacitly asserts, if it does not do so expressly, that it has jurisdiction over that defendant.”). By rendering judgment against Appellant, the district court tacitly — and validly — concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.1983). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . Appellant does not argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction because his vessel was not, in fact, stateless. See United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir.1987)

    ### Response:
    holding that a plea of guilty is an admission of all material facts alleged in the charge including those facts that serve as factual predicates to subject matter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on her assertion that the State advocated a factual theory of her involvement in Cave’s dismemberment during her trial that was inconsistent with its theory during the Pitonyak trial. Citing excerpts from the closing arguments at each trial, Hall argues that during the Pitonyak trial “the State argued that it was Pitonyak’s idea to mutilate the body and the evidence showed appellant did not participate,” while “the theory and argument were exactly opposite” in her trial. In her first point of error, Hall argues that this claimed inconsistency violated her due process rights. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1056-59 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998); see also Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In her second point of error, Hall similarly

    ### Response:
    holding that use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of recovery of that overpayment. R. at 4-5. The Court has jurisdiction to review referred issues only to the extent that the appellant argues that remand, rather than referral, was appropriate. See Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 201, 202-03 (2012) (en banc order); Link v. West, 12 Vet.App. 39, 47 (1998) (""Claims that have been referred by the Board to the [regional office] are not ripe for review by the Court.”). Mr. Dent has not challenged the propriety of the Board’s referral. The Secretary informs the Court that the Milwaukee Pension Management Center subsequently denied the waiver request in a June 16, 2014, decision. Dec. 18, 2014, Secretary’s Response. The Court will not address the Board’s referral of the waiver issue. See Pederson v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 276 (2015) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 2 . By way of background, ""improved pension”

    ### Response:
    holding that the court has discretion not to consider an issue abandoned on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one of the purposes in establishing the offense of assault with intent to murder was to compound the punishment for attempted murder.” Id. at 322-23, 593 A.2d 671. In this case, like in Williams, the appellant’s attempted first degree murder conviction and first degree assault conviction arose out of the same acts: his firing a handgun at Clark as Clark retreated from the scene. While we disagree, as we have explained, -with the appellant’s assertion that the offenses merge under the “required evidence test,” we conclude that the sentences should have been merged under the rule of lenity. First degree assault of the (a)(2) modality is an attempt to cause, or actually causing, physical harm to another by use of a firearm. See Lamb v. State, 93 Md.App. 422, 428-29, 613 A.2d 402 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Like first degree assault of the (a)(1)

    ### Response:
    holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct as being directed at Roman’s counsel are insufficiently supported in the record. See State v. Kneeland, 552 A.2d 4, 5 (Me.1988) (appellant has burden to insure that record is adequate to allow effective review by appellate court of claims of error or abuse of discretion). Accordingly, Roman’s rights to a fair and impartial trial were not violated. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring. 1 . We reject at the outset Roman’s claim that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. Based on the evidence introduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged. State v. Barry, 495 A.2d 825, 826 (Me.1985). 2 . See, e.g., State v. Rubino, 564 A.2d 59, 61 (Me.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Boone, 563 A.2d 374, 376 (Me.1989)

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    called back and admitted he still had not filed the bankruptcy petition. Johnson never filed the petition and never returned any of Neef s fees. The commission found violations of ethical rules 32:1.1 32:1.3, 32:1.4, 32:1.16(d), and 32:8.4(a) , (c), and (d). Under ethical rules prohibiting neglect, attorneys must advance and protect their clients’ interests and attend to matters entrusted to their care in a reasonably timely manner. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 2010). Johnson’s neglect and failure to take any action, including failing to file a bankruptcy petition as agreed, violated rule 32:1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hauser, 782 N.W.2d 147, 150-53 (Iowa 2010) (<HOLDING>); Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d at 495 (finding

    ### Response:
    holding attorney violated rule 3213 when he neglected clients dissolution of marriage proceeding by failing to make filings and by failing to appear at the scheduled trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “there was a chance of me getting out and starting a new life”; and (2) the deal that Florida offered Ashley gave him complete immunity from prosecution on the burglary and murder charges in exchange for his testimony against Mills. We hold that this cross-examination exposed Ashley’s prior inconsistent statements and bargain with Florida to the extent that the jury could judge his credibility and Mills could argue effectively that Ashley’s testimony was not credible. Mills’s lawyer engaged in sufficient cross-examination, and the trial judge neither abused his discretion nor violated the Confrontation Clause in limiting the cross-examination to that which the attorney-client privilege did not protect. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1563 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 340

    ### Response:
    holding that despite district courts restriction on crossexamination of government witness concerning the sentencing benefits he would earn through testifying for the government it did not violate defendants confrontation rights because of defense counsels effective impeachment of the government witnesses credibility and sentence reduction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at least partially motivated by his membership in his family and his family’s political opinion. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir.2005). However, because of the vagueness of Spa-hi’s testimony regarding the motivations of his child persecutors, the record would not compel any reasonable adjudicator to find, contrary to the agency, that Spahi was persecuted on account of a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); cf. Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2003) (discussing that credible testimony may be too vague to establish refugee status), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 304-05 (2d Cir.2007); I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>). The BIA reasonably concluded that Spa-hi had

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the mere plausibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to justify reversal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be the agent of a publicly traded company if the publicly traded company directs and controls the employment decisions. For example, in Kalkunte v. DVI Fin. Servs., Inc., No.2004-SOX-56 (ALJ July 18, 2005), a non-publicly traded company, AP Services, was hired to operate a publicly traded company, DVI Financial Services, through bankruptcy. AP Services was deemed an agent of DVI Financial Services because AP Services’ main principal acted as DVI’s Chief Executive Officer, and admitted that he had made the decision to fire the claimant. Id. at 7. In other cases, the non-publicly traded company has been found to be almost inseparable from the publicly traded company, or subject to the same internal controls. See Morefield v. Exe-lon Servs., Inc., No.2004-SOX-2 (ALJ Jan. 28, 2004) (<HOLDING>); but see Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonpublicly traded subsidiary of a covered employer could be held liable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether the jury found appellants guilty of violating only one statute or both,” the defendants “were not prejudiced; they were sentenced as if they had violated only one of the statutes, each of which ... carries the same penalties.” Murray, 618 F.2d at 898. Our analysis in Murray is directly applicable to the present case. As in Murray, there is no danger here of prejudice in connection with a lack of notice or double jeopardy rights. Nor is there a threat of a completely non-unanimous verdict that would undermine the validity of defendant’s conviction, to the extent such conviction is premised on defendant’s participation in only one of the two transactions, because we may assume that the jury followed the court’s unanimity instruction. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 655, 97 S.Ct. 2034 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the verdict simply suffers from a

    ### Response:
    holding with respect to unanimity instruction that we cannot assume that the jury disregarded these clear and unambiguous instructions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wickline, 530 So.2d at 714; Dunnam, 366 So.2d at 672. Our case law is in accord with this view. See Johnston v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 727 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting plaintiff's argument because it rested on state uninsured motorist statutes “that are grossly different from Mississippi’s”). 9 . See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So.2d 658, 663-65 (Miss.1994) (declaring invalid offset provision which operated to deny insured the maximum excess coverage the insured paid for); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So.2d 897, 904-05 (Miss.1986) (declaring void policy provision which stated that nonlisted vehicles would not be covered, but failed to inform insured that insured would not receive minimum statutoiy coverage); Nester, 459 So.2d at 793 (<HOLDING>); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 329

    ### Response:
    holding that policy exclusion for uninsured motorist claims involving permissive users violated mississippi public policy as expressed in the um act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and affirm. The facts of this case are known to the parties and need not be discussed here. The upward adjustments are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 720 (9th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). The district court’s factual findings supporting each adjustment were not illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). The application of enhancements for possession of images of minors under twelve and sadistic or masochistic images was not plain error. See United States v. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly considered the 18

    ### Response:
    holding application of vulnerable victim and sadistic or masochistic image adjustments was not impermissible double counting because the adjustments account for distinct wrongs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaints that are clearly baseless include those which describe fanciful, fantastic, or delusional scenarios); and Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d at 281. See also Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d at 259. 103 . See Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319-20 (5th Cir.1993). 104 . 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 105 . Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir.1994); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d .1996), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 68, 136 L.Ed.2d 29 (1996); and Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159 n. 13 (5th Cir.1992). 161 . See Board of County Commissioners, Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, — U.S.-,-, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). 162 . See Board of County Commissioners, Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, — U.S. at-- -, 117 S.Ct. at 1388-89, (<HOLDING>). 163 . See Eugene v. Alief I.S.D., 65 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that only deliberate conduct by a municipality which actually causes an injury is compensable under section 1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the France opinion by declining to answer the question directly presented by this case: “Finally, we need not decide in this case whether § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) would apply to a defendant who announced during a robbery that he had a gun. In this case France claimed to have dynamite, which could blow up the entire bank, not just the people in the immediate vicinity.” Id. The government now asks that we reach the question left unanswered by France. Before embarking on that inquiry, we respond to Jennings’s argument that we are no longer bound by our holding and reasoning in France because of an intervening change in the language of the Guidelines provision at issue. After France was decided, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the text of § 2B3.1 in two significant h Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gibson, 155 F.3d 844, 846-47

    ### Response:
    holding that i have a gun merits an enhancement because a reasonable teller would believe that failure to comply would result in being fatally shot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insurer where there has been a bad-faith refusal to settle resulting in an excess verdict, see Cowden, 389 Pa. at 468, 134 A.2d at 227; Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 511, 223 A.2d 8, 13 (1966), Allstate denominates attempts to assign exemplary entitlements under Section 8371 as champertous. In this line of argument, Allstate highlights that Pennsylvania courts have manifested a particular aversion to assignment of personal causes of action seeking penalties. See, e.g., Sensenig, 229 Pa. at 173, 78 A. at 92 (“Counsel for appellant practically admit that the treble damages imposed by the act of 1883 are to be regarded as a penalty, and that the right to such damages is not assignable.”); Osborn v. First Nat’l Bank of Athens, 175 Pa. 494, 498-99, 34 A. 858, 859 (1896) (<HOLDING>). Allstate recognizes that there are

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to pursue a statutory penalty for charging usurious interest was unassignable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appellees’ pretrial settlement with Cathedral in the Pines church. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code along with the common-law guides the analysis of this issue. Chapter 33 applies to “any cause of action based on tort in which a defendant, settling person, or responsible third party is found responsible for a percentage of the harm for which relief is sought.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code ANN. § 33.002(a)(1) (West 2008). Furthermore, section 33.012 requires the trial court to reduce the amount of recovery if the claimant has settled with one or more persons with respect to the cause of action by the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements. Id. § 33.012(b); see First Title Co. v. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>) The rationale for this doctrine is that the

    ### Response:
    holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of citizen jurors, as well as those of .the parties” and “best comports with the fair and efficient administration of justice.” Duk v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 320 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir.2003). We give weight to those same principles by adopting the totality-of-circumstances approach here. That said, recall should be the exception rather than the convenient rule, lest the sanctity of untainted jury deliberations be compromised. In sum, we hold that, in limited circumstances, a court may recall a jury shortly after it has been dismissed to correct an error in the verdict, but only after making an appropriate inquiry to determine that the jurors were not exposed to any outside influences that would compromise their ability to fairly reconsider the verdict. , See Figueroa, 683 F.3d at 73 (<HOLDING>). In deciding whether recall is proper, the

    ### Response:
    holding the pivotal inquiry is whether the jurors became susceptible to outside influences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“A party may not overcome a grant of summary judgment by merely offering conclusory statements.”); Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836 (Fed.Cir.1984) (“The party opposing the motion must point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counter statement of a fact or facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant. Mere denials or conclusory statements are insufficient.”); Redland Genstar, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed.Cl. 220, 232 (1997) (“‘[A]n expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies nothing of value to the judicial process.’”) (quoting Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir.1989)); J.F. Allen Co. v. United States, 25 Cl.Ct. 312, 325 (1992) (<HOLDING>). The proffered statements are unsupported by

    ### Response:
    holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2012). Mem. Op. at 10 n.2. But the Court explained that records required to be disclosed under FOIA are exempt from the Privacy Act. Id., citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2). 2 . FOIA Exemption 7(C) exempts documents compiled for law enforcement that ""could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). 3 . F0IA Exemption 6 allows withholding of ""personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which ""would constitute a clearty unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 4 . Since plaintiff has not challenged defendant's withholdings of the remaining documents in the OPF, the Court will treat the validity of those withholdings as conceded. See Fischer v. DOJ, 723 F.Supp.2d 104, 110 (D.D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>). 5 . 5 C.F.R. § 293.311 provides: (a) The

    ### Response:
    holding that the court may properly treat as conceded any exemptions and categories that plaintiff does not address in its opposition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rather than substantial changes to the nature of the work performed, our precedent and that of our sister circuits hold that the Axman defense is unavailable. In Consolidated Airborne, this court’s predecessor was presented with the question of whether changing only the quantity of goods purchased from the original contract to the resale contract made the contract so materially different that the original contractor could not be liable for the difference in the per unit costs of the goods. Consol. Airborne, 348 F.2d at 947-48. The Court of Claims held that changing the quantity of goods purchased did not suffice to establish a complete bar under Axman. Id. at 948. The Eighth Circuit held to similar effect in American Surety Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 652, 656-57 (8th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). In Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United

    ### Response:
    holding that changes in the quantity of units and the timing of delivery did not bar the government from using the resale contract as the measure of damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provisions are contained in a single sentence broken down into three subdivisions and stated in the conjunctive, as demonstrated by use of the word “and” connecting the second and third subdivisions. This conjunctive structure indicates that all three prongs must be applied to an extension of benefits. The second sentence of the extended coverage provision states that all of the provisions in the Policy will apply in the extended period. The Court finds that these extended coverage provisions were complied with by State Farm as a matter of law. On April 3, 1993, the defendant elected not to renew the plaintiffs policy. This decision was in accordance with both New York State law, see First United American Life Ins. Co. v. Curiale, 200 A.D.2d 243, 613 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (3d Dept.1994) (<HOLDING>), and the terms of the Policy’s “Renewability”

    ### Response:
    recognizing that insurers have the option to continue their policy in accordance with the statutes community rating requirements or to withdraw from the new york market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    public sale of assets pledged to secure the loan. No further judicial labor was required, so we conclude that the summary judgment was a final order disposing of the initial loan default action. Because an appeal of a nonfinal order was pending at the time, the trial court violated the express language of rule 9.130(f) by entering final judgment without having jurisdiction to do so. The summary judgment is thus null and void. See Bemben v. Chock, 938 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“The final summary judgment is a nullity because the trial court entered it during the pendency of the Sell ers’ interlocutory appeal of an order denying their motion to dissolve the Buyers’ lis pendens. See Fla. R.P. 9.130(f)”); McKenna v. Camino Real Vill. Ass’n, 8 So.3d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). A void judgment is “[a] judgment that has no

    ### Response:
    holding that the final judgment was entered without jurisdiction while a nonfinal appeal was still pending
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit. Such an expert should be treated as an ordinary witness. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note (1970). Courts and commentators now widely recognize the distinction between those experts whose knowledge and views lie within the ambit of Rule 26(b)(4) and those whose do not. E.g., Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 206 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 641 F.2d 984 (D.C.Cir.1979); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I.1976); accord, In re Application for Water Rights v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 677 P.2d 320 (Colo.1984) (en banc) (Colo.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)); see also Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball International, Inc., 620 F.2d 399 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). See generally, 4 J. Moore, J. Lucas & G.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs accountant whom trial court had prohibited from testifying about damages in breach of contract action because plaintiff had not identified him as an expert witness in fed rcivp 26b4 response should have been allowed to testify pursuant to fedr evid 701 as ordinary witness on basis of knowledge of plaintiffs records acquired in his capacity as plaintiffs accountant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Texas, 180 B.R. 160 (E.D.Tex.1995); Keller v. Blinder, 135 B.R. 892 (D.Co.1991), a litigant has the right to appeal final orders and decrees of the bankruptcy court, see § 158(a)(1), and may seek leave to appeal interlocutory (which is to say, non-final) orders and decrees. See § 158(a)(3). Whether or not to grant leave to appeal a non-final order is wholly within the discretion of the district court. See U.S. Trustee v. Vance, 189 B.R. 386 (W.D.Va.1995); QF Finance Ltd. v. National Indemnity Corp., 180 B.R. 510 (N.D.Ill.1995); In re American Freight System, Inc., 153 B.R. 316 (D.Kan.1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); compare 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (standards for interlocutory review of district court orders by circuit courts); see also White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374 (8th Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); In the Matter of Morse Electric Co., Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that circuit court cannot entertain interlocutory appeal when standards of  1292b are not met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability company. See Nelson v. Stahl, 173 F.Supp.2d 153, 164 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (""The Exchange Act’s definition of security does not refer to membership interests in limited liability companies.”). Nonetheless, plaintiffs asserted in their complaint and in briefing to the district court that DynaVision's interest in Signature was a security. Peeples did not question this assertion, nor did the district court analyze this issue on its own initiative. Our independent research of this issue indicates that whether DynaVision's interest could be considered a security is problematic. We are satisfied, however, that plaintiffs’ allegation that DynaVision's interest was a security passes the threshold test set forth in Bell v. Hood. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 416 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of any briefing on this issue

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs allegation that joint venture interests were securities was not so obviously frivolous as to fail the low jurisdictional bar in bell v hood
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to respond to interrogatories and requests for production are substantially similar to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(F)(3)(B) (""A discovery plan must state the parties' views and proposals on ... when discovery should be completed[.]""); Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A) (allowing parties thirty days to respond to interrogatories and requests for production, respectively). Federal court decisions are consistent with our conclusion. In Thomas v. Pacificorp, 324 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir.2003), the court stated that ""requests [for discovery] must be served at least thirty days prior to a completion of discovery deadline."" Id. at 1179. Other federal cases have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Sofo v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Chevola v. Cellco P'ship, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants a protective order where plaintiff failed to request discovery until nine days before the deadline
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    both Henry and Noel attested that the calendaring responsibility in his office lies solely with his assistants, and that in this instance, his assistants failed to calendar the deadlines set forth m the relevant standing orders. Moreover, office preparations for Hurricane Matthew contributed to the assistants’ failure to follow normal office procedure and calendar the deadlines. Counsel also attested that but for the failure to calendar the deadlines, he would have objected to the time sheets submitted by Reverse Mortgage and Nutter. These undisputed facts constitute the type of secretarial error or breakdown in normal office procedure, which constitute excusable neglect pursuant to rule 1.540(b). See Carter, Hawley, Hale Stores, Inc. v. Whitman, 516 So.2d 83, 83-84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Because the failure to comply

    ### Response:
    holding that neglectful but understandable breakdown in defendants established office practice that resulted in the complaint being lost on the desk of general counsel constituted excusable neglect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Mason v. Homes By Whitaker, Inc., 971 So.2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). The assignments did not alter the fact that the homeowners reside in Palm Beach County where the damage occurred and where the critical witnesses are located. Although RJG’s venue selection is “meaningful” in assessing the convenience of the parties, it “is not the paramount consideration.” See Elsenheimer, 952 So.2d at 578 (quoting Darby v. Atlanta Cas. Ins. Co., 752 So.2d 102, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Convenience is a compelling consideration in transferring venue. Id. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring venue to Palm Beach County. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Fuzzell, 681 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. DAVIS and KELLY, JJ„

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court abused its discretion in not transferring venue to alternative county
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made in a distinctly different context. The Court recognizes that the two statutes are similar in some ways, but dissimilar in others such as in comparing the scopes of the substantive rights protected and Congress’s intent with respect to available remedies outside the statutes themselves. The law is not so clear in light of the Kendall case alone to warrant the Court changing its opinion on this issue in which it carefully analyzed the various arguments and existing case law. Nevertheless, money damages are not recoverable against a state and its officials acting in their official capacities under § 1983 alone because there is no abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>). As the Court discussed in its opinion of

    ### Response:
    holding that congress did not intend to disturb the states eleventh amendment protection in passing  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or absurd result.”). Lastly, Cluley argues that the State improperly relied on an exhibit that was not introduced into evidence before the District Court. He refers to a letter from a representative of the testing equipment’s manufacturer concerning the acceptable testing parameters for the equipment in question. In its brief, the state explained that it only had marked this exhibit for identification purposes at the suppression hearing. Because the letter merely corroborated the testimony of DOH’s tester, the state’s reference to this document has no bearing on the outcome of our review. In any event, the rules of evidence do not apply at suppression hearings. See Rules 101(B)(1) and 104(a)(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; State v. Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I.1998) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion For these reasons,.we grant the

    ### Response:
    holding that the rules of evidence do not apply when a court is deciding upon preliminary questions dealing with the admissibility of evidence under rule 104 except for questions of privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of other affirmative defenses and probable cause in three precedential opinions. Holman, 564 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.2009); Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir.2007); Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir.1989). In Holman, the Third Circuit held that the “necessity” affirmative defense “need not have been considered in the assessment of probable cause for arrest for trespass at the scene.” 564 F.3d at 231. The Circuit held that a ruling to the contrary would require the arresting officer to “examine countless factual permutations to determine the ‘necessity’ of specific conduct at a given moment in time.” Id. at 231. In Sands, the Circuit held that an officer need not consider whether the charges are barred by a statute of limitations when determining whether there is probable .2012) (<HOLDING>). The Gorman court explained that: [CJlaims of

    ### Response:
    holding that once probable cause was established the officer was not required to investigate whether the person arrested was a victim acting in selfdefense or the aggressor in a domestic violence situation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    engage in sexual acts, a prosecutor may charge that behavior as both luring and attempted sexual conduct with a minor, as happened in this case. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1001(A)(2), 13-1405(A), 13-3554. Indeed, the same evidence was marshalled to convict Farnsworth of both offenses. In describing the offense of luring, the legislature implicitly acknowledged that the crime might involve someone posing as a child under fifteen. See § 13-3554(A), (B) (“having reason to know that the other person is a minor” sufficient mental state for offense; no defense that actual person lured was not a minor). Yet it also expressly excluded DCAC enhancement when the target was not an actual minor under the age of fifteen. See § 13—3554(C); State v. Regenold, 227 Ariz. 224, ¶ 4, 255 P.3d 1028, 1030 (App. 2011) (<HOLDING>); State v. Villegas, 227 Ariz. 344, ¶ 3, 258

    ### Response:
    holding plain language compelled that reading
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The court noted that the worker’s medical exams “revealed no abnormalities” and there was no “data concerning the level or amount of chemicals to which [she] was exposed or the mechanism of exposure.” Kuxhausen, 241 P.3d at 81. Like Dr. Keifer, Kuxhausen’s doctor testified only that there were substances listed on the Material Safety Data Sheets “that can make people sick,” with no supporting basis for concluding that those materials did make the claimant sick. Kuxhausen, 241 P.3d at 81. The court held that the doctor’s opinion was based on the logical fallacy that because the symptoms followed the exposure, they must be caused by it. “Such reasoning is nothing more than speculation.” Kuxhausen, 241 P.3d at 81; see also Elshaug v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2003 ND 177, 671 N.W.2d 784 (<HOLDING>). ¶27 According to Potter, such criticisms

    ### Response:
    holding sufficient evidence supported the departments conclusion that the worker failed to prove her sensitivity to chemicals was fairly traceable to her employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a particular phrase in a statute that has stood for over 20 years. ""This court has long been committed to the principle that a construction given to a statute by the court becomes a part thereof, unless the legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change."" City of Sun Prairie v. PSC, 37 Wis. 2d 96, 100, 154 N.W.2d 360 (1967). ""Legislative inaction following judicial construction of a statute, while not conclusive, evinces legislative approval of the interpretation."" State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 566, 455 N.W.2d 143 (1990). Thus, generally, ""[Legislative silence with regard to new court-made decisions indicates legislative acquiescence in those decisions."" State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 641, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993). See also Bauman, 7 Wis. 2d at 469-70 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 53. Romanshek contends that this doctrine

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not proper to depart from stare decisis where court had previously ruled that policy exclusion did not violate omnibus insurance coverage statute and legislature had not amended statute in the 11 years since the prior decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the absence of a direct conflict, a state law violates the supremacy clause when it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Id. at 186-87 (quoting Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 791 (1st Cir.1987) (citations omitted)). 1. Presumption Against Preemption Defendants vigorously contend that there should be no presumption against preemption in this context, for “[pjolicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ ... such as to warrant a presumption against finding federal preemption of a state-law cause of action.” Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347, 121 S.Ct. 1012 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)) (<HOLDING>). The Courts have long presumed that the

    ### Response:
    holding that state claims for fraudulent submissions to the fda were preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property pursuant to state statute acted “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983. Id. at 924-25, 942, 102 S.Ct. 2744. The statute authorized a court clerk to issue a writ of attachment based solely on a creditor’s ex parte petition. Id. at 924-25, 102 S.Ct. 2744. No judge reviewed the petition before the clerk issued the writ. Id. The Court limited its holding, noting that “we do not hold today that a private party’s mere invocation of state legal procedures constitutes joint participation or conspiracy with state officials satisfying the § 1983 requirement of action under color of law.” Id. at 939 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (quotations and citatio state authority, they never exercised state power over Carlson or conspired with state officials. See Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 855 (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that a store is not a state actor when pursuant to state statute it detains a suspected shoplifter in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable period of time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    same Peart issue he has •eviously raised in his 1988 case. The lird District affirmed on October 5, 2001. ;e 3d DCA case docket 3D02-2467. Al-ough Petitioner did not raise any of the me claims in that motion, which he is >w raising, his current Petition is still ne barred. Even if Petitioner’s claims were not ne barred or successive, this Court would also deny Petitioner’s claim based on well established Florida precedent. Although there is conflict among the districts regarding whether affirmative misadvice about collateral consequences of accepting a plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, the Third District Court of Appeal has held that even affirmative misadvice does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Scott v. State, 813 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). See also Collier v. State,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant is not entitled to postconviction relief where he has been given affirmative misadvice regarding possible sentence enhancing consequences of the plea in the event that the defendant commits a new crime in the future that is so because the defendant is under a legal duty to refrain from committing further crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sufficiently available and likely in the future as to be a material consideration in deciding how much to pay for the land. See Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. CIR, 615 F.3d 321, 335 (5th Cir.2010) (“The key inquiry [in determining highest and best use] is what a hypothetical willing buyer would consider in deciding how much to pay for the property.” (citing 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d at 781)); Olson, 292 U.S. at 255, 54 S.Ct. 704 (“The highest.and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered ... to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value while the property is privately held.”); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 132 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir.1943) (<HOLDING>). And on that score, even the Government’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that although the case involved an undeveloped property in a state of nature speculative elements regarding potential future uses are  proper to consider if they do in fact influence the value at the time enquired about
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Defendants’ objections to the plan were never ruled on, since the parties settled their dispute with regard to the Plan. Next, Trustee’s contention that Defendants essentially waived their standing objection is unavailing. Standing, a jurisdictional question, cannot be waived. Wiggins v. Martin, 150 F.3d 671, 673 (7th Cir.1998). While “[i]t is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that a party with adequate notice of a bankruptcy proceeding cannot ordinarily attack a confirmed plan,” In re Harvey, 213 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir.2000) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a)), confirmation of a bankruptcy plan “is res judicata only as to issues that can be raised in the less formal procedure for contested matters[.]” Strong v. IRS (In re Strong), 203 B.R. 105, 114 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>). “[A] confirmed plan acts more or less like a

    ### Response:
    holding that confirmation generally cannot have preclusive effect as to the validity of a lien which must be resolved in an adversary proceeding as man by fedrbankrp 70012
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    critical time. The last of these is the principal vehicle by which the majority finds qualified immunity here. Judge Ervin’s dissent persuasively demonstrates the error in that analysis. The majority holds today that “[ojrdinarily, ... courts in this circuit need not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the ease arose to determine whether a right was clearly established at a particular time.” Maj. op. at 709. I disagree that such an approach should inevitably be applied, and would consider pertinent authority from other jurisdictions in determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C.Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F.Supp. 1025, 1040-42

    ### Response:
    holding that the duty of disclosure affects not only the prosecutor but the government as a whole including its investigative agencies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of cases is distinguishable, however. To begin with, Shull no longer applies to habitual felony offender sentencing. The legislature has amended section 775.084 to specify that a habitual felony offender sentence is not subject to the sentencing guidelines. It also amended section 775.084 to delete the requirement that the trial court determine “if it is necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant to an extended term.” See Ch. 88-131, § 6, at 708-09, Laws of Fla.; § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2001) (“A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002.”). Habitual offender sentencing is now separate from both the sentencing guidelines and sentencing under the Criminal Punishment Code. See Bateman v. State, 566 So.2d 358, 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Owens v. State, 560 So.2d 1260, 1261 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the amendment to section 775084 superseded whitehead and a habitual offender sentence in excess of the guidelines even in the absence of stated reasons for departure is now valid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Chamberlain separately moved to dismiss Mr. Bella’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Raising the defense of qualified immunity, the officers argued as a threshold matter that the complaint failed to state a constitutional claim. They also argued that, even if the complaint did state a constitutional claim, they were still entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable. The district court held that the complaint stated a claim under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and that the qualified immunity defense did not otherwise shield the defendants from liability. Making the same arguments they made below, Officers Meyers and Chamberlain now bring this appeal pursuant to Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (<HOLDING>). II. Discussion A. Qualified Immunity We

    ### Response:
    holding that a district courts denial of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that it turns on an issue of law is an appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 usc  1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    death claim, II. Discussion A party is entitled to summary judgment only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from a district court’s order denying summary judgment, because such an order is not a final decision.” Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[B]ut an immediate appeal is appropriate where summary judgment is denied on the grounds of sovereign immunity or qualified immunity, because immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Audrain Cnty. Joint Commc’ns, 781 F.3d 925, 929-30 (8th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). The scope of our review is limited to issues

    ### Response:
    holding that the collateral order doctrine permitted interlocutory review of a denial of a motion for summary judgment under missouris sovereign immunity statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his jurisdiction when he reduced the officer’s suspension to a period of time not authorized by the Act and ordered back pay during the time the officer was suspended contrary to the Act. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 546-50 (also holding hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by demoting the officer below his prior rank, which was outside the remedies available to the hearing examiner under the Act). The intermediate courts of appeals that have addressed allegations that a hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction have required the city to establish that the examiner acted outside the scope of the Act or violated a specific requirement of the Act. See, e.g., City of Beaumont v. Mathews, No. 09-10-00198-CV, 2011 WL 3847338, at *2 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Aug. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. City of Houston, 309 S.W.3d 681,

    ### Response:
    holding hearing examiner acted contrary to the act thereby exceeding his jurisdiction by reinstating firefighter without an evidentiary hearing where notice given to firefighter did state the charged acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against Defendants-Appellees Arab Republic of Egypt and the National Bank of Egypt on the grounds that the defendants are immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611. In the alternative, the district court concluded that the suit should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in finding that none of the exceptions to the Act applies, and in concluding that this case should be heard in, an Egyptian forum. We affirm on the basis of the district court’s alternative holding that this case should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (<HOLDING>). In order to determine whether to dismiss a

    ### Response:
    holding that a court can dismiss a case under forum non conveniens before resolving any other jurisdictional issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should be reversed. See Pullman-Standard, Padgett, Ortiz, Robinette, and Gilbert, all supra. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 1 . Indeed, the Board rejected Mr. Washington's statement because it was, in the Board's view, uncorroborated and because he was not competent as a layperson to render a medical opinion, not because he lacked credibility. Contrary to the Board's assertions, there is no requirement that Mr. Washington's statement be corroborated, and service connection may be shown through lay evidence. See Rowell v. Principi, 4 Vet.App. 9, 19 (1993) (Board must explain why lay evidence alone is insufficient to establish entitlement to benefits; holding lay evidence alone may be sufficient to establish benefits); Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 147, 148 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 24, 25-26

    ### Response:
    holding that va regulations do not provide that service connection can only be shown through medical records but rather allow for proof through lay evidence and that lay evidence may serve to place evidence in equipoise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to talk to the police. State: Why not talk to the police if what you are saying is true. Defendant: Because I could always talk to them. State: You could? When? Defendant: Whenever I got my lawyer. State: And did you do that? Defendant: I got my lawyer. State: Did you talk to the police? Defendant: They never came and talked to me. State: Oh, did you[r] attorney ever invite them to come talk to you and say, hey, we got a meeting? Defendant: I mean, I figured it was probably too much — too late then. State: Oh. So you didn’t really want to talk to the police? Defendant: I mean, I never — it came up. That never — it was never in the conversation. This line of questioning clearly constituted comments on the appellant’s right to remain silent. See State v. Hoggins, 718 So.2d 761 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, it appears counsel may have been

    ### Response:
    holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendants exercise of his or her right to remain silent it violates the defendants state constitutional right to silence whether comment was introduced in states caseinchief or for impeachment purposes holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his postarrest or postmiranda silence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    604 F.2d 326, 334-36 (5th Cir.1979) (no agreement to import munitions without a license where parties “just discussed how [they] could possibly do it”); Steinberg, 525 F.2d at 1134 (no conspiracy where defendant’s statements regarding agreement were “equivocal”). There need not be a specific agreement as to price, quantity, and time, place and manner of delivery. See United States v. Sharif, 817 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir.1987). But there must be an agreement to commit some offense. No such agreement exists if the parties to the alleged conspiracy raise objections and impose unaccepted preconditions on their agreement. See Sharif, 817 F.2d at 1378; United States v. Jones, 765 F.2d 996, 1002 (11th Cir.1985); see also United States v. Podolsky, 798 F.2d 177, 178 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Iennaco imposed the unaccepted precondition

    ### Response:
    holding that unaccepted precondition to agreement would have defeated conspiracy but upholding conspiracy conviction based on district courts finding that agreement existed although performance was subject to certain conditions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concept,” Arnold v. Amoco Oil Co., 872 F.Supp. 1493, 1500 (W.D.Va.1995), and a “range of prices” may have a “reasonable claim[] to being [i.e., approaching] fair market value.” Slatky, 830 F.2d at 485. Because a range of prices may reasonably be found to approach fair market value, the mere fact that the parties have submitted competing appraisals and/or offers does not necessarily preclude the entry of summary judgment in one party’s favor. See, e.g., Rhodes, 143 F.3d at 1372 (“We wish to emphasize, however, that we do not hold that summary judgment for the franchisor can never be proper, and that jury trial must always be had, whenever the parties each produce an appraisal and the appraisals do not arrive at identical conclusions on value”); see also Sandlin, 900 F.2d at 1482-83 (<HOLDING>). This is because an estimation of “ ‘value’

    ### Response:
    holding that judgment as a matter of law was properly entered in a franchisors favor despite a difference between the parties appraisals as the difference was relatively small and the franchisors offer was between the two
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cf. Alscot Investing Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, 64 N.Y.2d 921, 488 N.Y.S.2d 629, 477 N.E.2d 1083 (1985) (upholding a change in the zoning code after a temporary moratorium delayed the issuance of a permit). In Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 234 Neb. 527, 451 N.W.2d 702 (1990), Whitehead Oil purchased property that was zoned for a planned commercial district. It was subsequently rezoned as a neighborhood business district which permitted retail stores, ear washes, and service stations. In 1986, the company applied for a land-use permit that would allow a convenience store, car wash, and gasoline station on the property. The planning director initially recommended denying the proposed use, but after White , 487 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). C. RESOLUTION OF THE ESTOPPEL ISSUE The

    ### Response:
    holding that a city may not act arbitrarily in adopting a moratorium ordinance in order to prevent a party from obtaining a building permit to delay or prevent a single project the city must exercise the authority for the purpose of protecting the planning process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.J.S.A 2C:58-3c(6), for example, prohibits issuance of a handgun purchase permit or firearms purchaser identification card to any person who is subject to a FRO issued pursuant to N.J.S.A 20:26-29 that prohibits the person from possessing any firearm. 18 U.S.CA § 922(g)(8) makes it unlawful for any person who is subject to a court order that “restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner ... and ... includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner ... or ... by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner[,]” to possess any firearm. See State v. S.A., 290 N.J.Super. 240, 247, 250-51, 675 A.2d 678 (App.Div.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, there is a strong public policy

    ### Response:
    holding that a fro issued under the act satisfied all the criteria of 18 usca  922g8ac making it illegal for the defendant to possess firearms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agreement, Furesz voluntarily waived the right to file any appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 except “to appeal the sentencing court’s determination of the criminal history category” or to challenge the imposition of a sentence outside the Guidelines range. App. at 47. Furesz, however, argues that the District Court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was “based on a criminal history category that vastly overstated the seriousness of Mr. Furesz’s record.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2. This argument is not a challenge to the District Court’s determination of Furesz’s criminal history category, but to the Court’s failure to grant his motion for a downward variance. It is therefore barred by his plea agreement. Cf. United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d, 416, 425-26 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the

    ### Response:
    holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    scene showed that Cantu had staged the evidence. And undisputed physical evidence contradicted portions of Cantu’s theory that the shooting was accidental. Cantu stated and demonstrated on the video that he was pulling the gun away from Jackie’s head when it discharged, but the evidence showed the gun was fired with the muzzle of the gun placed against Jackie’s forehead. Dr. Pustilnik also explained how other pieces of physical evidence did not support the defensive theory that the gun accidentally discharged during a struggle. From the evidence presented, the jury could have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no struggle for the gun and that Cantu intentionally or knowingly caused Jackie’s death. See Howard v. State, 484 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (<HOLDING>); see also Aldridge v. State, No.

    ### Response:
    holding evidence sufficient to support jurys verdict when physical evidence including evidence gun was fired from a distance greater than appellant told police was inconsistent with accidental discharge during a struggle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The district court correctly held that the bankruptcy court’s order satisfied those requirements. As noted above, the bankruptcy court’s order assigned to Baum the estates’ right to sue various individuals and to avoid various transactions. On its face, that order “finally determine[d] the discrete issue to which it is addressed.” See, e.g., Frontier Properties, 979 F.2d at 1363. Baum nevertheless argues that the decision is not “final,” because the bankruptcy court retains some control over the assigned assets. We are not persuaded. The bankruptcy court retains control only over monetary matters if Baum prevails in litigation or avoids a transaction. For example, the bankruptcy court can determine the appropriate amount of attorney fees and costs, if disp 1, 583 n. 1 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). AVOIDANCE POWERS A. Standard of Review The

    ### Response:
    holding that a judgment resolving the question of the priority of the federal tax lien   constitutes a final and appealable order over which we have jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trustee,” states “a proceeding to contest any act or failure to act by the United States trustee is [a contested matter] governed by Rule 9014.” Implicit in these rules is the conclusion that all acts of the U.S. Trustee are subject to review by the Court. See In re Barney’s, Inc., 197 B.R. 431, 437-38 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996)(noting that the Advisory Committee Notes to the Bankruptcy Rules further support this inherent power of review). In the opinion of this Court, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1102 does not restrict or limit this authority in any way. Numerous decisions have held that the court may modify or alter the composition of a committee when it does not adequately represent the parties-in-interest and that the court is not limited to ordering appointme .R. 209, 210-211 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990)(<HOLDING>); In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 8

    ### Response:
    holding that inadequate representation may only be remedied by appointment of another committee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fourth, if the claimant’s “severe impairment” is not listed in Appendix 1, the ALJ determines whether the claimant maintains the RFC to perform the work that she performed prior to the onset of her impairment (“past work”). Finally, at step five, if the claimant is unable to perform past work, or has no previous work history, the ALJ ascertains whether there is other work that the claimant is capable of performing. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir.1982) (per curiam); Morillo, 150 F.Supp.2d at 545. The burden lies with the claimant to prove the requirements of the first four steps, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Berry, 675 F.2d at 467; see also Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1996); Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 112 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Where a claimant suffers

    ### Response:
    holding that when the claimant has established that his impairment prevents him from returning to his previous employment the burden shifts to the commissioner who must produce evidence to show the existence of alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy and which the claimant could perform considering not only his physical and mental capability but also his age education experience and training
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to its trademark infringement and unfair competition claims). Consequently, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93A claim. VIII. HALL’S COUNTERCLAIM In his counterclaim, Hall alleges that The Black Dog Tavern, through its September 5, 1991 letter to Famous Sportswear and its subsequent commencement of this action, intentionally and wrongfully interfered with his advantageous business relationship with Famous Sportswear. He also claims that plaintiffs interference, which allegedly cost him over 860 T-shirt sales, constituted unfair competition in violation of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 93A. To prevail on either theory, Hall must prove that plaintiffs actions were somehow improper. See United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811, 815-16, 551 N.E.2d 20, 23 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8

    ### Response:
    holding improper conduct to be an element of the tort of intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 287-88. 16 . See id. at 285-87. 17 . See id. at 286. 18 .759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988). 19 .794 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1990). 20 . See O.K. Lumber, 759 P.2d at 524-25. 21 . See id. at 525. 22 . Id. at 526. 23 . Id. at 525. 24 . See Collins, 794 P.2d at 940. 25 .Id. at 947. 26 .See Sauer, 841 P.2d at 178. 27 . See id. at 179. 28 . See id. at 179-80. 29 . Id. at 180. 30 . Id. at 184. 31 . Id. 32 . We note that we have rejected the distinction between physical and economic losses which seems to underlie § 766C. See Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 360 (Alaska 1987). And although we have not previously discussed § 766C, we have declared that agents can be held personally liable for their independent tortious acts. See Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 308 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>); Barber v. National Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding attorney potentially liable for independent torts committed while working for firm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    running ads that feature the half-bottle of Gatorade, or any other Gatorade trademarks or logos, SVC’s request for injunctive relief based on alleged trademark dilution by tarnishment is also moot. 6. SVC argues that its request to enjoin Coca-Cola from running these ads is not moot because Coca-Cola’s alleged record of following a “cheat and retreat” strategy evinces bad faith and a likelihood that it will resume the ads. However, SVC’s fear that Coca-Cola will resume the ads is speculative at best and does not warrant a preliminary injunction in light of Coca-Cola’s sworn declarations and testimony under oath that it will not resume the ads during the course of this litigation. See Do The Hustle, LLC v. Rogovich, No. 03 Civ. 3870, 2003 WL 21436215, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Coca-Cola’s cessation of the ads and its

    ### Response:
    holding that speculative fears ascribing dishonesty to defendants assurances that he would not resume allegedly unlawful actions were not immediate enough to justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. While Manning’s complaint appears to present Count Two as an ERISA interference claim, in resisting ARIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Manning argues Count Two is instead an ERISA retaliation claim. Manning can establish ERISA-based retaliation through direct evidence, or in the absence of direct evidence of an employer’s deliberate interference with STD benefits, the Court analyzes § 510 interference claims using the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden-shifting analysis common to Title VII and ADEA cases. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1035 n. 7 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 1. Direct Evidence Manning may produce direct

    ### Response:
    holding because the plaintiffs erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence  the eighth circuit analyzed the claim under the mcdonnell douglas framework
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    support, a Mozingo claim in a suit by a patient). Thus, the students have not cited, and we have not found, a single North Carolina case permitting unrelated third party victims of a patient to sue the patient’s health care providers for medical malpractice, or even suggesting that such claims are possible. Instead, North Car olina courts have emphasized the policy reasons counseling rejection of such suits; “ ‘doctors- should owe their duty to their patient and not to anyone else’ so as not to compromise this primary duty.” Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C.App. 637, 482 S.E.2d 30, 33 (N.C.Ct.App.1997) (rejecting a third party claim of harm based on the care provided by a medical provider to a patient) (citations omitted); see also Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744, 746 (N.C.1931) (<HOLDING>); Nash v. Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356,

    ### Response:
    holding that doctors do not have to accept patients
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    addiction over the past four years, not to mention their later unreliable testimony at the evidentiary hearing attempting to explain those lies, make it impossible for the Court now to believe a word they say about the cause of the fire. Dismissal is really the only meaningful sanction available to the Court at this late juncture. D. Relationship Between Misconduct and Matters in Controversy “The most critical criterion for the imposition of a dismissal sanction is that the misconduct penalized must relate to matters in controversy in such a way as to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Halaco, 843 F.2d at 381. A plaintiffs drug use is highly probative of product misuse and proximate cause. See, e.g., Bocanegra v. Vicmar Services, Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 587 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of a plaintiffs marijuana use eight hours prior to a motor vehicle fire was relevant where an expert testified that marijuana use can affect cognitive functions for up to 12 hours after the acute high has worn off
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    third was perceived deficiencies in Gherman’s documentary evidence in support of her application. None of these bases can support the finding. The IJ relied on three particular “inconsistencies and lack of detail” with respect to Gherman’s Pentecostal faith: (1) her appearance; (2) the propriety of singing and dancing in the Pentecostal church; and (3) particular details of the Pentecostal faith. Assuming, arguendo, that there is some contradiction between Gherman’s profession to be a devout Pentecostal and her attire, she offered the plausible explanation that her particular church is no longer as strict about such matters. The IJ failed to address this explanation or to explain how the government’s evidence could rebut it. Cf. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). “Because an adverse credibility finding is

    ### Response:
    holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.Supp.2d at 45 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327); see also Smith v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 151, 158 (D.D.C.2006). Yet a fee petition that does not identify the specific attorneys who performed each respective activity is considered insufficiently detailed. Gray v. District of Columbia, 779 F.Supp.2d 68, 72 n. 5 (D.D.C.2011). Without such information, the court is unable to evaluate whether an attorney’s hourly billable rate and billed hours are reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see also Blackman v. District of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d 12, 14 (D.D.C.2005) (applying Hensley in t ate an exception to the application of the Laffey Matrix for IDEA litigation); see also Cox, 754 F.Supp.2d at 76 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, this court has rejected the

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel must have specialized knowledge of the bureaucracy and practices of dcps to handle idea cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. A plaintiff can attribute a constitutional tort to the city itself by showing the injury was caused by city policy, by city custom, or by policymaking officials’ deliberate indifference to constituents’ constitutional rights. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197. “Policy is made when a ‘decisionmaker [with] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action’ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (alteration in Andrews) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292); see, e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 485, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (<HOLDING>). “Custom ... can be proven by showing that a

    ### Response:
    holding city liable when county prosecutor instructed deputy sheriffs to forcibly enter a doctors office and effect an arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ex-spouse or child of the debtor and not one of the three payees expressly named in the statute. In re Kline, 65 F.3d at 751. Accord, Williams v. Kemp (In re Kemp), 232 F.3d 652 (8th Cir.2000) (affirming the lower courts’ rulings that debts owed to debtor’s child’s mother for birth expenses, necessities and child support were nondisehargeable even though child’s mother was not a payee named in the statute). Pre-BAPCPA, the rule in these exception to discharge cases was equally applicable to the issue of whether a claim was entitled to priority in a chapter 13 case because identical language was used to describe both the nondisehargeable debt under section 523(a)(5) and the claim entitled to priority under 507(a)(7). Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). Prior Sections 523(a)(5) and 507(a)(7)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that application of section 507a7 should be coincidental with application of section 523a5 because of identical language in the two statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    newly raised constitutional issues. Id. Here, Pugmire did not even argue — let alone demonstrate— plain error or exceptional circumstances; accordingly, the constitutional issue is not properly before this court and we will not consider it further. See City of Orem v. Lee, 846 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). II. Sufficiency of Evidence Pugmire argues the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the knife he carried was a dangerous weapon. The knife itself was the only evidence presented at trial on this issue. Although we are dissatisfied with the controlling analysis found in State v. Archam-beau, 820 P.2d 920, 928-30 (Utah App.1991), we are constrained to follow it. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (<HOLDING>). In Archambeau, the only evidence the trial

    ### Response:
    holding stare decisis applies when one court of appeals panel is faced with previous decision of different panel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Pursuant to Rule 4(c), in order for Allsopp to have been properly served, the process server had to (1) serve him in person, (2) leave the process papers at his “dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age or discretion” residing there with him, or (3) deliver the process papers to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service for him. In the present case, the process server testified that, when Davis opened the door, he asked if Allsopp resided there and Davis responded that Allsopp did. The process server stated that he could see a man he ss.2008) (<HOLDING>). Here, service of process was not attempted

    ### Response:
    holding that service was sufficient where process server dropped papers in the front yard after defendant refused to accept them and attempted to walk away
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is sufficient to permit an inference of gender discrimination on Roccanova’s part in connection with the administration of the RIF. First, Roccanova herself is a woman, and although not conclusive, see Feingold v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 155 (2d Cir.2004), that fact is relevant to the inquiry. See Zito, 869 F.Supp.2d at 395 (RIF decision-maker’s gender and age precluded an inference of age or gender discrimination). Second, the connection between these alleged comments and Roceanova’s participation in the January RIF is attenuated. To permit some inference of discriminatory intent, these two comments would need to be related to the adverse employment action in question. See, e.g., Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, No. 02 Civ. 5191(VM), 2003 WL 22251313, at *9-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (<HOLDING>), aff'd 110 Fed.Appx. 160 (2d Cir.2004).

    ### Response:
    holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to pursue his career. But the Court does not discern that this is a meaningful distinction, because the university professor in Roth also might have had to move geographic locations to teach at another university. To be sure, in Roth, the Supreme Court noted that a different result might be called for if the state had invoked any regulations “to bar the respondent from all other public employment in state universities.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74; Cf. Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 327-29 (6th Cir.1983) (recognizing a due process violation where a member of the state licensing board intentionally misapplied licensing law to foreclose Plaintiff from barbering anywhere in the state); Parate, 868 F.2d at 831. See also Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff stated a valid liberty interest claim where he contended that based on industry custom he was foreclosed from working at any savings and loan in the state where he had been denied a de facto license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    391 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1998). The bankruptcy court, identifying the assets of a law firm under the Pennsylvania UPA, looked to general principles of partnership law to hold that the partnership did not end at dissolution, but extended through the winding up period. 227 B.R. at 407. During that period, the partners still owe each other a duty, and must complete the unfinished business of the partnership. Id. at 407-08. In surveying other jurisdictions, the bankruptcy court concluded that post-dissolution proceeds (obtained during the winding up), whether from hourly or contingency fees, are assets of the partnership. Id. at 408. The trial court here also cited Melenyzer v. Tershel, No. 99-5200, 2004 WL 5149401 (C.P. Washington January 2, 2004) ll.Dec. 602, 485 N.E.2d 413 (Ill.App.Ct.1985) (<HOLDING>); Sullivan, Bodney & Hammond v. Bodney, 16

    ### Response:
    holding that handling contingency fee cases is part of winding up and fees earned in those cases were partnership assets
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    affairs, and that “irremediable adverse consequences” may flow from a determination that this case is not currently ripe for review. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 158, 164, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1525, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967). That the interpretations do not directly compel plaintiffs to take immediate action does not mean that the plaintiffs do not suffer immediate hardship, sufficient to trigger review. See Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction, 548 F.2d 559, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1977) (parents challenge of school regulation requiring teachers to “inculcate the practice of every Christian virtue” was ripe because of immediate, inevitable effect on teachers’ behavior), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089, 99 S.Ct. 872, 59 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979); see also Better Government Association, at 93-95 (<HOLDING>); American Federation of Government Employees

    ### Response:
    recognizing hardship where plaintiff alleged it was being deprived of statutory entitlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the burden of establishing all elements of her entitlement. See, e.g., Shultz, 8 F.3d at 850. Mullins must therefore demonstrate that her attorneys charged a reasonable rate and that the time they expended on her representation was reasonable. See In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1994) (per curiam). Based on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted by Mullins, we conclude that the hourly rates charged by her attorneys ($90 — $295) comport with prevailing community standards and are within the realm of reasonableness. Id. We also conclude that she has, for the most part, provided adequate descriptions and documentation of the work performed. See National Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319,1327 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Mullins submits numerous monthly bills for

    ### Response:
    holding that a fee application must contain sufficiently detailed information about the hours logged and the work done
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    But, the Court found no such problem in Street’s case, “holding] that the trial judge’s instructions were the appropriate way to limit the jury’s use of [the co-conspirator’s confession] in a manner consistent with the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 417, 105 S.Ct. 2078. Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87

    ### Response:
    holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would be presumed in the present circumstánces. 5 . Horton has not introduced competent evidence to challenge the state court's finding that defense counsel welcomed the voir procedure for strategic reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that in habeas proceeding state court factual determinations are pre sumptively correct absent contrary showing by clear and convincing evidence). The only arguably contrary information is an affidavit from Horton's habeas counsel containing a summary of his conversations with defense counsel in which defense counsel stated that he should have insisted that the individual voir dire be conducted in public. This affidavit is inadequate to justify disregarding the state court's finding. Cf. United States v. Maguire, 600 F.2d 330, 332 (1st Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Arguably, Horton’s public trial rights

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavit of appellate counsel summarizing conversations with trial counsel in which trial counsel admitted making errors is hearsay and cannot establish ineffective assistance claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1132(a)(3). Count VII seeks an order enjoining John Hancock from paying Plan benefits secondary to Medicare. Count VIII of Santana’s complaint requests attorney’s fees pursuant to section 1132(g)(1). ERISA contemplates actions against an employee benefit plan and the plan’s fiduciaries. With narrow exception, however, ERISA does not authorize actions against nonfiduciaries of an ERISA plan. See Klosterman v. Western Gen. Management, Inc., 32 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir.1994) (opining that claim for breach of duty under ERISA only valid against fiduciary); Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d 25, 29-31 (1st Cir.1994) (allowing that nonfiduciaries may only be sued for engaging in “act or practice” proscribed by section 1106(a)(1)); Kyle Rys. v. Pacific Admin. Servs., 990 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Big Star Div. of the Grand Union

    ### Response:
    holding that relief for nonfiduciary liability only available where nonfiduciary is engaged in prohibited transaction under section 1106a1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. State, 999 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). We held that a court of appeals may reform a judgment of conviction to reflect conviction of a lesser included offense only if (1) the court finds that the evidence is insufficient to support conviction of the charged offense but sufficient to support conviction of the lesser included offense and (2) either the jury was instructed on the lesser included offense (at the request of a party or by the trial court sua sponte) or one of the parties asked for but was denied such an instruction. Id. at 782. We see no reason why these principles would not apply to this Court, particularly when we serve in our capacity as the “court of appeals” in the direct appeal of a death penalty case. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 874-75 (Tex.Crim.App.l994)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that under Rule 78.1

    ### Response:
    recognizing factual review limited by constitution to direct appellate courts which includes court of criminal appeals when serving as direct appellate court in capital cases in which death penalty has been assessed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we will not disturb the jury’s finding unless the verdict is insupportable as a matter of law. Id. Decided June 11, 2014. Trotter Jones, James S. V. Weston, for appellant. Ashley Wright, District Attorney, Titus T. Nichols, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. Here, the circumstantial evidence demonstrated that Stokes’ DNA was on a cigarette butt found in the victim’s home with no explanation of any other reason it would be there, that Stokes was in the area of the burglary during the time period, that his clothing was wet and muddy when he was in the neighbor’s yard, and that some of the recovered items were also wet. This combined evidence was sufficient to support Stokes’ conviction under Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. See Marion v. State, 276 Ga. App. 553, 554 (623 SE2d 739) (2005) (<HOLDING>). “[Circumstantial evidence must exclude only

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants fingerprints atthe scene of the crime which were otherwise unexplained combined with circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support burglary conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and entry. Officer Bostwick, who was found credible by the district court, testified that the officers waited “approximately a minute” between announcing their presence and forcing entry. (Apx. at 83). Officer Anderson did not specifically state how much time elapsed, but he testified that the officers pounded the door for a “few seconds, maybe ten seconds,” before listening for a response and eventually forcing entry. (Apx. at 100). There is substantial precedent, both in this circuit and others, for the proposition that a wait of no more than fifteen seconds between announcement and entry may be sufficient when a drug search warrant is executed. See United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 925-27 (6th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1086, 119 S.Ct. 836, 142 L.Ed.2d 692 (1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gatewood, 60 F.3d 248, 250

    ### Response:
    holding fifteen to thirty seconds sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule will reduce or eliminate adjudicators’ exposure to ex parte information, as well as the inevitable human tendency to develop a will to win. See Ross v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, supra. Our view is consistent with the approach taken by most courts today. Courts generally discourage agency staff and members from simultaneously acting as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. “It is proper to have some blend of judicial and prosecutorial functions in an administrative proceeding, provided that the person performing the quasi-prosecutorial function is not a member of the decision-making body.” Waste Mgt. v. Pollution Control Bd., 175 Ill.App.3d 1023, 125 Ill.Dec. 524, 530 N.E.2d 682, 694 (1988). Accord Babcock Center, Inc. v. Office of Audits, 286 S.C. 398, 334 S.E.2d 112 (1985) (<HOLDING>); 4 Stein, Mitchell, and Mezines,

    ### Response:
    holding that administrative agency may adjudicate appeals by panels composed of other persons within the same agency who did not participate in investigative or prosecutorial capacities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The deadline serves the important purpose of providing finality to both the liqui dation proceeding and PCIGC’s potential liability resulting from the insolvency of an insurance carrier. If the filing of a claim provided notice to PCIGC of all potential claims arising out of the one incident, PCIGC’s potential liability would extend until the statute of limitations ran on all potential claims arising out of the original claim. As this case illustrates, such a result renders PCIGC unable to seek recovery against the bankruptcy estate of the insolvent insurer for those claims because the estate is not obligated to accept claims filed after the bar date, thus frustrating section 9-309(c) of the statute. Other courts that have address ssn., 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 634 N.E.2d 611, 615 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Whitehouse v. Rumford Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that once a liquidating court establishes a definitive bar date the ohio insurance guaranty association becomes statutorily obligated to observe the finality of that date and noting that were we to hold otherwise the specific filing deadline set forth in the ohio statute would be rendered meaningless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his sentence in limited circumstances, including when the sentence “was imposed in violation of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). See also United States v. DeBuse, 289 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir.2002) (noting that the defendant did not assert a violation of federal statutory or constitutional law in holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the extent of the district court’s downward departure). Although the statute authorizes McFarlane to appeal, and we have jurisdiction, only if his sentence was in fact imposed in violation of law, we cannot make that determination without reaching the merits of his argument. We therefore must necessarily exercise “jurisdiction to determine [our] own jurisdiction.” United States v. Ruiz, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to his Cooperation Agreement with

    ### Response:
    holding that the ninth circuit properly exercised jurisdiction to address defendants constitutional challenge to the district courts declination to depart downward although the challenge was ultimately denied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 673. Citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the Supreme Court said: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, 103 S.Ct. 673. “Absent a clear statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, courts employ the Blockburger test, as codified in section 775.021, Florida Statutes (1997), to determine whether separate offenses exist.” Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 19-20 (Fla.2001); see also Jones v. State, 608 So.2d 797 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>). Like the charges that Mr. Rodriguez faced

    ### Response:
    holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to characterize the agency relationships on which it focuses. The acts the dissent goes on to describe — discriminatory ""hiring or firing decision[s],’’ Dissent at 974 — are “company acts” that do not involve an unusual degree of attenuation between employer/defendant and employee/wrongdoer. These are precisely the sorts of cases in which employers' claims to have misunderstood the extent of their legal obligations are least plausible. 7 . We need not address the scope of employer liability for ""noncompany acts” such as sexual harassment. 8 . As with § 1981, the position of the Seventh Circuit on this question is not simple to characterize. The Emmel decision comports with the approach we take today, as do Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125, 1132 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), and Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of egregiousness is required for punitive damages since otherwise every employment discrimination claim could include a punitive damage award because every employment discrimination plaintiff must demonstrate an intentional unlawful discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he signed the agreement. To combat recidivist probationers and parolees, the Bettendorf Police Department commonly relied on paragraph P of the standard terms of a parole agreement to conduct searches of parolees in the city. Its officers were made aware of the consent-search provision and received training in conducting parolee searches. More specifically, Bettendorf police officers implemented a protocol to check the Traveler Motel in Bettendorf several times each day as part of a routine patrol. The motel was known by the po S.Ct. 2014, 2022, 141 L.Ed.2d 344, 355 (1998); State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155, 166 (Tenn.2009) (adopting Samson “where the parolee has agreed to warrantless searches by law enforcement officers”); State v. Velasquez, 612. P.2d 1254, 1260 & n. 4 (Utah 1983) (<HOLDING>); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1357-58

    ### Response:
    holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the contract, or that part of the contract was effectively ratified by the parties’ performance, and thus should be enforced to that extent. But that question is not properly before the Court at this time. For now, the question is whether the claims should proceed to arbitration, and so to the extent that there was no binding contract including an arbitration clause, the question cannot be addressed by this Court. In other words, while there may be an equitable reason why the district court could enforce discrete provisions of the contract based on the parties’ course of conduct, that is not the same as finding that there was a contract in place during the relevant time period. Cf. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448-49, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006) (<HOLDING>). The survival language is similarly illusory.

    ### Response:
    holding that nothing necessarily prevents a court from finding an arbitration clause unenforceable in a contract that it later finds is enforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . Id. at 1007 (citing City of Whittier v. Whittier Fuel & Marine Corp., 577 P.2d 216, 223 (Alaska 1978). 40 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 41(a). 41 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 41(b). 42 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 41(e)(1)(A)-(B). 43 . Shiffman v. K, Inc., 657 P.2d 401, 403 (Alaska 1983). 44 . Arbelovsky v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 922 P.2d 225, 227 (Alaska 1996) (internal citations omitted). 45 . Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Salzman, 751 P.2d 489, 492 (Alaska 1988). 46 . Otis Elevator Co., Inc. v. Garber, 820 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Alaska 1991). 47 . For example, Azimi attributed his failure to file timely jury instructions to confusion about the trial process: ""I thought maybe the day comes and we're going to talk and ask questions and then we pick the jury."" 48 . Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska 1998) (<HOLDING>). 49 . Civil Rule 41(b) was amended in January

    ### Response:
    holding that the superior court must inform a pro se litigant of the specific defects in his notice of appeal and give him an opportunity to remedy those defects before dismissal of the litigants claims for want of prosecution and untimeliness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in killing Paguada was to avoid arrest. Although Robertson testified at the penalty phase of the trial that Pa-guada saw him clearly after he shot Najar-ro, he denied killing Paguada to prevent her from identifying him. As this Court stated in Hansbrough v. State, 509 So.2d 1081, 1086 (Fla.1986), “[t]he mere fact that the victim might have been able to identify her assailant is not sufficient to support finding this factor.” The facts indicate that Robertson shot Paguada instinctively and without a plan to eliminate her as a witness. The State failed to show any other facts that would establish that Robertson’s dominant motive was to eliminate Pa-guada as a witness. See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1330, 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Young v. State, 579 So.2d 721, 724

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence the defendant knew the victim supported a finding that the murder was committed to avoid arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pet. filed); see also Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (1961) (“Where the issue is one inherently judicial in nature ..., the courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless the Legislature, by a valid statute, has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body.”). Pure questions of law that do not involve “embedded fact issues that counsel deference to agency proceedings” must be decided by the courts. Reconveyance Servs., 240 S.W.Sd at 433. Appellants’ claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) falls squarely within the class of claims that this Court has previously determined constitute purely legal inquiries that do not require the development of additional facts. Compare Reconveyance Seivs., 240 S.W.3d at 433 (<HOLDING>), Juliff Gardens, 131 S.W.3d at 279 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that udja claim regarding whether appellants services were prohibited by insurance code involved purely legal question despite lack of final agency determination that appellant was in violation of statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the requirements of intermediate scrutiny under First Amendment case law.) The Court finds that section 922(k) passes constitutional muster under these requirements: the purpose of the statute is to assist law enforcement in tracing weapons via their serial numbers; the connection between this objective and the statute is reasonable because common sense dictates that “[fjirearms without serial numbers are of particular value to those engaged in illicit activity because the absence of serial numbers helps shield recovered firearms and their possessors from identification”; and the regulation only reaches conduct that has a substantial risk of rendering a firearm untraceable because it does not, in any way, limit the possession of any specific class of firearms. Id. at 98-99 (<HOLDING>) Thus, the Court finds that section 922(k)

    ### Response:
    holding that section 922k passes muster under intermediate scrutiny and would also pass muster under a strict scrutiny analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2006) (en banc). With respect to Ms. Montgomery’s allegations against Mr. Kaufman, Ms. Montgomery vacillated between characterizing Mr. Kaufman’s actions as violations of civil service hiring regulations and as routine conduct that is often “in the best interest of the government.” However, beyond her inconsistent statements, Ms. Montgomery has provided no additional evidence that any hiring regulations were violated. Without some evidence to support her allegations, Ms. Montgomery cannot be said to have made a non-frivolous allegation that Mr. Kaufman violated a law, rule, or regulation. See Dorrall, 301 F.3d at 1380; Hetman v. Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1380-81 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Turning to Ms. Montgomery’s allegations

    ### Response:
    holding that the board lacked jurisdiction over employees ira because the employee did not provided any evidence whatsoever demonstrating a violation of a law rule or regulation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sentence based on Williams’s alleged intent to distribute crack cocaine to his girlfriend, Williams’s argument that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court improperly relied on that fact is meritless. D. Finally, Williams argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because (a) the district court failed to recalculate the Guidelines ra roperly considered the short period of time between his release from state prison and his arrest in this case also lacks merit because, while the fact may have influenced Williams’s Guidelines range, it also impacts several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including his history and characteristics, the need to protect the public, the promotion of respect for the law, and the need to promote deterrence. Id. at 590 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Drummond, 255 Fed.Appx. 60,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants illegal reentry into the united states only a few months after being de ported for the third time justified a harsher sentence under several  3553a factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aliens. Barrera-Flores contends that because he pleaded guilty to being “deported,” the maximum penalty is two years under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). This contention fails. See United States v. Lopez-Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that “any distinction between deportation and removal is legally insignificant for purposes of § 1326”). In addition, Barrera-Flores contends that congressional changes to § 1326(b)(2) created a separate crime for which “removal” must be pleaded and proved beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This contention also fails. See United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 413-14 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 966, 121 S.Ct. 1503, 149 L.Ed.2d 388 (2001) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that  1326b2 as amended does not define a separate crime from  1326a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (debtor has the rights and powers of a trustee under sections 363(b), 363(d), 363(e), 363(f), and 363(0). Despite the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 548, courts disagree on the issue of whether a Chapter 13 debtor has standing to bring avoidance actions normally reserved for trustees. This Court finds that the best approach is taken by courts who look elsewhere in the code to find a Chapter 13 Debtor’s authority to avoid certain transfers. See, e.g., LaBarge v. Benda (In re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 365 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (Chapter 13 debt- or’s authority to bring avoidance action is found in 11 U.S.C. § 522; Chapter 13 debtor has no standing to bring an avoidance action under 11 U.S.C. § 548); Davis v. Victor Warren Properties, Inc. (In re Davis), 216 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (<HOLDING>). Section 522 which defines a debtor’s

    ### Response:
    holding that chapter 13 debtor lacked standing under 11 usc  548 but finding limited authority for the debtor to avoid a transfer under 11 usc  522h
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the deeds to the property the United States purchased for the tribe specifically mention the appurtenant water rights and/or the Humboldt Decree. We conclude that the purchase of the reservation land subject to previously adjudicated water rights constituted an express waiver of sovereign immunity, and that the tribe’s actions in benefiting from and abiding by the Humboldt Decree for more than five decades served to ratify this waiver. See State Engineer v. South Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1163, 1172 (D. Nev. 1999) (stating that “[i]f there remain[s] any doubt as to the United States [’] express and unequivocal waiver in behalf of the Tribe, in its initial purchase of the decreed rights, the Tribe’s actions over the ensuing fifty years since the p P.2d 1147 (1985) (<HOLDING>). However, here, as the purchase of the tribe’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction over indian claims to land allotments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse- action. San Antonio Water Sys., 461 S.W.3d at 137. UTEP’s plea to the jurisdiction contended there was no causal connection between any of its actions and Esparza’s alleged EEOC activity. Espar-za alleged that UTEP’s “unlawful employment practices .., were carried - on and committed because of Plaintiff’s EEO activity.” As noted above, the only protected activity Esparza alleged was that she filed an EEOC claim on March 25, 2010. Esparza’s specific factual allegations, however, addressed only actions by UTEP that occurred before"" she filed her EEOC charge. Likewise, the evidence she filed in response to UTEP’s plea addressed only actions occurring before she filed her EEOC charge. It is axiomatic that UTEP (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Dodge v. City of Belton, Mo., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that police chiefs suspen  sion with pay was not an adverseemployment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    including the manufacture and distribution of marijuana from his XXXX Bryant Avenue South residence. Law enforcement may use a suspect’s criminal history or evidence of prior unlawful activity to corroborate information provided by informants. See Solomon, 432 F.3d at 828, n. 2 (finding that an affidavit reciting that defendant had a felony record increased the credibility of the tip) (citing Gabrio, 295 F.3d at 883); United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 196-200 (4th Cir.2002) (informant’s tip that defendant had a large quantity of heroin at his residence corroborated by information that defendant was a convicted felon and that a recent search of defendant’s residence had resulted in the seizure of drug paraphernalia); United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1380-81 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 6 (1st

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a suspects prior unlawful activity or related convictions can corroborate information supplied by informants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine a defendants were not the same parties as the original state court plaintiffs, and where the counterclaim itself is separate and independent from the original claim, then removal is appropriate. Walker 142 F.3d at 816-17. Both requirements set forth in Walker are satisfied here. The removing parties in this case are separate legal entities that do not include the original plaintiff. The counterclaim is separate and independent from the original claim filed by plaintiff (whether a claim is legitimately separate and independent hinges on whether it involves an obligation distinct from the nonremovable claims in the case). See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14, 71 S.Ct. 534, 540, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (<HOLDING>) Removing defendants’ allegations of FLSA

    ### Response:
    holding where there is a single wrong to plaintiff for which relief is sought arising from an interlocked series of transactions there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under  1441c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993). Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of the judge. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In addition, when considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non- movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences ’n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Although this might ordinarily end the

    ### Response:
    holding that ohio high school athletic association was not a recipient of federal funds because it did not receive direct federal assistance and it did not receive money from local schools who were recipients of federal assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statements and lacks the basis on which she had personal knowledge of the facts asserted. Because Morin offered no basis of knowledge concerning how she knew the discussions took place between Dr. Helfrick and Dr. Bertz, we are unable to consider her statements concerning the alleged conversations. See Radio Station KSCS v. Jennings, 750 S.W.2d 760, 761-62 (Tex.1988); City of Wilmer v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 890 S.W.2d 459, 467 (Tex.App.—Dallas), aff'd, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Tex.1995). Dr. Helfrick objected to Morin’s affidavit as containing incompetent evidence, but did not receive a ruling. However, objections to affidavits containing defects in substance need not be objected to at the trial level; thus, a ruling was not necessary. See Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 890 S.W.2d at 467 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in Ramirez v. Transcontinental

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure of an affidavit to be made on personal knowledge or specify how the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted is a defect in substance and need not be objected to at trial to be a ground for reversal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the scene of the burglary. Id. at 310, 94 S.Ct. 1105. As evidence of the witness’s possible bias and prejudice and because the witness was on probation at the time of these events, defense counsel in Davis sought to capitalize on the witness’s f appeal that was presented to the trial court during his offer to prove. Defendant argued that because Moody’s juvenile adjudication involved a crime of dishonesty and because he was considered one of two key witnesses in the State’s case, the record should be admitted for ' impeachment purposes. Defendant again relies on Davis to argue admissibility of Moody’s juvenile record on this basis; however, this reliance is misplaced in several respects. First, contrary to Defendant’s contention, and unlike the defendant in Davis, Moody Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Here, Defendant proposed no alternative

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err in admitting juvenile records where counsel stated in his opening statement that the witness had no record when in actuality the witness had nine juvenile adjudications for burglary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statements to the grand jury, the state had used inadmissible evidence to obtain the indictment. He contended that since these statements had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, Judge Thompson should apply the standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which requires the court to apply a harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test. The state did not contest the fact that Sergeant Case’s statements to Lt. Ward during the administrative investigation were compelled statements which are generally not admissible. However, the state argued that Case’s statements to Lt. Ward could be considered exculpatory evidence which the state was obligated to present to the grand jury. Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 164-65 (Alaska 1979) (<HOLDING>). The state pointed out that it had contacted

    ### Response:
    holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preliminary injunction hearing. Id., 435 U.S. at 250-51, 98 S.Ct. at 1045-46. However, in the case of public employees who have been terminated without due process, the cases suggest that a constitutionally adequate hearing can be a proper remedy when a person’s right to procedural due process is violated. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (to the extent terminated college professor proved that he had a property interest in his position, professor would not be entitled to automatic reinstatement, “[b]ut such proof would obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency.”); Brewer v. Parkman, 918 F.2d 1336, 1341-42 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Irizarry v. Cleveland Public Library, 727

    ### Response:
    holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the prohibition on hearsay that would make the statement admissible. “The court need not ... engage in an act of futility by authorizing depositions that clearly will be inadmissible at trial.” Drogoul, 1 F.3d at 1555. The district court also expressed concern about Babakhani’s right against self-incrimination. Babakhani was a codefendant who did not have legal counsel, and the district court could not “grant immunity to a defense witness merely because that witness possesses ... exculpatory information.” Cuthel, 903 F.2d at 1384 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the district court found that it would be unjust to allow Babakhani, a “fugitive from justice,” to testify for Alexander. See, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1569 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its

    ### Response:
    recognizing that it can be unjust to allow a fugitive to participate via deposition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights ... to park on the Property pursuant to terms and conditions of the Easements. That language clearly demonstrates the parties’ intent that the Easement was to continue upon reconveyance. Furthermore, the language in the deed reconveying the Ocean Avenue Property to the City, which specified that the property was being conveyed “[s]ubject to” the Easement at issue, is sufficient as a matter of law to reserve the Easement for Boston/Logan. See Barnside v. Coughlin, 422 Mass. 233, 661 N.E.2d 929, 930 (1996) (affirming Land Court’s summary judgment decision that mortgage purporting to be “[s]ubject to proposed right of way” was sufficient to reserve to grantor the right to create an easement); Texon, Inc. v. Holyoke Machine Co., 8 Mass.App.Ct. 363, 394 N.E.2d 976, 978 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Surf Site argues that the parties could not

    ### Response:
    holding that deed purporting to be subject to rights of the grantor holyoke to maintain steam and electrical conduits was sufficient to create an easement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott and Ascher on Trusts § 35.1.2, at 2286 (5th ed.2008). “[C]ourts[, however,] have often been willing, in appropriate circumstances, to find compliance with the terms of the trust, though there has plainly not been literal compliance.” Id. at 2287 (referring also to Unif. Trust Code § 602(c)(1) (“The settlor may revoke ... a revocable trust ... by substantial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the trust ....”); compare N.D.C.C. § 59-14-02(3) (Supp.2007) (containing U.T.C. § 602)). See also Paul v. Arvidson, 123 P.3d 808, 811 (Okla.Civ.App.2005) (dismissing requirement that sole remaining grantor/trustee deliver notice to self as absurd and holding grantor revoked trust by deeding property to later trust); Argo v. Moncus, 721 So.2d 218, 221-22 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 30] Here, if “substantial compliance” with

    ### Response:
    holding grantortrustee was not required to give self written notice since writing was for benefit of trustee and could be waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harper argues that the filing of his amended complaint, without the Title VII claim, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims because the amendment “related back” to the filing date of his first complaint, thereby depriving the court of original federal question jurisdiction (and thus supplemental jurisdiction) from the inception of the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (providing that “[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading” under certain circumstances). Harper’s argument is wrong as a matter of law. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is determined by examining the complaint as it existed at the time of removal. See Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    what a reasonable person in Morgan’s position would have done in these circumstances. ¶ 33. This case is certainly distinguishable from cases this court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have found to fall ■within medical-malpractice statutes and require expert testimony. In Chitty, the plaintiffs claim arose out of what she alleged was an unnecessary biopsy and a fraudulent diagnosis of cancer. Chitty, 16 So.3d at 775-76 (¶ 4). So the rendering of a profession medical services itself was the source of the alleged injury. Id. at 779 (¶ 13). And expert testimony was required to determine whether a reasonable dermatologist would have performed a biopsy. Id. Here, Crosthwait was not undergoing a medical procedure. Cf. Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hosp., 193 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Iowa 1971) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 34. Howell involved a patient’s fall.

    ### Response:
    holding that a hospitals giving showers to its patients is not a professional activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when delivering its charge on that offense. That instruction included the elements that defendant possessed a firearm and intended to use it to “endanger or threaten the life of [the victim].” However, in its charge on conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, the trial court correctly instructed that robbery with a dangerous weapon is the taking of property from a person “while using a firearm,” but erroneously omitted the element that the weapon must have been used to endanger or threaten the life of the victim. The State concedes that the instruction was erroneous because the trial court should have set out all the elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon in that portion of the charge, according to State v. Gibbons, 303 N.C. 484, 489, 279 S.E.2d 574, 577-78 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The trial court repeated the erroneous

    ### Response:
    holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.J., and O’CONNELL, J., concurred with MURRAY, J. 1 The DOC also argued that plaintiffs failure to verify the complaint and failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of MCL 600.5507(2) as set forth in the prison litigation reform act, MCL 600.5501 et seq., each independently warranted dismissal. The court ultimately rejected the former argument, while the DOC voluntarily withdrew the latter. 2 This Court previously dismissed plaintiff’s jurisdictional challenge. Rusha v Dep’t of Corrections, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 29, 2014 (Docket No. 317693). 3 Plaintiff relies almost exclusively on an unpublished decision of this Court for the proposition that statutory notice requirements are inapplicable where constitutional t 446, 451; 212 NW 207 (1927) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 6 See Price Paper Corp v

    ### Response:
    holding that to the extent the constitutional provision permitting cities to acquire parks without their corporate limits comprehends the right of acquisition by eminent domain see 1908 const art 8  22 the provision is not selfexecuting as it merely lays down a general principle 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    768 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 (Mo.App.1989); State ex rel. Connett v. Dickerson, 833 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo.App.1992). The court in Light distinguishes a suspended imposition of sentence from a suspended execution of an imposed sentence, stating “Suspension of imposition of sentence is an entirely different matter from imposing sentence and then suspending execution of it. In the first instance, the person has no criminal conviction, in the second, he does.” 768 S.W.2d at 592. Under the versions of §§ 559.016 and 559.036 in effect at the time Appellant was convicted, the court was prohibited from granting a second period of probation following a revocation that would extend beyond the five year maximum set forth in § 559.016. See State ex rel. Musick v. Dickerson, 813 S.W.2d 75 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). As a term of probation cannot be extended

    ### Response:
    holding that under statutes in effect at the time a court may not by revocation and granting a second period of probation extend the total time on probation beyond five years as the statutes do not speak of terms of probation but speak in plain language of the total time which may be spent on probation for a felony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remained subject to antitrust action by the Department of Justice. Although we are not unmindful of the disfavor with which antitrust exemption is generally regarded, see, e. g., California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 82 S.Ct. 901, 8 L.Ed.2d 54 (1962), we perceive significant differences between Philadelphia National Bank and the case which we today decide. AVe note that the history of the Bank Merger Act evidenced a congressional intent not to immunize bank mergers from at least Sherman Act attack, see 374 U.S. at 352, 83 S.Ct. 1715, whereas the 1934 Act entrusts the SEC with supervision of rate-fixing, a practice which outside the confines of the 1934 Act is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. at 347-349, 86 S.Ct. 1246

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a group boycott carried out within the framework of the 1934 act is not a per se antitrust violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ordinarily awarded in comparable and recent libel/defamation cases, particularly where no proof of actual economic harm was submitted. Cf. Tusino v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 169 Fed.Appx. 39 (2d Cir.2006) (reducing emotional damages award for libel from $250,000 to $100,000 where there was no medical or other objective evidence of plaintiffs damages, only plaintiffs and daughter’s testimony regarding embarrassment, loss of sleep, weight and 'appetite); Bach v. First Union-Nat’l Bank, 149 Fed.Appx. 354 (6th Cir.2005) (upholding award of $400,000 compensatory damages in Fair Credit Reporting Act case involv ing emotional distress where there was also a showing of actual damages in the form of denial of two credit applications); Stamathis v. Flying J, Inc., 389 F.3d 429 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Simon, 895 F.2d at 1319-20 (remitting

    ### Response:
    holding that a compensatory damages award of 250000 to truck driver and against merchant for defamation and malicious prosecution was not excessive under virginia law where the plaintiff suffered humiliation and embarrassment from being arrested taken into custody and booked for petit larceny due to actions of merchant he faced further insult with respect to his relationship with his employer and he incurred 10000 in actual outofpocket loss and expenses in defending against charge against him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The decree was thus subject to vacation. We remand to give the court an opportunity to address the parties’ other arguments. Reversed and remanded. Baker and Appelwick, JJ., concur. After modification, further reconsideration denied August 30, 2004. 1 Kong did not cite a specific subsection of the rule, but alleged that her challenge to the decree of dissolution would be based on fraud and duress surrounding the decree of separation. 2 In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 988, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). 3 Mu Chai contends a decree of separation may be converted to a decree of dissolution ex parte, so the service requirements of CR 5 do not apply. Mu Chai is mistaken. Service of such motions is required. CR 5(a); see In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. 228, 230, 584 P.2d 971 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 4 CR 6(a), (d). 5 Yi Kong alleges Mu Chai

    ### Response:
    holding that notice and opportunity to be heard in matters which materially affect a litigants rights are essential elements of due process that may not be disregarded and that notice of a motion to convert a decree under rcw 2609150 may not be dispensed with
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alcohol user and denied HCV treatment because of that claimed disability based on the ASAT Requirement. Defendants contend plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the statute. 1. Capacity First, any claim against Dr. Wright in his individual capacity must be dismissed because Section 504 does not provide for individual capacity suits against state officials. Garda, 280 F.3d at 107; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (statute’s non-discrimination requirements only apply to entities receiving federal funds). As for the claim against Dr. Wright in his official capacity and DOCCS, it is well-established that sovereign immunity has been validly abrogated under Section 504 and the claim may proceed subject to the analysis below. See, e.g., Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F.Supp.2d 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>). 2. Merits of Section 504 Claim Similar to

    ### Response:
    holding that new yorks continued acceptance of federal funds after garrett 531 us 356 121 sct 955 is a knowing relinquishment of its eleventh amendment immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Second Circuit, for instance, recognized that an inmate can bring a First Amendment right to petition claim when prison officials “intentionally file[ ] false disciplinary charges against him in retaliation for his cooperation with a state administrative investigation of alleged incidents of inmate abuse at the prison.” Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988). The court later recognized the right in the context of retaliation against inmates for filing grievances. Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An allegation that a prison official filed false disciplinary charges in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, such as the filing of a grievance, states a claim under § 1983.”) (citing Franco, 854 F.2d at 589-90). The S 9th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th

    ### Response:
    recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    voluntary dismissal or withdrawal of inflated claims may justify a fee reduction, the same will not be true of claims pursued in good faith, but later withdrawn for valid reasons, such as the discovery of additional evidence.” Green, 361 F.3d at 100; see also Morgenstern v. Cty. of Nassau, No. CV 04-58 (ARL), 2009 WL 5103158, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009) (“The court will not, however, deduct from the award the amounts incurred for legal services rendered in connection with the breach of contract, civil service law, or human rights law claims that were voluntarily dismissed ... [because] [t]he court agrees with the plaintiff that the work done in relation to those claims contributed to the ultimate success of the lawsuit .... (citing Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>))). There is nothing in the record that

    ### Response:
    holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether hindsight vindicates an attorneys time expenditures but whether at the time the work was performed a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court added that, in all events, “an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.” Id. at 488, 119 S.Ct. 936. We addressed the impact of AADC in Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3 (1st Cir.2000). There, an alien whose prior convictions disqualified him for discretionary relief under the IIRIRA — but not under the INA — claimed eligibility for a 212(c) waiver on the ground that the convictions predated the IIRIRA. Id. at 6. We rejected the Attorney General’s argument that AADC overruled Goncalves, or, alternatively, that the petitioner no longer was eligible for discretionary relief because deportation proceedings had not commenced until after the expiration of the so-called transitional rules. See id. at 10 (<HOLDING>). Noting that AADC applied only to cases on

    ### Response:
    holding that iiriras permanent rules lack the clear statement of the congressional intent necessary to eliminate habeas review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of patients in accordance with HRS regulations, Fla.Admin.Code R. 10E-5.061; 2) reporting abuse pursuant to the Florida Adult Protective Services Act, Fla.Stat. § 415.101, et seq.; and 3) raising the deficiencies in the periodic Baker Act hearings held pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 394.467. Plaintiffs argue that none of the specific remedies cited by Defendants are adequate to provide relief for the type of egregious, systemic abuse that Advocacy Center alleges. The Court agrees that these remedies are clearly inadequate in terms of the traditional exhaustion doctrine. See, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Int’l Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.1981) (rehearing en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982); Shinholster v. Graham, 527 F.Supp. 1318 (N.D.Fla.1981) (<HOLDING>). Patsy lists the five necessary aspects of an

    ### Response:
    holding florida administrative procedure act and abuse reporting system inadequate remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the activity out of which the violation — i.e., the shooting — occurred and the teacher's duties and obligations as a teacher. Thus, the teacher acted under color of state law, and the student may bring a § 1983 action. Consequently, the majority essentially raises to the level of a constitutional violation all torts committed by teachers against students. 24 . See McLaren v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 767 F.Supp. 1364, 1370-71 (N.D.Tex.1991) (finding that a sexual assault committed by a police officer was, under Texas law, committed outside the scope of his employment), aff'd, 968 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.1992) (table: unpublished opinion), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1269, 122 L.Ed.2d 665 (1993); Smith v. M Sys. Food Stores, Inc., 156 Tex. 484, 297 S.W.2d 112, 114 (1957) (<HOLDING>); see also Morgan v. Tice, 862 F.2d 1495, 1499

    ### Response:
    holding as a matter of law that a police officer was not acting within the scope of his employment when assaulting an acquaintance of a woman he had detained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    government’s representation is inextricably intertwined and entangled in the merits of Mr. Bolden’s claims.” This argument, however, overlooks that the Court has “consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.” Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915. Every appeal that has considered the disqualification of an entire United States Attorney’s office has found the disqualification issue to be entirely separate from the merits of the underlying case. See Whit-taker, 268 F.3d at 192 (“the [disqualification] order unquestionably resolves a jur-isprudentially important issue completely separate from the merits of the dispute concerning whether Whittaker committed mail fraud”); United States v. Vlahos, 33 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was a fugitive from an arrest warrant during the period of the investigation, and, (5) the Informant did not report the new charges filed against him. Sanchez contends that, had the relevant facts been included in the warrant affidavit, the Magistrate Judge would not have found probable cause for the search. We do not agree. At best, the omitted information establishes that the Informant is an unsavory character with a questionable moral compass. This fact does not, per se, doom a finding of probable cause. Courts, according to well-established precedent, may consider both the reliability of the informant and the reliability of the information provided by the informant. See United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 560 (3d Cir.2006); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (<HOLDING>). In other words, we determine probable cause

    ### Response:
    holding that while an informants veracity is highly relevant to the existence of probable cause it is only one part of the larger commonsense determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action against the agency’s interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is subjected to judicial review and the court’s interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C.Cir.1985) (footnotes omitted). Compare Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138, 95 S.Ct. 335, 355, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974) (“issues of ripeness involve ... the existence of a live ‘Case or Controversy’ ”) and Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 745 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1987) (separate opinion of Williams, J.) (ripeness doctrine is jurisdictional “in extreme cases”) with American Trucking Ass’ns v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 789-91 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Perhaps this line has not been carefully

    ### Response:
    holding a case unripe because whether or not constitutional limits are exceeded  our own ability to decide intelligently and our own confidence that we are expending our resources in resolving a dispute that has substance are proximately affected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disability insurance payments, even if those payments are exempt property under 11 U.S.C. section 522. The issue before us, then, is whether Kan-cilia's exemption under section 522 for his disability payments protects those payments from garnishment by creditors holding non-dischargeable debt under section 528. Seetion 522(c) states that exempt property ""is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose ... before the commencement of the case"" (emphasis added). It goes on to provide four exceptions in which creditors with nondischargeable debt may reach exempt property: (1) debt for taxes or domestic support obligations; (2) debt secured by an unavoidable lien or tax lien; (8) debt caused by a fiduciary's fraud, or debt caused by willful and mal 1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Ewiak, 75 BR. 211, 212

    ### Response:
    holding that because nondischargeable debt based on fraud was not one of the four enumerated exceptions to exempt property the exempt property was not liable for the creditors surviving claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are “at least fifteen years of age” if certain additional factors not at issue here are present. See id. Gomez argues that we should only look to the statutory language in subsection A. We disagree. Gomez was indicted for and convicted of violating Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1405 B. Therefore, our analysis is limited to that provision. Section 13-1405 B defines the victim as being either ""at least fifteen” or ""under fifteen.” Consequently, it is divisible with respect to the age of the victim, and, under the governing law in 2006, we may consider the indictment and plea agreement’s clear language showing that Gomez was charged with sexual conduct with ""a minor under the age of fifteen.” See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2283-85

    ### Response:
    holding that a court determining the character of an underlying crime using the modified categorical approach may consider inter alia the charging document and written plea agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    asserting his rights). 45 . Sutherland v. Dardanelle Timber Co., 2006 WL 1451531, at *8 (Del.Ch.) (finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a ""credible basis” to support allegations of management entrenchment and waste); Haywood v. Ambase Corp., 2005 WL 2130614, at *5-6 (Del.Ch.) (finding ""by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis” to support allegations of excessive executive compensati , 2004 WL 1728604, at *9 (Del.Ch.) (shareholders presented sufficient evidence to support a claim of corporate wrongdoing); Marmon v. Arbinet-Thexchange, Inc., 2004 WL 936512, at *4 (Del.Ch.) (finding a ""credible basis” where there was credible testimony presented in support of the various claims of corporate wrongdoing); Khanna v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 2004 WL 187274, at *6 (Del.Ch.) (<HOLDING>); Freund v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 2003 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that the shareholder has shown a credible basis by a preponderance of the evidence for his allegations of selfdealing with respect to a number of corporate transactions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(2). The court’s inquiry does not end here, however, because the question remains whether this limit on recovery applies to claims under § 1132(a)(3) as well as § 1132(a)(2). While there is a good deal of confusion surrounding this question, case law suggests that § 1132(a)(3) allows for individualized relief. See, e.g., Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d at 1011 (rejecting § 1132(a)(3) claim on grounds that money damages are not recoverable, not on grounds that there is no individual right to recovery); Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228, 230 (7th Cir.1990) (discussing in dicta that § 1132(a)(3)(B) may impose liability on a fiduciary that runs directly to the beneficiary); Bartucca v. Katy Indus., Inc., 668 F.Supp. 111, 113 (D.Conn.1987) (<HOLDING>). But see Horan v. Kaiser Steel Retirement

    ### Response:
    holding that russell does not prohibit an individual suit under  1132a3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See e.g., Murphy v. Town of Duxbury, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 513, 665 N.E.2d 1014, review denied, 423 Mass. 1105, 668 N.E.2d 356 (1996) (affirming grant of summary judgment on MCRA claim for lack of proof as there was no evidence that the Town officials were motivated other than by desire to enforce their interpretation of zoning laws). In addition, Cignetti’s claim against Healy fails because it is based solely on a theory of vicarious liability. Cignetti does not allege that Healy threatened him directly, but asserts that the “threats” allegedly made by Rossi can be attributed to Healy because Rossi was Healy’s agent. However, nothing in the record indicates that Rossi was acting at Healy’s direction or that Healy authorized or approved Rossi’s alleged “threats.” Cf. Alioto, 835 F.2d at 1175 (<HOLDING>). The MCRA claim against Fitzgerald also fails

    ### Response:
    holding supervisory personnel liable for  1983 violations only where evidence establishes that they authorized or approved the unconstitutional conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged— but it has not ‘shown’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (alteration and citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Generally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 424-25 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Munno v. Town of Orangetown, 391 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that district court properly took judicial notice of and considered media reports state court complaints and regulatory filings on a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CO agree to any action by prior, written approval. Harbert/Lummus also argues that, because the government does not dispute the CO’s authority to enter into a written contract with Harbert/Lummus to care for the plant after DOE ceased its guarantees, the CO must have had the authority to enter into the oral, unilateral contract because both contracts stemmed from the CO's authority to minimize DOE’s expenses with regal’d to the project. Again, this argument is unpersuasive because it does not address the fact that the unilateral contract was oral and did not contain the required written approval. As we have held before, agency procedures must be followed before a binding contract can be formed. See American Gen. Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct.Cl. 367, 587 F.2d 54, 57-58 (1978) (<HOLDING>); New Am. Shipbuilders, Inc. v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    career offender purposes. Watson also argues that if Amendment 709 were applied to nullify his career offender status, then he would be entitled to a sentence reduction by virtue of Amendment 706. Section 3582(c)(2) grants district courts the discretion to reduce a previously imposed sentence “if such a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The relevant policy statement on retroactive reduction of sentences provides that a sentence reduction is authorized under § 3582(c)(2) only where the applicable guideline range was lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual enumerated under § 1B1.10(c). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a); United States v. Pelaez, 196 F.3d 1203, 1205 n. 3 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a reduction in the defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that only the amendments listed in  lb110c may be applied retroactively using a  3582c2 motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). In Will, the Court found that a state was not a ""person” as defined by § 1983 because reading the term “person” to include ""state” under the statutory language would ""be a decidedly awkward way of expressing an intent to subject the States to liability.” 10 . 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1). 11 . La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 591(A). 12 . See 151 Cong. Rec. S1157-02, S 1158, 2005 WL 309648 (Feb. 9, 2005). Senator Pryor introduced the amendment, stating, “My amendment simply clarifies that State attorneys general should be exempt from S. 5 and be allowed to pursue their individual State's interests as determined by themselves and not by the Federal Government.” Congress rejected the proposed amendment. Cf. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 605, 607-09, 61 S.Ct. 742 (<HOLDING>). 13 . 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) provides, ""In

    ### Response:
    holding that we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural sense and if doubts remain resolve them in the light not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment but as well by all other available aids to construction and looking to supplemental legislation and the scheme and structure of the legislation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Servs., Inc., 376 F.3d 501, 504-06 (5th Cir.2004) (noting that waiver of removal rights must be “clear and unequivocal,” but interpreting forum selec tion provision in accordance with ordinary contract principles and construing ambiguity in forum selection provision against the drafter); Milk ‘N’ More, Inc. v. Beavert, 963 F.2d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir.1992) (noting that “a waiver of one’s statutory right to remove a case from a state to a federal court must be ‘clear and unequivocal,’” and finding that contract clause stating that “venue shall be proper under this agreement in Johnson County, Kansas” constituted a waiver because the agreement “seems reasonably clear and the wording strongly points to the state court of that county”); Weltman v. Silna, 879 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Other courts, including the Third and

    ### Response:
    holding that wjaiver of the right to remove must be clear and unequivocal  and that standard was not met by an agreement in which defendants consented to filing of suit in state court but which did not address removal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pointed out that the statute was intended to bring only the most serious, broad-based frauds into the federal courts. See id. at 489-92. However, even taking this restrictive rule into account, the United States Supreme Court has held that even a single racketeering scheme may provide the basis for RICO liability. See HJ Inc., 492 U.S. at 236, 109 S.Ct. 2893. Similarly, while courts have stated that a single-victim scheme that rises to the level of a RICO pattern is “rare,” Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 04-cv-7122, 2007 WL 576097, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2007), other district courts, as well as the Second Circuit, have held that a single-victim scheme may form a RICO pattern when the predicate acts are numerous and extensive. Jacobson v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Fin.

    ### Response:
    holding that a nineyear scheme by two defendants to defraud a single plaintiff of various real estate holdings constituted a rico pattern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he was only seeking asylum vis-á-vis his wife’s mistreatment and not on account of any direct harm. Pet’r’s Br. at 4. We find Wang’s explanation unavailing. Like the BIA, we observe that IIRIRA— enacted ten years before Wang applied for asylum — “broadened the definition of refugee to include a person who has been [persecuted for] resistance to a coercive population control program.” Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir.2009) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, Wang’s more detailed account of the events that transpired on May 24, 1992, if believed, provided fertile ground for a claim of past persecution at the time he originally applied for asylum. Wang chose instead to pursue a claim that would eventually be foreclosed by our decision in Lin-Zheng. See id. at 156 (<HOLDING>). In any event, the BIA deferred to the IJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that alien cannot rely on spouses forced abortion to establish automatic asylum eligibility based on past persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the numerous excessive force complaints against him conveyed a message of approval to him. Turpin, 619 F.2d at 201; see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971-76 (3d Cir.1996) (evidence of a series of prior written civilian complaints of a similar nature concerning a police officer’s use of force and the city’s lack of responsive action was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have inferred that the city knew, and acquiesced in, the tacit use of excessive force by its police officers). Kreger’s history, as well as the City’s prior history of excessive force complaints, should have put the City on notice of the need to re-train or discipline Kreger. See Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 407, 117 S.Ct; 1382; but see Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to county on monell claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that similar conduct occurred in the past
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to allow the Yakimas to cross over or to camp on their land in order to fish at the site. The Yakimas had signed one of the Stevens Treaties in 1855. The United States brought suit against the Winanses on the Yakimas’ behalf. The Supreme Court held that the land owned by the Winanses, previously conveyed by patent from the government, was by virtue of the treaty subject to an easement allowing access to the Yakimas’ “usual and accustomed” fishing site. The Court held, further, that the State could not license the Winanses to “construct and use a device which gives them exclusive possession of the fishing places, as it is admitted a fish wheel does.” Winans, 198 U.S. at 382, 25 S.Ct. 662. See also Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 39 S.Ct. 203, 63 L.Ed. 555 (1919) (<HOLDING>). In 1915, Charles Buchanan, still the Indian

    ### Response:
    holding that the yakimas had rights under the treaty on the oregon as well as the washington side of the river
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was assisting his codefendant. Finally, the considerable sum of money required to purchase 4.36 grams of co caine was found neither on Patton nor elsewhere in the apartment. Thus, the court’s determination that the intent-to-deliver element was proved beyond a reasonable doubt was not unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory. Indeed, the determination is justified by the evidence. Defendant finally contends that the circuit court erred in sentencing him as a Class X offender because the State proved neither that his prior convictions were for offenses committed after the effective date of the statute, nor that the second offense occurred after the first. However, in light of the recent supreme court decision of People v. Williams (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 467, 484, 487-88, 599 N.E.2d 913 (<HOLDING>), we find no error in the circuit court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the unified code of corrections places no duty upon the state to prove defendants prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and that it does not require any more formal proof of defendants prior criminal record than is evidenced by the presentence investigation report
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    626 P.2d at 301. The predicate felony to Bankert’s conviction of felony murder, thus stands. ISSUE TWO — SIMULTANEOUS POSSESSION OF COCAINE BY BUYER AND SELLER Bankert also claims that jury instruction number ten, stating that “[t]wo or more people can have possession of a substance at the same time,” and the prosecutor’s related closing argument thwarted a jury determination of the possession element. He points out that no drug deal was ever consummated. “It is axiomatic,” he says, “that during a drug transaction, a buyer and seller cannot each possess a controlled substance simultaneously.” At most, Bankert avows he is guilty of attempted possession. See State v. Lopez, 100 N.M. 291, 292, 669 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1983); State v. Curry, 107 N.M. 133, 135, 753 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Ct.App.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 132, 753 P.2d 1320

    ### Response:
    holding that the attempt to possess the cocaine can be inferred from defendants attempt to pick up the package
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    kidnapping; rather involved a police officer); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 151 A.2d at 690 (RI) (did not involve parental kidnapping; rather a hospital’s refusal to discharge infant); Armstrong v. McDonald, 39 Ala.App. 485, 103 So.2d 818 (1958) (third parties induced child to leave mother; no relatives involved). The remainder of the cases were federal court cases, which attempt to predict how the state supreme court will rule. Three jurisdictions have either deferred consideration or declined to create the tort. See McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F.Supp. 680 (N.D.Fla.1984), aff’d, 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.1986); Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa.Super. 48, 480 A.2d 1178 (1984); Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F.Supp. 603 (D.Vt.1977); but cf. Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Illinois, the state court of appeals

    ### Response:
    holding parental child abduction compensable under intentional infliction of emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    739 F.Supp. 906, 911-13 (S.D.N.Y.1990). A claim accrues under § 1140 when the employer decides to discharge an employee and communicates that decision to him. Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1138. Barnett was terminated on or about April 25,1991 according to the complaint, and she has conceded that her claim accrued no later than this date. Memo in Opp. at 5. IBM correctly argues that the state law claim most analogous to a wrongful discharge claim under § 1140 is a claim for wrongful discharge or employment discrimination. See Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 159 (11th Cir.1992); McClure v. Zoecon, Inc., 936 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir.1991) (“[NJearly all [courts] have construed § 510 claims as wrongful discharge or employment discrimination claims.”) (citations omitted); Held, 912 F.2d at 1205 (<HOLDING>). In particular, a claim for discharge in

    ### Response:
    holding that the most analogous claim for relief under new york law is a claim for employment discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), and permit such taxation when: the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state. Id. at 279, 97 S.Ct. at 1079; see also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20, 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2117-18, 65 L.Ed.2d 66 (1980) (quoting Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 436-37, 100 S.Ct. at 1231). 11 . See also Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 783, 112 S.Ct. at 2260 (stating that ""the constitutional test focuses on functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale”); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2941 (<HOLDING>)! As noted, the parties here agree that Unisys

    ### Response:
    recognizing breadth of unitary business principle and that it could apply not only to vertically integrated enterprises but also to a series of similar enterprises operating separately in various jurisdictions but linked by common managerial or operational resources that produced economies of scale and transfers of value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    make a difference. For example, “[t]he power to issue bonds for á specific purpose excludes the possibility of an implication of power to issue bonds for other purposes.” State ex rel Jacobsen v. Hansen, 75 S.D. 476, 480, 68 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1955). Likewise, when municipalities’ police powers are involved they are also strictly construed. See City of Sioux Falls v. Peterson, 71 S.D. 446, 25 N.W.2d 556, 557 (S.D.1946) (“It is a principle settled by the concurrence of many authorities that acts of the state legislature granting the police power to municipal corporations ... will be strictly construed.”). On the other hand, if the legislature’s intention is comprehensive and unambiguous, the courts will not interfere unless City’s action was inappropriate and unreasonable. See id. at 557 (<HOLDING>) [¶ 17.] With these principles in mind, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the municipal authority to regulate traffic implies broad authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    serves to toll it. See Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.2001). Thus, Mr. Hubler’s July 2003 and June 24, 2005, applications for post-conviction relief are of no consequence. The limitations period for § 2254 motions is also subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances, Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir.2000), such as where “a constitutional violation [will] result[ ] in the conviction of one who is actually innocent or incompetent,” Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). But in order for a petitioner to avail himself of the actual innocence exception he must demonstrate that his claim is based on a an independent constitutional violation. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Hubler’s claim of actual innocence is

    ### Response:
    holding that although actual innocence is not itself a recognized constitutional claim it can serve as a gateway through which a habeas petitioner may advance an otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Park's defense team, and her subsequent refusal to testify. 13 . Thompson cites one case, Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1986), to support her argument that the prosecutor’s actions broke the chain of causation between her phone call and Ayala’s refusal to testify. Smiddy, however, is inapposite for several reasons. First, that case deals only with post-trial calculation of damages rather than the existence of a cause of action. See id. at 1473 (""[T]he independent act of the prosecutor four days after Smiddy’s arrest, unless shown to have been improperly influenced by the police officers, cut off further liability for damages suffered thereafter.”). Second, Smiddy applies to “negligent conduct,” not to intentional misconduct by law enforcement officers. See id. at 1471, 1473 (<HOLDING>). Third, Smiddy dealt with a Section 1983 claim

    ### Response:
    recognizing that pressure undue influence or knowing misstatements by police could  extend the chain of causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal action. In Houman v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Pompton Lakes, 155 N.J.Super. 129, 382 A.2d 413, 425-28 (1977), the New Jersey Superior Court held that the council could discuss in an executive session whether to appeal to the State Tax Court but that the council violated the New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act when it took formal action to do so in executive session. Similar to section 38-431.03(A)(4), New Jersey law permits executive sessions only to “discuss” pending or anticipated litigation. Id. at 421. That court reasoned that “discuss” does not include final decisions, and hence a decision to appeal is not a “discussion” but rather a final decision that must be made in public. Id. at 428. Cf. City of Danville v. Laird, 223 Va. 271, 288 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1982) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 The Arizona open meeting law compels a

    ### Response:
    holding that council discussion in executive session of whether to appeal did not violate the open meeting law given that ultimate decision to adopt ordinance to meet the objections of trial court was made in public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    found in cases where state statutes explicitly made certain arbitration clauses unen-foreeable or placed serious burdens on the enforceability of arbitration provisions. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688, 688, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (finding preemption where Montana law made arbitration clauses unenforceable unless the first page of the contract contained in underlined capital letters a statement that the contract was subject to arbitration); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 518 U.S. 265, 269, 272-78, 282, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 758 (1995) (reversing Alabama Supreme Court's denial of arbitration based on a state statute rendering predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (<HOLDING>). But no such statute is involved here. Nor is

    ### Response:
    holding invalid on preemption grounds state statute making agreements to arbitrate franchise claims unenforceable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    based on a statutory interpretation that was inconsistent with an intervening decision of the Supreme Court). As the Second Circuit’s traditional understanding of Wilko and § 10 — that Wilko endorsed manifest disregard and that § 10’s grounds are not exclusive — is inconsistent with the basis for the holding in Hall Street, the Court finds that the manifest disregard of the law standard is no longer good law. Even assuming arguendo that “manifest disregard” remains a viable doctrine, “the reach of [this] doctrine is ‘severely limited.’ ” Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted). In fact, even a court convinced that an arbitrator incorrectly applied the law is not free to vacate the award. See Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Rather, vacatur for manifest disregard of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal court cannot vacate an arbitral award merely because it is convinced that the arbitration panel made the wrong call on the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    7 liquidation is enforceable only against the debtor’s property, this interest has the same properties as a nonrecourse loan.”); In re Hill, 440 B.R. 176, 182 (Bankr. S.D.Cal.2010). Generally speaking, chapter 13 provides a means to address a wide variety of claims, including claims which are nonre-course debt. 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (“ ‘claim against the debtor includes claim against property of the debtor’ ”). Even though the chapter 13 debtor faces no personal liability on the debt, the debtor may use Section 506(a) to determine that the claim is not supported by the value of any collateral, avoid the lien through the chapter 13 plan, and thereby treat the debt as unsecured debt. In re Metz, 820 F.2d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir.1987); In re Akram, 259 B.R. 371, 374-75 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2001). 10) (<HOLDING>); In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600, 605-06

    ### Response:
    holding that by virtue of section 1325a5 holder of secured claim retains the lien until the underlying debt is paid in full
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had sentenced Ragnoli, only the BOP had the authority to credit Ragnoli for his time in state custody by retroactively designating his state institution for service of his federal sentence. See Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478 (3d Cir.1990); 18 U.S.C § 3621(b) (granting the BOP authority to “designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment.”). Since the District Court had no authority to modify its earlier sentencing order, and the BOP had independent authority to decide whether to credit Ragnoli for his time in state custody, the District Court’s tetter was only a non-binding recommendation to the BOP, not an appealable order. This reasoning is in accord with our own case law, and the law of multiple other circuits. United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 778 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ceballos, 671 F.3d 852, 856

    ### Response:
    holding that the portion of a district courts order that included a specific place of imprisonment was only a nonbinding recommendation to the bop and therefore not appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    however, that rather than attribute Hemphill’s acceptance of the plea offer to coercion by the district court, we may logically conclude that Hemphill accepted the plea offer on September 28 because the Government had reduced the agreed-to sentence from seven years to five years. But what “we do not and cannot know [is] whether [Hemphill] would have accepted the plea agreement absent participation by the court.” Id. The record in fact suggests otherwise. Hemphill indicated on September 20 that he wanted to proceed to trial, he was diligently preparing for trial, and he gave no contrary indication prior to accepting the plea offer on the morning of September 28. The district court imparted the knowledge that several defendants who . 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2340, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (<HOLDING>). IV. The district court did more than offer

    ### Response:
    holding that a reasonable probability is one that in the judgment of the reviewing court is  sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    repeated false labor sheets constituted only “a simple repetition of a simple plan” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir.1992) (requiring enhanced sentence for repeated acts, even assuming defendant “engaged in no more planning than would be typical for the crime of mail fraud, which, by its very nature, involves planning”); see generally Kim, 23 F.3d at 515 (noting two “guideline paradigms of more than minimal planning — repeated acts and more planning than is typical for the simple form of the crime”). Reviewing the sentencing court’s factual findings for clear error, and giving due deference to its application of the Guidelines to the facts, we find the third prong of the more than minimal planning enhancement satisfied here. See Kim, 23 F.3d at 517 (<HOLDING>). Although the presentence report did not

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court should afford due deference to district court determination that defendant engaged in more than minimal planning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but did not preserve the issue for appeal, parents in these cases who allege ineffective assistance of counsel apparently have no recourse other than direct appeal by which to overturn the trial court’s judgment severing forever the ties with their children. Nevertheless, while we join Justice Vance of our sister court in Waco in questioning the practical applications and constitutional validity of this statute, we are barred by the legislature from considering Appellant’s points on appeal because they do not appear in Appellant’s statement of points or motion for new trial. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. CAYCE, C.J., concurs without opinion. 1 . See In re D.S., 176 S.W.3d 873, 876-77 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); In re B.T., 154 S.W.3d 200, 205

    ### Response:
    holding absence of statement of points does not preclude our consideration of appellate issues in termination appeals filed before september 1 2005
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. United States, 364 Fed. Appx. 920 (5th Cir.2010). Because Stier was the proper party and Anderson filed her claim within the 1-year state of limitations for defamation claims in the State of Texas, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.002(a), the dismissal based on limitations was also erroneous. Anderson, 364 Fed.Appx. at 925. Similarly, because the United States was not the proper party, there were no administrative remedies to exhaust before bringing her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. 2 . We note that there have been cases in which a supervisor’s defamation claims against subordinates have been held to be preempted. See Schwartz, v. Int'l Fed. of Prof Is & Technical Eng’rs, No. 3:07-CV-0978-l, 2007 WL 3196347 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 31, 2007) (memo, op.) (<HOLDING>); Greene v. Am. Fed. of Gov’t Employees,

    ### Response:
    holding that claims based on alleged defamatory statements made during course of grievance were preempted by csra because as union representative subordinate was recommending personnel action against supervisor by filing grievance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have considerable doubt whether the failure-to-train claim survived either the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Grayson, individually, see supra Section II.A, or the Monell policy-based claims against the Town and Grayson, in his official capacity, supra. If Grayson never violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in the first instance, it is difficult to see how a failure to train him could have caused any ""constitutional injury” to plaintiffs. Compare Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir.1996) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 substantive-due-process claim against City where its agents were found not to have violated plaintiff's constitutional rights) (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799, 106 S.Ct. at 1573), with Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1063 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); de Feliciano v. de Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 450

    ### Response:
    holding that city policymakers who owed an independent duty to pretrial detainees were individually liable under  1983 for prisoner suicide even though factfinder determined that the turnkey had not violated prisoners constitutional rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (rejecting the defendant’s “invitation to calculate intended losses based upon [the defendant’s] succeeding with his fraud and deception”). To do so would be to encourage the very conduct outlawed by the statute of conviction here. The value of assets concealed serves as relevant evidence in determining intended loss. See Wheeldon, 313 F.3d at 1073 (instructing the district court to determine intended loss based on the value of assets concealed). Holthaus does not dispute the dollar amounts associated with the concealed inheritance, so the value of concealed income constitutes the upper limit “a reasonable person in [Holthaus’s] position could have intended” to keep from his creditors at the time of the fraud. Staples, 410 F.3d at 490; see also Wheeldon, 313 F.3d at 1073, 1073 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). Holthaus failed to offer at sentencing more

    ### Response:
    holding where the defendant knows as well as anyone the value of the assets he concealed the intended loss calculation may properly be based upon the value of the assets concealed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the disparity here is mind boggling, and I understand that. And I recognize that.” J.A. at 211. This statement is inadequate to save the sentence. Defendant made two arguments based on sentencing disparities, and this statement lacks any indication that the district court understood those arguments. Additionally, nowhere in the record does the district court reveal that it understood Defendant’s argument that his age counseled in favor of a lower sentence. The district court’s cryptic statement is also conclusory, thus engendering uncertainty as to whether “the district court adequately considered and rejected [Defendant’s] arguments regarding proper application of the § 3553(a) factors or whether it misconstrued, ignored, or forgot [Defendant’s] arguments.” Thomas, 498 F.3d at 341 (<HOLDING>). The differences between Defendant’s sentence

    ### Response:
    holding that district judges statement that i certainly have received the sentencing memorandum read it and understand its presentations did not indicate the required consideration of the defendants arguments bracketed text in original
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Under article 38.22, section 6, a defendant is entitled “to offer evidence before the jury as to the voluntariness of a confession despite the judge’s earlier findings thereon to the contrary.” Vanderbilt, 563 S.W.2d at 596-97 (quoting Ross v. State, 504 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex.Crim.App.1974)); see also Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6. Thus, although appellant is correct in arguing that article 38.22 authorizes him to submit evidence to the jury pertaining to the voluntariness of his statement, the testimony appellant intended to elicit from Officer Razo was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court did not err in excluding its admission. See Tex.R. Evid. 802; see also Davis v. State, 970 S.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if the trial court had erred,

    ### Response:
    holding that appellants own statement when offered by appellant was selfserving and not admissible under the declarationagainstpenalinterest exception to the hearsay rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rules aim to deter lawless conduct by police and prosecution and often operate at the expense of placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or innocence); Thompson v. State, 123 S.W.3d 781, 784-85 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (unlike a criminal trial, a Chapter 64 proceeding is an independent, collateral inquiry into the validity of the conviction). 26 . Prible v. State, 245 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). See, e.g., Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (criminal defendant enjoys a presumption of innocence and a constitutional right to be present at a pretrial or trial hearing; applicant for post-conviction writ of habeas corpus enjoys neither); Dix & Dawson, supra, note 9, § 45.181 (<HOLDING>). 27 . Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 58-59

    ### Response:
    recognizing that this court in prible made it clear that a convicted persons effort to secure testing to show that another person was involved in the offense involved no constitutional considerations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (2004) (en banc). That case involved an individual with an extensive history of sex offenses against children, who admitted he was going to the city parks “cruising” and “looking” for children. Id. at 759-60. The city issued a unilateral order banning the plaintiff from the city parks without a hearing. Id. at 760. Unlike this case, the regulation did not implicate the First Amendment so we upheld it under the deferential rational basis review. Id. at 764, 773. Other laws restricting sex offenders’ proximity to schools or parks have been similarly upheld under rational basis review because courts have found they do not implicate the First Amendment or involve a fundamental right. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims as indistinguishable. {32} Under New Mexico case law, we are not to interpret the word “landlocked” so literally and absolutely as to mean that there exists no possibility of gaining access. No New Mexico case requires such a literal, absolute rule. To the contrary, the controlling view is that of “reasonable necessity.” Venegas v. Luby, 49 N.M. 381, 387, 164 P.2d 584, 587 (1945) (“The basis for an easement by implication must be reasonable necessity . . . the English rule of absolute necessity being in this state modified.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Hurlocker, 118 N.M. at 31-32, 878 P.2d at 349-50 (stating that “reasonable necessity” at the time of severance is one element of an easement by necessity); Herrera, 112 N.M. at 720, 819 P.2d at 267 (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Thompson v. Whinnery, 895

    ### Response:
    recognizing reasonable necessity as an element of an easement by necessity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    treatment” not actionable) (quoting Stetson v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir.1993)). Thus, despite the fact that Plaintiffs had been subjected to similar classroom observations during April 2003, arguably contravening Defendant’s past policy and practice as the EEOC Determination Letters found, Plaintiffs’ Exh. B at 1, Defendant’s classroom observations of Plaintiffs which occurred on March 15 and 24, 2004, after Plaintiffs were informed, on either March 5 or 7, 2004, of their new fifth grade teaching assignments, do not demonstrate Plaintiffs were subjected to an adverse employment action actionable under the ADEA. Although, under the ADEA a forced early retirement may constitute a form of adverse employment action, Less v. Nestle Co., 705 F.Supp. 110, 114 (W.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>), it is undisputed that Plaintiffs declined

    ### Response:
    recognizing that allegation of coerced early retirement may support a constructive discharge claim under adea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    activities of pre-petition creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) & (c)(2). Furthermore, to the extent that debtors, trustees, or creditors are concerned about meddling by secured creditors, potential problems of debtors managing property subject to retained liens, or abuse of the bankruptcy system by debtors, they are free to advocate that a plan defer § 1327 revesting until discharge. 9 . The Trustee argues in the alternative that even if the Talbots’ residence was not property of the bankruptcy estate, the sales proceeds representing post-confirmation appreciation in value of the residence constitutes property of the estate pursuant to § 1306(a)(1) of the Code. This is a dubious argument. See Black v. United States Postal Service (In re Heath), 115 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because, however, the Trustee did not raise

    ### Response:
    holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become pari of bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unless a contrary intention appears in the deed or conveyance, or a declaration of trust is recorded. The statute also permits any person to record a declaration of trust before or after the recordation of the deed. Because the deeds used in the initial conveyance of the parcel to Hoffenberg did not identify either trust, name the trust beneficiaries or state the nature or purpose of either trust, and because a declaration of trust was never recorded under section 689.07, the trial court was correct in finding that Hoffenberg owned each parcel in fee simple absolute. See, e.g., Zosman v. Schiffer, 697 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (recognizing language referring to the owners as trustees did not change the nature of the transaction); Terry v. Zaffran, 483 So.2d 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); Glusman v. Warren, 413 So.2d 857 (Fla. 4th

    ### Response:
    holding that without a declaration of trust being recorded or any beneficiary specifically named the words as trustee in an instrument of conveyance do not encumber or effect a grantees individual ownership of real estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the “draw its essence” or “arguably construing” test. In Foley, having decided that absence of causation renders an award punitive, we inevitably concluded that “[t]he award of damages in the present case does not draw its essence from the CBA, for the agreement’s essence does not contemplate punitive, but only compensatory awards.” 789 F.2d at 1423. The rule that punitive awards do not draw their essence from such a bargaining agreement is well-established, not only in our circuit but in others. See, e.g., Desert Palace v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 679 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir.1982); Bacardi Corp. v. Congresso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210, 214 (1st Cir.1982); Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. v. Webster Clothes, Inc., 596 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). When the agreement makes no provision for a

    ### Response:
    holding like foley that absence of causation renders award punitive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sufficient evidence must be presented showing that the action complained of was committed under color of state law and that said conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the United States Constitution. Romero-Barceló v. Hernández-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.1996). There are two aspects to the second prong: (1) there must be an actual deprivation of a federally protected right; and (2) there must be a causal connection between defendants’ conduct and the deprivation of such right. Gutiérrez-Rodríguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989). Additionally, the causal connection element requires that plaintiffs establish for each defendant, that the defendant’s own actions deprived the plaintiff of his or her protected rights. Id. at 562 (<HOLDING>). In addition, it is also set in stone that

    ### Response:
    holding that liability may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior because a supervisor can be liable only for his own acts or omissions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3d Cir.1970); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1943). While the federal courts of appeals have not reached a consensus about how the theory of respondeat superior applies specifically in RICO cases brought under § 1962(c), the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found that where, as here, the defendant corporation is not the Enterprise itself, the corporation is liable for the acts of its officers. Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1405 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1361-62 (3rd Cir.1987)) (finding that “theories of respondeat superior ... are not out of place” where the defendants named are not the section 1962(c) enterprise); Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 379 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that

    ### Response:
    holding that no  prohibition  prevents the imposition of liability vicariously on corporate persons on account of the acts of their agents particularly where the corporation benefitted by those acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). This element is the most difficult to substantiate. C.f, e.g., Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 929 (1st Cir. 1983) (observing that, in a discriminatory discharge case, a plaintiff “will rarely, if ever, be able to produce a ‘smoking gun’ that provides direct, subjective evidence of an employer’s ... intent”). A court must be “particularly cautious about granting summary judgment” in discrimination or retaliation cases, in which one party’s state of mind or intent is “crucial to the outcome.” Id. at 928; see also, e.g., Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997); Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir.1996); Hossaini v. Western Mo. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). However, even in such cases, “a plaintiff

    ### Response:
    recognizing the difficulty of disposing of issues of discriminatory or retaliatory intent at the summary judgment stage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a support network and the resources and skills necessary to help him successfully transition to independent adulthood. The government argued that courts generally do not impose a more lenient sentence because of a defendant’s troubled background. The court agrees with the premise of the government’s position — that family support and upbringing (whether good or bad) generally will not serve as the basis for altering a sentence — but this case presents a distinct inquiry for two reasons. First, the State of Alabama removed Terry from the custody of his parents and family and placed him in the state’s dependency system around the age of ten. When the State takes over a child’s parenting, which is a drastic step, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (<HOLDING>), it is not unreasonable to expect the State to

    ### Response:
    holding that a parents right to control a childs upbringing is a fundamental liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and bodies politic with perpetual existence unless disincorporated according to law,” and § 53A-2-101, allowing the state to create, merge, and dissolve school districts. The statutes cited, however, actually support local city and school board independence. We do not doubt that these statutes give Utah more power over the establishment and disestablishment of local governments than it would have over private corporations, but that is not the issue here. By defining municipalities as “political subdivisions” and “bodies politic,” Utah law recognizes that they are more than merely arms of the state. See Ambus, 995 F.2d at 995 (giving substantial weight to statutory and constitutional language describing school districts as “political subdivisions”); Utah Const. Art. XI, § 1 (<HOLDING>); id. § 8 (implicitly acknowledging counties,

    ### Response:
    recognizing utah counties as legal subdivisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a rectal swab taken from the victim with new, more sophisticated technology. Id. Once conducted, the DNA profile did not match Youngblood; instead, it showed that Walter Calvin Cruise, who had two prior child sex abuse convictions in Texas, committed the assault. Id. at 277. Youngblood was released from prison and his conviction was vacated. Id. at 276. 5 . Although we note a similar jury charge was issued by the trial court in Youngblood, the propriety of this charge under state evidence law is not before the Court. Heretofore, an adverse inference charge based on missing evidence, sometimes referred to as a spoliation of evidence charge, has been limited to civil cases in South Carolina. See Stokes v. Spartanburg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 368 S.C. 515, 522, 629 S.E.2d 675, 679 (Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Kevin R. Eberle, Spoliation in South

    ### Response:
    holding spoliation instruction was warranted in medical malpractice action where two pieces of evidence initially collected by hospital were missing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress has authorized the courts “to formulate a nationally uniform federal common law to supplement the explicit provisions and general policies set out in [the Act].” Peterson v. American Life & Health Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 404, 411 (9th Cir.1995). In that regard, we have held that “ERISA preemption does not mean that general principles of state law are irrelevant to interpretation of ERISA-governed insurance contracts.” Saltarelli v. Bob Baker Group Medical Trust, 35 F.3d 382, 386 (9th Cir.1994). On the contrary, courts are directed to formulate federal common law by considering both state law and governing fed 330, 1335 (11th Cir.1995) (assuming right of rescission exists under ERISA-created federal common law); Nash v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 946 F.2d 960, 966-67 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Coots v. United Employers Fed’n, 865 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    recognizing fraud in the inducement as defense under federal common law interpreting erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is the one required to shoulder these fees. See id. That is all too clear in a case like this, in which Ms. Mantiply has appealed each and every adverse order to the district court and then to this Court time and again. Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)’s award of attorneys’ fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute’s fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes—which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is—entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a 11 usc   1988 fee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    application for permit” prior to receiving FERC approval. 5 .The petition for judicial review was filed in Washington County in Idaho’s Third Judicial District on April 27, 2009. On December 9, 2009, this Court entered an Administrative Order, to become effective on July 1, 2010, establishing venue for water rights disputes in the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District. Neither party thereafter sought a change of venue to that court but it should be noted that any future dispute of this nature is appropriately venued with that court. 6 . The judge also noted authority from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that a water right does not vest until a license is issued. See, e.g., Little v. Greene & Weed Inv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>); Green v. Wheeler, 254 Or. 424, 458 P.2d 938,

    ### Response:
    holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    properly cured by a tort. This statement does not alter the rule that when there is a sufficiently causal relationship between property destruction and the fruits of a search, those fruits are suppressed. See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, at 72 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Because we conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, we need not decide whether, for example, there was sufficient causal relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery of the guns to warrant suppression of the evidence.”) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (creating the independent source doctrine as a limitation on the exclusionary rule) and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>)). Finally, the majority finds justification

    ### Response:
    holding that direct and indirect evidence from unlawful searches is inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Does acted in concert. Therefore, the Court concludes that joinder of the Doe Defendants in this action does not satisfy Rule 20(a). 2. Discretionary Severance Even if joinder of the Doe Defendants in this action met the requirements of Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds it is appropriate to exercise its discretion to sever and dismiss all but one Doe Defendant to avoid causing prejudice and unfairness to Defendants, and in the interest of justice. See Wynn, 234 F.Supp.2d at 1088. First, permitting joinder in this case would undermine Rule 20(a)’s purpose of promoting judicial economy and trial convenience because it would result in a logistically unmanageable case. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 232-33 (M.D.Tenn.2001) (<HOLDING>). Second, permitting joinder would force the

    ### Response:
    holding permissive joinder of 770 putative defendants would not promote judicial economy because the courts courtroom could not accommodate all of the defendants and their attorneys and therefore could not hold case management conferences and could not try all of plaintiffs claims together
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his testimony to be true. See Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (9th Cir.2004). Maafi failed to demonstrate past persecution. However, he fears arrest and death based on the raid of his Iranian church, his friend’s subsequent death sentence, and the likely seizure of a list identifying him as a Christian. This fear is not an irrational phobia but, rather, is corroborated by the Country Report’s statement that “[ajpostasy, specifically conversion from Islam, may be punishable by death.” Thus, the evidence compels the conclusion that Maafi has an objectively reasonable, well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b); Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 896-97 (9th Cir.2000) (as amended); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The IJ found that because Maafi failed to

    ### Response:
    holding that even a ten percent chance of persecution may establish a wellfounded fear
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 1409 (quoting Fecht, 70 F.3d at 1082). We cannot agree that the only reasonable interpretation of the contested sentence is that it warned potential investors that PCI may not have received all of the capital from the $25 million stock sale. Instead, the most obvious interpretation of this sentence is that this cash had already been received, but that this “fact” and the resulting cash increase was not yet updated in the Memorandum. In finding the statement immaterial, the district court also extended the bespeaks caution doctrine to statements of fact, despite the lack of approval from this circuit for such application of the doctrine as well as the explicit rejection of such an extension by two other circuits. See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1213 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65

    ### Response:
    holding that the bespeaks caution doctrine does not apply to representations of present facts that were false when made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    446 (1984). 32 . Evitts, 469 U.S. at 392-93, 105 S.Ct. at 834; Douglas v. Cal, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58, 83 S.Ct. 814, 816-17, 9 L.Ed.2d 811(1963). 33 . Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355-58, 83 S.Ct. at 815-17. 34 .Id. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817. 35 . Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393-97, 105 S.Ct. at 834-37. 36 . Id. at 400-01, 105 S.Ct. at 838. 37 . Id. at 396, 105 S.Ct. at 836. 38 . See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110-11, 117 S.Ct. at 560-61; Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817; Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, 400-01, 105 S.Ct. at 836, 838. 39 . Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27, 101 S.Ct. at 2159-60. 40 . Id. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 2159 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903). 41 . Id. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 2159-60. 42 . Id. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 2160. 43 . Santosky, 455 U. (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 64 . S.C.D. v. Etowah County Dep’t of Human

    ### Response:
    holding indigent mothers due process rights were not violated by trial courts failure to appoint attorney ad litem for her until six months after parental termination suit was filed against her where counsel was appointed giving mother a year to prepare for trial when department of protective and regulatory services made clear its intent to pursue dualtrack of both termination and reunification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (dismissing claims for negligence and wantonness because negligent failure to perform a contract is but a breach of contract, damages for mortgage servicing are typically economic, and there is a ""plethora of alternative avenues for relief in ‘negligent mortgage servicing' cases”); Wallace v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 974 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1370 (S.D.Ala.2013) (""To the extent, then, that Wallace seeks to derive tort claims of negligence and wantonness to recover economic loss (no physical injuries) stemming from SunTrust’s purported failure to perform contractual duties in the servicing of her mortgage, the Court finds that Wallace’s negligence and wantonness claims fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.”); Costine v. BAC Home Loans, 946 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1234 (N.D.Ala.2013) (<HOLDING>); Prickett v. BAC Home Loans, 946 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that claims for negligent mortgage servicing are not legally cognizable under alabama law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not differentiate between those recounted during another witness’s testimony and those replayed on videotape. We have upheld the admission of tape-recorded and videotaped evidence showing interviews with child victims, including both questions and answers, all necessarily conducted out of court and technically hearsay, but always subject to the trial court’s initial assessment of the factors set forth in Rule 804a. Most recently, in State v. Spooner, we upheld a trial court’s admission of the minor victim’s recorded out-of-court statements in the form of an interview by a police officer and a DCP worker that the State offered, in part, to bolster the victim’s testimony. 2010 VT 75, ¶ 17, 188 Vt. 356, 8 A.3d 469; see also State v. LaBounty, 168 Vt. 129, 136-39, 716 A.2d 1, 6-8 (1998) (<HOLDING>); State v. Blackburn, 162 Vt. 21, 25, 643 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that taperecorded interviews with child victim were admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendant “knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional or reckless misconduct.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 302, cmt. n (1930); see also Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951). Under these circumstances, a defendant “is required to anticipate and provide against all of these misconducts” regardless of whether the “third person’s misconduct is or is not criminal at common law or under a statute.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 302, cmt. n. Moreover, a defendant “is subject to liability only for such harm as is within the risk ... caused by the quality of the employee which the employer had reason to suppose would be likely to cause harm.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958); see also Argonne House Co. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C.Cir.1930) (<HOLDING>). To prevail on a theory of negligent hiring,

    ### Response:
    holding that employers knowledge of employees criminal conviction for intoxication did not put employer on notice that employee might be a thief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shriver testified that even today he “would not try to get Ms. Sinclair taken off a case,” and that “[s]he’s wonderful. She might demean[] her abilities, but she’s a dam good attorney.” ¶ 64 The relative inexperience of a second-chair defense attorney in capital trials does not in itself constitute IAC, especially when the first-chair attorney, like Sinclair, was experienced. Indeed, “[defendants facing the death penalty do not have a per se constitutional right to the assistance of two attorneys.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2010); see also Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1009 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Although Mississippi courts may customarily appoint two lawyers in a capital case, the Constitution dictates no such requirement.”); Smith v. State, 445 So.2d 227, 230 (Miss. 1984) (<HOLDING>). This is reiterated in Committee Comment to

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitution does not require the appointment of two attorneys for indigent capital defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regardless of whether same-sex couples (or other non-procreative couples) are included.”). As the Utah court in Kitchen noted: [I]t defies reason to conclude that allowing same-sex couples to marry will diminish the example that married opposite-sex couples set for their unmarried counterparts. Both opposite-sex and same-sex couples model the formation of committed, exclusive relationships, and both establish families based on mutual love and support. 961 F.Supp.2d at 1211, 2013 WL 6697874, at *25. Defendants’ preferred rationale presumes that same-sex couples cannot be good parents — this is the same type of unconstitutional and unfounded presumption that the Supreme Court has held “cannot stand.” See, e.g. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds same-sex couples can be just

    ### Response:
    holding a state could not conclusively presume that any particular unmarried father is unfit to raise a child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). The Court recognized that such a criterion ""would not sustain a roving-patrol stop,” id., but concluded that border-control checkpoints were exempt from the usual Fourth Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion. See id. at 562, 96 S.Ct. 3074 (""[W]e hold that the stops and questioning at issue may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints.”). Since there is obviously no contention that a traditional arrest or Terry stop is similarly exempt from that requirement, Martinez-Fuerte cannot support plaintiffs’ detention. 35 . Cf. Jones, 149 F.3d at 369 (<HOLDING>). 36 . The Second Circuit was interpreting and

    ### Response:
    holding that even though officer had it on good authority that smugglers  use tourists  to bootleg illegal aliens  the fact that defendant looked like a tourist does not give rise to reasonable suspicion  unless we are willing to say that tourists are involved in illegal activity often enough that just looking like a tourist is cause for suspicion we are not so inclined
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    detained 1,200 vessels from 2000 to 2012 — supports their argument that the order was arbitrary and capricious. Pis.’ Opp. & Cross-Mot. at 20-21. They argue the order reflects a “dramatic departure from customary agency practice and precedent,” which required the Coast Guard to provide a specific legal and factual basis for its actions. Pis.’ Reply at 10, citing New York Cross Harbor R.R. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 374 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C.Cir. 2004). They contend the agency failed to provide the legal and factual basis for its actions. Id., citing AR 1-2, AR 188-190, AR 432-435, AR 487, AR 496-508. Plaintiffs cite precedent that holds that an agency may not reverse course in the face of existing precedent without providing a reasoned analysis. New York Cross Harbor R.R., 374 F.3d at 1181 (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted). But this case

    ### Response:
    holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it reverses its position in the face of a precedent it has not persuasively distinguished
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right to be considered for executive clemency because the Governor allegedly had decided in November that he would not commute Wainwright’s death sentence. Contrary to Wainwright’s assertion, on December'9, in declining to recuse himself from deciding Wainwright’s fate, the Governor wrote Wainwright’s attorney that he would decide the case “fairly and impartially as [he was] obligated to do.” Plaintiff’s Complaint Exhibit 3, Wainwright v. Huckabee, No. LR-C-97-12 (E.D.Ark. Jan. 6, 1997). The district court consolidated the lawsuits and dismissed them with prejudice. Wainwright v. Brownlee, No. LR-C-97-11 (E.D.Ark. Jan. 7, 1997). Wainwright appeals. Under the established law of this circuit, Wainwright’s civil rights claims fail. See Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F.Supp. 363, 365

    ### Response:
    holding arkansas statute does not impose standards constraining discretion about granting clemency and thus does not create a constitutional right and invoke the due process clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the two claims have identical elements. See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975)). Moreover, a “ § 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause own in New York law, “exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person about to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852 (citations omitted); see Raysor v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.2d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Since the law seeks to protect citizens

    ### Response:
    holding that new york law reasonable cause standard is equivalent to fourth amendments probable cause standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (affirming summary judgment against employee on claim of retaliation for protesting racial discrimination in job promotions); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir.1990) (reversing award of damages in employee’s favor on a claim of retaliation for fifing an EEOC discrimination charge); Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir.1989) (questioning whether rights against retaliation survive Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson). Section 210 would restore rights to sue for such retaliatory conduct. H.R.Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 n. 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630. Importantly, this quotation states that the Act overrules not only Patterson but also Sherman, the Eleventh Circuit case that Augat pri p. 703, 711 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Shell Oil Co., No. CIV-A-94-3698,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs allegations  that he was improperly paid for appearances at arbitration proceedings that he received highly negative performance evaluations that he was harassed by being required to perform tasks outside his job description that he received shorter notice of his termination than other employees and that he was terminated in retaliation for his eeoc complaint  each state a claim upon which relief can be granted under  1981
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are hard to reconcile on this point”). The test for admissibility in this circuit and elsewhere has long been more permissive: whether the defendant’s conduct in prior crimes is “sufficiently analogous to support an inference” that the defendant intended to do something similar later. See United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1468 (6th Cir.1988). That is functionally the test the district court applied here. Thus, in United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914 (11th Cir.2006), the court upheld the admission of evidence that the police found notes in the defendant’s car saying that he planned to “rob ears and kill people” and “rape rob and pillage” as evidence that he intended to cause harm during a carjacking 10 years later. Id. at 918, 926; see also Benton, 852 F.2d at 1459, 1467-68 (<HOLDING>). The two offenses in LeCroy were no more

    ### Response:
    holding that the government could introduce evidence that a sheriff had accepted kickbacks to protect bootleggers to prove that the sheriff later accepted kickbacks for the purpose of protecting a cocainedistribution scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    995 F.Supp.2d at 52 (termination three days shy of six months after plaintiff lodged complaints does not sustain finding of causation). In the main, plaintiffs retaliation claim rests on her letter of February 23, 2009 denouncing sex discrimination, and the transfer made in January of 2010, eleven months later, following Manzur’s administrative complaint. In her view, the transfer was but a fabrication for complaining of sex discrimination and the hostile work environment (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 55). These circumstances undercut any cognizable claim of causation. See, Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64, 73 n. 8 (1st Cir.2011)(eight-month gap between events considered insufficient to raise an inference of retaliation); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>); King, 116 F.3d at 968 (finding that

    ### Response:
    holding that a time lapse of nine months between the filing of a formal grievance and the adverse employment action undercuts any inference of causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    measure of damages; Wise Electric insists that fair market value is the only allowable measure of damages, arguing that AHC’s inventory had an ascertainable market value after the fire so that the replacement-value measure of damages does not apply. AHC, on the other hand, characterizes its damages evidence as supporting the trial court’s award of $13,385,969.37 in replacement-value damages to its personal property (inventory) and, alternatively, diminution-in-market-value damages from a pre-fire market value of $13,385,969.37 to a post-fire market value of $0. It was AHC’s burden to prove the applicability of a damage valuation other than the general rule of diminishment-in-mar-kefe-value-before-and-after-the-damage valuation. See Pasadena State Bank, 149 Tex. at 52, 228 S.W.2d at 129 (<HOLDING>); Moran Corp., 381 S.W.2d at 328 (stating

    ### Response:
    recognizing plaintiff met this burden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are questions of law, which we review de novo.”); United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1517-18 (11th Cir.1994) (""Whether a particular Guideline applies to a given set of facts is a legal question subject to de novo review.”); United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 115-16 (4th Cir.1989) (performing de novo review where the defendant did “not really attack the factual undergirding of his sentence but rather contended] that his behavior did not fall within the legal definition of the term 'physically restrained’ ”). 11 . United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir.1999). 12 . Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (Apr. 30, 2003). See United States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086, 1098-1100 (9th Cir.2004), as amended by 367 F.3d 846, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5444 (9th Cir. May 06, 2004) (<HOLDING>). 13 . 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 14 . Koon v. United

    ### Response:
    holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the right to redeem the property expired after the 1974 tax sale. See BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, 285 Ga. 5, 7-8 (673 SE2d 205) (2009). Compare with Moultrie v. Wright, 266 Ga. 30, 31-32 (1) (464 SE2d 194) (1995), superseded by statute as stated in Community Renewal & Redemption v. Nix, 279 Ga. 840, 842 (1) (621 SE2d 722) (2005). 7 The defendants dispute the authenticity of the e-mails and produced a computer forensics expert to provide support for their argument that the e-mails were altered by a third party to include the language about assistance payments. 8 (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 430 (1) (571 SE2d 466) (2002). 9 Compare with Schoenbaum Limited Co. v. Lenox Pines, 262 Ga. App. 457, 471 (8) (c) (585 SE2d 643) (2000) (<HOLDING>). 10 Id. 11 See id. at 470-471 (8) (c). 12

    ### Response:
    holding that a question of fact existed as to whether defendants alleged predicate acts directly injured plaintiff under the parties real estate development contract after defendants forced plaintiff out of further development of the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Practice & Procedure § 2866, at 228-29). 47 . First RepublicBank, 958 F.2d at 120. 48 . 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). 49 . - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013). 50 . 501 U.S. 722, 757, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 51 . Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9, 13-14, 132 S.Ct. 1309; see also Trevino v. Thaler, -U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1914, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013) (explaining that the procedural rule at issue in Martinez ""required a defendant convicted at trial to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during his first state collateral review proceeding — or lose the claim”). 52 . Id. at 13-14, 16, 132 S.Ct. 1309. 53 . Trevino, 133 S.Ct. at 1918-1919. 54 . Id. at 1921. 55 . Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); In re Paredes, 587 Fed.Appx. 805, 824-25 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rule 60b motion when the relevant change in law occurred eight months prior and petitioner filed the motion two days before his execution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” See, e.g., Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 (1975). The common law tort of false arrest is recognized under § 1983 only if it also includes a violation of federal statutory or constitutional law. Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1994), citing Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1016 (2d. Cir.1991). The Court believes that Plaintiffs allege that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable ... seizures” by arresting them without probable cause. Cook, 41 F.3d at 77 (<HOLDING>); See also Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 97 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under  1983 because it violates the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Basch v. Ground Round, Inc., 139 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir.1998) (“Plaintiffs may not stack one class action on top of another and continue to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 165, 142 L.Ed.2d 135 (1998); Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir.1994) (“Plaintiffs may not piggyback one class action onto another and thus toll the statute of limitations indefinitely.”); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir.1988) (“The courts of appeals that have dealt with the issue appear to be in unanimous agreement that the pendency of a previously filed class action does not toll the limitations period for additional class actions by putative members of the original asserted class.”); Robbin v. Fluor Corp., 835 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a class action tolls the statute of limitations only for subsequent individual actions not for subsequent class actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may have an adverse verdict ... vacated and a new trial granted if any of the following causes materially affected movant’s substantial rights: (4) Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been influenced by passion or prejudice. (5) Error in fixing the amount of the recovery, whether too large or too small, in an action upon contract or for injury to or detention of property. “Passion” within the meaning of rule 1.1004(4) includes anger. See Collins v. State, 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880, 882 (1925) (“Passion is the state of mind produced when the mind is powerfully acted upon and influenced by something external to itself [and] ... is one of the emotions of the mind known as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror.”); Murphy v. S. Pac. Co., 31 Nev. 120, 101 P. 322, 327 (1909) (<HOLDING>). In ruling on the defendants’ motion for new

    ### Response:
    holding the word passion as applied to a jurys action means anger resentment heat absence of reflection disregard of the rights of others and kindred motives
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    represent that the merger of Plant and Bayside needs to be completed by November 25, 2012, because Bayside must make a $1.1 million payment to the IRS by that date under the terms of an Offer in Compromise for back taxes, and Bayside cannot make that payment unless the merger has closed. When the plan becomes effective, the Settling Insurers will make $17,125 million in settlement payments. In addition, the tort cases of asbestos victims and their families will be able to proceed in state court against Plant. III. LEGAL STANDARD Appellants, as movants, bear the burden of establishing each of the four factors required in order for a stay to issue. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009). Those are: “ ‘(1) whether the stay app 66 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>) (“Although there are important differences

    ### Response:
    holding that the slidingscale approach also survives winter in the context of stays
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conference. At the status conference, the Commonwealth announced its plan to file a motion for reconsideration of Judge Skinner’s denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Commonwealth filed the motion for reconsideration of Judge Skinner’s ruling on October 22, 1997. On December 2, 1997, Chief Magistrate Judge Alexander transferred the case back to Judge Wolf, who later transferred the case to this Court on March 2, 1999. The motion for reconsideration is now before this Court. B. Standard for Motion for Reconsideration A federal district court has the discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders and revise or amend them at any time prior to final judgment. See Bethlehem Steel Export Corp. v. Redondo Constr. Corp., 140 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court judge to whom a case had been reassigned could grant the defendants motion for summary judgment after the previous judge had denied the motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court relied on the following facts in making this determination: (1) Marujo was approached by a uniformed, armed police officer and was aware that a second officer was inside the store; (2) Officer Hinton asked Marujo to change his location by stepping toward him; (3) Officer Hinton requested to perform a pat down with no legitimate reason to interview Maryjo; (4) Marujo consented to the pat down with full knowledge that it would reveal the illegal drugs in his pocket; and (5) Margjo is not a native English speaker, and while he is conversant in English, he requires interpretive assistance with technical legal issues. Relying heavily on our opinion in People v. Fines, the court reasoned that the encounter rose to the level of an investigatory stop. See 127 P.3d 79 (Colo.2006) (<HOLDING>). The trial court held that the stop was not

    ### Response:
    holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basement because all the tenants in the building had access to the basement. We disagree. Factual determinations made in the course of sentencing must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir.1997). While there must be a certain nexus between the weapon and the offense for the enhancement to apply, it is well settled in this circuit that “when the weapon’s location makes it readily available to protect either the participants themselves during the commission of the illegal activity or the drugs and cash involved in the drug business, there will be sufficient evidence to connect the weap on(s) to the offense conduct.” Id. at 10 (quoting United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir.l992)(internal quotations omitted)(<HOLDING>)). Tucker was arrested at his home with a

    ### Response:
    holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28, 2002 filed claim. Persofsky attached the following to his replacement claim: (1) itemized statement; (2) employment agreement; (3) arbitration demand. 3 . Persofsky's motion to lift the automatic stay is embedded in the ""CONCLUSION” of ""DEFENDANT BARRY PERSOFSKY'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEBTOR'S COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AN orp. (In re Meyertech Corp.), 831 F.2d 410, 418 (3d Cir.1987)(Court reasoned that creditor’s filing a proof of claim on a pre-petition breach of contract action created an action in bankruptcy court that ""[b]y its very nature [] fits directly under the more specific definition of a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(B) ....""); Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97-98 (5th Cir.1987)(<HOLDING>); Atassi v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 990 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that because creditor did not file a proof of claim on a prepetition contract matter the peculiar powers of the bankruptcy court had not been invoked
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “infringement ‘commences’ for the purposes of [determining whether infringement commences before a copyright’s registration] when the first act in a series of acts constituting continuing infringement occurs.” Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 506 (6th Cir.1998). Under 17 U.S.C. § 412, a plaintiff may not recover statutory damages or attorney’s fees for any infringement “commenced” before the effective date of a copyright’s registration. The courts have held, based on the provision’s text, legislative history, and purpose, that a plaintiff may not recover statutory damages and attorney’s fees for infringement occurring after registration if that infringement is part of an ongoing series of infringing acts and the first act occurred before registration. See, e.g., id. at 505-06 (<HOLDING>); Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that the purposes of section 412 would be thwarted by holding that infringement is commenced for the purposes of  412 each time an infringer commits another in an ongoing series of infringing acts and citing cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had done all that was reasonably required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 once it had encouraged the employee to try to find another employee to swap shifts with him so that he could avoid working on Saturdays in violation of his religious beliefs. We held that it would have been unreasonable to require the employer to go further and attempt to arrange a schedule swap for the plaintiff. We recognized the interactive and reciprocal duties inherent in a reasonableness analysis, and concluded that the employer had done all that was reasonably required of it when it was amenable to, and receptive to, efforts that the employee could have conducted for himself to arrange his own schedule swap. We believe the holding of that case is controlling here. See also Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d at 1088 (<HOLDING>); Lee, 22 F.3d at 1022-23 (“The defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that so long as the plaintiff had no religious constraints against arranging his own schedule swap with other employees it would be a sufficient reasonable accommodation for the employer simply to be amenable to such a swap without requiring the employer itself actively to solicit other employees to make such a swap
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir.1996). The ADA protects three categories of “qualified individuals with a disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), by defining disability as (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Plaintiff alleges that she is a member of all three protected categories by virtue of suffering from clinical depression. (Complaint 154.) She therefore has placed her mental condition directly at issue in this case, at least with respect to her claims that she belongs to the first two protected categories. Cf. Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3370

    ### Response:
    recognizing that plaintiff who is not actually disabled may still be a member of third protected class
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    named in complaint); Grady v. Cross, 76 Fed.Appx. 760, 761 (8th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal because plaintiff “did not file and exhaust a grievance against ... a named defendant” before filing complaint); Love v. May, 63 Fed.Appx. 282, 283 (8th Cir.2003) (per cu-riam) (affirming dismissal because plaintiff did not file grievances against three defendants named in complaint). These unpublished opinions, though not precedential, have persuasive value, and we are persuaded to hold that a prisoner who files a complaint in federal court asserting multiple claims against multiple prison officials based on multiple prison grievances must have exhausted each claim against each defendant in at least one of the grievances. See Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Dismissal of the complaint on this ground in

    ### Response:
    holding that  1997ea requires an inmate to identify in his grievance each individual he intends to sue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be ordinary witnesses when their knowledge and opinions of patients’ conditions are obtained outside the realm of litigation through their own perceptions. In Morris-Rosdail v. Sche-chinger, 576 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa App.1998), the court found that two doctors, one who examined the plaintiff nine months prior to the commencement of a lawsuit and a second who was actively treating the plaintiff at the time of trial, did not develop their opinions as to the plaintiffs condition in anticipation of the lawsuit or with the trial in mind and were thus treating physicians. Id. at 612. The court thereby held that the rule governing disclosure of experts did not apply and that the doctors’ testimony as to the plaintiffs permanent impairment and need for future surgery was , 690 (E.D.Mich.2004) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 43.] In the instant case Veith came to Dr.

    ### Response:
    holding in a personal injury action where the plaintiff proffered a psychologists trial testimony would be limited to the nature cause and treatment of the plaintiffs psychological injury resulting from the accident that under the federal rule of civil procedure governing pretrial disclosure for expert witnesses the plaintiff was not required to file a written expert report prepared by the plaintiffs treating psychologist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Timothy G. Wakefield appeals the district court’s order affirming his conviction for operating a motor vehicle on a Forest Development Road without a valid driver’s license in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.54 and Forest Order No. 01-005. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Wakefield contends that the Forest Service does not have authority to create the prohibition that he violated nor to enforce it. This argument is without merit. The Forest Service regulation at issue is well within the scope of its authority. See 36 C.F.R. § 261.50 (stating the Forest Service supervisor may issue orders that restrict the use of described areas within its jurisdiction); cf. United States v. True, 946 F.2d 682, 683-84 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Wakefield’s August 30, 2004 motion to correct

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the forest service supervisor had authority to issue orders pursuant to 36 cfr  26150
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a question of jurisdiction, however, we will address it. Id. 6 . The court also labeled as jurisdictional error those cases where a court addresses and decides issues not raised by the pleadings. In re Marriage of Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d 582, 588-89 (Mo. banc 2006). 7 . Mr. Hawkins attempts to distinguish his ""jurisdictional defect” claim from a sufficiency claim, arguing that there must be some evidence of the child's best interest in a paternity case and that a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction in the absence of any such evidence. While there is case law which indicates that the policy underlying the Uniform Parentage Act is a child's best interests, there is nothing in the Act that requires a best interests analysis. See Harmon v. Headley, 95 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Mo.App. W.D.2003) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The statute has since been revised to

    ### Response:
    recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was ordering a new trial, the Texas Supreme Court stated in R.R. Street II that it would not consider whether evidence of those elements was conclusive and therefore able to support summary judgment. See R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 253. R.R. Street I therefore remains the only Texas court interpretation of the relevant provision and the best indication of how the Texas Supreme Court would decide this question. See Vine Street, LLC v. Keeling, 460 F.Supp.2d 728, 755 & n. 111 (E.D.Tex.2006) (citing Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.1992)). The court must follow that ruling unless it is convinced that the Texas Supreme Court would rule otherwise. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Durant v. Trans Terra Corp. Int’l, 142 F.3d 802, 809 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). R.R. Street I and R.R. Street II do not, as

    ### Response:
    holding that when making such a guess under erie r r co v tompkins 304 us 64 58 sct 817 82 led 1188 1938 a federal court is bound by an intermediate state appellate court decision unless convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is prejudiced only if that entity had a “substantial chance” of winning the contract award, but for the Government’s error. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2005). In this ease, the December 12, 2008 Solicitation was a small business set-aside at a $7 million level. Gov’t App. at 6. A business determined by the SBA to be “other than small,” does not qualify to compete for the procurement and therefore would not have any chance, much less a “substantial chance,” of winning the contract award. 13 C.F.R. § 121.1009(g)(5) (“A concern determined to be other than small under a particular size standard is ineligible for any procurement ... which requires the same or a lower size standard[.]”); see also Int'l Mgmt. Servs. v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 1, 6 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a threshold issue in this ease is

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff lacked standing to challenge small business status of awardee because plaintiff was not a small business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    662 A.2d 509 (1995). Imposition of the dismissal sanction for failure to produce an affidavit of merit attesting to a reasonable probability of negligence before damage as a result of the alleged professional negligence has been shown would have the same impact. In other circumstances, our courts have declined to construe the Statute so as to permit a malpractice defendant to use it as “a sword to prevent a valid malpractice claim from reaching the courtroom” on the ground that the Legislature did not intend to weed out meritorious claims. Barreiro v. Morais, 318 N.J.Super. 461, 470, 723 A.2d 1244 (App.Div.1999); accord Aster ex rel. Garofalo v. Shoreline Behavioral Health, 346 N.J.Super. 536, 543, 788 A.2d 821 (App.Div.2002); see also Hubbard, supra, 168 N.J. at 396-97, 774 A.2d 495 (<HOLDING>). We need not suggest that SCE invokes the

    ### Response:
    recognizing common knowledge exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dr. Chen, purport to give opinions about causation or toxicology. He admits that the pharmacokinetics of metam sodium, the symptoms of poisoning, the mechanisms of injury, the biomarkers of injury and the diagnosis of injury are matters beyond his expertise. (Schaible Dep. 30-31, 34.) He is not a medical doctor nor expert in asthma or RADS. (Schaible Dep. 34.) Schaible thus admits that he is not qualified to give opinions about metam sodium causing RADS or any of Plaintiffs symptoms. (Schaible Dep. 156, 180, 189-90.) Instead, Schaible’s opinions are limited to the opinions that Plaintiffs reported symptoms are “consistent with” possible consequences of metam sodium exposure. (Schaible Dep. 87-90.) See also Minner v. American Mortgage & Guar. Co., 791 A.2d 826, 865-66 (Del.Super.2000) (<HOLDING>). The obvious defect of this opinion, in any

    ### Response:
    holding that industrial hygienist was unqualified to opine as to causation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Perez in the middle of the defense’s case-in-chief. This rule does not leave a party without recourse, however, in situations where it is discovered that a juror has committed misconduct. Rule 3.280 requires the trial court to replace, with an alternate, jurors who, “prior to the t . For instance, in Dery, a juror failed to disclose- that she had taken a course that included the study of DNA evidence, and the State’s questions during voir dire required her to disclose this training. Upon learning mid-trial that the juror had taken a seventeen-week course in forensic science, the defense sought to remove her from the jury. The trial court’s refusal to do so was held to be an abuse of discretion. Dery, 68 So.3d at 255; see also Washington v. State, 955 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). We agree with McNeil that the facts of Bigham

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court committed reversible error by removing a juror who despite the courts invitation to ask questions was perceived to be asking too many questions some of which appeared hostile to the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion to dismiss where plaintiff had alleged that a back problem caused him “severe pain”); Candelaria v. Coughlin, No. 91 Civ. 2978, 1996 WL 88555, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1996) (Sand, J.) (denying cross-motions for summary judgment because, the parties disputed whether plaintiffs medical claims based on failure to provide proper wheelchair, failure to provide doctor-ordered heating pad, and refusal to treat blood in his urine were “serious” medical conditions); Orr v. Hoke, No. 91 Civ. 1256, 1995 WL 217541, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1995) (Preska, J.) (rejecting defendants’ argument on summary judgment motion that delay of treatment for a severed finger did not cause plaintiff severe pain); Davidson v. Kalonick, No. 84 Civ. 6985, 1986 WL 3775, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 1986) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the plaintiffs surgery was

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff who alleged he was in pain and discomfort after a bilateral otoplasty sufficiently showed a serious medical need noting that pain though subjective and difficult to measure may well be serious
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir.1998). Clark now contends that the district court erred in not making adequate factual findings, but he never raised this objection below. He also argues that some of the victims may already have received refunds, even though he offered no evidence as to whether he had actually made any such payments. Despite the district court’s brief consideration of the amount, if any, by which the order of restitution should be offset, the court effectively resolved any potential detriment to Clark by ruling that Clark did not have to pay those victims to whom he had already provided restitution. See United States v. Wiant, 314 F.3d 826, 832 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). There was, therefore, no “plain error” on the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts cursory treatment of a factual matter related to victim payment was adequate under rule 32c1 because the defendant expressed very little interest in pursing his objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) where the union has breached its duty of fair representation (the “hybrid” claim), Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185, 87 S.Ct. 903; (2) where resort to the grievance procedure can be shown to be futile, Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 329-31, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969); and (3) where the grievance process has been repudiated by the employer, Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185, 87 S.Ct. 903. See also Abdelmesih v. Waldorf-Astoria, 1995 WL 293634, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1995) (stating that if employee is unable to demonstrate that union’s failure to process grievance was result of either the union’s breach of duty of fair representation or employer’s repudiation, failure to exhaust will bar the complaint); LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transport Co., 865 F.2d 119, 120 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Sea-Land Corp., 844 F.2d 17,

    ### Response:
    holding that where employee cannot establish unions breach of duty of fair representation in failing to process grievance he must abide the outcome of the contractual remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused’s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.""); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, the federal “knock and announce” statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign ""without unnecessary delay” provided ""an opportunity for the extraction of a confession”). Nor have we. See, e.g., United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1168

    ### Response:
    holding that technical violations of fedrcrimp 41 d require suppression if there was a deliberate disregard of the rule or if the defendant was prejudiced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    paid during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the claim. I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A). If the refund claim is not filed within three years from the time a return was filed, then the amount of the credit or refund is limited to “the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.” I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(B). Where a taxpayer pays part of the tax before, and part after, filing a refund claim, the amount of any refund potentially allowable is limited to the amount paid before the claim (and within the applicable two- or three-year look-back period). See Carroll v. United States, 198 F.Supp.2d 328, 348 (E.D.N.Y.2001), rev’d on other grounds, 339 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.2003); Keeter v. United States, 957 F.Supp. 1160, 1163-64 (E.D.Cal. 1997) (<HOLDING>). The amount paid after the refund claim

    ### Response:
    holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    least some of the benefit he sought in bringing suit’ ”). “Put another way, a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d at 293. The judgment awards plaintiff $15,000 thereby achieving a change in defendant’s behavior toward plaintiff by requiring defendant to pay a not insignificant sum of money. By recovering the $15,000 award, plaintiff succeeded on an important issue, to wit, the payment of $15,000 in monetary damages thereby achieving a portion of the benefits he sought in filing suit. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Although plaintiff did not receive all of the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a judgement that produces a payment of damages  affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assets intact.” Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969, 971 (2d Cir.1932) (Hand, J). Accordingly, because liquidation was not “a continuance of the business,” the statute did not apply to liquidations. Id. Modern courts have followed this reasoning and likewise concluded that § 959(b) does not apply to liquidations. See, e.g., In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d 1449, 1460 (11th Cir.1992) (“A number of courts have held that section 959(b) does not apply when a business’s operations have ceased and its assets are being liquidated.”); Saravia v. 1736 18th St., N.W., LP, 844 F.2d 823, 827 (D.C.Cir.1988) (viewing “the statute as applying only to operating businesses, not ones that were in the process of being liquidated”); In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 157 B.R. 442, 447-49 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1993) (<HOLDING>). We agree with this reading of the statute. In

    ### Response:
    holding  959b does not apply to liquidations and citing cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it very seriously. It does strike us as being a dubious proposition that by filing a contempt motion a claimant can be positioned to recover an unlimited amount of compensatory damages from the United States without being bound by the strictures of either the Tucker Act or the Federal Tort Claims Act, which are express (but carefully limited) waivers by the United States of its sovereign immunity with respect to contract and tort claims. Absent an express waiver of sovereign immunity, money awards cannot be imposed against the United States. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 280, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1816, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). See also Barry v. Bowen, 884 F.2d 442, 443-44 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). There does not appear to be any express

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts award of monetary sanctions for contempt violated the sovereign immunity of the united states but also reversing on other grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not sent). We find it significant that Domino’s claim of lack of notice is made within the context of a section 2 — 1401 petition which requires, inter alia, that the petitioner show due diligence in the underlying litigation. Regardless of any possible negligence on the part of its original attorneys in notifying it of their withdrawal, Domino’s was aware of the claim against it and had an independent duty to follow the progress of its case. Nenadic, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 623, 394 N.E.2d at 535; Falcon Manufacturing Co. v. Nationwide Brokers, Inc. (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 496, 499-500, 462 N.E.2d 562, 565; Cooper v. United Development Co. (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 850, 856-57, 462 N.E.2d 629, 634; see also Stallworth v. Thomas (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 747, 751-52, 404 N.E.2d 554, 558 (<HOLDING>). In sum, we hold that the default and damage

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants assertion that he missed a court date because of a lack of notice was insufficient under former section 72 since he had a duty to follow his case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Constitution does not apply to local courts and no provision of Virgin Islands law includes a case-or-controversy requirement.” Hodge, 62 V.I. at 687 n.8 (citing Malloy v. Reyes, 61 V.I. 163, 171 n.4 (V.I. 2014)); see also Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 201, 222 (V.I. 2014); In re Q.G., 60 V.I. 654, 659 n.5 (V.I. 2014); Tip Top Constr. Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 60 V.I. 724, 730 n.2 (V.I. 2014); V.I. Narcotics Strike Force v. Pub. Emps. Relations Bd., 60 V.I. 204, 213 (V.I. 2013). However, Hamed cites none of this controlling authority in making his standing argument, despite being required to do so under this Court’s rules. V.I.S.Ct.R. 15(b) (“[I]n accordance with ethical standards, any attorney who ... does not present otherwise controlling contrary law, will be subject to such sancti ) (<HOLDING>); Haynes v. Ottley, 61 V.I. 547, 556 n.4 (V.I.

    ### Response:
    holding that a writein candidate had standing to seek a recount under the election statutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner advances several arguments concerning past persecution, but his arguments fail. Patel did not provide credible examples of past persecution based on his ethnicity. Petitioner was never arrested, imprisoned, or detained. He and his wife have traveled into and from Kenya without difficulty. To bolster his asylum claim, Patel testified to various events, and the most recent occurred in 1997. The record shows that Petitioner and his family have been the victim of several crimes, but such generalized lawlessness normally does not constitute persecution. See Singh, 134 F.3d at 967 (stating that “[m]ere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations ... generally is not sufficient” to obtain asylum); see also Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding cjonditions of political upheaval which affect the populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Although these factors are neither exclusive nor dispositive, courts have recognized the need for jury protection based on a combination of factors, including: (1) the defendants’ involvement with organized crime; (2) the defendants’ participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendants’ past attempts to interfere with the judicial process or witnesses; (4) the potential that the defendants will suffer lengthy incarceration if convicted; and (5) extensive publicity that could enhance the possibility that jurors’ names would become public and expose them to intimidation and harassment. Shryock, 342 F.3d at 971 (citations omitted); see Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1532 (8th Cir.1995) (collecting cases applying these five factors); see also Baker, 10 F.3d at 1390 (<HOLDING>). The record reveals that all five factors were

    ### Response:
    recognizing despite its skepticism about certain justifications for large joint trials that possible loss of testimony and more importantly risk to the lives of witnesses must be factored into the equation on a casebycase basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disrupts the goal of the NVRA — to streamline the registration process. See Majority Opinion, pp. 400-01. Although the NVRA seeks to simplify and harmonize registration procedures, the statute also identifies “protecting] the integrity of the electoral process” and “enhancing] the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office” as guiding purposes of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b) (emphasis added). Even under the majority’s complementary analysis conducted pursuant to Siebold and Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 118 S.Ct. 464, 139 L.Ed:2d 369 (1997), see Majority Opinion, p. 394, Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship procedure complements— rather than conflicts with — these important purposes. See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 384; Foster, 522 U.S. at 74, 118 S.Ct. 464 (<HOLDING>). The stated harmonious purposes are not served

    ### Response:
    holding that a state election law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concern in deciphering whether an act is ministerial “ ‘is whether the respondent had the authority’ to do what is the subject of the complaint.” Id. Citing State ex rel. Thomas v. Banner, 724 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). In this instance, that act is to order the struck venireperson reinstated on the panel and seated on the jury. I. BATSON AND IT’S PROGENY In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state’s use of peremptory challenges to purposefully or deliberately exclude black persons from jury participation solely on account of their race. Id. at 86, 106 S.Ct. at 1717. Thereafter, the Supreme Court extended the focus of Batson, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>), civil litigants, Edmonson v. Leesville

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourteenth amendment protects every person against purely racially motivated exercise of peremptory challenges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Rec. Vehicles, LLC, 753 F.Supp.2d 753, 766 (N.D.Ind. 2010) (evaluating the fair use defense in connection with a motion to dismiss, but denying the motion on substantive grounds); Karll v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 39 F.Supp. 836, 837-38 (E.D.Wis.1941) (granting motion to dismiss infringement claim because of fair use defense); Shell v. De Vries, 07-1086, 2007 WL 4269047, at *1-2, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 28317, at *4 (10th Cir.Colo. Dec. 6, 2007) (same); Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox, 491 F. Supp 2d 962, 971-72 (C.D.Cal.2007) (same); Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Svcs. v. Delsman, No. 09-1468, 2009 WL 2157573, at 7*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61825, at *20 (N.D.Cal. July 16, 2009) (same); see generally Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The court proceeds to the substance of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has an interest” under the language of § 506(a), and therefore no portion of the lien may be voided under § 506(d); 2) allowing such lien avoidance inequitably gives debtors more in Chapter 7 than in reorganization chapters; and 3) allowing such lien avoidance under § 506(d) would render redundant 11 U.S.C. § 722, which allows for redemption of personal property but not real property. Id. at 589-90. Other courts adopting the minority view include In re Lange, 120 B.R. 132, 135 (9th Cir.BAP 1990) (listing above reasons and adopting reasoning of Dewsnup); In re Mammoser, 115 B.R. 758, 759-60 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1990) (rejecting reasoning of Gaglia and holding that § 506(d) is not an avoiding power, but rather an implementing provision); In re Shrum, 98 B.R. 995, 1002 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Maitland, 61 B.R. 130, 132-35

    ### Response:
    holding that abandoned or exempt property is no longer part of the estate and therefore  506d is not available to void the undersecured portion of a lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to his parole officer in the two weeks prior to March 12, 2007, and Garcia had not been able to reach him at his parole contact number, see generally United States v. Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d 419, 425 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that flight immediately after crime can be evidence of consciousness of guilt of that crime). On this record, Coderre’s argument that the corrected affidavit would not demonstrate probable cause fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendants on both the federal and state law claims of false arrest. We also affirm the judgment for defendants on Coderre’s' claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Washington v. Blackmore, 986 A.2d 356, 361, 119 ConmApp. 218, 224 (2010) (<HOLDING>). We have considered Coderre’s remaining

    ### Response:
    holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    136 F.3d at 1432. Relevant considerations to determine if an environment is objectively hostile include: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. at 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367)(internal citations and quotations omitted). Again, Gerald alleges essentially four incidents in support of his hostile work environment claim: he contends that Locksley threatened him, that Locksley attacked him, that Locksley treated black coaches worse than white coaches, and that the Krebs discouraged Gerald from 1994)(<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 826, 116 S.Ct. 92, 133

    ### Response:
    holding that only two overtly racial comments and one arguably racial remark over the course of the plaintiffs eight years of employment did not constitute pervasive conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    No. 238, p. 28). Thus, a cause of action for “breach of good faith” appears to be the crux of the instant count. As this Court previously noted, “[a] cause of action for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing has been recognized by the courts.” 882 F.Supp. at 1031 (citing Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F.Supp. 692 (S.D.Fla.1992)). However, “a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be maintained under Florida law absent an allegation that an express term of the contract has been breached.” Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F.Supp. 1420, 1439 (S.D.Fla.1996). The Barnes court also noted that its holding was consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s position in Alan’s of Atlanta, Inc., v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1429 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this Court granted Anthony leave

    ### Response:
    holding that under georgia law the duty of good faith cannot be breached apart from an express contractual term
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    well-established Michigan precedent, we conclude that the offense of larceny from the person in Michigan does not have as an element force, attempted use of force, or threatened use of physical force. The remaining issue is whether larceny from the person is a crime that “by its nature, presents] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 commentary, applic. note 1. We apply a categorical approach to determine whether a particular offense creates a serious risk of physical injury to a person. See United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir.1995) (interpreting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), to apply to the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320 (6th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). “[T]he eategorical approach avoids the

    ### Response:
    holding that kidnaping by deception under ohio law is a violent felony as a matter of law under 18 usc  924e2bii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    diligence. Appellant cannot carry his burden of establishing the propriety of equitable tolling in this case. Appellant’s first motion for post-conviction relief was defective because he failed to sign it. He has not, moreover, offered any evidence suggesting he attempted to ascertain the status of that motion during the seven months it sat on the state court’s docket before being dismissed. In short, Appellant failed to act diligently, and the untimeliness of his petition was due to circumstances within his control. As a result, the district court did not err in finding Appellant’s defective motion for post-conviction relief did not equitably toll the limitations period on his petition. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 458, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (<HOLDING>). IV. Because Appellant’s petition challenged

    ### Response:
    holding the principles of equitable tolling  do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Disclosure of Sources is GRANTED; that defendants are COMPELLED to disclose their sources for the two news stories that are the subject of this libel suit; and that if defendants fail to disclose their sources within 60 days, there shall ARISE a presumption that defendants had no sources, which presumption may be removed by disclosure of the sources within a reasonable time before trial. 1 . Nauru is an island republic in the Pacific. Hammer DeRoburt, in addition to being a citizen of Nauru, is also its President; however, he is bringing this suit in his individual rather than in his representative capacity. See this Court’s Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or for Sanctions, filed July 22, 1980 (<HOLDING>). 2 . Second Amended Complaint, 121, at p. 16.

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) evidence of the victim’s or of a witness’s past sexual conduct with the defendant; (2) evidence which shows that some person other than the defendant com mitted the act upon which the prosecution is founded; (3) evidence that the victim’s pregnancy at the time of trial was not caused by the defendant; or (4) evidence of conviction for a crime to impeach under Rule 6 ) (addressing a situation in which the defendant offered to prove the fact that the seven-year-old victim reportedly told his mother that he had previously been molested by another person and the similarity between the physical acts in the two instances and holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence of a prior molestation committed by a different person); Baughman v. State, 528 N.E.2d 78, 79 (Ind.1988) (<HOLDING>): Parrish v. State, 515 N.E.2d 516, 519-520

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of prior molestation by a different person was the type of evidence which the legislature deemed should be excluded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    beliefs of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right and in the interests of the public weal. Shick, 716 A.2d at 1235-36 (quoting Mamlin, 17 A.2d at 409). Fraser argues that his case fits within Hennessy’s first two exceptions: Nationwide fired him for refusing to commit a crime and for his attempt to comply with a statutorily imposed duty. We find these arguments unconvincing. Even assuming that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would also view these as exceptions to an employer’s right to fire an at-will employee, Fraser has presented no evidence that Nationwide directed him to commit any crime, nor has he pointed us to any statutory duty to report Nationwide’s violations of the law. Compare Field v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 388 Pa.Super. 400, 565 A.2d 1170 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with Hennessy v. Santiago, 708 A.2d 1269

    ### Response:
    holding termination wrongful when employee had a statutory duty to report violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review Blackie’s sentence.” Id. at 403. Those rationales do not apply here where the district court gave an extensive explanation for imposing an above-Guidelines sentence on the record. As we explained in United States v. Poynter, 344 Fed.Appx. 171 (6th Cir.2009) (unpublished), “[wjhile this court has emphasized the importance of § 3553(c)(2), it has not vacated a sentence solely for failure to meet the statute’s written order requirement[,]” id. at 181 n. 8, and “[w]e do not regard the court’s failure to comply with this aspect of § 3553(c) as a basis for resentencing because the court provided a detailed oral explanation of its reasons for sentencing outside the Guidelines.” Id. at 181; see also United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1197 (10th Cir.2008) (footnote omitted) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jones, 509 F.3d 911, 916

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts failure to enter a written statement of reasons as required by  3553c2 is not reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no exhibits for trial. It appears that the evidence at trial would have mainly consisted of Azimi's own testimony, rather than documentary evidence that might have required sustained visual concentration. 19 . McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 90 (Alaska 1974). The provision of publicly-funded counsel in some child custody, parental termination, and involuntary commitment cases is a notable exception to this rule. See, eg., AS 47.30.725(d) (providing right to counsel before involuntary commitment for mental health treatment); Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 383 (Alaska 2007) (Alaska Constitution's due process clause guarantees counsel in involuntary commitment and administration of psychotropic medication proceedings); Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Sparks v. Gustafson, 750 P.2d 338, 341

    ### Response:
    holding that an indigent party has the right to courtappointed counsel in a private child custody proceeding in which the other parent is represented by counsel provided by a public agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that they should have pursued action which would have resulted in their discovery of the mistake in the survey. Under these circumstances, we concluded that the prejudice they would suffer by having their claim barred outweighed any prejudice to the defendant surveyors from the lapse of time. Id. at 872. These decisions, when considered with Myers, indicate that to invoke the exceptional-circumstances version of the discovery rule, the plaintiff must make a threshold showing that he or she did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of action. In fact, this requirement would seem a definitional prerequisite to reliance on any version of the discovery rule, judicial or legislative. See, e.g., Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978) (<HOLDING>). Returning to the present case, there is no

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants false representations that concealed cause of action preclude statute of limitations defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    delay, or obstruction occurred prior to the time that the officers had determined to arrest him for any criminal conduct. Indeed, they occurred in the course of the officers' lawful performance of their duty to investigate whether an offense had occurred. The acts by Smith include twice refusing to take his hands out of his pockets, reentering his home once; repeatedly refusing to put his hands on his head and come down off the porch, and, finally refusing to put his hands on his head and turn around. Each of these acts constituted a violation of § 148(a)(1) sufficient to warrant the filing of a criminal charge. Each could support a conviction under that section for obstructing the criminal investigation. See, e.g., In re Muhammed C., 95 Cal.App.4th at 1329-30, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21 (<HOLDING>); People v. Green, 51 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant violated  148a1 when he refused officers repeated requests to step away from the patrol car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    noted with respect to Plaintiffs prima facie case, he has not put forth any evidence that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employers, nor pointed to an adequate comparator to show that he was discriminated against because of his age. Cf. Maddow v. Procter & Gamble Co., 107 F.3d 846, 852 (11th Cir.1997) (“Evidence offered in the prima facie case may be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext.”). Plaintiffs conclusory allegations as to his job performance, as well as his perception that younger employees were given more hours and more favorable application of the “first out” policy, without more, fail to support a finding of pretext. See, e.g., Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 n. 6 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, “provided

    ### Response:
    holding that conclusory and generalized allegations of racial bias such as there was a racially biased attitude by management towards minority black employees were properly struck by the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1228, 143 L.Ed.2d at 326 n. 6, 330-31 (construing federal carjacking statute that imposed enhanced punishment when offense resulted in serious bodily injury or death as defining separate offenses with distinct elements to avoid “serious constitutional questions” under Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees). Here, the defendant was charged with scheduled violations, yet the State sought to have him sentenced to jail on the basis it had proved he committed nonscheduled simple misdemeanors. Because the defendant had no notice he was being charged with the greater offenses, he clearly did not have constitutionally sufficient notice of the charges against him. See In re Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122 (1968) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hibler, 5 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Mo.1999)

    ### Response:
    holding procedural due process requires that the charge must be known before the proceedings commence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasoned, “bigamy” would be erased as a crime because “under Kansas law a bigamous marriage ... is always void.” Id. at 1346-47. Second, Ms. Hunter ignores Congress’s obvious purpose. In enacting § 1325(c), Congress showed no sign that it wanted criminality to depend on whether a marriage was “void” or “voidable” under state law. Presumably for this reason, Ms. Hunter’s argument is unsupported by any case law. See United States v. Ali, 557 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir.2009) (rejecting the defendant’s challenge to a bigamy conviction on the ground that the second marriage was void, reasoning that this “virtual ‘impossibility’ defense is not what state legislatures intended when they enacted laws voiding bigamous marriages”); Bouf-ford v. United States, 239 F.2d 841, 843-45 (1st Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>). For both reasons, plain error did not arise

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants statement in an application for citizenship that he had only been married once was false even if the second marriage had been a nullity because it was bigamous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sec. 1313(d)(1)(A). The objective of the federal Act, which is the same as that expressed by Missouri in its Clean Water Law, sec. 644.011, RSMo, is to protect, maintain, and improve the quality of the state’s waters through cooperative action. Compilation of the 303(d) list is the first and most significant step in accomplishing this policy, for it is not until the impaired water-bodies are identified that federal and state regulators may begin the difficult tasks of targeting the harmful pollutants and regulating the responsible polluters. Accordingly, when the state compiles a 303(d) list, it does so with the aim of “prescribing” and “implementing” both federal and state environmental policy. See Tonnar v. Missouri State Highway and Transp. Comm’n, 640 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.App.1982) (<HOLDING>). That the promulgation of the 1998-303(d) list

    ### Response:
    holding respondent agency engaged in rulemaking when it created a rightof way manual pursuant to federal directives
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    services for the State. In stark contrast to the Wit-ham test results, the Med-Tox test indicated that Black's sample contained 528 milligrams of cocaine metabolites per milliliter-98 milligrams higher than Wit-ham's initial test conducted on the same sample. Based upon this evidence, the State moved to revoke Black's probation. Prior to the revocation hearing, Black filed a motion for the State to produce evidence it planned to use at his hearing. The State responded by stating that it did not possess the items requested and informed Black that this information could be obtained by contacting the JCPD: The revocation hearing took place on March 7, 2002. During the hearing, Black moved to strike all evidence due to the State's failure to provide t Ind.Ct.App.2002), trams. denied (<HOLDING>). However, judges are not required to admit all

    ### Response:
    holding uncertified investigation reports of law enforcement personnel inherently unreliable and inadmissible in revocation hearings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was handcuffed. There were at least two officers present with him. The area beneath the mattress, whether Fisher was 3 or 4 feet away, or 15 feet, was simply not easily accessible to a handcuffed and guarded man, if we take a logical and reasonable approach to the word “accessible.” We note that if, on the same facts, the district court, after judging the credibility of the witnesses, had come to the conclusion that the weapon was accessible and should be allowed into evidence, and the defendant had appealed, we are not sure what our conclusion on appeal would have been. We do not need to address that hypothetical. But what we can say on appeal is that giving proper deference to the district court’s assessment of the credibility of oral testimony, we cannot say that the inn.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Fisher argues that police lacked probable

    ### Response:
    holding public safety exception to miranda warning requirement did not apply where there was no evidence gun had been left in public place
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether or not they are found in the United States”); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1518-19 (S.D.Fla.1990) (upholding extraterritorial application due to the broad purpose and language of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which punishes “travel in interstate or foreign commerce” with intent to promote unlawful activity). “Travel[ ] ... in foreign commerce” should logically be read to include traveling from the United States to a foreign country, and then purchasing a minor in that country for use in child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2251A(c)(l). For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), which punishes anyone “who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct,” has been applied extraterritorially. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Martinez, 599 F.Supp.2d at 797-98 (same);

    ### Response:
    holding that the title of the statute engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places and the requirement that the defendant travel in foreign commerce evinced congressional intent to apply the statute extraterritorially
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789), in order to further the objective, also inherent in the Commerce Clause, Art. I § 8, cl. 3, of avoiding risks of local prejudice or restrictions harmful to the Union. This does not affect the content of applicable law, be its source state or federal, which is to be applied evenhandedly by all courts. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). 3 . Charlebois involved a contract specifying that the work was to be done by a licensed party; such a written provision is an additional safeguard but hardly a sine qua non. 4 . For discussion of medieval guild restraints leading to substitution of the concept of the open market, see Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 582-601, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 2002-2012, 80 L.Ed.2d 590 (1984) (dissenting opinion) (<HOLDING>). For more modern applications, see, e.g., FMC

    ### Response:
    holding irrelevant here
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has ever visited him to discuss his case; and that (4) he informed his lead counsel to withdraw his appeal. As we stated earlier, the record directly contradicts each of these claims. Thus, the State’s assertion that these letters establish Mr. Comer’s competence and obviate the need for a hearing is meritless. We also reject the State’s argument that, in deciding whether a hearing is necessary, we should presume that Mr. Comer is competent to waive further federal review based on a state court’s determination, thirteen years ago, that he was competent to stand trial. To be sure, a state court’s determination on competency to waive further legal remedies may trigger a presumption of correctness. See Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 734-35, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990) (<HOLDING>). But the presumption does not apply here

    ### Response:
    holding that state courts determination that the petitioner was competent to waive his right to pursue further postconviction review of his claims was a factual one and therefore presumed correct under the federal habeas corpus statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    accurate information during the presentence interview, by noting that any information withheld was done so on the advice of counsel, and by indicating that he is willing to meet again to discuss any additional information sought by the Probation Office. II. DISCUSSION Due process affords defendants the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). This right is enforced by ensuring that a defendant be provided an opportunity to explain, deny, or correct any information that may have a material effect on the sentence imposed by the Court. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Ryder v. Morris, 752 F.2d 327, 332 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that due process was violated where a death sentence was imposed based on information in a presentence report and the defendant was not given an opportunity to deny or explain the information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 4 . In reaching its conclusion that New York , law subordinated the Roses’ prior assignment, the District Court relied on Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers’ Finance, 264 U.S. 182, 44 S.Ct. 266, 68 L.Ed. 628 (1924), and Herman v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., 218 Mass. 181, 105 N.E. 450 (1914), neither of which takes precedence over New York authorities. See First Investors Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations, quotation marks, and

    ### Response:
    recognizing in a new york diversity action that the job of the federal courts is to give the fullest weight to the pronouncements of the new york court of appeals to have a proper regard to relevant rulings of other courts of the state and where appropriate give limited consideration to relevant cases from other jurisdictions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    introduced Young’s lease, which began in January 2003, and Young testified that he moved to the Paris Street residence in January 2003. This was approximately ten months prior to the search, suggesting that the confidential informant’s information was older than even the six months testified to by the detective. Further, the detective testified that the confidential informant never said when he or she observed Young with these quantities of drugs. And, when reporting Young’s prior arrest, the affidavit did not reveal that the arrest occurred nine years previously. Up to this point, and considering the affidavit in conjunction with the omitted facts, we can only conclude that the information was far too stale to establish probable cause. Rodriguez v. State, 297 So,2d 15, 18 (Fla.1974) (<HOLDING>). The affidavit’s recitation of the detective’s

    ### Response:
    holding that affidavit was stale and thus failed to establish probable cause to support wiretap
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allege a violation of his speedy trial rights until the day of trial. See Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (suggesting that defendant’s failure to object to open-ended continuance cuts against defendant’s argument that the delay occasioned by continuance was not excludable under the Speedy Trial Act). The district court also made the findings and statement of reasons required by § 3161(h)(8); it simply declined to set a specific ending date for the continuance because it was unclear when the transcripts would be available. Under these circumstances, Green may not seek “to turn the benefit he accepted into an error that would undo his conviction.... ” United States v. Eakes, 783 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906, 106 S.Ct. 3277, 91 L.Ed.2d 567 (1986). “The Spe th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we determine that the period from

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant did not mislead or sandbag the district court and thus cause delay because the district court erroneously induced defendant to waive his speedy trial rights without identifying an applicable exception for this under the speedy trial act or performing an endsofjustice analysis under  3161h8
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision will not be reversed unless the evidence compels a conclusion contrary to that reached by the BIA. See Chen, 470 F.3d at 1134. Segovia has failed to produce sufficient evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his membership in a particular social group, and, therefore, is not entitled to relief. E.g., Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir.2006). The suggested groups his claims are based upon are too general to comprise particular social groups for immigration purposes. Mwembie v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 405, 414-15 (5th Cir.2006) (noting that to establish membership of particular social group, applicant must show member of group sharing common immutable characteristic); see also Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576-77 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74

    ### Response:
    holding class of young working class urban males too allencompassing to meet requirements of particular social group
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cause does not require legal certainty, nor does it demand that all the facts in the officer’s possession point in only one direction.” Zappa v. Gonzalez, 819 F.3d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016); see Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 833 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that “it does no h Cir. 2003) (same). And Raisbeck reasonably could have thought that the meeting’s short duration suggested that its intended purpose was transactional, not social. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that police officers reasonably had believed that short meetings of one to five minutes were indicative of drug dealing). The search of Nicole before she entered the Jimmy John’s also provided some corroboration. Cf. United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 869

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a properly executed controlled buy is generally a reliable indicator as to the presence of illegal drug activity internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is without merit. On its face, the statute is limited to declaring what will happen in a case if a trial court fails to specify whether multiple sentences are concurrent or consecutive. See Minn.Stat. § 609.15. Specifically, the statute provides that if a trial court does not state whether two or more sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively, the sentences shall run concurrently. Id. The only question left, then, is whether the pronounced consecutive sentences are commensurate with appellant’s culpability or unfairly exaggerate the appellant’s criminality. Time after time this court has affirmed consecutive sentences for multiple murders committed during one event within this state. See Wilson, 539 N.W.2d at 246; see also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 421, n.5 (Minn.1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ouk, 516 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Minn.1994)

    ### Response:
    holding that consecutive sentences could be appropriate for appellant who stabbed two people to death one being a 2½yearold child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    redacted from the certificate the words “violent felony offense” as well as the sentence imposed. The nature of Vonneida’s prior offense could thus be inferred only to a limited extent from the district court taking judicial notice of the 1989 definition of first degree sexual abuse. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its broad discretion, see United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 687-88 (2d Cir.2010), in deciding to admit this one limited piece of propensity evidence, among the many more inflammatory options available. Furthermore, under Rule 414, Vonneida’s propensity to commit child molestation was probative of his intent that a minor engage in criminal sexual activity, which was centrally disputed in this case. We similarly dismiss (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). III. Sentencing Finally, Vonneida asserts

    ### Response:
    holding district court lacked discretion to permit defendant to stipulate to prior conviction in prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purports to forbid? Footnote 11 cites a single case, North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 10 S.Ct. 509, 33 L.Ed. 849 (1890), which concerned a private bondholder’s suit to compel a state auditor to levy a tax, the proceeds of which would be used to pay interest to holders of state bonds. In a half-page opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the suit on sovereign immunity grounds. Id. at 30, 10 S.Ct. 509 (“We think it perfectly clear that the suit against the auditor in this case was virtually a suit against the State of North Carolina. In this regard it comes within the principle of the cases of [Ju-mel], [Cunningham], [Hagood], and [In re Ayers].”). Temple, in turn, cited four cases involving bondholders. See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 720-23, 2 S.Ct. 128, 27 L.Ed. 448 (1883) (<HOLDING>); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109

    ### Response:
    holding that sovereign immunity prevents mandamus action to compel state officers to levy a tax to pay bondholders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally— (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (West 1981). 4 .Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchap-ter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (West Supp.1999). 5 . The Sixth Amendment states: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... U.S. Const, amend. VI. 6 . See also United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Willie did not object to his attorney’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants attorney can waive the defendants sixth amendment confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorneys decision and so long as it can be said that the attorneys decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a matter of serious criminal concern, but not as something new and different. The majority’s implicit assumption that terrorism is different, and must be treated differently, thus flies in the face of the congressionally sanctioned structure of sentencing that applies to terrorism as well as all other kinds of federal criminal offenses. Our courts are well equipped to treat each offense and offender individually, and we should not create special sentencing rules and procedures for terrorists. In presiding over the many terrorism-related cases on their dockets, courts have treated other issues in terrorism cases in ways that do not differ appreciably from more broadly applicable doctrines. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902,

    ### Response:
    holding that ordinary qualified immunity standard protects officials in a suit alleging an unconstitutional use of the material witness statute for detaining terrorism suspects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under these circumstances, a Chapter 7 trustee should be installed to investigate the suspect transfers, unburdened by any conflict of interest. iii. Blanco’s History of Misconduct. The parties seeking conversion spent most of the trial presenting evidence about Debtor’s and Blanco’s prepetition misconduct. Such misconduct can constitute “cause” under § 1112(b), though in most cases it is relevant to whether the debtor filed a petition in bad faith. In re Melendez Concrete Inc., 2009 WL 2997920, at *3 (Bankr.D.N.M.2009); In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir.1991). As Debtor correctly points out, entities seeking bankruptcy relief typically have a history of lax business and accounting practices. In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 120 B.R. 164, 174 (Bankr.D.Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, a showing of some prepetition

    ### Response:
    recognizing that typically there is some degree of mismanagement or incompetence in most businesses which file for protection under chapter 11
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and it must affirmatively appear from the face of the petition that the legal provision in question involves a clear mandate of public policy.’ ” Misischia v. St. John’s Mercy Med. Ctr., 30 S.W.3d 848, 863 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Adolphsen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 333, 338-39 (Mo.Ct.App.1995)). Where plaintiff “fail[s] to identify any specific statute, constitutional provision or regulation that was violated,” a trial court does not err in dismissing the plaintiffs claim. Id.; see also Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 939 (Mo.Ct.App.1998). For example, “[v]ague reference to ‘theft’ and ‘misuse’ of [the employer’s] own property are insufficient to state a claim under the ‘narrow’ public policy exception.” Link v. K-Mart Corp., 689 F.Supp. 982, 985 (W.D.Mo.1988) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, where a plaintiff failed to plead

    ### Response:
    holding that where plaintiff alleged that he was terminated for reporting the misuses and thefts of company telephone services by three managers the misuse and theft of merchandise by an assistant manager and the misuse and theft of food merchandise by a merchandise manager plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim because it did not implicate  any statute regulation or constitutional provision and did not allege that he was disciplined for reporting either to his supervisor or to a public agency violations of a well established and clear public policy that places a positive duty upon the employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and third examples show how the OOKeyMan software manages and tracks encrypted objects that may be transmitted between different applications, such as between WordPerfect® and Microsoft Word®. Id. col. 7 ll. 54-61, col. 9 l. 4-col. 11 l. 11. The defendants contend that these examples only disclose generic software and not a specific algorithm. We disagree. It is true that “black box” disclosures of software are often too generic to provide corresponding structure for computer-implemented means-plus-function limitations. E.g., Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“The ACM is essentially a black box that performs a recited function. But how it does so is left undisclosed.”); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 518 (Fed.Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). But the examples here provide detailed prose

    ### Response:
    holding that black box labeled purchase orders was insufficient structure to perform the generate purchase orders function
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Davis, 90 P.3d 1216, 1221 (Cal. 2004). NRS 18.015(3) promotes these policies by requiring an attorney to serve notice and perfect a charging lien in a timely manner. Diligent perfection of the lien under NRS 18.015(3) ensures that the client, the client’s opponent in the litigation, and others have notice of the attorney’s hen and may conduct the litigation and deal with any recovery it produces accordingly. A timely motion to adjudicate and enforce the charging lien under NRS 18.015(4) also enables the court to evaluate the lien while it has jurisdiction over any affirmative recovery, while the attorney’s performance is fresh in its mind, and before the judgment is satisfied and the proceeds are distributed. See Weiland v. Weiland, 814 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Sowder, 911 P.2d at 1038 (holding that a law

    ### Response:
    holding that notice was untimely where the attorney waited to establish the lien until approximately two months after the case concluded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.” See Ruby v. Springfield R-12 Public School Dist., 76 F.3d 909, 911 n. 6 (8th Cir.1996). Accordingly, all facts set forth in the Court's statement of facts will be taken from defendant Webco's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 63) and defendant’s suggestions in support (Doc. No. 64) unless otherwise specified. 2 . The Court recognizes there is no consensus in this circuit as to whether a presumption of a palpable conflict of interest applies when the entity both funds and administers the plan. The Eighth Circuit recognized the lack of consensus in Kecso, 480 F.3d at 853, fn. 1. Compare Tillery v. Hoffman Enclosures, Inc., 280 F.3d 1192, 1197 (8 th Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>), Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that when an entity both funds and administers the plan there is a rebuttable presumption that a palpable conflict of interest exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    party opposing termination must be given the opportunity to submit additional evidence in an effort to show current and ongoing constitutional violations. This position has been taken by numerous other courts that have considered the issue. See Loyd v. Alabama Dep’t of Corrections, 176 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir.) (reversing the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing pri- or to terminating the consent decree, reasoning that “[i]t would read all meaning out of [§ 3626(b)(3) ] to force the party opposing termination to show that the consent decree meets the requirements of § 3626(b)(3) and then not provide that party with the opportunity to present evidence on that point”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1061, 120 S.Ct. 613, 145 L.Ed.2d 509 (1999); Berwanger, 178 F.3d at 839-40 (<HOLDING>); Benjamin, 172 F.3d at 166 (“In sum, we

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court erred by letting more than a year pass after the motion for termination was filed without action and then terminating the decree under  3626b2 without making any findings and explaining that the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if there are disputed issues of material fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made the first offer by bidding on the contract. Whether Dinwiddie’s bid, to which it attached the Qualifications and Exclusions document, was an offer or a counteroffer, we conclude that there is at least a triable issue whether Dinwiddie intended, at the time that it submitted its bid documents, to be bound by the No Damages for Delay Provisions. 2 . At most, United suggests that the No Damages for Delay Provisions and other parts of the Contract evidence contrary intent because they evidence United’s desire to avoid all costs associated with delay damages. But this conclusory statement that a certain contract provision has a certain meaning does not suffice to create a triable issue of fact. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)

    ### Response:
    holding party opposing summary judgment does not show genuine issue for trial by replacing conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    system because without it the basic system of marshaling assets and the distribution of proceeds to creditors would be an impossible task."" Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 205 S.W.3d 690, 702 (Tex.App.2006). . 1 14 Many courts, however, have disagreed with this view. In Crawford, the Second Cireuit thoroughly addressed this precise is sue and explicitly rejected the reasoning in Kunica. The Second Circuit noted that seetion 349(b)(8) makes no distinction between property that the debtor disclosed or failed to disclose. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 484-85. And it refused to read section 554 as overriding the broad and clear language of seetion 349(b)(8) revesting the property of the estate in the debtor upon dismissal,. Id. at 484 (""We cannot vie 793, 801 N.Y.S.2d 271, 275-76 (N.Y.App.Div.2005) (<HOLDING>); Norris v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 362 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that all property regardless of disclosure revests in the debtor upon dismissal and declining to follow kunmica because the debtor did not obtain the functional equivalent of a discharge 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be preceded by Miranda warnings. Id. at 1278-80. In that case, “the questioning from Investigator DeWitt was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from [the defendant],” because “the ‘background questions’ asked related directly to an element of a crime that DeWitt had reason to suspect.” Id. at 1280. Hence, Miranda warnings were required. Id. In United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit held that Miranda warnings were required pri- or to questioning by an INS agent where the suspect was in custody, the questioning went to the suspect’s true identity, and the questioning was “reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information relevant to establishing an essential element necessary for , 2009 WL 2426015, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2009) (<HOLDING>); Bonilla-Siciliano, 2008 WL 1820828, at *5-6

    ### Response:
    holding that background and pedigree questioning of suspected alien was unconstitutional in the absence of miranda warnings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See McConnell & Picker, 60 U. Chi. L.Rev. at 427-29, 450-54 (summarizing the history). Although it had a rocky start, see, e.g., Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530-32, 56 S.Ct. 892 (invalidating the initial act), Congress eventually succeeded in avoiding a Tenth Amendment problem. It did so in part by requiring a state’s consent in the federal municipal bankruptcy regime before permitting municipalities of that state to seek relief under it, and in part by emphasizing that the statute did not effect “ ‘any restriction on the powers of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties.’ ” See, e.g., United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49-54, 58 S.Ct. 811, 82 L.Ed. 1137 (1938) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 75-517, at 2 (1937); S.Rep. No. 75911, at 2 (1937)) (<HOLDING>); cf. McConnell & Picker, 60 U. Chi. L.Rev. at

    ### Response:
    recognizing that this created a cooperative scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on Defendant’s person on June 30, 2007 were the fruits of the drug trade. While the district court explicitly overruled Defendant’s objection to the means by which the currency found in his possession was converted to 62.32 grams of actual methamphetamine, it did not squarely address Defendant’s factual contention that he acquired the $8,450.00 through his work as a rapper. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B) (requiring district courts to rule on disputed portions of the PSR or determine that such a ruling is unnecessary). Defendant recognizes that even if the district court’s lack of explanation violated Rule 32(i)(3)(B), we may review only for plain error, as he failed to specifically object to this omission at sentencing. See United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1297-98 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Because Defendant cannot satisfy the third

    ### Response:
    holding that plainerror review applies when a defendant fails to make a specific rule 32i3b objection based on a district courts failure to resolve a factual dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not bar a suit against a noncustodial parent because: (1) when the doctrine first evolved, the prevailing view of families did not include divorce; (2) when the parents are divorced, there is no longer any family harmony to protect; and (3) the noncustodial parent’s home is not the family home. This line of argument fails to account for the many parents who strive to maintain family relationships despite divorce, and also misperceives the underlying purpose of the doctrine. The primary focus of the parental immunity doctrine in Connecticut is the protection of the relationship between the parent and the child. The protection of that relationship enables the parent to raise the child effectively without undue interference from the state. See Mesite v. Kirchenstein, supra, 109 Conn. 84 (<HOLDING>); Dubay v. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. 527-28

    ### Response:
    recognizing that reciprocal obligations of parent and child are essentials of the family relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    determined that Marranea had failed to make a substantial showing that the affidavits reflected false statements that were made knowingly and recklessly. The District Court committed no error in finding that Marranea was not entitled to a Franks hearing. United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir.1993). In the alternative, Marranea contends that even if he is unable to make a substantial preliminary showing on the reckless or intentional withholding of information from the affidavits, the District Court should have conducted an ex parte, in camera review of the confidential informants’ statements to determine whether he was entitled to a Franks hearing. We have previously held that ex parte, in camera review is unnecessary in instances such as Marranca’s. See Brown, 3 F.3d at 680 (<HOLDING>). In anticipation of a Franks hearing, Marranea

    ### Response:
    holding that because the defendants offer of proof failed to show that the affiant was untruthful the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order disclosure of the informant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relation between a general depositor and the bank in which his deposit is made is simply that of debtor and creditor. The moneys deposited immediately become the property of the bank, and the latter becomes debtor of the depositor....”’ ... However, when funds are deposited for a special purpose with notice to the bank, the deposit does not become the property of the bank and the right of set-off does not exist. Id. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 864 (emphasis added) (first omission in original) (original source omitted). The court also held that exempt funds that are commingled with nonexempt funds lose their exempt status. Id. at 522, 290 S.E.2d at 865. Critical to the court’s decision was a balancing between the tremendous burden that would be put on bank if E.D.Va., 1980) (Bostetter, J.) (<HOLDING>). The continued vitality of that portion of

    ### Response:
    holding without elaboration that funds in debtors bank account arising from workers compensation payments remained exempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ultimate termination of litigation. See id. After it received case CV-57, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia recertified plaintiffs’ petition for interlocutory appeal to the D.C. Circuit. In October 2000, the D.C. Circuit denied the petition for interlocutory appeal because the appeal in this case, CV-29, was still pending before this court. See Vogel v. U.S. Office Products Co., No. 00-7038, 2000 WL 1683498 (D.C.Cir. Oct.26, 2000). II. Bankruptcy Filing On March 5, 2001, USOP filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition operates as a stay on the “continuation ... of a judicial proceeding against the debtor.” See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Therefore, t r.1990) (<HOLDING>). If a motion is dispositive, a magistrate

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is dispositive because it is the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    note that some disagreement has arisen regarding whether or not the term ""condition” also means the manner in which the light or device was originally installed, if that manner creates a problem. See Lawson v. Estate of McDonald, 524 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex.Civ.App. —Waco 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (""condition ... refers to the maintenance of a sign or signal in a condition sufficient to properly perform the function of traffic control for which it is relied upon by the traveling public” and not its susceptibility to vandalism); Creek v. Texas State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 826 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (adopting the definition in Lawson ); but see City of Denton v. Mathes, 528 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). However, while we agree with the broader

    ### Response:
    holding that condition included an intended if dangerous cycling of a traffic light
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    306 F.3d 295 (6th Cir.2002), to hold that conduct that warrants a sentence enhancement under § 2Dl.l(b)(l) necessarily precludes the application of a “safety valve” reduction under § 501.2(a). After applying all of the relevant factors, the district court ultimately sentenced defendant to sixty months of imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release, and a $600 special assessment. Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a “safety valve” reduction under U.S.S.G. § 501.2(a). II. Analysis We review a district court’s interpretation of a sentencing guideline de novo and “a court’s factual determination of whether a ... guideline applies in a particular case under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d at 327

    ### Response:
    holding that we review a district courts refusal to apply ussg  5c12 for clear error because it is a factual finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    academic exercise of resolving complicated factual questions in order to delineate an exact Guidelines range if the court has already settled on a reasonable sentence in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although the Second Circuit has determined that, in such cases, a precise -92 (1st Cir.1999) (applying de novo review to ""the trial court’s interpretation of the guidelines or its final determination to see whether the facts here supported a finding that[the defendant] made a threat of death” but applying clear error review as to any ""factual disputes”). Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, in contrast, have held that the applicability of the threat-of-death enhancement is a legal determination. See United States v. Soto-Martinez, 317 F.3d 477, 478-79 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Winbush, 296 F.3d 442, 443

    ### Response:
    holding that when the facts of a robbery are undisputed the imposition of the enhancement is a question of the application of the guidelines to be reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2, 1997, within one and one-half hours of each other would count as two separate convictions. However, Bradley, would lead one to believe that these two crimes would count as separate transactions, making this Appellant’s fourth strike. Moreover, even if we were to consider the two February crimes to be one previous transaction, the 1996 criminal event is clearly separate and Appellant would be on his third strike. 2 . A secondary problem with the case sub judi-ce is that the penalty is facially harsh. A twenty-five year mandatory minimum for a seemingly minor offense of burglary of $76.00 and a brassiere is extreme. However, no challenge is before us concerning the constitutionality of the punishment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100

    ### Response:
    holding in a five to four decision that a twentyfive year minimum sentence for stealing three golf clubs pursuant to californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment and that any criticism for the statute is properly directed at the legislature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Bar grievance committee proceedings. In State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex.1972), the members of a local grievance committee sought mandamus to command a district judge to vacate an order that temporarily enjoined the grievance committee from concluding a hearing on matters before the committee which had been previously considered by the committee at two earlier hearings. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the circuit court’s injunction and held that the committee’s prior decisions did not rise to the level of a final determination on the merits of the complaints before them. See id. at 718. Therefore, the matters before the grievance committee were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See id.; see also State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122, 1130 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine, d. The nominative fair use doctrine. SBR’s third objection to Plaintiffs’ trademark claims is the nominative fair use doctrine. This doctrine divides trademark “use” from trademark “mention.” To use a mark as a mark — a “trademark use” — the defendant must attempt to identify the source of the mark with the defendant itself. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Goose Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 128-31 (2d Cir.2009) (contrasting trademark use with “use in commerce”). “Trademark mention” is any other use of a mark; it is “to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other such purpose.” New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.1992). In a terminological infeli WL 3042668, at *5 (N.D.Cal. July 25, 2012) (<HOLDING>). However, the Ninth Circuit — progenitor of

    ### Response:
    holding that determining nominative fair use at the motion to dismiss stage is ap propriate if the pleadings show it is implausible that a viewer will be confused
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    care or skill____’” Id. (citations omitted). The Dentco Investment Co., Inc. case, although more closely resembling the facts in this dispute, is clearly distinguishable. In this case, there is no evidence that Parametric contracted with NMP to design a computer system capable of meeting NMP’s needs. The dispute involves a sales contract, and any system design was left specifically to NMP’s discretion. Whether Oklahoma courts would apply the economic loss rule to this dispute or not, NMP cannot pursue a gross negligence claim against Parametric because there is no duty imposed on Parametric outside the scope of the Licensing Agreement and the warranties contained therein. Compare, Walter Raczynski Prod. Design v. International Business Machines Corp., 1994 WL 247130, *2 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>); Hoke, Inc. v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 1992

    ### Response:
    holding that a provider of software and hardware was not an information provider and thus could not be charged with negligent misrepresentation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to investors fractional interests in the trust’s pool of mortgages.” Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 126 (2008). For an extensive discussion of securitization, see Timothy A. Frochle, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Why Procedural Requirements are Necessary to Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1719, 1725-29 (2011). 8 . See, e.g., Bevilacqua, 460 Mass, at 774, 955 N.E.2d 884 (“The title held by a mortgagee is defeasible, and ‘upon payment of the note by the mortgagor ... the mortgagee’s interest in the real property comes to an end.’ ” (quoting Maglione v. BancBoston Mortg. Corp., 29 Mass.App.Ct. 88, 90, 557 N.E.2d 756 (1990))); Perry v. Oliver, 317 Mass. 538, 541, 59 N.E.2d 192 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Geffen v. Paletz, 312 Mass. 48, 53, 43 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that extinguishment of the debt entitles the mortgagor to a surrender of the note and a discharge of the mortgage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state court proceedings would be warranted when “the new suit was merely a refiling of the old suit in ‘an attempt to subvert the purposes of the [federal statute granting jurisdiction]’ ”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948, 117 S.Ct. 359, 136 L.Ed.2d 250 (1996). We find it dispositive that the district court based its injunctive relief on appellants’ lack of standing to bring suit, because (1) lack of standing does constitute a final judgment for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes, and (2) standing is determined by procedural rules. See Nor-West Cable Comm. Partnership v. City of St Paul, 924 F.2d 741, 746-47 (8th Cir.1991) (classifying standing as an appealable procedural issue reviewed for clear error); see also Dresser v. Backus, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Summit Medical Assoc., P.C., v. Pryor, 180

    ### Response:
    holding that because relitigation of issue was barred by collateral estoppel res judicata determination of finality of judgment dismissed for lack of standing was not relevant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while urging that the prosecution should go forward can work a constitutional deprivation.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1812, 108 L.Ed.2d 942 (1990). 46 . Even if issue preclusion were imposed here, it of course would not prevent Snyder from relying on evidence relevant to the earlier rulings to prove a fact other than those conclusively resolved in the prior proceedings. See Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412, 258 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1979); Dorn v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 110, 348 S.E.2d 412, 415 (1986). 47 .Virginia law controls here because, in § 1983 proceedings, a prior judgment has the same pre-clusive effect it would have in the courts of the state that issued the judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 48 . Defendants were not parties to Snyder’s

    ### Response:
    holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [and] failure to segregate funds of the separate entities ...; the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own ...; the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm’s length relationships among related entities ...; [and] the diversion [of assets from a corporation by or to a] stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets ... between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another.” Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., Inc., 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 26 Cal.Rptr. 806, 813-15 (1962) (citations omitted). California courts have applied the alter ego doctrine to trusts. See, e.g., Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman, 231 Cal.App.3d 308, 282 Cal.Rptr. 354, 359 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We first address the Debtors’ reverse

    ### Response:
    holding guarantors of a family trust liable for the trusts debts under an alter ego theory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issues raised in Olmsted’s appeal. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Swift & Co. v. Elias Farms, Inc., 539 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2008). A. Duress Olmsted asserts that the District threatened to file termination charges against him when it had no intention or grounds to do so. Olmsted further asserts that in light of Minnesota law that requires “[a] school board [to] report to the Board of Teaching ... when a teacher or administrator is suspended or resigns while an investigation is pending,” see Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 2, the District illegally promised not to report him if he resigned. According to Olmsted, this threat and promise placed him under legal duress and comp as a defense to a contract. Bond v. Charlson, 374 N.W.2d 423, 428 (Minn. 1985) (<HOLDING>); see also St. Louis Park, 411 N.W.2d at 291

    ### Response:
    holding that duress is available as a defense to a contract only when agreement is coerced by physical force or unlawful threats emphasis added citing wise 42 nw2d at 407
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1950. 11 . Of course, if Heard, Jr. prevails on any of these premises, all defendants prevail regardless of this court's earlier holdings regarding the defendants other than Heard, Jr. 12 . All of these claims fall under an umbrella of alleged bad business strategy. 13 . It is highly doubtful that advertising costs etc. could have resulted in such extensive losses. 14 . As explained by the court in Naguszewski, ""The phrase 'debt for,' as it is used repeatedly in § 523(a), means 'debt as a result of or ‘debt by reason of,’ such that § 523(a)(4) requires that the debt at issue result from the debtor’s defalcation.” 2009 WL 6499348, at *4 (quoting Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 219, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 L.Ed.2d 341 (1998)) (citing Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 156 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>)). 15 . In Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme

    ### Response:
    holding that a debt that was the result of debtors fraud could be exempted from discharge under  523a4 when the parties had later entered into a settlement agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    all of a generic nature and are capable of application to a wide range of contexts. Similarly, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (""CUT-PA”) is a general statute that regulates the conduct of all businesses within the state. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110b(a) (""No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”). Although CUTPA may be applied to the insurance industry, to enjoy the protections of McCarran-Ferguson, a statute must be more than just capable of application to insurance, but must have been ""enacted ... for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). See Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). 7 . In assessing the law of Connecticut, we

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute of general applicability was not enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. at 37, 80 S.Ct. at 508; Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 602 F.2d 1025, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 232, 62 L.Ed.2d 172 (1979); Butera v. Sun Oil Co., 496 F.2d 434, 437 n. 7 (1st Cir.1974). All refusals to deal, however, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that When the manufacturer’s actions, as here, go beyond mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices, this countervailing consideration [the right of the manufacturer to decide with whom to deal] is not present and therefore he has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act. Parke U.S. 707, 723, 64 S.Ct. 805, 813, 88 L.Ed. 1024 (1944) (<HOLDING>); Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. 29, 80 S.Ct. 503, 4

    ### Response:
    holding that more  than mere acquiescence of wholesalers to a resale price maintenance scheme constituted a violation of section 1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    considering the ALJ’s award as not final, thereby delaying its enforcement, creates a needless ethical conflict between claimants and their counsel in LHWCA proceedings: in order to secure payment of fees and costs sooner, counsel may be tempted to advise clients not to appeal compensation awards. Although we are concerned about the possible ethical implications of section 921(a), it is Congress’ role or that of the agency to address them. Indeed, recognizing the economic penalty claimants’ counsel may incur by filing an appeal, the Benefits Review Board has held that counsel may request fee enhancements as supplemental fee petitions and not as requests to reopen fee awards that have become final. See Bellmer, 32 B.R.B.S. 245, 1998 WL 850155, at *1; see also Johnson, 183 F.3d at 1171 (<HOLDING>). In this way, counsel may seek additional fees

    ### Response:
    recognizing claimants interest in receiving compensation for delay in payment of fee awards partially addressed by bellmers supplementalfee ruling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between projects”); Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir.1998) (“Generally speaking, independent contractors often have fixed employment periods and transfer from” place to place as particular work is offered to them, whereas employees usually work for only one employer and such relationship is continuous and of indefinite duration.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5. The Extent to Which Employees Are Integral to Business Turning to the final factor, the Court does find that drivers were integral to Defendants’ business. Indisputably, Defendants’ business could not function without drivers, and Defendants wisely do not argue to the contrary. (See Defs.’ Mem. 19). See also Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F.Supp.2d 184, 191-92 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, while Defendants cite Velu and

    ### Response:
    holding where the defendants engaged primarily in the business of providing delivery services that onfoot delivery workers constituted an integral part of the  defendants business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    until a claim accrues. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.1996). Generally, a claim accrues when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. Id.; Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.1990) (stating that “a cause of action can generally be said to accrue when the wrongful act effects an injury”). When a claim accrues is a question of law for the court. Loyd v. ECO Resources, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 110, 126 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). The Insureds argue that this court’s precedent in Mauskar v. Hardgrove does not apply to this case. See No. 14-02-00756-CV, 2003 WL 21403464, at ⅜2-3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 19, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>). At a minimum, Maus-kar applies to the

    ### Response:
    holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his Rule 60(b) motion and his appeal from the denial of that motion moot. Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the father’s appeal in case no. 2100496. Conclusion In case nos. 2091106 and 2091130, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In case no. 2100496, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 2091106 — REVERSED AND REMANDED. 2091130 — REVERSED AND REMANDED. 2100496 — APPEAL DISMISSED. THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur. BRYAN, J., concurs in the result, without writing. 1 . In case no. 2100496, the father filed a petition for a writ of mandamus; however, this court elected to treat that petition as an appeal. See Evans v. Sharp, 617 So.2d 1039 (Aia.Civ.App. 1993) (<HOLDING>). 2 . ""Except as otherwise provided by the

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate courts can review the denial of a rule 60b motion by appeal even if the appellant mistakenly files a petition for a writ of mandamus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    converted to a cash equivalent in the same way as regular wages or the reasonable value of lodging. Id. at 630, 103 S.Ct at 2048-49, 76 L.Ed.2d at 199. The Court also noted that the legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend to include these types of fringe benefits when calculating the rate of compensation benefits. Id. at 632, 103 S.Ct. at 2050, 76 L.Ed.2d at 201. The majority trend is to treat an employer’s matching contribution to a 401k plan as a welfare benefit that falls under the category of “fringe benefits,” and thus is not included in the calculation of weekly benefits for workers’ compensation purposes. 8 Arthur Larson et. al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 93.01[2][b], at 93-20 (rev. ed.2015); cf. City of Lamar v. Koehn, 9 .E.2d 449, 463 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Clopton v. City of Muskogee, 147 P.3d 282,

    ### Response:
    holding that an employers contributions to an employees retirement account are not included in the calculation of a weekly wage for workers compensation purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute to the common-law concept most likely intended by the legislature to be embodied in the statute. See Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655, 82 S.Ct. 1399, 1402, 8 L.Ed.2d 750 (1962) (“[I]n the absence of anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that [the legislative body] used that word in the statute in its common law sense.”). 12. As the Court of Appeals set forth, Yarborough, 120 N.M. at 672, 905 P.2d at 212, this Court was first presented’ with this question in State v. Harris, 41 N.M. 426, 70 P.2d 757 (1987). The defendant in Harris was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and argued that his conviction was proper only if he had driven his truck recklessly. Id. at 427-28, 70 P.2d at 757. We stated that in the case of an accidental death of 862, 863 (1893) (<HOLDING>); People v. Datema, 448 Mich. 585, 533 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that recklessness not merely the violation of a city ordinance must be shown for assault with a firearm conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Serv., 553 F.Supp. 1387, 1389 (W.D.Pa.1983)). In 2006, the PAEA expanded the reach of § 3662 to include claims arising under specific sections of the PAEA, including § 404a. 39 U.S.C. § 3662 (2006). There is nothing in the statutory text or legislative history to suggest that the PAEA eliminated the exclusive jurisdiction conferred to the Postal Rate Commission (renamed the Postal Regulatory Commission, or PRC, by the PAEA) over claims enume ict court next determined that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Foster’s tort claims. Foster I at *5. Section 409(c) of the PAEA provides that any tort claim against USPS is subject to the provisions of the FTCA found in title 28 chapter 171. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006) (<HOLDING>). The FTCA explicitly prohibits claims of

    ### Response:
    holding that 39 usc  409c requires tort claims brought against usps to comply with the ftca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the trier of fact. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision granting the defendants’ motion for summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. 1 Summary disposition previously had been granted for the Felician Sisters of O.S.F. of Livonia. That ruling has not been appealed. 2 See also Winstead, supra, wherein this Court concluded that a cause of action for public disclosure of embarrassing private facts may exist where a newspaper published intimate details about the plaintiff’s private life, including the fact that she had several abortions. 3 See California v Greenwood, 486 US 35, 40; 108 S Ct 1625; 100 L Ed 2d 30 (1988) (<HOLDING>). See also People v Whotte, 113 Mich App 12,

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of federal constitutional law a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Antonio Naranjo-Mendoza appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to attempted entry after deportation and misuse of entry documents in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and 18 U.S.C. § 1546. Naranjo-Mendoza contends that Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), is no longer good law and that the district court violated his constitutional rights in enhancing his sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) based on a non-jury fact finding regarding his prior commission of an aggravated felony. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1079 n. 16 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, there is no merit to

    ### Response:
    holding that we are bound to follow almendareztorres even though it has been called into question unless it is explicitly overruled by the supreme court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleged advice that the jury would have been advised of the similarity of the crimes, appellant’s propensity to commit similar crimes, and of appellant’s recent release from prison do not appear to be accurate statements. First of all, the prosecution’s presentation of similar fact evidence is generally not contingent on whether or not the defendant takes the stand. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Therefore, it appears that if appellant avoided the witness stand merely to prevent the presentation of so-called Williams Rule evidence, he was ill-advised. Second, it is not apparent from this record why the fact that appellant had recently been released from prison CA 1995) (<HOLDING>). We decline to decide that issue in this case

    ### Response:
    holding that where the defendant claims he was deprived of the right to testify by reason of ineffective assistance of trial counsel both prongs of the strickland test must be satisfied in order to obtain postconviction relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the parties do not argue, and we do not address, whether PCA's pre-FACTA conduct may subject it to penalties under a post-FACTA reading of the FCRA. 6 . Experian suggests that Davis v. Asset Servs., 46 F.Supp.2d 503, 508 (M.D.La.1998), Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 557 F.Supp. 66, 71 (S.D.N.Y.1982), and Hiemstra v. TRW, Inc., 195 Cal.App.3d 1629, 1634, 241 Cal.Rptr. 564 (Cal.Ct.App.1987) support the contention that blanket certifications will satisfy a credit reporting agency's obligations under § 168 le(a). While these cases hold that credit reporting agencies may rely on blanket cer tifications rather than having to verify credit requests individually, none provides that a blanket certification by itself is sufficient to satisfy the § 1681e inquiry. See, e.g., Davis, 46 F.Supp.2d at 508 (<HOLDING>); Boothe, 557 F.Supp. at 71 (finding no

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant complied with the requirements of  1681ea because it obtained a blanket certification and because the plaintiff did not submit any evidence to prove that the defendant knew or should have had reason to know that the subscriber would access the report for an impermissible purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    justify strip searches in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion. See Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir.1993); Masters, 872 F.2d at 1254; Calvin, 405 F.Supp.2d at 943. It is telling that defendants’ own expert testified that he is not aware of any jail that conducts strip searches of all detainees charged only with misdemeanors without giving those detainees the option to remain outside of the jail’s general population. Moreover, courts have noted that a general policy to place detainees charged with minor offenses in the general jail population along with persons charged with more serious crimes does not justify a blanket strip search policy. See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112-13; Chapman, 989 F.2d at 396; Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; Calvin, 405 F.Supp.2d at 944-45 (<HOLDING>). The Court finds the reasoning of those cases

    ### Response:
    holding that administrative concerns such as space constraints are not sufficient to justify blanket strip search policies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It is clear from the above that the duty to supervise is only triggered under the common law where the employer had notice of incompetence or misconduct. See 30 C.J.S. Employer — Employee §205, at 254 (2007); see also Keller v. Koca, 111 P.3d 445, 448 (Colo. 2005) (“Thus, where a plaintiff asserts a claim for negligent supervision, the question of whether the employer o the scope of that duty the majority seek to impose is much too broad. As a practical matter, to prevent any mistake or criminal behavior or “harm to the public” (as the trial court said), Kinko’s would need supervisors for the supervisors and so on and so on. I believe this would put an unsupportable burden on defendant and violate one of the tenets for imposition of a duty. Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Could the Secretary of State be sued for

    ### Response:
    holding that in determining whether a duty exists a court should consider the following factors 1 the reasonable foreseeability of injury 2 the reasonable likelihood of injury 3 the magnitude of the burden that guarding against injury places on the defendant and 4 the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2011, letter to the town council and mayor in which she gave conditions to her accepting the permanent position: a salary of $53,000 a year and a contract guaranteeing she could regain her former job as sergeant if the council newly-elected in the future did not retain her as chief. She testified: “I felt like that the period of interim, that I was not being paid any more money was — It was time to move forward. Either with them sending applications or doing something to make it permanent.” (Doc. 37-2 at 30). The evidence clearly supports the finding that the Interim Chief position was temporary, and that Plaintiff was aware that it was temporary. A decline in revenue is also a sufficient affirmative defense under the EPA. Brokaw v. Weiser Sec., 780 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1233 (S.D.Ala.2011) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that the Town of Elberta

    ### Response:
    holding that a 4000 difference in pay between male branch manager with contract security services company and the female manager hired to replaee him after he resigned was based on a factor other than sex and thus females lesser salary did not violate the equal pay act where male manager had been paid a salary of 44000 per year and company hired female replacement at salary of 40000 but the salary for the position had been reduced due to annual revenue losses at branch of 1069727 during male managers employment period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    activity in the forum state, is not satisfied. The two types of IOC activity alleged are requiring USOC’s adherence to the Olympic Charter, and providing money for the USOC’s administrative costs. Shepherd argues his injuries are related to the discrimination to which USOC subjected him while USOC operated in Colorado as a result of his employment status with USOC under the ADA and against him as an Olympic class athlete under the Rehabilitation Act. (Comply 23.) As discussed, however, he does not suggest IOC was involved in any of the employment decisions out of which his cause of action arises. Moreover, USOC’s minimum contacts with Colorado are insufficient to impose personal jurisdiction on IOC. See Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134

    ### Response:
    holding personal jurisdiction did not exist over the londonbased international amateur athletic federation iaaf despite the fact that its member organization in the usa had minimum contacts with ohio where the plaintiffs contract claim did not arise out of iaafs contacts with ohio
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1188 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Scur-lock, 52 F.3d 531, 541-42 (5th Cir.1995), unlike the Eighth Circuit, we have not required a specific “targeting” of a vulnerable victim beyond the requirement that the defendant knew or should have known of the vulnerability. The Third Circuit, which had not addressed whether specific targeting was required, followed the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits in holding that § 3A1.1 contained no targeting requirement. United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1134, 1138-39 (3rd Cir.1997); see also United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1506 (2d Cir.1992) (declining to impose a specific targeting requirement); United States v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751, 755 (9th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 488 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the amendment does not implicate

    ### Response:
    holding in a postamendment case that the preamendment guideline did not contain a targeting requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77, 84 S.Ct. 1774. We have recognized that the right to such a hearing is subject to waiver by failure to properly challenge the confession in the trial court. United States v. Gonzalez, 548 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir.1977). The Supreme Court has also held, in applying the rule of Jackson v. Denno on habeas corpus review, that the “Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In the ordinary case, a defendant who fails to raise the issue of voluntariness has waived it. United States v. Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279, 1283 (5th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Knezek, 964 F.2d 394, 397-98 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We have, nevertheless, held that certain

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that defendant had waived the opportunity for a suppression hearing on his confession by first moving to suppress the confession orally at the start of trial when no motion to suppress was filed no hearing requested and no objection to the admission of the statements was made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    during the life of the performer. 3. Naxos Has Not Competed Unfairly Since Capitol has no rights in the original recordings, it cannot charge Naxos with unfair competition. As both parties agree, unauthorized copying without more is not actionable. (Def.’s Mem. at 16; Pl.’s Opp. Mem. at 18.) See Leonard Storch Enters., Inc. v. Mergenthaler, No. 78-C-238, 1980 WL 1175, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.8, 1980) (“[N]o New York case has ever recognized a right of unfair competition based solely on the copying or photocopying of a tangible product.”), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir.1981). A plaintiff only has a viable claim where it also has exclusive, cognizable rights to the property it seeks to prevent from copying. E.g., Hebrew Publ’g Co. v. Scharfstein, 288 N.Y. 374, 376-77, 43 N.E.2d 449 (1942) (<HOLDING>); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914,

    ### Response:
    holding that without more for defendant to copy books published by plaintiff which were not covered by copyright and then sell these copies does not state a claim for unfair competition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    county jail for each prohibited use of a weapon count, six months in county jail for reckless endangerment, and one year in the county jail for violation of a restraining order. The trial court also ordered defendant to complete two years of work release as a condition of his probation. Defendant thereafter initiated this appeal and, subsequently, violated the terms of his probation. Consequently, while this appeal was pending and without a limited remand, the trial court removed defendant from the work release program, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to four years in communi ty corrections for first degree burglary. The remaining sentences were left intact and concurrent. I. We first address, and reject, defendant’s contention that the trial court lacked jurisdi 2 (Colo.1984) (<HOLDING>). In People v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 130

    ### Response:
    recognizing that policy considerations and analytical framework in civil context are sometimes persuasive and instructive in criminal context
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2007, as a result of Controlled Air’s breach of the subcontract. While both actions stem from the same project and contractual relationship, each is premised on a different wrong arising from different occurrences. Upon completion of the lien foreclosure, the only issue decided will have been whether labor and materials were provided for which the Joint Venture has failed to pay. A decision on that claim, which has been asserted only in state court, will not foreclose the issue of whether Controlled Air breached the subcontract and whether the Joint Venture incurred damages as a result. Accordingly, the state lien foreclosure action will not dispose of all issues in the federal contract action. See, e.g., George Weis Co. v. Stratum Design-Build, Inc., 227 S.W.3d 486, 489-90 (Mo.2007) (<HOLDING>). Neither will any judgment rendered in the

    ### Response:
    holding a lien is a claim against property  here a surety bond and breach of contract is a claim against a person thus the lien proceeding did not dispose of the breach of contract action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injury directly caused by Rebol-lar's reckless driving. See United States v. Bonetti, 277 F.3d 441, 447 (4th Cir.2002) (affirming jury trial conviction, under Pinkerton, where the prosecution charged the defendant with a substantive count of harboring an unlawful alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), and then presented sufficient evidence that the defendant, as a conspirator, was liable for the serious bodily injury directly caused by his wife). 7 . Alvarado-Casas suggests that because we have yet to uphold a conviction for aggravated alien smuggling against a factual basis challenge where, as here, the defendant was not the direct or immediate causer of the serious bodily injury, the district court’s error is clear and obvious, citing Garcia-Pautin, 627 F.3d at 132 (<HOLDING>). Although the absence of precedent is relevant

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts acceptance of a defendants guilty plea to bringing an unlawful alien into the united states under 8 usc  1324alai was plain error in part because the defendant did not accompany or arrange to have a person accompany the alien across the border and we have found no case where a defendant has been convicted under clause i of this statute for bringing an alien into the united states except where the defendant accompanied or arranged to have the alien accompanied as in a smuggling operation across the border
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    years is the maximum sentence a judge may impose without any additional findings by a jury. However, HRS § 706-668.5 (1993) provides in relevant part that “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms run consecutively.” The imposition of prison terms in consecutive sequence, then, does not result in “an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence,” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348, ie., beyond one that can be imposed simply on the jury verdict and, thus, does not implicate Apprendi and its progeny. However, the court’s discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence is still circumscribed. See, e.g., State v. Vellina, 106 Hawai'i 441, 450, 106 P.3d 364, 373 (2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 150, 890

    ### Response:
    holding that it was plain error for the circuit court to sentence the defendant to consecutive prison terms based upon uncharged alleged misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    777-78 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (concluding that the plain meaning of the phrase “moneys disbursed” present in § 326(a), which is used to calculate the cap placed on a trustee’s compensation, cannot include secured creditors’ credit bids). Section 543, setting forth the obligations of a custodian, utilizes the term “disbursement” in subsections (a) and (c). See 11 U.S.C. § 543(a), (c). Section 543(a) prohibits a custodian, with knowledge of the commencement of the debtor’s case, from “mak[ing] any disbursement from, or take any action in the administration of, property of the debtor, proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property, or property of the estate, in the possession, custody or control of such custodian....” Id. § 543(a). S, at 4-6 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2003) (<HOLDING>); In re Huff, 270 B.R. 649, 653

    ### Response:
    holding that payments made by third parties on behalf of debtors are disbursements notwithstanding the debtors lack of control over the funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not make forbearance the “default,” and it does not put the onus on the Commission to prove that the prerequisites for forbearance are not satisfied. Rather, section 10(c) “simply means” that the Commission must attend promptly to forbearance petitions, and the burden is on the petitioner to show that a regulatory obligation is not needed and that forbearance is consonant with the public interest. Id. ble one. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005) (concluding that, where a statute was silent on the burden of persuasion and “[a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise,” the burden “lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief’); see also Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 756 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), superseded by statute on other grounds, 8

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of an express statutory allocation of the burden of proof the board of immigration appealss placement of the burden on the alien was reasonable under chevron
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    importance if the nature of the action makes it capable of repetition and yet prevents effective judicial review. Thus, a common element of both the public interest exception and the capable of repetition exception is that the complained of action be capable of repetition yet not effectively reviewable. Even if we were to recognize a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, this case does not meet the suggested requirements. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has as yet not recognized the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and judicial restraint compels us to wait until that court decides to resolve the split in authority in the intermediate appellate courts. See, e.g., Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803, 810-11 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the public interest exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tools had been accumulated during the marriage came from Appellant, who valued them at $100 in his deposition testimony and at $500 during the dissolution hearing. Although Appellee, Kendra O. Naylor, assigned a $20,000 value to “Mise. Tools” in her financial affidavit when listing marital assets, she acknowledged during the dissolution hearing that that was a “blanket statement ... with no specifics.” She further acknowledged that she had no written documentation showing what tools the couple had, and she gave no testimony regarding any specific tools. Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the final judgment as to the trial court’s $20,000 valuation of the tools and remand the case for further proceedings as to this issue. See Lassett v. Lassett, 768 So.2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Justice v. Justice, 80 So.3d 405,

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred in valuing the wifes jewelry at 10000 and distributing that amount to her as part of her share of marital assets where the only testimony as to the value of the jewelry came from the husband and concluding that the husbands unsupported opinion as to the value of the jewelry that was not definitively described is not sufficient to warrant the distribution of that amount to the wife
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he believed she understood that explanation. Record at 44. That impression was reenforced by Mr. Mills’ subsequent testimony that CK later asked him “to help her with taking out anger on others.” Record at 47. Given that the patient was a 6 year-old child and unlikely to have much intellectual appreciation of the role of mental health professionals, we find CK’s articulation of a desire for Mr. Mills to help her with an emotional problem to be convincing evidence of her understanding that she was seeing Mr. Mills as part of some treatment that was supposed to benefit her. Consequently, she would have had the necessary motivation to speak truthfully that supports this exception to the hearsay rule. See Clark; Edens; Dean; White; cf. United States v. Avila, 27 M.J. 62, 66 (C.M.A.1988) (<HOLDING>). Even though Mr. Mills also testified that he

    ### Response:
    holding that childs statements to a psychologist who was introduced to the child only as kathy and as just another mommy were not admissible under medical diagnosis and treatment exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district court erred in ruling that Bell had presented insufficient evidence to show that the defendants’ actions could deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct. Initially, we note that a number of cases from other circuits have held that confiscating an inmate’s legal papers and other property constitutes sufficient injury to support a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1404 (10th Cir.1996) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendants on inmate’s claim that guards conducted harassing cell searches, seized legal materials, refused to provide inmate with hygiene items, and transferred inmate to segregation in retaliation for suit against prison officials); Green v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1383, 1389-91 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that inmates allegation that guards destroyed his legal materials in retaliation for his filing of suits and grievances stated a cognizable first amendment claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . .” N.C.G.S. § 14-27.1(4) (1993). Section 14-27.4’s gravamen, or gist, is to criminalize the performance of a sexual act with a child. The statutory definition of “sexual act” does not create disparate offenses, rather it enumerates the methods by which the single wrong of engaging in a sexual act with a child may be shown. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has expressly determined that disjunctive jury instructions do not risk nonunani-mous verdicts in first-degree sexual offense cases. State v. McCarty, 326 N.C. 782, 784, 392 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1990) (upholding jury instruction that the defendant could be found guilty of first-degree sexual offense “if [the jury] found [the] defendant [had] engaged in either fellatio or vaginal penetration”); Hartness, 326 N.C. at 565, 391 S.E.2d at 179 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial court instructed the

    ### Response:
    holding that disjunctive instructions did not result in a fatally ambiguous verdict in an indecent liberties case and noting that the indecent liberties statute is more similar to the statute relating to firstdegree sexual offense    than to the trafficking statute discussed in diaz
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plea of illegally reentering the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326, appeals his fifty-one month sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand for resentencing. As an initial matter, the government contends this appeals is barred by the written appeal waiver in Ceja-Romero’s plea agreement. We disagree. The district court unequivocally stated that the appeal was barred “so long as [CejaRomero was] sentenced in accordance with the sentencing guidelines.” The district court’s clear statement therefore controls over the provisions of the appeal waiver. See United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir.1995). Our decision in United States v. Schuman, 127 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1997) (per curiam), does not compel a contrary r P.3d 942 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Second degree assault is not a specific

    ### Response:
    holding that pencil was deadly weapon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New Jersey resident who wanted to practice law there; (ii) he also knew that the plaintiff could not sit for the New Jersey bar unless he graduated from an accredited law school; (in) he sent a letter to the plaintiff in New Jersey stating that SNESL was “highly confident” of receiving accreditation, knowing that this statement was materially false because SNESL had substantial deficiencies that would make accreditation difficult if not impossible; and (iv) the plaintiff, relying on Larkin’s letter, enrolled at SNESL, paid substantial sums for tuition, and invested three years of his life in mastering its curriculum. We think that these allegations, if proven, would make out a viable claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. See Kerr v. Shurtleff, 218 Mass. 167, 105 N.E. 871, 872 (1914) (<HOLDING>). A similar analysis applies to the plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that college committed fraudulent misrepresentation by falsely telling prospective student that it could make him a dmd when student enrolled and graduated but school lacked the authority to grant the degree
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States v. Wetmore, 766 F.Supp.2d 319, 321-22 (D.Mass.2011); United States v. Blake, 2010 WL 702958, 2, 6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23014, 4-5, 16 (E.D.Cal. February 24) (not designated for publication) (characterizing allegations that provided probable cause for a search warrant as ""grooming”); United States v. Hansel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54725, 2 (N.D.Iowa August 4) (not designated for publication); United States v. Gleich, 2005 WL 741921, 1-2, 3-4, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5149, 4-6, 9-10 (D.N.D. March 30) (not designated for publication). 59 . State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 213-14, 891 A.2d 897, 932-33 (2006) (rejecting complaints about Kenneth Lanning’s testimony); Haycraft v. State, 760 N.E.2d 203, 210-11 (Ind.App. 1st Dist.2001), transfer denied, 774 N.E.2d 514 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>); People v. Petri, 279 Mich.App. 407, 415-16,

    ### Response:
    holding the testimony admissible as that of a skilled witness under indianas r 701
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As we think that the State’s objection was

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants substance abuse or addiction does not justify a downward departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir.2009) (hereinafter “ECA”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Certain types of statements are generally not materially misleading. “Puffery” is one such type. Puffery is an optimistic statement that is so vague, broad, and non-specific that a reasonable investor would not rely on it, thereby rendering it immaterial as a matter of law. See id. at 206. However, the mere fact that a statement uses conclusory, indefinite, and unverifiable terms, rather than expressing a reason in dollars and cents, does not compel a conclusion that it is immaterial as a matter of law. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093-94, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Novak, 216 F.3d at 315 (statements that

    ### Response:
    holding that statement that merger would give shareholders high value for their shares could be deemed material and noting that such conclusory terms in a commercial context are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate the absence of which renders them misleading
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    raised the objection “after the close of all of the evidence by a motion”); United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1996) (“[B]oth objections are subject to review only for plain error. It is true that both issues were raised in the trial court after the verdict.... But the usual rule is that an objection must be made known at the time that the court is making its decision to act....”); United States v. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (“Absent plain error, a conviction will not be reversed on evidentiary grounds not revealed to the trial court at the time of the assertedly erroneous ruling, even though the omitted argument is eventually made at some later stage of the trial.”); cf. United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 849, 850 & n. 25 (3d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). As we noted in Pursley II, Mr. Wardell did

    ### Response:
    holding defendants objection untimely and insufficient to preserve  the issue for appeal where defendant made his constitutional objection not when the evidence was offered but during a motion to strike made after the government rested but noting that we are satisfied that in this instance the district court did not commit plain error footnote omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    427 F.2d at 581. This construction is supported by other Texas court of appeals cases construing the privilege as inapplicable only when it is not invoked in good faith, or to protect against a reasonable fear of self-incrimination, but to prevent discovery necessary to the development of the opposing party’s case. See Denton, 897 S.W.2d at 760; Marshall v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 928 S.W.2d 190, 195-96 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (upholding sanctions against plaintiff who used privilege against criminal activity offensively to refuse to answer request for admission concerning “other criminal activity” where assertion of privilege would “deny appellees .information crucial to their defense”); Stewart v. Frazier, 461 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1970, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The construction of Katin and Speer that

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court properly deemed defendants responses to requests for admission admitted because defendants real purpose in refusing to answer the request for admissions was not to prevent being a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but to hinder the plaintiff in this common law damage suit from proving an essential element in his case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleges that several days after the accident, he submitted an Amtrak Injury/Illness Report to Amtrak’s New York office, setting forth his full address. Amtrak disputes this. Peters did not produce this document until his rule 60(b) motion for relief from the order and did not explain why the document was not produced earlier. 2 . While the passenger list Amtrak provided did not include Peters’ zip code, the record shows that class counsel added a zip code, albeit an incorrect one. 3 . This is not to say that Peters should be without a remedy. Rather, we simply believe that to the extent Peters’ claim is actionable, his redress, if any, should come from those responsible for causing his harm. See, e.g., Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 93-94 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 228, 88

    ### Response:
    recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where officer lacked specific articulable facts at time defendant misidentified himself to create reasonable suspicion connecting him with criminal activity). 53 . See, e.g., Holladay v. State, 805 S.W.2d 464, 472-73 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), overruled on other grounds by Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Glass v. State, 681 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); LeBlanc v. State, 138 S.W.3d 603, 608 n. 6 (Tex.A 278 Ill.Dec. 522, 798 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (2003) (refusing to fill gap in evidence by taking judicial notice of meaning of absence of record of license when officers provided no explanation as to why result of license check of ""no record on file” was inherently suspicious). 57 . See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 58 . See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64 (noting that

    ### Response:
    holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explained the consideration given to Dr. Naum’s conclusion of disability. Dr. Naum’s ordering of a disability placard adds nothing to a finding of disability here because there is no evidence that the two have substantially similar requirements for finding a person to be disabled. Additionally, Dr. Naum’s statement that Mr. Bass’s lower back pain was “in and of itself disabling” is ambiguous at best. Dr. Naum made this statement in response to a finding by Dr. Schreiber that plaintiff had 0% permanent or partial disability under the workers’ compensation laws. It is therefore not clear that Dr. Naum’s assessment of disability would be the same under the social security disability benefits law. See Daniels v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 152 Fed.Appx. 485, 491 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Dr. Naum qualified his

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to discuss a confusing and unclear statement a de minimis and therefore harmless violation of the treating physician rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    13:95-8.5).) However, this grievance procedure is not included in either of the Handbooks that were provided to O’Neill. While Defendants cite to the N.J.A.C. as containing this provision, they fail to point to any evidence demonstrating that they made reasonable efforts to make O’Neill aware of this process in any way. Absent any evidence that juveniles at JJC-operated facilities were educated about this procedure or had access to the materials necessary to utilize it, the Court cannot find this to be an available remedy that O’Neill was required to exhaust. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003)(administrative remedy unavailable where prison officials did not provide the required grievance forms); see also Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir.2007)(<HOLDING>); Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an administrative remedy which is unknown and unknowable is unavailable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that when no improper law-enforcement activity is involved, reliability is sufficiently tested “through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 721. Despite the appellant’s suggestion to the contrary, we do not find in Perry a set of factors the trial court must employ to determine the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Instead, the Perry Court underscored the role of the jury in making credibility determinations, just as Texas courts have done. See id.; see also, e.g., Davis, 177 S.W.3d at 359 (<HOLDING>). Having reviewed all of the evidence in the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the jurys role in evaluating credibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    State v. Neri 593 A.2d 953, 956 (R.I.1991). In the case at hand, when counsel for DCYF moved that exhibits 1 and 2 be admitted into evidence as full exhibits, counsel for Mr. Patino stated his objection as follows: “I guess I’d object to the reports, your Honor, since the witness [Dr. Barron] is here to testify.” The trial justice overruled Mr. Patino’s counsel’s stated objection, and exhibits 1 and 2 were then admitted into evidence as full exhibits. In arguing on appeal that exhibits 1 and 2 should not have been admitted into evidence, Mr. Patino relies on th been admitted as full exhibits when respondent’s counsel at a later point in time raised a hearsay objection with respect to those exhibits, that hearsay objection was untimely and therefore waived. See Brown, 9 A.3d at 1245 (<HOLDING>). In view of the clear language of Rule

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants objection was untimely and thus waived because the evidence to which he objected had already been presented to the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    vacates an award and directs a rehearing is not appealable. Because Struss’ challenge is to a lower court order of the latter type, the order in the instant case is not appealable. Our construction of § 25-2620(a)(5) is comparable to the construction placed on statutes in other states with arbitration statutes similar to those in Nebraska and derived from the Uniform Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Stolhandske v. Stern, 14 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App. 2000); Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App. 2000); Kowler Associates v. Ross, 544 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. App. 1996); Dept. of Transp. v. State Employ. Ass’n, 581 A.2d 813 (Me. 1990); Carner v. Freeman, 175 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 1965). See, similarly, Airports Com’n v. Airports Police Fed., 443 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn. 1989) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding the district court’s order

    ### Response:
    holding that even though appellant was not entitled to appellate review of order vacating award and directing rehearing  as of right  the minnesota constitution gave the minnesota supreme court independent power to review any case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule 1.10(b), as Rule 1.10(b) explicitly incorporates Rule 1.6. As noted above, Rule 10(b) deals with the imputation of the conflict of one lawyer of a firm to the rest of the firm. Rule 1.10(b) explicitly states that “[w]hen a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.” As is apparent from the text of Rule 1.10(b), it does not explicitly refer to a paralegal, and how the conflict of a paralega 41, 14[5], 876 P.2d 1176 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Koulisis v. Rivers, 730 So.2d 289, 291

    ### Response:
    holding that ethical rule er 110b may be extended to the conduct of nonlawyers through er 53
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which requires the district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Thus, when a district court considers § 3553(a)(2)(B), it should focus on whether a sentence will provide general deterrence. See United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that § 3553(a)(2)(B) speaks to general deterrence while § 3553(a)(2)(C) speaks to specific deterrence). General deterrence is effective in the context of white collar crime such as Edwards’s bank fraud and bankruptcy fraud. “Defendants in white collar crimes often calculate the financial gain and risk of loss, and white collar crime therefore can be affected and reduced with serious punishment.” Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (<HOLDING>). White collar crime, especially bank fraud,

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentence of seven days imprisonment was substantively unreasonable where the defendant participated in a securities fraud conspiracy that caused more than 1 billion in losses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of way were ballast and that this ballast was put on the right of way by the railroad. Thus, the ballast retained its nature as personalty and could be conveyed to AVLT by the railroad and Plaintiffs have not shown an issue of fact in support of their federal claim regarding the ballast. Thus, the only remaining issue to be resolved is the ownership of the property itself, which is an issue that remains only under the state law doctrine of abandonment. Il.Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims The District Court concluded that because Plaintiffs had not raised an issue of fact regarding a federal claim, its original jurisdiction was extinguished, and the case should be remanded to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (1995)(<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs argue that the District Court

    ### Response:
    holding that when original jurisdiction claims are dismissed before trial the district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims unless there is an affirmative justification for doing so
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AND JUDGMENT JEROME A. HOLMES, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-Appellant Patrick Portley-El, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his application for a writ of habe-as corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “petition”). He also moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c)(1)(A). See Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 868-69 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude

    ### Response:
    holding that  2253c1a applies when a state habeas petitioner proceeds under  2241
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdictional sufficiency of the certification, and, to the extent that our opinion can be read to support the view that certification is not reviewable, it is dictum. The government does not rely on Romulus to support its position on the certification issue in the instant case. 6 . Both C.G. and Vancier were decided before the ■1984 amendments that added subsection (3)'s “substantial Federal interest” prong. See Pub.L. No. 98-473, § 1201(a), 98 Stat. 2149 (1984). The certification in each of these cases was based on an alleged lack of state court jurisdiction over the juvenile with respect to the offenses charged. C.G., 736 F.2d at 1477; Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1380. 7 . Contra United States v. Juvenile Male, 915 F.Supp. 789, 793 (W.D.Va.1995) (hereinafter “Juvenile Male (W.D.Va.) ”) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See S. Rep. at 386 (""[C]ertain

    ### Response:
    holding that the court may only make a facial inquiry into the validity of the certification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may add to the credibility of a witness, it is by no means indispensible. It is unreasonable to discredit the sworn testimony of a witness for the sole reason that there is no contemporaneous documentary evidence to support it, especially when there may be valid reasons why no such evidence exists. It is especially unreasonable to impose a contemporaneous documentation requirement on homeless people, who will likely never have documentation that they lived in a particular locale; on undocumented immigrants, who often work for low wages paid in cash and who seek to avoid creating official records of their presence; and on the mentally ill, whose disabilities often compromise their ability to comply strictly with evidentiary rules. Cf. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 900-01 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, it is unacceptable to require aliens

    ### Response:
    holding that when an asylum seeker offers credible testimony she need not support her claim with any corroborating evidence because authentic refugees rarely are able to offer direct corroboration of specific threats
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have addressed competency to be executed have recognized Justice Powell’s proffered test as the appropriate standard by which to determine competence. See, e.g., Scott v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 1011, 1014 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the standard established in “Ohio’s Ford statute,” ie., “that the convict in question does not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the convict,” appropriately defines incompetence to be executed); Massie v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1195 n. 1 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Ford for the proposition that “the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it”); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 640 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572 (8th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the ford standard requires only that an inmate know the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""good faith” exception, ""involve an application of a ""good faith” exception analysis only after determining that the warrant was invalid. Majority's opinion at 395 n. 21, 319 P.3d at 314 n. 21. However, our jurisprudence clearly establishes that the warrant in this case was per se invalid because it was mis-dated. See Endo, 83 Hawai'i at 94, 924 P.2d at 581. Thus, in our jurisdiction, upholding a mis-dated warrant would constitute an application of the ""good faith” exception where it has been previously rejected. Ultimately, how the ""good faith” exception is applied or formulated in other jurisdictions is irrelevant, since, as noted, Endo would hold the warrant was invalid. See id. at 93-94, 924 P.2d at 581—82. 20 . See also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660, 671-72 (1992)

    ### Response:
    holding that one of the purposes of the exclusionary rule is to ensure police officers carefully review warrants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 29, 2008, Plaintiff settled her remaining claims against her workers’ compensation plan for $3,300.00. See Defendant’s Exhibit C [Docket #48-6]. Plaintiff provides evidence showing her non-approved medical expenses totaled $8,013.12. See Plaintiffs Exhibit B [Docket # 58-3]. Defendant argues Plaintiff waived any right to seek reimbursement under her no-fault coverage for the additional expenses when she entered into a settlement agreement with her workers’ compensation provider. Under the facts alleged, I disagree. Under New York law, if a claimant has her workers’ compensation claim denied — as Plaintiffs evidence shows her claim was — such claims are not “recovered or recoverable.” See Hartford Ins. Group v. Mendez, 93 Misc.2d 957, 404 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Arvatz v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 171

    ### Response:
    holding claimant would be entitled to renew claim against nofault insurer upon a showing by the claimant that application has been made for payment of the medical claims in question under workmens compensation and that there has been a disclaimer of liability for such payment by the workmens compensation carrier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    added); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 827 (10th Cir.1995) (Medical monitoring claims, if brought alone, request injunctive relief and “certification of a class under such circumstances [would be] legally permissible under Rule 23(b)(2).”). In sum, the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy is injunctive in nature and may be pursued under 23(b)(2). (2) SJC Opinion Philip Morris argues that the SJC effectively closed off the possibility of class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because it held medical monitoring to be a legal, not equitable, claim. Donovan, 914 N.E.2d at 898. Since plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law in the form of payment of future medical expenses, Philip Morris asserts, they are not entitled to an injunction. See Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 68 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). It points to several statements made by the

    ### Response:
    holding that injunction seeker must demonstrate no adequate remedy at law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue of material fact regarding the likelihood of confusion. Id. For the reasons explained below, the court concludes that no rational trier of fact could confuse the “Big Dog Motorcycles” mark with the “Big Dog(s)” apparel marks as those marks are encountered by consumers in the marketplace. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Motorcycles is warranted. A. Degree of Similarity Between the Marks The court examines the degree of similarity between the marks on three levels: sight, sound, and meaning. King of the Mountain Sports, 185 F.3d at 1090. These factors must be evaluated “in the context of the marks as a whole as they are encountered by consumers in the marketplace.” Id. at. 1090 (quotation omitted). The court does not engage in a sid ., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Universal Money Centers, Inc. v. AT & T Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding the district court did not err by declining to weigh this factor firmly in plaintiffs favor where there was no similarity in the parties use and presentation of their respective trade beyond their obvious sameness of spelling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by hearing witnesses again and by rendering an independent decision based on the evidence received in the circuit court proceeding. Tenn. Dep’t. of Children’s Servs. v. T.M.B.K., 197 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006). A de novo trial is “[a] new trial on the entire case-that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law-conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.” Kissick v. Kallaher, No. W2004-02983-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1350999, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 18, 2006) (no Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed). Consequently, the circuit court is not “reviewing” the juvenile court’s decision; instead, it is conducting a new proceeding as though the petition was originally filed in circuit court. This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact de novo on t enn.2002) (<HOLDING>). To the extent the trial court made findings

    ### Response:
    holding that the question of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of a permanency plan was a question of law reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    custody of R.A. her life would not be worth living. Given her approximately 15 attempts at suicide, this continued reference to a “life not worth living” suggests she still sees suicide as a remedy for her problems. It is not in R.A.’s best interest to place him in an environment where his sole caretaker, who has attempted suicide at least 15 times, sees suicide as a solution to problems. In light of all the evidence, the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Jordan’s parental rights was in R.A.’s best interest. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Jordan’s parental rights was in the best interest of R.A. See in re J.T., 2009 WL 2077184 at 14 (<HOLDING>). We overrule Jordan’s first issue.

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    award. C. Past Practices The district court also ruled that Arbitrator Murphy failed to “arguably construe” the CBA because he “failed to look to past practices of the parties to interpret any ambiguity” of the CBA. The district court found that under “long-recognized practice, Smucker and the Union allowed employees who were bumped from their position by a more senior employee’s exercise of bumping rights to bump a less senior employee.” But the Sixth Circuit has held that past practices should not be used to interpret or give meaning to a provision or clause of an agreement that is clear and unambiguous. Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. Akron Newspaper Guild, Local No. 7, 114 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir.1997); Int’l Union of Elec. Workers v. Hurd Corp., 7 Fed.Appx. 329, 335 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The plain language of Article 6, Section 2 of

    ### Response:
    holding that where a collective bargaining agreements terms are clear but the management has engaged in contrary practice for a number of years the words of the agreement must be enforced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must prove to establish retaliation. A Title VII discrimination plaintiff must establish an adverse employment action. However, the same is not true in a retaliation case. Id. at 745. “The language of ‘materially adverse employment action’ that some courts employ in retaliation cases is a paraphrase of Title VII’s basic prohibition against employment discrimination, found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2).... The provision regarding retaliation may intentionally be broader, since it is obvious that effective retaliation against employment discrimination need not take the form of a job action.” Id. at 745-46 (quoting McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 258-59 (7th Cir.1996)); see also Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996) (“There is nothing in the law of (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Particularly instructive is another case

    ### Response:
    holding that filing of charges by employer constituted retaliatory act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.J. 920, 938 n. 468 (1997); Paul C. Giannelli & Francis A. Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: “Locking” the Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 U. Va. L.Rev. 1045, 1089 (1979). 11 .11 Del. C. § 1336(a)(11). 12 . 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 13 . Id. at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also U.S. v. McKinnon, 11th Cir., 985 F.2d 525 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843, 114 S.Ct. 130, 126 L.Ed.2d 94 (1993) (applying same ""reasonable expectation of privacy” test for purposes of Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, after which 11 Del. C. § 1336 is patterned). 14 . Id. 15 . See United States v. Clark, 8th Cir., 22 F.3d 799, 801 (1994). 16 . Cf. Ex parte Graves, Tex.App. 1st Dist., 853 S.W.2d 701, 705 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 17 .That Howard was stipulated by the parties

    ### Response:
    holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in jailhouse conversations held between defendant and alleged accomplice when defendant was or should have been aware of monitoring system since speaker was visible on cell room wall
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    family, and even then their primary message should be focused on the Assembly’s continued commitment to the museum, not to any statements related to Cafesjian. The Assembly’s recognition that “news will travel” is not proof that the Assembly or Hovnanian actually published the statements to any persons who lack a common interest in the litigation. Even if disclosure of the letter’s contents to inquiring family members and friends constitutes excessive publication, the memorandum itself does not show that anyone from the Assembly actually passed along the statements to anyone. Defendants have failed to show that any non-Assembly members ever learned of the allegedly defamatory statements, and even that alone is insufficient evidence of excessive publication. See Mastro, 447 F.3d at 859 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Defendants have failed to present

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of excessive publication failed to raise triable issue of fact where third parties who allegedly heard privileged information had not given testimony regarding the source of their knowledge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.W.2d at 763. Nevertheless, there may be goodwill in a professional partnership that is separate from the skills or attributes of an individual member. Id, at 764. A case illustrating such a situation is Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ dism’d), in which a physician owned shares in a professional corporation that provided emergency-room physicians to hospitals. The corporation had contracts with several hospitals and employed about fifty to one hundred physicians on a part-time basis and ten on a full-time basis to satisfy those contracts. The court of appeals drew a distinction between the goodwill built up by the physician personally at the hospital at which he practiced and the corporati S.2d 364, 367-368, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Geesbreght and Nail illustrate the

    ### Response:
    holding that law firms partnership agreement and history of operations precluded recovery of goodwill upon dissolution but recognizing that blanket prohibition against goodwill of a law firm has been superseded by the economic realities of the contemporary practice of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    based on general policy. Instead, this exception provides that a court can prohibit disclosure of records on an individual basis only when privacy interests outweigh the public interest favoring disclosure. Although the supreme court obviously may waive or modify its own rules, it has not done so here. See C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5.2 (order limiting access to court files shall not be granted except upon a finding that harm to privacy outweighs public interest); Anderson v. Home Insurance Co., supra (interpreting § 24-72-204(1)(e) as allowing a court to limit access only when right of privacy outweighs public interest). SCA relies on Florida law to support its assertion that judicial records are exempted from the Open Records Act. See Times Publishing Company v. Ake, 660 So.2d 255 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, Florida’s definition of public

    ### Response:
    holding that court clerks performing duties relating to the administrative operation of the courts including the release of judicial records are subject to the control of the florida supreme court not the legislative branch
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from prosecuting the state court action, and not the state court action itself, the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable. However, this is a distinction without a difference. As thé United States Supreme Court found in Atlantic Coast Line, the Anti-Injunction Act “cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding”. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739; see also Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne, 329 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir.2003) (citing County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54, 58-59, 101 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed.2d 258 (1980) for the proposition that federal court may not effectively enjoin state proceeding by framing injunction as restraint on parties); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). Thus, unless the Plaintiffs’ federal

    ### Response:
    holding that the statutory bar set by the antiinjunction act cannot be avoiding by directing the injunction solely to a party as distinguished from the state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment in accordance with Rule 56, a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings; rather, the nonmovant must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995). Accordingly, the nonmovant “must make a sufficient showing on every essential element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial.” Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.1995). II. Cause of Death To establish Bieffe’s liability for the alleged defect in the BF85, plaintiff must prove that the defect probably, or more likely than not, caused the injury. See, e.g., Walton v. Jones, 286 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn.1979) (<HOLDING>); Block v. Target Stores, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 705,

    ### Response:
    holding in the medical malpractice context that a plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence more likely than not caused the victims death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of opinion and from which an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the court certifies the issues to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for its consideration whether to permit an appeal to be taken from such order, should a timely application be made to that court. 2. This case is stayed pending further order of the court. Plaintiffs shall file a Status Report within ten days of any action on their application by the Federal Circuit. * The Tax Court's Bakersfield decision also, without mentioning its precedents, split from its own prior holdings that limited the rationale in Colony to the sale of goods or services by a trade or business. See, e.g., Insulglass Corp. v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 203, 1985 WL 15309 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Schneider v. Comm 'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1032

    ### Response:
    holding gross receipts provision provides exception for trade or business to general meaning of gross income provided in section 61a so reporting of gross proceeds alone from sales of commodities would not prevent application of irc  6501e1a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir. 1988)); Aplee. Br. 21 (“[Elliott] asks this court to take the extraordinary step of exercising its supervisory power[ ] to suppress his statements.... ”). We recently emphasized our “circumspect approach to the exercise of the supervisory power.” United States v. Lilly, 810 F.3d 1205, 1219 (10th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734-35, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980) (noting Court’s “restrained application of the supervisory power,” which Court “applie[s] with some caution”). We don’t take lightly the assertion that a prosecutor has violated his ethical duties, and suppressing evidence is a stiff penalty. Thus, we typically demand full development of these issues in the district court. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1973) (<HOLDING>). We lack the benefit of that development here.

    ### Response:
    holding that the problem is initially one for the trial courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the other states cited by the Inter-Tel Technologies court that specified a procedural mechanism to initiate piercing the corporate veil and that would differentiate the circumstances in those states from those at issue in Michigan. In light of the foregoing, we hold that plaintiffs were entitled to bring a new action in an attempt to enforce the prior Kasper judgment against Persha. While we continue to recognize that piercing the corporate veil is merely a remedy to be applied in certain limited circumstances, the concern that there be a separate cause of action to support this type of equitable relief does not arise when, as in this case, there already exists a judgment based on one or more causes of action. See Union Guardian Trust Co v Rood, 308 Mich 168, 172; 13 NW2d 248 (1944) (<HOLDING>). In other words, a party certainly needs to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first cause of action that they were forced to resign, and that all three plaintiffs were harassed, in retaliation for their complaints about Ayed’s allegedly sexually inappropriate behavior with students and other faculty members. This is a First Amendment claim, but it is dismissed for the following reasons. 1. Applicable Law To establish that defendants violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment speech rights, plaintiffs must establish that (1) the speech at issue was protected; (2) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse employment action. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-85, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F.3d 351, 355 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see 42 U.S.C. § 1981. “A State cannot

    ### Response:
    holding that speech must be at least a substantial or motivating factor in the discharge quotations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    MAK asserts Count Eight against all five defendants. See Complaint at 148-152. While the License Agreement — and thus the License Agreement's forum-selection clause— applies only to defendant SES America, the court dismisses the abandonment of the Marks claim against the other four defendants for the following reasons. First, in the License Agreement, the parties agreed that SES America ""is the owner and/or has the right to license” the Marks. Thus, it appears from the record before the court that SES America has some interest, and perhaps the sole interest, in the Marks. As a result, it is likely that SES America is an indispensable party to any abandonment claim concerning the Secure Eco Shred Marks. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 974 F.Supp. 302, 310 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int'l

    ### Response:
    holding that in a suit where a party sought cancellation of a mark under the abandonment doctrine a nonparty with an interest in the mark was a necessary party under fedrcivp 19
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    31 at 26-27. Plaintiff does not attempt to identify a single similarly situated male who engaged in a single act of work performance deficiencies similar to, or as serious as, any of those cited by defendant as grounds for plaintiffs termination. Therefore, under defendant’s interpretation of “same or similar conduct,” plaintiff has not met her burden in establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment purposes. In summary, regardless of how “same or similar conduct” is defined, plaintiff is unable to establish the third element of her prima facie case. Thus, her claim of sex discrimination fails and it is unnecessary to examine the fourth element of a prima facie case or the issue of pretext. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (<HOLDING>). See also Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977,

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure of proof regarding a required element of a case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and further analysis unnecessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the portion of the R & R relating to statements he made during an interviewed conducted by Detective Alexander after his arrest. (Doc. 46.) The Government responded to defendant’s objections. (Doc. 50.) Having reviewed Defendant’s objections, the Government’s response and the entire record, the Court is now prepared to rule on this matter. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s objections are OVERRULED, and the Court hereby ACCEPTS and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Limbert’s R & R. II. ANALYSIS When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on a motion to suppress, a district court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report and recommendation to which objection is made. See, United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (providing that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a magistrate judges ruling on dispositive motions such as those for the suppression of evidence must be reviewed de novo by the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acts of Negligence Lastly, Barton contends that Whatabur-ger’s employees were negligent in violating its own company policies and procedures to minimize the risk of theft or robbery. Specifically, Barton alleges that Whatabur-ger’s employees committed the following acts of negligence: (1) store manager Da-vilyn Spencer left her safe key at the restaurant at the end of her shift; (2) Murray left his shift early without notifying Spencer; (3) Murray failed to count the money in the registers and deposit the excess in the safe at the end of his shift; and (4) eted murder committed on premises of Sonic restaurant was not foreseeable result of Sonic’s failure to employ security guard); Boggs v. Bottomless Pit Cooking Team, 25 S.W.3d 818, 824-25 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Cowart, 20 S.W.3d at 784-86 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could be based”). Mr. Hernandez cannot avoid the consequences of his inadequate appellate briefing by incorporating his filings in the district court. As stated above, Mr. Hernandez’s application attempts to “incorporate[ ] by ... reference as though fully set forth hereat [sic], each and every allegation set forth in all prior filings in this matter.” Aplt. Application for COA at 2. This he cannot do. Under Tenth Circuit Rules, “[incorporating by reference portions of lower court or agency briefs or pleadings is disapproved.” 10th Cir. R. 28.4 (emphasis added). It should be patent that when the proposed incorporation is as all-encompassing as that sought by Mr. Hernandez, our disapproval results in an outright prohibition. See Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 963-64 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant was not permitted to incorporate district court filings into an appellate brief by reference and that his pro se status did not except him from such established rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the certification. We conclude, therefore, that the Board’s refusal to interpret the Fundamental Canons of the Laws and Rules of Professional Engineering was not error. III. Grievant next argues that the Board erred in concluding that his exercise of free speech was not a motivating factor in the employer’s insistence that he sign the certification. He claims that being forced to sign the certification under threat of disciplinary action or discharge' constitutes a retaliatory act on the part of the employer. He contends that while the Board properly concluded that the objections he raised throughout the certification were protected speech, it failed to consider as protected speech his refusal to sign the certification. See Riley v. National Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (<HOLDING>). An employee’s allegation that an employer

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the Inequities in Berry v. Berry, 39 Baylor L.Rev. 1131, 1188-89 (1987). At the time of the declaratory judgment, Daniel had elected to participate in the “30 and out” option, thereby fixing his pension benefits as matured, and presently available. This maturity marks the date for valuing the benefits, from which Maytag would set the amount of the benefits in conjunction with the Agreement. Cassandra, as alternate payee under the QDRO, should have been paid her proportionate share based on Maytag’s $2600 per month valuation. Any other resolution would be inequitable to Cassandra and such manipulation of the value as Daniel proposed is not anticipated under the Plan, the decree, or the QDRO. See In re Marriage of Lehman, 18 Cal.4th 169, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 825, 955 P.2d 451, 456 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Halbert v. Halbert, 220 Ga.App. 615, 469

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonemployee spouse holds a community marital property interest in pension plan early retirement enhancements because practically by definition the right to retirement benefits that accrues at least in part during marriage before separation underlies any right to an enhancement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule. The “unlawful act” course of conduct embodies the “misdemeanor-manslaughter rule” under which a criminal defendant is guilty of a felony for killing a human being while in the commission of a misdemeanor. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.13(a), at 288 (1986) 83, 784 (1971) (concluding that violations of the motor vehicle code are not necessarily the unlawful act contemplated in misdemeanor-manslaughter, and that to sustain a conviction “it must be established that such violation in itself, or together with the surrounding circumstances, ‘evidence a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences’ ” (quoting Commonwealth v. Holman, 160 Pa.Super. 211, 50 A.2d 720, 721 (1947))); Holder v. State, 152 Tenn. 390, 277 S.W. 900 (1925) (<HOLDING>); State v. Beayon, 158 Vt. 133, 605 A.2d 527,

    ### Response:
    holding that the misdemeanormanslaughter rule requires a showing of intent or the commission of an act in such a maimer as to make the killing of deceased a natural or probable result of such conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims are of the same substantive scope as the cancelled claims and to proceed from there. A finding that the new claims are not substantively identical in scope would result in the limitation of TTI’s potential recovery only to infringement of the claims for the period following the issuance of the reexamination certificate, but it would not preclude those claims. Laitram, 163 F.3d at 1346. CONCLUSION Because the district court did not err in dismissing the suit as moot in light of the cancellation of the only claims asserted in the case, we affirm. AFFIRMED 1 . Courts often treat justiciability doctrines, including standing and mootness, as a subset of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, — U.S. —, 133. S.Ct. 1523, 1532, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the concepts derive from

    ### Response:
    holding that district court appropriately dismissed suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the case was moot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any effect that their interpretation gives to subsection (c)(2). Finally, petitioner’s reliance on the legislative history of § 106(c) is.also misplaced. He points in particular to floor statements to the effect that “section 106(c) permits a trustee or debtor in possession to assert avoiding powers under title 11 against a governmental unit.” See 124 Cong. Rec. 32394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id., at 33993 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The Government suggests that these statements should be construed as referring only to cases in which the debtor retains a possessory or ownership interest in the property that the trustee seeks to recover, Brief for United States 20, and cites as an example this Court’s decision in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The weakness in petitioner’s argument is more

    ### Response:
    holding that the internal revenue service could be required to turn over to bankrupt estate tangible property to which debtor retained ownership
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to cover contract-related tort and unjust enrichment claims. Finally, the fact that the choice-of-law provision is contained in a distinct paragraph titled “Governing Law,” which also includes the forum-selection clause designating a Virginia federal district court as the proper forum, “counsels] in favor of a broad interpretation”-because that combination “manifests the intent to reduce uncertainty and proceed in one forum under one body of law.” Zaklit v. Glob. Linguist Sols., LLC, No. 1:14-cv-314, 2014 WL 3109804, at *11 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2014). In sum, the text of the choice-of-law provision points persuasively to the conclusion that the parties intended that Virginia law apply to tort and unjust enrichment claims related to the Agreement. See Freedman, 325 F.Supp.2d at 641, 653-54 (<HOLDING>). This conclusion finds further firm support in

    ### Response:
    holding that a choiceoflaw provision providing that virginia law would govern the parties agreement clearly foreclosed plaintiff from bringing a tort claim that arose from the plaintiffs rights under the agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with one count of stalking for his numerous phone calls to Nall. ¶30 However, Tichenor’s argument raising § 46-11-410, MCA, is being raised for the first time on appeal. It is well settled that this Court will not review issues raised for the first time on appeal and we will not hold a district court in error where the court was never given an opportunity to correct itself. State v. Baker, 2000 MT 307, ¶¶ 29-30, 302 Mont. 408, ¶¶ 29-30, 15 P.3d 379, ¶¶ 29-30; State v. Weeks (1995), 270 Mont. 63, 85, 891 P.2d 477, 490. Moreover, objecting parties must make the basis and grounds for their objection clear to the court. Baker, ¶¶ 29-30; Weeks, 270 Mont. at 85, 891 P.2d at 490. And, the objection must be specific enough to inform the court or the prosecutor of the issue. See Sta .3d 817 (<HOLDING>). ¶32 In opposing Tichenor’s motion to dismiss,

    ### Response:
    holding that age factor in sexual assault statute pertains only to sentencing and is not an element of the offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    transcripts to his response, including his own and Marshall’s. Farrar testified that on the day he slipped, the ramp was exposed to the elements and was wet from rain. He had not delivered mail to the building for several weeks prior to the day of his fall, but on that day, he noticed that the wheelchair ramp had been painted. Far-rar’s uncontroverted deposition testimony was that after he fell, he spoke with Marshall, who told him that the person who had come to check the fire alarm earlier that morning had also slipped on the wheelchair ramp. Sabine and Northwest argue that Farrar failed to present evidence of actual or constructive knowledge because he did not proffer evidence of a prior fall or a report involving injury. But whether an Tex.App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, “ ‘The fact that the owner or

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of similar incidents is probative as to notice element in premises liability case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""[wle must defer to a trial court's findings of fact if those findings are supported by competent evidence in the record."" People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Colo.2000); see also People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216, 1223 (Colo.2001). However, we must examine the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. See Medina, 25 P.3d at 1223. Like the trial court, we must review the totality of the cireumstances known to the police officers at the time of the encounter to determine whether the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a search and seizure. Outlaw, 17 P.3d at 157. Therefore, we cxamine the encounter between Haley, Dunlap, Daniels and Officer Miller. First, as a preliminary matter, the police had justification to make the traffic stop. See People v. Ramos, 13 P.3d 295, 297 (Colo.2000)(<HOLDING>); People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1355

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    612 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir.1979), cert, denied, 447 U.S. 925, 926, 100 S.Ct. 3019, 3020, 65 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1980). 40 . Accord, e.g., Charron v. United States, 200 F.3d at 789; cf., e.g., United States v. IBM Corp. (In re IBM Corp.), 618 F.2d 923, 932 (2d Cir.1980) ("" 'Judges, while expected to possess more than the average amount of self-restraint, are still only human. They do not possess limitless ability, once passion is aroused, to resist provocation.’ ”). 41 . The cases plaintiffs cite in support of this argument (Pis. Br. at 22) are inapposite, since the factual circumstances were very different. In both cases, the judge was reversed, and upon remand, expressed his resultant personal offense to the party and counsel. United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44, 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10

    ### Response:
    holding that a reasonable man would be convinced that the trial judges impartiality might be questioned where the judge commented that defendant had broken faith with the court at his first trial by consenting to the judge visiting the jury room but then raising the issue on appeal and stated that he intended to increase defendants sentence because of these circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misses the point. Even if, as the concurrence suggests, the Court used this term in Graham — a case centering on the use of excessive force during an investigatory stop of a citizen, 490 U.S. at 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1865 — to distinguish between the constitutional protections afforded to civilians, pretrial detainees, and incarcerated individuals, this says nothing about whether a claim that falls outside of these set boundaries is ""covered by” the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, a non-citizen alleges excessive force abroad, and there is no indication that the show of authority was directed at apprehension, it cannot be that the claim arises under the Fourth Amendment or not at all. The cases the concurrence cites are not to the contrary. Cf. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843-44, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (<HOLDING>); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74, 114

    ### Response:
    holding that the passenger of a vehicle being pursued by police was not seized during a fatal collision and therefore could assert a substantive due process claim under the fourteenth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    there is also no obvious connection between the alleged statements by Phelps and Owens and the December travel request denial. Nurriddin has neither shown that the denial of travel requests was an adverse action nor provided evidence for a rational fact-finder to conclude that NASA’s explanation for the denial of his travel requests is a pretext for retaliation. Hence, this claim, too, fails. 5. Designation as AWOL for 59 Days in 2000 Nurriddin alleges that he suffered from discrimination and retaliation when he was temporarily listed as AWOL from September 12, 2000, through December 1, 2000. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 121. NASA does not dispute, though it might have, that being designated AWOL constitutes an adverse employment action. Compare Ware v. Billington, 344 F.Supp.2d 63, 77 (D.D.C.2004) (<HOLDING>), with Brown v. Snow, 407 F.Supp.2d 61, 65

    ### Response:
    holding that designation as awol constituted an adverse action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    area, i.e., the ""provision of water service,” which is a governmental function. See City of Beaufort, 325 S.C. at 180-82, 480 S.E.2d at 731-32. 14 . Other jurisdictions also recognize this fundamental principle. See Grassini v. DuPage Twp., 279 Ill.App.3d 614, 216 Ill.Dec. 602, 665 N.E.2d 860, 864 (1996) (“[I]t is contrary to the effective administration of a political subdivision to allow elected officials to tie the hands of their successors with respect to decisions regarding the welfare of the subdivision.”); id. (""This principle has not been confined in application to county governments.... Indeed, it has found expression with respect to employment decisions in ... the Municipal Code_” (citation omitted)); City of Hazel Park v. Potter, 169 Mich.App. 714, 426 N.W.2d 789, 793 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Morin v. Foster, 45 N.Y.2d 287, 408 N.Y.S.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an employment contract between an outgoing city council and the city manager was void on public policy grounds because it attempted to take away the governmental or legislative power of the incoming council to appoint and remove public officers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    there was “an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the [injured employee],” Gladson v. Piedmont Stores, 57 N.C. App. 579, 579, 292 S.E.2d 18, 18, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 556, 294 S.E.2d 370 (1982), or “the interruption of the routine work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions,” Sanderson v. Northeast Construction Co., 77 N.C. App. 117, 121, 334 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1985). The lifting of an object by an employee that is heavier than expected or heavier than the usual nature of the object may constitute an unlooked for and untoward event not expected or designed by the injured employee. Gladson, 57 N.C. App. at 580-81, 292 S.E.2d at 19; see also Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 135 N.C. App. 112, 116, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999) (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 351, 543 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that while the plaintiffs job responsibilities included assisting patients who received epidurals her regular work routine did not require lifting the legs of women weighing 263 pounds who had received epidurals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    termination negates Ofc. Schmidt’s claim since Ofc. Schmidt filed his first EEOC complaint in November 2011 and was not fired until August 2012. ECF No. 39-2 at 23. But this ignores the fact that the investigation against Ofc. Schmidt, which would culminate in his eventual August 2012 termination, began the moment he returned to work on December 5, 2011. ECF No. 39-31. Defendant next argues that because the Plaintiffs have alleged multiple theories for his termination, including that his termination was in retaliation for supporting his wife’s sexual harassment charges and his pursuit of worker’s compensation benefits, Ofc. Schmidt cannot establish but-for causation, ECF No. 39-2 at 24; see also Kern v. S. Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 66 Md.App. 441, 447-48, 504 A.2d 1154, 1157 (1986)(<HOLDING>). However, the assertion of multiple wrongful

    ### Response:
    holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3582(c)(2), and the district court lacks the authority to grant a reduction. Id. In addition, where a defendant is not otherwise eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), a U.S. Supreme Court decision, standing alone, does not provide the court with the authority to reduce the defendant’s sentence. United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (11th Cir.2005). A proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) does not contemplate a de novo resentenc-ing of the defendant, and “all original sentencing determinations [must] remain unchanged with the sole exception of the guideline range that has been amended since the original sentencing.” United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir.2000); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2693-94, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court correctly found that

    ### Response:
    holding that  3582c2 permits a district court only to substitute an amended guideline for the guideline used at the original sentencing and that a court lacks the authority to correct mistakes in a defendants original sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on which Kalfus relies, warrants no different conclusion under New York law because the free speech claim there at issue concerned a public university’s exclusion of a former student from a “publicly owned and maintained” campus that was “open to the public.” Id. at 410-11, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 115, 465 N.E.2d 831 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Leonard provides no support either for Kalfus’ contention that free speech and press protections extend to private property, such as the hospital steps here at issue, or for his argument that New York law affords more expansive free speech and press protections for activities on private property than the federal Constitution. See SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 505-06, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 105-06, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (1985) (<HOLDING>); accord Downs v. Town of Guilderland, 70

    ### Response:
    holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (2d Cir.1995); Ferrostaal, Inc. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 109 F.Supp.2d 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (The initial burden rests on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 30 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Kittay v. Peter D. Leibowits Co. (In re Duke & Benedict, Inc.), 265 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2001) (""[T]he nonmoving party must set forth specific facts that show triable issues, and cannot rely on pleadings containing mere allegations or denials.""). 31 . See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (<HOLDING>); Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment is appropriate wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the other occupants of the car. To be sure, the white bag was not in the appellant’s plain view or direct line of sight when he was ordered out of the passenger seat of the Honda. Proof that contraband is in a person’s plain view or line of sight can be sufficient to show the person had knowledge of its presence; it is not necessary to prove knowledge, however. As Judge Moylan explained in Folk, swpra, one of the common threads running through cases holding evidence sufficient to prove joint constructive possession, beyond a reasonable doubt, is “the fact that the contraband was wi ential to show knowledge of the presence of contraband, however. When an object is out of sight, it is not necessarily “out of mind.” Compare Colin v. State, 101 Md.App. 395, 407, 646 A.2d 1095 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Also of critical importance here, the

    ### Response:
    holding that circumstantial evidence that the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle in which contraband was hidden in the compartment in a door reacted nervously when the vehicle was stopped and gave the officers a false name added up to a revealing picture that could reasonably be interpreted as showing that he had something to hide and knew where it was to be found
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim, plaintiffs must prove t. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). [2] As to Zembiec’s remaining claims for relief, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough opinion. [3] The district court did not err in denying Zembiec leave to amend his complaint. It reviewed the allegations in Zembiec’s proposed amended complaint and concluded that they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We agree that Zembiec’s amendment would have been futile. See Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We have considered all of Zembiec’s

    ### Response:
    holding that amendment is futile if the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the language of the policy is susceptible of two constructions, as manifested in argument, it is to be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.”) Thus, the definition of ""manifest” that should be adopted — even if discovery is a possible interpretation of the term — favors coverage in this case. 23 . Interpreting ""manifest” to mean discoverable, moreover, is consistent with nature of an occurrence-based policy and with the expectations of the insured, as an occurrence of bodily injury or property damage — here, when the property became polluted, with each discharge of PCE, to a legally significant level — has nothing to do with when that injury or damage is discovered. Cf. Maryland Cos. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 627 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the Sixth Circuit has observed, ""[I]t is

    ### Response:
    holding that actual injury to property  the presence of the asbestos hazard  occurs upon installation and exists regardless of whether it yet has been discovered by the building owners
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their clerks, and the state bar association in an effort to have his attorney removed from the case; and “promptly” filing his own habeas petition pro se after discovering that his AEDPA clock had expired due to his attorney’s failings). Similarly, “the fact that Mr. Pace’s attorney was contemplating filing for a new trial in 2006 does not explain Mr. Pace’s complete failure to file any motions in his criminal case until March 19, 2008, nor his decision to delay the filing of his habeas application until September 29, 2011.” R. at 202 (Order of Dismissal, filed Dec. 8, 2011). In sum, Mr. Pace does not allege specific facts that would support a claim of due diligence after his attorney’s alleged untruthfulness and abandonment. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The district court determined that Mr. Pace

    ### Response:
    holding that the petitioner has a strong burden to show specific facts to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances and due diligence quoting brown v barrow 512 f3d 1304 1307 11th cir 2008 internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fatal Claim Petition, denying each of Snizaski’s allegations. The WCJ conducted a hearing on September 16, 1996, at which Rox Coal asserted as an affirmative defense that Snizaski was ineligible for fatal claim benefits because Decedent’s death resulted from his violation of the law. Rox Coal relied upon the police report from the accident, submitted by Snizaski, which indicated that Decedent had been guilty of the following violations of the Vehicle Code: (1) careless driving; (2) driving at an unsafe speed; (3) driving on the wrong side of the road; and (4) failure to use a restraint system. Rox Coal relied on section 301(a) of the Act, which provides in relevant part as follows: Every employer shall be liable for compensation for personal injury to, o 7 Pa. 172, 146 A. 543 (1929) (<HOLDING>). Rox Coal’s company car policy provided that

    ### Response:
    holding that the employee was not entitled to compensation because he committed an act in direct hostility to and in defiance of the positive orders of the employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plea agreement,] I wish to withdraw my plea and change my plea to not guilty.” Also, any alleged prejudice suffered as a result of Ledezma’s change of heart was eliminated by his subsequent motion to withdraw the motion to withdraw guilty pleas. In order to connect his attorney’s performance with the revocation of the March plea agreement, Ledezma argues that the apparently unintentional motion to withdraw guilty pleas caused the Government to file the motion to revoke the March plea agreement. A review of the record demonstrates otherwise. The motion to revoke cited Ledezma’s refusal both to stipulate to career offender status and to cooperate fully with law enforcement as the reasons for revoking the March plea agreement. See United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352, 354 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Further, Ledezma’s repeated statements that

    ### Response:
    holding that the government is no longer bound by its obligations under a plea agreement when a defendant commits a material breach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the money they paid a non-attorney representative who misled them into believing that the “waiver” she promised to get them would preserve their right to appeal their case to the BIA. The BIA abused its discretion when it determined that the declaration was “vague” and faded to prove that petitioners had an agreement with the non-attorney representative against whom they have filed an ineffective assistance claim. See Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.1999) (listing Lozada requirements necessary to establish ineffective assistance). Not only did petitioners properly comply with Matter of Lozada, 19 I & N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), they also acted with due diligence upon discovering that their appeal had not been filed. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we conclude that petitioners have

    ### Response:
    recognizing equitable tolling of deadlines and numerical limits on motions to reopen or reconsider during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception fraud or error as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception fraud or error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Holt argued that the Board enacted the revisions on the same day that it set the deadline to apply under the old ordinance, thereby creating and taking away a right at the same time. Section 3-3-36 had only one requirement, that a member have a service-related injury. Section 3-3-37 grandfathered members who had submitted an application for service-connected disability as of December 9,1996. Thus, according to Holt, although he qualified under section 3-3-36, it was impossible for him to submit his application timely because the earliest he could have submitted it, even if he had been aware of the changes on December 9,2000, was December 10,1996. The County argued that certain events must occur before an inchoate right vests. Pitts v. City of Richmond, 235 Va. 16, 366 S.E.2d 56 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In the case at hand, filing the application

    ### Response:
    holding that inchoate rights to retirement benefits do not vest until a member qualifies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (""Once the defendant has been put on notice that the State claims the warrantless search was constitutional because [the defendant] has no expectation of privacy in the area searched, then the defendant must factually demonstrate that he does have standing to contest the warrantless search.""), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 9 r passengers have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their coats or jackets found in cars. See People v. Armendarez, 188 Mich.App. 61, 468 N.W.2d 893, 900 (1991) (finding that car passenger had ""standing to object to the search of his personal effects in the car, namely, his coat,"" where his coat was found on front seat of vehicle); State v. McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852 P.2d 111, 112-13 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 1 11 Finally, other jurisdictions have found

    ### Response:
    holding that car passenger had legitimate expectation of privacy in his jacket found crumpled on the back seat of car
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employed part-time by Cabana and other companies to obtain the necessary building and zoning permits. The applications filed by defendant Stearns were replete with misstatements. As a result, plaintiffs were ultimately compelled to remove the pool at their own expense, since its existence on their property eventuated a violation of the zoning ordinance. At trial the judge granted defendant Stearns’ motion for judgment, holding that he did not owe any duty to plaintiffs and that the representations made by him in applications for the building and zoning permits were not relied upon by plaintiffs. 135 N. J. Super, at 376. The Appellate Division, citing Wyt 13 Cal. 3d 177, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P. 2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1974); 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P. 2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (<HOLDING>). In support of his position, defendant cites

    ### Response:
    holding psychotherapist liable for negligent failure to warn potential victim or her parents that the violenceprone patient undergoing psychiatric treatment by defendant had made threats against the victim whom he subsequently murdered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [in an action], the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more ... parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit has held that Rule 54(b) broadens the joint liability rule from Frow so that “just reason for delay” now includes preventing inconsistent judgments in situations in which multiple defendants are jointly and/or severally liable. See United States ex rel. Hudson v. Peerless Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 942, 944 (4th Cir.1967) (emphasis added). Rule 54(b) also authorizes a delay in entry of judgment for the “just reason” of avoiding “logically inconsistent judgments in the same action.” Phoenix Renovation Corp. v. Gulf Coast Software, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 580, 582 (E.D.Va.2000) (<HOLDING>). A logically inconsistent judgment results

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 54b applies when plaintiffs theory of recovery against one defendant is largely subsumed by its theory of recovery against the other defendant even though there was no formal joint liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    thus further shortening the time he had to research and write his petition. Cf. Garrick, 162 Fed. Appx. at 124-25 (“[T]he record shows no allegation that he was misled or tricked, or that anything (or anyone) actually ‘stood in his way.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005))); Bonilla, 2001 WL 253605, at *2 (“The one year period cannot be ‘tolled’ further while a potential petitioner seeks forms from the court (at least absent unusual circumstances, not present here).” (emphasis added)). Further, petitioner was diligent in pursuing his rights. Petitioner tried to obtain habeas forms immediately after receiving the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of allocatur in his PCRA action. Cf. Rios, 2008 WL 2952352, at *8 (<HOLDING>). Unlike the petitioners in Garrick and similar

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable tolling did not apply in part because petitioner waited three months after his pcra appeal was denied before attempting to secure the habeas forms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the twelve-month sentence, the district judge extensively reviewed Smith’s history and his conduct while on supervised release. R5 at 19-20. The judge also noted the seriousness of Smith’s underlying offense and that the sentence of twelve months of imprisonment was appropriate in light of the repetitiveness of Smith’s conduct. The judge further stated: “All I can do is remove you right now, hope to protect society for the period of time that you are on release.” Id. at 22. Given the district judge’s consideration of the nature and circumstances of Smith’s offense, Smith’s history and conduct while on supervised release, and the need to protect society, it cannot be said that she did not consider the § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also Scott, 426 F.3d at 1329 (<HOLDING>). Because the district judge considered the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    representation benefits the child, our community, and the courts, and exemplifies the ideals of service in our profession. By advocating the child's point of view, Ms. Vigil not only contributed an important viewpoint to aid the court’s deliberation, but also enabled the child to feel that her voice was heard, considered, and respected as part of the judicial process. The child's perception that she was treated with good faith is important, our Supreme Court has noted, because ""a child who feels that he or she has been treated fairly in the course of the commitment proceedings will likely be more willing to accept hospitalization and treatment.” Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So.2d 1206, 1211 (Fla.2001). 2 . See, e.g., Polites, 904 So.2d at 532 (<HOLDING>); Hairison, 896 So.2d at 870 (holding the trial

    ### Response:
    holding the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine when it ordered the office of the state attorney to pay for the costs of mental health experts evaluating the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of release granting authorities the right to search premises and persons at reasonable times could stand muster under both the Alaska and federal Constitutions.”); William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 17:8 (2012) (“In most jurisdictions, one of the conditions in [parole] agreements is that the parolee or probationer consents to the search of himself, his possessions, and his residence by a parole officer, and a majority of courts give effect to such provisions.”). The consent to search in the standard IDOC parole agreement is broad and authorizes searches “without ... reasonable cause” and by any “law enforcement officer.” In some states, this permission has been judicially narrowed. See State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904, 906, 909 (Minn.Ct.App.2012) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 575 Pa. 447, 836 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding a parole agreement provision that the offender will submit at any time to an unannounced visit andor search of the offenders person vehicle or premises by the agentdesignee justifies a search so long as reasonable suspicion exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the juvenile department itself a duty to investigate or otherwise pursue allegations of child abuse, it did require team members, including county juvenile department representatives, to carry out investigations in accordance with protocols under ORS 418.747(2). ORS 418.747(4). That obligation, which included a duty of “immediate investigation,” arguably created a special relationship between the juvenile department, to whom the Union County allegations were referred, and the Union County victim. It did not, however, create a special relationship between the juvenile department and other persons, including the Malheur County victims, because there had been no allegation of child abuse regarding those victims. Cf. Blachly v Portland Police Dept., 135 Or App 109, 117, 898 P2d 784 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs also rely on ORS 419A.012(1) as a

    ### Response:
    holding that state agencys duty to investigate a child abuse report involving a day care center created a special relationship between the agency and children at the day care center including those who had not been specifically named as victims in the report because they were among a finite group of children at the facility who were identified as suspected victims of abuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district. Again, this provision has no bearing on Canon 5(A)(3). That an assistant judge may temporarily perform the duties of a probate judge does not affect the clear import of Canon 5(A)(3), which is concerned with the broader implications of running for one judicial office while performing the duties of another. We thus find no ambiguity in this regard. ¶ 11. Ultimately, respondent maintains that, even if the omission was intentional, the drafters’ departure from the Model Code was “unreasonable” and “does not make any sense.” The argument is essentially a variant of two others. One is that, however unambiguous, Canon 5(A)(3) nevertheless leads to absurd results that the drafters could not have intended. See Chayer v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 2008 VT 45, ¶ 10, 183 Vt. 439, 954 A.2d 783 (<HOLDING>). The other is that Canon 5(A)(3) serves no

    ### Response:
    holding that we may look beyond text of statute or rule where plain language is unambiguous but would lead to an absurd result that drafters cannot have intended
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indeed it exists under these factual circumstances, is much narrower than the duty imposed where a fiduciary relationship exists, Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 393 So.2d at 555 n. 5, and does not permit the discovery of the claim and litigation files which were ordered in the instant ease. PETITION GRANTED. BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur. 1 . Simultaneously, the trial court ordered Allstate to provide a complete answer to an interrogatory. Allstate has failed to demonstrate that this portion of the order results in the irremediable injury necessary to merit the exercise of certiora-ri jurisdiction, and its contentions of error are meritless. 2 . These facts distinguish the instant case from North American Van Lines, Inc. v. Lexington Co., 678 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a judicial sale may be set aside “by reasons of fraud, accident, surprise, or mistake, irregularities in the conduct of the sale, and so on,” but cautioned that a judicial sale is not ordinarily vacated “on the ground of mistake flowing from [a moving party’s] own culpable negligence.” 122 N.J. Eq. at 528,194 A 545. Karel represents an overview of those decisions, many from the nineteenth century, which reflected an intent to protect a mortgagor, particularly in those instances where the mortgagor’s home was being foreclosed, and to protect all parties in interest where the mortgage foreclosure process was fraught with some deficiency which deprived an interested party of sufficient notice of the proceedings. See Kirkpatrick v. Corning, 48 N.J. Eq. 302, 24 A 441 (E. & A. 1891) (<HOLDING>). See also Heintze v. Bentley, 34 N.J. Eq. 562,

    ### Response:
    holding that purchasers at judicial sales subject themselves to the courts power to guard on equitable terms against hardship surprise mistake misrepresentation or undue advantage even though purchasers are not at fault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    directly across from the entrance to Silkwood Estates. This will result in traffic congestion in that area. Beyond this testimony, Plaintiffs did not present any expert evidence that the level of traffic on Todd George Road would be increased to unacceptable levels. On the other hand, the JBM Traffic Study and the study performed by the City’s traffic engineer indicated that, with the improvements recommended by the studies and which were required by the zoning ordinance as a precondition to building, the level of service on Todd George Road would remain acceptable. In light of this evidence, the decision that the increase in traffic could be accommodated and should not preclude rezoning was at least fairly debatable. See Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Mo.App.1980) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs also contend that the rezoning

    ### Response:
    holding rezoning is at least fairly debatable where the evidence on traffic was conflicting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    different sponsored links appearing on a page that a consumer might believe each one is the true “producer” or “origin” of the Styrotrim product. As such, Plaintiff fails to properly plead a false designation of origin claim. (b) False Advertising Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s AdWords program constitutes false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). Maintenance of a false advertising claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) requires, “(1) a commercial injury based upon a misrepresentation about a product; and (2) that the injury is ‘competitive,’ or harmful to the plaintiffs ability to compete with the defendant.” Jack Russell Terrier Network of Northern California v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiff and Defendant are not direct

    ### Response:
    holding that while under a false association claim parties need not be direct competitors under a false advertising claim they do
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lamar failed to seek post-conviction review of his claims in state court pursuant to Colo. R.Crim. P. 35. The district court agreed and dismissed Lamar’s § 2254 petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust his state court remedies. The court rejected Lamar’s ar er 8, 2010, Lamar notified the court that he has appealed the sentence imposed on May 5, 2010, after the matter was remanded by the CCA for resentencing. The state court docket indicates Lamar’s opening brief was filed on June 17, 2011, and the answer brief is not due until November 29, 2011. Accordingly, because Lamar’s direct appeal from his conviction and sentence is still pending before the Colorado courts, he has not exhausted all available state remedies. See Daegele v. Crouse, 429 F.2d 503, 504-05 (10th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, our review of the record

    ### Response:
    holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to apply a clearly erroneous or a de novo standard of review to the scope of employment issue in a FTCA claim. The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing the federal government to be sued for the actions of “any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment” under circumstances where the United States would be liable if it were a private employer. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 2674. Scope of employment is generally determined by the law of the state where the tort occurred. See Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1012 n. 7 (8th Cir.1991) (Brown). However, FTCA claims are strictly limited to a scope of employment analysis, regardless of state law doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent authority. Primeaux II, 181 F.3d at 878 (<HOLDING>). The applicable law in this case is the law of

    ### Response:
    holding that apparent authority as a separate theory of vicarious liability should not be considered in ftca claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to award restitution. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally does not turn on the victim’s injury, but on the penal goals of the State and the situation of the defendant. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. 353 (1986). Although the Court grounded its opinion on federalism concerns, some courts have found the wording of this section of Kelly broad enough to reach restitution ordered pursuant to the VWPA. See United States v. Caddell, 830 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir.1987) (“[T]he language in the [Kelly] opinion extends generally to penal sanctions of restitution without regard to whether the court imposing the sanction is a state or federal court.”). However, in Towers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that § 523(a)(7) “offers r.W.D.Pa.1993) (<HOLDING>). We find the reasoning in Towers persuasive.

    ### Response:
    holding restitution paid to a local department store is not dischargeable pursuant to kelly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to perform the service skillfully, carefully, diligently, and in a workmanlike manner.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, 354 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tenn.2011) (collecting cases); see also Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387, 788 N.E.2d 522, 531 (2003) (“When a party binds himself by contract to do a work or to perform a service, he agrees by implication to do a workmanlike job and to use reasonable and appropriate care and skill in doing it.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Davis v. New England Pest Control Co., 576 A.2d 1240, 1242 (R.I.1990) (“[T]here is implied in every contract for work or services a duty to perform it skillfully, carefully, and diligently and in a workman-like manner[.]”); Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>). As the Mitchells further point out, courts

    ### Response:
    recognizing an implied warranty in horse training because training introduces new elements to enhance the horses capabilities and personality and extinguishes undesirable traits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rely on the court’s second reason for rejecting the post-litigation license as a defense: that at the time Warner Bros, took the pictures and made pictorial reproductions, it did not have a license to do so, and therefore any infringing activity by Warner Bros, could not be later validated by the grant of a license. Id. Here, the Court has found that the defendant already had a valid, oral license from the same co-owners prior to their issuance of any retroactive license. The written license agreements only serve to memorialize terms already agreed upon earlier and do not act as a contrivance to avoid copyright infringement liability. Leicester, therefore, is clearly distinguishable. See Great Southern Homes, Inc. v. Johnson & Thompson Realtors, 797 F.Supp. 609, 612 (M.D.Tenn.1992) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs also argue that the written

    ### Response:
    recognizing validity of retroactive license that memorialized grant of oral license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and convict black men without regard to the existence of probable cause” cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1972)). Further, to recover under § 1985(3), Mills was also required to demonstrate that he was “in .1993) (noting that elements of malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law require a plaintiff to show that legal proceedings were instituted without probable cause). Mills’s claims for assault and battery must likewise fail because the existence of probable cause privileged both Blasko and Bair to use reasonable force to arrest Mills. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir.1995); Renk, 641 A.2d at 293-94 (<HOLDING>). And finally, nothing about the conduct of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the decision held them liable only for attorney’s fees that resulted, at least in part, from their wrongful conduct of removing assets from the trust that was the subject of the lawsuit. It does not hold a nonparty liable for an underlying judgment. The main line of authority relied upon by Bermudez consists of a series of cases from this court holding that a nonparty to litigation who funds and controls vexatious litigation can be deemed a party for purposes of paying costs and attorney’s fees. See Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So.3d 691 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (attorney’s fees under civil theft statute); Visoly v. Sec. Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So.2d 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes); Lage v. Blanco, 521 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). These cases deal only with attorney’s fees

    ### Response:
    holding attorneys deemed parties for purposes of paying attorneys fees resulting from frivolous lawsuit they filed without clients authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 489-90. Accordingly, the Court held that the officers investigating the case “had no due process duty to collect bloodstained articles found at the scene of the crime to preserve them for defendant’s use.” Id. at 490. C. While we recognize the rule that police officers generally have no duty to collect all potential evidence from a crime scene, we conclude that this rule is not absolute. We do not condone shoddy and inadequate police investigation procedures at the expense of a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. In some eases, the State’s failure to gather evidence may amount to suppression of material evidence. See Bradley, at 491 (noting that police “might have a duty at some point to seize an item of evidence”); People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 503 (Colo.1986) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); State v. Powers, 555 So.2d 888, 890

    ### Response:
    recognizing that state agents may suppress evidence by failing to collect and preserve the evidence when performing routine procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest in Collins’ life. Although Mr. Collins was listed as thé nominal settlor of the Trust, he did not fund the trust or pay -any premiums on the policy. The Trustee, Gor-dillo, testified the trust never had any money, did not pay any premiums on the policy, nor did she know the source of funds for any premium payments. Instead, the record shows premiums were paid by Houchins through his Bonded Life ac count. Under Tennessee law, a policy must be taken out in “good faith” and the rule is that if one procures a policy upon the life of another and pays the premiums, that party “must have an insurable interest in the life of that other, or the policy .will be a mere wager policy.” Clement, 46 S.W. at 661; Sun Life v. Wells Fargo, 2016 WL 6746352 at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2016) (<HOLDING>). Conestoga argues the policy is not void

    ### Response:
    holding that policy was void ah initio as a wagering contract where the investors funded the premium by funneling the money through the trust account
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prospective-only application. King v. Shelby Medical Center, 779 F.Supp. 157, 157 (N.D.Ala. December 18, 1991). Both Republican Senator John Dan-forth and Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy predicted that it would fall to the federal courts to determine the retroactivity issue. See 137 Cong.Rec. S15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30,1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 137 Cong.Rec. S15483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth). The Second Circuit has yet to decide whether the Act should be applied retroactively. See Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir.1992) (declining to address the retroactivity issue). District courts in this circuit have reflected the national trend, with a split of authority that generally favors non-retroactivity. See Croce, 786 F.Supp. 1141 (<HOLDING>); McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F.Supp. 961, 973

    ### Response:
    holding that the act is retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    propensity to commit criminal acts.” United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Howard, 235 F.3d 366, 372 (8th Cir.2000)). For evidence of past crimes to be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence must be (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the charged crime; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) such that its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Williams, 308 F.3d at 837. Betterton argues that his prior convictions were not relevant to a material issue. However, evidence of past drug-related crimes is relevant to establish knowledge and intent for the charged drug offense. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 398 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 692

    ### Response:
    holding two prior convictions for distribution of crack relevant to show intent to distribute the crack found in defendants possession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and fairness to litigants.” Busch v. Biggs, 264 N.J.Super. 385, 396, 624 A.2d 1017 (App.Div.1993). The Cogdell Court explained that in the present day litigation explosion, the judicial system must “conserve judicial resources; judicial energy is not inexhaustible or endlessly renewable. Thus, a rule that can control litigational extravagance and reduce piecemeal litigation is a necessity.” Id., 116 N.J. at 24, 560 A.2d 1169. We are cognizant that application of the doctrine is limited in that, “as in the ease of all other preclusionary doctrines ... the party whose claim is being sought to be barred must have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action.” Cafferata v. Peyser, 251 N.J.Super. 256, 261, 597 A.2d 1101 (App.Div.1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the doctrine does not bar related

    ### Response:
    holding that a patients settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    objected to this argument as improper and moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. On appeal, Mason contends this improper argument violated her motion in limine because it informed the jury of the effect of its answers, it added to the burden already imposed on her by the jury charge’s improper comment on the weight of the evidence, and it required counsel to spend additional time rebutting the improper argument. Therefore, she contends, the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial. Again, however, because we do not have a complete reporter’s record, we are unable to review the evidence to determine if the verdict was based on the evidence or on the improper argument. See Wooten v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 928 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). And, because we must presume that the omitted

    ### Response:
    holding that lack of complete record precluded appellate review of alleged incurable jury argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    city’s welfare drove New Jersey citizens to allow casino operations, with strict controls, in Atlantic City. See Tose, 819 F.Supp. at 1319. The 1977 Casino Control Act establishes a comprehensive and elaborate regulatory framework for the casino industry, reflecting a concern that casinos be restrained in order to protect the public. See N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to 190; see also Knight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 380, 431 A.2d 833, 836-37 (1981). The Act typically regulates the gambling operators rather than penalizing the individual gamblers. For instance, casinos, rather than an underage gambler, are held liable when the latter enters a casino. See N.J.S.A. 5:12-119; see also Department of Law & Public Safety v. Boardwalk Regency, 227 N.J.Super. 549, 548 A.2d 206 (App.Div.1988) (<HOLDING>). When it passed the Act, the New Jersey

    ### Response:
    holding casino responsible for allowing two underage persons to gamble
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    foreclosure.” Tex.R. Crv. P. 735.3. Indeed, a Rule 736 order allowing a foreclosure to proceed “is without prejudice and has no res judicata, collateral estoppel, estoppel by judgment, or other effect in any other judicial, proceeding.” Tex.R. Civ, P. 736.9. Thus, a lender may abandon acceleration even after receiving a non-judicial foreclosure order under Rule 736. See Biedryck v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 01-14-00017-CV, 2015 WL 2228447, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 12, 2015, no pet.) (describing Rule 736 as “merely providing] a procedural device to obtain authorization to proceed with the remedy of foreclosure”); see also Snowden v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. H-14-2963, 2015 WL 5123436, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 31, 2015) (citing Biedryck, 2015 WL 2228447, at *5) (<HOLDING>). Under the rule established in Boren, the Bank

    ### Response:
    holding that a lender may abandon acceleration even after obtaining a rule 736 order allowing foreclosure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the grand or petit jury, failure of the magistrate to follow the Criminal Rules, misjoinder of offenses or defendants, duplicity, multiplicity, and defects in an indictment or information that go to matters of form rather than substance” (footnotes omitted) as “waived if not promptly raised”). The government, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), argues that Harrod intentionally relinquished and abandoned a known right in light of the fact that he used a pretrial motion with respect to the initial 18 U.S.C. § 472 indictment. Harrod’s awareness of his right to file a similar motion with respect to the superseding § 474 indictment does not, however, tran Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829

    ### Response:
    holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under  474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and has deleted the last sentence that addresses meeting the requirements of rules 402 and 403. However, under the amended version, evidence must still conform with rules 402 and 403 to be admissible. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b) advisory committee’s note. 5 . See note 4. 6 . The Utah Supreme Court has recently applied the analysis to determine if prior bad acts evidence is admissible for the proper non-character purposes of identity and knowledge under rule 404(b). See State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194. 7 . Because J.B.’s testimony is admissible to show intent, I find it unnecessary to address the State's argument concerning the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence to corroborate the victim’s testimony. See State v. Marks, 120 Idaho 727, 819 P.2d 581, 585 (App.1991) (<HOLDING>). However, in his concurring opinion, Judge

    ### Response:
    holding where the prosecution had to prove the defendant had the intent to gratify his sexual desires that the intent exception to rule 404b is dispositive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it to the Camden Clerk’s Office for filing, in violation of the Rules of Court and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Entry 4 at 2-3). 17 .The attachment to Plaintiff's complaint lists several letters sent via Certified Mail that he claims are evidence of mail tampering because he did not receive a response. (Docket Entry 4 at 9). The United States Post Office’s tracking service, available at https:/! tools.usps.com/go/TrackConfirmActionJinput, indicates all of the letters were delivered. 18 . The Court takes notice of the fact that it previously appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff in Owens v. Volunteers of America Dela. Valley Promise, No. 08-4612 (JBS-AMD), Mem. Op. and Order of 7/30/2012; Docket Entries 74 and 75, pursuant to Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301 (3d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds counsel is appropriate in

    ### Response:
    holding district court had sua sponte responsibility to duty to inquire into the competency of an unrepresented party in certain circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they were voluntary and spontaneous. The Government is wrong as a matter of law. See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1326 (11th Cir.2010) (noting voluntariness is a question of law). An Edwards violation carries a “presumption of involuntariness,” Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1220, that is not instantaneously ameliorated when police end an interrogation. Un der this Court’s precedent, a defendant’s statement made several hours after she requests counsel may be uncoerced and voluntary, see United States v. Valdez, 880 F.2d 1280, 1238-34 (11th Cir.1989), but a statement made “no more than a few minutes” after an Edwards violation does not meet the legal standard for voluntariness, see Gomez, 927 F.2d at 1536, 1538-39; cf. Henderson v. Singletary, 968 F.2d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This case is remarkably similar to our

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of an edwards violation the amount of time between interrogation and a defendants statement is only one measure of  voluntariness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an unserved resident defendant, who otherwise does not destroy diversity, precludes removal under § 1441(b). See Maple Leaf Bakery, 1999 WL 1101326, at *2. Plaintiffs contend further that removal is defective in any event since Beard, a resident defendant, joined in the notice of removal. However, in the court’s opinion, while certainly odd and unnecessary, it appears that Beard’s joinder in the removal petition does not render the removal defective. Neither, in the court’s opinion, may his joinder in the removal petition constitute a “voluntary appearance” that could be properly be equated with service of process, particularíy since a necessary premise of the removal notice was the lack of service of process on Beard. Cf. Windac Corp. v. Clarke, 530 F.Supp. 812, 813 (D.Neb.1982) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ suggestion to the

    ### Response:
    holding that although the resident defendant had not been formally served prior to removal the resident defendant had made a voluntary appearance in state court and therefore jurisdiction was not proper under  1441b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    absolutely should know how the BOP treats its inmates especially in situations where it uses live ammunition to kill them.” See Pl.’s Resp. at 3-4, EOF No. 314. Pinson does not identify any specific redactions that are problematic or provide any arguments that would help the Court weigh the' public and private interests. Pin-son does not explain why identifying particular staff members would serve the public interest or reveal what the government is up to in a way that understanding the actions of high-ranking BOP officials alone does not. Here, because Pinson has not presented any compelling evidence of illegal activity by the BOP, the names of the third-party inmates and individuals are categorically exempt from disclosure. See Pinson, 202 F.Supp.3d at 102, 2016 WL 4074130, at *7 (<HOLDING>); SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the names of thirdparty inmates within memoranda were categorically exempt from disclosure absent compelling evidence of illegal activity by the bop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be inappropriate in this case because all Defendants lack standing to enforce the arbitration agreement, given that none of the Defendants were parties to the contract. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 10.) In certain circumstances, however, a nonparty to an arbitration agreement can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision within a contract executed by other parties so long as it is the “appropriate case,” or certain exceptions apply. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 416-17 (4th Cir.2000) (“Well-established common law principles dictate that in an appropriate case a non-signatory can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision within a contract executed by other parties.”); Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 4 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc.,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that generally a nonparty to an arbitration agreement does not have standing to invoke the agreement but considering whether the nonparty could force arbitration because it was a third party beneficiary of the contract a successor in interest to the contracting party or an agent of the contracting party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Fourth Amendment; the probation officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or the possession of contraband. The District Court decided the motion on the facts contained in the parties’ stipulation, Doc. 31-2, and denied it. Williams then pled guilty to one count of the indictment, and the court sentenced him to prison for eighteen months and a two-year term of supervised release. Williams appeals his conviction, arguing that because he was on probation for a previous conviction at the time, the search should have been based on a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing or a reasonable suspicion that he had contraband. He contends that there is a lesser government interest in monitoring probationers than parolees, so there should be a differe 11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-riam) (<HOLDING>). In Knights, the Court held that a

    ### Response:
    holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    667. 16 .' The petitioners also attempt to evade the precepts of Collins by emphasizing their status as civil service employees, rather than at-will employees. See W. Va. Dep't of Env'l Prot. v. Falquero, 228 W.Va. 773, 724 S.E.2d 744 (2012). Although the petitioners are correct in .their assertion that firefighters are civil service employees, they exaggerate the implications of that distinction. While the firefighters' status as civil servants entitles them to certain protections, such as the right to continued employment absent a showing a good cause for termination, their status as civil service employees does not entitle them to benefits of a perceived contractual obligation where no such obligation exists. See, e.g., Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 668 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also W. Central Mo. Reg'l Lodge No. 50 v.

    ### Response:
    holding that provisions protecting classified service employees from administrative demotion or discipline did not preclude reclassification of employees and warning against misinterpretation of scope of protections afforded to employees where protections apply only to administrative actions such as the promotion or discipline of employees they do not limit or preclude the city councils legislative authority to make necessary policy and budget decisions they do not somehow override the express authority for the city councils actions  and thus they do not create a constitutionallyprotected property interest that prohibits the city council from passing the ordinance at issue in this case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    IJs have the freedom to require supporting evidence, yet do not inappropriately demand it, we require that, before denying a claim for lack of corroboration, an IJ must “(1) make an explicit credibility finding; (2) explain why it is reasonable to have expected additional corroboration; and (3) explain why the petitioner’s reason for not producing that corroboration is inadequate.” Ikama-Obambi v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir.2006); accord Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir.2004). In this case the IJ did not explicitly make an adverse credibility finding, as the BIA acknowledged. Had the IJ then denied Lopez’s asylum claim due to the lack of corroboration alone, we would have cause to vacate and remand. See Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). But the IJ and BIA went on to evaluate the

    ### Response:
    holding that ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he described applicants testimony as general and meager making his demand for corroborating evidence improper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by forwarding Romano’s letter to law enforcement officials. Romano and Rida claim that their reasonable expectations of privacy were violated in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. They do not dispute the fact that Gardner employees had the right to open and read the letter, but simply contend that the act of forwarding a copy of the letter to law enforcement officials violated their reasonable expectations of privacy. Because the initial reading of the letter by Gardner employees was a valid “entry” in constitutional terms, the “plain view” doctrine applies to justify the copying and forwarding of the letter to law enforcement officials. United States v. Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir.1975). Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Dunn, 478 So.2d 659, 663

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 177 F.3d 1212, 1224 (11th Cir.1999). A). United States v. James Daniel Good In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, the Supreme Court declared for the first time that in the context of civil forfeiture, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner of real property notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before it seizes property, absent a showing of exigent circumstances. See 510 U.S. at 59, 114 S.Ct. 492. We note that Good applies retroactively to this case because the government did not dismiss its civil forfeiture action against defendant Properties until after Good was decided. See Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96-99, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail,

    ### Response:
    holding that new rules of law apply to pending civil cases on direct appeal regardless of whether events predate announcement of rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and abetting) for a tort that they otherwise could not commit against plaintiff. Under Oregon law, a civil conspiracy is not an independent tort. Rather, it is a theory of mutual agency under which the acts of each of the conspirators are imputed to the other members for purposes of tort liability. The joint liability that arises from the acts of others is predicated on an agreement or meeting of the minds to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or a purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means, that results in an injury to another. Bonds v. Landers, 279 Or 169, 174-75, 566 P2d 513 (1977). Thus, in the absence of a statutory violation, a conspiracy is not tortious unless the underlying act itself is tortious. See Bliss v. Southern Pacific Co. et al, 212 Or 634, 642, 321 P2d 324 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Thus, any discussion about conspiracy must

    ### Response:
    holding that an alleged conspiracy to bring about a termination of a lease was not tortious when an alleged coconspirator could terminate the lease as a matter of contract right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), that was in his original § 2255 motion; (2) the criminal judgment was void because it violated the Due Process Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause and thus resulted in an illegal sentence; and (3) if the district court could not hear his claims, then the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s. (AEDPA) limitations on second or successive § 2255 motions were unconstitutional. The district court held that the first two claims actually were substantive attacks on the criminal judgment, and therefore they were unauthorized second or successive § 2255 claims. It dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (limiting second or successive motions); In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the district court held that the

    ### Response:
    holding that district court has no jurisdiction to decide unauthorized second or successive  2255 claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    gun at a building that happens to be occupied without actually shooting, attempting to shoot, or threatening to shoot another person.” Id. By contrast, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1.2(a)(2) only mentions vehicles. Buildings are confined to subsection (a)(1). Vehicles as a class are generally quite smaller than buildings. This difference in size in proportion to the average size of a person causes us to draw a conclusion opposite Alfaro: shooting in the direction of an occupied vehicle has as a necessary element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against a person because one cannot commit that act without shooting, attempting to shoot, or threatening to shoot at that person in the vehicle. See generally United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 492, 495 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As the government properly conceded at oral

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute requiring the discharge of a firearm in the direction of a person is unlike alfaro
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violation’ ” that caused the public no actual harm. 551 F.3d 875, 889 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting People v. Carmony, 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 365, 372 (2005)). Windham’s case is far more akin to Crosby than to Gonzalez. Windham left California for a year and a half, in deliberate violation of his parole and without notifying law enforcement. When he returned to California, he lived out of his car and altered his appearance in order to avoid contact with the police. Windham, in other words, did not merely commit “passive” violations of the registration laws; rather, he actively and intentionally evaded police surveillance and, in so doing, posed a threat to the public. See Crosby, 678 F.3d at 794; In re Coley, 55 Cal.4th 524, 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 382, 283 P.3d 1252, 1272 (2012) (<HOLDING>). His offenses of conviction were therefore

    ### Response:
    holding that a failure to update sexoffender registration should not be considered a minor or technical offense when committed as part of a more general course of conduct that demonstrates a deliberate general unwillingness to comply with the sex offender registration requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    BJR contend that, even if the emails were in “electronic storage,” the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as to them should be affirmed because they did not engage in a violation of section 2701. We agree. In its order granting summary judgment to Respondents, the circuit court held that “regardless of this Court’s findings as to whether any violation of 18 USC § 2701 occurred, Plaintiff cannot obtain any relief or recovery against Defendant Jennings or Defendant Cooke, as Defendant Jennings and Defendant Cooke are not persons who potentially engaged in such alleged ■violation.” Because Husband has not specifically challenged that ruling, it is the law of the case and requires affirmance. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we conclude that the circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that an unappealed ruling is the law of the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Circuit has not directly spoken on this issue, at least one Circuit has upheld the imposition of an identical provision. United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.1988). At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit’s decision indicates that reasonable minds could differ as to the legality of the disputed condition, and any error was therefore not “plain.” We therefore affirm the district court’s imposition of the disputed term. K. Amount of Loss Calculation 1. Standard of Review We review the district court’s calculation for clear error, United States v. Guthrie, 144 F.3d 1006, 1011(6th Cir.1998). Finding no clear error, we affirm the district court’s amount of loss determination. 2. The Amount of Loss Calculation Was Not Clearly Erroneous. The district court’s determin th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court’s inclusion

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We recognize that there is a policy favoring consistent judicial interpretation and application of the uniform laws. See Minn. Stat. § 645.22; UCC § 1-103(a)(3). In Coeur d’Alene Mining, the Idaho Supreme Court examined UFA § 9 and the earlier version of UCC § 3-304(2), found that that earlier version of the UCC was consistent with the UFA, and concluded that the result would be the samé under both statutes. 118 Idaho at 818-19, 800 P.2d at 1032-33. However, Coeur d’Alene Mining is based on the original draft of Article 3 of the UCC. Id. As previously noted, the original section 3-304 has been expanded substantially in the current section 3-307 and it is not clear the Idaho court would have reached the same conclusion under the current law. Furth N.W.2d 765, 770-71 (Minn.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). But see Minn.Stat. § 604.10 (2004) (providing

    ### Response:
    holding that article 4a of the ucc preempts common law claims where they are inconsistent or duplicative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he was serving a consecutive sentence composed of 18 months initial confinement and 18 months extended supervision for the Waukesha case, and 24 months initial confinement and 36 months extended supervision for the July 2011 Milwaukee case. He contended that denying PAT to inmates who had committed offenses prior to PAT's August 3, 2011 repeal was an ex post facto violation pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), and Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987). Consequently, he alleged, he was eligible to earn PAT and had earned sufficient PAT on these two sentences so to entitle him to release, thus his continuing detention was illegal. See State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 251, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965) (<HOLDING>). As will be demonstrated next, even though

    ### Response:
    holding that goodchilds claims of constitutional error that would invalidate his murder conviction could be reviewed by habeas corpus even though he could not be discharged from custody due to a concurrent burglary sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in some cases, interest. Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 324. Kulch rejected the argument that a plaintiff may not premise a Greeley claim on the violation of a statute that itself provides civil remedies, holding that: [T]he civil remedies set forth in R.C. 4113.52 are not adequate to fully compensate an aggrieved employee who is discharged, disciplined, or otherwise retaliated against in violation of the statute. The existence of other remedies, therefore, does not render the public policy exception moot. Id. After Kulch, Ohio appellate and federal district courts have routinely recognized Greeley claims premised on violations of § 4123.90. Perrine v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 835, 848 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (citing Boyd, 727 N.E.2d at 144); Yetts v. ITW-NIFCO, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 776, 784 (<HOLDING>); Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maint.,

    ### Response:
    holding on the basis of kulch and livingston v hillside rehab hosp 79 ohio st3d 249 680 ne2d 1220 1997 which recognized a common law tort claim for age discrimination notwithstanding the age discrimination remedies provided by ohio statutes that a greeley claim based on  412390 could progress since that section did not provide for recovery of full compensatory or punitive damages nor authorize trial by jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1975). Furthermore, LaWall cannot be sued in her capacity as the chief county attorney for actions taken by her staff. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Dunlap failed to state a claim against public defender Harriette Levitt because she was not acting under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). The district court properly determined that the claim against Andrew Novak was barred because it implied the invalidity of Dunlap’s conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Dunlap’s remaining claims are without merit and were properly dismissed. See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,

    ### Response:
    holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    erred in its ruling when it denied Smith’s request to have his trial counsel removed. ■ Smith complained that trial counsel had failed to notify him of his state statutory right pursuant to C.P.L. § 290.10 to testify before the grand jury. New York courts have consistently held that counsel’s failure to ensure that the defendant testifies before the grand jury does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Wiggins, 89 N.Y.2d 872, 675 N.E.2d 845, 653 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y.1996) (“Defense counsel’s failure to timely facilitate defendant’s intention to testify before the Grand Jury does not, per se, amount to a denial of effective assistance of counsel under the circumstance of this case[.]”); People v. Dennis, 295 A.D.2d 755, 744 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App.Div.3d Dept.2002) (<HOLDING>) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

    ### Response:
    holding that defense counsels failure to notify the people that defendant wished to testify before the grand jury does not by itself amount to ineffective assistance of counsel and finding that det fendants conclusory allegation that this failure may have impacted his ability to present a viable defense to be insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Massachi, 239 F.3d at 673-74. The statutes provide any “person aggrieved” by a violation of Section 553 or 605 with a private right of action. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(1), 605(c)(3)(A). Although Section 553 does not contain a definition of “person aggrieved,” Section 605(d) defines this term as “any person with proprietary rights in the intercepted communication by wire or radio, including wholesale or retail distributors of satellite cable programming .... ” 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6). Several courts have held that the unauthorized interception and broadcast of either satellite or cable transmissions violates both 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. See, e.g., International Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 75 F.3d 123, 131-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929, 117 S.Ct. 298, 136 L.Ed.2d 217 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Entertainment by J&J, Inc. v. Nina’s Rest. &

    ### Response:
    holding that claims of unauthorized broadcasts of cable television transmissions may be brought under both 47 usc  553 and 605
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case, Haverda wrote a letter to the editor, during a Sheriffs Election campaign, expressing support for the incumbent Sheriff Ratliff and criticizing his political opponent. Haverda received no compensation to pen the letter to the editor, and the letter was public and not an internal publication. Additionally, it was not part of Haverda’s job duties to speak to the media or write letters to the editor. Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a teachers first amendment rights were violated when the board of education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stated earlier in this opinion, Defendant’s detention was brief during the initial contact, and nothing about the context, content, scope, or purpose of the question about drinking has been attacked. Defendant attacks the question because it was not in the script. We are unpersuaded. The breach of procedure in this case was too insubstantial to constitute constitutional harm. At the point the question was asked, the deviation did not change the detention from one of reasonable detention to one of unreasonable detention or require an individualized suspicion of intoxication. The constitutional status of the roadblock remained intact during the brief, minimally intrusive initial contact, and the reasonableness of the initial contact and detention was not diminished by the questio r.1997) (<HOLDING>). What is required is keeping the exercise of

    ### Response:
    holding that no authority exists demanding that an officer be held either to a script or denied reasonable discretion which is necessary to conduct a series of traffic stops occurring in a free and unstructured world
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as discussed above, Tapia’s allegations as to the content of the tape, if proven, would not entitle him to relief, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Turner, 63 F.3d at 815. We further find that the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on the contents of the tape was not an abuse of discretion. See Villafuerte, 111 F.3d at 633. AFFIRMED. 2 . This circuit has never ruled on Tapia’s contention that Chapman review should be used on habeas review when no state court has tested error with Chapman review, see Hanna, 87 F.3d at 1038 n. 2 (refusing to reach the issue), but other circuits are split, with the Eighth Circuit and arguably the Second Circuit taking the minority position argued by Tapia. See Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Lyons v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 499 (2d Cir.1996)

    ### Response:
    holding that chapman harmless error review will be conducted when error is tested for harmlessness for the first time on habeas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal. 528 U.S. at 479-80, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 10 . Interestingly, South Carolina does not contend that we are barred from considering Frazer’s claim in light of Flores-Ortega. Indeed, South Carolina asserts that Carey is consistent with Flores-Ortega. For the reasons stated, we disagree. Carey presumes that counsel need not inform or consult with his defendant regarding the right to appeal. Flores-Ortega, however, states the opposite: that ""in the vast majority of cases, counsel [will] ha[ve] a duty to consult with a defendant about an appeal."" 528 U.S. at 481, 120 S.Ct. 1029. 11 . See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) (<HOLDING>). 12 . The fact that there was little

    ### Response:
    holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tipster’s observation of the act of drinking and the possibility of further consumption contained sufficient signs of intoxication to justify a traffic stop. Id. at 158; see also Lamb v. State, 269 Ga.App. 335, 604 S.E.2d 207, 208 (2004) (upholding a traffic stop based on a tip from a bartender who told authorities by phone “that a man who was too intoxicated to drive was leaving the restaurant, and that he would not let her call him a cab”); State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 962 A.2d 498, 502 (2008) (upholding a stop based on a tip containing a teenager’s bare assertion defendant was “drunk” and observing that “ ‘drunk’ has a commonly understood meaning and the signs of drunkenness are matters of common knowledge and experience”); State v. Lamb, 168 Vt. 194, 720 A.2d 1101, 1102-06 (1998) (<HOLDING>). This is not a case like Florida v. J.L., 529

    ### Response:
    holding that a traffic stop was more than justified where a 911 caller reported that the defendant was very upset and intoxicated and was leaving a residence because of the impossibility that such information could have been supplied by anyone but a knowledgeable insider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc. (In re Holman), 2010 WL 1880424, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2010); Canty v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Canty), 2010 WL 1880710, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2010). Similarly, Judge Sawyer also found a cause of action under § 105 for fraud on the court or contempt was actionable. “Whether the Plaintiffs action is cast as one under § 105, the Court’s inherent power, or an independent action for fraud on the court, a bankruptcy court may act to remedy the wrong complained of here.” Woodruff v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (In re Woodruff), 2010 WL 386209, at *9. As stated in Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Rodriguez), 396 B.R. 436, 457 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2008): While it is true that the considerable discretion conferred on courts sitting in bankruptcy by § 105 is not th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that no private cause of action exists under  105 for  524 violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has been met and that FGS’s complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. DISCUSSION A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction The main contention upon which the government bases its motion to dismiss is that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The government motion is made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). FGS has invoked three separate bases upon which this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is founded: the Federal Tort Claims Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450m-1, and-Pub.L. No. 101-512, § '314. A motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction's an argument that the Court lacks the power to hear the class of cases to which the plaintiffs claim belongs. See Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 945 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, if the claims of FGS fall within a

    ### Response:
    holding that subject matter jurisdiction relates to whether a plaintiffs claim falls within a class of claims which a court is empowered to hear
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    555 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983). Arthur Young relies on a sophism to obscure the law, which is that when the circumstances of a case so dictate, privity is not required for the court to award rescissory damages in a Rule 10b-5 case. As the Eleventh Circuit has concluded: “Though we recognize the harshness of this result given that the defendants were not the actual sellers of the stock and therefore must ‘rescind’ by paying an amount they in fact never received, the substantial role played by the defendants provides adequate justification for the award.” Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th Cir.1989) (quotation omitted). See also Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>) We conclude that the district court properly

    ### Response:
    holding in a rule 10b5 action that as between the innocent purchaser and the wrongdoer who though not a privy to the fraudulent contract nonetheless induced the victim to make the purchase equity requires the wrongdoer to restore the victim to the status quo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd result and ... is clearly inconsistent with the pur poses and policies of the act[.]” (citation omitted)). However, determining that a qualifying patient can freely travel and possess marijuana in “[ojther placets] open to the public” is contrary to the express statutory mandate, and is not necessary to avoid the frustration of the legislature’s purpose. See id. (“[T]his court may not reject the prohibition against the transportation of marijuana in “[o]ther placets] open to the public[,]” but would appear to uphold the prohibition against the “medical use” of marijuana in other locations prohibited by HRS § 329-122(e)(2), such as school buses, youth centers, and moving vehicles. Majority Opinion at 619 (<HOLDING>). This interpretation of the statute yields

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant proves his or her affirmative defense of medical use if inter alia the marijuana was found in an other place open to the public where transportation for medical use might legitimately occur emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    401; Coll, supra, 29 N.J. at 174-75, 148 A.2d 481. The trial court should have allowed Dr. Glover to testify before the jury regarding her estimate of the costs that would occur if Mrs. Campo were to suffer a recurrence of cancer. -III- The error, however, was harmless. Under Rule 2:10-2, a reviewing court should reverse only if a trial error is clearly capable of producing an unjust result. The trial court permitted Dr. Glover to testify regarding Mrs. Campo’s increased risk of harm. Dr. Glover testified that because of Dr. Tama’s alleged failure to diagnose Mrs. Campo’s cancer in 1985, Mrs. Campo was more likely than not to suffer a recurrence. Not allowed was Dr. Glover’s offer to testify regarding the monetary damages that Mrs. Campo would incur if she shoul d 66 (App.Div.1955) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, however, squarely instructed

    ### Response:
    holding that it is prejudicial to indicate to the jury that the plaintiff has or may have another remedy  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    imply that the claims’ “ ‘controls’ are effective in the face of the attacks identified in the Big Book.” Finally, as an intuitive and legal matter, the Court is wary of reading into claims a limitation that is not expressly there. As InterTrust correctly notes, “[s]pecifica-tions teach. Claims claim.” SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n. 14 (Fed.Cir.1985). With its global construction argument, Microsoft is not asking for construction of a term; it is asking for wholesale importation of a term that is present in only one of the claims at issue. In the absence of substantial justification for Microsoft’s position, the Court is disinclined to take such a drastic step. See Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). For all of these reasons, the Court CONSTRUES

    ### Response:
    holding improper reading into claims a limitation appearing only in the specification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the joint account by granting a co-owner of the account an opportunity to present clear and convincing evidence of a different intent. See Reed, 715 N.E.2d at 900. Because of this rebuttable presumption, we find that Charnas' interest in the joint account amounts to more than a mere speculation of a possible future benefit and, instead, becomes a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. Nevertheless, even though we conclude that Charnas possesses a protected property interest, we find that she failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the lack of a hearing to establish evidence of Loizos' different intent. See U.S. Outdoor Adver. Co., Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of Transp., 714 N.E.2d 1244, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>), trams. denied; see also, Turner v. Bd. of

    ### Response:
    holding that appellants fourteenth amendment due process claim did not require reversal where they failed to show that they were prejudiced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“UTPA”) and the common law. Reviewing de novo, Alexander Mfg., Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan & Trust v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir.2009), we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant failed to attempt a good-faith settlement, as required by the UTPA and common law. Plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether liability was reasonably clear. See Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-201(6) (providing that an insurer has a duty “to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear”); Palmer ex rel. Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 261 Mont. 91, 861 P.2d 895, 903 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Lead counsel advised Defendant that: (1)

    ### Response:
    holding that under montana common law an insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith in denying a claim if the insurer had a reasonable basis for contesting the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would be a less expensive alternative. The cost of that choice is exposure to lawsuits such as Woods's, which have a legal and factual basis independent of any ERISA plan. Such suits are not preempted merely because they seek damages that might also be available in the form of plan benefits. 4 . See Holloway v. Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc., 107 Fed.Appx. 398, 400-01 (5th Cir.2004). 5 . Texas Aggregates’ only argument against the application of Hook is that it is no longer good law or should be overturned. Hook remains good law, however, and this panel lacks the authority to overturn a prior panel decision absent an intervening decision to the contrary by the Supreme Court or this court enbanc. See Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 491 (5th Cir.1997). 6 . Arana, 338 F.3d at 439-40 (<HOLDING>). 7 . See Rokohl v. Texaco, Inc., 77 F.3d 126,

    ### Response:
    holding that  502a operated to preempt state law claims despite the fact that the law in question may have been exempt from  514a preemption as a law regulating insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to ""Community Alternatives” in this opinion. 2 .This court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Ms. Monroe's claim was preempted. Byrd v. VOCA Corp. of Washington, D.C., 962 A.2d 927, 929-30, 934-35 (D.C.2008). 3 . Community Alternatives had argued in Byrd I that Ms. Quarles and Ms. Byrd could ""show neither the clear mandate of public policy nor a close fit between any such policy and the conduct involved in the alleged wrongful termination,” but this court determined that ""we need not, and do not resolve these questions.” Id. at 934. 4 . Although the tort originally applied to at-will employees, this court held in Byrd I that it also applied to contract employees like Ms. Quarles and Ms. Byrd. 962 A.2d at 931-34; see also infra note 6. 5 . See, e.g., Fingerhut, 738 A.2d at 803-07 (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Guest Servs., Inc., 718 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff director of security for a hospital had sufficiently pled requisite public policy and a close fit where he asserted that a hospital fired him for reporting to law enforcement that a hospital administrator bribed a public official
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and that male co-workers interfered with various aspects of her work. Although Boeing insists that the basis for such treatment was unrelated to her gender and instead was because her co-workers disliked her, “a counterweight is not enough to eliminate the need for a fact-finder to weigh the facts on both sides.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir.2008). In our view, the EEOC similarly raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Boeing adequately responded to Miles’ complaints of harassment. While Boeing terminated one offending male employee and disciplined another, a reasonable jury could find that these two employees were part of a much larger problem with respect to Miles’ treatment. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1118-19 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). There was evidence in the record that the

    ### Response:
    holding that district court improperly considered the sufficiency of employers remedial measures on eventbyevent basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and not per capita.” Leoma and Ruth Ann direct the court to the maxim that states, “In construing either a trust or a will[,] the challenge is to find the settlor’s or testator’s intent and, provided that the intention is not against public policy, to give it effect.” Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Beach, 118 Ill. 2d 1, 3, 513 N.E.2d 833, 834 (1987). To discern the testator’s intent, courts may analyze both “the words used in the instrument and the circumstances under which they were drafted.” Harris, 118 Ill. 2d at 3-4, 513 N.E.2d at 834. The statutory presumption contained in section 2 — 4(f), however, represented a dramatic shift in public policy to construe written instruments in favor of adoptees. See Wielert v. Larson, 84 Ill. App. 3d 151, 153, 404 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The court in Wielert did find that the terms

    ### Response:
    holding that  issue of the body  in a 1959 will was insufficient to evince clear intent to exclude adoptees from inheriting under the will
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court has conclusively established, as long as the detaining officer has an objectively justified basis to detain an individual, the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant. See Ohio v. Robinette,-U.S.-•, -, 117 S.Ct. 417, 420-21, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); Whren v. United States, - U.S. -,-, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). 8 . Notably, in construing the significance of the position of the patrol car relative to a pedestrian-defendant, the United States Supreme Court has held that when an officer is in a patrol car pursuing a defendant who is on foot, that does not necessarily convey a message to the defendant that he is not free to leave or to disregard the police presence. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1980, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Deputy Rosenbaum’s testimony indicates

    ### Response:
    holding that no seizure had occurred because the record did not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers or that they commanded the defendant to halt or displayed any weapons or that they operated the car in an aggressive manner to block the defendants course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    litigated issue was whether a drafting mistake had occurred in a trust document); Chilson v. Metro. Transit Auth., 796 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.1986) (same, where the previously litigated issue was whether an employee had been unlawfully discharged). What matters is whether the movant presents new evidence to support the motion, in addition to satisfying the other criteria of Rule 60(b)(2). See Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1309. By applying the wrong legal standard to Wortley’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion, the bankruptcy court abused its discretion. See Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co., 411 F.3d at 1330. Even if the bankruptcy court’s statements can be construed as applying the standards of Rule 60(b)(2), it made clear errors of judgment and abused its discretion in applying those standards. See id. (<HOLDING>). For example, the bankruptcy court’s statement

    ### Response:
    holding that a court abuses its discretion by making clear errors of judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The trial court overruled the objection, and appellant now contends that the trial court erred in doing so. Assuming that appellant properly preserved the issue for appeal by not objecting until the third question was asked, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling. Because appellant’s defense was that Payton Grant killed the victim after having sex with appellant and later planted the bloody shirt in appellant’s home and the victim’s driver’s license in his garbage, it was not improper for the prosecutor to question Investigator Morgan regarding the failure of appellant, who agreed to and did speak with the police, to mention that the red shirt was not his and that someone else put it in his home with the blood on it. See Seabolt v. Norris, 298 Ga. 583, 587 (783 SE2d 913) (2016) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 292 Ga. 785, 788 (741 SE2d

    ### Response:
    holding that it did not violate the defendants right to remain silent when the prosecutor questioned her about inconsistencies between her pretrial statements to authorities and her defense at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts óf state may hinder’ the conduct of foreign affairs.” Id. at 404, 110 S.Ct. at 704 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423, 84 S.Ct. at 938). The policies underlying the doctrine include “international comity, respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations on their own territory, and the avoidance of embarrassment to the Executive Branch in its conduct of foreign relations.” Id. at 408, 110 S.Ct. at 706; see id. at 409, 110 S.Ct. at 706-07. The gravamen of Count I is a claim that Kazakhstan breached the Management Agreement by “failing to issue an export license” to World Wide. Am. Compl. ¶ 93. Count XI seeks a declaratory judgment for breach of that agreemen 6 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Because the relief sought here would require

    ### Response:
    holding that licensing the exploitation of natural resources is a sovereign activity under the fsia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brought with respect to prison conditions under ... Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any ... correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires dismissal of civil actions regarding prison conditions if brought prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Oladukun v. Winn, No. 04-40198-RWZ, 2005 WL 1972560, at *1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17046, at *4 (D.Mass. Aug. 16, 2005) (Zobel, J.) (unpublished opinion). The Reform Act, however, does not apply to habeas proceedings. Kane, 319 F.Supp.2d at 213 n. 84. Even if the habe-as claim is the type of federal prisoner claim that requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, cf. Oladukun, 2005 WL 1972560, at *1-2, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17046, at *4-5 (<HOLDING>), because that exhaustion is not statutorily

    ### Response:
    holding that judicial review of any jail time credit determination by the bureau occurs after administrative remedies are exhausted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    quite common vision of the university as more than the sum of classes in its course catalog — as a sort of sanctuary where young adults grow in a myriad of ways. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 279 n. 2, 102 S.Ct. 269, 279 n. 2, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (university “atmosphere” includes extracurricular activities, “critical aspect[s] of campus life”). As was said of the use of a similar activity fee at the University of Nebraska, “[w]ithin wide limitations a state is free to adopt such educational philosophy as it chooses. The Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska obviously has embraced an educational philosophy that the education of students extends beyond that which takes place in the classroom.” Veed v. Schwartzkopf 353 F.Supp. 149, 152 (D.Neb.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir.1973), cert.

    ### Response:
    holding constitutional the granting of student activity funds to the campus newspaper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “at the point at which a parent ceases to act in good faith and with parental affection and acts immoderately, cruelly, or mercilessly with a malicious desire to inflict pain”). The intent underlying parental discipline and battery are not the same. “A parent who disciplines a child in a physical manner intends to corre 727 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo. 1986), overruled by People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619, 624 (Colo. 2004); Ceaser, 964 N.E.2d at 917 (“By arguing that she exercised her parental privilege in disciplining M.R., Ceaser necessarily represents that her intent was to correct M.R.’s behavior through corporal punishment, rather than to simply batter her daughter,” making admissible the defendant’s prior conviction for battering her child); State v. Morosin, 262 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Neb. 1978) (<HOLDING>). The parental privilege defense comes down to

    ### Response:
    recognizing as peculiarly applicable to child abuse cases the principle that  wjhere an act is equivocal in its nature and may be criminal or honest according to the intent with which it is done then other acts of the defendant and his conduct on other occasions may be shown in order to disclose the mastering purpose of the alleged criminal act  quoting 1 whartons criminal evidence  350 at 520 11th ed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    analysis. For extrinsic evidence to be admissible under the second step of the Beechum analysis, its prejudicial effect must not substantially outweigh its probative value. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913. The prejudicial effect of extrinsic evidence substantially outweighs its probative value when the relevant exception is uncontested because the incremental probative value of the extrinsic offense is inconsequential when compared to its prejudicial effect. United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir.1980) (citing Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914). Accordingly, courts have generally held motive evidence is admissible only where the defendant contests the issue of motive or where motive is an element of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 585 F.3d 703, 708 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 317-18

    ### Response:
    holding extrinsic evidence of defendants motive to possess gun inadmissible where defendant did not contest the issue of motive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the argument is without merit, as collateral estoppel merely requires that the party against whom the doctrine is invoked be a party in the prior case. See id. at 978. Neither are any of the other factors that we use to determine if a full and fair opportunity was present applicable. See Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1167, 127 S.Ct. 1132, 166 L.Ed.2d 893 (2007) (explaining that whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate the issue fully, and whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties are relevant factors for the full and fair opportunity element). Therefore this element is established. See Frandsen, 46 F.3d at 979 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The ""absolute immunity” available to

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Plaintiff is not subject to merit system protection under Ala.Code § 45-4-120 or otherwise that he did not, therefore, have a property interest in his job. Nonetheless, no published decision of an Alabama state or federal court appears to have interpreted that statute or otherwise addressed the rights of a deputy sheriff from Bibb County as they relate to due process or continued employment more generally. Further, the Alabama Supreme Court has recently noted some potential uncertainty as it relates to whether deputy sheriffs are subject to civil service protections afforded county employees. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 64 v. Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County, 103 So.3d 17, 20 n. 3 (Ala.2012); cf. Etowah County Com’n v. Grant, 10 So.3d 1009, 1012-13 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). As a result, the legal basis of Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that deputy sheriffs were in the service of the county rather than in the service of the state for purposes of determining their entitlement to overtime compensation under alacode  36214 or  41 distinguishing whitten and mack supra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tex. Fam.Code. Ann. § 52.025 (emphasis added); see Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 653. A “juvenile processing office” is “little more that a temporary stop for completing necessary paperwork pursuant to the arrest.” Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654. Under the plain language of section 52.025(b), it may be used only for (1) the return of the child to a parent or guardian; (2) the completion of forms or records; (3) photographing and fingerprinting if the child; (4) the issuance of warnings; and (5) the receipt of a statement in compliance with section 51.095(a)(1), (2), (3), or (5) of the Family Code. Tex. Fam.Code. Ann. § 52.025(b). Moreover, under the plain language of section 52.025(a), while a “designated juvenile processing office” may be a room located in a police 0 S.W.3d at 907 (<HOLDING>); In re D.Z., 869 S.W.2d at 564 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that statement of child that meets admissibility requirements of section 51095 may be nonetheless inadmissible when provisions in sections of family code dictating the necessary procedures for taking the childs statement are violated specifically section 52025b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brown pelican, bald eagle, piping plover, whooping crane, loggerhead sea turtle, Kemp’s ridley, Alabama beach mouse, and Perdido Key beach mouse were not likely to be adversely affected by the Five-Year Plan. (AR, 1695.) Simply put, nothing in either the NMFS Opinion or the FWS Assessment at the outset of the Five-Year Plan suggested that BOEM’s administration of that Plan was likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened species or their critical habitat. So § 7(a)(2) did not require anything further of BOEM at the outset of the program. B. Reinitiation of Consultation. Of course, initial consultation may not insulate an agency from the duty to perform further consultation if circumstances change at a later date. See Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 F.3d 513, 525 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b) (“Reinitiation of

    ### Response:
    recognizing agencys continuing duty to reinitiate consultation if new information reveals effects of the action that may affect listed species in a manner to an extent not previously considered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The fact that the officer did not recognize the minivan as belonging to a local resident also fails to contribute to the reasonable suspicion calculus. Evidence introduced at the suppression hearing made it clear that the area in question is one that is used for many purposes by different kinds of people-local residents use the roads as a shortcut, while both residents and tourists alike camp, hike, bike, picnic, and visit the local forest and national monument. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that a Border Patrol agent would not recognize every passing car. Similarly, the fact that a van is registered to an address in a block notorious for smuggling is also of no significance and may not be given any weight. See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In arriving at this conclusion, we first

    ### Response:
    holding that coming from the wrong neighborhood does not give rise to reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interpretations of state criminal statutes. The fact that the convictions thus obtained must now be vacated is the result of extraordinary circumstances outside the State’s control. 124 Wn. App. at 342. We agree. ¶23 In Andress, the Supreme Court made the extraordinary decision to go behind a facially valid judgment and sentence in a collateral attack and then beyond the plain language of the statute to interpret the legislature’s intent 30 years ago when it enacted the second degree felony murder statute. Accordingly, we, like Division One, also hold that this nearly unprecedented procedure triggered the “ends of justice” exception to another procedural rule — the mandatory joinder rule set out in CrR 4.3.1. See Ramos, 124 Wn. App. at 337; see also Wright, 131 Wn. App. 474 (<HOLDING>). ¶24 Both the trial court and this court are

    ### Response:
    holding the states failure to request an intentional murder instruction at the initial trial had no effect on the states ability to proceed on that alternative and rejecting the defendants claims under the mandatory joinder rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    means of determining what discovery sanction is just,” but rather “a way for a district judge to think about what to do.” Valley Engineers, Inc. v. Electric Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.1998). 1. Extraordinary Circumstances “Dismissal under a court’s inherent powers is justified in extreme circumstances.” Id. In the Ninth Circuit, “extraordinary circumstances exist where there is a pattern of disregard for Court orders and deceptive litigation tactics that threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of a case.” See Advantacare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 WL 1837997 at *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug.17, 2004) (Fogel, J.) (citing Halaco, 843 F.2d at 381). See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 709 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that it is well settled that dismissal is warranted where  a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    443 So.2d 973, 976 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2400, 81 L.Ed.2d 356 (1984). In order to support a finding that a defendant committed a murder to avoid arrest, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s dominant or only motive for the murder of the victim, who is not a law enforcement officer, is the elimination of a witness. Menendez v. State, 368 So.2d 1278 (Fla.1979). “Proof of the requisite intent to avoid arrest and detection must be very strong” to support this aggravating circumstance when the victim is not a law enforcement officer. Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19, 22 (Fla.1978). The State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Robertson’s dominant mo a.1991), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1198, 117 L.Ed.2d 438 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court erred in finding the

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence the victim tried to keep defendant from fleeing the scene of a crime and defendant killed victim in order to escape supported the finding that murder was committed to avoid arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceeding commenced. Only one of those creditors— Dormin Shipping — has objected to the relief sought by the foreign representative. Dormin is free to argue to the Danish bankruptcy court that Dormin has a superior claim to the amount it successfully garnished before the Danish bankruptcy commenced. Finally, the Objecting Creditors also assert that even if the Court grants comity to the Danish proceeding, the Rule B attachments should remain in force because comity is not one of the listed grounds for vacating a Rule B attachment under the Second Circuit’s decision in Aqua Stoli, 460 F.3d at 436. But the application of comity very often has the effect of overriding domestic legal doctrines or rules. See, e.g., In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. 333, 337 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>); Triton Container Int’l Ltd. v. Cinave S.A.,

    ### Response:
    recognizing canadian order as an exercise of comity even though it overrode a defendants constitutional right to a civil jury trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    different line-up sessions,” of which one session was pertinent to Wright’s case. Id. at 218, 528 A.2d 498. The trial court reasoned that “to allow the jury to view the tape again and again would unduly emphasize that evidence.” Id. This Court perceived no error: [Wright] relies on the provision in Md. Rule 4-326(a) (which says, among other things) that “[U]nless the court for good cause shown orders otherwise, the jury may also take ... exhibits which have been admitted into evidence ...” into the jury room. As we see it, the “good cause” mentioned in that rule encompasses the reasons articulated by the trial court. We are not persuaded that the trial court was clearly wrong. Id. Adams, 183 Md.App. at 204-05, 960 A.2d at 1224. Judge Sharer also pointed out that [w]hat c 131 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The majority creates a rule that a trial

    ### Response:
    recognizing potential for prejudice arising from undue emphasis on a tape recording by repetitive playing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under which Quiznos is alleged to have directly or indirectly extracted exorbitant payments from its franchisees for the services, goods and materials essential to their businesses. They also claim that provisions intended to limit their means of redress are unconscionable. These include a prohibition on suing individual officers, agents or affiliates of Quiznos, a truncated (one-year) statute of limitations of any and all claims, a bar on punitive or exemplary damage claims, waiver of the right to a jury trial, prohibition of class actions and consolidation of claims or cases, and a forum selection and choice of law clause requiring cases to be brought in Colorado and decided under Colorado law. Citing cases such as Jones, plaintiffs argue that some or all of these provisions m ) (<HOLDING>); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 223 Ill.2d

    ### Response:
    holding arbitration clause added to contract for cellular telephone service unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162. ""An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law."" Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162. 112 Mitchell has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file a timely motion to suppress, because he has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the motion to suppress would have been granted had it been timely filed. Mitchell asserts that the affidavit supporting the warrant to search his house did not establish probable cause on its face. Probable cause exists when ""there is a 'fair probability that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant."" State v. (11th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 420

    ### Response:
    holding that an affidavit that gave directions to 1924 queen city avenue and included a description of the numberplate and building at that location provided sufficient probable cause to validate a search warrant despite also containing a single reference to 1942 queen city avenue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to travel to another pharmacy. . .may reduce the efficacy of those drugs”). Second, the court noted the rules’ delivery requirement, as related to pharmacies, applied to all objections to deliveries that did not fall into an exemption, regardless of the motivation behind those objections. Id. Finally, the court noted the delivery requirement also applied to all prescription products, not just contraceptives, making the requirement broadly ap plicable to a range of drugs, including those not subject to religious objections. See id. Akin to the law in Stormans, the Act provides no exemption for religious objections. But this lack of an exemption does not render the Act unconstitutional, because such exemptions are not constitutionally required. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the notice provision to which

    ### Response:
    holding states may make nondiscriminatory religious practice exemptions but that such exemptions are not constitutionally required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981)); see also Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 286, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (“[W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action.”). Although the Eighth Circuit has not addressed this issue, the Tenth Circuit did so in Qwest v. City of Santa Fe 380 F.3d 1258, 1265-67 (10th Cir.2004), affirming the district court that no action under § 1983 was available because nothing in the text or structure of § 253 indicated an intention to create a private right. Cf. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 1454, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005) (<HOLDING>). This Court concludes Level 3 has not met its

    ### Response:
    holding enforcement of the tcas substantive provisions through  1983 would distort the scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies created by the tcas remedial provisions after identifying the express private remedy in the tca  332c7 the court concluded that congress did not intend this remedy to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a  1983 action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also White, 369 S.W.3d at 915. Under section 11 of the FAA, a court may modif ation award, it must do so only “to effect the intent [of the award] and promote justice between the parties.” 9 U.S.C. § 11. A party seeking to modify an arbitration award bears the ultimate burden of proving the grounds for modification. White, 369 S.W.3d at 916. Here, the arbitrator expressly found in the award, “I do not find a reason to pierce the corporate veil and impose individual liability on Mr. Broemer for the three percentage cases.” The trial court’s modification imposing joint and several liability upon Broemer for the entire amount of the award conflicts with that finding, and HLRS did not demonstrate that any of the statutory grounds allowed the modification. See White, 369 S.W.3d at 916 (<HOLDING>); Kosty v. S. Shore Harbour Cmty. Ass’n, 226

    ### Response:
    holding no statutory grounds allowed trial court to modify arbitration award to dismiss claims against party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to punish her for exercising her free speech rights.’ ” (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 954 n. 4 (7th Cir.1989) (citing Bart, 677 F.2d at 622))). And it has been adopted or reaffirmed by a majority of our sister circuits. See, e.g., Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 937 (1st Cir.2008) (recognizing retaliatory harassment may be actionable under objective test); Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir.2003) (same); Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir.2002) (same); Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 584-85 (D.C.Cir.2002) (same); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 679-80 (6th Cir.1998) (same); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 325-26 (2d Cir.1996) (same). But see McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 573-74 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 513-14 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Of Undertaking One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to [perform] his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965); see Torres v. Dilley Youth Athletic Ass’n, No. 04-11-00439-CV, 2012 WL 3205856, at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Aug. 8, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); see also Poynor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that texas courts have adopted section 324a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dismissed. Carlson v. Metz, supra. Such was the case here, and so the Cobbs’ appeal of the order that sustained the demurrer is timely. In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, the petition is to be construed liberally. If as so construed the petition states a cause of action, a demurrer based on the failure to state a cause of action is to be overruled. Carlson v. Metz, supra; S.I. v. Cutler, 246 Neb. 739, 523 N.W.2d 242 (1994). In their appellate brief, the Cobbs state that their second cause of action asserts sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Neb. U.C.C. § 2-315 (Reissue 1992) provides and defines such an action, and it states: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to 320 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. National Sea Products, Ltd., 35

    ### Response:
    holding implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose cannot lie where goods were subject of gift rather than sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeal, and was not intended to apply later in the course of the proceeding. Chandler, 145 F.3d at 1358-59. This reasoning is consistent with the holding in eases where courts have decided whether appellate fees may be assessed for appeals pending on the effective date of the PLRA. For example, in Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir.1996), the court held that it could not dismiss two remaining appeals as ftivolous because appellant had used up his allotted “three strikes” during the pendency of those appeals. The court concluded that “[s]ection 1915(g) governs bringing new actions or filing new appeals — the events that trigger an obligation to pay a docket fee — rather than the disposition of existing cases.” See also Thurman v. Gramley, 97 F.3d 185, 188 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that the dispositive events for purposes of the new fee obligations under  1915b1 are the bringing of a civil action and the filing of an appeal once these milestones have passed fees do not attach to later activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has to do with the operation of an EPA rule that purports to oblige public water systems to install a filtration system if they fail to meet certain regulatory standards by a prescribed deadline — an obligation that extends into the future indefinitely, and that does not account for the present and future safety of the system’s drinking water. Based on our reading of the Act, we find that the district court acted within its discretion by declining to order that the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) install a filtration system. We therefore affirm its judgment. I. Background The facts surrounding this controversy are laid out in extensive detail in the district court’s two written opinions, United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 48 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.Mass.1999) (MWRA /) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 97

    ### Response:
    holding that district court had equitable discretion not to order filtration remedy for sdwa violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an award of fees on appeal or on this review. CAMERON, Justice, dissenting: I dissent for two reasons. First, I believe that under the statute involved that the state is a person and must comply with the county claims statute. As the majority cites: Since, in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (<HOLDING>). A.R.S. § 11-622 requires a person who has a

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of the words any person was insufficient under the ordinary dignities of speech to authorize an action by the federal government for treble damages under the sherman act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Grp., Inc. v. United States, 658 F.3d 276 (2d Cir.2011) (affirming jury finding that a series of LILO and other transactions did not withstand the substance-over-form inquiry); Wells Fargo, 641 F.3d 1319 (Fed.Cir.2011) (same as to SILO transaction involving public transit vehicles); BB & T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir.2008) (affirming district court’s conclusion that “although the form involved a lease financed by a loan, BB & T did not actually acquire a genuine leasehold interest”); AWG Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F.Supp.2d 953, 981-82 (N.D.Ohio 2008) (finding that in SILO transaction, taxpayer never obtained ownership interest in German waste-to-energy disposal treatment plant to support deductions); John Hancock Life Ins., 141 T.C. at 54-55 (2013) (<HOLDING>). In each of these cases, the court found that

    ### Response:
    holding that the substance of lilo transactions were not consistent with their legal form precluding various deductions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should not imply that term when the Legislature has excluded it. GE Solid State, supra, 132 N.J. at 308, 625 A.2d at 473. Equally significant was the failure of the Legislature at its very next session (1974-1975) to enact Assembly Bill No. 1817, which, among other Act amendments, would have incorporated verbatim into the CBT property factor the language of its recently-enacted CIT counterpart, i.e., that taxpayer’s property included rented or leased property. That bill was introduced in the Assembly on May 16, 1974, and thereupon referred to the Committee on Taxation. The Committee reported out that bill, with amendments, and went to a second reading on April 21, 1975. The full Assembly never voted on it, however. See Garfield Trust Co., supra, 102 N.J. at 431-32, 508 A.2d at 1110-11 (<HOLDING>). In 1990, Senate Bill 1112 was introduced

    ### Response:
    holding analogous circumstances conclusive  of legislative intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment is granted as to Count II. IV. Remaining State Law Claims Defendants have met their burden of establishing that no rational trier of fact could find that the phrase “Box Packaging” warrants trademark protection as either a suggestive mark, or alternatively, as a descriptive mark that acquired a secondary meaning. Defendants also establish that no genuine issue of material facts exist as to the other federal claims brought under the Lanham Act. Plaintiff fails to meet its burden of showing through specific evidence that a triable issues of fact remain. As such, this Court grants summary judgment as to Plaintiffs common law and statutory claims because all are resolved under the same analysis as the federal claims. (Counts VI through IX). See Spex, Inc., 847 F.Supp. at 579 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this

    ### Response:
    holding that cjlaims for unfair competition and deceptive business practices involving trade names brought under illinois statutes are to be resolved according to the principles set forth under the lanham act and noting that illinois courts look to federal case law and apply the same analysis to state infringement claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2021-22, 90 L.Ed.2d 445 (1986) (upholding FTC’s ruling that dentists violated antitrust laws by agreeing to withhold x-rays from insurers); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29-31, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 1567-68, 80 L.Ed.2d 2 (1984) (upholding exclusive contract between anesthesiologists and hospital); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 2475, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982) (finding physicians’ price-fixing agreement violative of antitrust laws). Nor can it fairly be said that a health care professional cannot under any circumstances state a cause of action under the Sherman Act against a hospital review committee for denial of staff privileges. Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 332, 111 S.Ct. 1842, 1848, 114 L.Ed.2d 366 (1991) (<HOLDING>); cf. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of

    ### Response:
    holding that physicians claim against peer review committee satisfied the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirements of the sherman act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    623 (D.Md.2002). The Court will not analyze here whether such a cause of action exists because, even assuming arguendo that it does, Moham-madian’s facts fail to support such a claim. In their rulings on hostile work environment under the ADA, courts have adopted the standard set forth by Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), for Title VII claims, requiring plaintiffs to prove that their workplace was “permeated with insult, ridicule, and intimidation”. Occasional insulting comments and behavior, no matter how hurtful, are insufficient to support a claim of hostile work environment. Id. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367. To successfully establish a prima facie claim of hostile working environment under the ADA, the plaintiff must therefore prove tha (N.D.Okla.1996)(<HOLDING>). In this case, assuming without deciding that

    ### Response:
    holding that calling an employee with mental health issues names like crazy and lunatic did not suffice to create a hostile work environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    innocence.” State v. Tisdale, 153 N.C. App. 294, 297, 569 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002). Defendant was charged with PWISD pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(l) (2009). “While intent [to sell or deliver] may be shown by direct evidence, it is often proven by circumstantial evidence from which it may be inferred.” State v. Net 647 S.E.2d 129, 137 (2007) (“Cases in which packaging has been a factor have tended to involve drugs divided into smaller quantities and packaged separately.”); State v. McNeil, 165 N.C. App. 777, 783, 600 S.E.2d 31, 35 (2004) (finding an intent to sell or deliver where defendant possessed 5.5 grams of cocaine separated into 22 individually wrapped pieces), aff’d, 359 N.C. 800, 617 S.E.2d 271 (2005); State v. Carr, 122 N.C. App. 369, 373, 470 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The State has not pointed to a case, nor have

    ### Response:
    holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It is generally considered an abuse of discretion to permit counsel “to ‘stake out’ a prospective juror in advance regarding what his decision might be under certain specific factual scenarios . . . .” State v. Jaynes, 353 N.C. 534, 549, 549 S.E.2d 179, 192 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 934, 152 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2002). The question presented to the potential jurors in this case was not directed at discerning whether the potential jurors would believe Wilds in spite of his having agreed to a plea bargain, but whether the jurors would be able to consider his testimony notwithstanding his having agreed to a plea bargain. This question is proper as it is directed at the potential juror’s ability to be fair and impartial. See State v. Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 644, 440 S.E.2d 826, 841 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Next, defendant argues the trial court erred

    ### Response:
    holding that questions by defense counsel as to whether prospective jurors would be able to consider a life sentence in a particular case or would automatically vote for death upon conviction were proper to discern impartiality and fairness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (finding that the plaintiffs claims, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under a qualified ERISA plan, “undoubtedly” met the criteria for preemption under § 514(a), despite the fact the state laws at issue did not expressly reference ERISA plans); Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302 (having no difficulty concluding the plaintiffs’ claims, all arising from the administration of benefits under a qualified ERISA plan were preempted by ERISA); see also Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 439 F.3d 767, 771-72 (8th Cir.2006) (“ERISA preempts ‘state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits’ under an ERISA plan.”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Howard v. Coventry Health Care, of Iowa,

    ### Response:
    holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). We review the facts upon which the BIA’s decision rests to ensure that they are supported by substantial evidence from the record considered as a whole, Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir.2010), and we will reverse based on a factual error only if any reasonable fact-finder would be “compelled to conclude otherwise,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, but we accord deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), to its interpretation ' of statutes and regulations within its enforcement jurisdiction. Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir.2004); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (<HOLDING>). III. Discussion Huang raises three issues on

    ### Response:
    holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation citation and quotation marks excluded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    10: Pimental’s Chapter 93A claim hinges upon her breach of contract and negligence claims; she alleges that Wachovia’s “unfair or deceptive” practices were its “premature and erroneous disbursal of construction loan funds ....” Compl. ¶ 33. Wachovia’s duties to Pimental are defined by the terms of the loan contract, which expressly commit the inspection of the property and the decision to disburse funds to the discretion of Wachovia without imposing a duty upon it to protect Pimental’s interests. Since Pimental has failed to allege sustainable breach of contract or negligence claims, and the Chapter 93A claim is based upon the previous two claims, there is no basis for finding Wachovia liable under Chapter 93A. See Egan v. Athol Mem. Hosp., 971 F.Supp. 37, 47 (D.Mass.1997) (Gorton, J.) (<HOLDING>). ■ A practice may be a violation of

    ### Response:
    holding that where there was no evidence of the claimed underlying violation and where there were no unique arguments related to the chapter 93a claim defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93a claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    home studies on willing and appropriate relatives with whom to place the child). The Department’s evaluation and the court hearing are to be expedited and meaningful. If Child’s best interests would be served by being placed with Colin, the court should, accordingly, oversee a transition plan. Cf. Lance K., 2009-NMCA-054, ¶¶ 2, 44 (ordering the court and the Department to oversee a transition plan to return a child to the father after an erroneous termination of his parental rights). On a final note, we emphasize that Section 32A-4-25.1(D) imposes a duty upon the district court to make a serious inquiry into whether the Department has complied with its mandate to locate, identify, and consider relatives with whom to place children in its custody. See Benjamin O., 2007-NMCA-070, ¶ 34 (<HOLDING>). In future cases, such inquiry will not be

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the preservation of family unity is one of the legislative purposes of the childrens code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court has not specifically recognized the crime-fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court in Jaffee recognized that “[although it would be premature to speculate about most future developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way....” 518 U.S. at 18 n. 19, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The Supreme Court also historically has recognized that evidentiary privileges must be “strictly construed,” and may be recognized “only to the very limited extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Based on the First Circuit’s analysis in

    ### Response:
    holding that apart from confidential communications witness spouse alone has privilege to refuse to testify adversely and may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to at least qualified immunity, as plaintiff concedes. Richardson, 5 F.3d at 623-24 (held Selsky entitled to qualified immunity on facts before court; no discussion of absolute immunity). A government official has qualified immunity from liability for damages based on his official acts as long as those acts violate no clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Weg v. Macchiarola, 995 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir.1993). The defendant must establish that he had an objectively reasonable belief that his act violated no clearly established rights. Id. Since the district court did not consider this issue, we remand so that it may do so. Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . Compare Moye v. Selsky, 826 F.Supp. 712, 724 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>); Lopez v. Coughlin, 92 Civ. 7713 (KMW), 1994

    ### Response:
    holding selsky not entitled to absolute immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Kearns are dismissed. C. In counts three, four, and six, Hill seeks to impose municipal liability on Robeson County based on inadequate hiring, training, supervision, and discipline of Britt. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 352^02, 406-11. A municipality is not liable under section 1983 for the actions of its employees or agents unless the plaintiff can show that a municipal policy or custom caused plaintiffs constitutional injury. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In order to impose municipal liability, the municipality’s employee must (at a minimum) have committed a constitutional violation. See, e.g., M 97) (<HOLDING>). Alleging that a municipal employee (such as

    ### Response:
    holding that forcible rape of a suspect by a police officer may constitute a violation of the substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or if it has waived its sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity to states from suits brought in federal court. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). “[A] federal court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases involving federal law, but the Eleventh Amendment gives the state ‘a sovereign immunity from suit.’ ” Tegic Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Texas Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 267, 117 S.Ct. 2028). Sovereign immunity applies to actions brought under the patent laws of the United States. See generally Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) (<HOLDING>). A state, however, may waive its immunity from

    ### Response:
    holding that congress did not properly abrogate states eleventh amendment immunity from suits under the patent act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the third-party’s breach of the contract without justification, actual breach of the contract, and damages resulting therefrom.” Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 668 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (1996) (citations omitted). Here, the first and fourth elements of Plaintiffs claim — existence of a valid contract and breach — require interpretation of the parties’ CBA. Indeed, there is no way to adjudicate breach of contract absent interpretation of the underlying contract. See Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874, 877 (2d Cir.1990) (“Under traditional principles of New York law, a party may not recover for tortious inducement of breach of a contract without proving that the underlying contract has been breached.” 747 F.Supp. 162, 172 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (<HOLDING>). Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs state law claims of inter alia tortious interference with contract are preempted by section 301 of lmra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to rule on the remand issue.” (Defs. Mem. at 7.) Customarily, a federal court first resolves any doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case before reaching the merits or otherwise disposing of the case. On some occasions, however, considerations of judicial economy and restraint may persuade the court to -avoid a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction when the case may be disposed of on a simpler ground. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996). The court is skeptical that transferring the case to a different federal venue constitutes a ""disposal” under Cantor, since it would not moot the question of jurisdiction. Cf. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007)

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court may dismiss based on forum non conveniens without first addressing personal jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in functional terms” is not sufficient to bring the claim within the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6. Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583. The Court acknowledged that many devices are named for the function they perform, e.g., “filter,” “brake,” “clamp,” “screwdriver,” or “lock.” See id. The Court, relying purely on dictionary definitions, concluded that detent fell into this category of terms and noted the following: It is true that the term “detent” does not call to mind a single well-defined structure, but the same could be said of other commonplace structural terms such as “clamp” or “container.” What is important is not simply that a “detent” or “detent mechanism” is defined in terms of what it does, but that the term, as the name for structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art. Id. (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The Court held that

    ### Response:
    recognizing the following technical and nontechnical dictionary definitions a mechanism that temporarily keeps one part in a certain position relative to that of another and can be released by applying force to one of the parts a part of a mechanism as a catch pawl dog or click that locks or unlocks a movement a catch or checking device the removal of which allows machinery to work such as the detent which regulates the striking of a clock
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    successfully asserted that he was not an Indian in federal court for purposes of the Major Crimes Act). A party cannot play “fast and loose” with a court by changing legal positions in the midst of a suit. Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 367, 552 P.2d 796, 803 (Ct.App.1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). {13} Defendants successfully argued inconsistent positions. First they successfully argued the position that the Guzmans had no remedy through workers’ compensation because, since Anthony had already left work, his death was not within the course and scope of his employment. Implicit in this position is a denial of negligence on their part in relation to his death. See Espinosa v. Albuquerque Publ’g Co., 1997-NMCA-072, ¶ 13, 123 N.M. 605, 943 P.2d 1058 (<HOLDING>). Then in district court, summary judgment was

    ### Response:
    holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    every state employee the right to be fairly considered for promotion, this right is not itself a substantive right [protected by the Fourteenth Amendment], but rather a vehicle for arriving at the ultimate promotion decision”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the mere existence of an entitlement to a heai'ing under state law, without further substantive limitation, does not give rise to an independent substantive liberty interest protected by the [Fourteenth [A]mendment.”). The Utah state court decisions cited by Ms. Simmons are not to the contrary. Those cases do suggest that some at-will employees may have contract-based rights under state law. See, e.g., Thurston, 835 P.2d at 169-70 (<HOLDING>); Lowe, 779 P.2d at 670 (holding that an

    ### Response:
    holding in a breach of contract action that a state statute established that employees have a right to rely on the layoff and termination procedures advanced by their employers and that to the extent that the government employer considered factors in addition to seniority ability and merit the countys termination of the plaintiffs employment was in violation of the county personnel management act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in contrast, is an inherent value not established by market forces, but based upon sentimental or personal value. Ford Motor Co., 125 S.W.3d at 799. The only evidence as to the fair market value of the house as received with the 625 square foot shortage was the appraisal that reflected a value greater than the value represented. Matheus offered no expert testimony that the fair market value of the house with the shortage was less than the value as represented to him. Matheus, himself, testified only as to the amount he pr r’s opinion that vehicle’s value was “worthless” as “unsafe for what I want it for” affirmatively showed opinion based on personal value to him and constituted no evidence); Pontiac v. Elliott, 775 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we note that the supreme court

    ### Response:
    holding owners testimony as to autos value as nothing as she could not depend on it or sell it referred to intrinsic value of vehicle to her and constituted no evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cases. However, the statute does not so provide, and the legislative record reflects no such intent. The Vaccine Act contains no basis for the majority’s hypothesis that Congress imposed an absolute and irremediable bar to any petition filed beyond the three-year statutory limitations period. Indeed, the Vaccine Act itself extends the period of limitations for cases erroneously filed in the district court instead of under the Vaccine Act; this congressional action to relieve a specific foreseeable problem does not establish congressional intent to prohibit relief for every other tardy fifing. The absence from the Vaccine Act of explicit authorization for equitable tolling is not unusual, and does not defeat the courts’ equitable power. See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558, 94 S.Ct. 756 (<HOLDING>). In justifying its decision to bar the

    ### Response:
    recognizing judicial power to toll periods of limitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shall have bid protest jurisdiction ‘without regard to whether suit is instituted before or after the contract is awarded.’ ” Software Testing Solutions Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed.Cl. 533, 535 (2003); see also Cubic Def. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed.Cl. 239, 252 (1999) (noting that “this court has followed GAO’s timeliness rule when the plaintiffs protest is founded upon alleged defects in the solicitation,” but not in the case of a procurement violation). The contracting officer also raised the application of the Christian Doctrine. The Christian Doctrine provides that contract terms that should have been included in a given contract are considered to have been included, even if they were not. See G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 160 Ct.Cl. 1, 312 F.2d 418 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Defendant argued initially that the Christian

    ### Response:
    holding that government contracts must be read as if they included clauses required by law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cannot make the payment, and the effect of nonpayment will be to trigger a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 petition by the co-debtor, which may have a ripple effect on other parties as well. For these reasons, separate classification is often practically necessary. Id. The amendment, therefore, expressly allows separate classification of co-signed obligations, despite the absence of any “theoretical difference” from other claims. At no time does the report indicate any desire to address the second condition for separate classification, that the discrimination not be unfair. This Court realizes that several learned judges view the 1984 amendment to section 1322(b) as creating an exception to the prohibition against unfair discrimination. See In re Domon, 103 B.R. 61 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Riggel, 142 B.R. 199 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio

    ### Response:
    holding that the amendment constitutes a carve out to the unfair discrimination standard id at 64
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to eliminate the waste of judicial resources caused by duplica-tive individual actions. Third, the individual actions will not adjudicate the controversy that underlies this class action litigation; rather, each would only resolve the individual claims of a minute portion of the class. d.To Concentrate this Litigation in New Jersey Is Desirable 101. Rule 23(b)(3) indicates that the third factor to be considered in assessing whether the class action device is superior to other means of adjudication is “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum.” The factor emphasizes the desirability of the forum selected, not the desirability of claims concentration generally. See 1 Newberg § 4.31, at 4-123; Bentkowski, 70 F.R.D. at 405 (<HOLDING>). 102. In this case, plaintiffs’ claims are

    ### Response:
    holding that when majority of class lived in new jersey maryland pennsylvania and virginia the eastern district of pennsylvania was a desirable forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 of the ’465 patent by any of the three accused hangers concerns the claim recitations 1) that the tongues and openings are “formed between said upper walls of said locking members and main bar, respectively,” and 2) that the tongues are “offset to underlie the edges of the openings.” This language clearly applies literally only to a hanger bar in which the tongues are formed on the locking cap and extend downwardly through openings in the main bar, and not the reverse arrangement employed in defendants’ accused hanger bars, in which the tongues are formed on the main bar and extend upwardly through openings in the locking cap. However, this reversal of parts does not affect the locking action. In both constructions, the tongues and openings cooperate to perform the same function (<HOLDING>) in substantially the same way (by engagement

    ### Response:
    holding down the locking cap
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not appeal the adverse determination. Mr. Wilson argues that he went “above and beyond to exhaust all administrative options to resolve this out of court,” namely, complaining to several offices within DOT and requesting mediation with the Associate Administrator at the Departmental Office of Civil Rights. Opp’n at 3-4. However, these efforts did not exhaust Mr. Wilson’s administrative remedies as they were not an appeal of the initial FHWA determination pursuant to DOT’s FOIA regulations. The regulations require that FOIA appeals be filed with the DOT official responsible for processing appeals, in this case the Associate Administrator for Administration. See 49 C.F.R. § 7.21(c)-(d); see also Thorn v. United States, Civ. No. 04-1185, 2005 WL 3276285, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2005) (<HOLDING>). B. FOIA Request No. 2009-0157 As to FOIA

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where plaintiff sent a letter to the attorney general grieving the initial agency determination instead of following the administrative appeal process specified by agency regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “judge shopping” and dilatory tactics. Id. The District contends that the Tribe was not entitled to a change of judge as a matter of right because the Tribe’s motion for peremptory challenge: (1) was filed in an action that had been appealed from a lower court; and (2) was filed against a judge who had made a prior ruling on contested matters in this case. We consider each contention in turn. A. Appeal from a lower court The District contends that the office of the Engineer is a lower court because it acts as the exclusive trier of fact in water appropriation cases. Indeed, the district court is required to give deference to the Engineer’s decision and only conducts a de novo review of legal conclusions. See State Engineer v. Morris, 107 Nev. 699, 701, 819 P.2d 203, 205 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, NRS 533.450(1) describes the

    ### Response:
    holding that reviewing courts will review the engineers decision for substantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    speech was protected to begin with and must be kept separate from that preliminary question. c. Causation The district court concluded that Nagle’s speech could not have caused the adverse employment action because Fried had already decided not to recommend her for tenure before he learned of her Virginia speech: “[a]lthough Superintendent Fried cannot recall exactly when he became aware of [Nagle’s protected speech in Virginia], he believes he was, at the time, already leaning toward not recommending [Nagle] for tenure.” Order at 20. This testimony, however, by itself, indicates that a grant of summary judgment against Nagle is reversible error. First, it is established that an adverse employment action occurs on the date that a decision was formally reached. Cioffi, 444 F.3d at 163 (<HOLDING>). Events leading up to a formal decision will,

    ### Response:
    holding that an adverse employment action dated not from a closed meeting at which an informal consensus regarding the matter was reached but rather from an official meeting with a formal vote and a publicly declared outcome
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unambiguously holds Anin responsible for his lawyer’s actions and omissions. Therefore, despite the fact that Anin may not have received actual notice, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen his deportation proceeding. Additionally, the fact that Anin did not receive actual notice of the deportation hearing does not present a violation of the Due Process Clause. Although procedural due process in the deportation context requires a meaningful and fair hearing with a reasonable opportunity to be heard, see London v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-3, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982); Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir.1999), it does not demand that an alien receive actual notice. Due process is satisfied if notice is accorded “in a manner 1992) (<HOLDING>); cf. Furlong v. Havee, 885 F.2d 815, 818 (11th

    ### Response:
    holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with federal law,” for example, “when it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or when state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Id at 1332 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)). Here, the EPPs’ claims sound in unfair competition in violation of state consumer protection statutes and state antitrust laws, as well as unjust enrichment. In line with the Federal Circuit, and because the Warner Chilcott Defendants do not suggest Congress intended to preempt these areas of state law, the Court concludes that there is no field preemption of state consumer protection, unjust enrichment, or antitrust laws. See id. at 1333 (<HOLDING>); ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101, 109 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that in light of the presumption against preemption there is no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial question of federal patent law because congress has not expressed its clear and manifest intention to preempt that area of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a). In Count Two of the Complaint, DIRECTV alleges that Thompson “intentionally intercepted, endeavored to intercept, or procured other persons to intercept electronic communications from DIRECTV.” (Compl. at ¶ 85). Further, DIRECTV alleges that Thompson “disclosed or endeavored to disclose to others” the intercepted communications and “intentionally used or endeavored to use” the intercepted communic ons in which it held that § 2520 does not create a private right of action for alleged violations of § 2512(l)(b) and dismissed claims identical to those in this action. See, e.g., Baker, 318 F.Supp.2d at 1116-1120 (<HOLDING>); Childers, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1289-89 (same).

    ### Response:
    holding that the language of  2520a does not provide an explicit private right of action for a violation of  25121b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    declaratory judgment. The parties agreed to a bench trial as to the issue of the amount, if any, of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that should be awarded to Air Routing under the Theft Act. Britannia and Air Routing agree that the Theft Act requires the trial court to award Air Routing reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees for defending Britannia’s Theft Act claim. The Theft Act is unusual in Texas law in that it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a party who successfully defends a Theft Act claim, without any prerequisite that the claim is found to be groundless, frivolous, or brought in bad faith. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem Code Ann. § 134.005(b) (Vernon 1997); Johns v. Ram-Forwarding, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 635, 637-38 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Scott A. Brister, Proof of Attorney’s Fees in

    ### Response:
    holding theft act entitles defendant to recover reasonable and necessary attorneys fees in successfully defending theft act claim even if defendant does not recover any actual damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to determine the materiality of the breach. The Ninth .Circuit was the first to formulate that federal law defines the term executory contract, but that “the question of the legal consequences of one party’s failure to perform its remaining obligations under a contract is an issue of state contract law. While the principles of contract law do not differ greatly from one jurisdiction to another, to the extent they do, a bankruptcy court should determine whether one of the parties’ failure to perform would give rise to a ‘material breach’ excusing performance by the other party under the contract law applicable to the contract ...” Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise College Park, Inc.), 703 F.2d 1339, 1348 n. 4 (9th Cir.1983); see also In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership, 882 F.2d at 235 (<HOLDING>); In re Terrell, 892 F.2d at 471-72 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. AgroSource, Inc., appeals the order denying access to twenty-two emails that were the subject of a public records request, asserting that the trial court did not conduct a proper inspection of these documents. We affirm because the trial court’s determination that the responsive emails were exempt from disclosure is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Bryan v. Butterworth, 692 So.2d 878, 881 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>). The trial court considered the testimony of

    ### Response:
    holding that where the record shows that competent substantial evidence supports the trial courts findings that the documents were exempt from disclosure said findings will not be second guessed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The jury was also properly instructed on self-defense. The sole question is whether the conviction should be reversed because the prosecution called Ortiz to testify as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief and not as a rebuttal witness. Ortiz’s testimony was offered to impeach and rebut Kruse’s claim of self-defense. Kruse claims that section 16-8-107(1) bars the admission of Ortiz’s testimony in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, but recognizes that the evidence could properly be admitted as rebuttal testimony. See § 16-8-107(1). The alleged error occurred when Ortiz testified as a prosecution witness and not as a rebuttal witness. In our view, the untimely admission of Ortiz’s testimony did not constitute plain error under the facts in this case. The court o 7 P.2d 759, 761 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Berge v. Berge, 189 Colo. 103, 104, 536 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that supreme court would not consider issue not mentioned either in petition for rehearing or in petition for certiorari even though matter was argued before it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the prior settlement. IV. CONCLUSION Given the record before it, the superior court could not permissibly have denied judg ment to the State of Alaska and Clarence Jackson. It consequently did not err in dismissing Ahwinona’s complaint. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the trial court’s entry of final judgment against Ahwinona. 1 . See also Murat v. F/V Shelikof Strait, 793 P.2d 69, 75 (Alaska 1990) (stating that unauthenticated documents can be considered in support of a motion when no timely objection to the documents is made, relying on ""the well-recognized principle that a failure to timely raise any eviden-tiary objection constitutes waiver of that objection and permits the court to consider the proffered evidence”) (citing Kvasnikoff v. Weaver Bros., Inc., 405 P.2d 781, 784 (Alaska 1965) (<HOLDING>)). 2 . In Brock v. Rogers & Babler, Inc., 536

    ### Response:
    holding that unauthenticated documents may be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment where the documents were not objected to or their authenticity disputed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barring exclusion by the Court, this attachment could possibly convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Under the Third Circuit's recent opinion in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., however, the Court may consider the agreement, notwithstanding its introduction into the record via the motion to dismiss, since Loftus's claim is based on the agreement. See 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Ci r to have read Leatherman to have eliminated the requirement of ""heightened specificity” in all § 1983 actions including those against individual government officials, albeit without much discussion. See, e.g., Holloway v. Watson, Civ. A. No. 93-4436, 1993 WL 328589, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 27, 1993); Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 428 (<HOLDING>); Lassiter v. Kalp, Civ. A. No. 93-1176, 1993

    ### Response:
    holding that under leatherman a federal court may not apply a pleading requirement more stringent than that provided for in the federal rules of civil procedure even in  1983 litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in making its ruling to remand for lack of removal jurisdiction”); Baldridge v. Kentucky-Ohio Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1341, 1349 (6th Cir.1993) (“We find that the so-called ‘collateral issue’ was not collateral at all .... The preemption inquiry here, unlike an inquiry into the enforceability of a forum-selection clause, necessarily ‘related to the question of jurisdiction.’ ”); see also Godsey v. Miller, 2001 U.S.App. LEXIS 9402, at *9, 9 Fed. Appx. 380, 383 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (“This case differs from Regis in that the issue of a forum selection clause is an independent contractual concern created by the actions of the parties, and is not linked to the inherent subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.”); Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Under the second group of cases, applying the

    ### Response:
    holding unreviewable a decision on a nonjurisdictional issue necessarily related to the question of jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DMV’s stated purpose in issuing license plates. We are not persuaded. As the District Court correctly concluded, Vermont’s restriction on scatological terms — what the Vermont statute describes as “offensive”— reasonably serves legitimate governmental interests. Automobile license plates are governmental property intended primarily to serve a governmental purpose, and inevitably they will be associated with the state that issues them. Although the owner of a vehicle chooses the characters that appear on a vanity plate, the Vermont DMV must approve of a vanity plate before issuing it. The state has a legitimate interest in not communicating the message that it approves of the public display of offensive scatological terms on state license plates. See General Media, 131 F.3d at 283-284 (<HOLDING>). The fact that Perry’s plates do not actually

    ### Response:
    holding that the government has a legitimate interest in not appearing to endorse lascivious materials on a military base and that banning such materials is a reasonable way to serve that interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 314A(4) (quotation omitted)). The district court dismissed Pappas’ complaint not because there is no Oklahoma duty to use reasonable care with persons in custody, but because Pappas did not demonstrate that conduct by a private person akin to that alleged in his complaint would constitute a violation of the duty of care under Oklahoma law. Pappas argues the district court failed to identify any Oklahoma state law that would bar his claim, but the court was under no obligation to do so. As the party averring jurisdiction, Pappas — the FTCA plaintiff — bears the burden of proof to establish' that ’ the court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction based upon analogous Oklahoma private liability. See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider ftca claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to protect the public from further crimes. Id. at 1117. The court pointed out that [although recidivism ordinarily decreases with age, we have rejected this reasoning as a basis for a sentencing departure for certain classes of criminals, namely sex offenders. We also reject this reasoning here. “Terrorists, even those with no prior criminal behavior, are unique among criminals in the likelihood of recidivism, the difficulty of rehabilitation, and the need for incapacitation.” Padilla poses a heightened risk of future dangerousness due to his alQaeda training. He is far more sophisticated than an individual convicted of an ordinary street crime. Id. (citations and brackets omitted) (quoting Meskini, 319 F.3d at 92); see also United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 258-65 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), resentencing aff'd, 410 Fed.Appx. 673, 682

    ### Response:
    holding 30year sentence to be substantively unreasonable after conviction of conspiracy to inflict mass civilian casualties and assassination of high public officials in the united states because of recidivism concerns and impermissible comparisons to other terrorismrelated cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Discussion Chance and Sanders challenge the video lottery operator license residency requirement on the basis that it violates the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. These issues will be addressed in that order. I. Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause reserves to Congress the power to “regulate Commerce ... among the several States.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The state argues that the residency requirement is not subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny because the state is acting as a market participant. The market participant exception has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in three instances: Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976), (<HOLDING>); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 100

    ### Response:
    holding that the state of maryland was a participant in the market of purchasing junk car hulks through a bounty system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3 (9th Cir.2000). “[T]he question remaining to be answered becomes whether these facts, and their reasonable inferences, satisfy the elements of the claim for relief.” Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216(9th Cir.2005). The IJ concluded, and the BIA agreed, that Aguilar’s testimony did not meet his burden of proving that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if removed to El Salvador. The government urges us to accept this conclusion, but we need not reach this issue. Even if the IJ correctly concluded that Aguilar’s testimony, by itself, was insufficient to meet his burden under CAT, this conclusion would not be dispositive because a CAT applicant may satisfy his burden with evidence of country conditions alone. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, it is undisputed that the Country

    ### Response:
    holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his text messages with Krueger because those text messages would have “supported a [motion] to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct.” As Prozer contends, and the government concedes, the district court violated Clisby when it failed to address those two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Prozer raised those constitutional claims in clear and simple language. See Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A claim must be presented in clear and simple language, such that the district court may not misunderstand it.”). Although the court resolved most of Prozer’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims in rejecting Ground Three, it did not mention Prozer’s ineffective assistance claims concerning counsel’s failure to file the pretrial motions or the subpoena. See id. (<HOLDING>). For that reason, we vacate the district

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court violated clisby by failing to address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that consisted of two sentences found in the middle of a fifteenpage memorandum attached to the  2254 petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial, particularly in a case such as this involving claims for equitable relief. Plaintiff counters that “a litigant has a right to a jury trial where there exists a cause of action at common law, or one analogous thereto, for legal relief.” (Document No. 9-2 at 10). However, Plaintiff also states that to the extent his claims are “reduced to purely equitable actions, he submits his case to the sound discretion of the Court.” Id. As noted above, Plaintiffs Complaint does not allege any state common law claims and only makes claims for equitable relief under ERISA. Accordingly, I conclude that Plaintiff is not entitled to a trial by jury and recommend that the Court strike Plaintiffs jury trial demand. See Liston v. Unum Corp. Officer Severance Plan, 330 F.3d 19, 24 n. 4 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); and Canis v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., 49

    ### Response:
    holding in dicta that a jury trial is not available for claims under erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    antitrust concerns. See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 611 (6th Cir.1990) (recognizing in antitrust context, the “traditional rule that a principal cannot conspire with one of its agents”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952, 112 S.Ct. 406, 116 L.Ed.2d 355 (1991); Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc. 54 F.3d 1125 (3d Cir.1995) (reasoning that “in order for the concept of a conspiracy between a principal and an agent to apply in the antitrust context, the exception to the general rule should arise only where an agent acts to further his own economic interest in a marketplace actor which benefits from the alleged restraint, and causes his principal to take the anticompetitive actions about which the plaintiff complains”); see also ISO II, 203 F.3d at 1324, 1327-29 (<HOLDING>). Nor have plaintiffs presented any evidence to

    ### Response:
    holding that xeroxs policy of prohibiting its majorityowned european affiliate from selling parts was within scope of intellectual property grant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been allowed to take the witness stand in his own defense. R. Vol. XVII at 2687. The trial court told Williams to raise this issue on appeal. Id. at 2688. Thus, Williams could have claimed on direct appeal that the trial court’s failure to resolve this issue in the first instance was error. Furthermore, Williams was certainly aware that he should have raised this claim on direct appeal. In short, Williams was not prevented from raising his claim because of the inadequacy of the record on appeal. Thus, the district court did not err in ruling that this claim was procedurally barred. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Right to Testify Williams next contends his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he denied him his right to testify. See Cannon, 383 F.3d at 1170 (<HOLDING>). Although Williams did not assert his

    ### Response:
    holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offering was a “reasonable and necessary” and, therefore, deductible cost of Mrs. Black’s estate. Respondent argues that the reimbursement was not “necessary” within the meaning of section 20.2053-3(a), Estate Tax Regs., because the Erie stock belonged to Black LP, not Mrs. Black’s estate, and that Black LP sold the stock. To the extent the secondary offering of Erie stock generated funds needed and used to discharge debts of Mrs. Black’s estate, Black LP’s obligation to reimburse Erie for costs associated with that offering was related to and occasioned by Mrs. Black’s death, and, for that reason, the reimbursement might be deductible by her estate under section 2053. Accord sec. 20.2053-8(d), Example (2), Estate Tax Regs.; see Burrow Trust v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1080, 1089 (1963) (<HOLDING>), affd. 333 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1964). Moreover,

    ### Response:
    holding that where a revocable inter vivos trust paid its own trustees fees the settlors estate could nonetheless deduct those fees under section 2053 because the trustees services were primarily occasioned by the death of the decedent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion under section 2255, the government’s argument is persuasive with respect to Green’s filings. A motion under section 2255 must “specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the movant and of which he has or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have knowledge and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified.” Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rule 2(b); see United States v. Horvath, 157 F.3d 131, 132-33 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (facts supporting claimed error need only be set forth generally). Courts are often called on to determine whether a moving party’s generalized allegations are sufficient to meet the requirements of section 2255. See, e. g., United States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, Green’s June 10, 1997 and

    ### Response:
    holding that a section 2255 petition must be based on more than airy generalities conclusory assertions and hearsay statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law in this Commonwealth, we also note that courts in other jurisdictions have arrived at similar resolutions when faced with factually similar disputes. See Patten Securities Corp., Inc. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400, 407, n. 3 (3d Cir.1987), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Delgrosso v. Spang and Co., 903 F.2d 234, 236 n. 2 (3d Cir.1990) (concluding in an application of federal law, that an arbitration clause and a forum selection/consent to jurisdiction clause could both be given effect, because arbitration awards are not self-enforceable and thus the forum selection/consent to jurisdiction clause would appear to dictate the location of any action to enforce the award); Bank Julius Baer & Co., LTD. v. Waxfield LTD., 424 F.3d 278, 284-85 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Security Life Insurance Company of America v.

    ### Response:
    holding in a case factually similar to patten securities that a forum selectionconsent to jurisdiction clause should be understood as complementary to an agreement to arbitrate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 12111(8). Stated differently, an employee can only sue under the Rehabilitation Act “if he or she can perform the essential functions of the position with reasonable accommodation.” Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C.Cir.2002) (emphasis added) (citing Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994)). Because the enforcement standards of the Rehabilitation Act are the same as in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), case law analyzing disability benefits under the ADA applies with equal force to the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (stating that the “standards used to determine whether [the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated ... shall be the standards applied under the [ADA]”); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems

    ### Response:
    holding that the mcdonnell douglas framework applies equally to ada and rehabilitation act cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (requiring red taillight). Thus, there is no question that Hayes was entitled to conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the traffic violation, including the request for a driver’s license, registration proof of insurance and even a computer check for outstanding warrants. Id. ¶ 15, 604 N.W.2d at 471. This investigative detention, however, should “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” unless the officer has reasonable hirt, odd attire for a hot July evening. Kenyon and his passenger acted exceptionally nervous given the minor nature of the violation. They were sweating, had constricted pupils and slurred speech, all of which are physical symptoms of stimulant use. See, e.g., United States v. Lebrun, 261 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hanson, 1999 SD 9, ¶ 14, 588 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding identical symptoms justified search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while awaiting trial — is meritorious. Section 15-18-5, Ala.Code 1975, provides: “Upon conviction and imprisonment for any felony or misdemeanor, the sentencing court shall order that the convicted person be credited with all of his actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for such offense. The actual time spent incarcerated pending trial shall be certified by the circuit clerk on forms to be prescribed by the Board of Corrections.” The facts in this case appear to present a case of first impression in Alabama: whether a minor, transferred to stand trial as an adult, is entitled to credit on prison time for the time spent in the youth detention facility. Adcock was a minor when the crime was committed and most of his pretrial incarceration was in a youth detention facili 4 (1975) (<HOLDING>). In order to determine whether § 15-18-5

    ### Response:
    holding that a youth detention facility was a jail for purposes of statute requiring credit for time served in jail while awaiting trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Cardegna into consideration. On its own motion, the trial court held a hearing to determine what effect, if any, the Cardegna decision had on this court’s mandate. The trial court found as follows: As to the supplemental authority provided by Charles Boyd Construction, Inc., the argument advanced by defendant that the recent ruling in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006), has an effect on the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s mandate is not one that the trial court can accede to because the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s ruling that this court must determine the enforceability of the contract is law of the case. See Brunner Enter. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 452 So.2d 550 (Fla.1984) (<HOLDING>). The trial court pointed out that the subject

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a lower court cannot change the law of the case as decided by the highest court hearing a case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Alaska 2002) (determining that the trial court erroneously excluded expert witness testimony regarding the ""appropriate standard of care for a heating service professional""); Wilson v. State, 669 P.2d 1292, 1296-97 (Alaska 1983) (concluding that it was not error to allow an expert to state an opinion that an OSHA inspector was negligent in conducting an inspection of a drilling platform). 20 . See, eg., Thurman v. Clune, 51 Cal.App.2d 505, 125 P.2d 59, 60 (1942) (""[The opinion of experts relative to the proper safeguards to be taken in the construction of ice hockey rinks is evidence which is admissible ... on the query of whether defendant in a particular instance has properly safeguarded the ice hockey rink in question.""); Remley v. Newton, 147 Colo. 401, 364 P.2d 581, 583 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Bengjam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 246

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony regarding the safe and proper way to install tether ball equipment in a negligence action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mailing obligation for BVA decision); see also Jones and Mindenhall, both supra; Hyson v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 262, 264-65 (1993); Saylock, supra. The “latest address of record” for the appellant was, at the time of the SOC mailing (and still is), “13230 E. 32 Court[,] Tulsa, OK. 74134”. This address was listed as her address on her NOD, the last correspondence from the appellant to VA immediately prior to the issuance of the SOC. The RO, however, sent the SOC to the appellant at the wrong ZIP Code. The Court concludes that the ZIP Code used by VA in forwarding the SOC to the appellant did not match that in “latest address of record”. Because VA used an address other than the one “of record”, VA failed to comply with § 19.30. See Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 589, 592-93 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Nor do we find persuasive the Secretary’s

    ### Response:
    holding that va must follow its own regulations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    But we have already explained why, under Chase, the gap left at common law as to intangibles is not properly viewed as an exemption at all. Further, Howe’s contrary view would virtually moot the inclusion in section 9-28-1 of “any choses in action of the judgment debtor” since in general these were not subject to attachment at common law and, on Howe’s reading, would have been added by the statute as a remedy only to be immediately subtracted by the “except such” proviso. Howe’s approach to section 9-26 — 1(10) was rejected by the Supreme Court, in an analogous context, almost a century ago. Page v. Edmunds, 187 U.S. 596, 23 S.Ct. 200, 47 L.Ed. 318 (1903). Still, one can find more recent decisions looking in both directions. Compare In re Geise, 992 F.2d 651, 658-59 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), with In re Mitchell, 73 B.R. 93

    ### Response:
    holding that property not subject to sequestration is not therefore exempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 961. Hall further recognized that the Sixth Circuit has been inconsistent in its treatment of Greeley claims predicated on § 4123.90 and that the court of appeals has not issued a controlling opinion on the issue. Id. at 961-63. This Court, agreeing with the rationale presented in Hall, similarly concludes that such a claim is cognizable and that the jeopardy requirement is satisfied. See id. at 963. The end result of such a holding obviates the apparent injustice the Court noted above in recognizing the narrow scope of § 4123.90, because an employee who is discharged prior to pursuing a workers’ compensation claim possesses a remedy when that discharge is predicated on absences retroactively covered by workers’ compensation. Cf. Boyd, 133 Ohio App.3d at 161, 727 N.E.2d at 144 (<HOLDING>). In summary, then, this Court concludes that

    ### Response:
    recognizing public policy claim associated with  412390 precoolidge and stating that there is no evidence that the legislature intended relief under   412390 to be exclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stating he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because he was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed. Appx. at 266. We affirmed the district court’s order, holding the district court had no authority to sentence Mr. Lagunas below the statutory mandatory minimum. Id. at 267. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the mandatory minimum sentencing penalties for crack cocaine by significantly reducing the prior crack/powder ratio but which we held did not apply retroactively to defendants sentenced under the prior sentencing ratio statute. See Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010); United States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part by Dorsey v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding statutory reduction in mandatory minimum penalty based on new ratio is not retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s October 22, 2006, judgment did not dispose of the issue of child support. Specifically, the trial court stated: “The Court reserves the issue of child support pending the mother having surgery and being able to return to work. Upon the mother returning to work or after a reasonable period of time once she has regained the ability to work she shall be ordered to pay child support according to the guidelines set forth in Rule 32 [Ala. R. Jud. Admin.]” Because the judgment did not determine all the rights or liabilities of the parties but, instead, reserved the issue of child support pending the occurrence of a specific event, i.e., the mother’s having surgery and being able to return to work, the judgment is not final. See Reid v. Reid, 844 So.2d 1212, 1213-15 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (<HOLDING>); and Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 816 So.2d 57, 58

    ### Response:
    holding a judgment that reserved the issue of child support pending the mothers taking an examination  to obtain her nursing license to be nonfinal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the account. McColley’s employment was not terminated, even though she was roughly the same age as Schliske. Thus, in every case in which the investigation revealed a violation of the Friends and Family policy which occurred after April 19, 2005, the result was the same. Plaintiff also directs the court to evidence that a more thorough investigation would have revealed other violations of the Friends and Family policy by other associates in the Fort Dodge office. Evidence of a poorly conducted investigation, standing alone, absent evidence that defendants acted in bad faith, failed to follow their ordinary disciplinary procedures or treated other employees differently-proof that is totally absent here-cannot show pretext or defeat a summary judgment motion. See Roeben, 545 F.3d at 643 (<HOLDING>)(citing Hanebrink v. Brown Shoe Co., 110 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that ejven if plaintiff could show that the employers investigation was poorly conducted or that its decision was impetuous that alone would not allow him to survive summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A.2d 691 (1977), aff'd, Del.Supr., 386 A.2d 670 (1978)). On several occasions, this Court has discussed the causal nexus between an injury and an automobile accident which is required to trigger coverage under § 2118(a)(2)(e). “While a causal connection between use of the vehicle and the injury is required, there is no requirement to show that the injury was proximately caused by the use of the automobile. Rather, the showing must be that the injury occurred by virtue of the inherent nature of using the motor vehicle.” Dickerson v. Continental Casualty Co., Del.Super., C.A. No. 82C-MR-8, Poppiti, J. (Sept. 1, 1983) (citing Hutchins v. Mills, Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 363 So.2d 818, 821 (1978), cert. denied, Fla.Supr., 368 So.2d 1368, No. 88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, Taylor, J. (Nov. 2, 1989) (<HOLDING>); Sczubelek v. Maahs, Del.Super., C.A. No.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only false claims, but also implications (which it argued might be ambiguous and thus not literally false but merely misleading). We decline to entertain that belated argument. 6 . Although we referenced consumer testing specifically in 1-800 Contacts, the cases we cited make clear that a statement citing a scientific or validating test constitutes a ""tests prove"" or ""establishment” claim. See C.B. Fleet, 131 F.3d at 435 (“When an advertising claim of favorable fact either expressly or impliedly asserts that the fact is testor study-validated, the fact of the validation becomes an integral and critical part of the claim. Such a claim may therefore be proven literally false by showing only that the test asserted to validate it did not in fact do so.”); Rhone-Poulenc, 93 F.3d at 514-15 (<HOLDING>); Quaker State, 977 F.2d at 63 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that where defendant has hyped the claim of superiority by attributing it to the results of scientific testing plaintiff must prove only that the tests relied upon were not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that they established the proposition for which they were cited alteration in original internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums.”). Even accepting the facts as Appellant described them on direct examination, there is no evidence on which a rational member could rely to conclude that Appellant was not the initial aggressor. The next question is whether a rational member could have found that Appellant regained the right to act in self-defense as a result of either Mansur’s escalating the conflict or Appellant’s withdrawing in good faith. Under our ease law, Mansur could not have escalated the level of force in this situation, as Appellant had already introduced deadly force. See United States v. Stanley, 71 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F.2012); see also Armstrong v. Bertrand, 336 F.3d 620, 623, 625-26 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §

    ### Response:
    holding that an armed gunman did not regain the right to selfdefense even though the victim threatened to kill the gunman and lunged for his gun
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not hold that a trial judge may not give a mitigating circumstances instruction if he or she is disposed to grant the defendant’s request. The purpose of a contemporaneous objection requirement is to give the trial judge the opportunity to rule on the defendant’s constitutional claim, see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); this is what O’Bryan failed to do. Accordingly, we hold that the defendant is barred from raising his claim about the absence of a mitigating circumstances instruction in these federal habeas proceedings. See also O’Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d, 706, 710 (5th Cir.1982) (Gee, J., dissenting). We note further that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zant v. Stephens, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (<HOLDING>) makes the defendant’s argument on the merits

    ### Response:
    holding that death sentence need not be set aside where one of three statutory aggravating circumstances found by juror was subsequently held to be invalid by state supreme court but other two were specifically upheld and stating that the absence of legislature or courtimposed standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of either or both of those aggravating circumstances does not render capital sentencing statute invalid as applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    84 . N.T. 03/01/12, pg. 249 line 20-pg. 250 line 10. 85 . N.T. 03/01/12, pg. 261, lines 3-14. 86 . N.T. 03/02/12, pg. 18 line 13-pg. 19 line 18. 87 N.T. 03/02/12, pg. 21 line 20-pg. 22 line 14. 88 . N.T. 03/01/12, pg. 255 line 19-pg. 256 line 9. 89 . N.T. 03/01/12, pg. 232, lines 17-22. 90 . N.T. 03/02/12, pg. 29, lines 5-16. 91 . Green Valley Dry Cleaners. Inc. v. Westmoreland Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp., 861 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). 92 . Rohm & Haas Co. v Cont’l Cas. Co., 732 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. Super. Ct 1999) aff'd, 566 Pa. 464, 781 A.2d 1172(2001). 93 . Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (Pa. 1992). 94 . Criswell v. King 112 . Id. at 462. 113 . Id. at 465. 114 . Id. at 467. 115 . Id. See also Hargrove v. Frommeyer & Co., 323 A.2d 300, 304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974)(<HOLDING>). 116 . Id. at 469. 117 . Id. at 469 n. 4. 118

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of landowner supervising design and construction of building sufficient ot submit issue of control to the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of discovery, an appellate court must employ a “concededly rigorous standard” of scrutiny. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 1853, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). Initially, we note the existence of a policy disfavoring the dismissal of antitrust actions before discovery begins because the proof of illegal conduct lies largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators. Id.; Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 472 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2986, 53 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1977); see also Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College, 717 F.2d 1523, 1529 (6th Cir.1983) (dismissals of antitrust claims prior to discovery should be granted very sparingly); Chapiewsky v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 297 F.Supp. 33, 38 (W.D.Wis.1968) (<HOLDING>). The record does not clearly indicate whether

    ### Response:
    recognizing the difficulty of precisely pleading the effects on interstate commerce before completion of discovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1275 n. 4 (8th Cir.1990) (same). The defendants, however, neglect to put this dicta into its proper context — Justice Blackmun added in the next sentence that “the [Speedy Trial] Act nowhere refers to a superseding indictment, and seems to assume that dismissal of the first indictment will precede issuance of the second. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(d)(1) and 3161(h)(6).” 474 U.S. at 237, 106 S.Ct. 555 (emphasis added). The point of Black-mun’s distinction was simply that he believed that these Speedy Trial Act provisions did not apply to the situation the court faced in that case, not that criminal defendants are entitled to a “get out of jail free” card when indictments captioned as “superseding” indictments are issued after dismissals of or 5 (D.Kan.1992) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in one of the only reported cases

    ### Response:
    holding that when a court has given a party a full and fair opportunity to litigate a motion to suppress and then  has decided the motion on the merits the party may be estopped from bringing the same motion in subsequent litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to expressly rule on each one of Plaintiffs’ objections to Defendants’ fee request, McGrath v. County of Nev., 67 F.3d 248, 255 (9th Cir.1995), Plaintiffs raised serious questions about several issues that the district court should have addressed, including (1) whether there was duplication of work, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (“Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary ....”); cf. McGrath, 67 F.3d at 255 (“[T]he participation of more than one attorney does not necessarily constitute an unnecessary duplication of effort.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); (2) whether some of the invoices included fees that were not charged to the client, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (<HOLDING>); and (3) whether the use of block-billing and

    ### Response:
    holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the child is exacerbated by their cireulation""); United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir.2001) (even a ""passive consumer who merely receives or possesses the images directly contributes to this continuing victimization.""). Moreover, ""the recipient may be considered to be invading the privacy of the children depicted, directly victimizing these children."" United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d at 930. Each time Brown viewed and/or disseminated an image of child pornography, he violated each child's ""individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters."" United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 546. Finally, it seems clear that the child pornography industry would not exist but for patrons such as Brown. See United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 644

    ### Response:
    recognizing that children were  injured both physically and psychologically as a result of the defendants patronage of the porn industry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    view, the public policy considerations raised in Sabine Pilot, i.e., to relieve “at-will” employees from being pressured to eommit criminal acts, would rationally apply to both the employe 12, 230 Ill.Dec. 596, 694 N.E.2d 565, 569-70 (Ill.1998) (no personal liability for retaliatory discharge of subordinate for filing a workers' compensation claim); Rebarchek v. Farmers Coop. Elevator, 272 Kan. 546, 35 P.3d 892, 903-04 (Kan.2001) (same). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Iowa, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia recognize the personal liability of individual non-employers for wrongful termination even when the individual acted within the course and scope of his or her employment in firing another employee. See, e.g., Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 777 (Iowa 2009) (<HOLDING>); Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 172 N.J.

    ### Response:
    holding that liability for the tort of wrongful discharge based on refusal to commit an unlawful act can extend to the corporate officers who authorized or directed the discharge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denied, 484 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 465, 98 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987), we allowed a Rule 32 error to be corrected in a postsentencing Rule 35 proceeding. Salas is overruled in light of our holding in this case. 2 . If the district court states that the controverted matters will not be considered in imposing sentence, the sentencing record must unambiguously reflect that the district court placed no reliance on the controverted matters. If the record is ambiguous in this regard, the sentence must be vacated and remanded for resentenc-ing. We thus expressly approve of our opinion in Baron, 860 F.2d at 920. 3 . Compare United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d 924, 932 (1st Cir.1987) and United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832, 108 S.Ct. 107, 98 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474,

    ### Response:
    holding resentencing is not always required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Chugach was not Del-Jen’s successor in interest because there was no predecessor-successor relationship between Chugach and Del-Jen in the form of a merger or transfer of assets. We conclude that the district court and Chugach are correct. While we agree with Coffman that a determination of successor liability under USERRA requires an analysis under the Leib factors as stated by Congress, such an analysis is unnecessary and improper when no merger or transfer of assets even transpired between the two subject companies. Generally, one of the fundamental requirements for consideration of the imposition of successor liability is a merger or transfer of assets between the predecessor and successor companies. See Kicinski v. Constable Hook Shipyard, 168 F.2d 404, 408-09 (3d Cir.1948) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, indisputably, there was

    ### Response:
    holding that because there was no predecessorsuccessor relationship defendant corporation was under no duty to reemploy nurse returning from military service who had worked for alleged predecessor company
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    what effect the scrivener’s error had on the jury. As we have already concluded, the parties stipulated to the trial court’s answers to the jury’s questions, but by erroneously inserting Perry’s first name into question three, the trial court gave the jury a version of the questions and answers that Perry had not stipulated to. Neither the parties nor the trial court recognized the error, and the jury returned a guilty verdict one hour later. The jury was never informed of the mistake and the trial court did not question the jury to make sure that it had understood that the third question should have referred to Michael, not Tony. We emphasize that a trial court’s typographical error does not necessarily mandate reversal. See, e.g., Broadus v. State, 487 N.E.2d 1298, 1306 (Ind.1986) (<HOLDING>); Elmore v. State, 688 N.E.2d 213, 220

    ### Response:
    holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1998) (“[A]Ilegations that a war-rantless arrest or imprisonment was not supported by probable cause advanced a claim of false arrest or imprisonment .... ”). Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 126 n. 5, states that “[bjecause a conviction and sentence may be upheld even in the absence of probable cause for the initial stop and arrest, ... claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are not the type of claims contemplated by the Court in Heck.” We view this language as sufficient to clearly exclude Gibson’s Fourth Amendment claims of false imprisonment, and arrest and detention without probable cause from the Heck deferred accrual rule. Other circuits have taken a position similar to our decision in Montgomery. See Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Simmons v. O’Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that arrest interrogation and search and seizure claims accrue when they actually occur and heck does not affect them because ultimate success on them would not necessarily question the validity of a conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which do not implicate the First Amendment right to gather news. The Defendant cannot make such a showing; accordingly the motion to quash must be granted. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Dade County, Florida, this 16th day of July, 1986. 1 Defendant did not cite any Florida civil case in which a subpoena to a non-party journalist has been enforced. See Woods v. Lutheran Inner City Center, 10 Fla. Supp. 2d 32 (4th Judicial Circuit 1985); 11 Med. L. Rptr. 1776, 1776 (Fla. 4th Cir. 1985). 2 See Tribune Co. v. Huffsteddler, 11 Fla. L. W. 246 (June 6, 1986); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976) (reporter’s contempt conviction for refusal to testify before a grand jury reversed), Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, modified on rehearing 628 F.2d 932 (Fifth Cir. 1980)

    ### Response:
    recognizing a qualified privilege for confidential sources in a libel suit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applied. 4 . Appellant would have been subject to a sentence of no more than twenty years of imprisonment on the kidnapping conviction had he not been subjected to the enhanced penalties authorized by Section 9714. 5 . We ruled an unrelated portion of this statute to be unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Butler, 563 Pa. 324, 760 A.2d 384 (2000), on procedural due process grounds. 6 . We note that Section 102 of Title 42, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, defines ""court” to include ""any one or more of the judges of the court who are authorized by general rule or rule of court, or by law or usage, to exercise the powers of the court in the name of the court.” It is clear that ""court” does not also mean ""jury.” See Mishoe v. Erie Ins. Co., 573 Pa. 267, 274-75, 824 A.2d 1153, 1157 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 7 .See note 1, supra. 8 . Judge Todd filed a

    ### Response:
    holding that the judicial codes definition of court is limited to the role of judges and for purposes of the statute the word does not also include jury within its ambit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to cover ""different situations”). 20 . Because the jury convicted appellant of what was submitted as a lesser-included offense, even if it was not actually a lesser-included offense, the jury implicitly acquitted him of the charged offense of evading detention, and the State may not reindict appellant for that offense. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.14 (Vernon 2006) (“If a defendant, prosecuted for an offense which includes within it lesser offenses, be convicted of an offense lower than that for which he is indicted, and a new trial be granted him, or the judgment be arrested for any cause other than the want of jurisdiction, the verdict upon the first trial shall be considered an acquittal of the higher offense_”); Pope v. State, 509 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex.Crim.App.1974)

    ### Response:
    holding that guilty verdict in first trial on what was submitted as second lesserincluded offense despite its not having been lesserincluded offense as matter of law precluded subsequent prosecution for what had been charged as greater offenses in first trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one, Crowley, 226 Mass, at 585, 116 N.E. 241— of the broader rule that a mortgagee must have a valid claim to the debt before attempting foreclosure. Requiring reunification of the note and mortgage prior to the notice of sale arises logically as a rule from the fact that a mortgage urt in In re Marrón, foreclosure of a mortgage does not become impossible only when the debt has been extinguished; rather, “[a] mortgage cannot be made available without connecting it with the debt or duty secured thereby.” Sanger, 78 Mass, at 367 (emphasis added). Were a mortgagee without an interest in the debt able to exercise the power of sale, the note would be left outstanding as a valid obligation of the mortgagor to its holder. Cf. Cooperstein v. Bogas, 317 Mass. 341, 344, 58 N.E.2d 131 (1944) (<HOLDING>). “[T]he holder of the note could attempt to

    ### Response:
    recognizing double liability as a concern in a reach and apply case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    orders or expedited and inexpensive adjudication of smaller claims in a number of contexts. In the analogous context of unemployment proceedings, this court in Salida recognized that: If findings entered at an unemployment compensation hearing may be used to establish the employer's liability for unlawful discharge in a subsequent lawsuit, the employer would have a strong incentive to use its superior resources consistently to oppose a discharged employee's claim for unemployment benefits. Issues presented to the Division will be contested strongly, and the hearings will become lengthy and more detailed, and will no longer be suited to the prompt resolution of unemployment compensation claims. Salida, 732 P.2d at 1165; see also Williamsen v. People, 735 P.2d 176, 182 (Colo.1987) (<HOLDING>). These considerations apply equally to the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that compelling reasons may exist not to apply collateral estoppel where proceedings are tailored to promote prompt inexpensive adjudication of smaller claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims as permitted by Rule 41(a), and in accordance with that rule, the dismissal of the three claims was without prejudice. When a nonsuit has been made effective, a new action may be filed within one year of the nonsuit or within the applicable statute of limitations, whichever is longer. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-126(a)(1) (Repl. 2005); Blaylock v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 330 Ark. 620, 622, 954 S.W.2d 939, 940 (1997). The three unlitigated claims were illegal-exaction claims. See Smith v. City of Springdale, 291 Ark. 63, 722 S.W.2d 569 (1987) (challenging bidding practices in an illegal-exaction claim). We have applied a three-year statute of limitations to illegal-exaction claims. Munson v. Abbott, 269 Ark. 441, 602 S.W.2d 649 (1980). Assuming that appellees’ causes of action accrued, (<HOLDING>). Thus, the appeal is properly before us.

    ### Response:
    holding that the circuit courts order concluding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain a complaint because the case had been dismissed without prejudice constituted a final order because all other claims either had been refiled or dismissed with prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Claims of their Amended Complaint. B. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. 1. Defendants Violated the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. As discussed above, the Court will construe plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint to state a claim directly under § 1415(i)(2)(A) to enforce the IDEA. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to provide plaintiffs with a FAPE, failed to comply with their Child Find duties, and failed to ensure a smooth and effective transition from Part C to Part B, in violation of §§ 1412(a)(1)(A), 1412(a)(3)(A), and 1412(a)(9). (Pis.’ Reply at 3.) Plaintiffs have the burden of proving a violation of the IDEA. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005) (<HOLDING>). a. Defendants Denied a Free Appropriate

    ### Response:
    holding that the burden of proving a violation of the idea lies on the party seeking relief during the administrative process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a material issue of fact regarding plaintiffs discrimination claims. The court is persuaded that no rational factfinder could base a finding of pretext on any of the above assertions, and finds them to be unrelated events, inconsequential facts and opinions, or attenuated inferences. The ADEA does not require an employer to give special treatment to older workers to the disadvantage of junior employees; it requires only that older workers be treated fairly. See Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 630 n. 6 (10th Cir.1995). The evidence overwhelmingly supports the defendant’s proffered reasons for the plaintiffs termination, and the plaintiffs meager evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir.1997)(<HOLDING>) Accordingly, the court finds summary judgment

    ### Response:
    holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    602 Pa. 346, 980 A.2d 502 (2009)). To ascertain the plaintiffs theory of liability, courts must examine the averments in the complaint. Id. at 105. ¶ 12 Regarding professional malpractice: Our Supreme Court retained privity (an attorney-client or analogous professional relationship, or a specific undertaking) as an element of proof necessary to maintain an action in negligence for professional malpractice. The only exception being a narrow class of third party beneficiaries under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 where the intent to benefit is clear and the promisee (testator) is unable to enforce the contract. Cost v. Cost, 450 Pa.Super. 685, 677 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1996), appeal denied, 547 Pa. 727, 689 A.2d 233 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Accord Krauss, supra at 308 (<HOLDING>). If a complaint does not set forth a cause of

    ### Response:
    holding claims against attorney for legal malpractice must be asserted by attorneys actual client absent limited exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and rejected the merits of King’s Batson challenge on direct appeal. King, 89 So.3d at 229-31. As we indicated then, the reason proffered by the State— that Juror Ill’s brother was facing a criminal charge—is a valid race-neutral reason to exercise a peremptory strike. Id. at 230 (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 229 (Fla. 1991)); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial court to accept as race-neutral reasons for striking a minority female juror the facts that she was nineteen years old, single, lacked ties to the community, and might be too tolerant of the crimes at issue); cf. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 604-05 (Fla. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The reasons offered by the State during trial

    ### Response:
    holding that the states agebased justification for exercising a strike was pretextual in that case but noting that a jurors age can be a relevant consideration when evaluating the genuineness of a proffered justification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nature of a summary judgment hearing. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442. The only evidence the movant offered in support of summary judgment was the deemed admissions. The trial court granted summary judgment against the pro se litigant, terminating her rights as joint managing conservator of her daughter and appointing the movant as the sole managing conservator. Id. The Court reaffirmed the Carpenter two-fold standard for withdrawing deemed admissions and for allowing a late summary judgment response. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the pro se litigant had good cause for her late-filed responses, and that once the requests were no longer deemed admitted, she was not required to file a summary judgment response. Id. (citing Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>)). Although the pro se litigant never filed a

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Elias Velgara-Chavez appeals his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with a sentence enhancement pursuant to § 1326(b)(2), and challenges his 51-month sentence as substantively and procedurally unreasonable. We affirm. Velgara-Chavez contends that there was insufficient evidence that he had the specific intent to reenter the United States without the Attorney General’s consent. See United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. Most significantly, the

    ### Response:
    holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    change of plea hearing also indicates that the district court advised Miller of his rights, which would have included the right to counsel, and again Miller gave no indication that he had or desired any counsel other than the public defender. These actions clearly indicate a choice by Miller to proceed with appointed counsel. 17 Had Miller informed the district court that he had retained McCullough and desired MeCullough's representation at the change of plea hearing, the district court would have been required to respect Miller's choice of counsel. See Barber, 2009 UT App 91, ¶ 17, 206 P.3d 1223. However, by his actions, Miller informed the district court that he desired to proceed with appointed counsel, a choice that the district court was also required to respect. See id. 1139-50 (<HOLDING>). Miller's choice of the public defender as his

    ### Response:
    recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    codified in the FSIA, constitute an unconstitutional statutory delegation of congressional authority to the Executive in violation of the separation of powers embodied in the Constitution. In order to determine whether this statute violates the separation of powers inherent in the structure of the Constitution, we must first look at the relevant constitutional provisions. The Constitution assigns to Congress the power to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. This power derives from Congress’s power in Article I “[t]o constitute tribunals inferi- or to the Supreme Court,” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, and in Article III to “ordain and establish” inferior courts, U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922) (<HOLDING>); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v.

    ### Response:
    holding that lower federal courts derive their jurisdiction wholly from the authority of congress  provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.” The use of the word “includes” “‘suggests a calculated indefiniteness with respect to the outer limits of the term’ defined.” Commonwealth National Bank of Dallas v. United States, 665 F.2d 743, 750 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting First National Bank in Plant City, Florida v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 90 S.Ct. 337, 24 L.Ed.2d 312 (1969)). In order for a third party lender to be a “person” for the purposes of § 6672(a), the third party lender must have the power to see to it that the taxes are paid. Commonwealth, 665 F.2d at 755. In addition, the third party lender must assume “control over how the employer’s funds are to be spent and over the process of deciding which creditors of the employer tes, 878 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Security Pacific Business

    ### Response:
    holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after the first child was bom. The children had never lived with Arredondo alone, and the last time he saw them was December 8,2000. Arredondo has lived at different times with his mother, his brother, his grandmother, and with the children’s great-grandmother. He did not have medical insurance for the children but thought they were covered by Medicaid at one time. He claimed to have bought his children clothes and to have contributed to the purchase of food in the great-grandmother’s household when he was not in prison. However, he admitted the child’s mother was on food stamps, and Brenda also testified that Arredondo lived with the great-grandmother withou .App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.), overruled in part on other grounds by In Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, evidence of record also exists

    ### Response:
    holding the evidence was sufficient to support termination under subsection n when after release from prison the defendant was advised of visitation but only visited with his children twice and made no further efforts to be involved with them and a case worker testified that all reasonable efforts were made to return the children to the parents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Doc. 18). Defendants have filed a Response (Doc. 49). Additionally, on July 8, 2002, the court heard oral arguments on plaintiffs’ motion. The court has carefully reviewed the parties’ written and oral arguments and is now prepared to rule. I. BACKGROUND This litigation arose from defendants attempt to enforce the Kansas Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax Act, Kansas Statutes Annotated §§ 79-3401 et seq. (“Act”), upon plaintiffs. The Act imposes a tax, subject to various exceptions, on the use or the sale and delivery of motor vehicle fuel within the state. Pursuant to Kansas Statutes Annotated § 79-3408(c) of the Act, the legal incidence of the fuel tax falls on the “distributor of first receipt” of such fuel. See Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 578 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The distributor must compute and remit the

    ### Response:
    holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on distributors not retailers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    improper segmentation where initial shipments only preserved the future option of additional shipments). Accordingly, the Court determines that this segmentation argument fails as a matter of fact and law. Plaintiffs’ second improper segmentation argument, however, is persuasive. Plaintiffs argue that the Parallex Project involves a joint United States-Russian-Canadian experiment, in which plutonium will be shipped from Russia and the United States to Canada. While the EA considered' the American shipment of MOX to Canada, and the experiment itself, it failed to analyze the potential environmental effects of the Russian shipment. Plaintiffs argue that NEPA applies to the Russian shipment, and that the EA should have considered this part of the project. Defendants respond t C.Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F.Supp. 749

    ### Response:
    holding that canadian citizens have standing to intervene in nepa based suit against agency on the basis of citizenss claims that possible oil spill from transalaskan oil pipeline might cause damage to canada
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    criminal acts and the applicable foreseeability standard, D.C. courts consider the negligence theory being advanced and the circumstances of each case. “The question is not simply whether a criminal event is foreseeable, but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against it ... [, which] is ultimately a question of fairness.” Romero, 749 F.2d at 79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). There are two lines of cases in which a lesser degree of specificity is required with respect to evidence of foreseeability: those involving either (1) “a special relationship between the parties to the suit” or (2) “a relationship of control between the defendant and the intervening criminal actor .... ” Romero, 749 F.2d at 81 (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also Workman, 320 F.3d at 263 (“From our

    ### Response:
    recognizing these two categories as the only district cases departing from that general rule of nonliability at common law for intervening criminal acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2d DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>); Am. Express Ins. Servs. Eur. Ltd. v. Duvall,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of outofstate defendants indirect ownership interests in the nursing homes operating and management companies insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in florida
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to treatment. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.034(a) (Vernon Supp.2002). A trial court must specify which criteria form the basis for its decision to grant the State’s application. Id. § 574.034(c) (Vernon Supp.2002); KT. v. State, 68 S.W.3d 887, 889-90 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Here, the jury found appellant was mentally ñl and made positive findings applicable to subsections (a)(2)(C)(i), (ii), and (iii). To establish a matter in dispute by clear and convincing evidence, a party must present a degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the jury “a firm belief or conviction” as to the truth of the matter asserted. KT., 68 S.W.3d at 890 (citing In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 199 .App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Here, in addition to Dr. Stone’s diagnosis of

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of patients schizophrenia auditory hallucinations paranoia irritability and refusal to take medication not sufficient to meet required statutory burden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    suffered for any set length of time. Although the prosecutor’s statement that the jury needed to find only that the victim suffered mental or physical pain, in isolation, could suggest that a murder can be especially cruel even if the victim is rendered unconscious quickly, the statement’s context clarifies that the prosecutor was referring only to the lack of a particular temporal requirement. Indeed, after making this statement, the prosecutor accurately read the court’s instruction defining cruelty. Taking his statement in context, the prosecutor communicated the correct standard: there is no bright-line rule about the length of time required to establish a victim’s suffering. See id.; cf. State v. Cropper (Cropper II), 223 Ariz. 522, 526 ¶ 12, 527 ¶ 14, 225 P.3d 579, 583-84 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Because the prosecutor did not misstate the

    ### Response:
    holding there was no misconduct when prosecutor argued that period of time required for suffering was a subjective standard defined by what that means to the jury 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shaped the ex post facto provision of the constitutions of Pennsylvania and the United States.” We further noted that virtually identical standards have applied to determining whether an ex post facto violation has occurred pursuant to the Pennsylvania and United States Constitution. Id. Accordingly, in Young, where we found no violation of the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution, we declined to depart from our analysis in resolving Young’s state constitutional claim. As aptly noted by the lower court and discussed above, since our decision in Young, “substantial developments have occurred in federal ex post facto jurisprudence, which may impact the harmony between the [United States] and Pennsylvania constitutions.” Gaffney, 702 A.2d at 569, citing Artway, 81 F.3d at 1254 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ursery (civil forfeitures do

    ### Response:
    recognizing the confused state of federal law regarding punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    how Appellant could lose and regain the right to act in self-defense. Although we find the instruction on escalation was erroneous, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was not entitled to such an instruction at all, as there was no evidence raising the issue of escalation. Moreover, contrary to Appellant’s arguments, withdrawal was not in issue either, for the same reason. A. An allegation that the members were improperly instructed is an issue we review de novo. United States v. Ober, 66 M.J. 393, 405 (C.A.A.F.2008). In regard to form, a military judge has wide discretion in choosing the instructions to give but has a duty to provide an accurate, complete, and intelligible statement of the law. See United States v. Wolford, 62 M.J. 418, 419 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Medina, 69 M.J.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that instructions must be correct and complete
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a formal written demand do not warrant a finding of “good cause.” Upon receipt of Kubik’s May 21, 1987 letter, appellant’s counsel still had until June 29, 1987 — thirty-eight days — to effect service of process or to seek a good cause extension prior to the expiration of the time limit. He did neither. He showed no diligence in formally demanding the information and providing its relevance in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 16.22(d). See Powell v. Starwalt, 866 F.2d 964, 965 (7th Cir.1989) (observing that Rule 4(j) “defines diligence in prosecution”). The failure of appellant’s counsel to act until September does not rest upon the necessary “good cause” for purposes of extending the time requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j). See Floyd v. United States, 900 F.2d 1045, 1047 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted); see also Braxton ¶. United

    ### Response:
    holding that simple attorney neglect without the presence of substantial extenuating factors such as sudden illness or natural disaster cannot constitute the sole basis for a good cause determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his 2001-2002 bonus as a part of his overall compensation package. This court is not confronted with a claim for statutory penalties involving a pro rata portion of an unvested bonus, a profit sharing plan, or a gratuitous bonus subject solely to the employer’s discretion. When an employee contracts for a bonus in exchange for his services to the. employer, and the right to that bonus vests prior to the employee’s termination, an employer’s failure to pay that unpaid bonus within 24 hours of the employee’s demand subjects the employer to a claim for statutory penalties under MinmStat. § 181.13. Applying the reasoning in Brown to the matter at hand, we conclude that respondent’s earned bonus constituted a “wage” for purposes of section 181.13. The decision in 36 N.W.2d 496, 499 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues- that the plain statutory

    ### Response:
    holding that a bonus could be a wage if it was an inducement rather than a reward ie if it was previously agreed to and the stipulated conditions were satisfied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Applying the Blockburger test, we do not believe the acts for which Martin was convicted are the same in fact. The images of child pornography found on Martin’s computers were downloaded and saved at separate times. Moreover, these pictures involved the exploitation of different children. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in a similar case: Even had [Defendant] downloaded all the image files in a very short period of time, the fact that there were more than 28 separate files supports a conclusion that he made a new decision to obtain each one. Every time he downloaded a new file, he recommitted himself to additional criminal conduct. Each decision to download more child pornography represented a new volitional departure. State v. Multaler, 252 Wis.2d 54, ¶ 58, 643 N.W.2d 437, 449 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 41.] Martin was charged and convicted for

    ### Response:
    holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on appeal. 3 In State v. Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d 233, 549 N.W.2d 718 (1996) (Ferguson II), the supreme court reversed on a ground not addressed in State v. Ferguson, 195 Wis. 2d 174, 536 N.W.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1995) (Ferguson I), when it concluded that § 973.06(l)(c), STATS., did not authorize assessment of laboratory expenses against the defendant because such expenses were not ""fees or disbursements."" Although the supreme court did not reach the issue of whether the expense related to the services of an expert witness, it did not specifically reverse our holding on that issue in Ferguson I, 195 Wis. 2d at 180, 536 N.W.2d at 118. Therefore, that holding retains precedential value. See Sweeney v. General Cas. Co., 220 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 582 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). 4 Because we conclude that § 973.06(l)(c),

    ### Response:
    holdings of the court of appeals not specifically reversed by the supreme court retain precedential value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) is not adequately represented by the existing parties. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2); see also South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir.2003). Rule 24 should be construed liberally, with all “doubts resolved in favor of the ee Utahns for Better Transp., 295 F.3d at 1115 (“The threat of economic injury from the outcome of litigation undoubtedly gives a petitioner the requisite interest.”). When a third party files suit to compel governmental agency action that would directly harm a regulated company, the company’s economic interests in the lawsuit satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)’s recognized-interest requirement. See, e.g., Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109

    ### Response:
    holding that timber companies had an interest in a lawsuit aimed at changing their methods of timbercutting
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the second manufacturing count. The State responds that the two counts relate to two separate crimes and the merger argument must, accordingly, fail. We agree with the State. Although both the first and second counts charged Dittmer with crimes that included the date of December 20, 1999, the assistant county attorney explained that the conspiracy to manufacture charge stemmed from a different act with different people at a different time than did the manufacturing charge. Dittmer did not contest this explanation and the district court accepted it, stating “they are two separate and distinct offenses.” Under these circumstances, we conclude the merger argument is inapplicable. See State v. Walker, 610 N.W.2d 524, 526-27 (Iowa 2000). Cf. State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1997) (<HOLDING>). III. Disposition We vacate the judgment and

    ### Response:
    holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hard proof rather than spongy rhetoric.” Hale, 289 B.R. at 792 (citing Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991)). B. Education Loans Under 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(8) Although the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to guarantee honest debtors a “fresh start” through the bankruptcy discharge, Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991), Congress legislated under § 523(a)(8) that “any educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution” is excepted from discharge, unless the debtor can establish “undue hardship.” See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); see also In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 739 (3rd Cir.l993)(<HOLDING>). Moreover, Congress has amended § 523(a)(8) a

    ### Response:
    holding that  523a8 may apply to nonstudent comakers of educational loans
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a sentence that was not individualized, that violated the separation of powers doctrine, and that was based on an unconstitutional disparity between crack and powder cocaine. We conclude that Wilson’s claims are meritless and that the district court properly considered itself constrained by the applicable statutory minimum sentence. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (nothing that determinate sentences are not unconstitutional); United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 561 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.2009) (deciding that prosecutor’s discretion to seek enhanced minimum sentence does not vio late separation of powers doctrine), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 09-6745); United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 518 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In accordance with Anders, we examined the

    ### Response:
    holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any constitutional violation. Public officials are generally granted qualified immunity from lawsuits based on reasonable discretionary acts taken in carrying out their official duties. Because of the need to protect constitutional rights while also avoiding a chilling effect on the conduct of these officers, qualified immunity balances “[t]he public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), with the public interest in having officials act “with independence and without fear of consequences,” id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967)); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (<HOLDING>). “[Wjhether an individual official protected

    ### Response:
    recognizing that permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a receiver acting within the scope of his authority as receiver give rise to ‘actual and necessary costs’ of a Chapter XI arrangement.” Id. at 485, 88 S.Ct. at 1767. Following this broader interpretation of § 503(b), the Ninth Circuit found that “the use of a form of the word ‘include’ is significant, and generally thought to imply that terms listed immediately afterwards are an inexhaustive list of examples, rather than a bounded set of applicable items.” In re Mark Anthony Constr., Inc., 886 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). The opinion in Reading not only survived the later enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, but has been expanded by lower courts. See Matter of Copeland, 991 F.2d at 239 (citing to Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>) and In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc., 755 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that those injured during the trustees administration of an estate are entitled to an administrative priority regardless of whether their injury was caused by a tort or other wrongdoing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a revocation sentence. See Miller, 634 F.3d at 844. Revocation sentences are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which outlines the specific factors of § 3553(a) that a district court must consider. See Miller, 634 F.3d at 844. Because § 3583(e) does not reference § 3553(a)(2)(A), we recently held that “it is improper for the district court to rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) for the modification or revocation of a supervised release term.” Id. We reject LeBoeufs argument that the district court committed reversible error in imposing his revocation sentence. First, it is not clear that the district court even considered § 3553(a)(2)(A). Nowhere did the district court specifically reference that subsection or “just punishment.” Although the court mentioned “punishmen 5th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). LeBoeuf therefore has not shown reversible

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant could not show district courts alleged error in considering  3553a2a when imposing a revocation sentence was clear or obvious under plain error review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    projects were to be supervised by at least two trained staff members. Id. Despite these policies and rules, when Sierra had been employed by AMI for only eight days, he was sent alone to supervise three youths on a work project, two of whom had recently been classified as escape risks. Sierra had not undergone the required training. He was not told of the risk status of the youths he was supervising. No one was assigned to accompany him. This court held that these facts were sufficient to establish the level of indifference to employee safety necessary to support an action against AMI. Other cases that have allowed actions to go forward against employers have involved a similar level of indifference to employee safety. See, e.g., EAC USA Inc. v. Kawa, 805 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So.2d 448

    ### Response:
    holding that employer could be subject to contribution claim based on the intentional tort exception to workers compensation immunity when there was evidence that employer had removed safety guards from printing presses had been warned of the dangers but refused to reinstall the guards disregarding safety notices about the machinery and had instructed employees to engage in dangerous practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an agent to make any other gift only by specifically providing for and defining the agent’s authority in the power of attorney. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5601.2(a)-(c). Section 5602 of the statute, inter alia, enumerates various powers a principal may confer on an agent, “by inclusion of the language quoted in any of the following paragraphs or by inclusion of other language showing a similar intent on the part of the. principal.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5602. “The Powers of Attorney statute does not confine the way powers given in a power of attorney may be defined.... [Gjeneral language may be used to show the ‘similar intent on the part of the principal,’ if such general language, according to its common usage, encompasses such power or powers.” In re Weidner, 595 Pa. 263, 273, 938 A.2d 354, 360 (2007) (<HOLDING>). The applicable version of Section 5602 stated

    ### Response:
    holding attorneyinfact lawfully exercised poa to change beneficiaries of decedents life insurance policy where poa was executed before 1999 amendments to statute and incorporated by reference powers enumerated  in statute which included authority to engage in insurance transactions and poa specifically stated that grant of specific powers was not intended to limit general powers conferred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    need to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant. This explanation is sufficient for purposes of § 3553(c)(1). We reject Mr. Ghertler’s arguments to the contrary. First, Mr. Ghertler is wrong that we should not consider the district court’s statements described above because they were made after the sentence was imposed and did not relate to the sentence selected. The record shows that, although the district court’s com ments followed the imposition of the sentence, those comments were clearly part of the court’s closing remarks regarding the propriety of the sentence. We have taken a holistic approach in evaluating the district court’s explanation of the sentence imposed. Our review is not limited to the district court’s closing remarks. See Parrado, 911 F.2d at 1573 (<HOLDING>); see also id. (citing with approval United

    ### Response:
    holding that district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing life sentence based on review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing taken together with the courts closing remarks
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impact across state lines and around the world. It also increases the cost of insurance. Although theft itself is not a commercial activity, § 668 as a whole is directed toward interstate commerce by reducing traffic in objects of cultural heritage stolen from museums whose activities affect interstate commerce. U.S. v. Windley, 1997 WL 431129 at *2 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Congress rationally could conclude that criminalizing the theft of objects of cultural heritage from museums will reduce interstate trafficking in stolen art and thus is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” Id. (quoting Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631). See also U.S. v. Franklyn, 1998 WL 603237 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the definition of “museum” in § 668

    ### Response:
    holding 18 usc  922o a valid exercise of congressional power under commerce clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    incident occur on, in, or over navigable waters, Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971), and 2) a significant relationship between the incident and traditional maritime activity. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive maritime law. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). Furthermore, courts have found admiralty law applies in personal injury and contract disputes between passengers injured on cruise ships and the cruise ship companies. See e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, 867 F.2d 1318,

    ### Response:
    holding that a forumselection clause was enforceable in a suit between injured passengers and the cruise line
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    gave rise to a right in the sedated patient to have the hospital protect her from a sexual assault. In Thetford v. Cit h this Court found special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect — a duty on the part of the operator of a farmers’ market to take reasonable steps to protect a threatened tenant who was an invitee. The special circumstances were that the operator was aware that for several weeks hostility had grown between two tenants at the farmers’ market and that the operator had received two specific warnings that an outbreak of violence was imminent. Nail, 542 So.2d at 1212-13. F lding owner of bar not liable for injuries tó officer caused by a scuffle with a person the owner wanted removed from the premises); Wawrzyniak v. Sherk, 170 A.D.2d 972, 566 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Kithcart v. Feldman, 89 Okla. 276, 215 P. 419

    ### Response:
    holding officer unable to recover for injuries caused by the arrestees mother when she lunged toward officer who was arresting her son because apprehension of suspects is within the scope of police duties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    request to consolidate the present case with the case allegedly pending before the Montgomery Circuit Court. Although we are concerned that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction because either the Louisiana court or the Montgomery Circuit Court retained jurisdiction of custody matters in this case, we decline to further address that concern because we dismiss this appeal on the basis that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction on other grounds. Juvenile courts are purely creatures of statute that have extremely limited jurisdiction. See Ex parte K.L.P., 868 So.2d 454 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). At the time the father’s petition was filed, the operative statute, former § 12-15-30(a), Ala. Code 1975, provided that “[t]he juvenile court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction of 08) (<HOLDING>). As this court recently stated: “‘[I]n order

    ### Response:
    holding that when evidence did not prove dependency of child as alleged in complaint but revealed pure custody dispute juvenile court was without jurisdiction to determine custody of child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the partnership, and the assets and liabilities of’ it and “declar[e] and determin[e] the rights and obligations of the parties in such regard.” More importantly, by making the request, the Farnsworths imbued the trial court with the discretion to award attorney’s fees in any manner it deemed “equitable and just.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997). That did not mean the trial court was restricted to simply awarding them fees. On the contrary, the blanket of authority arising from the demand for declaratory relief and granted under § 37.009 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code encompassed the discretion to award fees to any party, including the Deavers. First Nat. Bank v. J.E. Mitchell Co., 727 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). So, to the extent that the Deavers incurred

    ### Response:
    holding that fees may be awarded to any litigant involved in the declaratory action in a manner deemed equitable and just by the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should have recognized that, given that appellate counsel's law partner wrote the article, a potential conflict of interest existed and, upon recognizing as much, discharged their duty to inquire as to whether a conflict of interest existed. See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.1994) (""When a district court is sufficiently apprised of even the possibility of a conflict of interest, the court first has an 'inquiry' obligation. The court must investigate the facts and details of the attorney's interests to determine whether the attorney in fact suffers from an actual conflict, a potential conflict, or no genuine conflict at all.""); id. (""When a possible conflict has been entirely ignored, reversal is automatic.”); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Even if he had raised that argument, it would

    ### Response:
    holding that automatic reversal rule applies in habeas petitions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to hold jurisdictional challenges waived by failure to present the jurisdictional issue to the arbitrators.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir.2004). Apache's cryptic references to its jurisdictional argument in its motion to vacate in district court are more troubling, however. Although Apache did present ’n, Int’l, 343 F.3d 401, 410-11 (5th Cir.2003) (""[I]f the relevant bargaining agreement requires just cause for dismissal, an arbitrator acts beyond his jurisdiction by fashioning an alternate remedy once it has concluded — implicitly or otherwise — that an employee's conduct constitutes just cause for dismissal”). See also Weber Aircraft, Inc. v. Gen. Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767, 253 F.3d 821 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 6 . New York, like most states, is an at-will

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitrator had authority to choose between suspension and termination where the authority was vested in the company to suspend andor discharge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.2d 29, 48 (Fla.2000) (citation omitted) (citing Stein v. State, 632 So.2d 1361 (Fla.1994)). “The ‘cold’ element generally has been found wanting only for ‘heated’ murders of passion, in which the loss of emotional control is evident from the facts.... ” Walls, 641 So.2d at 387-88. Here the calm and deliberate nature of the defendants’ actions against the victims establish this element beyond any reasonable doubt. In this instance, the victims were bound and gagged for two hours and, thus, were unable to offer any resistance or provocation. More importantly, during this time the defendants had ample opportunity to calmly reflect upon their actions, following which they mutually decided to shoot the victims execution-style in the backs of the their heads. See Walls, 641 So.2d at 388 (<HOLDING>). With respect to the “calculated” prong,

    ### Response:
    holding executionstyle slaying  by its very nature is a cold crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be added to the composition to pass the microbiological test, depending on the amount of the other ingredients (e.g., pro-pofol and oil) that are present in the composition.” (Def. Mem. at 22.) Plaintiffs counter that the proper construction of “an amount of edetate” is “at least an amount of edetate which is sufficient in and of itself to meet the microbiological test recited in the claim phrase, regardless of the presence of other components in the composition, up to no more than 0.1% by weight of edetate.” (Goldberg Decl. Ex. P. at 5.) Mayne’s proposed definition encompasses the scenario of no edetate in the claimed composition. (Def. Mem. at 21.) Reading an express limitation out of the claim is contrary to case law. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1105 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Texas Instruments Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

    ### Response:
    holding that a court cannot construe claims to read an express limitation out of the claim or render it meaningless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleges that his presentence report contained irrelevant and inaccurate information. Specifically, petitioner contends that the presentence report (1) contained charges for which he was never convicted, (2) described an incident that never occurred, and (3) incorrectly mentioned that he had been released from a training school shortly before the offense for which he was tried. A sentence violates due process if it was carelessly or deliberately pronounced on an extensive and materially false foundation which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, petitioner must show that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to rebut contested information at sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the timeliness of the motion could be waived and Metellus’s failure to object constituted waiver of the claim. Although the Fifth District distinguished this case from Joslin v. State, 826 So.2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Robie v. State, 807 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), it certified conflict to the extent that Joslin and Robie conflict and that they consider rule 3.170 to be jurisdictional. LAW AND ANALYSIS We first address Metellus’s claim that there was a double jeopardy violation. The Fifth District held that no double jeopardy violation occurred. We agree. The double jeopardy clause does not protect a defendant from reprosecution or resentencing if the defendant willfully re fuses to perform a condition of a plea bargain. See, e.g., Melvin v. State, 645 So.2d 448 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla.1994)

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy may be waived pursuant to a bargainedfor plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff-Appellant Barbara Nurczewska appeals the dismissal of her first amended complaint without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Nurczewska’s argument to set aside the foreclosure sale based upon California’s deed-of-trust statutes is misplaced. An agreement between the lender and a non-trustor third party, like Nurczewska, does not void the sale. See Nguyen v. Calhoun, 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 450 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Nurczewska’s breach of contract claim fails

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonstatutory postponement  does not constitute an irregularity in the foreclosure proceeding itself that could justify setting aside a foreclosure sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for forcible sexual abuse ""makes sense only in the unusual case,” because ordinarily ""it is 'difficult to conceive [how] the government could establish force beyond a reasonable doubt yet the [defendant] could prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence' ”) (quoting Gaynorv. United States, 16 A.3d 944, 948 (D.C.2011)). 41 . See, e.g., Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123, 1127 (D.C.2010) (en banc). 42 . See also Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 167 (D.C.2011) (""[I]nvalid provisions are to be severed unless it is evident that without those provisions, the legislature would not have enacted the remaining provisions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 43 . See Gay Rights Coal, of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C.1987) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>). 44 . Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7

    ### Response:
    holding that ordinarily a statute must be construed in a manner which protects its constitutionality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and, Whitney claims, Whitney has been engaged in “settlement discussions” with plaintiffs for the seven months between that time and July 2007, when Whitney sought the Court’s permission to file the instant motion. See Whitney Mem. at 12; Waldner Deck Ex. R (email from Whitney’s counsel to plaintiffs dated 12/21/06); Declaration of Thomas Attonito dated July 18, 2007, ¶ 8 (“Whitney has not filed the instant application to vacate the default until now since I was in negotiations with the Funds in an attempt to settle this matter.”). However, these allegations, even if true, make Whitney’s delay in moving to vacate the default judgment less reasonable, not more so, as they show a conscious decision to delay. See Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 336 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In sum, Whitney has offered nothing that

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that motion to set aside default made at least seven months after defendant learned of entry of default was not made within a reasonable time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    562; In re Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., -S.W.3d at-, 2013 WL 5470089, at *6; Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 839. 7 . See Del.Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2014); Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 839; Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del.1990). 8 . See Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 840; Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del.1990). 9 . See Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 840; Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773. 10 . See Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 840; Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773. 11 . See Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773. 12 . See id. 13 . See id. 14 . See Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 840; Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773. 15 . See Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 773. 16 . Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530, 104 S.Ct. 831, 835, 78 L.Ed.2d 645 (1984). 17 . Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (stating WL 5470089, at *6 (<HOLDING>); Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 839 (holding Texas

    ### Response:
    holding texas law governs procedural matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have applied a spoliation presumption that the contract language specifically negated borrowed employee status. According to Lomeli, this presumption precludes summary judgment, regardless of the balance of the remaining borrowed employee factors. Even if Southwest failed to produce the relevant contract governing Lomeli’s employment and, thus, a spoliation presumption was warranted, this presumption does not automatically preclude summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly found borrowed employee status to exist as a matter of law even when the contract between the employers provides that the worker is to be classified as an independent contractor or that the worker is not considered an employee of the borrowing entity. See Billizon, 993 F.2d at 106; Melancon, 834 F.2d at 1245 (<HOLDING>); Gaudet, 562 F.2d at 358-59; see also Brown,

    ### Response:
    holding that parties to contract cannot prevent borrowed employee status from arising by providing in contract that it cannot arise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    same seven seconds they fell to the ground with Witt and inadvertently struck him on the head with a flashlight. The parties’ dispute as to what actually happened during these seven seconds is critical to the summary judgment analysis, because that dispute goes directly to the reasonableness of the troopers’ use of force. In sum, the documentary evidence in this case — the dashboard video — does not “blatantly contradict[ ]” Witt’s account of the facts; therefore, it “does not establish that the officers are entitled to summary judgment.” See York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210-11 (10th Cir.2008) (refusing to direct grant of summary judgment when an audio tape recorded “only part of the incident involving the [plaintiff] and the police officers”); Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding documentary evidence did not establish that plaintiffs version of events was blatantly and demonstrably false
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requires consideration of whether withholding adjudication of the Electrocution Causes of Action at this time will impose any meaningful hardship on the parties. “The prototypical case of hardship comes from the claimant who faces a choice between immediately complying with a burdensome law or ‘riskpng] serious criminal and civil penalties.’ ” Warshak, 532 F.3d at 526 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 153, 87 S.Ct. 1507). This prototypical hardship is not present in this litigation. The CPEA does not force the Inmates to make any choice. In fact, as already discussed, the CPEA provides for carrying out executions by electrocution if, and only if, one of two statutory contingencies a 2012 WL 113655, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct.App. Jan. 11, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012) (<HOLDING>). The Inmates nevertheless argue that

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs action was ripe where the plaintiff who had received a pardon for three felony drug convictions in georgia and had his firearm rights expressly restored by the pardon asked the court to determine whether a tennessee criminal statute prohibiting anyone convicted of a felony drug offense from possessing a firearm applied to him in light of a tennessee attorney generals opinion stating that the criminal statute applied to pardoned felony drug offenders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a mixed question of law and fact, and we review legal conclusions for correctness and factual findings for clear error. See Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17,¶ 20, 20 P.3d 382. ¶ 8 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Schultz must meet the heavy burden of showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance that fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. See Manning, 2004 UT App 87 at ¶ 31, 89 P.3d 196. ¶ 9 Schultz has failed to make this showing. We agree with the trial court that trial counsel sufficiently explained Schultz’s appellate rights. It is not surprising that Schultz was upset after learning that he was going to prison. Cf. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,¶ 18, 983 P.2d 556 (<HOLDING>). We cannot say, however, that this distress

    ### Response:
    recognizing that most people confronting possibility of lengthy prison sentence would suffer some level of depression
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are higher than in a(b)(2) declaratory/injunctive relief action because “monetary relief ... is less of a group remedy and instead depends more on the varying circumstances and merits of each class member’s case.” Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, No. 06-44, 2007 WL 922288, at *10, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20794, at *33 (E.D.Va. Mar. 23, 2007) (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir.1998)). Consequently, courts are required to provide notice of a certified (b)(3) action to all class members and an opportunity for them to opt-out of the class (so that they will not be bound by any final judgment and can bring individual actions if they wish). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-812, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In this section, the Court will consider the

    ### Response:
    holding that the due process clause requires notice of right to optout of suits for money damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See also St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., supra, 32 N.J. at 22, 158 A.2d 825; Cohen v. Home Ins. Co., supra, 230 N.J.Super. at 82, 552 A.2d 654. Thus, whether or not this action is time-barred should have been determined on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations. While there does not appear to be any New Jersey case directly on point, there are several New York decisions which apply the statute of limitations to gwasi-contract and quantum meruit causes of action. See, e.g., German v. Pope John Paul, II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (1995) (finding that statute of limitations barred action based on breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit theories); Wint v. Fields, 177 A.D.2d 425, 576 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Moors v. Hall, 143 A.D.2d 336, 532 N.Y.S.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the evidence was insufficient for the statute of limitations to bar recovery of a quantum meruit cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    underlying the lawsuit). While this evidence may create a weak inference of wrongdoing, it is minimally probative. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 528-29 (6th Cir.1996) (""Northwest’s rewiring of the CAWS is circumstantial evidence, if only of a weak and suspect sort, that the CAWS as it existed at the time of the accident was not foolproof.”). Even if the evidence is not technically with rule 407's scope: (i) rule 407’s underlying concerns are persuasive when evaluating the probative value of the evidence; and (ii) the circumstances of Montoya’s resignation in light of the other evidence in the record make the inference of wrongdoing one can draw from his resignation a weak one. See Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 82 Fed.Appx. 639, 646-47 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished)(<HOLDING>). 6 . Montoya asserts, relying on Wilks'

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while the evidence at issue was admissible under rule 407 its probative value was minimal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    funds because, prior to their liquidation, the CDs had been payable to another son — the defendant’s brother— upon the father’s death. Id. at 365 (¶ 14). Thus, the court reasoned that “even if the transfers [were] voided, the assets would not return to the estate, but rather to [the defendant’s brother].” Id. at (¶ 15). ¶ 49. Reviewing the issue de novo, we cannot agree that Elva Mae’s surviving sisters were the proper parties to challenge transactions executed in violation of ¡the terms of the POA. A POA “is nothing more than one form of a principal-agency relationship.” Clark v. Ritchey, 759 So.2d 516, 518 (¶7) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing McKinney v. King, 498 So.2d 387, 388-89 (Miss.1986)); see also King Metal Bldgs., Inc. v. Renasant Ins., 159 So.3d 567, 570 n. 8 (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (<HOLDING>). As in any other principal-agent relationship,

    ### Response:
    holding a power of attorney allows a principal to convey to an agent the authority to act on its behalf in identified matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.2d 103, 109-10 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 494 So.2d 334 (La.1986). Stated differently, ""statutes enacted after the acquisition of such a vested property right ... cannot be retroactively applied so as to divest the plaintiff of his vested right in his cause of action because such a retroactive application would contravene the due process guaranties.” Faucheaux, 470 So.2d at 879. 599 So.2d at 1063-64. The Cole court also recognized that ""it is well settled that [the] 1976 amendment prohibiting executive officer suits cannot be retroactively applied to divest parties whose causes of action accrued before the amendment was enacted.” 599 So.2d at 1064, n. 16 (collecting cases and authorities). See also Gautreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 96-2193 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/96), 694 So.2d 977 (<HOLDING>). 5 .The issue presently before us is one of

    ### Response:
    holding that asbestos was not a listed substance in larevstat 2310311 prior to 1975 such that when it caused disease it was covered by workers compensation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conclusion is that the source as alleged and pleaded is not money-mandating, the court shall so declare, and shall dismiss the cause for lack of jurisdiction[.]” (emphasis added)). The Complaint, however, does not allege any requisite legislative act to invoke the Bill of Attainder Clause. Therefore, in this case, the court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Bill of Attainder Clause claim, iii. The Fourth Amendment, The Due Process Clause Of The Fifth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, And Tenth Amendment To The United States Constitution Are Not Money-Mandating. As a matter of law, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment are not money-mandating. See LaChance v. United States, 15 Cl.Ct. 127, 130 (1988) (<HOLDING>) (citing Shaw v. United States, 8 Cl.Ct. 796,

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate the payment of money by the united states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    two prisoners died after being left in an oppressively hot isolation cell for almost fifteen hours. Id. at 1209. We relied on state law to identify the actors responsible for ensuring that the prison did not employ this illegal form of punishment. State law placed an affirmative duty on certain prison officials to inspect the prison facilities. Id. at 1213. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of these defendants, and remanded for the district court to determine their liability. Id. at 1214. See also Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 757, 760 n. 7 (5th Cir.1977) (“when a state official’s violation of state law causes [a constitutional violation], a federal cause of action arises under § 1983”) (citation omitted); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831-32 (5th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). I would first look to state law to determine

    ### Response:
    holding that cause of action exists under section 1983 where mayor and police chief may have had obligation under state law to supervise policeman with alleged history of racial violence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if certain circumstances are met). In Tennessee, however, there is no ""safety valve or means of waiver for the requirement of the appellant’s signature.” In re Gabrielle W., 2017 WL 2954684, at *4. 7 . Even in states that lack a signature requirement, courts have confirmed the importance of a party’s consent to an appeal in a termination of parental rights case. See Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of I.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270 (Ind. 2010) (""If a lawyer is unable to locate the client despite due diligence or if the lawyer cannot get clear instructions from the client with respect to an appeal, the lawyer should not file a notice of appeal.”); In re Adoption/Guardianship of Darjal C., 191 Md. App. 505, 992 A.2d 503, 515 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Welfare of Parzino, 22 Wash. App. 88,

    ### Response:
    holding that attorney lacked standing to file notice of appeal on behalf of client who couldnot be located because the client must make the ultimate decision regarding the appeal internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    responding to defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the videotape from admission into evidence, the trial justice ruled that the audio recorder in the video camera was “the acquiring mechanism which intercepted the oral communications between the parties.” The state has the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275, 1280 (R.I.1993) (“When the state prosecutes a defendant, it carries the burden of proving every element necessary to the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, even if some of those elements may not be disputed.”). In this case, the trial justice “read[] the statute [under which defen dant was charged] and * * * attempted] to summarize the elements in his own words.” State v. Durfee, 666 A.2d 407, 409 (R.I.1995) (<HOLDING>). Merely by failing in the jury instructions to

    ### Response:
    holding that this court has long approved of the practice by which a trial justice reads the statute and    attempts to summarize the elements in his own words
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such an approach. Our long line of precedent demonstrates that despite her massive overhaul, the BETTY LYN II maintained her vessel status during the repair period. Neither the manner of her repair, nor the fact that the needed repairs were so extensive as to temporarily disable her, divested her of her status as a vessel. Indeed our review of the history of maritime liens demonstrates they were designed to encourage repairs on ships in great need. See supra Section III.A. The BETTY LYN II need merely be capable of transportation on water to be a vessel. The law does not require that she be able to self-propel. See Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1307 (noting the “vessel” had to be towed in for repairs); Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, 390 F.2d 596, 597 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Templeton, 378 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a houseboat is a vessel capable of being subject to a maritime lien as the fact that she has no motive power and must  be towed does not deprive her of the status of a vessel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    McKas-kle does not require that a criminal must “speak for himself,” as the majority appears to characterize that case. See Majority Opinion at 743. Instead, McKaskle imposes its limits on the “unsolicited participation” of standby counsel. 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944 (emphasis added). This rule suggests that standby counsel may not usurp the role of the pro se defendant who otherwise wants to participate directly in some stage of the proceedings. McKas-kle does not prohibit a criminal defendant from delegating certain tasks to standby counsel. See id. (“[T]he objectives underlying the right to proceed pro se may be undermined by unsolicited and excessively intrusive participation by standby counsel.”) (emphasis added). Cf. United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). I part company with the majority’s rationale

    ### Response:
    recognizing that faretta right was not eroded where pro se defendant conceded that standby counsel took no action that was not authorized by mills or adopted any strategy or position that was not initiated by mills
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. We have for review Snell v. State, 752 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), in which the district court certified the same question of great public importance that it had in Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) approved sub nom. State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Snell challenges his thirty-year prison sentence under the Prison Releasee Reof-fender Act (the “Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been previously addressed by other opinions of this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). We also find the other issues raised by Snell

    ### Response:
    holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assistance); Middleton, 849 F.2d at 493-95 (counsel’s failure to uncover mitigating evidence of mental illness, physical and sexual child abuse, and drug abuse chronicled in psychiatric, family court, youth services, and prison records, fell outside scope of professionally competent assistance). Rodriguez faults trial counsel for failing to discover mitigating evidence which Rodriguez declined to divulge prior to the penalty phase. Trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance “when the essential and foundational information required to trigger such an investigation is withheld from the defendant’s attorney by the defendant himself.” Miller, 907 F.2d at 999; see Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863, 108 S.Ct. 182, 98

    ### Response:
    holding that trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims to which his client has neglected to supply the essential underlying facts  clairvoyance is not required of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that (1) they qualify as high public officials, and (2) the “allegedly actionable behavior was made in the course of their official duties.” Id. In applying the second element to a defamation claim, Pennsylvania courts evaluate certain factors to “determine whether the statements are closely related to the official’s legitimate duties: (1) the formality of the forum in which the words were spoken or published; and (2) the relationship of the legitimate subject of governmental concern to the person seeking damages for the defamatory utterance.” Id. at 568. Here, there appears to be no dispute that each of the Individual Defendants, except Carolyn Williams, would qualify as a high public official under Pennsylvania case law. See Lindner v. Mollan, 544 Pa. 487, 677 A.2d 1194 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Osiris Enterprise, 877 A.2d 560, 567

    ### Response:
    holding that mayor is a high public official
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Systems, Inc. (""MERS”), but it simplifies the discussion to treat GAMC as the affected party- 2 . After the events in this case, the time period was extended by Congress to 30 days, but the amendment has no effect on this case. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro tection Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-8, § 403 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)). 3 . E.g., In re Superior Stamp & Coin Co., 223 F.3d at 1010; Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir.1986). Other circuits have recognized the doctrine. E.g., In re Kumar Bavishi & Assocs., 906 F.2d 942, 944 (3d Cir.1990); In re Montgomery, 983 F.2d 1389, 1395 (6th Cir. 1993); In re Kelton Motors, Inc., 97 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir.1996); In re Bohlen Enters. Ltd., 859 F.2d 561, 566 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The decisions require that the new creditor

    ### Response:
    recognizing but expressing doubts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motivated by factors not disclosed on the record — are all inappropriate grounds for deciding that the BIA was not compelled to conclude that the vacatur presented by Rumierz met the Pickering standard. Pursuant to a proper analysis, the record compels a finding that Rumierz has met the burden allocated to him by the BIA. 2. Whether the vacatur meets the Pickering standard In order to determine whether a vacatur is tied to a defect in the underlying conviction, rather than rehabilitative or immigration-related purposes, the BIA starts by examining the order itself. See Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 624. Often, the statutory basis for the order will resolve whether the underlying conviction remains valid for immigration purposes. Compare Matter of Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878 (BIA 2006) (<HOLDING>) and Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec.

    ### Response:
    holding that a conviction vacated under ohio revised code  2943031 for the trial courts failure to advise the alien defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea is no longer a valid conviction for immigration purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the nonmovant, then summary judgment should not be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burk, 948 F.2d at 492; Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247. With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of Susie’s Motion for Summary Judgment. B. Analysis 1. Requirements under ADA, The ADA provides in pertinent part that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual____” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Three criteria must be met in order to establish a violation of this s 7, 541 (N.D.Ill.1993) (denying motion to dismiss ADA claims where plaintiff alleged that defendant law school discriminated against him because of his epilepsy); Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of this summary judgment motion

    ### Response:
    holding under rehabilitation act that epileptics are handicapped individuals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (N.D.N.Y.2000); Phipps v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 53 F.Supp.2d 551, 558 (N.D.N.Y.1999). Because the State of New York has not consented to suit in federal court and the Department of Transportation is an arm of the State, plaintiffs claims for money damages against the State of New York, the NYSDOT, and the individual defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.2001); Richman v. Pediatric Serv. Group, LLP, 222 F.Supp.2d 207, 209 (N.D.N.Y.2002); Hayut, 127 F.Supp.2d at 340; Phipps, 53 F.Supp.2d at 558. B. Individual Liability Under Title VII and the ADA It also is settled that there is no individual liability under Title VII. See Wrighten v. Glowski, 232 F.3d 119, 120 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no individual liability under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    collection action was in privity with client-creditor). Finally, CCSI is in privity with Citibank SD because CCSI represents similar interests and legal rights to the underlying debt as its corporate affiliate Citibank SD. See FWB Bank v. Richman, 354 Md. 472, 731 A.2d, 916, 930 (1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (“Privity in the res judicata sense generally involves a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.”). Third, whether claims are “identical” for res judicata purposes is determined by the transactional test: do they “arise[] out of the same transaction or series of transactions”? Laurel Sand & Gravel, 519 F.3d at 162; accord Long v. Burson, 182 Md.App. 1, 957 A.2d 173, 187 n. 16 (2008); Sheahy, 284 F.Supp.2d at 281 (<HOLDING>). In other words, even if a claim or defenses

    ### Response:
    holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 3161(h)(7) to a defendant, the delay must meet the reasonableness requirement of § 3161(h)(6),” and noting that the reasonableness requirement “comports with Supreme Court precedent”); United States v. Stephens, 489 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir.2007) (“Attribution of the excludable delay of one co-defendant to another co-defendant is not, however, automatic; rather the period of delay must be reasonable”) (citing Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326-27, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986)); United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 599 (8th Cir.1998) (applying reasonableness requirement to and finding reasonable an 80-day delay in co-defendant’s trial resulting from another co-defendant’s capture and identity hearing); United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 336 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 460

    ### Response:
    holding that the codefendant clause exclusion requires a defendant to make a motion for severance in order to benefit from the reasonableness limitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 832, 834 (6th Cir.2013) (considering the district court’s written opinion memorializing a prior oral ruling, even though opinion was written after notice of appeal); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir.1991) (same); Blaine v. Whirlpool Corp., 891 F.2d 203, 204 (8th Cir.1989) (same). In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that a sentencing court has jurisdiction to issue a post-judgment, post-appeal supplemental order detailing its rationale for a sentencing departure because such an order facilitates, rather than interferes with, the review of the appeal. See United States v. Vernier, 152 Fed.Appx. 827, 835-836 (11th Cir.2005). 2 . Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Skilling, No. 4:04-CR-25-2

    ### Response:
    holding honest services statute covers only bribery and kickback schemes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basis for his claim. Since Mr. Smith failed to develop the factual basis for his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, an evidentiary hearing will not be held unless both elements of Section 2254(e)(2) are met. Mr. Smith claims that he was unfit to stand trial.and that appellate counsel should have presented that claim on his direct appeal. It is well-established that a defendant’s due process is violated if the prosecution tries him when he is not competent to stand trial. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992). Finding, however, that Mr. Smith was unfit to stand trial does not show that he was innocent of the underlying offense as required by Section 2254(e)(2)(9). See Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 103 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), judgment vacated,—U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 37, 139

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section 2254e2 on whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a fitness hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the area where the encounter occurred as “known for drug trafficking.” This conclusion is likewise unsupported by the proof adduced at the suppression hearing. Nevertheless, the dissent concluded: “the encounter occurred late at night in an area known for drug trafficking. Only moments earlier, Detective Lockwood ... had witnessed a number of hand-to-hand drug transactions.... It is my opinion that when the defendant ran, the Detective had reasonable suspicion to pursue and further investigate.” Because the determination of the constitutionality of a seizure is so fact-intensive, we cannot overstate the importance of an accurate assessment of the proof as drawn from the actual evidence adduced at the trial court level. The proof in this case simply does not support a fin rim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). And, as previously indicated, an individual’s

    ### Response:
    holding that ones presence in a high crime area late at night without more will not justify an investigatory stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under Title VII, states, in relevant part, “Each United States district court ... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The issue before this Court is whether Ballard’s claims solely for attorney’s fees and costs are “actions brought under this subchapter,” or, posed differently, whether Ballard can recover costs arising out of administrative and state proceedings. The Second Circuit has not specifically addressed this question. In fact, it explicitly declined to do so. See Nestor, 466 F.3d at 70, n. 4 (2d Cir.2006) (“We need not and do not decide whether a fees only suit may be brought under Title VII.”) (emphasis added). This question has split other Circuit Courts. Compare Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 858

    ### Response:
    holding that title vii plaintiff may bring suit to recover attorneys fees after successfully litigating before a state administrative body
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    extrinsic corroborating evidence of the victim’s acts of violence is admissible to show defendant’s . state of mind, we now hold the lesser-that a defendant claiming self defense may show his own state of mind by testifying that he knew of the victim’s prior acts of violence. Therefore, the district court erred when it held that Saenz could not, as a matter of law, show his state of mind at the time of his attack by testifying that he knew about the victim’s past acts. Moreover, the error was not harmless. By excluding the evidence, the district court prevented Saenz from supporting his claim of self-defense. Error cannot be harmless where it prevents the defendant from providing an evidentiary basis for his defense. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 134 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Saenz’s conviction is reversed.

    ### Response:
    holding that erroneous exclusion of evidence regarding defendants lack of criminal record was not harmless in prosecution for drug offenses in which defendant asserted entrapment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    existed here. Plaintiffs also argue that the Pennsylvania minority tolling principle applies to toll the two-year statute of limitations on Plaintiffs Section 504 claims. (See Pis.’ Mot. for J. of Admin. R. 16-18.) Plaintiffs’ argument for minority tolling could only apply to P.P.’s claims on his own behalf—not to the Parents’ claims on his behalf. Pennsylvania’s minority tolling statute provides, If an individual entitled to bring a civil action is an unemancipated minor at the time the cause of action accrues, the period of minority shall not be deemed a portion of the time period within which the action must be commenced. Such person shall have the same time for commencing an action after attaining majority as is allowed to others sburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The court need not consider whether

    ### Response:
    holding that although the statute of limitations ran on the parents action the child could bring action after majority was reached
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her due process by depriving her of “any procedure by which she could claim” successor permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Schoemehl. Her claim is without-merit. We addressed and rejected the same claim in Carter I, where Mrs. Carter argued “that her right to due process was violated because there was no procedure available to her to litigate her right to Schoemehl benefits.” 606 S.W.3d at 373. Carter I held: If [Mrs.] Carter’s dependency at the time of [Mr, Carter’s], iryuiy had been established as a matter of law in thp final award, it would have preserved the issue of her contingent right to Schoe-mehl benefits for future determination by the Commission. See, e.g., State ex rel. ISP Minerals, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 465 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Mo. banc 2015) (<HOLDING>). Had the issue of [Mrs.] Carter’s contingent

    ### Response:
    holding that where a workers compensation settlement which was akin to a final award left the issue of the employees entitlement to compensation for future medical care indeterminate and open the commission retained the authority to determine the extent of the employers liability for the open claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The trial court further concluded that it was “an abuse of discretion to single out and penalize [Woodruff] for the same circumstances presented by and to other license holders.” While the board of county commissioners of the county in which an applicant for a retail liquor license seeks to operate “shall have discretion to approve or disapprove the application depending on whether it deems the applicant a suitable person to hold such license and whether it considers the proposed location suitable,” SDCL 35-2-1.2; Luke v. Mellette Cnty., 508 N.W.2d 6, 7 (S.D.1993), this court’s scope of review of a trial court’s decision in a trial de novo is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous. See Yadco, Inc. v. Yankton Cnty., 89 S.D. 651, 237 N.W.2d 665, 669-70 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the issue presented on appeal is

    ### Response:
    holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    weapon was a deadly weapon per se or a firearm. Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Crumpton has now added to this list by allowing the trial court to find the jury made an affirmative deadly weapon finding by finding the defendant guilty of homicide. See Crumpton, 301 S.W.3d at 664. Here, as in Crumpton, the jury found McCallum guilty of criminally negligent homicide. Under Crumpton, therefore, the jury necessarily made an affirmative finding that McCallum used a deadly weapon — namely, “the hand of the defendant ... [which] caus[ed] Pribyl to fall and strike his head on the ground.” The law is well-settled that both a hand and the ground can be deadly weapons — that is, objects capable of causing death. See Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Johnston v. State, 150 S.W.3d 630, 639

    ### Response:
    holding hand can be deadly weapon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of laches in these circumstances and the appropriate remedy that flows therefrom. III. A. Because foreclosure proceedings seek primary or principal relief which is equitable in nature, a complaint in foreclosure is properly cognizable in the General Equity part of the Chancery Division. See R. 4:3 — 1(a)(1); Weinstein, New Jersey Practice § 28.5 (2000) (“A foreclosure action seeking a sale of the mortgaged premises ... should ordinarily be brought in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey”). And, it has long been the law of New Jersey that an application to open, vacate or otherwise set aside a foreclosure judgment or proceedings subsequent thereto is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Wiktorowicz v. Stesko, 134 N.J. Eq. 383, 386, 35 A.2d 696 (E. & A.1944) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason to depart from settled

    ### Response:
    holding that in proceedings in foreclosure  the application to open the decree was addressed to the discretion of the court  and that appellate courts will not undertake in such a case to review the order for the purpose of determining whether it shall substitute its discretion for that of the court of chancery quoting masionis v romel 101 nj eq 780 782 138 a 892 e  a1927
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d at 1054; and Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d at 862. 166 . Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373, 1381-82 (5th Cir.1994). 167 . See Board of Commissioners, Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown,-U.S. at---, 117 S.Ct. at 1388-89; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1299-1300 (plurality); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 121-22, 108 S.Ct. at 923; Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d at 1381-82; Gonzalez v. Ysleta ISD, 996 F.2d 745, 752-60 (5th Cir.1993); Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d at 244-45, Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d at 392; and Benavides v. ■County of Wilson, 955 F.2d at 972-73. 168 . See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 916 F.2d 284, 286 (5th nter, Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir.1977), (<HOLDING>); and In re Zorrilla, 115 B.R. 894, 897

    ### Response:
    holding that a default judgment could not be rendered after defendants counsel telephoned plaintiffs attorney to request additional time within which to answer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by “offenses that result from the advertising of your products or work,” language found in one of the disputed policies). Because the causation language is missing in the policies here, however, these decisions are not directly applicable. Second, the policy definition in this case does not include the terms “unfair competition” or “piracy” which are the somewhat open-ended terms on which expansive claims of coverage have traditionally been laid. See, e.g. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F.Supp. 77, 79 (N.D.Cal.1989) (finding that the term “piracy” could incorporate patent infringement). Two recent California Supreme Court decisions plainly set forth the analysis which this court must use in deciding the motion: Bank of the West, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (<HOLDING>), and AIU Insurance Co. v. FMC Corp., 51 Cal.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an insureds payments for violations of the state unfair business practices act calbus  profcode  17203 are not insurable damages under the insureds advertising injury insurance policies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.’ ” Coastal Group, Inc. v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 274 N.J.Super. 171, 179, 643 A.2d 649 (App.Div.1994)(quoting N.J. Stat. § 56:8-2). To bring a NJCFA claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are “consumers,” and that the items they purchased are “merchandise.” See R.J. Longo Constr. Co. v. Transit Am., 921 F.Supp. 1295, 1311 (D.N.J.1996). A “consumer,” while not defined by the NJCFA, has been described as “ ‘one who uses (economic) goods, and so diminishes or destroys their utilities.’ ” Windsor Card Shops v. Hallmark Cards, 957 F.Supp. 562, 567 (D.N.J.1997)(quoting Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster, 212 N.J.Super. 350, 355, 515 A.2d 246 (1986)). “Merchandise” is defined by the NJCFA as “any objects, wares 515 A.2d 246 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs cite to these cases in support of

    ### Response:
    holding that a company who purchased computer parts to use in its computers is a consumer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wilson, 716 So.2d 1160 (Ala.1998). The present case, while factually somewhat similar, is clearly distinguishable from Ex parte Hood. In Ex parte Hood, the defendant failed to give notice of its intention to enforce the arbitration agreement until three months after the case had been removed to the federal court and two months after the parties’ counsel had met to discuss how the federal litigation would proceed. This Court stated: “We might assume that if [the defendant] Golden had immediately followed its removal with service of its answer pleading an arbitration defense, such action would have been sufficient to put Hood on notice that Golden still intended in the federal court to reserve its right to seek arbitration. Cf. Terminix Int’l Co. v. Jackson, 669 So.2d 893, 896 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>). Filing an answer at such a time might have

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Raising a Copyright Claim Defendant argues that Micro Focus fails to plead a copyright infringement claim with regard to Net Express because its application is still pending witli the U.S. Copyright Office. (D.I. 6 at 4; see D.I. 1 at 3, ¶ 9). 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) requires that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” Courts ¿re divided as to whether a pending application to the Copyright Office (the “application” approach) or an issuance of the registration (the “registration” approach) is required to file a copyright infringement claim. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 615-16 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The Third Circuit has not yet addressed this

    ### Response:
    recognizingthat the fifth and seventh circuits have adopted the application approach whereas the tenth and eleventh circuits have adopted the registration approach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    scheme that creates a separate financial risk for the financial institution constitutes a separate execution.”); United States v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir.1999) (“[T]he crime of bank fraud is complete when the defendant places the bank at a risk of financial loss, and not necessarily when the loss itself occurs.”); United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir.1994) (stating that to determine what constitutes an execution of a bank fraud scheme one must first “ascertain the contours of the scheme”); United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir.1993) (finding that bank fraud plan was executed with each deposit of a bogus check in part because “it was the deposits that put the bank at risk”); see also United States v. Reitmeyer, 356 F.3d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). There are of course situations where conduct

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of the major fraud act that determining when a scheme is executed will depend on factors including the goal of the plan its nature the benefits intended and whether the conduct created a new and independent financial risk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be reserved for clemency actions. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417, 113 S.Ct. 853 (acknowledging that the traditional remedy for claims of actual innocence based on late findings of newly-discovered evidence has been executive clemency); Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir.1999) (“[WJhen available, state clemency proceedings provide the proper forum to pursue claims of actual innocence based on new facts.”) The argument that clemency is the proper course to pursue using newly-discovered evidence still supports Cherrix’s claims for DNA testing. Section 848(q) of Title 21 of the United States Code encompasses claims for a habeas petitioner’s compensation of fees incurred during Virginia state clemency proceedings. See Strickler v. Greene, 57 F.Supp.2d 313, 317-18 (E.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803

    ### Response:
    holding that  848q allows funding for services that are reasonably necessary in the habeas petitioners pursuit of clemency from the governor of virginia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    know of the condition. The defendants contend that the trial court’s dismissal order should be upheld on this basis. We agree that the plaintiffs failed to allege this necessary premises-defect element. Moreover, we disagree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that we can infer this element from the pleadings. Nevertheless, the court of appeals did not err in reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding, because the plain tiffs’ pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable jurisdictional defect, but merely a pleading deficiency. Because the trial court did not rule on the defendants’ special exceptions and allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their pleadings, omitting this element cannot support the trial court’s judgment. See Herring, 513 S.W.2d at 9-10 (<HOLDING>); see also 7 William V. DoRSA-neo III, Texas

    ### Response:
    holding that when the allegations do not affirmatively negate a claim dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only when the plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend after special exceptions have been sustained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to search the house, and, while appellant was handcuffed in the back of the patrol car, the officers told him that if he did not consent, his mother and young son would be required to vacate the house while the officers secured the residence, despite the officers having no basis for doing so. After this threat was made, appellant spoke to his mother; appellant then agreed to sign the written consent to search. The officers’ threats to remove appellant’s family from the residence are what lead appellant ultimately to consent to a search of his residence. Such antagonistic action by the police against a suspect’s family is a factor which significantly undermines the voluntariness of any subsequent consent given by the suspect. See United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 403-04 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 560-61

    ### Response:
    holding consent invalid where defendant threatened by officer that everyone in the house would go to jail if he did not sign consent form
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Jackson, Georgia, their state habeas petitions are filed in Butts County. 16 . See Turpin, 498 S.E.2d 52; Head v. Ferrell, 274 Ga. 399, 554 S.E.2d 155, 166-67 (2001) (finding no error in state habeas court’s consideration of mental retardation claim under miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default under Turpin); Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56, 63 (2007) (finding that petitioner had not established mental retardation, but noting that ""the habeas court was correct in considering this new claim, because this Court, under the ‘miscarriage of justice’ exception to the rule of procedural default, has authorized habeas courts to consider alleged mental retardation when the issue was not raised at trial”); Hall v. Lewis, 286 Ga. 767, 692 S.E.2d 580, 593 (2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Rogers v. State, 276 Ga. 67, 575

    ### Response:
    holding unappealed finding by habeas court that petitioner was mentally retarded under miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default rendered moot new sentencing trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1993) (Lyons II), we concluded that the earlier dismissal of the case did not bar the plaintiff from invoking the savings statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-126, and refiling his complaint: [To] toll the limitations period and to invoke the saving statute, a plaintiff need only file his or heir complaint withing the statute of limitations and complete timely service on a defendant. A court’s later ruling finding that completed service invalid does not disinherit the plaintiff from the benefit of the saving statute. Lyons II, 315 Ark. at 177, 866 S.W.2d at 374; see also Thomson v. Zufari, 325 Ark. 208, 924 S.W.2d 796 (1996); Hicks v. Clark, 316 Ark. 148, 870 S.W.2d 750 (1994); Green v. Wiggins, 304 Ark. 484, 803 S.W.2d 536 (1991); Nelson v. Wakefield, 282 Ark. 285, 668 S.W.2d 29 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, here we are upholding the circuit

    ### Response:
    holding failure to complete timely service on defendant prevented plaintiff from invoking savings statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    very fact that an alternative deadline is tied to the schedule for collection of the tax verifies this reading of “tax year.” {¶ 18} Finally, our construction of “tax year” is borne out by the BTA’s consistent application of this deadline for filing valuation complaints; in both of the following BTA cases, the BTA found that jurisdiction did not exist, based upon the “tax year” constituting the year when the value was determined — what Toledo calls the “assessment year” as opposed to the “collection year.” See Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (Apr. 8, 1994), B.T.A. Nos. 1993-K-1088 and 1993-K-1089 (complaint filed in March 1992 found to be untimely to contest value as assessed for 1990); Bill v. Ottawa Cty. Bd. of Revision (Nov. 5, 2004), B.T.A. No. 2004-A-920 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, we hold

    ### Response:
    holding that a complaint contesting a propertys valuation for tax years 19881994 would have had to have been filed by march 31 of the year following the tax year in question ie march 31 1989 through march 31 1995
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that licensing regulation does not reflect any congressional intent to completely regulate Miller Act sureties. If anything, the cited regulation indicates an administrative desire to utilize, rather than preempt, state regulation of sureties. The operation of the Miller Act and various authorities support the conclusion that the Miller Act does not totally occupy the field. For example, a Miller Act suit on the surety bond is not a subcontractor’s exclusive remedy. See, United States For and on Behalf of Sunworks, etc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 695 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.1982) (allowing subcontractor to sue bonded general contractor for quantum meruit recovery); United States ex rel. Mobile Premix Concrete, Inc. v. Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., 515 F.Supp. 512 (D.Colo.1981) (<HOLDING>). Federal courts have also found it necessary

    ### Response:
    holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    others in any one crash ... Fla. Stat. § 324.021(7). There is nothing in § 324.021(9)(b)(2) that imposes any penalties or liabilities on lessors of motor vehicles who do not maintain these minimum levels of insurance. While not dispositive, Florida case law supports the Court’s interpretation that § 324.021(9)(b)(2) is simply a cap on strict vicarious liability damages and nothing more. See, e.g., Lewis v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 912 So.2d 349, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“The legislature enacted section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes, in order to limit such liability and to shift responsibility for damages arising out of motor vehicle accidents from innocent owners and lessors of motor vehicles to those at fault.”); Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Hughes, 833 So.2d 832, 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Folmar v. Young, 591 So.2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that  3240219b2 merely limits the liability of shortterm lessors the statute reduces responsibility for damages arising from the fault of others but preserves full liability for compensatory damages caused by ones own fault the statute merely caps the amount of damages for the vicarious liability of the lessor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the edict that every administrative proclamation, fiat, or decree constitutes a rule mandating the rigors that appellant would apply to this case. Words such as “rule,” “impact,” “procedure,” et cetera, must contain within their syllables an alphabetical concatenation: the application of practicality and reasonableness, and the actual on-the-site effect upon the agency as well as upon the employer of whatever has been promulgated. Were East correct, any system within an agency that determines who should proceed against whom would be an APA matter of intrusion, domination, or substantive regulation. We would foresee aeons of rulemaking proceedings when all the agency seeks to do is operate in a rational manner. Cf. Donovan v. Union Packing Co. of Omaha, 714 F.2d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1983) (<HOLDING>). It has been almost three years since OSHA

    ### Response:
    holding constriction of secretarys independent subpoena power to be inconsistent with enforcement of osh act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the more clear in light of the materials on which we relied in our agency analysis in Laurel Baye. All the sources we cited dealt with an agent who had authority to speak finally on the principal’s behalf with permanent legal effect. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.07(4) (2006) (explaining that an agent’s actual authority to affect its principal’s legal relations expires when the principal’s power to act is suspended); 2 William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 504 (2008) (same, with respect to the resignation or termination of the delegating authority); Id. § 421 (“If there are fewer than the minimum number of directors required by statute, [the remaining directors] cannot act as a board.”); Emerson v. Fisher, 246 F. 642, 648 (1st Cir.1918) (<HOLDING>). In every case the cited rule prohibits an

    ### Response:
    holding that a corporate treasurers delegee lacks authority to disburse corporate funds after the treasurer himself resigns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s suppression ruling on any ground made manifest by the record). Hornbecker and the government agree that Rugen detained Hornbecker between 8:02 p.m. and 8:11 p.m., and that the lawfulness of the detention is appropriately analyzed under the Terry line of cases. Hornbecker and the government also concur that, because most of the period between Rugen’s request for the Volkswagen’s papers and his completion of the written warning was attributable to Horn-becker’s initial inability to locate the papers, whether Rugen lawfully detained Hornbecker during this period essentially depends on whether Rugen’s request to inspect the papers was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Citing interests in regulating motor vehicles

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the lawfulness of a detention whether a terry stop or a full custodial arrest is determined by a factspecific application of a legal standard designed to help courts assess whether the police action was objectively reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court’s legal conclusions de novo, including “state law legal issues.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). III. For its first argument, the Glasser Pension Plan asks this court to dismiss the appeal outright for alleged fraud on the court relating to the bankruptcy court’s order permitting the Brocks to withdraw the settlement agreement. There is no merit to this argument, which is nothing more than an end run on an order that has not been appealed to either the BAP or this court. As to the merits, the parties agree that Colorado law applies. They also agree that Colorado law recognizes the general rule that a creditor can reach a debtor’s assets placed in trust to the same extent that the debtor is entitled to reach such assets. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429, 433 (Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). They

    ### Response:
    holding creditors can reach assets of trust to the same extent as the maximum amount that would be payable to the beneficiary in the trustees discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    filed suit seeking both monetary and injunctive relief against the University and various of its officers and agents (collectively the “defendants”), alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The University, which the plaintiffs concede is a state entity, moved to' dismiss the Equal Pay Act claim, as well as the claim for compensatory relief under Title VII, arguing that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over these claims. The district court denied the defendants’ Eleventh Amendment defense, and the defendants appealed that decision to this Court under the collateral order doctrine, see Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In our initial consideration of this case, we

    ### Response:
    holding that the collateral order doctrine allows for immediate appellate review of the denial of an eleventh amendment immunity claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63. B. Detention During Delay in Investigation Although the length of a detention may render a traffic stop unreasonable, there is no rigid, bright-line time limitation. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 679, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1571, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Instead, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria. Id. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 1575. The reasonableness of the duration of a detention depends on whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Id. at 686, 105 S.Ct. at 1575. In determining the reaso 834, at *1 (Tex.App.-Austin Mar. 7, 2007, pet. refd) (mem.op.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Dickson v. State, No. 03-06-00126-CR, 2006 WL

    ### Response:
    holding delay in dwi investigation primarily for arrival of rookie officer for purpose of training was reasonable because delay furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for maintaining or discontinuing criminal prosecutions is vested almost exclusively in the district and county attorneys, and not in the trial judges. Accordingly, a Texas trial court has no authority to dismiss a case, either on the defendant’s motion or on the court’s own motion, unless the prosecutor consents or the dismissal is otherwise authorized by constitution, statute, or common law.”) (footnotes omitted). “While a trial court is thus authorized to dismiss an accusation, it may not do so in a manner ‘impermissibly interfer[ing] with the State’s right to prosecute.... ’ State v. Aldridge, 259 Ga.App. 673, 674(1), 577 S.E.2d 863 (2003).” State v. Carr, 287 Ga.App. 691, 692, 652 S.E.2d 597, 598 (2007). In District of Columbia v. Cruz, 828 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C.2003), the tr (<HOLDING>). “Countervailing the principle of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court was not authorized to dismiss misdemeanor charges without the states consent on the basis that the state had refused to consent to fishers waiver of a jury trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    marriage in question. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (“Although no longer possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, they remain a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations.”); Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1305 (D.N.M.1999) (examining the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes and law of the place in Federal Torts Claims Act case); Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751, 752 (N.M.1975) (<HOLDING>). The contracting parties engage in a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that laws of the navajo tribe are entitled by federal law to ml faith and credit in the courts of new mexico because the navajo nation is a territory within  9 dnm2003 determining validity of a navajo couples marriage by examining required elements of common law marriage under navajo lawbnavajo law currently recognizes multiple ways to establish a valid marriage it recognizes both those marriages contracted outside the navajo reservation if valid by the laws of the place where contracted and those within the reservation under the requirements of title 9 of the navajo nation code navajo code recognizes both traditional and common law marriage navajo code tit 9  3 and 4 1993 because the alleged marriage in this case spans more than a fiftyyear period a proper understanding of the evolution of navajo law on traditional and commonlaw marriage is required to resolve the validity of the jarvisons marriageunder navajo tradition celebration of a traditional marriage ceremony and the knowledge thereof by the community were sufficient to create a valid marriage a marriage license or other documentation was unnecessary see in re francisco 16 indian l rep 6113 after participating in the traditional navajo wedding ceremony some couples do not obtain marriage licenses because traditionally the performance of the ceremony completely validates the union see also antoinette sedillo lopez evolving indigenous law navajo marriagecultural traditions and modern challenges 17 ariz j intl  comp l 283 292 2000 navajo marriages have been governed by tribal statute since 1940 when the tribal council passed a resolution requiring navajo couples desiring to marry in a traditional ceremony to obtain a marriage license see lopez supra at 293 navajo tribal council res cj240 june 3 1940 recognizing that the overwhelming number of navajo who have not been t 1980 recognizing difficulty in obtaining government benefits caused by inability to validate traditional marriagesin 1944 the tribal council validated preexisting marriages recognized by the community even though not accompanied by church state or tribal custom ceremony see unnumbered navajo tribal council res amending cj240 july 18 1944 in re francisco 16 indian law rep 6113 see also navajo code tit 9  8 the 1944 amendment was the precursor to the current  8 recognizing that navajo couples had continued to marry through unlicensed traditional ceremonies in 1954 the tribal council adopted a resolution validating all prejanuary 31 1954 navajo marriages that were out of compliance with earlier navajo tribal council resolutions requiring a license david l lowery developing a tribal common law jurisprudence the navajo experience 19691992 18 am indian lrev 379 405 1993 in re francisco 16 indian l rep 6113 navajo tribal council res cf254 feb 11 1954 codified at navajo code tit 9  61 1977 amended by navajo tribal council res cap3680 apr 30 1980 in 1957 the tribal council recognizing the frequent necessity of documentary proof of marriage established a procedure allowing those whose prior marriages were validated by the 1954 resolution to petition for a formal recognition of marriage through the navajo courts navajo tribal council res cf1457 feb 4 1957 although the 1954 resolution requiring marriage licenses was passed to avoid problems in obtaining government benefits for dependents by encouraging tribal members to obtain marriage licenses navajo courts subsequently validated customary marriages that occurred after the january 31 1954 date as common law marriages thus achieving the same result see lowery supra at 405 in re marriage of daw 1 navajo rptr 1 3 navajo ctapp1969 ten years later the navajo courts acknowledging the language of the 1954 tribal council resolution again held that any marriage contracted by tribal custom after january 31 1954 may not be validated by the tribal court but is recognized as a common law marriage in re marriage of ketchum 2 navajo rptr 102 105 navajo ctapp1979 the courts in re ketchum opinion listed the requirements of a common law marriage as 1 present consent to be husband and wife 2 actual cohabitation and 3 actual holding out to the community to be married lowery supra at 40506 in re ketchum 2 navajo rptr 102 104105 citing kelly v metropolitan life ins co 352 fsupp 270 sdny1972 listing essential features of common law marriage and meister v moore 96 us 6 otto 76 24 led 826 1878 deciding that common law marriage exists absent a statute to the contraryin 1980 the tribal council eliminated the january 31 1954 cutoff date for the validation of traditional navajo marriages that had been entered into without licenses recognizing both that the navajo people had continued to marry in traditional ceremonies since 1954 and that the law of validated marriages has created problems and hardships for numerous married navajo people lopez supra at 296 navajo tribal res cap3680 apr 30 1980 however in an effort to encourage the move toward formalization and to ease the problem of accurate record keeping the tribal council urged the navajo people to obtain navajo tribal marriage licenses pri or to marriage and record them within three months by eliminating the cutoff date the council allowed all traditional marriages to be validated extending federal benefits normally afforded to married couples to those navajo couples who were recognized in the community as being married and who considered themselves spiritually united in accordance with navajo cultural and religious tradition lopez supra at 296 citing navajo tribal council res cap 3680 apr 30 1980although the supreme court of the navajo nation confirmed the institution of common law marriage in a 1988 decision navajo nation v murphy 6 navajo rptr 10 in 1989 it ruled that navajo tradition and culture do not recognize commonlaw marriage and overruled all prior rulings permitting navajo courts to validate unlicensed marriages in which a navajo traditional ceremony had not occurred lowery supra at 406 in re marriage of francisco 16 indian l rep 6113 navajo 1989 while declaring anglostyle common law marriages invalid as contrary to navajo tradition in in re francisco the navajo supreme court reaffirmed its responsibility under cap 3680 to validate unlicensed marriages consecrated with a traditional ceremony lowery supra at 406 in re francisco 16 indian l rep 6113 lopez supra at 299 in 1993 the tribal council rejected the navajo supreme courts holding in in re francisco invalidating common law marriages and explicitly included common law marriages in the navajo code navajo nation code tit 9 sec 3 1993 lopez supra at 299current navajo law allows parties to contract marriage through a traditional ceremony or by commonlaw marriage within the navajo nation as followsi
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the two principal parties to translate their votes into representation with equal effectiveness. See infra Part III.B.2.b. According to Plaintiffs, a variety of measures of the 2016 Plan’s partisan symmetry reveal that, throughout the life of the plan, supporters of non-Republican candidates will likely have a significantly more difficult time translating their votes into representation. Legislative Defendants are correct that none of these empirical analyses appear in the Constitution. But Plaintiffs need not show that a particular empirical analysis or statistical measure appears in the Constitution to establish that a judicially manageable standard exists to resolve their constitutional claims. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Plaintiffs must identify cognizable

    ### Response:
    holding that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10 falls within the category of minor deviations  from mathematical equality among state legislative districts that are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the fourteenth amendment notwithstanding that the plain language of the constitution references no such statistical threshold
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this case based on the fact that Claimant is on WC disability. However, Homony is a UC case and Claimant is seeking UC benefits in the instant case. Thus, Homony is controlling. Moreover, the law is well-established that “[a]n employer has a right to expect an employee who is on sick leave to report back to work when cleared to do so by his physician or at least to notify his employer of his reasons for failing to return.” Geesey, 381 A.2d at 1344 (emphasis added). Thus, an employee’s failure to act in this reasonable manner in communicating with her: employer regarding her ability to return to work constitutes willful misconduct. Id. The Majority recognizes that “the [UCBR] relies upon Oliver v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa.Cmwlth. 98, 450 A.2d 287 (1982) (<HOLDING>).” Majority Op. at 1239. It further notes: It

    ### Response:
    holding that claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. 4 . See State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, ¶ 13, 133 P.3d 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 . The legislature renumbered Title 78 during the 2008 General Legislative Session. Because the language is identical, we cite to the newly numbered statute. 6 . See Mountain Am. Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1993). 7 . See Blackner v. Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 8, 48 P.3d 949; Hall v. State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 11, 24 P.3d 958. 8 . Blackner v. Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 949. 9 . Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978). 10 . Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971); Pace v. St. George City Police Dep't, 2006 UT App 494, ¶ 6, 153 P.3d 789. 11 . Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (1997). 12 . Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grov 8) (<HOLDING>). 20 . 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). 21 . Id.

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain meaning of section 63301010 retained immunity for injuries occurring while the incarcerated person is in prison and under control of the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.”) (footnote omitted). 12 . Cooper argues that the government’s theory throughout the trial was that Cooper had leased the Lounge to Rosaline Pamela Campbell, known as Jamaica Pam; consequently, according to Cooper, only one offense had been violated — the act of executing one lease. In contrast, the government asserts that its theory was that Cooper had made the unit available on at least six occasions and received compensation each time; consequently, Cooper was guilty of multiple crack house violations. Our review of the record indicates that the government focused on ""making the Lounge available” as opposed to merely leasing it. 13 . See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98

    ### Response:
    holding that the crime of rape is a lesser included offense of the crime of felony murder in the perpetration of rape and that since the latter crime included all of the elements of the former consecutive sentences were therefore improper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    performance and thereafter filed an emergency motion to discharge the lis pendens, or in the alternative, to require FM to post a bond. The trial court first ruled on and denied the emergency motion to discharge the lis pendens, and thereafter, the trial court granted the homeowners’ motion for summary judgment as to FM’s claim for specific performance. In these appellate proceedings, the parties agree that this Court’s determination as to the trial court’s ruling precluding FM from proceeding on its claim for specific performance is dispositive of whether the lis pendens must be removed from the property because without a sustainable action for specific performance, the lis pen-dens must be discharged. See Blue Star Palms, LLC v. LED Trust, LLC, 128 So.3d 36, 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Lake Placid Holding Co. v. Paparone,

    ### Response:
    holding that a complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    providing this coverage simply because Plaintiffs chose to file for benefits in another state that may also have jurisdiction. If the interpretation propounded by General Casualty is adopted, then it is conceivable that a North Carolina employer who had policy with this provision - but providing coverage for benefits required under North Carolina law - would be afforded no coverage under its policy for an accident occurring in North Carolina where the employee chose to file for benefits in another state that might also have jurisdiction. For instance, another state may assert jurisdiction because the injured employee originally accepted the employer’s offer of employment while in the that state. See Murray v. Ahlstrom Indus. Holdings, Inc., 131 N.C. App. 294, 506 S.E.2d 724 (1998) (<HOLDING>). General Casualty, which drafted the policy

    ### Response:
    holding that north carolina has jurisdiction over a claim arising from an accident in mississippi because the original offer of employment was accepted over the telephone while the employee was in north carolina
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the LRR includes tables listing individual Owners, their specific § 10 permits, and the number and size of their pipelines. Indeed, portions of the LRR discuss requiring Owners to bear pipeline relocation costs according to the § 10 permit power. {E.g., “The cost for removal and replacement of pipelines and docking facilities located within the area of navigation servi tude are not included in the cost estimate because these costs are owner costs, not project costs.”) Owners contend, erroneously, that WRDA-86 precludes the Corps’ exercising § 10 permit authority to enforce the navigational servitude. For obvious reasons, Congressional waiver of this servitude must be express. See, e.g., United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707, 107 S.Ct. 1487, 94 L.Ed.2d 704 (1987) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to

    ### Response:
    holding waiver of navigational servitude will not be implied but instead must be surrendered in unmistakable terms 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    raping Almand was a private act not accomplished because of “power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible oMy because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 59, 108 S.Ct. at 2255 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), reh’g denied, 314 U.S. 707, 62 S.Ct. 51, 86 L.Ed. 565 (1941)); cf. Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589 (5th Cir.1996) (concluding rape of criminal suspect by sheriff was under color of state law when rape victim knew sheriff was investigating her case and where sheriff overcame her resistance by intimidation linked to Ms authority: “I can do what I want, I’m the sheriff’), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 68, 136 L.Ed.2d 29 (1996); Dang Vang, 944 F.2d at 479 (<HOLDING>). Considering that Bryant gained entry to the

    ### Response:
    holding that jury could have reasonably concluded from expert testimony showing plaintiffs  as hmong refugees  were in awe of government officials that the defendant used his government position to exert influence and physical control over the plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to recover money already disbursed, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 5302, 5314, 5112(b)(6), the time spent on making these decisions, and then revoking benefits awarded and initiating recovery of payments, can never be reclaimed by the Secretary if a legal interpretation by this Court is later reversed. Cf. Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3rd Cir.2000) (“The irreparable harm requirement is met if a plaintiff demonstrates a significant risk that he or she will experience harm that cannot adequately be compensated after the fact by monetary damages.”). Second, occasionally a decision of this Court may invalidate the procedures used by the Secretary in a manner that would require a serious restructuring of the VA workforce. See, e.g., Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 171 (1991) (<HOLDING>). For a case on appeal to the Federal Circuit,

    ### Response:
    holding that board panels may consider only independent medical evidence to support their findings resulting in va altering its longstanding practice of including members of the board with medical expertise on each panel and relying on their medical opinion in rendering board decisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    likelihood of confusion between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ trade dress. Finally, plaintiffs offer no eviden-tiary support for their eighth claim, alleging false advertising. A. Plaintiffs’ Misappropriation, Breach of Contract and Fraud Claims 1. The Threshold Requirement of “Novelty” A plaintiff asserting misappropriation of her idea must establish that her concept is sufficiently novel to be entitled to legal protection under New York law. “New York law dictates that an idea, whether embodied in a product and called a trade secret or otherwise reduced to concrete form, must demonstrate novelty and originality to be protect[a]ble as a property right under ‘[any] cause of action for [its] unauthorized use.’ ” Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 995 F.2d 1173, 1178 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, with out novelty, no cause of action

    ### Response:
    holding that new york law requires the same showing of novelty in trade secret claim as in submission of ideas claim and quoting murray v natl broadcasting co inc 844 f2d 988 994 2d cir1988
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    District — namely, the press’s “unique role and interest in observing government activity in our democracy” insofar as it is charged with disseminating information to and educating the public — PG Publishing has standing to maintain this action. 604 A.2d at 1225. III. Next, PDE asserts that PG Publishing has failed to establish a right to relief under the RTKL because agencies have no duty under the RTKL to retain records for any period of time. It points to Section 507 of the RTKL providing that “Nothing in this act shall be construed to modify, rescind or supersede any record retention policy or disposition schedule of an agency established pursuant to law, regulation, policy or other directive.” 65 P.S. § 67.507; see also Paint Township v. Clark, 109 A.3d 796, 808 (Pa.Cmwlth.2015) (<HOLDING>). In short, just as Section 705 of the RTKL, 65

    ### Response:
    holding that record retention was not modified by and is expressly recognized by the rtkl
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(3); 9601(29). As discussed in Section B of this opinion, PERC, a hazardous waste, did leak into the ground of the facility at issue and entered the environment. Therefore, there has been a ""disposal” as defined by the statute. 95 . Defs.’ Post-Trial Br. at 6 (Docket No. 326) (citing Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981)). 96 . See, e.g., Gen. Battery, 423 F.3d at 298 (quoting Exxon Corp g proof of personal ownership or physical possession as a precondition for liability frustrates CERC-LA's broad remedial purposes); United States v. Union Corp., 259 F.Supp.2d 356, 393 (E.D.Pa.2003) (citing Aceto); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F.Supp. 56, 60 (D.N.H.1984) (""Mottolo I"") (<HOLDING>); R.R. Street II., 166 S.W.3d at 242 (citing

    ### Response:
    holding that section 107a3 clearly states that arrangers need not own or possess the waste
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Parenti v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 826, 829, 586 N.E.2d 1121. {¶ 14} The Johnsons asserted a number of claims in their complaint, including violations of the Ohio Securities Act, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, invasion of privacy, respondeat superior, promissory estoppel, and fraudulent misrepresentation. In their brief, the Johnsons have addressed only their negligent-misrepresentation, fraudulent-misrepresentation, Ohio Securities Act, and respondeat superior claims. This court will limit its discussion to those claims. See State ex rel. Moore v. Malone, 96 Ohio St.3d 417, 2002-Ohio-4821, 775 N.E.2d 812, at ¶ 39 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, before this court can determine

    ### Response:
    holding that a party waived the claims she failed to pursue in her merit brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her bias more than apparent. On cross-examination, Stephan-Blackwell admitted that she was dating Lundgren in 2003, at which time she was still lying to the SEC about her involvement in this case. She further admitted that she approached the government about immunity only after she separated from Defendant and that shortly after she received immunity she became engaged to Lundgren. Moreover, Defendant raised all these issues in his closing. Because the limitations placed on Defendant’s cross-examination of Stephan-Blackwell did not deprive Defendant of the ability to attack Stephan-Blackwell’s credibility and reveal any potential bias, the limitations cannot be said to have deprived Defendant of the opportunity to defend himself. Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). e. Cumulative Effect of the District Court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants right to crossexamine a witness for bias or motivation to lie is not grounds for reversal where the jury had enough information despite the limits placed on otherwise permitted crossexamination to assess the defense theory of bias or improper motive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that such authority might be granted upon showings of particularly extraordinary circumstances. 91 B.R. 655, 656-57 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1988); see In re Munoz, 111 B.R. 928, 931 (D.Colo.1990) (for a creditor to assert an avoidance power, “courts have found it imperative that the creditor first seek approval from the bankruptcy court”); In re Curry & Sorensen, Inc., 57 B.R. 824, 828 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (creditors lacked standing to bring avoidance action without prior court approval); In re Toledo Equip., 35 B.R. 315, 320 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1983) (creditors committee must first make appropriate showing that debtor-in-possession has un justifiably failed to prosecute preference action before commencing action itself); see also In re Chernicky Coal Co., Inc., 67 B.R. 828, 832 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986) (<HOLDING>). We therefore do not foreclose the possibility

    ### Response:
    holding that creditor who did not seek authorization from bankruptcy court could nevertheless assert claim under  549 in chapter 11 case because appropriate circumstances were shown  ie there was no trustee to file the claim the debtor had no reason to file a claim and the successful avoidance of the transfer would have increased the debtors liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of action and requires parties to raise in a single lawsuit all the grounds for recovery arising from a single transaction or series of transactions that can be brought together. See Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1563 (Fed. Cir.1996); Hawkins v. Dawn, 208 Tenn. 544, 548, 347 S.W.2d 480, 481-82 (1961); Vance v. Lancaster, 4 Tenn. (3 Hayw.) 130, 132 (1816). The principle is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that it will not be applied if the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation. See Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 279 (2d Cir.1986); Carris v. John R. Thomas & Assocs., P.C., 896 P.2d 522, 529-30 (Okla.1995); see also Rose v. Stalcup, 731 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Restatement of Judgments points

    ### Response:
    holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the exceptions to the preservation requirement). Finally, Defendant argues that her BAC results should have been excluded because the test was not performed within three hours of arrest, as required by 7.33.2.15(A)(2) NMAC. We note that this regulation has been superseded by statute. Section 66-8-110(E) (“If the test performed pursuant to the Implied Consent Act is administered more than three hours after the person was driving a vehicle, the test result may be introduced as evidence of the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath at the time of the test and the trier of fact shall determine what weight to give the test result.”). Any time lapse impacts the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. See State v. Bowden, 2010-NMCA-070, ¶¶ 8-12, 148 N.M. 850, 242 P.3d 417 (<HOLDING>). II. Validity of the Search Warrant Next,

    ### Response:
    holding that where a statute and regulation conflict the statute generally prevails and also explaining that section 668110e permits test results taken more than three hours after the person was driving to be admitted into evidence and gives the fact finder the discretion to give appropriate weight to the results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confronting witnesses or evidence against him.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (citations omitted). The defendants’ constitutional claim here is therefore properly brought under the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth Amendment, because the challenged events occurred before any witnesses or evidence were brought against the defendants. Under the Fifth Amendment, a defendant “has a [constitutional] right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Fare th Cir.1996) (recognizing the Rule 43 right to presence for all portions of the voir dire), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414, 138 L.Ed.2d 179 (1997); United States v. Alessandretto, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949, 101 S.Ct. 2031,

    ### Response:
    holding that absence of defendants from part of voir dire discussing trial publicity with prospective jurors was error under rule 43
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and that an application that is signed by a representative of the applicant is invalid. Additionally, in Taylor v. Cox, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that § 17-10-4, Ala.Code 1975, makes no exception or accommodation for a person physically incapable of making his or her own signature, and suggested that the Legislature reconsider the wording of the statute. Although the record indicates that Evans informed Rosia and Sharon that Sharon could sign Rosia’s name, testimony did not indicate that Evans acted willfully. “A ‘willful’ act may be described as one ‘done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.’ ” Padgett v. State, 36 Ala.App. 355, 357, 56 So.2d 116 (1952) (<HOLDING>). In Parker v. Sutton, 47 Ala.App. 352, 254

    ### Response:
    holding that while registering to vote a defendant who falsely replied that he had never been convicted of a crime did so as the result of inadvertence or ignorance and his action did not constitute a willful act of perjury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines. Permissive consecutive sentencing, however, is available only under the limited circumstances listed in Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F. The state’s argument fails to consider the plain language of the sentencing guidelines, which states: “The use of consecutive sentences in any other case constitutes a departure from the guidelines!)]” Thus, the imposition of consecutive sentences for reasons other than those set forth in Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F. constitutes a departure from the sentencing guidelines and requires the existence of substantial and compelling reasons identified on the record by the district court, notwithstanding the parties’ plea agreement for consecutive sentencing. See State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 71 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Minn.Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5(2)

    ### Response:
    holding that negotiated plea agreements that include a sentencing departure are justified under the guidelines in cases where substantial and compelling circumstances exist but a plea agreement standing alone  does not create such circumstances in its own right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to him because his relationship with the plaintiff was a tenancy at sufferance. Id. at 574. We disagreed, holding that when the tenancy at sufferance follows “the termination of a conventional leasehold relationship,” RSA chapter 540-A applies. Id. at 575, 576. We explained that when the legislature enacted RSA chapter 540-A, it intended to “remove[ ] the landlord’s common law right to self-help in evicting a residential tenant whose tenancy at sufferance was preceded by a different leasehold tenancy.” Id. at 575. We observed that RSA 540-A:2 generally prohibits a residential landlord from attempting to “circumvent lawful procedures for eviction pursuant to RSA 540,” and that RSA chapter 540 applies to tenancies at sufferance. Id.; see AIMCO Props. v. Dziewisz, 152 N.H. 587, 589 (2005) (<HOLDING>). “Therefore, when RSA 540-A:2 . . . forbids a

    ### Response:
    holding that current version of rsa chapter 540 applies to tenancies at sufferance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sheriffs are state constitutional officers, such that the deputies they appoint are also deemed to be state officials, rather than employees of the counties in which they serve. Mack, 929 So.2d at 483; Whitten v. Lowe, 677 So.2d 778, 779-80 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); see also Lockridge v. Etowah County Corrin, 460 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Ala.Civ.App.1984) (recognizing that only the sheriff, not the county commission, was authorized to promulgate work rules or grant leaves of absence for deputy sheriffs); Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 379 (11th Cir.1989) (“We can find no authority in Alabama law granting the county commission the authority to hire and fire deputy sheriffs.... ”). As a result, a deputy sheriff is not generally subject to a merit system covering county employees, see Whitten, supra (<HOLDING>); see also Hooks v. Hitt, 539 So.2d 157, 159

    ### Response:
    holding that sheriffs deputies were not employed in the service of marshall county and that the county personnel board therefore had no jurisdiction to review their respective terminations ordered by the sheriff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The question before us is whether the officers’ entry into Yvette Sugura’s apartment, upon which they discovered evidence tending to incriminate Mr. Miles, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment despite the absence of a search warrant. The government argues that the search was justified by the officers’ objectively reasonable belief that Mr. Miles was both living in and present in the apartment at the time of the search. Aplee Br. at 6-12; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (“[A]n arrest warrant founded on probable case implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In the alternative, the government argues

    ### Response:
    holding that payton does not require that the arrestee actually reside in the residence searched provided that the officers had a reasonable basis for believing that the arrestee both 1 lived in the residence and 2 could be found within at the time of entry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the place of those defendants for the purposes of the third-party action. 3 . This statutory provision, as well as Miss.Code Ann. § 83-3-107, discussed infra, were repealed, revised and recodified in 1987. See Miss.Code Ann. § 83-2-1, et seq. Since these prior provisions were effective at the time the insurance policy at bar was issued, they control this court’s determination rather than the statutes currently in force. 4 . It is also interesting to note that Judge Wingate relied in part upon the decision of International Ins. Co. v. Love, No. Civ-86-64-A (W.D.Okla. Feb. 23, 1987). McMullan, 1990 WL 483731 at *16. The value of that decision was effectively voided by a later Tenth Circuit decision. F.D.I.C. v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 975 F.2d 677, 682, 683 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Gary v. American Cas. Co. of

    ### Response:
    holding failure to gain approval of insurance board for endorsement did not void regulatory exclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under section 227(c).” Id. at 6590 n. 124. The FCC further explained that a seller may face vicarious liability “under a broad range of agency principles, including not only formal agency, but also principles of apparent authority and ratification.” Id. at 6584 ¶ 28. The Courts have diverged on the appropriate deference that should be accorded Dish Network and prior FCC rulings in this area under Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Compare Gomez, 768 F.3d at 878 (“Because Congress has not spoken directly to this issue and because the FCC’s interpretation [of the TCPA in Dish Network ] was included in a fully adjudicated declaratory ruling, the interpretation must be afforded Chevron deference.”) with Mais, 944 F.Supp.2d at 1243 (<HOLDING>) and Toney v. Quality Res., Inc., 75 F.Supp.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a prior fcc ruling regarding vicarious liability under section 227b was not entitled to chevron defer ence because it contradicted the tcpas plain language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with debtor information and CPA drafted and sent letters directing debtors to send their payments and all other communications directly to TCI. The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), holding that plaintiff had stated a claim under § 1692a(6) by alleging that “TCI is merely renting or borrowing CPA’s name and letterhead to assist in its own debt collection activities.” Id. at *4. The court finds that plaintiff sufficiently alleges that defendant is operating as the debt collector when GCS mails the initial letter. The letter states that the debtor’s file “will be referred” for collection, indicating that it has not yet been referred to any collection agency. See, e.g., Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Services, Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the evidence reveals that GCS never

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of the phrase will be reported in a letter supports an inference that since the account may be reported to a collection agency the ostensible debt collector debtor assistance is not such an agency though the court noted that the unsophisticated consumer might just as easily draw the opposite inference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served. Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the conduct of public business. Id. at 495, 95 S.Ct. at 1046. Thus, once certain information is in the public domain, as it is here, the entitlement to privacy is lost. This is the case even when the information in question is part of a federal income tax return. Cooper v. Internal Revenue Service, 450 F.Supp. 752 (D.D.C.1977) (<HOLDING>). Not only is there no right of privacy for

    ### Response:
    holding that tax returns and tax return information cannot regain their confidential status once the returns have become part of the public record by their use in a public trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Miller, as excessive. We agree and reverse. Based on the testimony as presented at the wife’s temporary relief hearing, the court found that the husband has a net monthly income of $11,666. It ordered him to pay $2,580 per month in basic support to the wife and, on top of that amount, also required that he pay her monthly expenses totalling approximately $9,000. It further ordered that he pay her $30,000 as temporary attorney’s fees and $10,000 as temporary costs. The basic temporary support and expense awards together constitute nearly all of the husband’s net monthly income. As such, we find that the present award places an undue burden on the husband based on the record evidence and findings as to his ability to pay. See Benenfeld v. Benenfeld, 705 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>); Chereskin v. Chereskin, 665 So.2d 1133 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that a husband cannot be required to pay a support award that exceeds his financial ability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Association. Even if these facts were rele vant, this court, as a general rule, “will not enlarge the record on appeal with evidence not before the district court.” McIntosh v. Partridge, 540 F.3d 315, 327 (5th Cir.2008). Even liberally construed, Legrand’s brief does not adequately set forth an argument on appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 28; Stevens, 535 Fed.Appx. at 359; see also Jacobson v. Clay, 72 Fed.Appx. 999 (5th Cir.2003) (finding inadequate appellants’ briefs that “do not cite authority and consist of con-clusory assertions”). Although Legrand attempts to articulate claims of error in her reply brief, this court does not normally entertain arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 459 n. 3 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ramirez, 557 F.3d 200, 203

    ### Response:
    holding an argument made in plaintiffs reply brief but not in their opening brief waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for negligent acts. The plaintiff argues that to construe RSA 508:14,1, as the defendants suggest would be in derogation of the common law. As set forth above, statutes in derogation of the common law are to be interpreted strictly. Sweeney, 151 N.H. at 241. Other jurisdictions that have interpreted similar statutory provisions have construed the phrase “any person” as referring to “any person as a member of the general public.” Conant, 51 P.3d at 1267; see also Snyder, 634 N.E.2d at 761 (“We believe that the purpose of the Recreational Use Act would not be advanced by applying the Act to a situation where an owner does not open his property to the public, but simply invites a few private persons to a picnic.”); Perrine, 911 P.2d at 1293 (same); LePoidevin by Dye, 330 N.W.2d at 563 (<HOLDING>). These courts have recognized that to hold

    ### Response:
    holding that immunity is limited to the general public because the court does not presume that the legislature intended  to work a wholesale change in the entire law relating to the obligations of all landowners to all entrants to the land including social guests invited to the premises for recreational purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concedes this, noting that a “factual finding” interpretation of these figures, including the “zero-release” figures, is the less likely of the two possibilities— the other being that the figures were intended only as decisionmaking devices. Id. at 481. 59 . Looking to the future, and commanded by Congress to make policy, a rule-making agency necessarily deals less with “evidentiary” disputes than with normative conflicts, projections from imperfect data, experiments and simulations, educated predictions, differing assessments of possible risks, and the like. The process is quasi -legislative in character. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 735 (D.C.Cir.1974). Accord, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 60 .The original S-3 rulemaking record on

    ### Response:
    holding that agency may promulgate rules based on qualitative appraisal of risk when scientific knowledge provides no answer to crucial issues of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. N.E. Power Co., 133 N.H. 753, 756, 584 A.2d 179, 181 (1990). We base our judgment on this question of law on the trial court’s findings of fact. See Robbins v. Lake Ossipee Village, Inc., 118 N.H. 534, 536, 389 A.2d 940, 941 (1978). Clear and unambiguous terms of a deed control how we construe the parties’ intent, see Lussier, 133 N.H. at 756, 584 A.2d at 181, but the law may imply supplemental rights. See Sakansky v. Wein, 86 N.H. 337, 339, 169 A. 1, 2-3 (1933). The overriding principle defining the parties’ proper exercise of their rights is the rule of reason, which gives “detailed definition to rights created by general words either actually used” in the deed “or, whose existence is implied by law.” Id. at 339, 169 A. at 2; cf. Robbins, 118 N.H. at 536-37, 389 A.2d at 942 (<HOLDING>); White v. Hotel Co., 68 N.H. 38, 43, 34 A.

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not err in finding implied right to use and enjoyment of beach in deeded right of way to beach
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may “receive the records of the administrative proceedings” and also “hear additional evidence.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). It conducts a “modified de novo” review of the administrative proceedings, M.N. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 700 F.Supp.2d 356, at 363-64, No. 09 Civ. 20, 2010 WL 1244555, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010), and must base its determination “on the preponderance of the evidence,” § 1415(i)(2)(C). The court has “broad authority to grant appropriate’ relief, including reimbursement for the cost of private special education when a school district fails to provide a FAPE.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2492, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009); see Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985) (<HOLDING>). M.H. and E.K. v. New York City Department of

    ### Response:
    holding that idea authorizes reimbursement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment procedure. But the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b) motion. See Edward H. Bohlin Co., 6 F.3d at 357 (“Gross carelessness, ignorance of the rules, or ignorance of the law are insufficient bases for 60(b)(1) relief.”). The Sangis also contend that the district court should have granted the motion to reconsider based on newly discovered evidence. Rule 60(b)(2) permits relief for evidence “which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(2) relief because the record indicates that the Sangis did not pursue discovery with due diligence. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Martech USA, Inc., 993 F.2d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sangis have failed to show that

    ### Response:
    holding a movant must demonstrate that it exercised due diligence in obtaining the information to succeed on a motion brought under 60b2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    there was no explicit mention of assumption and because there was some uncertainty about the notice to Harris’ creditors. We find neither rationale supports the ruling. We agree that assumption under section 365 requires the express approval of the court, In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co., 715 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir.1983); In re Kelly Lyn Franchise Co., 26 Bankr. 441, 445 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1983); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 11365.03, at 365-25 (L. King 15th ed. 1985), but conclude the requirement was satisfied. It is not seriously disputed, and there is no finding to the contrary, that the whole purpose of the stipulation was to effect an assumption of the Fort Ord contract, as revised to permit the government’s withholding. Cf. In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co., 715 F.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Harris indicated its intent to assume the

    ### Response:
    holding there was no assumption where neither the bankruptcy court nor the debtor exhibited any intention of assuming the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    absence. 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a); see R. at 341. In reviewing the 1997 Board decision for CUE, the 1999 Board decision likewise construed the regulation as requiring some type of evaluation by the adjudicators of the veteran’s offered reasons, adequately explained its mstances” Did Not Exist The appellant’s final argument, that the 1997 Board committed CUE when it found that the record did not contain adequate objective evidence to render his reasons “compelling,” amounts to no more than a disagreement with how the Board weighed the facts and, as such, cannot serve as a basis for establishing CUE. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d)(3) (2001); Crippen and Fugo, both supra. The Court notes that although the appellant in his reply brief (see Carbino v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 507, 511 (1997)) (<HOLDING>), referred to evidence of record (Reply Br. at

    ### Response:
    holding that raising issue for first time in reply brief is contrary to courts rules of practice and procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under Rule 16, under today’s ruling only the trial court can compel production of data, and the decision to do so is discretionary. In any event, we do not read Super.Ct.Crim.R. 16(b)(2) to conflict with our ruling here. Rule 16(b)(2) states: Except as to scientific or medical reports, this paragraph does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case.... Usually, any report made by an agent of the defendant that could form the basis of intended expert testimony would take the form of a scientific or medical report and so would not fall within this rule. Even were such a report to take another form, however, Rul D.C.1977) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Nor is it likely that, even if relevant

    ### Response:
    holding that superctcrimr 16 is to be construed consistently with the federal rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir.1999) (“[T]he burden of authentication does not require the proponent of the evidence to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity____Rather, the standard for authentication, and hence for admissibility, is one of reasonable likelihood.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[a]uthentication of course merely renders [audio] tapes admissible, leaving the issue of their ultimate reliability to the jury,” and any doubts raised at trial concerning their reliability “would ... go to the weight to be given to the tapes by the jury, not to their admissibility.” Tropeano, 252 F.3d at 661; see also United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). McLaurin argues that the admission of the

    ### Response:
    holding that allegations of tampering went to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interpreted NRS 616C.025(1) Barrick argues that the appeals officer erred in ruling that filing either a notice of injury or a claim for compensation satisfies NRS 6160.025(1). Instead, Barrick contends that NRS 6160.025(1) requires the filing of both a notice of injury, pursuant to NRS 6160.015(1), and a claim for compensation, pursuant to NRS 6160.020(1). Thus, if an employee fails to file either a notice of injury or a claim for compensation, the employee is, at least presumptively, barred from receiving benefits. We agree. The construction of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. See State, Dep’t of Mtr. Vehicles v. Lovett, 110 Nev. 473, 476, 874 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1994); see also American Int’l Vacations v. MacBride, 99 Nev. 324, 326, 661 P.2d 1301, 1302 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, in interpreting statutes,

    ### Response:
    holding that this court may independently review the administrative construction of a statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Club Housing v. L.R., 62 So.3d 351, 363 (Miss.2010) (“L.R. also argues, for the first time on appeal, that it would be unconstitutional for this Court to deny her those damages [on economic cost of raising a child], given that pain and suffering damages have a statutory cap. This Court declines to consider the constitutional argument, as it comes too late and is not properly before the Court.”); Williams v. Skelton, 6 So.3d 428, 430 (Miss.2009) (“This Court finds that Williams’s assertion that [the sixty-day-notice requirement in] [S]ection 15 — 1— 36(15) is unconstitutional is procedurally barred because she raises the issue for the first time on appeal, and she did not give the trial court the opportunity to rule on this issue.”); Powers v. Tiebauer, 939 So.2d 749, 754-55 (Miss.2005) (<HOLDING>); Cockrell, 865 So.2d at 360 (declining to

    ### Response:
    holding constitutional challenge to section 93991 raised for the first time on appeal was barred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have been within the six-year statute of limitations that the court found applicable to claims under the LAD. In Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 627 A.2d 654, 659 (1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a two-year statute of limitations for claims under the LAD. However, the Mon-tells court also held that its decision did not apply to cases pending at that time or to cases in which the operative facts arose before the date of the court's decision, see id. at 662, circumstances present here. 9 . The parties have not argued thal we need apply New Jersey procedure to the New Jersey claims, and we will apply the federal rules to both. See Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 139-40 (2d Cir.1994); cf. Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., Inc., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Salas by Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 905-06

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal rule favoring admissibility of relevant evidence applies to state law claims in federal cases to which state law privileges might oth erwise apply
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    may be proceeded against for the same offense by another indictment or information. Id. at 443-44, 330 A.2d at 173 (citations omitted); see also Hooper v. State, 293 Md. 162, 169 n. 3, 443 A.2d 86, 90 n. 3 (1982) (“[I]f jeopardy had attached at the trial, the nol pros on appeal will ordinarily operate as an acquittal of the underlying charges because of double jeopardy principles.”); Ward, 290 Md. at 91, 427 A.2d at 1017 (“[A] nolle prosequi, without the defendant’s consent and after jeopardy attaches, ‘amounts to an acquittal’ of the underlying offense.”); Friend v. State, 175 Md. 352, 356, 2 A.2d 430 (1938) (“The nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the accused ... placed this defendant in double jeopardy.”); cf. Bynum v. State, 277 Md. 703, 709, 357 A.2d 339, 342 (1976) (<HOLDING>). C. Nolle Prosequi as Dismissal The State

    ### Response:
    holding that although double jeopardy prohibited subsequent prosecution for offenses charged in counts dismissed by a nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the accused after jeopardy has attached it had no application in the context of the same prosecution which continues on other counts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    knew it to be untrue. UJI 13-1003. We find nothing in Bernstein’s deposition to indicate that he knew the statements to be untrue. To the contrary, Bernstein stated that the tension between the parties affected his relationship with both parties and he was inclined to take “steps backward” from both of them. He also described Defendant as an “elder statesman of anthropology and respected for the work he did amongst Huichol people.” Given this context, there is a factual dispute for the jury to resolve as to whether Bernstein knew the statements to be untrue. These statements should have gone to a jury. {28} As to the statement made to O’Donnell, it is too vague to be evaluated or found defamatory. Therefore, it is non-actionable. See Leyba v. Renger, 874 F.Supp. 1218, 1221 (D.N.M.1994) (<HOLDING>); Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618

    ### Response:
    holding statement leyba did not have the full support of the men in the anesthesia group not defamatory because it was vague had elements of fact and opinion and did not specifically address professional skills or credentials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See id. Marrero concedes in her amended complaint that on May 3, 2002, she received a letter informing her of the Housing Department’s intention to remove her from office. This letter, along with a second letter, required her to appear at an informal meeting to discuss the removal proceedings. She attended the meeting and was given a full opportunity to respond to each of the allegations. Even drawing all inferences in Marrero’s favor, the process provided her in this pre-termination hearing comported with due process guarantees by providing her notice and an opportunity to be heard. As a result, the pre-termination hearing provided constitutionally adequate process without necessitating a post-termination hearing. See Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 43-44 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 2. Equal Protection Claim Under the Equal

    ### Response:
    holding that due process requires no irreducible combination of pre and posttermination hearings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cell occupied by Bostic and two other inmates. Appellant seeks to attack disciplinary action taken against him for making, possessing, or using intoxicants on the ground that his guilty plea was involuntary. Appellant alleges that the hearing officers were aware that he pled guilty to the violation, of which he was innocent, only because he was under extreme stress due to threats made against him by his co-defendants (his two cell mates). The district court dismissed. In a criminal trial, a guilty plea must be the voluntary expression of the defendant’s own choice. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 14 nd these procedural protections to proceedings less formal than state and federal criminal trials. United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1296-99 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the IDC was not constitutionally

    ### Response:
    holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court stated: [T]his argument-ignores the explicit language- of the [“charge” exception]. There is no dispute that the [National Park Service], which operates Fort Jefferson, does not charge a fee for entry into the Park. The fact that licensing fees are charged to boat and seaplane charter operators or that fees are charged by private taxi services for transportation purposes does not change the fact that no charge is made for entering or using the park area. Id. at 1582; see also Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir.1996) (“Because there was no entrance fee, or any other fee of any kind, paid in the instant case, we conclude the ‘charge’ exception to [Arkansas’s recreational use statute] does not apply.”); Wilson v. United States, 989 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kirkland v. United States, 930 F.Supp. 1443,

    ### Response:
    holding that 2 per personper night fee paid by boy scout troop to spend the night at army military post was not a charge to enter onto the land or for use of the land and therefore did not fall within the charge exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the value of the claims, relying in large part on the allocation of the burden of proof in jurisdictional matters. Id.; see Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir.2012) (declining to weigh the evidence and determine whether the value of the plaintiffs actual damages exceeded the value of the offer of judgment only because (a) the trial court had failed to conduct any jurisdictional fact finding and (b) the court of appeals was not empowered to make factual findings in the first instance). When a plaintiff makes a specific demand in the complaint for damages, or otherwise specifies the value of his or her claims, an offer of judgment in excess of that value will be held to moot the case. Warren, 676 F.3d at 372. Such specification may c d 180, 189-90 (3d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); McCann, 458 F.3d at 286 (“a presumption in a

    ### Response:
    holding that a presumption in a civil case is burst upon the introduction of a minimal quantum of evidence leaving behind only the evidence and inferences to be judged according to the appropriate allocation of the burden of persuasion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notebook was open, Special Agent Itnyre testified that the other books appeared to be of a similar nature, and the fact that they were partially located under the couch created reasonable suspicion that they contained evidence. (See Hr’g, Gov. Ex. 16.); see United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir.1983); cf. Whitten, 706 F.2d at 1013 (“There was nothing facially incriminating about the closed notebook from which the DEA agents could reasonably have concluded that it might contain evidence of crime.”). In conjunction, all of this information gave Special Agent Itnyre probable cause to believe that all the notebooks and papers, not just those where writing was visible, were associated with criminal activity. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1013 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>) implied overruling on other grounds recognized

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain view exception justified the seizure of a tablet of paper that was open to a page reading move cars to new place calls sammy roscoe 10 gallons big glass beads 60 degree adaptor the incriminating nature of which was readily apparent in the context of an investigation into largescale methamphetamine manufacture and distribution operation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    592 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 440 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In addition, in Table and non-Table eases, a petitioner bears a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-13(a)(1)(A); Althen, 418 F.3d at 1278 (citing Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 165 F.3d 1344, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). And so, a petitioner must offer evidence that leads the “trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact’s existence.” Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1322 n.2 (brackets existing) (internal quotation omitted); see also Snowbank Enter. v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 476, 486 (1984) (<HOLDING>). To establish a prima facie case when

    ### Response:
    holding that mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under a lease agreement which the appellant purportedly executed on behalf of a professional association. Although the named professional association utilized by the appellant on the lease agreement was not a duly incorporated entity, the appellant maintained that the parties understood that it was merely an abbreviated name for appellant’s duly incorporated entity. The appellee, however, counters that at all times, its lease agreement was with the appellant solely as an individual and that in any event, where the appellant knowingly executed a contract on behalf of a non-incorporated entity, the appellant was individually liable as a matter of law. See § 607.0204, Fla.Stat. (1993); Royal Dev. and Management Corp. v. Guardian 50/50 Fund V, Ltd., 583 So.2d 403, 405, (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the appellee’s assertion, our

    ### Response:
    holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    broker to seek condemnation. In the circumstances of voluntary con ons for condemnation of property, if the seller and the broker agreed to, and did, pursue condemnation as an acceptable substitute for a sale, then the broker should be entitled to a commission when the property is condemned. If, however, the seller specifically authorized the broker to pursue only a sale, then the broker would not be entitled to a commission for a condemnation. In this case, it is undisputed that a valid oral contract existed whereby, at least, Mclver would act as broker to obtain the sale of Topsail, and would receive a two ). Whether the parties have validly modified a contract is usually a question of fact. See Kiwanis Club of Little Havana, Inc. v. de Kalafe, 723 So.2d 838, 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); cf. Transammonia Export Corp. v. Conserv,

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a contract has been modified by subsequent oral agreement or course of dealing is a question of fact for the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Unlike Batson, several significant witnesses, including Respondent, minor Appellants, and Roe, have already been deposed. Testimony elicited during those depositions created at least a mere scintilla of evidence as it relates to whether Respondent either knew or should have known that Mr. Bibby posed a specific threat of harm to the children that Respondent invited into her home. See Bass v. Gopal, Inc., 395 S.C. 129, 134, 716 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2011) (citing Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009)) (“In a negligence case, where the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence standard, the non-moving party must only submit a mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”); Bishop, 331 S.C. at 88, 502 S.E.2d at 82 (<HOLDING>). Although the circuit court placed emphasis on

    ### Response:
    holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    master’s overall holding that the petitioner’s evidence had not met the preponderance of the evidence standard for Althen prong three); Hodges v. Sec’y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 962 & n. 4 (Fed.Cir.1993) (noting the special master’s consideration of all of the petitioner's evidence, and affirming his finding that the evidence fell short of meeting the preponderance of the evidence burden for the petitioner to establish causation). 39 . The court notes, however, that a balance must be struck between the Daubert analysis, as it used in Vaccine Act cases, and the guiding principle that petitioners' “experts’ ultimate conclusions [are not required to] be generally accepted in the scientific community.” Cedillo, 617 F.3d at 1339; see also Capizzano, 440 F.3d at 1325 (<HOLDING>). 40 . The special master's finding was ""most

    ### Response:
    holding that requiring  general acceptance in the scientific or medical communities to establish a logical sequence of cause and effect is contrary to what we said in althen 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.” Simon v. Pfizer Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 775 (6th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Keeping these countervailing principles in mind, this court has held that in deciding whether an issue is within the scope of an arbitration agreement courts should “ask if an action could be maintained without reference to the contract or relationship at issue. If it could, it is likely outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.” Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir.2003). This court has applied this method to determine whether particular torts or challenges to the validity of the contract itself are within an arbitration clause. See, e.g., Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395-96 (<HOLDING>); Highlands Wellmont, 350 F.3d at 576-77

    ### Response:
    holding that alleged theft of funds is within arbitration clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “procedural ruling[s] that cannot serve as the basis for a determination that [the plaintiff] prevailed.” See OCAW, 288 F.3d at 458. Accordingly, the plaintiff “did not obtain relief on the merits because it sought documents, not merely a search therefore.” Plaintiffs argument that the Court’s orders were the functional equivalent of those in Edmonds, because they resulted in the FBI producing hundreds of pages of documents, amounts to a pre-Buckhannon catalyst theory that “a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if he achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” However, the District of Columbia Circuit explicitly rejected this reasoning in OCAW, 288 F.3d at 457; see also Campaign v. FDA 448 F.Supp.2d 146, 150 (D.D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, while Plaintiff obtained some of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the fdas voluntary release of documents that may have been caused by the courts order to submit a revised vaughn index cannot constitute court ordered relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of credit and Bank One’s potential indemnification claim. Bank One’s Brief in Opposition at 10. The effect on the estate will be the same regardless of who wins this action. Should the City prevail in its action against Bank One, Bank One will likely have an indemnification against Debtor. Should the City fail in the action against Bank One, it will still have its claim against Debtor arising out of Debtor’s asserted failure to complete the subdivision improvements. Both claims would arise out of the same obligation and would be for approximately the same amount. See, e.g., In re Salem Mills, Inc., 148 B.R. 505, 508 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (stating indemnification agreements impact only on allocation of assets among competing creditors, not on size of asset pool); Xonics, 813 F.2d at 127 (<HOLDING>). It seems apparent that one of these two

    ### Response:
    holding jurisdiction over creditor disputes only involves property of estate or resolution affects some other creditor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it paid him and therefore ratified the contract in its entirety. We disagree. The Georgia Supreme Court has previously held that a county commission’s “power to approve the whole includes the power to approve any part thereof less than the whole. [Cits.]” Bd. of Public Ed. &c. v. Zimmerman, 231 Ga. 562, 568 (II) (203 SE2d 178) (1974). In this case, the county commission voted against approving Powell’s written contract. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that its later payment to Powell for work provided should be construed as approval or ratification of his entire written contract. Instead, as held by the trial court, Powell’s payment should be construed as approval of at-will employment by the board of tax assessors. Cf. Ogletree v. Chester, 682 F2d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Decided March 25, 2008 Groover & Childs,

    ### Response:
    holding county employee with unenforceable contract was atwill employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the questioning; and the use of physical punishment.” Id. at 278 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)). The District Court’s finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. Although the police did not inform Martinez of his constitutional right to refuse consent, the subject’s “knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The finding that Martinez’s consent was voluntary was not clearly erroneous in light of the police officer’s brief encounter, calm demeanor, and lack of repeated questioning, as well as Martinez’s immediate consent to the search and his prior experience as a police officer in the Dominican Republic. See Price, 558 F.3d at 279-80 (<HOLDING>). IV. For the reasons set forth above, we will

    ### Response:
    holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clause is thus most naturally read to concern whether the property is used by the public or the government, not whether the purpose of the taking is legitimately public. II Early American eminent domain practice largely bears out this understanding of the Public Use Clause. This practice concerns state limits on eminent domain power, not the Fifth Amendment, since it was not until the late 19th century that the Federal Government began to use the power of eminent domain, and since the Takings Clause did not even arguably limit state power until after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 Yale L. J. 599, 599-600, and nn. 3-4 (1949); Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 250-251 (1833) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, several early state

    ### Response:
    holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at military dependent's on-base home; the defendant phoned his mother and told her to dispose of a bag in the attic of her off-base home; she asked a friend to do it, but the friend turned the rifle over to authorities); United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d at 568 (noting that ""the clear costs of applying an exclusionary rule are not countervailed by any discernible benefits” especially where the unauthorized use of Navy equipment in violation of the PCA was “unintentional and in good faith""); United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.1979) (refusing to consider whether CID investigators' act of disarming and detaining defendants violated PCA because application of exclusionary rule not warranted under Walden, supra ); United States v. Rasheed, 802 F.Supp. 312, 324 (D.Haw.1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Danko, 219 Kan. 490, 548 P.2d 819

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no violation in a joint navycoast guard drug interdiction operation on the high seas and inferring in dicta that there is now no such need to deter future violations of 10 usc  375 based on the absence of any ninth circuit case applying the exclusionary rule to such violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Seckman, Reid, Inc. v. Metro Nat’l Corp., 836 S.W.2d 817, 820-21 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992). 18 . See, e.g., In Re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1464 (5th Cir.1991). 19 . In Re Missionary Baptist Foundation, 818 F.2d 1135, 1142 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). 20 . E.g., In Re Fabricators, 926 F.2d at 1464; In Re Missionary Baptist Foundation, 818 F.2d at 1142. 21 . See, e.g., In Re Gilchrist, 891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1990) (noting that ‘‘[i]t is well established that [reviewing courts] do not consider arguments or claims not presented to the bankruptcy court”). 22 . Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 420 (7th Cir.1988), see also, In Re Espino, 806 F.2d 1001, 1002 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 23 . Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953

    ### Response:
    holding that a cursory presentation constitutes waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damages bars or limits any recovery herein,” Plaintiff argues that this is not a valid affirmative defense, because a p July 2, 1994, 982 F.Supp. 1101, lili (D.S.C.1997) (in holding that even though plaintiff refused to take antidepressants, he did not fail to mitigate damages, the court explained that a plaintiff has the duty to mitigate damages and the “court can consider whether that person has failed to follow the advice of their physician or other treating professional”) (citation omitted); Salas v. United States, 974 F.Supp. 202, 211 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (concluding that plaintiff cannot be charged with a failure to mitigate damages because she made reasonable efforts to treat and cure her condition); Baker v. Dorfman, No. 97-7512-DLC, 1999 WL 191531, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogan v. Lewis, 975 F.Supp. 956, 966 n. 14

    ### Response:
    holding that a jury could have reasonably concluded after receiving an instruction on mitigation of damages related to pain and suffering that plaintiff took reasonable steps to alleviate his distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unreasonable. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand. We generally review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). We “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), and only proceed to consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence “[i]n the absence of a ‘significant procedural error.’ ” United States v. Ellis, 641 F.3d 411, 422 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586). With g proceedings are to begin by determining the applicable Guidelines range. The range must be calculated correctly.”); see also Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1105 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because the district court did not

    ### Response:
    holding that a district courts failure to consider the 18 usc  3553a factors was plain error relying on gall
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable”); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (“neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance”). Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address the validity of DNA collection statutes under the Fourth Amendment, as we just noted, state and federal courts that have are almost unanimous in holding that these statutes do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See cases cited in the persuasive opinion of Magistrate Judge Gorenstein in Nicholas v. Goord, 2003 WL 256774 (S.D.N.Y.2003). But see United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Courts uphold these DNA collection statutes

    ### Response:
    holding that forced blood extractions from federal parolees pursuant to the federal dna analysis backlog elimination act violates the fourth amendment in the absence of individualized suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    530 U.S. 211, 224, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890, 116 S.Ct. 1783, 135 L.Ed.2d 153 (1996). It is well established in this Court’s cases that an employer’s decision whether to terminate an ERISA plan is a settlor function immune from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., ibid.; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 131 L.Ed.2d 94 (1995). And because “deeision[s] regarding the form or structure” of a plan are generally settlor functions, Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S., at 444, 119 S.Ct. 755, PACE acknowledges that the decision to merge plans is “normally [a] plan sponsor decisio[n]” as well. Brief for Respondents 13, n. 5, 20-21; see also Malia v. General Electric Co., 23 F.3d 828, 833 (C.A.3 1994) (<HOLDING>). But PACE says that its proposed merger was

    ### Response:
    holding that employers decision to merge plans did not invoke the fiduciary duty provisions of erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a record kept in the ordinary course of business of the City and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Phila.Code § 12-2804(5). 9 . Although the BAA contends that Kovler appeared at the hearing with the original Ticket and that the original Ticket was used by the hearing examiner in making his determination, the original Ticket is not part of the official record and we are unable to discern from the hearing transcript exactly what information was before the hearing examiner. 10 . We further note that Kovler did not raise any objection concerning the absence of the original Ticket at the hearing before the BAA. Kovler’s argument in this regard is therefore waived. See Mitman v. Police Pension Comm'n of City of Easton, 972 A.2d 1276, 1283 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Kovler argues that the photographs do

    ### Response:
    holding issues not raised before local agency are waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sample, which, given advancements in scientific technology, may be “mined” in the future for a host of personal and medical information beyond that contained in his present DNA profile, cannot be justified. Indeed, Dr. Heinig recognized that blood or buccal samples contain genetic information that could conceivably be subject to misuse. She also observed, however, that the Act prescribes strict penalties for misuse of the samples or unauthorized disclosure of such information. These safeguards adequately ensure that any risk to Wilson’s legitimate privacy interests is minimized. See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85. Further, Wilson’s concerns are purely speculative. The hypothetical possibility of some future abuse does not substantiate a justiciable controversy. See Banks, 490 F.3d at 1191-92 (<HOLDING>); Amerson, 483 F.3d at 86-87 (same); Johnson,

    ### Response:
    recognizing potential for abuse of dna information despite statutory safeguards but in the absence of evidence of abuse refusing to adjudicate based on speculation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when an express cause of action already exists in another section of the same statute. See, e.g., id. at 572, 99 S.Ct. 2479. When Congress wished to provide a cause of action, it apparently knew how to do so and would have done so in a section of the statute immediately following. Congress knew how to create a cause of action in the statute and did so. Section 1914 expressly creates a cause of action for violations of §§ 1911-1913. Furthermore, at least two courts have held that a claim is not viable under § 1915. See B.R.T. v. Executive Dir. of Soc. Serv. Bd. of N.D., 391 N.W.2d 594, 601 (N.D. 1986) (showing a violation of § 1915 will not invalidate termination of parental rights); State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Woodruff, 108 Or. App. 352, 816 P.2d 623, 625 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Also, in support of its assertion that this

    ### Response:
    holding noncompliance with  1915 placement preferences in not a basis to invalidate termination of parental rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has shipped no products into the U.S. since 2007. In light of these limitations, and in the absence of additional product distribution, the present record does not support the exercise of general jurisdiction over Nestlé Canada. Plaintiffs seek to acquire general jurisdiction over Cadbury pic and Cadbury Holdings on substantially the same grounds advanced against Nestlé S.A. Plaintiffs claim that the periodic business inspections, quality auditing procedures, and royalty payments required by the Cadbury — Hershey agreements permit the court to exercise general jurisdiction. However, these regular but infrequent business dealings are precisely the type of contacts that the Supreme Court rejected as a basis for general jurisdiction in Helicopteros. 466 U.S. at 417-18, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>). Hence, the court finds this argument

    ### Response:
    holding that business visits and purchases within a forum even if occurring at regular intervals are not enough to support general jurisdiction over a defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Therefore, we conclude that “a domain name registration is the product of a contract for services between the registrar and registrant.” Dorer, 60 F. Supp.2d at 561. A contract for services is not “a liability” as that term is used in § 8.01-511 and hence is not subject to garnishment. See Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089, 1094-95 (D. Conn. 1975) (analyzing garnishment of services and concluding that automobile insurer’s duty to defend is not gamishable); cf. J. Maury Dove Co., Inc. v. New River Coal Co., 150 Va. 796, 827, 143 S.E. 317, 327 (1928) (where “contract contains mutual obligations and liabilities, or involve[s] a relation of personal confidence,” one party cannot assign it without consent of other party); McGuire v. Brown, Guardian, 114 Va. 235, 242, 76 S.E. 295, 297 (1912) (<HOLDING>). If we allow the garnishment of NSI’s services

    ### Response:
    holding contract for personal services is not assignable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adherents believe their faith commands them to sacrifice animals. But the Court did not do so, instead deeming it sufficient that they had a sincere desire to sacrifice animals for religious reasons. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Additionally, if anything turned on whether a religious practice is “mandatory” or “optional,” courts would have to question “the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of [their] creeds” and perhaps even adjudicate “controversies over religious authority or dogma,” tasks that are “not within the judicial ken.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 877, 887, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-50, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the free exercise clause prohibits courts from deciding church property disputes by resolving underlying conflicts over the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims would have necessitated evidence outside of the administrative record (i.e., Garcia’s testimony in the Martinez case, Garcia’s conversations with Steiner), the limited scope of a circuit court’s administrative review which prevents the consideration of such “new” evidence, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3— 110 (1998), would have prevented him from fully and fairly litigating his civil-rights claims. This contention is premised on the idea that somehow his administrative appeal of the Board’s decision would subsume his. civil-rights claims. But Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 claims are original actions independent of the administrative review proceeding and are therefore plenary in scope. See Stykel, 252 Ill.Dec. 368, 742 N.E.2d at 914; Stratton, 141 Ill.Dec. 453, 551 N.E.2d at 646 (<HOLDING>). Because a civil-rights claim under federal

    ### Response:
    holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    illegality. See People v. Mitchell, 355 Ill.App.3d 1030, 291 Ill.Dec. 786, 824 N.E.2d 642, 644, 649-50 (2005) (affirming suppression of evidence when “officers stopped defendant for no apparent reason other than to ran a warrant check”). ¶ 13 If, as the court of appeals suggested, a warrant automatically dissipated the taint of illegality, law enforcement could then “create[ ] a new form of police investigation” by routinely illegally seizing individuals, knowing that the subsequent discovery of a warrant would provide after-the-fact justification for illegal conduct. United States v. Gross, 624 F.3d 309, 320-21 (6th Cir.2010). We cannot reconcile such a situation with the Fourth Amendment or the logic of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that the subsequent

    ### Response:
    holding evidence that derived so immediately from violation is fruit of illegality and should be suppressed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in question has not previously been held unlawful. Instead, qualified immunity can be denied if, “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [was] apparent.” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614-15, 119 S.Ct. 1692. Because “[t]he basic purpose of th[e Fourth] Amendment ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,” Camara, 387 U.S. at 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, Fourth Amendment protections apply in both civil and criminal contexts. For example, in Camara, the Supreme Court held that even a routine administrative search of a home for compliance with health and safety regulations must comply with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 537, 87 S.Ct. 1727; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (<HOLDING>) (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 530, 87 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by public school officials and noting it would be anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we think, by the accompanying senseless prohibition of speech (and of other activity in the park) by organizations that fail to meet the technical requirements of the ordinance but for one reason or another pose no risk of the evils that those requirements are designed to avoid. On balance, we think the permissive nature of the ordinance furthers, rather than constricts, free speech. Id. Thomas therefore sets the standard for addressing “as applied” prior restraints on speech resulting from the administration of licensing legislation. Contrast Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 348 F.3d at 1281-82 (determining that a sign ordinance was content neutral and, consequently, governed by Thomas) with Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1269-70 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Because 48-91 is not, under Lakewood,

    ### Response:
    holding that freedman and presumably fwpbs inc controlled the analysis of a sign ordinance the court considered contentbased
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to immunity for violations of federal statutes.” (Pis' Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 21 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs have not argued that the Business Council is amenable to suit on their RICO claims, and in fact have focused exclusively on the individual Defendants. 12 . The Court has not addressed Count Eight of the Amended Complaint. This Count, entitled ""injunctive relief,” does not allege a cause of action; instead, Count Eight is a prayer for injunctive relief based on the substantive claims raised in Counts One through Seven. 13 . Once tribal remedies have been exhausted, the tribal court's resolution of tribal law, and in particular its determination of who is a ""member” of the Community, would not he subject to review by this Court. See Runs After, 766 F.2d at 352 (<HOLDING>); Burlington Northern R.R. v. Crow Tribal

    ### Response:
    holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ass’n, 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 191 Cal.Rptr. 104, 106 (1983). “The injury must be actual and substantial, or an affirmative prospect thereof, and not a mere possibility of harm.” Parkem Indus. Servs., Inc., 619 S.W.2d at 430 (citation omitted). It is not enough that the party seeking injunctive relief merely claim irreparable harm; he must come forth with evidence of the irreparability of his harm or inadequacy of any remedy. See City of Las Cruces v. Rio Grande Gas Co., 78 N.M. 350, 352, 431 P.2d 492, 494 (1967) (“The question here is whether Rio Grande [Gas Company] has demonstrated that it will suffer an irreparable injury.”); Tom James Co. v. Mendrop, 819 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.App.1991); Williams, 704 S.W.2d at 472; Texas Employment Comm’n v. Norris, 636 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex.App.1982) (<HOLDING>). {20} Upon reviewing the evidence the County

    ### Response:
    holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    No. 120], The court has also considered the procedural history and previous court filings in the main bankruptcy case, including: (a) Voluntary Petition [Dkt, No. 1] (the “Petition”); (b) Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor(s) [Dkt. No. 7]; (a) Schedules A-J [Dkt. No. 15] (the “Schedules”); and (d) Discharge of Debtor [Dkt. No. 37]. Though the foregoing items do not constitute an exhaustive list of the filings in the underlying bankruptcy case and the Adversary, the court has taken judicial notice of the contents of the docket in this matter. See Levine v. Egidi, Case No. 93C188, 1993 WL 69146, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 8, 1993) (authorizing a bankruptcy court to take judicial notice of its own docket); In re Brent, 458 B.R. 444, 455 n. 5 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2011) (Goldgar, J.) (<HOLDING>). While the court’s standard final pretrial

    ### Response:
    recognizing same
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assessor. Section 100— 5(a) of the Township Code states, in relevant part, as follows: “(a) The township board may employ and fix the compensation of township employees that the board deems necessary, excluding the employees of the offices of supervisor of general assistance, township collector, and township assessor.” (Emphasis added.) 60 ILCS 1/100 — 5(a) (West 1996). A township may exercise only those powers conferred upon it by statute. Grassini v. Du Page Township, 279 Ill. App. 3d 614, 618, 665 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1996). Any employment agreement between plaintiff and the Township, similar to other types of unauthorized agreements, would have been void ab initio. See, e.g., Cannizzo v. Berwyn Township 708 Community Mental Health Board, 318 Ill. App. 3d 478, 741 N.E.2d 1067 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Grassini, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 620, 665 N.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding employment contracts of former executive director of township community mental health board ultra vires and void ab initio though board members had staggered terms of appointment because the contracts extended beyond the term of the township supervisor in office at the time of the execution of the contracts and the board was appointed by the supervisor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    added). In Hayko, the injured child and his playmate were attracted onto the land by a mining shack, which we concluded, as a matter of law, was not an ""unusual attraction."" Id. at 146, 235 P. at 374. The child plaintiff ""could not see the box of caps till he had trespassed."" Id. at 145, 235 P. at 374. Thus, because the alleged attractive agency, a box of dynamite caps, did not invite the trespass, the doctrine did not apply to the injured child. 137 Moreover, contrary to the majority's assertion, we acknowledged in Hayko that the attractive nuisance doctrine applies only to trespassers: ""The plaintiff was a trespasser to whom there was owing no duty, unless under the attractive nuisance doctrine...."" Id. at 145, 235 P. at 374; see also Esquibel, 112 Colo. at 549-50, 151 P.2d at 759 (<HOLDING>). 138 As the court of appeals correctly

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant was not liable for the child plaintiffs injuries resulting from climb ing on old automobiles on the defendants land because the child trespassed on the land due to its availability and proximity to her home and not because of the attraction of the automobiles
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only partial or limited success.” Id. A district court determines the amount of the fee award based on the significance of the results obtained by the prevailing party. Id. at 437-38, 103 S.Ct. 1933. A. Plaintiff Is the Prevailing Party To qualify as a prevailing party under IDEA’S fee-shifting statute, a plaintiff “must obtain at least some relief on the merits of [her] claim.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. 566. This means that “[t]he plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree ....” Id. (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff must have been more than a mere catalyst for change that occurred without the need for judicial intervention. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (<HOLDING>). “In short, a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual

    ### Response:
    holding that to be a prevailing party a plaintiff must obtain a judgment or judiciallyenforced consent decree a party does not prevail without a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    MOTION FOR REHEARING PER CURIAM. We withdraw our previous opinion in this cause issued February 28, 2005, and substitute the following therefor. Upon consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari, we determine that petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims concerning revocation of parole or the imposition of restitution. As to the claim requesting recalculation of petitioner’s presumptive parole release date, the petition is denied because the Commission seeks to use exactly the same number of months for aggravating circumstances as initially used in establishing the presumptive parole release date. See Terry v. Florida Probation and Parole Comm’n, 634 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>); McClain v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 647 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that during a determination of a new presumptive parole release date after revocation of parole the commission may rely on the same aggravating factors that were considered in the first calculation but that the number of months may not exceed the initial number agreeing with tubb v florida parole commn 580 so2d 616 fla 5th dca 1991
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other words, the State argues, because “[t]he United States merely has the equitable ability under the law of apportionment to assert that the first-party plaintiff has a claim against the third-party defendant,” the United States is “attempting to act as a conduit for [Pjlaintiff s claim against the State” and thereby avoid the Eleventh Amendment. The key to the State’s argument is the absence of a duty under Alaska law between a defendant/third-party plaintiff and a third-party defendant. For other third-party claims, such as contribution and indemnity, in which such a duty does exist, this court and others have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize a state from a third-party claim in federal court. See, e.g., United States v. Hawaii, 832 F.2d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Barrett v. United States, 853 F.2d 124,

    ### Response:
    holding that the eleventh amendment does not prohibit the united states from prosecuting a claim of contribution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this money to any alternate source that may represent a worthwhile endeavor. Instead, courts must redirect the funds in a manner that best serves the original intent of the settlor or testator. Indeed, the very term cy pres suggests this limitation on the principle; cy pres is Norman French for “as near” and signifies that the donor’s intent must be followed “as nearly as possible.” See Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 177, 65 A.2d 843 (1949); Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Assn., 64 Wyo. 468, 493, 196 P.2d 369 (1948). When courts employ their cy pres power, they must redirect the gift to an alternate donee that pursues a purpose similar to that of the original donee. See, for example, Board of Education of City of Rockford v. City of Rockford, 372 Ill. 442, 24 N.E.2d 366 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The related purpose requirement also applies

    ### Response:
    holding that cy pres could not be used to divert the proceeds of an educational trust to a civic association even though that associations activities were undoubtedly laudable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sec. Fire & Cos. Co. v. Vintson, 454 So.2d 942, 946 (Ala.1984); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Branum, 568 So.2d 795, 798-99 (Ala.1990). 3 . Even so, in Sterchi Bros. Stores, this Court recognized that this rule is subject to certain exceptions. For example, ""one who delivers an article ... that may become dangerous without repair and which work he contracted to do, ... is liable for the injury reasonably to be contemplated, and that is likely to result in its use, and which does, in fact, result from such negligent failure ... to any other who is not himself at fault."" 236 Ala. at 352, 182 So. at 477. 4 . Neither party argues that a mobile home is not a product, and we express no opinion on that issue. But see Foremost Ins. Co. v. Indies House, Inc., 602 So.2d 380, 382 (Ala.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Bell v. T.R. Miller Mill Co., 768

    ### Response:
    holding that an assembler of a mobile home is deemed to be a manufacturer of a finished product that is the mobile home for purposes of determining the applicability of the affirmative causalrelation defense under the aemld
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    155, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 622, 627 (2002)). It is a well-established principle in other jurisdictions that a civil settlement releasing a defendant from liability does not foreclose the state from seeking restitution in a criminal case. See State v. Iniguez, 169 Ariz. 533, 821 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct.App.1991) (""[The distinction between civil damages and restitution means that the victim's release of civil liability does not prevent the state from ordering the criminal law remedy of restitution."" (emphasis omitted)); People v. Maxich, 971 P.2d 268, 270 (Colo.Ct.App.1998) (""[A] release from liability obtained in a civil settlement cannot limit a criminal court's authority to order restitution equivalent to actual pecuniary damages.""); State v. Applegate, 266 Kan. 1072, 976 P.2d 986, 938 (1999) (<HOLDING>); State v. Belfry, 416 N.W.2d 811, 813

    ### Response:
    holding that because the state was not a party to a settlement agreement a civil release of claims does not and cannot specifically preclude courtordered restitution in a criminal case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not prohibit retaliation against employees who do not allege unlawful discrimination”); see also Mixon v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 3:ll-CV-228-MOC-DSC, 2011 WL 5075808, at *6, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124291, at *17 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2011)(“Title VII requires that employees provide some kind of notice to their employer that they are complaining about prohibited practices covered by the statute. Generalized complaints about disputes or annoyances in the workplace are insufficient”); Gray, 2011 WL 1831780, at *6-7, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51155, at *21 (finding no protected activity where the plaintiffs emails to management did not mention racial discrimination, harassment, or retaliation); Richardson v. Richland Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 52 Fed.Appx. 615, 617 (4th Cir.2002) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). In this case, neither of Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the state constitution’s equal population requirement must be read in the context of the geographic boundaries of counties, the state-recognized political subdivisions. In other words, the Whole County Provision, as recognized by this Court, requires that each State House and Senate District be confined to a single county or minimum grouping of contiguous counties. Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 383-84, 562 S.E.2d at 397. In effect, North Carolina’s Whole County Provision, of which equal population is a component, establishes a framework to address the neutral redistricting requirement that “political subdivisions” be respected. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646-47, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826-27, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511, 528-29 (1993) (Shaw I); Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 364, 371, 562 S.E.2d at 385, 389 (<HOLDING>). Our state constitution’s Whole County

    ### Response:
    recognizing the importance of counties as political subdivisions of the state of north carolina and observing that the state constitutions limitations upon redistricting and apportionment uphold what the united states supreme court has termed traditional districting principles    such as compactness contiguity and respect for political subdivisions  citation omitted quoting shaw i 509 us at 647 113 s ct at 2827 125 l ed 2d at 528
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The court held that no indictable conspiracy existed where the only parties were the defendant and government agents or informants, and that the district court had abused its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the person with whom the defendant purportedly conspired was actually a government agent. The court, moreover, observed that “[i]f Barboa pled guilty to something which was not a crime, he is not now precluded from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes ‘to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him.’ ” Id. at 1423 n. 3 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2103, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). See also United States v. Ruizdel Valle, 8 F.3d 98 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We note, moreover, that every circuit court

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant should have been allowed to withdraw guilty plea postsentence in part on basis that the same district judge ruled that similar facts in codefendants case did not constitute crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Estate.” ECF No. 13, ¶ 34. But simply because a plaintiff demands money from the estate does not mean the proceeding is a core proceeding and is within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Instead, “[c]ore proceedings are actions by or against the debtor that arise under the Bankruptcy Code in the strong sense, that the Code itself is the souree of the claimant’s right or remedy, rather than just the procedural vehicle for the assertion of a right conferred by some other body of law, normally state law.” Matter of U.S. Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir.1997); In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A proceeding ‘arises in’ bankruptcy only if it has ‘no existence outside of the bankruptcy’ ”); Barnett v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, state law, and not the bankruptcy code,

    ### Response:
    holding civil rico claim stemming from diversion of trust funds noncore because the claim does not invoke a substantive right created by federal bankruptcy law and this is a claim that could exist outside of the bankruptcy context
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under two circumstances: (1) “if the court finds the corporation did not substantially comply with the requirements of sections 490.1320 through 490.1328”; or (2) “if the court finds [the corporation] acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith with respect to the rights provided by this chapter.” Iowa Code § 490.1331(2)(a), (b). The Kellys rely only on the second alternative to support their claim for attorney fees. We have previously discussed the trial court’s decision-making process in determining whether to make an award of attorney fees: An award of attorney fees and expenses is a two-step process under section 490.1331. As a prerequisite for such an award, the trial court must make a factual finding that the corporation did not substantially comply with c 72, 76 (1951) (<HOLDING>), In re Marriage of Voyek, 491 N.W.2d 189,

    ### Response:
    holding good faith required for adverse possession means the actual existing state of mind and freedom from a design to defraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Commonwealth must demonstrate an item could cause harm before it can qualify as an instrument of crime for purposes of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907; harm is not an element of the PIC statute. I would not view Appellant’s argument as narrowly; I believe Appellant has adequately raised a general claim that the plastic soda bottle is not an instrument of a crime. Thus, I would address this claim on the merits. ¶ 2 Further, I would find that the plastic soda bottle is not an instrument of crime as defined by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907. It was certainly not specially made or adapted for criminal use, nor was it possessed by Appellant under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for its lawful uses. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(d)(1) and (2); Commonwealth v. Williams, 808 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa.Super.2002) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 3 Thus, I would reverse Appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding the mere use of an item to facilitate a crime does not transform the item into an instrument of crime for purposes of the pic statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testified that defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect. Defendant’s personality traits, which Dr. Kull said did not amount to a disease or defect that should excuse or mitigate his conduct, were immaterial to the case, or at least of only minimal materiality, unless a psychiatric evaluation of the trustworthiness of a witness’s testimony is admissible to assist the jury’s weighing of credibility. State v. J.Q., supra, 252 N.J.Super. at 39, 599 A.2d 172 (credibility is an issue reserved exclusively for the jury); United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-87 (8th Cir.1993). Assuming arguendo that such a psychological evaluation of the credibility of a witness would ever be admissible, it surely could not be admitted without a substantia 15 A.2d 1260 (App.Div.1986) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Kull’s testimony acquainted the jury with

    ### Response:
    holding that despite limiting instruction letter written by murder victim shortly before his death was improperly admitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any New York federal or state court that has held that special damages is an element of an unfair competition claim.”). Simply alleging that defendant diverted plaintiffs customers and business is sufficient to show special damages. See CA, Inc., 621 F.Supp.2d at 54; Out of the Box Promotions, LLC v. Koschitzki, 55 A.D.3d 575, 866 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681 (2d Dep’t 2008). Although unfair competition often involves misappropriation of trade secrets or ideas, a claim may be based on misappropriation of client lists, internal company documents, and business strategies “if wrongful or fraudulent tactics [are] employed.” Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423, 278 N.E.2d 636, 639 (1972); see also Milton Abeles, Inc. v. Farmers Pride, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 500, 503 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>); Berman v. Sugo LLC, 580 F.Supp.2d 191, 209

    ### Response:
    holding that misappropriation of a confidential distribution list of customers and subdistributors may give rise to a claim of unfair competition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997). Vargas asserts that his petition is not time barred because Apprendi falls under this second exception. Although the Second Circuit has yet to address whether Apprendi apphes retroactively on collateral review, see Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133 (2d Cir.2001), it has noted that the Supreme Court “has measured at least eleven new rules, or proposed new rules, of criminal procedure against the criteria for the second [Teague ] exception and, in every case, has refused to apply the rule at issue retroactively.” Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 529; see also Bilzerian v. United States, 127 F.3d 237, 241 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, every other circuit that has

    ### Response:
    holding that united states v gaudin 515 us 506 115 sct 2310 132 led2d 444 1995 which shifted the determination of materiality in a prosecution under 18 usc  1001 from the judge to the jury was not a watershed rule justifying retroactive collateral review under teague
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    activities based on the expectation of less severe repercussions. Id. at 531 n. 21, 120 S.Ct. 1620. Thus, in at least one context, namely, crimes implicating the fourth Calder category, the high Court has condemned the reliance interest argument advanced by the Commonwealth—rejecting the notion that protection of an individual’s reliance interests is the sole aim of the Ex Post Facto Clause—and suggested that such an argument would be equally unavailing in the context of the third Calder category at issue herein. Additionally, the Commonwealth cites no case law which would support limiting the ex post facto prohibition to intentional crimes; to the contrary, other courts have found ex post facto violations in circumstances involving unintentional crimes. See, e.g., Masino, supra (<HOLDING>); State v. Bunn, 50 Haw. 351, 440 P.2d 528

    ### Response:
    holding the date of the criminal negligence by contractors who failed to properly encase underground gas pipes in concrete resulting in leakage and an accumulation of gas which caused an explosion that killed several people not the date of the consequences of such negligence was the relevant date of the unintentional crime for purposes of an ex post facto analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with instructions to order the modification retroactive to April 16, 2001. Because of the irregular nature of the settlement award, we conclude that the trial court did not err in including only the net portion of this award in Mark's income. Since the record is devoid of evidence regarding the impact on transferring the tax dependency exemptions on both parties and the children, we remand the case to the trial court for further determination in this regard. The order of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. FRIEDLANDER, J., and DARDEN, J., concur. 1 . A different result may obtain when the matter is one of jurisdiction of the person. Sudham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Mark's accounting of the settlement award

    ### Response:
    holding that a judgment entered without jurisdiction of the person is void unless the jurisdictional defect has been waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as the District’s, statute. Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have long recognized that the federal conspiracy statute encompasses two types of conspiracies: (1) a conspiracy to defraud the United States government or agency; and (2) a conspiracy to commit a specific-offense against the United States. See United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 1994) (“As the language of the [federal conspiracy] statute indicates, there are two different conspiracies with which a defendant can be charged under § 371—a conspiracy ‘to commit any offense against the United States,' or a conspiracy ‘to defraud the United States.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)); see also Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 863, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the specifics of this case, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing the two different types of conspiracies under the federal statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the present judicial estoppel is to the policy which prohibits litigants from manipulating their pleadings in order to obtain unjust results. This policy is evident in Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) and 41(a)(2) which restrict a party’s right to amend his pleadings or to dismiss his action without prejudice. Under these rules, a court has the discretion to deny dismissal without prejudice of either a claim or an entire action. See 3 Moore’s Federal Pr .Ed.2d 112 (1982). A second point we have considered is whether, when judicial estoppel is being employed, as here, across jurisdictional lines, the proper estoppel law is state or federal. In diversity cases, courts disagree whether the proper estoppel law is state or federal. Compare Allen v. Zurich Insurance Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 n. 4 (<HOLDING>) with Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937

    ### Response:
    holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frazier of her Miranda rights. Frazier was under police supervision the entire time she was at the DCI office. Each time Frazier was interviewed, she was questioned by the same officer (Jones), at the same location (DCI office), and all but one interview was in the same room at the DCI office. The subject matter of each interview was the same, i.e., the death of Standing Bear. Frazier relies heavily upon the span of time between the. initial warning and her final statement. While Frazier was read her Miranda rights roughly six and a half hours before her final statement, she was reminded of those rights a mere hour before her final interview. Even without the reminder, the six and a half hour time span would not cause the initial warning to become stale. See Davis, 998 P.2d at 1138 (<HOLDING>); State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 951 P.2d 869,

    ### Response:
    holding that a six and a half hour break between the initial warning and defendants confession did not cause the initial warning to become stale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the defendant’s use of the trademarked word “Playboy,” without the font or symbols — e.g., the famous Playboy bunny— associated with the trademark, constituted fair use because the use was limited to what was reasonably necessary and no more. 279 F.3d at 802. In the instant case, eBay’s use of the TIFFANY Marks on its website and in its communications to eBay buyers and sellers is similarly limited to the Tiffany name. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Exs. 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1164.) eBay has thus met its burden on this element of the New Kids “it would be unreasonable to assume that [Playboy] currently sponsors or endorses someone who describes herself as a ‘Playboy Playmate of the Year in 1981,’” especially where website included explicit disclaimer); Merck & Co., 425 F.Supp.2d at 414 (<HOLDING>); cf. Courtenay Commc’ns Corp., 334 F.3d at 214

    ### Response:
    holding that there is nothing improper about the use of a trademark to communicate that goods bearing that mark were actually sold on defendants website
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that induced the execution of the contract. Thus Capital City argues that the district court misinterpreted D.C. law when it instructed the jury (and affirmed in its post-trial order) that the breach of an implicit term of a contract could be tortious. We review the district court’s legal instructions de novo. See Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron) Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C.Cir.1993). It is true that no reported D.C. case has held that a mere intent not to perform a contractual duty can give rise to a cause of action sounding in tort. Nevertheless, such a holding is not precluded by any of the cases that have recognized that a misrepresentation of one’s intent to perform a collateral commitment might be tortious. See, e.g., Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 706-07 (D.C.1981) (<HOLDING>); see also Shear v. National Rifle Ass’n, 606

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant had not committed tort because its agents collateral comment had been made in good faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    application for asylum and that every statement in that application was correct and true. Tian further admitted that the statement in his initial asylum application that his wife had been forced to have an abortion was read back to him by his attorney and that he had not indicated that such fact was incorrect. In addition, contrary to Tian’s argument, the record does not indicate that the IJ erred in finding his attempted amendment of his application belated because he waited almost two years to file such correction. In finding him not credible, the IJ also reasonably relied on Tian’s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim that family planning officials had detained and beaten him for not paying a fine. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this case was perfected on appeal, resolved, in UCFAA’s favor, some of the arguments raised by the Planchers in opposition to UCFAA's claim of entitlement to limited sovereign immunity. 104 So.3d at 359. The supreme court specifically rejected the argument that the lack of a statutory declaration precludes a corporation from being considered a state agency or subdivision pursuant to section 768.28(2), finding that a corporation formed by the Jacksonville Transit Authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as ""a state agenc[y] or subdivision! ] under section 768.28(2) because it primarily acts as an instrumentality of JTA,” despite the lack of a statute specifically authorizing its formation. Id. at 368-69; see also Mingo v. ARA Health Servs., Inc., 638 So.2d 85, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). 7 .Pursuant to section 1004.28(l)(a), Florida

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while the lack of an express statute granting sovereign immunity precludes such immunity as a matter of law the entity in question could still be determined to be acting as an agency of the state under the facts and circumstances of a particular relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the probation officer to attribute 1,269.15 grams of crack to Woods, see J.Á. at 2329(PSR), was unreliable. The officer did not personally meet with Dotson, J.A. at 2094, but relayed information from his supervisor who did meet with Dotson. See J.A. at 2094. The probation officer also repeatedly stated that he calculated the presentence report quantities conservatively based on Dotson’s testimony. Woods points out that Dotson was arguably not always honest during his testimony, see J.A. at 626-29 (saying he did not use drugs during probation but then remembering that he did), that he could not calculate weight of drugs by looking at them, J.A. at 621-22, and that he was not sure how much a kilogram is. See J.A. at 546. Cf. United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 371-72 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Smoot v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that a drug users testimony when she admitted to guessing and felt pressured into guessing was not sufficiently rehable for calculating drug quantities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of appeal on August 19, 2010, outside of the prescribed time. * * * The order denying the extension of time to file a notice of appeal is AFFIRMED; the motion to dismiss the appeal of the summary judgment is GRANTED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). 2 . See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). 3 . See Allied Steel, Gen. Contractor v. City of Abilene, 909 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir.1990) (""We review extensions of time under FRAP 4(a) for abuse of discretion.”) (citing Chipser v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 600 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir.1979)). 4 . Anderson v. Pasadena Ind. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 447 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Fed. R.App. P.

    ### Response:
    holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court’s findings, specifically, regarding the best interests of the minor child. The court cannot change the timeshar-ing arrangements purely as punishment in the absence of evidence of what is in the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Edgar v. Firuta, 100 So.3d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (reversing trial court’s modification of parental plan to award father sole parental responsibility over children, which was based on mother’s willfully disobedient relocation of children to another state rather than on evidence-based assessment of twenty statutory best interests factors); Landingham v. Landingham, 685 So.2d 946, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (explaining that trial court cannot modify child's custody to punish custodial parent); Ginder v. Ginder, 536 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)

    ### Response:
    holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and applying that standard to plaintiffs claim). Though a formal finding of a violation by the FDA is not required, id. at 509 (citing Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 772 (5th Cir.2011)), the plaintiff must at least “speciffy] with particularity what went wrong in the manufacturing process and citef ] the relevant FDA manufacturing standards [the defendant] allegedly violated.” Id. at 510 (quoting Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir.2011)). Here, plaintiff has alleged only that St. Jude “deviated from FDA requirements” and “failed to comply with the FDA approved specifications for the device.” She does not identify which FDA regulations were violated or explain how the design, manufacture, or sale of the device deviated from FDA requirements. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff has alleged that the leads were

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded his parallel claims by identifying the regulations that were allegedly violated providing a letter in which the fda had warned the defendant of violations of particular regulations showing that the defendant had issued a voluntary recall of the allegedly defective product and pleading a causal connection between the violations and the harm suffered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “forensic interviewer.” Rather, Thomas used the information she gathered from Jordan and his family to develop a written treatment plan and continued to provide counseling and advice on parenting techniques in subsequent meetings with family members. These actions are consistent with Thomas’s testimony that, in cases like this one, her “primary purpose [was] to provide the treatment and assistance that the family needs.” J.A. 1482. Evaluating the primary purpose of a child declarant like Jordan is a bit more difficult. In analyzing whether statements made by a child were testimonial, courts have not treated the young age of a declarant as determinative but instead have considered age as one of the “relevant circumstances.” E.g., Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 181-82 (Pa.2012) (<HOLDING>). In another case involving child declarants,

    ### Response:
    holding that a fouryearolds statement to a child services caseworker that her father caused her brothers injury was nontestimonial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine considers only business activities in Florida that are related to the incidents that gave rise to the plaintiffs lawsuit. In Cortez v. Palace Holdings, S.A., 66 So.3d 959 (Fla.Ct.App.2011), for example, even though the defendants had corporate headquarters located in Florida, none of those corporate divisions were involved in the tortious conduct and therefore the case was dismissed on Florida’s rule of forum non conveniens. See Cortez, 66 So.3d at 963-964. Likewise, in Tananta, the location of the corporate defendant’s marketing arm in Florida was “inconsequential” because these marketing operations “had nothing whatsoever to do with” the injury that the plaintiff suffered. See 909 So.2d at 886; see also Calvo v. Sol Melia, S.A., 761 So.2d 461, 464 (Fla.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). In contrast, under Rhoditis,

    ### Response:
    holding that the presence in florida of corporate subsidiaries whose conduct is unrelated to the claim is not relevant for floridas forum non conveniens analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Accordingly, the court found that it was “without authority” to consider the plaintiffs’ claims for those damages. Id. at 581. Here, as in Mitchell II and Anderson, some of the damages plaintiff seeks are not “included within the legislation” plaintiff invokes. See Mitchell II, 664 F.2d at 274. Although money-mandating, 1603(a) mandates only “a restricted degree of compensation” — namely “a grant ... to reimburse” the cost of certain “energy property.” The amount of that grant is to be equal to “the applicable percentage basis of such property.” There is no provision, explicit or implicit, for any kind of consequential damages. In short, § 1603(a) cannot “fairly be interpreted” as mandating consequential damages. LCM Energy Solutions v. United States, 107 Fed.Cl. 770, 773-74 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff does not argue otherwise, but

    ### Response:
    holding that  1603a cannot be fairly interpreted as mandating consequential damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to allow the' unpaid balance to carry forward and accrue interest, the loans satisfy the carry-forward characteristic. The loans also do not provide a fixed amount of debt at the time they are approved. It is true that the loans indicate a maximum borrowable amount, but the borrower can draw on the loans only as necessary to cover any unpaid tuition balance after other sources of funding have been exhausted. The amount disbursed therefore might not reach the stated maximum. When the school issues the loan, it is unknown whether the student will use all, some, or none of the available credit. See Peterson, 584 N.W.2d at 663 (finding no fixed debt when attorney did not agree to provide representation for a specific fee and instead charged an hourly rate); cf. Brozek, 535 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>). The state maintains that the loans cannot

    ### Response:
    holding that a construction contract was not an openend credit plan because it had a specific price set out in its original form which was only amended once
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    they nonetheless concede that the DOBI approved Appellees' rates, see App. at 82. Under New Jersey law, such approval necessarily requires a determination that the rates are ""not unreasonably high, and are not inadequate for the safeness and soundness of the insurer, and are not unfairly discriminatory.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-45(a); see also N.J. Builders Ass’n v. Sheeran, 168 N.J.Super. 237, 402 A.2d 956, 961 (App.Div. 1979) (noting that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-45 evidently requires the DOBI Commissioner to conduct “some degree” of fact-finding). 3 . It is well established that the filed rate doctrine can serve as a defense against both federal and state actions. See, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228, 118 S.Ct. 1956, 141 L.Ed.2d 222 (1998) (<HOLDING>). 4 .Appellants also argue that ""the filed rate

    ### Response:
    holding that the respondents statelaw claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 1142, 1153-54 (5th Cir.1987) (observing that the “general bankruptcy policy of ensuring that all similarly-situated creditors are treated fairly” requires that the trustee have the first opportunity to pursue estate actions without interference from individual creditors); see also In re E.F. Hutton Southwest Properties II, Ltd., 103 B.R. 808, 812 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1989) (“If an action belongs to the estate, the trustee has the power and duty to prosecute the action for the benefit of all creditors and shareholders in the estate.”). If, on the other hand, a cause of action belongs solely to the estate’s creditors, then the trustee has no standing to bring the cause of action. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 433-34, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 1688, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>); In re Rare Coin Galleries of America, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he or she has standing under Article III of the Constitution. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Belter Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). “Standing to sue requires an individual to demonstrate (1) actual or threatened injury which is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action and (3) a substantial likelihood the relief requested will redress or prevent the plaintiffs injury.” ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir.2004). See also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Moreover, the ACLU, as a “voluntary membership organization has standing to sue on behalf of its members when (a) its members otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neith ) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Plaintiff demonstrates injury

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge a ten commandments display at the state capitol as plaintiffs frequently travel to the state capitol to engage in political advocacy for a variety of organizations and that they will endure direct and unwelcome contact with the ten commandments monument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.2002) . We are not persuaded by Auer’s arguments on appeal regarding his inability to exhaust his claims. We construe the district court’s order as dismissing the retaliation claim without prejudice. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.2003) (dismissing without prejudice). However, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the remaining defendants based on Auer’s purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We conclude that Auer exhausted the administrative process by filing grievances complaining about defendants’ alleged excessive force and by appealing through all available levels of administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the district court erred by ruling

    ### Response:
    holding that 42 usc  1997ea requires prisoners to exhaust a process and not a remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court, a creditor must prove the applicability of § 523(a)(6) by a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 291, 111 S.Ct. 654. Thus, on appeal, we review de novo any legal interpretation of the terms “willful” and “malicious,” but we review only for clear error the bankruptcy court’s finding that a creditor showed a willful and malicious injury by a preponderance of the evidence. “A debtor is responsible for a “will-fur injury when he or she commits an intentional act the purpose of which is to cause injury or which is substantially certain to cause injury.” In re Jennings, 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1165 (11th Cir.1995)) (alteration omitted); see Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62,118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Our sister circuits have disagreed about

    ### Response:
    holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    participatory democracy and the centrality attributed to the right to vote in our legal and political culture, I am compelled to conclude that the deprivation of the franchise is an “affirmative disability or restraint” of the gravest sort. Yet the majority concludes otherwise. In support of its holding that felon disenfranchisement does not constitute criminal punishment, the majority concludes that Article 120 does not impose “any affir sical sanction, the deprivation of citizenship, to constitute a sanction “essentially penal in character.” The majority also argues that disenfranchisement during incarceration is not an affirmative disability because it is “not as enduring as permanent occupational debarment.” See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (<HOLDING>). But revoking a license to practice a

    ### Response:
    holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of non-liability on FastShip’s claims for patent infringement with regard to LCS-3, - 5, -7, -9, and -11. Def.’s Mot. at 1. This motion has now been thoroughly briefed and was argued at a hearing held on June 8, 2015. STANDARDS FOR DECISION A. A Claim Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 14.98(a) As explicated in 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the United States has waived sovereign immunity and granted this court exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate patent infringement claims against the federal government “[wjhenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); see also Martin v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. 627, 632-33 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The statute further states, in relevant part,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that section 1498 rather than the tucker act 28 usc  1491a grants this court jurisdiction over patent infringement claims against the united states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the purse with which Appellant might harm either herself or him. We assume, without deciding, that this justifies Officer Stewart’s seizure of Appellant’s purse. ¶ 12 But the State must also justify the immediate search of the purse after it was in Officer Stewart’s control. After the purse’s seizure, the danger of Appellant using something in it to harm herself or others was removed. Generally, once a purse is no longer in its owner’s possession, a protective search of the purse is not justified pursuant to Terry. See State v. Schellhorn, 95 Or. App. 297, 769 P.2d 221, 223 (1989) (“[O]nce the officer had seized the purse, he no longer had any reason to believe that it still posed an immediate threat to him.”); People v. Stewart, 166 Mich.App. 263, 420 N.W.2d 180, 181-82 (1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 222

    ### Response:
    holding that the search of purses could not be justified as a protective search for weapons when police had control of the purses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he could ask his union to invoke arbitration on his behalf. See id. § 5(d). The negotiated procedure, though not open to all conceivable complaints, did cover Suzal’s. Using terms of art whose meaning derives from the CSRA, the collective bargaining agreement defined grievable matters to include “prohibited personnel practices” as well as “adverse actions and removals for performance”. Id. § 2(a). We agree with the Voice of America that the expiration and nonrenewal of an appointment for a specified term is not a “removal”, and hence that it is not an “adverse action” either. See 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (effectively defining “adverse actions” to include removals, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and furloughs); Berger v. Department of Commerce, 3 MSPB 297, 297-98, 3 M.S.P.R. 198 (1980) (<HOLDING>); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an adverse action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the Defendants either invoked or threatened to invoke the arbitration provision of the Sears credit card agreements. We thus agree, in disposing of Count I, with the courts that have deemed a challenge to an arbitration provision, in the absence of an underlying dispute or imminent injury, to be nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Bowen, 233 F.3d 1331; Lee v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., No. 07-04765, 2007 WL 4287557, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Dec.6, 2007) (concluding that plaintiffs “have not and cannot allege any damage because they do not have a dispute with defendants that they tried unsuccessfully to litigate as a class action”); Rivera v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9282, 2002 WL 31106418, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002) (<HOLDING>); Tamplenizza v. Josephthal & Co., 32 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that plaintiff lacked standing to seek declaratory relief on arbitration provision because she did not file or serve any lawsuit alleging that defendant  or anyone representing any of the defendants has informed her that they will seek to invoke the arbitration policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the words “prior to the arrangement of the program or project” may be given effect. To hold otherwise would effectively excise these words from the statute. But the words are there, and it must be assumed that the legislature employed them for a particular reason, to wit, the section is to apply to diversion of parkland to nonpark uses, and not to the use of parkland for other park purposes. Secondly, the whole thrust of section 26.-001(a)(2) is to require that certain findings be made by the governing body after notice and a hearing. One of the two required findings is that: [T]he program or project includes all reasonable planning to minimize harm to the land, as a park.... Id. A necessary consequence of the use of this language is that the program or project mu . 121, 123 (1920) (<HOLDING>). The appellant apparently does not challenge

    ### Response:
    holding that a safety museum was foreign to park purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Edward King appeals the granting of the State’s motion, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), which sought to vacate the portion of his sentence which “allowed a total of 334 days as credit for time incarcerated prior to imposition of this sentence.” However, rule 3.800(a) prohibits the filing of such a motion during the pendency of a direct appeal. See Day v. State, 770 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Because the State filed this motion during

    ### Response:
    holding that effective january 13 2000 a party may not file a rule 3800a motion during the pendency of a direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel to inform Jones, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. AFFIRMED. * Jones was initially sentenced to 124 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the parties filed a joint motion to remand this case in light of this court's decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241-49 (4th Cir.2011) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). By order entered on November 28, 2011, we

    ### Response:
    holding that a north carolina offense may not be classified as a felony based on the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed upon a repeat offender if the individual defendant was not eligible for such a sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seeks to avoid the plain meaning of the rules by contending that the doctrines of waiver, equitable estoppel and equitable tolling of limitations periods preclude the debtors’ reliance upon these time limits. The debtors contend that the failure to comply with the time limits presents a subject matter jurisdiction defense which cannot be waived and which is not subject to the equitable doctrines. A. The jurisdictional nature of the time limits. Generally, a failure to comply with a limitations period may be excused by equitable doctrines such as estoppel, waiver, or equitable tolling, if the limitations period is not a jurisdictional requirement. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, 801 F.2d at 1172; See also, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (<HOLDING>). If, however, the time period at issue is a

    ### Response:
    holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the eeoc is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is reasonable in light of the circumstances. Accordingly, this court finds that the Magistrate Judge committed no clear error in granting Whirlpool’s Motion for determination of good faith settlement. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the court AFFIRMS the August 1, 2003 Magistrate Order Granting Plaintiff Whirlpool Corpo ration’s Motion of Determination of Good Faith Settlement. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Magistrate Order does not include page numbers. However, the court will cite to the Magistrate Order as though it were numbered pages one through four. 2 . Hawaii Revised Statutes (""HRS”) § 663-15.5(d): A determination by 153, 504 P.2d 861 (1972) (concluding that contracts for indemnity are strictly construed). 4 . See, e.g., Hong v. Estate of Graham, 70 P.3d 647 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Hac v. Univ. of Hawaii, 102 Hawaii 92, 73

    ### Response:
    holding that the hongs waived all of their arguments with respect to an alleged duty to disclose by among other things failing to assert the arguments regarding second restatement  551
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that KMS has notified Quality King that it has a corporate policy that restricts its authorized distributors from selling to anyone other than hair salons, barber shops, beauty schools and barber schools for resale and that some of such salons may have arrangements with their distributors restricting resale only to salon customers for personal use. Also on September 27, 1996, the defendant filed a related action in the California Superior Court captioned KMS Research, Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., No. BC 158155 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Sept. 27, 1996). The complaint in that action alleges claims against Quality King and other named defendants , 779 (N.D.Cal.1993) (same); see also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 878-79, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950) (<HOLDING>). Declaratory judgment actions in the federal

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    36, 37-38 (2), (3) (456 SE2d 631) (1995). 17 Howsam, supra at 83-84. 18 Id. at 84; but compare North Augusta Assoc. v. 1815 Exchange, 220 Ga. App. 790, 792 (2) (469 SE2d 759) (1996) (court in effect finds that whether party has complied with a provision of arbitration agreement setting forth a condition precedent to arbitration is a gateway question for court). 19 Supra. 20 See id. (in accordance with a severability clause in the parties’ agreement, trial court did not err in striking a section of the arbitration clause concerning eligibility of arbitrators as violative of the FAA; but trial court did err in striking another part of arbitration clause governing judicial review, as latter provision was not violative of the FAA); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, 262 F3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); SI V v. FMC Corp., 223 FSupp.2d 1059 (N.D.

    ### Response:
    holding that under a severability clause arbitration provision was not rendered unenforceable because it contained an invalid limitation on punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the direction in which he had been walking. After Officer Lewis expressed confusion, Hummons said he owned two homes and was out doing work with the weed trimmer. She noted that the weed trimmer did not look as if it had been used. She then asked to see his identification card, which Hummons voluntarily pro vided. While holding the card, the officer conducted a warrant check. ¶ 5 Although the warrant check revealed a misdemeanor arrest warrant, Officer Lewis decided to tell Hummons about the warrant, but not arrest him. As she began to explain, however, he became belligerent and she opted to arrest him on the warrant. In a search incident to that arrest, Officer Lewis discovered drugs and drug paraphe ee I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 218, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court

    ### Response:
    holding law enforcement request for identification not tantamount to seizure finding no constitutional violation when law enforcement conduct consisted simply of questioning employees and arresting those they had probable cause to believe were unlawfully present
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when he claimed that: While still an employee of the Hospital, [he] pointed out to his superiors all the way up to the president, the inadequate staffing, inconsistent administration of treatment orders, the absence of blood gas quality control, and inappropriate documentation in the administration of care and treatment of patients throughout the Hospital, as well as the failure to meet regulatory standards which are required for reimbursement by Medicare and Medicaid. We do not agree with Karvelas that such activities constitute protected activity. It is true that Karvelas need not have known that his actions could lead to a qui tarn suit under the FCA, or even that a False Claims Act existed, in order to demonstrate that he engaged in protected conduct. See Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 741 (<HOLDING>). However, conduct protected by the FCA is

    ### Response:
    holding that even an investigation conducted without contemplation  or knowledge of the legal possibility of  a false claims act suit can end up being in furtherance of such an action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 312.011(1). That definition contains the “statutory requirements” for an affidavit. Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex.1995). When an affidavit meets the Government Code’s requirements, it may be presented as summary judgment evidence if it complies with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure ledaCf). See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(f); Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Gar-Dal, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex.1978) (stating that Rule 166a(f) “sets forth the procedure for presenting summary judgment evidence by affidavit”). When a written statement does not meet this basic definition, however, it is “no affidavit at all.” Hardy v. Beaty, 84 Tex. 562, 19 S.W. 778, 779 (1892) (<HOLDING>); see also Anderson v. Cochran, 93 Tex. 583, 57

    ### Response:
    holding that a written statement could not be regarded as an affidavit sufficient in law for any purpose because it was not sworn to by any one or before any officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    studying [the condition],” it was his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that plaintiff’s compensable “injury could have or would have aggravated or caused the fibromyalgia.” Dr. Payne noted further that plaintiff’s history did not reveal any causative factor, other than the work-related injury, for the onset of fibromyalgia. In light of this testimony, we hold that Dr. Payne’s opinion regarding the etiology of plaintiff’s current condition is more than mere speculation and, thus, was sufficient to support the Commission’s finding that “[plaintiff’s] reactive fibromyalgia was caused or substantially aggravated by her original injury by accident.” See Hedrick v. PPG Industries, 126 N.C. App. 354, 484 S.E.2d 856, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 546, 488 S.E.2d 801 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Keel v. H & V Inc., 107 N.C. App. 536, 421

    ### Response:
    holding that although cause of dystonia unknown experts opinion regarding causation based on temporal relationship between plaintiffs workrelated injury and onset of condition was sufficient to support commission s finding that dystonia was caused by compensable injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the California Court of Appeals which summarily denied relief. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. 2. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the prior adjudication resulted in a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”. Brumfield v. Cain, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2275, — L.Ed.2d - (2015) (quotation omitted). The summary denial of Harris’s claims is a denial on the merits for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99-100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (<HOLDING>). 3. To establish a Brady violation, Harris

    ### Response:
    holding federal courts should apply the aedpas deferential standard of review even when the petitioners claims have been summarily denied by the state courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is denied. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant’s motion for a ruling and for reconsideration. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 30th day of August, 2004. 1 . The Calendar Committee for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia reassigned the case to this court in November 2003. 2 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). 3 . Judge Johnson held that, ""[u]pon consideration of the motion of the defendants, United States, and Michael Hartman, et ah, for summary judgment and the response thereto, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. There are material facts in dispute. The most significant are the Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Addington v. Farmer’s Elevator Mutual Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding that the court implicitly denied the plaintiffs motion to strike certain submissions because the court in its opinion granting defendants motion to dismiss relied on defendants materials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one. He may also properly investigate various defenses, but unreasonably select among the alternatives. The inquiries also overlap at the prejudice stage: with respect to defective investigations, the test for prejudice is whether the noninvestigated evidence was powerful enough to establish a probability that a reasonable attorney would decide to present it and a probability that such presentation might undermine the jury verdict. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527. 1 Guided by this distinction, we first consider counsel’s performance of their “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. An investigation must be more than cursory. Rios, 299 F.3d at 805-06 (<HOLDING>). For mental health defenses, counsel cannot

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel must interview more than one witness before abandoning a particular defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Moreover, the issue of parental involvement, at the behest of police officials, to arrange the police interview with Alvarado and the subsequent refusal by police to let his parents attend the interview are certainly relevant issues in the totality of circumstances. See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 113, 116 S.Ct. 457 (stating that “in custody” determination is made against the backdrop of historical facts that make up the “totality of circumstances”); see also note 3, supra. Considering these additional factors in the objective determination of custodial status, we do not believe that a reasonable 17-year-old in Alvarado’s position would have felt “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S.Ct. 457; cf. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (<HOLDING>). B. We proceed now to the second level of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the only relevant inquiry in an in custody determination is how a reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the declaration] should be accepted as true.” (Id., citing McGowan v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 103 A.3d 374, 382-83 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014).) OOR concluded that based upon the evidence provided, the Department met its burden of proving that it does not possess the requested records. (Final Determination at 4.) As to the Department’s claim that it was not required to obtain a record from its contractor where that record does not directly relate to the contractor's performance of providing medical services, OOR noted that certain records in the possession of a third-party government contractor are subject to disclosure under RTKL Section 506(d)(1), 65 P.S. § 67.506(d)(1), citing Allegheny County Department of Administrative Services v. A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d 1025, 1039 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011) (<HOLDING>). (Final Determination at 4-5.) OOR then

    ### Response:
    holding that records in the possession of a party with whom an agency has contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the agency are presumptively public records subject to public access so long as the record a directly relates to the governmental function and b is not exempt under the rtkl
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions took place, October, 2008, plaintiff was working for Dragonfly. Thus, its clear that if someone had any substantial control over the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of plaintiffs employment it was Dragonfly and not TSI. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim fails. It is important to note that regardless of whether TSI was plaintiffs employer, plaintiffs claim would have still failed. Although causal connection may be established due to the temporal proximity between the alleged retaliatory actions and the issuance of the Right to Sue letter, the defendants proffered reason for communicating with plaintiffs new employer was both legitimate and non-discriminatory. See DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The defendants in this case did not take any

    ### Response:
    holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statements on the Wallach tape had “no basis,” the complaint is utterly devoid of allegations indicating either a specific agree ment by these defendants to participate in the affairs of the enterprise or an agreement to the commission of two specific predicate acts. Finally, Ms. Goren’s amended complaint cannot be saved by its many conclusory and vague allegations concerning the collective conduct of the “defendants.” It is well established that a complaint may be dismissed if it contains only conclusory, vague and general allegations of a conspiracy. See Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 352; Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 814 F.2d 1127, 1136 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026, 108 S.Ct. 2004, 100 L.Ed.2d 235 (1988); see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Instead, in order to state a viable RICO

    ### Response:
    holding that a conspiracy claim must contain supportive factual allegations describing the general composition of the conspiracy some or all of its broad objectives and the defendants general role in the conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the injury occurred to be the place where the product was designed and manufactured”). 7 . Mrs. Pounders does not challenge application of the statute of repose against Enserch. 8 . BW's subsidiary, Byron Jackson Pumps, designed and installed the pumps, which included asbestos-related components. For ease of reference, we refer to BW as the entity that performed these functions. 9 . See Ball, 877 P.2d at 47 n. 3 (collecting cases); Fine v. Huygens, DiMella, Shaffer & Assocs., 57 Mass.App.Ct. 397, 783 N.E.2d 842, 847-48 (2003) (applying activity analysis and concluding statute of repose applies to design professionals who supplied exterior wall panel but does not apply to suppliers who provided stock windows); Abbott v. John E. Green Co., 233 Mich.App. 194, 592 N.W.2d 96, 102 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Pendzsu v. Beazer East, Inc., 219 Mich.App.

    ### Response:
    holding under activity analysis contractors who designed and installed asbestos product were entitled to protection of statute of repose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Times standard at the time of publication, Defendants argue, they must win on this motion for summary judgment. The Court agrees. As stated above, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Federal Rule 56 of Civil Procedure requires the nonmoving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256-57. To do so, the nonmoving party must identify evidence that would support a jury verdict. Id. In assessing the record, the Court must see it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Hancock Indus., 811 F.2d at 231, but must also apply the clear and convincing standard of proof to the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 441, 529 A.2d 434 (<HOLDING>). The substantive law directs the analysis and

    ### Response:
    holding this to be evidence so clear direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the factfinder to come to a clear conviction without hesitancy of the truth of the precise facts in issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not confused. (Doc. 49, Exh. 16, # 26). In addition to the above mentioned admission, the Court notes that the Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she read the state court complaint, and that she “pretty much” understood it. (Doc. 49, Exh. 3, p40). However, she also found the title “complaint for money loaned” to be confusing (Id., at 41). She testified that she did not understand paragraph 2 of the state court complaint wherein it says “[t]here is presently due the plaintiff from the defendant on the money loaned on defendant’s charge card debt.” (Id. at 4S). However, the Court does not find that this testimony alone, without more evidence, supports that a genuine issue of fact exists. See Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Had the state court complaint stated only

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misconduct by proving that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen. This theory is flawed because it misconstrues the nature of the charge against him. Mitchell was charged with being present in an unauthorized area, in violation of ODOC Rule 03-1. The librarian’s description of the incident makes clear that Mitchell was not authorized to be at the canteen on August 8, 2008, because he was assigned to Housing Unit B, and, as Mitchell knew, only inmates assigned to Housing Unit C were permitted to go to the canteen that day. (R. at 28-29.) Thus, whether Mitchell signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen is legally irrelevant, as Mitchell’s conduct of being present at the canteen without authorization violated Rule 03-1 in any ev .1991) (<HOLDING>). C. Lack of Evidence to Support the DHO’s

    ### Response:
    holding that written statement that inmate was found guilty on the basis of confidential witness testimony satisfied wolff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the state. That notwithstanding clause was included in ORS 115.008 in response to our decision in Payne. In Payne, we held that ORS 12.250 exempted the state from the 30-day limitation period set out in ORS 115.145(1). We based that holding on our earlier decision in City of Medford v. Budge-McHugh Supply Co., 91 Or App 213, 754 P2d 607, rev den, 306 Or 661 (1988), in which we held that ORS 12.250 was applicable outside of ORS chapter 12, despite the “in this chapter” language. Specifically, we applied the exemption in ORS 12.250 to claims brought under ORS 30.905. In doing so, we rejected the argument that “ORS 12.250 applies only to limitations in chapter 12.” Budge-McHugh Supply Co., 91 Or App at 218-19. However, the Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in Shasta, 329 Or at 158-59 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even without ORS 115.008, we

    ### Response:
    holding that ors 30905 did not make ors 12250 applicable to claims brought under that statute because ors 12250 applies only to limitations contained in ors chapter 12
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    922 P.2d at 1211. 14. In this case, Defendant was required to work as a workfare participant with the Project Forward Program. If Defendant declined to participate in this program, his wife would be required to participate in order to continue the family’s AFDC benefits. If his wife also declined to participate, the AFDC benefits would be terminated. Under these circumstances, the work for HSD by Defendant cannot reasonably be characterized as voluntary. Instead, Defendant was compelled to work in order to receive AFDC benefits for his family. 15. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Durand v. City of Woonsocket, 537 A.2d 129 (R.I.1988), reviewed a similar question regarding whether work was voluntary. In Durand the Court held that a participant in a sta 12 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Me. 1986) (<HOLDING>); Durand, 537 A.2d at 131 (“[T]he source of

    ### Response:
    holding that a workfare participant is not an employee of a municipality for the purposes of workers compensation because participant neither received nor could have expected to receive remuneration or wages for the services that he performs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official with final poli-cymaking authority. See Vineyard v. County of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir.1993); Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 795-96 (11th Cir.1998) A claim concerning an isolated incident is generally insufficient to sustain a claim for failure to train because those officials who are responsible for creating a policy must be on notice of the constitutional deficiencies. In Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665 (11th Cir.1990), the Eleventh Circuit held a sheriffs department could not be liable for the actions of a deputy unless there was evidence “of a history of widespread prior abuse” such that the sheriff was “on notice of the need for improved training or supervision.” 919 F.2d at 674. See also Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342-46 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561,

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs claims could not succeed without proof that the city had knowledge of prior incidents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preceding fifteen years. In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence upon Lawyer’s conviction for felony DUI. Accordingly, Lawyer’s judgment of conviction and sentence for felony DUI is affirmed. Chief Judge LANSING, and Judge GRATTON concur. 1 . At the time of Lawyer’s conviction this provision was codified as Idaho Code § 18-8005(7). It has subsequently been recodified as Idaho Code Section 18-8005(9). 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 184, § 5. 2 . This review excludes those jurisdictions which adhere to the rule that the existence of an identical name raises the presumption of identity, see United States v. Nguyen, 111 Fed.Appx. 439, 440-41 (8th Cir.2004), as this concept is incompatible with Idaho law. See Medrain, 143 Idaho at 332, 144 P.3d at 37 (<HOLDING>); Martinez, 102 Idaho at 880, 643 P.2d at 560

    ### Response:
    holding that a certified copy of a judgment of conviction bearing the same name as the defendant with nothing more is insufficient to establish the identity of the person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or other entity ... in any man ner, including ... any denial ... [of] staff privileges ... because such health care institution, or person, association, or corporation ... declines to participate in a health care service which violates the health care institution's conscience.” (emphasis added)). 7 . The Second Circuit has held that this statutory provision does not imply a private right of action. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir.2010). However, if the hospitals are indeed entities covered under 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c), JWHO would likely have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of its statutory right to be free from discrimination in seeking admitting privileges. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Banks v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605,

    ### Response:
    holding that because  1983 by its plain text broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory  as well as constitutional law plaintiffs could bring suit for violation of social security act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1(a). Application Note 1 to that section defines “underlying offense” as “the offense as to which the defendant is convicted of being an accessory.” Id,., Application Note 1. It further directs the sentencing court to “Mpply the base offense level plus any applicable specific offense characteristics that were known, or reasonably should have been known by the defendant.” Id. Thus, § 2X3.1, applied in isolation, would only extend the reasonable-knowledge requirement to “specific offense characteristics” of the underlying offense. Application Note 1 to § 2X3.1, however, casts doubt on this conclusion by directing-courts to “see Application Note 10 of the Commentary to § 1B1.3.” Id. Application Note 10 states that for “solicitation, misprision, or access .2001) (<HOLDING>); but see United States v. Cihak, 137 F.3d 252,

    ### Response:
    holding that ussg  1b13 application note 10 brought in by the crossreference in section 2x31 extends the reasonable knowledge requirement to all conduct relevant to determining the offense level for the underlying offense 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    capacity to sue or be sued or authority to sue or be sued is found in Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(a), which provides in relevant part: (a) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the court.... Rule 9(a) speaks of three concepts: “capacity” to sue or be sued, “authority” to sue or be sued in a representative capacity and “legal existence” of an organized association. The rule thus implies that each of the three are distinct concepts with different meanings. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 796 F.Supp. 103, 110 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (Lasker, J.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir.), cert.

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 9a makes it clear that legal existence and capacity to sue are distinct concepts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    R. App. P. 26(a). Ramos-Lopez concedes that her petition for review was not received in this court until the next day, March 3. Instead, she argues that her petition was timely under the three-day enlargement period of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(c). By its terms, Rule 26(c) applies only to actions triggered by “service.” Fed. R. App. P. 26(c) (“When a party may or must act within a specified time after service, 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire_” (emphasis added)). Section 1252(b)(1) does not mention “service”; the trigger date for filing is the “date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Thus, Rule 26(c) does not apply to enlarge the period in § 1252(b)(1). See Mounivong v. I.N.S., 49 F.3d 728, at *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Nahatchevska v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 1226, 1227

    ### Response:
    holding under a prior immigration statute that rule 26c did not enlarge the period for filing a petition for review of the bias decision because rule 26c refers to service while the time for filing under the statute at issue commenced upon the date of the issuance of the final deportation order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    experienced no fear of being injured and had not suffered any physical injuries, she could maintain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because “(1) the death or serious physical injury of another [was] caused by defendant’s negligence; (2) a marital or intimate familial relationship [existed] between plaintiff and the injured person; (3) [she had observed] the death or injury [of the victim] at the scene of the accident; and (4) [she had suffered] severe emotional distress.” Portee, supra, 84 N.J. at 101, 417 A.2d 521. Claims for emotional distress that are either direct or indirect may arise when the negligence consists of medical malpractice. E.g., Frame v. Kothari, 115 N.J. 638, 560 A.2d 675 (1989); Strachan, supra, 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346. The special 1979) (<HOLDING>). In Carey, the Court considered more closely

    ### Response:
    holding that doctors failure to inform parents of availability of amniocentesis that deprived parents of opportunity to terminate pregnancy forms basis of direct claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    129 F.3d at 1185-86 (applying the fugitive dis-entitlement doctrine to dismiss fugitives’ appeal of a civil contempt order against them for failing to comply with a court order to enforce a forfeiture judgment entered against one of them); Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 282 (2d Cir.1997) (dismissing civil defendants’ appeal from a civil judgment against them on the basis of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine where defendants failed to comply with discovery in aid of plaintiffs attempts to collect the judgment, failed to comply with the court’s order to appear before the court, and failed to submit to the bench warrants issued by the court upon their failure to appear as ordered); Prevot v. Prevot (In re Prevot), 59 F.3d 556, 567(6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). We review a district court’s application of

    ### Response:
    holding district court should have dismissed a fathers suit brought under the international child abduction remedies act icara wherement doctrine to dismiss a bivens action filed by a fugitive this court has stated the dismissal of a civil action on fugitive disentitlement grounds requires that 1 the plaintiff is a fugitive 2 his fugitive status has a connection to his civil action and 3 the sanction employed by the district court dismissal is necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine magluta v samples 162 f3d 662 664 11th cir 1998 citations omitted the father was a fugitive felon inhibited the processes of the united states district court  by making unavailable to it the depth of expert testimony that the court indicated that it needed and was abusing the laudable purposes of icara by employing it to further his scheme to escape american justice and responsibilities while holding his children with him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(C). In ruling upon the Rule 12.02(6) motion, the court declined to assume that the exceptions to the statutory immunity conferred by Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101 et seq. would not apply. ANALYSIS Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Complaint The State argues that the plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The State’s argument is premised upon the contention that the recreational use statute creates the plaintiffs’ cause of action. The State therefore argues that the complaint must allege one of the exceptions to immunity provided in the recreational use statute. We disagree. The statutory right against the-State as a landowner is codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(C). See Sanders v. State, 783 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). The State generally may be held liable for

    ### Response:
    recognizing that tenncode ann  98307alc removes the states immunity and codifies the common law obligations of the owner or occupier of land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    revival has expired because the judgment has been dormant for more than two years; (2) Midwest failed to properly serve the motion upon the O’Connors and Pipex; (8) the execution proceedings were dismissed with prejudice, preventing Midwest from again bringing the same or similar proceeding in this court; (4) the settlement agreement was breached by Midwest; and (5) James P. O’Connor’s death precludes revival as to the judgment against him. Because the court finds that the time for revival is determinative on this issue, it will not discuss the various other arguments. II. DISCUSSION In matters of aiding execution of judgments, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defer to the laws of the state in which the Federal District Court sits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a); McCarthy, 35 F.Supp.2d at 847 (<HOLDING>), aff’d, 172 F.3d 63 (10th Cir.1999) (table).

    ### Response:
    holding that pursuant to rule 69a revival of a judgment is relief available to a judgment holder that he or she may pursue by complying with state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    EA in every case could require the reversal of permitting decisions where a draft EA was not circulated even though the permitting agency actively sought and achieved public participation through other means. The regulations do not compel such formality. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. Our conclusion is consistent with the views of other circuits, which uniformly have not insisted on the circulation of a draft EA. See Alliance To Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Amy, 398 F.3d 105, 114-115 (1st Cir.2005) (concluding that “[n]othing in the CEQ regulations requires circulation of a draft EA for public comment, except under certain ‘limited circumstances,’ ” and rejecting Anderson’s contrary language as dicta); Pogliani v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 306 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 359

    ### Response:
    holding that a draft ea must be circulated only in certain limited circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Lesher, 651 S.W.2d 734, 735-36

    ### Response:
    holding temporary restraining order void for lack of requirement of separate bond
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [a]s Guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” We consider the two claims in order. A. “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Id. at 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475. As a result, “errors in application of state law, especially with regard to the admissibility of evidence, are usually not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir.1983); see also Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 542 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Otherwise stated, a state court’s violation

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a federal habeas court does not rule on errors in the application of state law especially rulings regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the United States, after a conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence.” Corresponding official comments further explain that a “crime of violence” includes the attempted “burglary of a dwelling.” USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. nn.1 (B)(iii) & 5 (2004). Ibarra-Hernandez contends, however, that the district court had the requisite discretion to depart downward from this 16-level adjustment because the Sentencing Commission’s 2001 amendments changed the nature of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Specifically, Ibarra-Hernandez points to Application Note 5 of the former version of USSG § 2L1.2, which allowed a sentencing court the discretion to depart only in situations where the factors explicitly enumerated in Application Note 5 existed. See USSG § 2L1.2 cmt n.5 (2000); Taylor, 286 F.3d at 306-07 (<HOLDING>). Ibarra-Hernandez argues that, when the

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant must satisfy the enumerated criteria contained in application note 5 in order for the court to grant a downward departure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should be considered in the equitable balancing process [and that] an aggrieved person seeking preliminary relief outside the statutory scheme for alleged Title VII violations would have to make a showing of irreparable injury sufficient in kind and degree to justify the disruption of the prescribed administrative process....”). In interpreting Sampson, however, numerous other courts have assumed that the “genuinely extraordinary” test for irreparable harm applies in all employee discharge cases, whatever the asserted basis for relief. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 193, 199-200 (2d Cir.1985); E.E.O.C. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 666 F.2d 1037, 1040-44 (6th Cir.1981). But see E.E.O.C. v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Such a conclusion is predicated, in our

    ### Response:
    holding that irreparable harm is presumed where discharged employee has exhausted her administrative remedies and proceeds under a civil rights statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    step two. Def.’s Mot. at 9. The District of Columbia Circuit has not directly addressed to what extent an ALJ must , 577 (6th Cir.2009) (finding that “when an ALJ considers all of a claimant’s impairments in the remaining steps of the disability determination, an ALJ’s failure to find additional severe impairments at step two does not constitute reversible error”) (citation omitted). Here, as in Nejat and Maziarz, the ALJ concluded that T.J. satisfied the requirements of step two and continued to the next step. Similarly, a member of this Court recently found that failure to consider evidence at one stage of the administrative process is not an error when the evidence is properly considered at a later stage of the process. See Blackmon, 719 F.Supp.2d at 91-92, 2010 WL 2607215, at *11 (<HOLDING>). Because the ALJ proceeded to step three,

    ### Response:
    holding that the court need not determine whether the aljs finding of nonseverity as to the plaintiffs depression neuropathy and borderline intellect was legal error as any alleged error at step two did not prejudice plaintiff and therefore does not require reversal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is not divested of jurisdiction to hear and resolve the counterclaim. See rule 1.420(a)(2). Here, Tarragon prevailed on its counterclaim in the arbitration proceedings and its motion to confirm the award with the trial court must be treated in exactly the same manner. That is, Tarragon’s motion to confirm the award on its arbitration counterclaim acted as a counterclaim in the claim of lien action once the motion to confirm was filed and served. To ignore the fact that Tarragon’s motion to confirm the award on its counterclaim was pending would be the antithesis of “indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption to uphold [the arbitration] proceedings.” Miele, 656 So.2d at 473; see also Murphey v. Dean Witter & Co., 392 So.2d 286, 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (Anstead, J., specially concurring) (<HOLDING>). Second, the parties stipulated to a stay of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that appellant originally sought enforcement of arbitration award but later voluntarily dismissed her action after appellee filed its counterclaim but explaining that courts generally favor upholding arbitration proceedings which have resulted in an award citing knight v hs equities inc 280 so2d 456 fla 4th dca 1973
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    clause [of § 921(a)(20) ] defines the rule for determining ‘what constitutes a conviction.’ ... The exemption clause ... is thus just one step in determining whether something should ‘be considered a conviction.’ ”); cf. United States v. Kahoe, 134 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (4th Cir.1998) (“The plain language of § 921(a)(20) means that a conviction that has been set aside can no longer be disabling. The language does not provide that such a conviction was not disabling between the time it was obtained and the time it was set aside.... Neither the amended language of § 921(a)(20) nor the legislative history of the amendment counsels a result contrary to that set forth in Lewis, and we determine that Lewis is controlling.”); United States v. Thompson, 117 F.3d 1033, 1034 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) Like the substantive criminal statutes to

    ### Response:
    holding that prior indiana felony was conviction for purposes of defendants  922g1 prosecution and noting that although state law determines whether there is a predicate statelaw conviction once the conviction is established federal law dictates that the convicted felon may not possess any firearm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the record supports the district court’s assumption that, merely because these accounts had Tennessee addresses on record, Lloyds “repeatedly transferred the Tennessee customers’ funds as directed, provided customers with bank statements of account, and likely offered other incidental banking services.” As Lloyds points out, any bank statements sent to Tennessee would have been sent there because the customers listed the account address as Tennessee, not because Lloyds chose to create continuous and substantial consequences in Tennessee. The relationship of these account holders is best characterized as “unilateral,” because Lloyds did not direct contacts at Tennessee. Cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Nor do the wire transfers between Lloyds and

    ### Response:
    holding that the nonresident defendants acceptance of checks drawn from a texas bank account purchases of helicopters and related training trips did not create general jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purpose of the video recording is to prove the truth of the statement asserted therein. That is, the recording is offered as evidence in order to establish that the Defendant did in fact commit the acts of sexual contact. Because the recording qualifies as hearsay evidence, as the trial court determined, it “is not admissible except as provided by [the Tennessee Rules of Evidence] or otherwise by law.” Tenn. R. Evid. 802. The trial court ruled that the video recording did not fit within any exception to the general rule of excluding hearsay evidence. We disagree. Although the video recording does not qualify as one of the specifically recognized hearsay exceptions, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 802 provides for admission if allowed “otherwise by law.” See also Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 480 (<HOLDING>). We have determined that the legislature acted

    ### Response:
    recognizing the power of the general assembly to enact statutes bearing on the introduction of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the later developments arising from the contact with Bob Hughes’s employer by Region VII Agency’s lawyers “comprise but one case.” Although section 1367(a) permits the joinder of co-plaintiffs whose claims are related and form the same case and controversy, see Monroe v. Brown, 256 F.Supp.2d 1292 (D.Ala.2003) (finding supplemental jurisdiction over co-plaintiff husband’s claims for loss of consortium where the court had original jurisdiction over wife’s personal injury claim), when a co-plaintiff seeks to join a lawsuit with a freestanding, independent claim that is based on new legal theories and additional, unrelated facts, he must establish an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Siegel v. Consol. Edison, Inc., 318 F.Supp.2d 176, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (<HOLDING>). Bob Hughes’s claims are separate from those

    ### Response:
    holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in August 1991. The defense hired investigators Jeff Galler and Dave Burns to investigate the work alibi defense. Documents (timecards and receipts) that would have established whether Over olding that the failure to investigate the alibi did not constitute ineffective assistance as there was no prejudice because the one alibi witness that was offered during the evidentiary hearing could not pinpoint the date of the conversation, so his testimony would have possessed “minimal value as alibi evidence”). Moreover, there was no prejudice from the failure to present the alibi defense because even if Overton’s counsel had established that Overton was working that night, sufficient time remained for him to commit the murders. At best, the work alibi was an incomplete alibi. Susan and (<HOLDING>). Overton further asserts that alternative

    ### Response:
    holding that there was not deficient performance with regard to the failure to investigate the alibi defense claim because the available testimony provided at best an incomplete alibi as the testimony still allowed for a two to threehour window for the defendant to commit the murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that are based on the adjudicator’s observation of the applicant’s demeanor, in recognition of the fact that the IJ’s ability to observe the witness’s demeanor places her in the best position to evaluate whether apparent problems in the witness’s testimony suggest a lack of credibility or, rather, can be attributed to an innocent cause such as difficulty understanding the question. See Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. On the other hand, we grant lesser deference to credibility determinations that are based on analysis of testimony as opposed to demeanor. See Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 307. “[W]e will reverse where [an] adverse credibility finding is based upon speculation or upon an incorrect analysis of the testimony.” Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178; see also Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 307 (<HOLDING>). Where inconsistencies or implausibilities

    ### Response:
    holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    another’s trademark have been established (typically including the requirement that the name acquired a “secondary meaning” as a result of its association with the relevant products, see Circuit City Stores, 165 F.3d at 1054), and (2) that the scope of the injunction accounts for the reality that the mark relates to the offending party’s own last name. See, e.g., Joseph Scott, 764 F.2d at 65 n. 2, 69 (stating, in modifying the district court’s preliminary injunction, that an individual “should be permitted to use his name to describe his past accomplishments and expertise,” but that “he must make perfectly clear that his firm is no longer associated with, and is not a successor to,” a competing corporation); Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Berghoff Restaurant Co. v. Lewis W. Berghoff

    ### Response:
    holding that an individual may use his signature on certain labels or advertisements if he chooses but only with appropriate disclaimer that he is not connected with or a successor to a competing corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a particular corporate origin). It is important for district courts to recognize surveys of this type because their qualification for a traditional hearsay exception obviates the need to examine methodology before overruling a hearsay objection. Regardless of the basis cited for admitting these surveys, errors in methodology thus properly go only to the weight of the evidence—subject, of course, to Rule 403’s more general prohibition against evidence that is less probative than prejudicial or confusing. See, e.g., Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1341 (finding, in the context of a survey offered to show actual confusion, that while courts cite different bases for admitting survey evidence, “[t]he more relevant issue [is] the weight to be given to the surveys”); see also Starter, 170 F.3d at 297 (<HOLDING>). The “modern view” urged by Schering is thus

    ### Response:
    holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    father is property of their respective bankruptcy estates. This is a core matter as it “concern[s] the administration of the estate.” § 157(b)(2); see also In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 930 (5th Cir. 1999). This Court may only hear a case in which venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1408. In their petitions, both Ramirez and Eck-hardt state their residence is located in Laredo, Texas. [LR ECF No. 1 at 1]; [RE ECF No. 1 at 2]. Therefore, venue is proper. B. Constitutional Authority to Enter a Final Order This Court has an independent duty to evaluate whether it has the constitutional authority to sign a final order. Stem v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011).But see Wellness. Int’l Network v. Sharif, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1938-39, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (<HOLDING>). The instant issue solely determines whether

    ### Response:
    holding that parties may consent to jurisdiction on noncore matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was made payable to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and does not contain an endorsement. At trial, BAC offered the original note, which contained an undated blank endorsement. BAC’s witness, an employee of Bank of America, did not know when the endorsement was made. On appeal, BAC argues that the original note established its standing to foreclose. Although BAC may have established its standing at the time of trial by filing the original note endorsed in blank, it did not establish its standing at inception of the suit. By now it should be understood that a plaintiffs standing at inception of the suit is not established by filing the note with an undated endorsement after the complaint has been filed. See Matthews v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 160 So.3d 131, 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (<HOLDING>); Focht v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 So.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that standing at inception of the suit was not established where the note attached to the complaint was not made payable to the plaintiff and contained no endorsement even though the original note endorsed in blank was introduced at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dated his notice of appeal April 13, 2012, but it is date-stamped received and was filed in Bankruptcy Court on May 3, 2012. The date a court receives a notice of appeal controls whether it was timely filed. See United States v. Solly, 545 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir. 1976) (construing Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure); see also Caterbone, 640 F.3d at 110 (looking at date notice of appeal in bankruptcy case was filed, not sent, in assessing timeliness). Because Hussain’s notice of appeal was received after the 14-day time period expired on April 23, 2012, it was untimely. Hussain also did not file a motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant Rule 8002(c). The District Court thus lacked jurisdiction to entertain Hussain’s appeal. See Caterbone, 640 F.3d at 111-12 (<HOLDING>). As a result, we also lack jurisdiction over

    ### Response:
    holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for a change of venue and the alleged lack of satisfaction he received from the court in response to his motions, filed without prior communication with the Gardners and made orally to the court at various times, to have other counsel appointed to represent him. The court (Cole, J.) ordered a change of venue to Cumberland County for the trial of the charges. Although the court stated it was satisfied that the record of the M.R.Crim.P. 11 proceedings conducted on May 7, 1992, at which Fleming had entered guilty pleas, clearly reflected he had done so knowingly and voluntarily, the court properly allowed Fleming to withdraw those pleas. See M.R.Crim.P. 32(d) (A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed.) See also State v. Malo, 577 A.2d 332 (Me.1990) (<HOLDING>). The court also ordered that on September 9,

    ### Response:
    holding that although a criminal defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to withdraw a previouslyentered plea relief should be granted liberally
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the State had the burden of disproving the defense. That course was inconsistent with the Model Jury Charge (Criminal), Homicide § 6, and violated the legislative commands contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13b(1) and (2). Under those subsections, the State is required to disprove an affirmative defense if there is evidence supporting it, unless the code or another statute “requires the defendant to prove [the defense] by a preponderance of evidence or such other standard as specified in this code.” Since the felony murder affirmative defense does not contain language placing the burden of persuasion on a defendant, a proper jury instruction must advise that the State has the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The difficulty with defendant’s position in

    ### Response:
    holding that if any evidence raising the issue of selfdefense is adduced  the jury must be instructed that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the selfdefense claim does not accord with the facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument. Under the plain language of the UBIT, the purchase of securities on margin is a purchase using borrowed funds; therefore, under § 514(c), the securities are subject to an “acquisition indebtedness.” See Elliot Knitwear Profit Sharing Plan v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 347, 348-51 (3d Cir.1980). Thus, the margin-financed securities constitute “debt-financed property” under § 514(b)(1). As “debt-financed property,” § 512(b)(4) and § 514(a)(1) require that the income derived from these securities be treated “as an item of gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business” (in the proportion that the basis of the property bears to the amount financed), and, therefore, this income is included in the § 512 computation of unrelated business taxable income. See, e.g., id. (<HOLDING>). Thus, Taxpayer’s reliance on Supreme Court

    ### Response:
    holding securities purchased on margin are subject to ubit as marginfinanced securities are debtfinanced property and  514a requires treating income derived therefrom as income from unrelated trade or business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ”). 1. Magnitude of the Fraud A number of decisions cite the magnitude of the fraud in weighing an alleged inference of scienter. See In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1838 (M.D.Fla.2002) (citing Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F.Supp.2d 1324 (N.D.Ga.1998), as stating that “a drastic overstatement” coupled with GAAP violations could be enough to raise the requisite strong inference against an auditor); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1345 (S.D.Fla.1999) (citing the allegation that the “sheer magnitude of the restatements of Sunbeam’s financial statements suggests that Arthur Andersen should have known or was severely reckless not to know that its Unqualified Audit Opinion was misleading”); Carley Capital, 27 F.Supp.2d at 1339-40 (<HOLDING>); In re Sahlen & Assoc., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773

    ### Response:
    holding that the totality and magnitude of that defendants accounting violations constituted strong circumstantial evidence of reckless or conscious behavior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In any event, we find it questionable whether the school district has even preserved this issue for our review. The denial of a motion to dismiss by itself is not a final and appealable order but, rather, is an interlocutory order not appealable under any of the exceptions set forth in Rule 307. In re Petition of Filippelli, 207 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817-18 (1990); Rosinia v. Gusmano, 90 Ill. App. 3d 882, 886-87 (1980). “Rule 307 allows only the review of the order from which a party takes an appeal, and such an appeal does not open the door to a general review of all orders entered by the trial court up to the date of the order that is appealed.” In re Petition of Filippelli, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 818; but see Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center v. Berlin, 268 Ill. App. 3d 184, 187 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Here, the denial of the school district’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the proper scope of the review under rule 307 is to review any prior error that bears directly upon the question of whether the order on appeal was proper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is unavoidably, and frequently, and personally exposed to the state’s demeaning and discriminatory message, and that it has impacted him personally in a variety of ways.” However, Plaintiffs reading does not comport with Allen’s text or its subsequent interpretation. Allen held that when plaintiffs ground their equal protection injuries in stigmatic harm, they only have standing if they also allege discriminatory treatment. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755, 104 S.Ct. 3315. That Plaintiff alleges that he personally and deeply feels the impact of Mississippi’s state flag, however sincere those allegations are, is irrelevant to Allen’s, standing analysis unless Plaintiff alleges discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 822 (7th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>); In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the allen inquiry is unchanged when plaintiffs claimed to be part of small group facing discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937), the Supreme Court explained the reach of the Ex Post Facto Clause as follows: [T]he ex post facto clause looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by a statute, rather than-to the sentence actually imposed_ [A]n increase in the possible penalty is ex post facto, regardless of the length of the sentence actually imposed, since the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier. Id. 57 S.Ct. at 799 (citations omitted). Prior to the enactment of the MVRA, the district courts had the discretion to order “that the defendant make restitution to any victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 1985). See United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In exercising this discretion, the court was

    ### Response:
    holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circuit court indicated that it would conduct an in camera review of the Andrews claim file notes. However, even though Twin City complied and provided the court with the Andrews claim file notes, the court failed to make any findings to support its conclusions. Twin City subsequently offered to provide the court with copies of the 199 “other” claim file notes for in camera review, which offer the court refused. While we do not hold that there is a procedural requirement to conduct an in camera review before ruling on a party’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege, the present facts establish that Twin City satisfied its burden of triggering the circuit court’s obligation to conduct an in camera review of the disputed docu ments. See DM & E, 2009 S.D. 69, ¶ 48, 771 N.W.2d at 686 (<HOLDING>). See also Unklesbay, 855 N.E.2d at 522

    ### Response:
    holding that the party asserting privilege must make a showing to justify withholding materials if that is challenged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the issue. Varnado, 920 F.2d at 321. Wiggins also asserts that defense counsel improperly obtained and introduced into evidence mental health records in an effort to prejudice the jury. Wiggins contends that he was prejudiced by the tendency of the evidence to show that he was incompetent and that he had been treated for sexual aggression against children. Contrary to Wiggins’s assertion, his prison medical file did contain documents pertaining to his treatment for a psychological disorder; and Wiggins admitted at trial that defense counsel had access to his prison medical file. Furthermore, Wiggins’s testimony with regard to the type of mental disorder from which he was suffering opened the door to defense counsel’s questioning. United States v. Delk, 586 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir.1978)(<HOLDING>). Wiggins’s argument that the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant cannot object to counsels attempt to rebut proposition once defendant has opened door to line of testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doubts as to the victim’s veracity.’ ” Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d. Cir.2002) (quoting Singer, 63 F.3d at 118); see also Martinez v. Simonetti 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.2000). Moretti acted based on a sworn complaint that alleged several crimes against plaintiff. Before Moretti arrested plaintiff, she first verified the existence of an Order of Protection and reviewed the alleged threatening emails sent to DeQuatro. Plaintiff argues Moretti should have recognized the emails to be fakes, sent by someone else under plaintiffs email address. The law, however, does not require Moretti to be an expert nor that Moretti investigate every potential explanation or scenario as plaintiff seems to argue. See Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). All the law requires is that an officer have

    ### Response:
    holding police are not required to explore and eliminate every potentially plausible claim of innocence as part of their prearrest investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    workers to successfully compete in the job market. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1. The full 60-day notice period is not required if the closing is “caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable as of the time that notice would have been required.” 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A). In order to qualify for the UBC exception, the defendant must prove two elements: (A) that the circumstances complained of were unforeseeable; and (B) that the circumstances complained of actually caused the mass layoff or plant shutdown. See Calloway v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., 800 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir.2015). The burden is on the employer to show that the statutory exception applies. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9; see In re Advanced Accessory Systems, LLC, 443 B.R. 756, 766 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2011) (<HOLDING>). The UBC exception is not narrowly construed.

    ### Response:
    holding that former employer met its burden of proof that ubc exception applied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    118 S.Ct. 1051, 140 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998) (concluding that police officers who testified before a grand and petit jury were not absolutely immune for their testimony if they functioned as complaining witnesses and the allegedly false testimony was necessary to show “the full range of occasions on which [the defendants'] falsehoods were uttered''); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1447 (6th Cir.1997) (denying Briscoe immunity for a “complaining witness who set the wheels of government in motion by instigating a legal action”); Curtis v. Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281 (7th Cir.1995) (recognizing that a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution may be brought against a police officer based on testimony given in adversarial pre-trail proceedings); Enlow v. Tishomingo County, 962 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that disputed issues of fact as to whether officer who allegedly gave false testimony before a grand jury could be considered a complaining witness prevented summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appears in the Court’s discussion of Cohen’s second requirement, that the issues on appeal must be collateral to the merits, it may imply that the Court considered a Blackledge allegation analogous to a double jeopardy claim for purposes of the third Cohen requirement as well. 12 . In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 13-14, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2148-2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the Court asserted that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit retrial after the defendant had obtained a reversal of his conviction on grounds of a fatally defective indictment. 13 . The Supreme Court has recently implied that post-conviction relief is adequate in a claim of selective prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Flynt v. Ohio, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1958, 68 L.Ed.2d 489 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Vindictive prosecution claims, like those

    ### Response:
    holding that 28 usc  1257 does not permit interlocutory federal review of allegedly selective prosecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in and to all existing leases, if any, and any future leases covering all or any part of the Mortgaged Property ... and any guaranties of the lessees’ obligations under any thereof_ [Moreover, Brewery] ... does further hereby ... assign to the [City] all of the rents ... now or hereafter accruing or owing from the Leases.... The Leases and all of said Rents are being hereby ... assigned for the purpose of securing ... the following: (1) payment of all indebtedness evidenced by the Action Grant Loan Agreement ...; (3) performance and discharge of each and every obligation, covenant and agreement of [Brewery] contained herein and in the Action Grant Loan Agreement and the incurred any expenses related to the property during the redemption period. See G.G.C. Co., 287 N.W.2d at 382-83 (<HOLDING>). Procedure 11 for filing ""a frivolous lawsuit”

    ### Response:
    holding that an assignment of rents clause in a mortgage is enforceable after foreclosure during the redemption period to secure any deficiency and to pay any expenses associated with maintaining the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    There is no suggestion that any of the plaintiffs’ photographs in these cases appeared in the Moving Cover Sequence. 36 . Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc'y, 97-3924-CIV (Lenard), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18060, at *6 (S.D.Fla. May 14, 1998). 37 . Id. at *10. 38 . Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272. 39 . Id. at 1273. 40 . Id. at 1274 (emphasis in original). 41 . 533 U.S. 483, 121 S.Ct. 2381, 150 L.Ed.2d 500 (2001). 42 . E.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (""[T]he judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the claim or issue.""); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164

    ### Response:
    holding that the concept of collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137, 81 S.Ct. 523. If we deemed citizens’ lawful and protected efforts to influence government “state action,” then citizens could be held liable whenever their political activities played a role in government action later determined to have been unconstitutional. Such a holding would create a new category of state action (lobbying) and a new battlefield — the nation’s courtrooms — in political contests. Such a holding also would have a chilling effect on legitimate political expression in derogation of the First Amendment. It would threaten to deprive governmen 73, 578 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); In re: Yellowstone River,

    ### Response:
    holding that montana constitutions equal protection clause protects against arbitrary and discriminate state action 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Crye, 907 S.W.2d at 500. Reasonable probability is determined by the substance and context of the opinion and does not turn on semantics or on the use of a particular term or phrase. Id.; Myers, 411 S.W.2d at 713. An expert must base his opinion on facts or data perceived or reviewed during or before trial. Tex.R. Evid. 703; Onwuteaka v. Gill, 908 S.W.2d 276, 283 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). The weakness of facts in support of an expert’s opinion generally goes to the weight of the testimony rather than the admissibility. Onwuteaka, 908 S.W.2d at 283. Nevertheless, an expert’s opinion regarding causation that is based completely upon speculation and surmise amounts to no evidence. Id.; see also Schaefer v. Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 612 S.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Tex.1980) (<HOLDING>). “If the foundational data underlying opinion

    ### Response:
    holding that experts medical opinion constituted no evidence because it was based upon speculation and surmise rather than reasonable medical probability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    revealed none. In case we were left with any doubt, the administrative rules that govern CSD specifically provide that relatives have no right to the adoption of children in CSD custody unless they have established a “parent-chil 2d 617, 620-21 (1981) (refusing to create any common law right to the custody or adoption of one’s grandchildren). In fact, the Oregon courts have gone so far as to hold that even a custodial grandparent lacks a protected interest in the adoption of her grandchildren. Graham, 591 P.2d at 377-78 (considering appeal by grandmother who had temporary custody of children for 14 months prior the filing of the adoption petition); see also Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d 301, 308-09 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (similar); but cf. In re P.C., 842 P.2d 364, 367 (Ok.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). We have, in short, found no statutory,

    ### Response:
    holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    added); Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1164 n. 4 (Johnson “held that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus could not be extended to aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States.”) (emphasis added). It is this emphasis on sovereignty, taken together with the lease agreements governing Guantanamo, that is fatal to Petitioner’s argument. See Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418 (6 Bevans 113) (“the 1903 Lease”); Relations with Cuba, May 9, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 866 (6 Bevans 1161). Petitioner emphasizes that for all practical purposes the United States controls Guantanamo, but such control does not establish sovereignty. See Vermilyar-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 390, 69 S.Ct. 140, 93 L.Ed. 76 (1948) (<HOLDING>); Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinction between sole power and sovereignty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-626-27 (1996), because the final agency order was entered after October 30, 1996, and deportation proceedings were pending before April 1, 1997. See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997). Under the transitional rules, “there shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is ... deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense” enumerated in section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). See IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G). Rojas-Garcia admitted to being convicted of a firearms offense, which is covered by section 241(a)(2)(C) of the INA. We must therefore dismiss this petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1396a(a)(10)(B) guarantees that if a state elects to provide Medicaid to the medically needy, it must also provide it to the categorically needy and that it may not provide more assistance to the former group than to the latter. See id. at 39. Moreover, states may not provide benefits to some categorically needy individuals but not to others. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i); see also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 573 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2597, 73 L.Ed.2d 227 (1982) (stating that Section 1396a(a)(10)(B) ensures “that the medical assistance afforded to an individual who qualified under any categorical assistance program could not be different from that afforded to an individual who qualified under any other program”); see also Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F.Supp. 1123, 1140 (E.D.Cal.1994) (<HOLDING>). Section 1396a(a)(10)(B) thus precludes states

    ### Response:
    holding that current text of  1396aa10b requires comparability between groups of the categorically needy as well as between individuals within the same group
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleging the transaction was a fraudulent conveyance. This argument at its essence is that Debtor engaged in a knowing and conscious fraudulent scheme. Critical to Debtor’s position is that the release of Clark Fork under Section 1102 was effective, thereby removing Plaintiffs as creditors of Clark Fork. However, if Plaintiffs can prove (as they have alleged) that the release was obtained through fraud, then the release would be ineffective. “If action is taken for a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent scheme, the action is void and of no force or effect.” Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts Sec. 69.4 (4th Ed.2003). A release may be set aside if it was obtained fraudulently. Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Riggs et al. v. Gillespie, 241 F. 311 (4th

    ### Response:
    recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    status as a person on felony probation and the murder, this claim is unpreserved. See id. (declining to address the appellant’s argument that the trial court improperly found the victims’ ages as mitigating circumstances where there was no causal link between the children’s ages and their deaths, because the appellant failed to raise that argument before the trial court). Even if this claim were not barred, we would find it to be without merit. As noted above, Caylor does not dispute that he was on felony probation at the time of the murder. Instead, he argues that because this Court has imposed a nexus requirement on the “avoid arrest” aggravator, a similar requirement should apply to the felony probation aggravating circumstance. See Connor v. State, 808 So.2d 598, 610 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, the felony probation aggravator is

    ### Response:
    holding that to establish that a murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest the state must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of a witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a trade name of County Forest. His brief to this Court reiterates that this was his intent. This testimony establishes that he was not operating Porter Cash Fuel as a separate sole proprietorship, which might have permitted County Forest to escape liability. Because Porter operated Porter Cash Fuel as an agent for County Forest without disclosing that County Forest was the principal, he and County Forest are parties to the contract. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.03. This result is consistent with the outcome of our prior cases. Treadwell, 2007 ME 150, ¶¶ 19-23, 938 A.2d 794; Me. Farmers Exch. v. McGillicuddy, 1997 ME 153, ¶¶ 2-4,10-11, 697 A.2d 1266; Estate of Saliba v. Dunning, 682 A.2d 224, 226 (Me.1996); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Barr, 2010 ME 124, ¶¶ 26-27, 9 A.3d 816 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 8] Our cases from an earlier era endorsed

    ### Response:
    holding that a sole proprietor was personally liable for a contract she made before incorporating her business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    available for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 12203, the retaliation provision of the ADA. III. ANALYSIS ON RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT Because Hickman was not entitled to recover compensatory damages under her ADA retaliation claim, she was only entitled to seek equitable remedies for that claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Because she could only recover equitable remedies, Hickman had no statutory right to a jury trial on the ADA retaliation claim. However, in actions not triable of right by a jury, the court upon its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c). The Court chose to do so here. The Court is not bound by the findings of the advisory jury and is free to adopt them in whole or in part or to totally disregard them. See Andrade v. Chojnac 04) (<HOLDING>); Nieto v. Kapoor, 268 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that by its terms rule 50 applies only to jury trials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his past sexual history as part of the program. However, the hospital promised that any information disclosed during treatment would remain confidential. The petitioner confessed to new sex crimes during treatment, which the hospital disclosed to the court. The court thereafter sentenced the petitioner to an extended period of imprisonment, in part because of the petitioner’s confessions of past criminal sexual activity. We held that the petitioner’s confessions were obtained involuntarily because he was required to divulge his past criminal history under the promise that any disclosures would remain confidential. Id. at 1465-66. Pens is consistent with several decisions from our court, as well as our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants statement was involuntary because federal officer made a direct promise of confidentiality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not abuse its discretion in denying Ellis’s request to admit the whole of his videotaped interview The trial court denied Ellis’s request to admit the whole of his videotaped interview first because Ellis- did not confess during the interview. Though Ellis did not confess to wrongdoing during the interview, he did make admissions, as he placed himself with Y.W. in the shower at the same time (though under different circumstances than those testified to by V.W.), and as he admitted to unintended contact with V.W.’s vaginal area while teaching V.W. how to bathe. See Collier, 892 S.W.2d at 695 (noting that defendant’s statement placing himself at the scene of a murder, though not a confession, was an admission). The rule of completeness applies to both confessions and admissions. Id. (<HOLDING>). The trial court committed legal error when it

    ### Response:
    holding that an admission  falls under the rule of completeness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the right to use kitchen appliances and implements and the right to deny entry to a person who had no right to enter the house at all. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded Chana had a “right to actual care, custody, control, or management of the house.” And although a rational jury would probably conclude that Chana’s right to actual care, custody, control, or management of the Twombly Drive house was limited in scope and contingent on Janie’s continued permission, a rational jury could find that Chana’s limited right was greater than Ramirez’s — who had no right at all. See Garza, 344 S.W.3d at 413 (stating the Penal Code’s definition of owner is “expansive” and “give[s] ownership status to anyone with a rational connection to the property”); cf. Alexander, 757 S.W.2d at 97 (<HOLDING>). Conclusion We hold the evidence at Ramirez’s

    ### Response:
    holding a rational jury could find the named owners limited right to actual care custody control or management of his neighbors half of the duplex was a greater right than the defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute was satisfied and he was not denied his right to allocution. Accordingly, any objection by Pepe-Frazier’s trial counsel would have lacked merit and, thus, counsel was not ineffective. Decided March 18, 2015 The Pate Law Firm, Page A. Pate, Jess B. Johnson, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Arthur C. Walton, Sheila E. Gallow, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. Pepe-Frazier also seems to argue that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a presentence investigation or present mitigating evidence, pointing to counsel’s testimony at the motion-for-new-trial hearing in which he conceded that he “probably” should have done those things. However, Pepe-Frazier fails to identify exactly what an inve (712 SE2d 633) (2011) (<HOLDING>). 15 See, e.g., Morris v. State, 294 Ga. 45, 49

    ### Response:
    holding that the meaning of certain street slang or drug terminology was outside the ken of the average juror
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See ORCP 21 A (authorizing that procedure). The Court of Appeals affirmed, Lowe, 207 Or App at 534, and we allowed review to consider whether plaintiffs complaint stated a negligence claim under Oregon law. Before turning to the parties’ arguments, we begin by noting what this case does not involve. This is not a case in which plaintiff has alleged that she has suffered any present physical harm as a result of defendants’ negligence and seeks damages for her fear of developing cancer, for the increased risk of developing cancer that she faces, or for the costs of medical care to determine the extent of her harm. In such a case, as defendants conceded below, a plaintiff could obtain damages for those harms upon proper proof. See Zehr v. Haugen, 318 Or 647, 656-57, 871 P2d 1006 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Rather, plaintiff alleges only that a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that when a defendants negligence causes bodily injury the plaintiff can recover damages for past present and future medical expenses bodily injury and emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    admissions to the jury. Instead, it sought to enter the admissions into evidence. Despite the absence of a request to publish, the trial judge allowed Contractor to argue the admissions to the jury. Contractor capitalized on this ruling by arguing the substance of the admissions to the jury and presenting the answer to admission number four during both its opening and closing arguments. We find no error. B. Jury Charge Contractor argues the trial judge denied its alternative request that the jury be instructed that the responses to the requests to admit were conclusive facts in the case. We find no merit in this contention. Generally, a party is entitled to a jury charge regarding requests to admit which were published to the jury. See McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (<HOLDING>). Here, Contractor argued at trial that “either

    ### Response:
    holding trial courts general charge concerning requests for admissions was a correct statement of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Kirk, we hold that the trial court’s refusal to sever the charges is harmless error. Although Kirk controls our harmless error ruling in this case, we are troubled by the trial court’s disregard for the clear holding in Johnson and Long that the charge should have been severed. See id. (noting that the development of case rendered harmless “any error that may have initially occurred” in the denial of the motion to sever (emphasis added)). The error here is rendered “harmless” only because the defendant decided to testify in one or more of the cases, a dilemma he should not have been required to confront had the trial court applied the Johnson and Long holdings. Nevertheless, we are bound by the Kirk decision, see Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171, 174-75, 395 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1990) (<HOLDING>), unless this Court should determine en banc

    ### Response:
    holding that decision by panel of this court is established precedent under rules of stare decisis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    test. Onee the driver has elected either a blood or a breath test, the officer has a corresponding duty to comply with the driver's request. See § 42-4-1801(T)(a@)(II)(A). The issue before us today requires us to apply the language of the statute in light of our own precedent in Gillett. Of course, our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the general assembly. People v. Dist. Court, 718 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). We first look to the language of the statute itself. Words are given their. plain and ordinary meaning unless they have acquired a technical or particular meaning. § 2-4-101, C.R.S. (2004). If the clear intent of the legislature appears with reasonable certainty, we need not resort to other rules of statutory constru pp.1994) (<HOLDING>). There is no language on the face of the

    ### Response:
    holding that arresting officer has duty to implement drivers election without allowing driver to change such election
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Although he introduced evidence of actual damages resulting from his excessive force claim, he did not introduce evidence of damages resulting from his unlawful entry claim. In that these two claims are separate and distinct, the damages resulting from the excessive force claim are not sufficient to show that Miller suffered damages as a result of the officers’ unlawful entry into his home. Therefore, the district court would not have erred if it had given a nominal damages instruction on Miller’s unlawful entry claim. Miller further points out that the First Circuit has held that “a plaintiff may request the judge to instruct the jury on nominal damages, or in the absence of such an instruction, may ask the trial court for nominal damages on the r. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>); Salazaar v. Encinias, 242 F.3d 390 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    585 F.3d 1247, 1261 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (“[T]he scope of our review limits us to determining whether the trial court reached a decision that falls within any of the permissible choices the court could have made. In other words, the Supreme Court’s precedent convinces us that any ‘definite and firm conviction’ of the reviewing court must still include some measure of deference to the trial court’s factual determinations.”). Credibility findings demand even greater deference. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504; see also Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1078 n. 8 (9th Cir.2002). When applying this standard of review, we necessarily incorporate an understanding of the appropriate burden of proof in the district court. See Marsellus v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd., 581

    ### Response:
    holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in proving or disproving the same facts is not enough to establish privity.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. This proposition from Mazziotti was later reaffirmed in Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 242 Conn. 384-85, where the court held that an employer could not be reimbursed for workers’ compensation payments made to an employee from the proceeds of uninsured motorist benefits received by, and payable to, that employee. Furthermore, the overwhelming weight of authority of the jurisdictions that have considered whether under-insured/uninsured motorist benefits are a collateral source have concluded that those benefits fall squarely within that rule. See, e.g., International Sales-Rentals Leasing Co. v. Nearhoof, 263 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1972) (<HOLDING>); Respess v. Carter, 585 So. 2d 987, 988-90

    ### Response:
    holding that joint tortfeasor defendant does not get setoff equal to amount of recovery injured plaintiff receives from carrier of his uninsured motorist coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have the constitutional right to present a defense, including the right to offer testimony and evidence in their defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). However, the review of a state court evidentiary ruling by a federal court on a petition for habeas corpus is limited to a determination of whether the error, if any, was of such magnitude so as to deny Petitioner his right to a fair trial. Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir.1989) (citation omitted); see also Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir.1984) (stating that generally federal courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions are not empowered to correct erroneous evidence rulings of state trial courts); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Before relief can be granted the error must

    ### Response:
    holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    premiums for that Employee.” Id. at 1842. The phrase “agrees in writing,” LINA argues, empowers LINA to decide whether to insure Bowers, and then whether to grant the WOP benefit. This reading of the Life Policy language entirely ignores the context of the phrase. In both instances, the sentences address when a benefit begins, not whether a benefit applies at all. The use of the phrase “in writing” does no more than further emphasize this point. The instances in which a legal consequence is conditioned on the delivery of written notice are legion. To argue that a provision regarding the delivery of written notice implicitly grants discretion contradicts both common sense and basic contract interpretation principles. See Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., 933 F.2d 652, 657 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (quotations omitted). As such, this language

    ### Response:
    holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    id., cmt. See also 2k Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 407 (3d ed. 2000) (""[I]t is improper to put a witness on the stand merely to have him exercise before the jury his privilege against self-incrimination. ’'). 25 . We note, however, that Simons may not have been able to predict that the trial court would have permitted introduction of this evidence. In New York, motive is not an element of murder, see People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 2005 WL 1397044, at *5 (June 14, 2005); People v. Marin, 65 N.Y.2d 741, 745, 492 N.Y.S.2d 16, 481 N.E.2d 556 (1985), and evidence ""[t]hat a third party may have borne animus towards the victim, standing alone, does little to establish that the third party committed the crime,” Wade v. Ma .2d 896 (2d Dep't 1992) (<HOLDING>). At the district court, the Superintendent

    ### Response:
    holding in case involving the assault robbery and attempted murder of a taxi driver that no clear link existed between the crimes and an individual accused of similar crimes in the same area and rumored to be the true culprit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Co., 113 W.Va. 764, 169 S.E. 738 (1933). Finally, the Court has consistently held that “[s]ubrogation entitles a person to no greater rights than the party had to whose rights he claims subrogation.” Butts v. Sun Lumber Co., 82 W.Va. 113, 95 S.E. 585 (1918). In the instant case, Valley requests this Court to apply the doctrine of subrogation, presumably pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court’s equity power under 11 U.S.C. § 105 whereby the Court is authorized to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” However, the powers enumerated in section 105(a) “are not a license for a court to disregard the clear language and meaning of the bankruptcy statutes and rules.” Rouse v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 226 B.R. 39 (W.D.Mo.1998) (<HOLDING>), quoting Viking Associates v. Drewes (In re

    ### Response:
    holding that creditor who did not timely perfect lien in mobile home after refinancing loan notentitled to subrogation even though delay resulted from prior pmsi holders delay in releasing lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appellant]”). Because Mr. Grant challenged the arbi-trability of Ms. Rotolante’s claims at the outset of the arbitration proceedings, his motion to vacate was not subject to the three-month statute of limitations under 9 U.S.C. § 12. See Solvay Pharm., Inc. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 442 F.3d 471, 478 n. 6 (6th Cir.2006) (noting that challenge to arbitrability may manifest itself as attack on arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) or as motion resisting petition to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C § 4 when challenge occurs after arbitration, but “[w]hen the challenge occurs prior to the arbitration, there is no question that the issue is one of arbitrability, for no award yet exists to be challenged”); see also Lucey v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 305 Fed.Appx. 875 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Lukens Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of

    ### Response:
    holding that contractors failure to file motion to vacate arbitrators decision did not waive challenge to written arbitration clause as unconscionable where contractor raised objection to arbitration and validity of provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in state court, see Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558-59 (7th Cir.1999), she does not make that claim. Under these circumstances Rooker-Feld-man applies and divested the district court of jurisdiction. Rooker-Feldman applies for the additional reason that despite Dawaji’s assertions to the contrary, the relief she seeks would require that we nullify the state-court judgment. Dawaji’s request for damages is the amount that she would have received had she not been coerced into accepting the settlement. She thus wants the federal court in effect to negate the state-court order approving the agreed-upon child support, maintenance, and property settlement. Rooker-Feldman cannot be circumvented in this way. See Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823,

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim seeking the value of plaintiffs foreclosed home plus interest and punitive damages would effectively undo the statecourt foreclosure judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on its rational assessment of the cost and benefit that would flow from moving.”) (Citations omitted). In sum, the fact that these authorities ultimate^ ly disbelieved the defendants and therefore chose not to rely upon them is no evidence of irrationality. Seventh, while the defendants fault the government for failing to explain the specific reasons for disbelieving them, it is Defendants’ burden, not the government’s, to make a “substantial” showing that the departure decision was irrational. Normally the general statement of a prosecutor or law enforcement officer that a defendant was unbelievable or unreliable is a sufficient reason to deny a defense motion to compel the government to file a motion for downward departure. United States v. Nicolace, 90 F.3d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Johnigan, 90 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not error to deny a motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding a defense motion to compel the government to file a departure motion where among other things the fbi questioned the defendants candor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more modem statutes use the term ""disability.” Modern practice now also gives preference to tire wording ""per son with a disability,” rather than ""disabled person” — but both phrases have the same meaning. 13 . In Ranger Fuel Corporation v. W.Va. Human Rights Comm'n., 180 W.Va. 260, 376 S.E.2d 154 (1988), we stated that West Virginia's pre-1989 ""actual disabilities only” statutory definition of ""person with a disability” was to be strictly construed for purposes of determining whether a person had protected status to bring a claim under the law. Applying this standard to facts arising under the pre-1989 law, this Court decided a number of cases addressing the issue of ""who is a person with a disability?” See Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 182 W.Va. 615, 390 S.E.2d 814 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Casteel v. Consolidation Coal Co., 181 W.Va.

    ### Response:
    holding that our law prohibiting disability discrimination could be invoked by a person with asymptomatic hiv infection and recognizing that the 1989 definitional changes broadened the scope of protected status under our disability discrimination law id at n 5
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defendant is on parole rather than to the acts constituting a violation of parole for purposes of 'the same transactions or occurrences’ clause in guideline § 5G1.3.” United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir.1991) (cit ing United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir.1990), limited on other grounds, United States v. Higgins, 128 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir.1997)). If we were to analyze the issue, we would certainly consider the fact that the guideline language in both Nottingham 8 L.Ed.2d 1011 (2001), United States v. Alexander, 100 F.3d 24, 26-27 (5th Cir.1996) (same), United States v. Gondek, 65 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.1995) (same), and United States v. Bernard, 48 F.3d 427, 430-32 (9th Cir.1995) (same), with United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 976-80 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65,

    ### Response:
    holding that application note 6 is not mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we first noted that the State presented no evidence to show that the defendant gave his brother-in-law explicit or implicit consent to enter or use the defendant’s bedroom. Id. at 316. Furthermore, we noted that the State presented no evidence that the brother-in-law ever entered the defendant’s bedroom, with or without the defendant’s consent. Id. We therefore held that once the officers received notice that the defendant lived in the bedroom, the officers were obligated to investigate further to determine if the brother-in-law truly-had authority to consent to a search of the bedroom. Id. at 317. Because the officers did not investigate further, we reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 318; see also Riordan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Reynolds v. State, 781 S.W.2d 351, 355

    ### Response:
    holding that babysitter living in home connected via ramp to defendants home had no authority to consent to search of defendants home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ga. App. at 511 (1) (a) (punctuation omitted); see also Brown, 267 Ga. App. at 645 (1) (“It is only when the evidence is insupportable as a matter of law that the jury’s verdict may be disturbed, even where the evidence is entirely circumstantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 12 See Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 212, 213 (2) (723 SE2d 504) (2012) (“The [Sjtate presented evidence other than [the defendant’s] mere spatial proximity to the pipe containing cocaine to show that he had constructive possession over it. The pipe was dry, although it had been raining and the surrounding area was ‘soaked’; from this evidence the court as factfinder could infer that the pipe had been on the ground for a very short period of time.”); Reason v. State, 283 Ga. App. 608, 610 (1) (a) (642 SE2d 236) (2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 332,

    ### Response:
    holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant possessed cocaine when although other people were present and had access to the yard the surveilling officers testified that in the period immediately prior to the search the defendant was the only person to retrieve items from the bucket where the cocaine was found which the defendant did repeatedly as police watched
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    showed that he traveled to California to purchase a large quantity of drugs, an activity which is substantially similar in kind to the conduct the government alleged he committed in the current conspiracy. See United States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1432 (8th Cir.1995) (finding evidence indicating previous involvement in large-scale distribution activities sufficiently similar to present charge of involvement in large-scale distribution activities). The government charged the onset date of the conspiracy here as sometime around January 1995, thus only five years (over four and a half of which he spent in prison) separated Frazier, Sr.’s alleged current criminal conduct and his past conduct, rendering the past conduct well within the bounds of admission. See Hardy, 224 F.3d at 757 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Green, 151 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that sixyearold conviction is not too remote for introduction under rule 404b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    560 (1979). 2 . Although the indictment charged McGee under both subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), the District Court only instructed the jury as to subsection (b)(2). J.A. 446-450. 3 . In Chiarella, the Court reversed the conviction of a print-shop employee who traded securities of takeover targets he deduced from print materials because he did not share a fiduciary or similar relationship with the targets' shareholders. 445 U.S. at 224-225, 235, 100 S.Ct. 1108. Similarly, in Dirks, an investment analyst was not liable for tipping his clients about a company’s fraud because ""[t]here was no expectation by [the analyst’s inside] sources that he would keep their information in confidence.” 463 U.S. at 665, 103 S.Ct. 3255. 4 . Compare United States v. Kim, 184 F.Supp.2d 1006 (N.D.Cal.2002) (<HOLDING>), with SEC v. Kirch, 263 F.Supp.2d 1144

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no duty of confidentiality between members of a social group of ceos although club rules emphasized a need for confidential ity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2006, the 2005 arrest warrant issued for his younger brother which allegedly forced that brother to flee Haiti, and the political persecution of other individuals in Haiti. To the extent that the BIA ruled that Lindor’s published novel and the “alleged new threats due to his novel” did not create an exception to the time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen, its decision was not an abuse of discretion. The threats Lindor allegedly received in October 2006 resulted from his publication of his book and his subsequent interviews with Haitian radio stations to which he called in while he was in the United States, rather than being “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); of., e.g., Haddad, 437 F.3d at 517 (<HOLDING>); cf. also Niyibizi v. Mukasey, 300 Fed.Appx.

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioners divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in jordan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    connection the Court notes that U.S. Bank already has moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against it on the grounds that they are time-barred under the ICFA’s three-year statute of limitations. See Doc. 8. Naturally, were the Court to find fraudulent joinder on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims against Pierce & Associates are time-barred, that ruling would require the Court to give judgment for U.S. Bank on the grounds of the statute of limitations as well. Moreover, if for some reason the Court were to hold that Plaintiffs’ claims against U.S. Bank are not time-barred, this would be tantamount to an admission that Plaintiffs’ claims against Pierce & Associates are not time-barred either, requiring immediate remand of this case to state court. See Hauck, 2006 WL 1596826, at *6 (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes that the allegation of

    ### Response:
    holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    n.2, 151 A.3d 502; Taylor v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 143-44 (Me. 1984). A “discharge"" refers to an ""outright discharge” from the custody of the Commissioner without conditions. 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1)(B) (2015); Taylor, 481 A.2d at 142; see Beal, 2016 ME 169, ¶ 2 n.2, 151 A.3d 502. In this case, Begin purported to seek only release. The procedure and burden of proof are the same for both discharge and release. 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1). 4 . The procedural aspects of the release or discharge proceeding are governed by 15 M.R.S. § 104-A (2015), the current version of the statute. See James v. State, 2015 ME 111, ¶¶ 2, 4, 121 A.3d 1290 (applying the 2014 version of section 104-A to a 2007 NCR judgment); Michaud v. N. Me. Med. Ctr., 436 A.2d 398, 400 (Me. 1981) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and we, are bound to apply

    ### Response:
    holding that amendments to procedure apply to both pending and future matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the point in time when the landlord became aware of the dog and its viciousness and the attack. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Marks, 3 Haw.App. 127, 642 P.2d 542, 544 (1982)(noting that 28-day notice requirement would have prevented landlord from evicting the dogs’ owner prior to the dog-biting incidents in question); Feister v. Bosack, 198 Mich.App. 19, 497 N.W.2d 522, 525-26 (1993)(noting that, even if the ability to evict was equivalent to control, there was insufficient time for the landlord to have evicted because the event giving rise to notice occurred a ""scant two days” before the plaintiff was injured and thus the landlord would have been unable to evict under Michigan law which requires a minimum of 30 days notice); Roy v. Neibauer, 191 Mont. 224, 623 P.2d 555, 556 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Meyers v. Haskins, 140 A.D.2d 923, 528

    ### Response:
    holding that landlord was not liable where dog injured child nine days after landlordtenant relationship was established and where the lease called for 30 days notice before it could be terminated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[n]umerous circuits have affirmed that all procedural violations do not establish a denial of free appropriate public education such that reimbursement is warranted, only those violations that are sufficiently harmful and serious. See, e.g., Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1059; Doe by and Through Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Sch., 133 F.3d 384, 388 (6th Cir.1998)(finding that reimbursement may be appropriate for ‘sufficiently serious procedural failures by the school district’ in conducting child-find procedures); Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir.1992) (agreeing that when a school district has ‘egregiously violated the procedural requirements’ of the IDEA, reimbursement may be called for); Doe v. Alabama State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 662-63 (11th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>).” Hoffman, 38 F.Supp.2d at 761. Even assuming

    ### Response:
    holding that proper analysis of procedural violations considers the harm flowing from the violation in assessing whether relief is appropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the assignment from Flavors to Fragrances was invalid. It is not disputed that defendants’ policies were “occurrence” policies. In these kinds of policies, the peril insured is the occurrence itself. Zuckerman v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 304, 310, 495 A.2d 395 (1985) (citing S. Kroll, “The Professional Liability Policy ‘Claims Made”’ 13 Forum 842, 843 (1978)). “Once the occurrence takes place, coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for some time thereafter.” Id. at 310-11, 495 A.2d 395 (quoting S. Kroll, supra, 13 Forum at 843). It is also not disputed that the subject policies require the insurer’s consent in order for the insured to assign the policy to a third person. See also Kase v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 58 N.J.L. 34, 36, 32 A. 1057 (Sup.Ct.1895) (<HOLDING>). However, once a loss occurs, an insured’s

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurance policy cannot be transferred to a third person without the insurers consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.1985)). Expert testimony “is properly excluded when it is not needed to clarify facts and issues of common understanding which jurors are able to comprehend for themselves.” Hibiscus Assocs. Ltd. v. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen & Firemen Retirement Sys., 50 F.3d 908, 917 (11th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). ANALYSIS Defendant Cirrus’s Expert David Klepacki Even assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Klepacki is qualified as an expert regarding the matters he intends to address, the process he used in forming his expert opinion must be sufficiently reliable under Daubert and its progeny. See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1342 (stating that “one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony”); cf. McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257 (<HOLDING>). The Court must also find that the testimony

    ### Response:
    holding that rulings on admissibility under daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered experts methodology
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their parents. The guardian opined that “with assistance, the parents would be very capable parents.” At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the mother and father to all three children. In determining that termination was appropriate, the trial judge focused primarily on the abuse of the infant. The trial judge expressed concern that the parents had suggested their eldest child may be to blame for the injuries to the infant. As to the middle child, the trial judge made no specific findings of fact. There is no question that the abuse of the infant in this case constituted egregious conduct that threatened the life and health of this child. See N.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 996, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); M.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.,

    ### Response:
    holding egregious conduct occurred when infant was shaken forcefully enough to break bones
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    into a custodial account in its own name and, after a [debt relief company] negotiates a settlement, [the company] distributes money to the creditor in payment or partial payment of the consumer’s debt.” Id. at 324, ¶ 10. In so holding, the court noted that “the debt adjusting statute should be construed liberally in favor of the consumers it aims to protect.” Id. at 326, ¶ 17. ¶ 34 Consistent with the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning in Carlsen, it would be unreasonable to construe A.R.S. § 6-701(4) to allow a company to avoid licensure simply by splitting its operations into multiple entities, then putting one in charge of receiving money and another in charge of distribution. See Carlsen, 256 P.3d at 325, ¶ 12; see also Browne v. Nowlin, 117 Ariz. 73, 77, 570 P.2d 1246 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170

    ### Response:
    holding a lender could not circumvent a statutory prohibition against collecting certain fees by using a thirdparty escrow agent as a camoflauge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facie case, defendant has the burden to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If defendant meets its burden, plaintiff must show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Id. 1. Denial of salary increase Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of race discrimination ""with respect to defendant’s denial of a salary increase. Plaintiff is African-American. Defendant’s refusal of a salary increase qualifies as an adverse employment action. See Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 531 (10th Cir.1998) (adverse actions not limited to monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits); Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff offered evidence that four

    ### Response:
    recognizing that unequal pay is an adverse action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that a prior state conviction obtained where defendant had been wholly deprived of counsel could form the predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction. Id. at 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 915. While the defendant in Lewis was convicted under a different statute than Sharpley, the reasoning of Lewis regarding the use of the unrestricted word “conviction” applies with equal force here. Id. at 61-62, 100 S.Ct. 915. To the extent that Sharpley attacks his prior conviction as part of his sentencing proceedings, he can do so only if the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). See Custis, 511 U.S. at 491-92, 496-97, 114 S.Ct. 1732 (<HOLDING>). Gideon, in turn, establishes that criminal

    ### Response:
    holding that where a sentence was enhanced under 18 usc  924e for prior convictions absent statutory language authorizing collateral attacks defendant could not challenge prior conviction except for gideon error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 552. The primary issue in that case was whether the larceny of property from different owners at the same time and at the same place constituted one or several larcenies. Id. at 301, 312 S.E.2d at 552-53. However, the Court briefly addressed the method by which the State proved the value of the stolen items: [ The defendant] forcibly entered an apartment occupied by three roommates and took property belonging to each. The property was never recovered. At trial, each roommate estimated the value of the items taken. [The defendant] concedes the aggregate value of the property exceeded Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars, the statutory minimum to sustain a conviction of grand larceny. However, [the defendant] argues the value of the property taken from mo 32, 216 S.E.2d 758, 759-60 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Seaboard Coast Line, 262 S.C. at 46, 202

    ### Response:
    holding that the jury is the tribunal to determine the weight to be accorded the testimony of the witnesses and accept or reject the valuations placed thereupon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not have relied on Illinois law “because she claims to have been unaware of the basis for litigation until a short time before filing suit.” 908 F.2d at 1390. Following this lead, the district judge in Lems v. Hermann stated: Similar to the plaintiff in Short, because Lewis was unaware of his claims until after the new period of repose [section 13] had expired, he could not have delayed filing in reliance on Illinois law. Lewis v. Hermann, 775 F.Supp. at 1146 (citing Short, 908 F.2d at 1390). This “late discovery” rule seems to have some support in the Seventh Circuit’s most recent discussion of this issue. See Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 702-03 nn. 6 & 7 (7th Cir.1993) (seeming to indicate that because the plaintiffs could not have complied with Short, had it app 7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Given the necessary factual showing for

    ### Response:
    holding that short would not apply retroactively because plaintiffs forewent an state court lawsuit in reliance on illinois law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    binding United States law and applicable to the case was considered by the Court in Puerto Rico, and it concluded that “[mjatters of pollution by foreign vessels within the territorial sea of the United States are governed by UNCLOS. Although the treaty arising from the convention is currently pending ratification before the Senate, it nevertheless carries the weight of law from the date of its submission by the President to the Senate.” United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., et al., — F.Supp. - [1997 WL 1045726] (D.P.R. Sept 19, 1997) (citing Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The issue was briefed and resolved by the Court’s opinion, and thus was actually litigated. See, e.g., Bush v. Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd., 62 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). However, the third prong of the collateral

    ### Response:
    holding that fully litigated requires both that the issue was effectively raised in the prior action either through pleadings or development of evidence and argument at trial or on motion and that the losing party have had a fair opportunity pro cedurally substantively and evidentially to contest the issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    charging Morales contained two counts: a conspiracy count involving one kilogram or more of heroin and a substantive count involving 100 grams or more of heroin. The reference to Section 841(b)(1)(B) clearly informed Morales that the government would seek and the District Court would be required to impose a sentence of at least ten years on the substantive count. Morales contended at sentencing that he went to trial because he believed that the only mandatory minimum the government would seek was the ten years authorized by Section 841(b)(1)(B). This argument has some force because lack of an affirmative obligation to convey information does not necessarily excuse the giving of potentially misleading incomplete information. Cf. United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, because Section 851 does not

    ### Response:
    holding that although we had previously held that an attorneys failure to inform his or her client of the immigration consequences of a conviction was not ineffective assistance actively misleading the client concerning these consequences was ineffective assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See docket entry no. proceed In Forma Pauperis in this cause be denied. 30 . See docket entry no. 37. 31 . See docket entry no. 47. 32 . See docket entry no. 34. 33 . Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.1981). While specific notice regarding summary judgment procedures is not required with regard to pro se litigants', see Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir.1992), this Court prefers to provide such notice whenever possible. 34 . See Washington v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 68 F.3d 935, 939 (5th Cir.1995); Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 33 F.3d 498, 504 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1994); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics and Intelligence Coordination Unit, 2 2d 338, 341 n. 2 (5th Cir.1982); and Orthopedic & Sports Injury Clinic v. Wang, 922 F.2d at 225, (<HOLDING>). 66 . See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d at 346,

    ### Response:
    holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusoiy facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between a potential customer and a host computer.” See Dawson, 274 S.W.3d at 178; Karstetter, 184 S.W.3d at 405. Therefore, the degree of interaction between the parties must be examined to determine jurisdiction. See Dawson, 274 S.W.3d at 178. Here, the contact in question is an individual’s direct use of the internet to commit, allegedly, the torts of libel, defamation, and business disparagement. Thus, as we determine the “degree of interaction” between the' parties in this ease, we also look to other libel and defamation cases that involved the distribution of tor-tious statements to broad audiences to determine whether Wilkerson’s contact with Texas via the internet is sufficient to satisfy the minimum-contacts requirement. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471-72 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see generally Touradji v. Beach Capital

    ### Response:
    holding that sliding scale used to evaluate internet contacts is still applicable in defamation case in spite of defamation cause of actions unique features concluding that sliding scale is compatible with the effects test of calder v jones  465 us 783 104 sct 1482 79 led2d 804 1984 for intentional torts and stating we must evaluate the extent of the interactivity between parties on internet bulletin board as well as appellants arguments with respect to colder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. [Id. at 634-35.] While Williams is distinguishable from the instant case in that the trial court there failed to inform the jury of the consequences of a unanimous verdict even in its original charge, this distinction is not of constitutional significance. Part of the constitutional concern is with the clarity of the court’s instructions. See People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (en banc) (“[T]he certainty essential to a jury verdict directly resulting in death can only be achieved when the jurors are clearly instructed concerning the effect of their verdicts on the ultimate question of life imprisonment or death.”); Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del.1985) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons previously set forth at

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts instruction implying that the jury had to be unanimous in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment violated defendants constitutional rights because this instruction could have been clearerand should have been
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    here. The Parke-Davis Court was critical of the absence of an original complaint by the injured plaintiff and proper joinder of all parties in a unitary action. The case sub judice proceeded exactly as contemplated for the bringing of a contribution claim: ""The procedural mechanism for invoking [a] non-statutoiy right of contribution ... is by means of third-party joinder.... [W]hether the inchoate right of contribution can be asserted in a given case will generally be determined based upon compliance with the procedural requirements necessary to invoke such right.” Parke-Davis, 217 W.Va. at 20, 614 S.E.2d at 20. The only procedural irregularity was created by the subsequent' settlement of Mr. Smith. 9 . See In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 223 (Del.Ch.2014) (<HOLDING>) Robarts v. Diaco, 581 So.2d 911, 915

    ### Response:
    recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    747, 749 (Minn. App.1997). Appellants argue that the district court erred in finding that they waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction through their participation in the litigation. See generally D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92-S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (indicating that in a civil suit defendant has a constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to defend, but that right can be waived). The defense of personal jurisdiction is deemed waived if not raised as a defense, made by motion, or included in a responsive pleading. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(a); see also Majestic, Inc. v. Berry, 593 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Minn.App.1999). In addition, rule 12.08 does not “preclude waiver by implication.” Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2000) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). It has long been the rule

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant waives the defense of insufficient service of process despite asserting the defense by answer by affirmatively invoking the jurisdiction of the district court to obtain partial summary judgment without earlier or simultaneously moving to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had even a “moderate limitation” adhering to a schedule or concentrating or understanding or handling instructions, then she would be precluded from work (Id.). The ALJ’s failure to address this issue in her opinion raises a red flag that, at a minimum, needs to be acknowledged on remand and then lowered if the Commissioner continues to deny Title II benefits for the relevant period. See Sayles v. Barnhart, No. 00 C 7200, 2001 WL 1568850, at *9 (N.D.Ill., Dec. 7, 2001)(finding that “the fundamental problem with the ALJ’s determination is that both in the body of her ruling and in her findings, she addressed the vocational expert’s opinion in response to only one of the hypotheticals ... and disregarded the others”); see also Connor v. Shalala, 900 F.Supp. 994, 1003-04 (N.D.Ill.1995) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the speech aphasia issue, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the alj did not consider the vocational experts testimony on crossexamination and failed to articulate a basis for rejecting this evidence which was a basis for remand
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    recognizes that disavowal would not apply when a “person of reasonable intelligence would not be misled into relying on the erroneous statement.” See Biotec Biolo-gische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2001). Here, however, the statement does not appear to be erroneous. Rather, the Applicant’s statement that Claim 1 “requires motion of both of the actuators if the base effector is to move at all,” was clear cut and repeated in the “Letter After Final.” See Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 994-96 (Fed.Cir.2003) (recognizing statements in prosecution history to constitute a disclaimer when such statements are “detailed, consistent, and repeated.”); cf. Tektel, Inc. v. United States, 116 Fed.Cl. 612, 624 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Plaintiffs suggestion of a

    ### Response:
    holding where there is a dearth of evidence suggesting that the government made a scriveners error the court had no basis to conclude a scriveners error occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could not have been meant to refer to Risk Management, which was not created until 1981. However, when Risk Management was created, the Legislature gave it powers and responsibilities that suggest it can readily fit within the term ""agency concerned"" for purposes of section 63-30-12. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63A-4-101 to -206 (1993) (defining powers and duties of Risk Management). See also Utah Ádmin.Code R37-1-1 to -5 (1994) (administrative rules establishing policies and procedures of Risk Management). We should assume that when the Legislature created Risk Management it did so advisedly, fully aware of the impact this would have on existing law. See Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975). See also Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 525-26 (Utah 1986) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(1)

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff need not file notice in accordance with section 633012 because division of state lands had statutory authority to decide dispute prior to the creation and enactment of the governmental immunity act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    invoked to offer excuses for neglect leading up to the judgment in the first place, not excuses for neglect for failure to file post-judgment motions to alter or amend. Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 n. 14 (8th Cir.1988); see, e.g., In re Freightway Corp., 170 B.R. 108 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1994) (seeking reconsideration under Rule 60(b) of order denying creditor’s claim for failure of creditor to appear); In re King, 165 B.R. 296 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1994) (seeking rehearing under Rule 60(b) for order granting motion to value collateral where creditor failed to respond); Elliot v. Hancock (In re Hancock), 160 B.R. 677 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1993) (seeking relief under Rule 60(b) from default judgment entered when no answer was filed); cf. In re Gray, 156 B.R. 707 (Bankr.D.Maine 1993) (<HOLDING>); In re Bowden, 138 B.R. 584

    ### Response:
    holding creditors could not attack debtors discharge as it applied to them by characterizing motion as under rule 60b where procedure to challenge discharge was provided by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    release “dispell[ed] any doubt regarding either the amount purported to be released or by whom the release was executed.” Id. at 1167. As noted above, the “pay when and if paid” clause is part of a settlement agreement between Weststar and Walton under which the parties agreed to settle all existing disputes and lawsuits and continue them existing contractual relationship, except as modified by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The “pay when and if paid” clause in the Settlement Agreement does not identify any rights that Walton may have under the Miller Act payment bond — or any other bond for that matter— as a predicate for releasing them. Indeed, it is not even framed as a release or waiver of claims. Thus, Walton’s agreement hnson & Sons Inc., 236 F.2d 864, 865 (3d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Sunbelt Pipe Corp. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that freight and transportalion charges are not recoverable under the terms of the miller act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For these reasons, and the fact that the delay has only been a few months, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he would suffer any prejudice if default is set aside and the matter proceeds on the merits. Accordingly, this factor weighs in Wong’s favor. 4. Alternative Sanctions A district court should also consider whether there are any sanctions less drastic than a default that are both available and effective. Payne, 439 F.3d at 204-05. Courts have commonly imposed alternative monetary sanctions on attorneys who are responsible for a party’s default. See GNB, Inc. v. Tropex, Inc., 849 F.2d 605, 1988 WL 60618, at *2 (4th Cir.1988) (unpublished table decision) (alternative sanction of attorney’s fees appropriate where attorney is at fault for delay); Lolatchy, 816 F.2d at 953-54 (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding district court abused its discretion by entering default judgment where attorney caused delay and sanctions short of default such as costs attorneys fees or contempt of court would have likely cured the attorneys failure to respond
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Rule 803(3). Harmon, ¶ 32. This case deals with the “highly contentious” distribution of Helen’s estate, and Helen’s alleged statements are “out-of-court statements made by the testator regarding his or her testamentary intentions.” Harmon, ¶ 37. As such, Helen’s statements to her attorneys do not contain “comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” M. R. Evid. 804(b)(5); see Harmon, ¶ 37. The verbal act doctrine does not apply here because the issue is not whether Helen discussed her dispositional intentions with her attorneys—“the existence of statements”—but rather what she told them—“the truth of the matters asserted within [the statements].” Morrow, 236 Mont. at 399, 770 P.2d at 862; see also In re Estate of Mead, 2014 MT 264, ¶¶ 23-24, 376 Mont. 386, 336 P.3d 362 (<HOLDING>). The District Court therefore did not abuse

    ### Response:
    holding that the verbal act doctrine applied to the testators outofcourt statement acknowledging his signature on the will because the existence of that statement was material to determining the validity of the witnesss signature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (citations omitted) (discussing pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11); see State v. Layman, 214 S.W.3d 442, 452 (Tenn. 2007) (“[A] trial court has discretion under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure to reject a plea agreement ....”); State v. Todd, 654 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tenn. 1983) (“The trial judge may accept or reject the plea agreement in the exercise of his discretion.”) (discussing Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11). A trial court’s refusal to accept a guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495 (“A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.”); State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1995) (<HOLDING>). “An abuse of discretion occurs when [a] trial

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court acted within its authority in rejecting a plea bargain in a capital case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lewd and lascivious molestation violate his right against double jeopardy because both convictions arose from a single, continuous episode without a spatial or temporal break between each act to enable the defendant to form a new criminal intent for each separate act. We disagree. The differences in the character and type of crime proven are as important as the spatial and temporal aspects when considering whether multiple punishments are appropriate. An analysis of those differences, as noted by Judge Griffin in her concurring opinion in the defendant’s initial appeal, leads to the conclusion that the defendant’s convictions for attempted sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation did not violate his double jeopardy rights. See also State v. Meshell, 2 So.3d 132, 135 (Fla.2009)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence for

    ### Response:
    holding that acts of oral anal and vaginal penetration as prescribed by statute defining lewd and lascivious battery are distinct criminal acts such that separate punishments for those acts do not violate double jeopardy despite the fact that they occurred in the same criminal episode
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    future litigation. Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 613 Pa. 80, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (2011). “When a party to a suit has been charged with spoliating evidence in that suit (sometimes called “first-party spoliation”), we have allowed trial courts to exercise their discretion to impose a range of sanctions against the spoliator.” Id. (citing Schroeder v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 551 Pa. 243, 710 A.2d 23, 27 (1998)) (footnotes omitted). This Court has stated: “When reviewing a court’s decision to grant or deny a spoliation sanction, we must determine whether the court abused its discretion.” Mount Olivet Tabernacle Church v. Edwin L. Wiegand Division, 781 A.2d 1263, 1269 (Pa.Super.2001) (citing Croydon Plastics Co. v. Lower Bucks Cooling & Heating, 698 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>)). Such sanctions arise out of “the common

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the decision whether to sanction a party and if so the severity of such sanction is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the need to ensure that “every man’s vote should equal another’s,” and the problems created by the use of large, demographically unequal counties as building blocks. Ibid. Against that backdrop, and in recognition of that concern, we hypothesized that the municipality provision in the Constitution “may” have to be breached at some later date. Ibid. But the one-man one-vote question is not implicated here, for there is no allegation that the division of Newark and Jersey City into only two districts each would result in impermissible population 330 (1993) (observing that “unnecessary fragmentation of [municipalities] limits the ability of local constituencies to organize effectively and increases voter confusion and isolation”); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68, 82 (D.Colo.1982) (<HOLDING>); J. Gerald Herbert, Redistricting in the

    ### Response:
    recognizing frequent use of respect for municipal boundaries as criteria in evaluating redistricting plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    progressed, the government minimized a greater percentage of calls, in keeping with the approach approved in United, States v. Hyde. Moreover, many of the intercepted calls about which Brown com plain § 3500 (2002). 25 . See United States v. Martinez, 87 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir.1996). 26 . 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). 27 . 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1). 28 . Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 104, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976) (quoting S.Rep. No. 981, 85th Cong. 3 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 29 . 565 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir.1978). 30 . Id. 31 . Id. 32 . Id. 33 . Id. 34 . Id. at 363-64. 35 . Id. (quoting United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 566 (5th Cir.1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted); See also United States v. Ramirez, 954 F.2d 1035, 1038-39 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 36 . See United States v. Ramirez, 174 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that agents rough notes were not statements under the jencks act where notes were scattered and all the information contained in them was available to the defendant in other forms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and LMS. See St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 531; David L. Smith & Assocs., L.L.P., 327 S.W.3d at 878-79. The mere existence of monetary benefits to both Hospital and LMS by virtue of their relationship is insufficient to establish the third element of a joint enterprise; there must be evidence that the monetary benefits were shared among the members of the enterprise without special or distinguishing characteristics. See St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 531; David L. Smith & Assocs., L.L.P., 327 S.W.3d at 878-79; see also Blount, 910 S.W.2d at 933 (explaining that circumstantial evidence that could give rise to any number of inferences was insufficient to satisfy third element of joint enterprise); Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828, 851 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Chesser argues that Hospital and LMS (along

    ### Response:
    holding evidence was legally insufficient on third element of joint enterprise because although both entities of the alleged joint enterprise contemplated economic gain that gain was not shared without special or distinguishing characteristics but instead one entity passed along revenue attributable to work of the other and kept for itself revenue attributable to the work of its own drivers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    living with Mother and Children, and, thus, no new parent-child relationship or family unit would be created. While Father concedes that the Superior Court opined in J.M. that cohabitation is not the sine qua non of a new family unit, he notes, consistent with the dissent below, that the Superior Court in that case held only that mother and grandfather were permitted to show cause under Section 2901, but that it remanded to the orphans’ court to make the ultimate determination as to whether cause was shown. Father suggests that, rather than relying upon J.M., the Superior Court should have instead considered L.J.B. (remanding for hearing regarding stepmother’s intention to adopt where stepmother and the child’s father were separated) and Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867 (Pa.Super.2000) (<HOLDING>), when interpreting the term “family unit,” as,

    ### Response:
    holding that proposed adoption by stepparent who was separated from the childs mother was not valid and that as a result termination of the fathers parental rights was inappropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the statute at issue. See 617 N.W.2d at 65. The State of Minnesota’s interest in enforcing chapter 253B is significant. We have said in other contexts that Minnesota’s interest in enacting civil commitment laws lies “in both protecting the public from sexual violence and rehabilitating the mentally ill.” Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 872. These state interests are “compelling.” Id.; cf. Davis, 773 N.W.2d at 72 (concluding that the state has a “strong interest” in ensuring traffic safety); Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 14-15 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., concurring) (noting with respect to sex offender registration “it seems clear that if the state can ever reach the on-reservation conduct of tribal members ... it can do so here”); Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 416-17 (Minn.2007) (<HOLDING>); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 924

    ### Response:
    holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the citizens of minnesota from those who pose a severe threat to their health and safety citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be brought against a beneficiary’s employer when the employer is the plan administrator and thus bears responsibility for, and has control over, the plan itself. See Garren, 114 F.3d at 187. The Seventh Circuit, however, has adopted the position that only the plan as an entity may be sued. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1491 (7th Cir.1996) (stating that ERISA permits suits to recover benefits “only against the plan as an entity,” and thus suits against non-plan defendants such as medical personnel are not allowed unless liability against such person is established under another part of the statute), quoting Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Riordan v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to

    ### Response:
    holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    116, 126-27, 970 P.2d 215, 222-23 (1998) (murder conviction) (Although earlier case of State v. Hansen, 304 Or. 169, 173-76, 743 P.2d 157, 159-61 (1987) excluded expert testimony on grooming, it did not hold that such testimony is, in all circumstances, inadmissible. Experts can explain seemingly abnormal responses of a certain class of victims but must refrain from providing details of the victimization process.); State v. LaBounty, 168 Vt. 129, 141, 716 A.2d 1, 9 (1998) (saying that ""profile” evidence has been overwhelmingly disapproved by appellate courts); In re Det. of Thorell, 149 Wash.2d 724, 757, 72 P.3d 708, 726 (2003) (profile evidence inadmissible, citing State v. Braham); Braham, 67 Wash.App. 930, 937-39, 938 n. 5, 939 n. 7, 841 P.2d 785, 789-90, 790 ns. 5, 7 (Div. 1 1992) (<HOLDING>). 72 .See this opinion, ante. 73 . Eeds, 254

    ### Response:
    holding grooming evidence inadmissible under r 403 under the facts of the case but not foreclosing admissibility in every case and not addressing r 702
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Code of Virginia, under which Silver was charged in the indictments. C. Testimony Regarding the Fact That the Alleged Victim Complained to Her Guidance Counselor about Silver’s Allegedly Taking Indecent Liberties with Her Is Admissible Having found that the recent complaint hearsay exception applies to the statute under which Silver was indicted, the Court now must decide whether, under the facts of this case, the alleged victim’s report of sexual abuse to her high school guidance counselor is admissible as a recent complaint of sexual assault that qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule. In Williams v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals, when analyzing the recent complaint exception to the hearsay rule, upheld the admissibility of -17, 467 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Silver characterizes the delay in reporting

    ### Response:
    holding that a letter written by a thirteenyearold victim two years after her alleged rape was admissible reasoning that the issue of the twoyear delay was one of credibility not admissibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (""[This Court has repeatedly held that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask jurors to have sympathy for crime victims."" (citing Tobler v. State, 1984 OK CR 90, ¶¶ 16-17, 688 P.2d 350, 354)). 48 . Hence this Court finds that Roy has established inadequate performance in this regard. 49 . Hence we find that Roy has failed to show ""prejudice"" on his ineffective assistance claim regarding this evidence and that his second Proposition II claim fails accordingly. 50 . See generally 12 0.$.2001, § 2404; see also Burks v. State, 1979 OK CR 10, 594 P.2d 771 {establishing standards for admission of ""other crimes"" evidence under § 2404(B)), overruled in part on other grounds in Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 7, ¶ 8, 772 P.2d 922, 925; Freeman v. State, 1988 OK CR 192, ¶¶ 2-9, 767 P.2d 1354, 1355-57 (<HOLDING>). 51 . Roy's second ineffective assistance

    ### Response:
    holding that prohibitions of  2404b and burks apply equally to evidence that stigmatizes the defendant though it does not establish a separate crime if the other acts evidence is unrelated to the crime at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Steele contends that the district court was required by United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.3(b) to run his entire federal sentence concurrently with his undischarged state term of imprisonment. We disagree. Not all of Steele’s state offenses were considered as relevant conduct to increase his offense level. Therefore, § 5G1.3(b) and its requirement of a fully concurrent term are inapplicable. See United States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Steele raises an argument for a

    ### Response:
    holding that  5gl3b does not apply when the undischarged term of imprisonment results from multiple offenses only some of which were taken into account in determining the defendants offense level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (case-by-case analysis required in undue influence cases because they are often proved by circumstantial evidence); Knowlton v. Schultz, 179 Ohio App. 3d 497, 508, 902 N.E.2d 548 (2008) (undue influence usually proved by circumstantial evidence); In re Estate of Johnson, 340 S.W.3d 769, 777 (Tex. App. 2011) (exertion of undue influence is subtle and usually involves extended course of dealings and circumstances; usually established by circumstantial evidence). That necessity of establishing undue influence through circumstantial evidence gave rise to the “suspicious circumstances doctrine” in a common-law claim of undue influence. See Feeney and Carmichael, Will Contests in Kansas, 64 J.K.B.A. 22, 27 (September 1995); see also In re Estate of Maddox, 60 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tenn. App. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Over a century ago in this state, Sellards v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in most cases proving undue influence must be done circumstantially through the existence of suspicious circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct. By contrast, when an accused in-fringer’s post-filing conduct is reckless, a patentee can move for a preliminary injunction, which generally provides an adequate remedy for combating post-filing willful infringement. A patentee who does not attempt to stop an accused infringer’s activities in this manner should not be allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely on the in-fringer’s post-filing conduct. Similarly, if a patentee attempts to secure injunc-tive relief but fails, it is likely the infringement did not rise to the level of recklessness. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374(citations omitted). Robocast did not move for a preliminary injunction. Apple’s defenses are reasonable. See Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Allowing a finding of willfulness based on

    ### Response:
    holding that the objective prong of willfulness was not met where a defendants defenses were reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exists as to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is our obligation to raise it, sua sponte, even though, as here, no party has asked us to consider it.”) (citation and alterations omitted). 36 . Henderson v. Shinseki, -U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). 37 . See Gatewood v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 82 A.3d 41, 48 (D.C.2013) (explaining that claims-processing rules are ""typically promulgated by a decision-making body” and jurisdictional rules are ""most often legislative enactments”); id. at 46 (""Jurisdictional rules may be raised at any point in the proceedings and are not subject to waiver, however late they are invoked S. 312, 316, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988)); Vines v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 935 A.2d 1078, 1083 (D.C.2007) (<HOLDING>). 43 . Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to designate the judgment or order being appealed is a jurisdictional defect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit material.” Id. at 69, 115 S.Ct. 464. For similar reasons, this court held in Nofziger that, to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 207(c), the government had to show not only that the former government official knowingly communicated with his former agency, but that he also knew the agency had ""a direct and substantial interest” in the matter. 878 F.2d at 443 (quoting the statute). Otherwise, we explained, if the ""ex-official tries to interest his former agency in a particular project in the mistaken belief that it had no 'direct and substantial interest' in it, he will have committed a felony.” Id. at 444 (emphasis omitted); see also Flores-Figueroa v. United States, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 1888, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433, 105 S.Ct. 2084

    ### Response:
    holding that 18 usc  1028aal which makes it an aggravated crime to knowingly transfer  without lawful authority a means of identification of another person requires proof that the defendant not only knowingly transferred something but that he knew it was a means of identification and that it belonged to another person
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court. However, the Court decided to rule on the merits and held no taking of any kind existed. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991). The United States Supreme Court stated: This unusual disposition does not preclude Lucas from applying for a permit under the 1990 amendment for future construction, and challenging on takings grounds, any denial. But, it does preclude, both practically and legally, any takings claim with respect to Lucas’s past deprivation, i.e., for his having been denied construction rights during the period before the 1990 amendment. See generally First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011-1012,112 S.Ct. 2886.

    ### Response:
    holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the takings clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    surveying services fall within the public service exception because they are “extensively regulated” industries. We disagree. While it is true that surveying is regulated by statute in North Carolina and that engineers and land surveyors in our State must be licensed, see N.C.G.S. § 89C-23 (2007), these facts alone do not automatically convert a profession into a public service. Further, when a breach of contract between two parties involves only economic loss, as in the present case, the health and safety of the public are not implicated. A third party who might be affected by negligence of an engineer or surveyor can still bring a negligence suit against the engineer or surveyor. See Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 666-67, 255 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the limitation on liability in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the attorney-client relationship. And that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for compensation or other damages. See Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 284, 176 N.W. 989, 990 (1920) (“[Because] the client has the right to terminate the relation of attorney and client at any time[,] ... it follows as a natural consequence that [the client] cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising that right .... ”); cf. Perl v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.1984) (“The law treats a client’s right to an attorney’s loyalty as a kind of ‘absolute’ right in the sense that if the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.1982) (<HOLDING>). But see Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412,

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is neither necessary nor desirable for the courts of appeals, because differences in opinion have the effect of ventilating important legal questions and creating a background against which the Supreme Court can ultimately resolve an issue for the country as a whole.” Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hanks v. Finfrock, 531 U.S. 1029, 121 S.Ct. 606, 148 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). Justices O’Connor and Breyer foresaw that the majority’s reasoning in Ap-prendi would render unconstitutional statutes such as § 841. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the consequences of the majority’s rule “in terms of sentencing schemes invalidated by today’s decision will likely be severe”); id. at 550-51, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (<HOLDING>); id. at 565, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (Breyer, J.,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the majoritys reasoning strongly suggests that determinatesentencing schemes are unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fairness and justice” or our determination of what might be most just in a particular case. “ ‘We must look to the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions of [this] state, to determine [our] public policy and that which is not prohibited by statute, condemned by judicial decision, nor contrary to the public morals contravenes no principle of public policy.’ ” Claude v. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co., 679 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Harvey v. Care Initiatives, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Iowa 2001) and In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa 2003)). “ ‘The power to invalidate a contract on public policy grounds must be used cautiously and exercised only in cases free from doubt.’ ” Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 540 (Iowa -23 (Ind.Ct. App.2006) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs also contend that, because

    ### Response:
    holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    undisputed that all actions complained of in this case occurred in connection with the drawn out termination process. Plaintiffs claim that his emotional distress was caused by uncertainty in his official employment status clearly arises out of the nature of his employment. Moreover, in order to prevail under a common law theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress plaintiff must show that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Agis v. Howard Johnson Company, 371 Mass. 140, 145, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). As a matter of law, the contact alleged certainly does not rise to the required level of outrageousness. See Richey v. American Automobile Association, 380 Mass. 835, 406 N.E.2d 675 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Mathias v. Beatrice Foods Co., 23 Mass.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that the conduct of plaintiffs supervisor in terminating the plaintiff after attempting to verify plaintiffs excessive absences did not make out a plausible case of outrage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    determined by the arbitrators, see Daiei, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 755 F.Supp. 299, 303 (D.Haw.1991), the district court did not err. Nor did the district court err in finding that the Panel did not act with manifest disregard of the law when it applied Hawaii law rather than abiding by the contractual choice-of-law provision. Although parties are generally entitled to select the law which applies to contractual claims, we have expressly determined that tort claims are not governed by a contractual choice-of-law provision. See Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, Ltd., 971 F.2d 401, 407-08 (9th Cir.1992) (tort claims are not governed by contractual choice-of-law provisions); Consol. Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708 F.2d 385, 390 n. 3 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Panel awarded damages to IEL based

    ### Response:
    holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing on this issue. With respect to the second argument (regarding Aviall’s remedy selection), the court denies summary judgment. Cooper maintains that AvialTs public meeting was “meaningless” because the TNRC had already approved Aviall’s proposed remedy, but the effect of the TNRC’s approval was simply to make the proposed remedy available to Aviall (subject to certain comments and admonitions), and did not dictate that remedy. See P. Apr. 11, 2008 App. 5009-12 (TNRC Letter of Approval). The cases that Cooper cites are distinguishable because implementation of the remedy in those cases began before the public meeting, or because the remedy decision had already been finalized by a consent judgment. See Reg’l Airport Auth., 460 F.3d at 708 (<HOLDING>); Union Pac., 215 F.3d at 837-38 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether there exist ‘exceptional circumstances,’ ... justifying] the surrender of that jurisdiction.” 460 U.S. at 25-26, 103 S.Ct. at 941-42. Having concluded that such “exceptional circumstances” are absent in this case, we vacate the district court’s order and remand with instructions that the federal case should progress without being linked to the status of the parallel case in commonwealth court, at least until a judgment is obtained in that case which would operate to preclude appellant’s claim in federal court. Vacated and remanded. Costs to appellants. 1 . Under Puerto Rico tort law, family members have a personal cause of action for moral damages and anguish they suffer as a result of their relative’s injury. See, e.g., Caez v. U.S. Casualty Co., 80 P.R.R. 729, 734 (1958) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Section 1291 provides in relevant part:

    ### Response:
    holding that the material and moral damages caused by the unlawful death of a human being may affect several persons and in such case each acquires an independent action against the person causing the unlawful death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The question here is whether the phrase “frequency and persistence of noncompliance” refers only to the plaintiff or also to other debtors. In its reply brief, JRL argues, for the first time, that this phrase applies only to the plaintiff. JRL submitted its first three briefs on this issue — two in support of a pre-trial motion in limine and its opening brief on the instant motion — without citing a case interpreting § 1692k(b)(l), or making the argument that “frequency and persistence of noncompliance” was as to the plaintiff only. See Court’s Doc. Nos. 101 at 7-10; 124 at 2-8; 187 at 4-5. This argument comes too late. A party may not seek a new trial on the basis of a theory not urged before the verdict was rendered. See Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Ciralsky v. C.I.A., 355 F.3d 661, 673

    ### Response:
    holding that it is wellsettled that rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues presenting the case under new theories  or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the sensing device but the fact of the intrusion into a closed area otherwise hidden from human view, which is the hallmark of any search."")(quoting United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir.1975)(Mansfield, J., concurring)). 6 . See People v. Daverin, 967 P.2d 629, 632 (Colo.1998)(""""Another well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a search undertaken incident to a lawful arrest.""). 7 . See People v. Hauseman, 900 P.2d 74, 77 (Colo.1995)(stating that ""warrantless search of a vehicle lawfully impounded by law enforcement officials designed to produce an inventory of the contents of that vehicle and conducted pursuant to routine administrative procedures"" is an exception to the warrant requirement). 8 . See People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529, 534 (Colo.1999)(<HOLDING>). 9 . See People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 271

    ### Response:
    holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Harris was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief and responded with a letter reiterating counsel’s arguments. The district court sentenced Harris to a 188 month term of imprisonment to run concurrently on both counts based upon its findings that he distributed a total of 27.6 grams of cocaine base. Harris claims the failure of the district court to treat the drug quantities as an element of the offense to be presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt violated Apprendi We find Harris’ reliance on Apprendi is misplaced. Harris’ sentence of 188 months does not exceed the 240 month maximum in § 841(b)(1)(C) for an “identifiable but unspecified quantity” of cocaine base. See United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir.2001) (en bane) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518

    ### Response:
    holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to Lucent’s infringement claims. However, even New-bridge acknowledges that they did not rely on these opinions because they were “unwilling to waive attorney-client and work product protection.” (D.I. 648 at 8, n. 4). Indeed, because of Newbridge’s decision not to rely on these opinions, the Court cannot evaluate whether they were from competent legal counsel or whether they expressed favorable or unfavorable opinions. As the Federal Circuit recognized, “[W]hen an infringer refuses to produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel in response to a charge of willful infringement, an inference may be drawn that either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion was obtained, it was unfavorable.” Electro Medical Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056-1057 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Newbridge also attempts to place the burden

    ### Response:
    holding that district court was free to draw adverse inference against infringer when infringer refused to produce counsels opinion based on attorney client privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to allow an interlocutory appeal under D.C.Code § 11 — 721(d). See D.C.App. R. 5(a) (“The clerk shall not accept such application [for leave to appeal an interlocutory order] for filing unless the ruling or order sought to be appealed contains the statement of the trial judge referred to in D.C.Code § ll-721(d).”). Superior Court Civil Rule 23(f) states that “[t]he Court of Appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting or denying class action certification under this Rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.” The intention of this language, we acknowledge, is to authorize this court to permit an appeal of an otherwise non-appealable interlocutory order without the trial judge’s certific 1223 (D.C.1986) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335, 343

    ### Response:
    holding superior court civil rule 101a1 a nullity for the superior court may not adopt a rule which abridges any substantive right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the Trust are, and have always been, identical. Finally, David Smith plays a central role both in this litigation and, more importantly here, in the financial affairs of Lynn Smith and the Trust as a whole. Balancing these factors, it is clear that neither Lynn Smith nor the Trust controlled David Smith for purposes of this analysis. Nevertheless, given the nature of the relationships, the complete identity of interests, and David Smith’s role both in this litigation and as to Lynn Smith and the Trust, the absence of significant control over David Smith is far outweighed by the other factors. Accordingly, any adverse inferences which can be drawn from David Smith’s invocation of his privilege should be applied against Lynn Smith and the Trust. The question then 8-59 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Pipefitters’ Ass’n Local Union No.

    ### Response:
    holding that adverse inferences are permissive not mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    grant of summary judgment on all Nelson’s tort claims, the court’s grant of summary judgment on all tort-based punitive damages is affirmed. HENDERSON and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur specially. 1 . The contract contains no provisions setting forth possible grounds for termination. The issue of whether WEB can prove just cause to dismiss Nelson remains for determination on remand. MILLER, Chief Justice (concurring specially). I write specially to point out that in amending the bylaws by implication, the Board of Directors was required to follow both statutory law and procedures set forth in its own articles of incorporation and bylaws. St. John’s Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 90 S.D. 674, 681, 245 N.W.2d 472, 475 (1976) (<HOLDING>). There has been no claim that amendment of the

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to follow specific amendment procedures rendered attempted amendment of bylaws null and void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1468. Second, if the reissue claims are broader, the court determines whether the patentee surrendered subject matter and “whether the broader aspects of the reissued claim relate to [the] surrendered subject matter.” Id. at 1468-69; see also id. at 1469-70. To determine whether a patentee surrendered subject matter, we ask “whether an objective observer viewing the prosecution history would conclude that the purpose of the patentee’s amendment or argument was to overcome prior art and secure the patent.” Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2006). If the patentee surrendered by argument, he must clearly and unmistakably argue that his invention does not cover certain subject matter to overcome an examiner’s rejection based on prior art. Medtronic, 465 F.3d at 1376 (<HOLDING>); Hester, 142 F.3d at 1482 (explaining that

    ### Response:
    holding that a patent attorneys argument did not clearly and unmistakably surrender the subject matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the question of what a reasonable jury could determine regarding reasonableness — is an issue that we consider de novo. See, e.g., Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 204-07 (4th Cir.2003) (reversing district court order denying qualified immunity and concluding that officers’ actions were reasonable); Elliott, 99 F.3d at 644 (explaining that in reviewing the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, although we may not review a determination by the district court that the forecasted evidence gives rise to a reasonable infer ’s expert’s opinion that Appellants' actions were unconstitutional. ""Opinions, be they expert or lay, are only as good as the evidence upon which they are based.” Id. at 1280 n. 11; cf. Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33, r.1991) (<HOLDING>). 10 . It is important to note that Pittman

    ### Response:
    holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we frequently have applied them to corporations involved in parent-subsidiary relationships. See, e.g., U.S.I. Properties Corp. v. M.D. Constr. Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 2064, 104 L.Ed.2d 629 (1989); Rodriguez v. SK & F Co., 833 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir.1987); Topp, 814 F.2d at 833-39; Lugo-Vina v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 574 F.2d 41, 43-44 (1st Cir.1978); de Walker v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 569 F.2d 1169, 1170-73 (1st Cir.1978). In this context, we have repeatedly held that, where there is no evidence that the integrity of the corporate form has been violated, the separate corporate identities of a parent and subsidiary should be honored when determining either one’s principal place of business. See U.S.I. Properties, 860 F.2d at 7 (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez, 833 F.2d at 9 (recognizing

    ### Response:
    recognizing separate corporate identity of subsidiary despite evidence that subsidiary was whollyowned by grandparent corporation shared all its officers and directors with grandparent was grossly undercapitalized and did not prepare its own budget construction requirements or policies and procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine contained in Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, ""attorney work product is exempt from mandatory disclosure without regard to the status of the litigation for which it was prepared.” FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 28, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 2215, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (exempting from mandatory public disclosure ""inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation with the agency”). In reaching this decision, the Court stated that it was ""not rely[ing] exclusively on any pa C.Cir.1982) (requiring showing of extraordinary justification to overcome protection of opinion work product), with Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 735 (4th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether

    ### Response:
    holding opinion work product to be absolutely protected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the Eleventh Circuit in Doe. As applied in this case, the Court cannot say that a reasonable person would have found the denial of the request to transfer to be materially adverse. Unlike White, the responsibilities of the two positions at issue in this case are almost identical. See 126 S.Ct. at 2417. When describing the responsibilities of the requested position, Plaintiff stated, “They basically do what I do.” (First Reis Depo. at 45). The only differences of record between the two positions are that (1) the requested position is indoors where there is heat and air conditioning, (2) the requested position begins work earlier in the day than Plaintiffs position; and (3) the requested positi purpose of Count III was Plaintiffs termination. ii. Causal Link Def 5, 951 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Breech v. Ala. Power Co., 962 F.Supp. 1447,

    ### Response:
    holding that a 7month time period between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is too indirect to satisfy the causal connection requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    creditors from acting unilaterally to obtain payment from a debtor to the detriment of other creditors. Id. (citation omitted). Although the scope of the automatic stay is broad, the clear language of section 362(a) stays actions only against a “debtor.” Id. (citing Assoc. of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir.1982)). As a consequence, “[i]t is universally acknowledged that an automatic stay of proceedings accorded by § 362 may not be invoked by entities such as sureties, guarantors, co-obligors, or others with a similar legal or factual nexus to the ... debtor.” Id. at 1205 (quoting Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (6th Cir.1983)); see also United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486, 1491-93 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Croyden Associates v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that stay does not preclude government from pursuing deficiency judgment against nondebtor cosignors of promissory note
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discussion). 59 . See Brennan, 2003 WL 151384, at *2. 60 . Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 941 (10th ed.2000); see also Black’s Law Dictionary, 1242 (7th ed.1999) (defining ""public” as ""[r] elating or belonging to an entire community, state or nation [and][o]pen or available for all to use, share, or enjoy”). 61 . Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 330. 62 . See S. Drawer and Co., 24 F.3d at 326. 63 . See id. at 325-26. 64 . See Cantekin, 192 F.3d at 408. 65 . See id. 66 . See S. Prawer and Co., 24 F.3d at 326. 67 . See id. 68 . See id. 69 . 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 70 . See LeBlanc I, 913 F.2d at 20 (int of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 536-40 (9th Cir.1998); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940-41 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Fed. Recovery Servs. v. United States, 72

    ### Response:
    holding that based upon means similar to or supported by
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    link or associate structure to the claimed function. B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1424. In addressing whether a disclosure of structure is sufficient under § 112, ¶ 6, the Federal Circuit has stated that a court should “ask[ ] first whether structure is described in the specification, and, if so, whether one skilled in the art would identify the structure from the description.” Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed.Cir.1999). Thus, once some structure in the specification is identified, even if that structure is a black box, the proper inquiry then turns to whether the patent discloses sufficient structure with which one skilled in the art could use to perform the function. See S3, Inc. v. nVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1370-71 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 220 Ga. App. at 360 (2) (“If a foreclosure advertisement is not defective as a matter of law, defects in it will prevent confirmation only if the factfinder determines those defects ‘chilled’ bidding and caused an inadequate selling price.”). 9 OCGA § 15-6-67 (b) (2) (A); see also Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 180-7-.02 (2) (“Any description written for conveyance or other purpose... shall include the general location of the tract or lot with sufficient accuracy such that the tract can be readily located on the ground. The land lot, district, section, militia district number (in Headright Grant areas), city (if known to be within the city limits) and county shall be called out in said description.”). 10 See Deljoo v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., 284 Ga. 438, 440 (668 SE2d 245) (2008) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Wilkinson, 208 Ga. 489, 493-94 (2)

    ### Response:
    holding in the context of a conveyance that it is only when a description is manifestly too meager imperfect or uncertain to serve as adequate means of identification that the court can adjudge the description insufficient as a matter of law punctuation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case of persons who are employed by an educational ageney or institution but who are not in attendance at such ageney or institution, records made and maintained in the normal course of business which relate exclusively to such person in that person's capacity as an employee and are not available for use for any other purpose."" § 1282g(a)(4)(B). Upon appeal, the Star argues that the trial court erred in concluding that all of the Reed materials were education records and are therefore required to be kept confidential by FERPA. The scope of the term ""education ree-ords"" as used in FERPA has been addressed by several courts, some giving the term a narrow definition, others giving it a broader definition. Compare Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 262 Ga. 848, 427 S.E.2d 257 (1993) (<HOLDING>), and State ex rel. Miami Student v. Miami

    ### Response:
    holding that records relating to a student court were not education records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have applied. Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 713. In fact, he does not show that the decision was incorrect, let alone “so incorrect that it lies outside of the range of reasonable conclusions.” Jones, 525 F.3d at 503. Therefore, Crockett has not satisfied his burden under AEDPA. See Rizzo, 528 F.3d at 505 (rejecting habeas petition and noting that Rizzo claimed constitutional violations “but stop[ped] short of stating which Supreme Court case injurious effect on the jury’s verdict because the juror’s affidavits showed that they accepted his trial testimony, which would very likely have resulted in an acquittal if they had received clarification on the meaning of “abet.” The district court disagreed with Crockett, finding the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision that 2d 439 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). The court concluded that Crockett did not

    ### Response:
    holding that it was reversible error for a trial court to fail to answer a jurys question on the burden of proof for two hours after which the jury returned a verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Deckers. No plain error having been shown, we decline to address Deckers’ argument that plaintiffs’ secrets were not trade secrets. 2. Challenges to the Form of the Verdict Because the parties could not agree on how to word a special verdict form, the district court created a form on its own, essentially a general verdict form. Deckers contends now that there were several errors inherent in the verdict form. These are not claims about the way the jury answered the form’s interrogatories, rather these are allegations that errors were built into the form itself. We hold that Deckers waived these contentions by failing to raise them until after the jury had rendered its verdict and was discharged. Cf. Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss and Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1331 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The district court gave the parties ample

    ### Response:
    holding that a party waived its objection to the jurys verdict by not objecting to an alleged inconsistency prior to the dismissal of the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    meaning and may be interpreted according to its common usage. See Denton, 911 S.W.2d at 389 (approving of lower court’s reliance on the “plain meaning” of the statutorily undefined term in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence); Capps v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 579, 352 S.W.2d 833, 835 (1962) (explaining that the statutory language, including the term “operate,” consists of “ordinary English words which are commonly and ordinarily understood by people generally, hence the court was not required to define them.”). Therefore, nothing in our case law suggests that a risk exists that jurors may arbitrarily apply an inaccurate definition to the term “operate” or that an express definition is required to assure a fair understanding of the evidence. Compare Medford, 13 S.W.3d at 772 (<HOLDING>). The court of appeals correctly noted that

    ### Response:
    holding that  arrest is a technical term possessing a long established history in the common law and it would be inappropriate if jurors arbitrarily applied their personal definitions of arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 69. Denying the Freedmen the right to vote in tribal elections violates the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Treaty, so the Cherokee Nation cannot claim tribal sovereign immunity against a suit complaining of such a badge and incident of slavery. The district court is mistaken to treat every imposition upon tribal sovereignty as an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. Sovereignty and immunity are related, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), the latter being an attribute of the former, P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 146, 113 S.Ct. 684. But it is possible to cut back sovereignty in a way that leaves sovereign immunity intact. Cf. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755, 118 S.Ct. 1700 (“To say substantive state l 343, 357 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We find no express and unequivocal abrogation

    ### Response:
    holding the copyright act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity where nothing on the statutes face could be so construed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I, Section 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the requirements of which are not distinguishable from the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, see Pennsylvania Game Comm’n v. Marich, 542 Pa. 226, 229 n. 6, 666 A.2d 253, 255 n. 6 (1995), a local agency employee has a personal or property right in his employment when he can establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment through either contract or statute. See Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 548 Pa. 265, 267, 696 A.2d 1158, 1159 (1997) (per curiam). Parenthetically, it is arguable whether a public official's due process interest extends beyond the economic benefits of the position. See generally Harris v. Board of Educ. of the City of Atlanta, 105 F.3d 591, 596-97 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Indeed, Appellant framed his mandamus

    ### Response:
    holding that a school superintendent does not have a constitutional right to actually hold his position and execute the duties of the office
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sign ordinance whose “grandfather” clause allowed certain speakers to use nonconforming signs, observing that “[e]ven if a complete ban on nonconforming signs would be permissible, we must consider carefully the government’s decision to pick and choose among the speakers permitted to use such signs”). The sign code exemptions that pick and choose the speakers entitled to preferential treatment are no less content based than those that select among subjects or messages. Moreover, even insofar as § 27-581 simply allows some types of messages to be displayed in a more prominent manner than others — for example, using flashing lights or moving parts — it constitutes content-based regulation of speech. See Café Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. John’s County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1289 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400,

    ### Response:
    holding that limiting signs displaying political messages to a smaller size than signs displaying other types of messages constituted content discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Fla. R. Grim. P. 3.704(d)(14) (expressly providing that “pri- or record” on criminal punishment code scoresheet includes convictions for offenses committed by the offender as a juvenile); Mendoza-Magadan v. State, 217 So.3d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his prior juvenile dispositions rendered without a jury trial should not be included on his score-sheet when calculating the lowest permissible prison sentence); Nichols v. State, 910 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>) (citing N.C. v. Anderson, 882 So.2d 990 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants prior juvenile dispositions are valid as prior criminal convictions because floridas juvenile procedures are constitutionally sound
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    warrant relief from judgment. In Pacific Far East, the law was clarified after judgment to show that the bankrupt had paid an erroneously high fee. The court relied on two factors to permit relief in the form of a partial refund. First, the parties could not appeal, so a post-judgment motion was the only means to obtain relief. Second, the judgment from which the movant sought relief had been based on a stipulation by the parties. Thus, the contract law principle of ""mutual mistake” applied. Claimant in this case does not point to a similar legal or equitable reason to grant relief. 5 . One might argue that claimant should have brought this motion when the cases on which $405k relied were decided. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109

    ### Response:
    holding eighth amendment applicable to civil forfeitures and cited as controlling in 405k
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been shown to have had the requisite value at any time during the period of possession or concealment. Luckey, 655 F.2d at 205. In determining whether or not the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, all conflicts are resolved in favor of the verdict. United States v. Ramos, 558 F.2d 545, 546-47 (9th Cir.1977). In this case, we find that evidence, properly admitted at trial, indicating the ease with which blank airline tickets can be filled in to make the tickets appear valid, provided a reasonable basis for the jury to find that the tickets in Wallace’s possession had a value equal to the losses that the airlines usually sustain on stolen tickets. See United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1331 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 2232, 56 L.Ed.2d 401 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Because the lowest estimated average loss on

    ### Response:
    holding that when stolen goods have no readily ascertainable value the factfinder may consider any reasonable method by which to ascribe a monetary worth to the goods
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    matters here, in defendant Smith’s case, the violation of the rule is clear. The record does not contain Smith’s written consent to the student’s representation, and the transcript does not indicate that the trial judge was made aware that a 711 student was participating in the suppression hearing. I would therefore grant Smith a new trial. Respondent Denzel W’s case is more problematic. By failing to address the consent portion of the rule, the court bypasses the more fundamental question of whether the rule even applies to juvenile proceedings. Rule 711 states that eligible students may participate in civil and criminal matters. The rule does not specifically refer to juvenile proceedings, which are neither criminal nor civil proceedings. See In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Assuming Rule 711 does apply to juvenile

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a juvenile proceeding is nonadversarial and designed to further the best interests of the minor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted). 25 See Easley v. State, 262 Ga. App. 144, 149 (2) (584 SE2d 629) (2003) (“Since verdicts acquire their legality from return and publication, there was no verdict in this case until it was received and published in open court.” (citations and punctuation omitted)); Irvine v. Grant, 15 Ga. App. 269, 269 (82 SE 819) (1914) (“A verdict is not a verdict in law until received and published in open court.”); see also OCGA § 17-9-21 (“Verdicts shall he received only in open court, in the absence of agreement of the parties.”). 26 See Merchants’ Bank of Macon v. Rawls, 7 Ga. 191, 200 (4) (1849) (“The rule on this subject is more one of expediency than of principle. We believe that the e SE2d 616) (1993); see Maltbie v. State, 139 Ga. App. 342, 344-45 (2) (228 SE2d 368) (1976) (<HOLDING>); Ezzard v. State, 11 Ga. App. 30, 30 (1) (74

    ### Response:
    holding that jurys original verdict of guilty without intent and recommend mere was an acquittal such that after it was presented to an officer of the court and the court the trial had ended  and the trial court was without authority to return the jury to its room for any further action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    since a finding in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a). Id. at 1409-10, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269. In addition, the Court of Appeal contrasted Susag’s situation to the one presented in Sanford, noting that, “[Susag] has alleged no claims of excessive force that took place after he was finally subdued and placed in the patrol car.” Id. at 1410, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269. (emphasis added.) The majority argues that Smith’s conviction might have been based only on his conduct whi l.Rptr. 212 (1981). Had discrete acts of resistance taken place over the course of an hour rather than five minutes, they might not have constituted the same offense. See People v. Moreno, 108 Cal.Rptr. 338, 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 8-9 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, it is undisputed that Smith’s

    ### Response:
    holding two instances of violating  148 were two offenses because thirty minutes elapsed between the two incidents and in the intervening space of time the defendant had completely calmed down and ceased his criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “Joshua, under certain circumstances, permits courts in this circuit to consider subsequent amfffffffffendments to official guidelines commentary when interpreting prior guidelines, even if the new commentary conflicts with a panel’s decision rendered pri- or to the amendment”). Our sister circuits abide by that self-same principle. See, e.g., Williams v. Ashland Eng’g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.) (“An existing panel decision may be undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the Supreme Court, an en banc opinion of the circuit court, or a statutory overruling.”), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 116 S.Ct. 51, 133 L.Ed.2d 16 (1995); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Landreth v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 643, 648

    ### Response:
    holding that if a panel finds that a nlrb interpretation of the labor laws is reasonable and consistent with those laws the panel may adopt that interpretation even if circuit precedent is to the contrary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by auto and several motor vehicle offenses. The evidence at trial indicated that his BAC at the time of the accident was .253%. Id. at 5, 671 A.2d 1045. The defendant there argued that the court erred in “instruct[ing] the jurors that if they found defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.10 percent or higher they could presume recklessness.” Id. at 12, 671 A.2d 1045. We found that the court “never mentioned a presumption, but merely told the jurors that if they found this level of blood alcohol, it was one factor from which they could infer recklessness. This was proper.” Ibid. Where alcohol is presented as evidence of recklessness, the State must present evidence of the defendant’s BAC at the time of the incident. State v. Casele, 198 N.J.Super. 462, 472, 487 A.2d 765 (App.Div.1985) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, although the State argued that

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of intoxication together with the circumstances of the accident were sufficient to demonstrate recklessness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the EBA. See, e.g., Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1979) (Mansfield, J., concurring) (noting that there was “nothing in the contract ... for an exclusive distributorship ... that obligates” the manufacturer “to police its customers in other areas or to stop them from selling or transshipping goods”); Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir.2005) (an exclusive distributorship agreement between the sub-distributor and distributor did not obligate the distributor to enforce its own exclusive distributorship agreement with the manufacturer and “prevent” that manufacturer from selling products in the sub-distributor’s territory); see also Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 644-45 (3d Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>). With no express breach of any provision

    ### Response:
    holding that an exclusive license standing alone did not bar sales to a store that would resell the product within the exclusive territory of a different company and noting that there was no restriction against bona fide sales to an independent vendor even with knowledge that some products may be resold into another territory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.2d 586, 589-90 (1974). See also Keliipuleole, 85 Hawai'i at 221-22, 941 P.2d at 304-05 (“[A] rational, sensible and practical interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable, because the legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). Even where a statute appears unambiguous, the court may deviate from a literal application of the language in order to avoid absurdity and give effect to the legislature’s intended purpose. State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 518, 572 P.2d 1222, 1225 (1977). See, e.g., State v. Stan’s Contracting, 111 Hawai'i 17, 27-28, 137 P.3d 331, 341-42 (2006) (<HOLDING>); State v. Haugen, 104 Hawai'i 71, 76-77, 85

    ### Response:
    holding that a narrow interpretation of the word fraud in tolling statute would lead to absurd and unjust results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    produce documents and refused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum requesting the production of documents. The trial court further found that Emeritus had violated pre-trial discovery rules and that the offenses were largely the fault of Emeritus and not defense counsel. Although the record contained no direct evidence that Emeritus had dissipated or transferred assets, given the information that was before the trial court, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a likelihood existed that Emeritus would dissipate or transfer its assets to avoid satisfaction of the judgment. Conclusion Emeritus’s motion to dissolve the post-judgment injunction is denied. 1 . See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974) (<HOLDING>); In re L.A.M. & Assocs., 975 S.W.2d 80, 84

    ### Response:
    recognizing need to balance interests of debt or and creditor in determining nature of protection to be afforded creditor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of judicial speech. See In re Eastburn, 121 N.M. 531, 538, 914 P.2d 1028, 1035 (1996). “These limitations, however, do not extend to the publication of language that does pose a serious and imminent threat to the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in general and of the judge in particular.” Id. In determining whether the endorsement clause in our Code of Judicial Conduct has breached such constitutional limits, we must balance Respondent’s First Amendment right to comment on matters of public interest against the interest of the judiciary in regulating the speech of its judges to promote the appearance and reality of impartiality within the judiciary. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-54, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impairment that significantly restricted his ability to perform “either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” McKay, 110 F.3d at 372. In order to carry this burden, a plaintiff must introduce evidence, expert or otherwise, relating to his vocational skills or training, the geographical area to which he has access, or the number and type of jobs which demand similar training from which he would also be disqualified because of his disability. The failure to introduce such evidence is fatal when faced with a motion for summary judgment. See Bolton v. Scrivner, 36 F.3d 939, 943-44 (10th Cir.1994) (affirming award of summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff had introduced no such evidence); Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc. 928 F.Supp. 37, 50-52 (D.Maine 1996) (<HOLDING>), aff'd 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1997); Howard v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs failure to provide evidence of general employment demographics is fatal at summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and omissions in his arrest-warrant application and investigative report. This circuit has had few opportunities to address the nexus between an officer’s statements in his or her investigatory materials and the institution of a criminal prosecution sufficient to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. It is absolutely clear, however, that an officer will not be deemed to have commenced a criminal proceeding against a person when the claim is predicated on the mere fact that the officer turned over to the prosecution the officer’s truthful materials. McKinley, 404 F.3d at 444; Skousen, 305 F.3d at 529; Wysong v. City of Heath, 377 Fed.Appx. 466, 470 (6th Cir.2010) (unpublished opinion); Kinkus v. Village of Yorkville, Ohio, 289 Fed.Appx. 86, 91 (6th Cir.2008) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>). As discussed above in the context of Sykes’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the officer played no role in the prosecution because the police report provided to the prosecutor did not contain false information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161 .2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987) (stating that although endangerment requires more than threat of metaphysical injury or possible ill effects of less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that parent’s conduct be directed at child or that child actually suffers injury); Robinson v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 89 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (stating that “to endanger” means to expose child to loss or injury or to jeopardize child’s emotional or physical health); In re M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d 521, 536 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). “Conduct that subjects a child to [a] life of

    ### Response:
    holding that courts may look to parental conduct both before and after childs birth to determine whether termination is appropriate that parents conduct need not be directed at child and that danger to childs wellbeing may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that she fit the definition of an “eligible employee.” See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2004). Second, the worker must establish that she worked for an employer covered by the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2004); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). Third, the worker has to show that she qualified for FMLA benefits for one of four statutory reasons. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2004). Fourth, the worker has to prove that she gave her employer appropriate notice. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.302. See also 29 C.F.R. 825.303 (notice requirements for unforeseeable leave). Finally, the worker has to establish that the employer denied her benefits to which the FMLA entitled her. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2004). See also Cavin v. Honda of America Mfg. Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 716 (6th Cir.2003)(<HOLDING>). B. “Eligible employee” and employer. A worker

    ### Response:
    recognizing these five factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the Hawai'i Constitution would mean little if parents were deprived of the custody of their children without a fair hearing ... Furthermore, the Supreme Court has said that parental rights cannot be denied without an opportunity for them to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. In re Doe, 99 Hawai'i 522, 533, 57 P.3d 447, 458 (2002) (footnote, citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doe v. Doe, 120 Hawai'i 149, 168, 202 P.3d 610, 629 (App.2009); Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawai'i 323, 334-35, 172 P.3d 1067, 1078-79 (2007) (citing several Hawai'i eases recognizing that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of their children); In re Doe, 77 Hawai'i 109, 114-15, 883 P.2d 30, 35-36 (1994) (<HOLDING>). In sum, parents in juvenile proceedings

    ### Response:
    recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    828 (1998)). A petitioner is actually innocent when he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir.2001) (summarizing the tests employed by the circuit courts to determine actual innocence). Alaimalo has made a showing of actual innocence. He was convicted of importing methamphetamine from California to Guam, which Cabaccang held is not a crime. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 637. Further, we note that the government d r.1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir.1997). In contrast, a decision that simply “provides farther clarification” of the statute of conviction without “materially varying] from the statutory construction set forth” in previous case law does not effect such a change. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (<HOLDING>). We hold that Cabaccang effected a material

    ### Response:
    holding that the supreme courts decision in jones v united states 529 us 848 120 sct 1904 146 led2d 902 2000 did not effect a material change in the law but only clarified a prior supreme court decision and two ninth circuit opinions consistent with joness holding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dispositive. Trull, 349 N.C. at 447, 509 S.E.2d at 191. Although the exact details of the murder and robbery are lacking, the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, permits a reasonable juror to infer that defendant murdered and robbed the victim without any break in the series of events. Defendant further argues that the trial court’s error violated his constitutional rights. Defendant did not raise this constitutional issue at trial; consequently, the trial court did not have the opportunity to consider or rule on this issue. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Defendant has accordingly failed to preserve this assignment of error for appellate review. See State v. Fullwood, 343 N.C. 725, 733, 472 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997) (<HOLDING>). This assignment of error is overruled.

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to cause harm” instead of to restore order. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir.2004). Johnson insists that Moeller struck him six to eight times in the head. But “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1776. No reasonable juror could believe Johnson’s version of events because the security tape shows that after Johnson hit Calloway, Moeller struck him only once in the back with the metal restraints, drove him to the floor, and handcuffed him. See id. (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Johnson submitted an unsigned

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment should have been granted because motorists version of facts was utterly discredited by videotape of incident
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a party to the divorce action, and no evidence was presented to suggest that he had consented to the transfer of any of the husband’s interest in KRIP. Section 10A-5A-1.09(a), Ala.Code 1975, which became effective on January 1, 2015, provides that “[a] limited liability company is bound by and may enforce the limited liability company agreement.” We note that there is no binding Alabama precedent regarding whether a trial court is bound by such an agreement in making an equitable division of property in a divorce; however, in Equitable Division of Property, Brett R. Turner points out that the general rule appears to be that a court is so bound. 3 Brett R. Turner, Equitable Division of Property § 9:6 (3d ed.2015); see also Schiller v. Schiller, 625 So.2d 856, 858 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 714 N.E.2d 187, 192

    ### Response:
    holding that a partnership agreement that contained prohibitions against the sale or assignment of a partners interest in the partnership without the others consent would be enforced
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that we see ... spent their life in the United States.” (Tr. 3.) These subsequent statements suggest that the district court did not find that Flores-Venegas presented a sufficiently extraordinary case to justify a downward departure. The court’s references to the need for legislative action, rather than judicial action, reasonably could be interpreted as referring to the Commission’s decision not to provide a departure for defendants who illegally reenter the country because they have lived most of their lives in the United States. The Commission’s failure to recognize departure on this ground does not, however, prevent the district court from departing on such a ground under unusual circumstances. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court’s statements are, at a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that as long as ground has not been prohibited by guidelines departure is permissible if case is outside heartland of cases governed by particular guideline
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and bilked investors of millions of dollars. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act reaches Panice’s misconduct. Perhaps consideration of the stiffer penalties under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Enron and WorldCom cases would weigh in favor of a “downward departure” for Panice. But such a consideration would be more appropriately given by the district court when evaluating the sentencing factors, particularly § 3553(a)(6) — the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Finally, Panice argues the application of the victim enhancement offends the ex post facto clause. The amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 became effective January 25, 2003; Panice’s conduct in the Receiver case occurred from 2001 to 2002. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Nurek, 578 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court of Appeals that “[t]he parties’ subjective belief as to whether an employment relationship exists is not dispositive of the legal question of whether one is the employer of another, except as such belief indicates an assumption of control by the one and submission by the other.” Here, to paraphrase Whitehead, “the inescapable conclusion is that [Love] voluntarily submitted to [USA Waste’s] control.” We therefore hold that under the workers’ compensation laws of both Maryland and the District of Columbia, USA Waste was Love’s employer and hence was immune from liability to him in tort for his work-related injury. The judgment on appeal must be reversed. So Ordered. 1 . See Union Light & Power Co. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 796 A.2d 665, 669 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that temporary employee status for workers compensation purposes is determinable as a matter of law where the particular undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    future sales price [and] not applying a discount to reduce the price further,” ante at 558, and that the statute “permitted, but did not require” the trial court to apply a discount to the $599,000 future sales price. Ante at 568. The statute did not “require” the trial court to consider the future sales price at all, but because it did, the statute required the trial court to consider that price only with evidence of “the necessity and amount of any discount to be applied” to that price “to arrive at a current fair market value.” Tex. Prop Code § 51.008(b)(5). We have often recognized that, for purposes of calculating damages, the amount of any future payment must be discounted to reflect its present-day value. See, e.g., Sheshunoff & Co. v. Scholl, 564 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>); Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Jaeger, 551

    ### Response:
    holding that an award of future salary payments should have been discounted to its present value at the legal rate of interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court’s decision denying absolute immunity to school board members in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). The Court held that affording absolute immunity to school board members was unwarranted “since it would not sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy” for constitutional violations. Wood, 420 U.S. at 320, 95 S.Ct. 992. While Wood dealt with a school board’s discipline of a student, at least one other circuit has extended this holding to deny absolute immunity to school boards’ decisions concerning a faculty member’s employment. See Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1507-08 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the record indicates that the

    ### Response:
    holding the courts ruling precludes an extension of absolute immunity to board members decision to terminate faculty member
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    condition. Two days of the first leave and all of the subsequent leaves were reported as “sick days” rather than FMLA leave pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 825.207(a). After each of her leaves, plaintiff was allowed to return to her position as bus driver for the District and no further requests for leave were made thereafter. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that she was denied any benefit to which she was entitled or that she was planning to make a further request for leave from the District. Furthermore, while she was disciplined and subsequently fired, allegedly for exercising her rights under the FMLA, courts in this circuit have consistently held that these types of claims constitute retaliation and not interference. See Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); LeClair v. Berkshire Union Free School

    ### Response:
    holding that interference and retaliation are two separate theories that can be advanced under the fmla and that termination is evidence of retaliation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and human rights abuses in Montenegro.” Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen based on their failure to establish changed circumstances in Montenegro. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(h). Finally, although the BIA erred in finding that Smail Perasevic’s affidavit was “unsworn,” we decline to remand on that basis. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275-76 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to remand because the Court could “predict with confidence” that the BIA would reach the same conclusion absent the error). Because that affidavit concerned the same claim that the IJ had previously found not credible, the BIA was under no obligation to afford it any probative weight. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 147-48 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that the agency may properly conclude that a prior adverse credibility determination undermines the authenticity of documentary evidence filed in support of a motion to reopen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a single controlling criterion, each reflects a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. Schnekloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2046, 36 L.Ed.2d at 861. Accordingly, this Court has held that an analysis of the voluntariness of a confession is a factual question that must take into account the totality of the circumstances. State v. Mayes (1992), 251 Mont. 358, 376, 825 P.2d 1196, 1208 (citing Allies, 606 P.2d at 1050). Pursuant to § 46-13-301(1), MCA, a defendant may move to suppress a confession that the defendant feels was involuntary. This section places the burden on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. The central question is whether the State has established by a preponderance of the . 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (<HOLDING>); Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Worth 1992, pet. ref'd); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no pet.). 15 . See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 16 . See d 376 (2006). 20 . United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 510-11 (5th Cir.2004); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245; McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 256 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd). 21 . Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880; Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); McQuarters, 58 S.W.3d at 255. 22 . Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). 23 . Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242; Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). 24 . Garcia, 43 S.W.3d at 530; McQuarters, 58 S.W.3d at 255. 25 . See Mohmed, 977 S.W.2d at 628 (<HOLDING>); Smith, 840 S.W.2d at 692; Petty, 696 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that officers may question motorists about their license registration and travel plans
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute does not contain , any language connoting negligence. 10. The State directs this Court to Commonwealth v. Jumper, 511 Pa. 446, 515 A.2d 540, 541 (1986), for the proposition that other jurisdictions have allowed similar convictions for involuntary manslaughter based on civil negligence. In Jumper the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor vehicular homicide when he went through a red light and caused the death of another motorist. Id., 515 A2d at 540. The Jumper court affirmed the vehicular homicide conviction, stating that [u]nder the homicide by vehicle statute, culpability is to be determined in each given case in light of the particular facts surrounding the Vehicle Code violation on which the homicide by vehicle charge is predicated, and a determination 1390 (D.C.1977) (<HOLDING>). 16. Many commentators have noted problems

    ### Response:
    holding that misdemeanor violation of carrying an unlicensed firearm was sufficient without a showing of recklessness or negligence for an involuntary manslaughter conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    692, 699, 659 P.2d 823 (1983). Our Kansas Probate Code expressly provides that, absent certain exceptions, “the property of a resident decedent, who dies intestate, shall at the time of death pass by intestate succession.” K.S.A. 59-502. Later, another statute notes: “In all cases of intestate succession . . . the property shall pass immediately from the decedent to the person entitled to receive it.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 59-509. Several of our Kansas cases reiterate this principle, holding: “By law the whole of an estate vests in the heirs, testate or intestate, at the death of an ancestor.” Peterson v. Peterson, 173 Kan. 636, 640, 251 P.2d 221 (1952); see also In re Estate of Williams, 238 Kan. 651, 659, 714 P.2d 948 (1986); Magaw v. Emick, 167 Kan. 580, 585, 207 P.2d 448 (1949) (<HOLDING>). And as Intestate Descendants observe, a

    ### Response:
    holding that wjhile the administrator has a right of possession until the estate is settled    the property passes to the heirs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Or they could have asked the district court to strike the defense, and mustered arguments at. that time in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The difficulty for the Davises was compounded by the fact that no court, so far as I can tell, had ever held that RCRA cases could be brought in state court, and that numerous courts had either held or assumed that jurisdiction was exclusively federal. Nor do we find any report of a RCRA citizen action ever being brought in an Ohio court. The district court’s holding on this matter is at least plausible, but I cannot say that resolution of that question is sufficiently plain under Yellow Freightand Holmes to have put the Davises fairly on notice that they could bring the RCRA allegation in Ohio court. See Diversified Foods, 985 F.2d at 31 (<HOLDING>) Indeed, if the district court held strong

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a goodfaith belief in exclusive federal jurisdiction might excuse a failure to bring a federal claim as part of a previous statecourt action but rejecting that excuse where the belief in exclusive federal jurisdiction was formed in the face of two circuit decisions to the contrary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and excessive scrutiny do not constitute adverse employment actions in the absence of other negative results such as a decrease in pay or being placed on probation.’ ” Abraham v. Potter, 494 F.Supp.2d 141, 147-48 (D.Conn.2007) (quoting Honey v. Cnty. of Rockland, 200 F.Supp.2d 311, 320 (S.D.N.Y.2002)). Consequently, the issuance of a “counseling memorandum” and a “notice of discipline,” without any further evidence regarding a materially adverse effect thereof, is not an adverse employment action as a matter of law. Weeks v. New York State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir.2001), abrogated on other grounds by, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 108-14, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002); see also Sanders, 361 F.3d at 756 (citing Weeks, 273 F.3d at 86) (<HOLDING>). Further more, interrogations alone are

    ### Response:
    holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be harmless. See T.D., 731 N.W.2d at 553 (stating that failure to object to evidence at trial results in waiver of appellate review); In re Welfare of Children of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 172 (Minn.App.2005) (noting that erroneous admission of evidence which is cumulative to other admissible evidence is harmless). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. In sum, we conclude that appellant’s evi-dentiary challenges are without merit. Even apart from the challenged evidence, substantial independent and undisputedly admissible evidence supported the district court’s findings. And, because this was a bench trial, any prejudice stemming from any erroneously admitted evidence would be minimal. See State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn.2009) (<HOLDING>); S.R.A., 527 N.W.2d at 838 (recognizing that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that risk of unfair prejudice is diminished in bench trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by medical sources to the effect that a claimant is “disabled” are not dispositive, but an ALJ must consider all medical findings and evidence that support such statements. Id. The opinion of claimant’s treating physician is entitled to great weight and may only be disregarded if there is persuasive contradictory evidence. Evans, 734 F.2d at 1015. Controlling weight may be given only in appropriate circumstances to medical opinions, i.e., opinions on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment(s), from treating sources, when the opinion is 1) well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and 2) not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). See Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (<HOLDING>). While the credibility of the opinions of the

    ### Response:
    holding that a treating physicians medical opinion must be given controlling weight only when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), arguing inter alia that he was improperly sentenced in light of our decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir.2011) (en banc), because he did not have the requisite qualifying prior convictions to trigger a mandatory life sentence or the career offender designation. The district court granted the motion with regard to the Simmons issue and ordered resentencing. At resentencing, the district court concluded that Austin did not qualify for the enhanced sentence under § 851 or the career offender designation. The court further sustained Austin’s objections to three criminal history points, as calculated in the original PSR, assigned to convictions that were consolidated for sentencing. See United States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215 (4th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). The district court calculated a revised

    ### Response:
    holding that consolidated sen tence or consolidated judgment under north carolina law is single sentence for guidelines purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). We examine the totality of the circumstances to see if the waiver choice was uncoerced and the defendant had a “requisite level of comprehension.” Id. As explained above, Walker was not a novice to criminal matters and was well aware of her rights. Furthermore, her relationship with the officers, as well as them statements about possible leniency if she cooperated, do not affect the voluntariness of her waiver. We have previously held that deceptive tactics may not invalidate an otherwise lawful waiver, and they do not invalidate Walker’s waiver. See Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). There is no other indication that Walker’s

    ### Response:
    holding that deceit is only prohibited to the extent that it deprives the suspect of the ability to understand his or her rights and the consequences of abandoning them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assistance of counsel claim. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. V Mancuso asserts that the use of posthypnotic testimony deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. He contends that the hypnotic process itself undermines the ability to reliably test a witness’ veracity on cross-examination because it. hardens the witness’. memories, whether ■ or not such memories are uncertain or false. Because such memories remain unconscious, Mancuso asserts confrontation is impossible. We have previously rejected this argument. The admission of post-hypnotic testimony does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198

    ### Response:
    holding the fact of hypnosis if disclosed to the jury may affect the credibility of evidence but not its admissibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Appeals conflict both with this state’s strong public policy upholding the freedom of contract as well as rules of property law. Respondent con tends that the holdings we must review properly reflect the force of the general principle that one cannot convey more than one owns and the more specific application of that principle in the context of a lease of real property by one whose interest is measured by his or her life or the life of another. On the unique facts of this case, we conclude that Petitioners have the stronger argument, because Decedent owned interests at the time of the lease other than the life estate she acquired as a result of the 1969 family settlement agreement. Those interests were transferable. See generally Statler v. Watson, 160 Neb. 1, 68 N.W.2d 604, 607 (1955) (<HOLDING>). {10} In this state, we have a broadly worded

    ### Response:
    recognizing a life tenants power to lease not only her present interest in the land she occupies but also a future interest she owns in the same land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    776 F.2d 1304, 1305 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 10 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1138 at 261 (1985 Pocket Part)). With the liberalizing of Rule 4(m), there is reason and support for now limiting the inquiry to its contents. See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1302-03 (panel did not consider Rule 6(b) in majority opinion affirming the denial of motion for extension and the granting of a dismissal). Many courts have analogized the good cause and excusable neglect standards. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (3d Cir. 1995); Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1312 (Becker, J. concurring) (citing to 2 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 4.18[2] (2d ed. 1994)); Braxton v. United States, 817 F.2d 238, 241 (3d Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841

    ### Response:
    recognizing that although the term good cause is undefined it is at least as demanding as the excusable neglect standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (in adopting the holding of International Standard Electric Corp., stating that “[r]e-sorting to the courts of the nation supplying the substantive law for the dispute does nothing to enhance the underlying principles of international arbitration because, under the terms of the New York Convention itself, judicial review of such an award is extremely limited and extends only to procedural aspects of the determination”). The Agreements stipulated that substantive Venezuelan law would apply, but that the arbitration “shall be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association .... ” Hotel Mgmt. Agreement § 19.03(c). The procedural law can therefore be construed as being supplied by the United States. Cf. Coutinho, 2000 WL 435566, at *6 (<HOLDING>); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Petersen,

    ### Response:
    holding that because arbitration was conducted in china pursuant to procedural rules of china international economic and trade arbitration commission the courts of china and not the district court was the competent authority under article vle of the convention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Admittedly, this interpretation makes it difficult to imagine a situation in which a Defendant may have violated ERISA’s duty of disclosure but still find refuge in the 404(c) safe harbor. Cf. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 585-90 (applying section 404(c) after concluding that fiduciaries did not violated any disclosure duties imposed by ERISA). The court nevertheless concludes that this is the most appropriate reading of the regulation, and that this overlap is preferable to creating a separate set of disclosure duties that ERISA fiduciaries would have to consider in the 404(c) context in addition to the disclosure duties already established by the case law interpreting ERISA’s fiduciary obligations. Cf. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Notably, this interpretation of section

    ### Response:
    holding that erisas duty of loyalty creates a duty to disclose certain information to beneficiaries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2) he sought to but was unable to obtain complete supporting documents for the years 1975-1986, (3) the figures are documented in part by past tax returns which comport with Debtor's testimony, and (4) Debtor's expert Mr. Fife used a reasonable method to calculate the contributions and interest thereon. 5 . § 522(b)(3)(C); § 522(d)(12). 6 . § 522(b)(4)(B)(i)-(ii). 7 . Although Wilson’s declaration does not attest to whether the IRA was in substantial compliance on the date of the bankruptcy petition, which is the operative date for purposes of this analysis, the parties did not raise this as an issue. 8 . 26 U.S.C. § 408(d) deals with the tax treatment of distributions and will be discussed in the next section. 9 . See Michel v. C.I.R., 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1019, 1989 WL 154252 (T.C.1989) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The distinction can be found in the IRC

    ### Response:
    holding that the subsequent tax treatment of an ira contribution does not affect the validity of the ira
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the arguments” of other jurors “with a distrust of [their] own judgment,” particularly when “a large majority of the jury tak[es] a different view of the case.” Id. at 501-02, 17 S.Ct. 154. For that very reason, the use of an Allen charge to encourage jury unanimity “has long been sanctioned” by the Supreme Court. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237, 108 S.Ct. 546. The need for unanimity, however, is reduced in the context of penalty-phase proceedings because a deadlocked jury will not result in a mistrial. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.11 (providing that “[i]f the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree as to punishment, the judge shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life” with or without parole); see also Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238, 108 S.Ct. 546 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the state retains “a strong

    ### Response:
    recognizing identical feature of louisiana law reduced need for unanimity noting that fact obviously weighs in the constitutional calculus but ultimately concluding it is not dispositive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stop of the Contour was to confirm the identities of the men in the car, to investigate the contents of the bag Defendant had carried, and to attempt to obtain consent to search Defendant’s residence. Those objectives were achieved in an expeditious manner. Once Defendant gave oral consent to search his house, it was reasonable to transport him to that location so that he could sign a written consent form and be present for the search. Approximately twenty (20) minutes elapsed from the time that the Contour was stopped to the signing of the consent form. The officer’s removal of the occupants from the vehicle at gunpoint and his request that they get on their knees did not exceed the scope of the detention. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Campbell, 178 F.3d at 349 (stating that

    ### Response:
    holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a deed and its delivery are two separate acts, and transfer of title is not accomplished until delivery occurs. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Cos., 33 N.Y.2d 370, 372, 353 N.Y.S.2d 161, 308 N.E.2d 682 (N.Y. 1974) (Transfer of title requires both the execution and delivery of a deed, and where a deed is executed but delivery does not occur title is not transferred.); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 244. Moreover, once a foreclosure sale takes place, the prior owner lacks standing to claim any “improprieties in the events surrounding the closing of title which resulted in the sale of the premises,” because the owner’s interest in the property is extinguished by the completion of the foreclosure sale. Kolkunova v. Guaranteed Home Mortg. Co., 43 A.D.3d 878, 842 N.Y.S.2d 46, 48 (N.Y. 2007) (<HOLDING>). As stated by the Second Circuit,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rivera and Guzmán asseverate that we should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Docket Document No. 36. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are not dismissed. Accordingly, we deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claims. IV. Conclusion In accordance with the foregoing, we DENY Defendant Alejandro’s motion for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 28. We GRANT Defendants Rivera and Guzmán’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Vélez’ due process claims, and otherwise DENY the motion for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 36. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . We disregard the parties' Spanish-language exhibits. Estades-Negroni v. Assoc. Corp. of N. Am., 359 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A supervisor is ""defined loosely to

    ### Response:
    holding that nonenglish materials submitted for review may not be considered during the pretrial process or become part of the record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    IV. 2 . Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting United. States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). 3 . The government also argued that the search of the bathroom was permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest. This argument is not pursued on appeal, 4 . Appellant did not present any evidence at trial. 5 . This element is satisfied even if the defendant is a co-owner of the property. See Jackson v. United States, 819 A.2d 963, 966-67 (D.C.2003). 6 . See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 5.400 (5th ed. rev. 2015); see also Guzman v. United States, 821 A.2d 895, 898 (D.C.2003) (defining ""malice”); Brown v. United States, 584 A.2d 537, 539 (D.C. 1990) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134

    ### Response:
    holding that provocation is a proper defense to the charge of malicious destruction of property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1965); Hoffman, 268 F.2d at 296-97; Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir.1999). Thus, the cryptic reference to the common law in Malley’s footnote 7 would appear to preclude judicial action as a superseding cause only in the situation in which the information, submitted to the judge, was deceptive. Egervary also cites case law from other circuits to argue that, because each of the defendants allegedly participated in one way or another in making representations to the District Judge prior to the execution of the Order, all of the defendants should be held liable for the subsequent deprivation of his rights. These cited cases, however, are not inconsistent with the conclusion we reach above. The cited cases include Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 353-54 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Probation,

    ### Response:
    holding that the chain of causation was not broken where the prosecutor allegedly fabricated evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deductible under the more general “ordinary and necessary” provisions of § 162 is equally unpre-vailing. Meals are not deductible unless the expense is different from or in excess of that which would have been made for the taxpayer’s personal purposes. Moss v. Commissioner, 758 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 979, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 L.Ed.2d 335 (1985). Judge Putnam alleges no purpose for his lunches, other than his own subsistence, and we can not see how these expenditures aided the development or business of the federal district courts. The federal courts did not dictate the location, duration or content of Judge Putnam’s midday meals. See Christey v. United States, 841 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016, 109 S.Ct. 1131, 103 L.Ed.2d 193 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the argument that Judge Putnam

    ### Response:
    holding that because state imposed substantial restrictions on state troopers lunch arrangements lunch expenses were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under general provisions of  162a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    know that he has sustained the requisite serious injury. As a limited tort plaintiff, appellant herein did not have a valid cause of action, and the statute of limitations period did not begin to run, until she knew or reasonably should have known that she sustained a “serious injury.” The MVFRL defines a serious injury as “[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. When the accident in this case first occurred, appellant sustained injuries to her face and jaw that appeared to result in only minor bruises and contusions. Consistent with recent caselaw, these injuries would not rise to the level of a serious injury. See, e.g., Dodson v. Elvey, 445 Pa.Super. 479, 483-84, 665 A.2d 1223, 1225 (1995) (<HOLDING>), alloc. granted, 544 Pa. 608, 674 A.2d 1072

    ### Response:
    holding that bruising and soft tissue injury even accompanied by residual pain does not rise to the level of a serious injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    very terms of the lease, therefore, notification is accomplished once an appropriate writing is addressed and deposited in the mail as specified; neither receipt nor proof of receipt are required.”). Defendants argue that the phrase “five (5) days after notice” contained in section 24.1 of the lease is ambiguous, and therefore must be construed in favor of CLT and Flamer’s. Defendants assert that the phrase should be construed as “business days,” and that CLT’s 9 July 1999 payment timely cured the default within five business days. We disagree, and affirm the trial court’s entry of judgment and order of ejectment. Where the language of a contract is clear, the contract must be interpreted as written. Howard v. Oakwood Homes Corp., 134 N.C. A . App. 216, 223, 346 S.E.2d 515, 520 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Id. We noted that Webster’s Third New

    ### Response:
    holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who had not attained the age of 18 years.” Id. § 2G2.2 application note 1 (2003). While admitting that he believed that he was distributing child pornography to minors, Wainwright argues on appeal that his offense level could only be enhanced under § 2G2.2(b)(2)(C) if the recipients were, in fact, under the age of eighteen. Wainwright claims that there was no evidence in the record that the individuals to whom he distributed child pornography were actually minors, as opposed to individuals posing as minors. Wainwright further contends that the district court appears to have relied on the first application note to § 2G2.2 to expand the definition of “minors” to individuals who were over eighteen by including those who the defendant believed were minors. Wain 172 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The guidelines have since been amended to

    ### Response:
    holding that an enhancement for distribution of child pornography to a minor was improper because the pornographic materials at issue were transmitted to an undercover law enforcement officer who was not a minor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    256, 261, 589 S.E.2d 134, 138 (2003), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 237, 593 S.E.2d 784 (2004). The State contends the statements at issue were properly admitted under Rule 803(3) to demonstrate Weeks’ “existing state of mind and emotional condition” during the robbery. However, the statements by Weeks were made several days after the robbery, and therefore do not reflect Weeks’ “then-existing” state of mind during the robbery. Rather, the statements were simply a recital of Weeks’ memory of the events that took place and his emotional condition at the time. As such, they were not admissible under Rule 803(3). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 803(3) (excluding statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed); In re Hayden, 96 N.C. App. 77, 81-82, 384 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The trial court therefore erred in admitting

    ### Response:
    holding that where the proffered hearsay statement of the victim pertained to a memory of the previous days events and was offered solely for the purpose of proving such events such statement was not admissible under rule 8033
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supervise and monitor the Evergreen Funds and the Investment Adviser Defendant; (3) the Trustee Defendants were beholden to the Investment Adviser Defendant for their positions, not to the Fund investors; (4) the Trust no longer holds annual meetings of shareholders; and (5) each of the Trustees was paid substantial sums of money, ranging from $218,250 to $625,500, during the Class Period for serving as a Trustee. Even taken together, these allegations are insufficient to excuse demand. The fact that an adviser was responsible for selecting board members is an insufficient basis for establishing lack of independence or disinterestedness. See Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 4673(WK), 1999 WL 511411, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999), affd, 208 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Plaintiffs’ allegations that the

    ### Response:
    holding allegation that directors serve at the pleasure of the investment adviser merely states a fact common to all funds which has not been deemed problematic by the bodies regulating the industry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500, 112 A.2d 475 (1955). Res ipsa loquitur does not apply.” Jensen, supra at 232. See also Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac of Marlow Heights, Inc., 77 Md.App. 41, 549 A.2d 385 (1988). 7 . Md.Rule 5-702 provides, in pertinent part, that ... the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony. 8 . The ""admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court and its action will seldom constitute a ground for reversal.” Myers v. Celotex Corp., 88 Md.App. 442, 460, 594 A.2d 1248 (1991)(<HOLDING>). This is not a case like Myers, however, where

    ### Response:
    holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion but applied an incorrect standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if Anyssa were returned to Mother’s care. In addition, Dr. Kathryn Coffman, a pediatrician who had examined Anyssa as well as Ashley’s medical reports, testified that she would be “very concerned about any child being in [Mother’s] care” based on Mother’s failure “to take any steps to protect” Ashley despite Mother’s knowledge that the abuse was taking place. As Dr. Coffman put it, “for two months at least [Ashley] was beaten while in [Mother’s] care, that she continued to leave the child in harm’s way, and the child ended up dying a very painful death” due to Mother’s knowing failure to protect her. Our review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to uphold the juvenile court’s best interest finding. See Kent K v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 42, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION ¶ 18 Based on the foregoing, we

    ### Response:
    holding that best interest of child need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gardner does not argue that the zoning amendment was arbitrary or capricious. 4 . As we noted above, it is not clear from the record whether the amendment passed by the City Council differs from the Planning Commission’s recommendation. For the purposes of appeal from summary judgment only, we assume that the facts are as Gardner argues. 5 . We note that a city council’s statutory authority to amend a planning commission's proposal is not unbounded: the council’s amendments must not result in a land use decision that is arbitrary and capricious, see Utah Code Ann. § 10 — 9— 1001(3)(b) (1999); Springville Citizens, 979 P.2d at 336, and the public must have sufficient notice of the amendment contemplated. See, e.g., Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764, 764 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees argue that the Ordinance is

    ### Response:
    holding public had fair notice of adopted zoning amendment where uses permitted in adopted amendment were a subset of those permitted in the proposed amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a new context (as suggested by Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004), announced June 24, 2004), one thing is certain — Blakely requires alterations to Washington’s 20-year-old sentencing process. Before this country’s highest court issued its opinion in Blakely, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94ARCW, permitted a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range guideline on the basis of facts neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury. The Blakely Court held: “ ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (<HOLDING>)). This “sea change” in the law was not caused

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional a state statute which authorized a 20year sentence despite the usual 10year maximum if the judge found the crime to have been a hatecrime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This majority rule is essentially the rule we have adopted for remarriage as explained in Taylor. Thus, it is entirely consistent with our current law and creates no disincentive to remarriage, a concern in states where remarriage results automatically in the termination of maintenance. We adopt the majority rule for cohabitation situations. ¶ 19. In doing so, we particularly note the cautionary words of the North Dakota Supreme Court in Cermak v. Cermak, 1997 ND 187, ¶ 10, 569 N.W.2d 280: The length of [the recipient spouse’s] relationship is unknown; it may last until her death, or may sour tomorrow. On this record, any support [she] may receive from her cohabitant is provided from his benevolence and comes with no reciprocal or continuing obligation. See also Gilman, 956 P.2d at 765 (<HOLDING>). As the Kentucky Supreme Court explained, we

    ### Response:
    recognizing that cohabitants owe no legal or financial support to one another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of any fact that is of consequence to’ the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”); see generally Duncan, 155 F.R.D. at 25 (noting that to the extent an ongoing injury is claimed, the relevance aspect of “good cause” can be read as merging with Rule 35(a)’s “in controversy” requirement). Wal-Mart has clearly demonstrated that the requested examination would produce relevant information. The medical cause of White’s discomfort is the central focus of the litigation below. The results of an examination would tend to make it either more probable or less probable that the alleged cause of White’s discomfort — battery acid — is in fact the actual cause of the discomfort. See Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582; cf. Clement, 493 So.2d at 1354 (<HOLDING>) Thus, Wal-Mart has established relevance. A

    ### Response:
    holding that bloodtest results would be irrelevant in action challenging parentage where the results could not be compared to information relating to necessary parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    State. Robertson v. State, 112 Md.App. 366, 385, 685 A.2d 805 (1996) (citation omitted). Appellant contends that the instruction given by the trial court failed to focus on his theory of defense — that he was merely present in the house and did not “possess” the contraband. We disagree and hold that the given instructions adequately addressed appellant’s theory of the case. In instructing the jury, the court essentially utilized the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions. See MCPJI 4:24. “[GJenerally, the pattern jury instructions suffice and trial judges usually may rely on them.” Bayne v. State, 98 Md.App. 149, 160, 632 A.2d 476 (1993). Of course, situations may arise when a pattern jury instruction is not adequate or complete. See e.g., Green, 119 Md.App. at 562, 705 A.2d 133 (<HOLDING>). The instant case, however, does not present

    ### Response:
    holding that pattern jury instruction was inadequate because it did not encompass the valid defense asserted by the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denied, 528 U.S. 1079, 120 S.Ct. 797, 145 L.Ed.2d 672 (2000); Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 235 (6th Cir.) (Applying Fourth Amendment to post-arrest use of force), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 821, 117 S.Ct. 78, 136 L.Ed.2d 37 (1996); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir.1991) (overruled on other grounds) (applying Fourth Amendment standard to excessive force claim where plaintiffs were detained and beaten for 12 hours without being formally arrested); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir.1989) (“We think the Fourth Amendment should probably be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer”); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit has rejected the

    ### Response:
    holding fourth amendment protects against use of force while in arresting officers custody until arraignment or formal charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.1998). When evaluating the adequacy of an EIS, the court must determine whether the EIS contains “a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences.” See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Service, 137 F.3d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir.1998). The court must ensure that the agency took a “hard look” at the environmental effects of the proposed action. See Vermont Yankee v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 535, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). In interpreting NEPA, courts give substantial deference to the regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”). See 42 U.S.C. § 4342 et. seq.; Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (<HOLDING>). B. Summary Judgment Rule 56(c) of the Federal

    ### Response:
    holding ceq regulations entitled to substantial deference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Alabama Courts” notwithstanding the verdict of those courts. Wilson’s claims were subsequently dismissed by a federal magistrate judge after the parties consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. Wilson’s claims are jurisdictionally barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars state-court losers from seeking what would be, in substance, appellate review of state-court judgments in federal district court based on claims that the state-court judgment violated the losing parties’ federal rights. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2010); see also Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because that is precisely what Wilson seeks

    ### Response:
    holding rookerfeldman also bars federal claims raised in state court as well as claims that are inextricably intertwined with the statecourt judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (a treaty requires “a formal ratification”); Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir.2001) (explaining that when the United States has signed, but not ratified, an international agreement, the agreement “does not yet qualify as one of the ‘treaties’ of the United States that creates binding obligations”). In addition, this Court cannot grant relief under the ICCPR because it is not a self-executing treaty. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir.2001). Martinez-Lopez also argues that customary international law, including principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, prevents his removal. International customs, however, cannot override congressional intent as expressed by statute. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Bradvica v. INS, 128 F.3d 1009, 1014 n. 5

    ### Response:
    holding that congress may shut the door to the law of nations either explicitly or implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy the field
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    11 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). Thus, “[e]ven where a federal question is involved, the state court is not required to follow a federal court and can determine whether or not the federal court decision is persuasive.” Id. Accordingly, neither Brown- nor Conjour are binding on this Court. We do, however, find the Brown analysis persuasive. As noted by the trial court, a number of United States district court opinions emanating from the Third Circuit have cited Brown or its progeny for the proposition that the allegedly stigmatizing statements must go beyond allegations of improper or inadequate performance, incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance. This proposition is also long-standing precedent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, see, e.g., Mercer, 308 F.3d at 845 (<HOLDING>), and the United States Court of Appeals for

    ### Response:
    holding that comments eoncerning exemployees ability to perform job could not be construed to suggest stigmatizing traits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion to suppress didn’t raise that issue.” Snowden clearly did not raise this issue in his written motion. And at the suppression hearing he elicited only limited testimony about the events after the agents decided to converge on his car. In response to a question by the court during his closing argument, Snowden contended that the use of “excessive force” — by which he meant drawn weapons — turned any legitimate Terry stop into a full arrest requiring probable cause. To the extent that Snowden’s argument is preserved for our review, it is unavailing. When police officers reasonably believe they are dealing with a person about to engage in a substantial drug transaction, they may use the degree of restraint necessary for their own control and safety. See Askew, 403 F.3d at 506-07 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1228

    ### Response:
    holding that agents did not escalate terry stop into custodial arrest by blockading suspects car and approaching with guns drawn
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d at 522 (recognizing that collateral estoppel principles had hardly been applied in criminal cases); Page, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d at 1167 (collateral estoppel principles more commonly used in civil cases); see also Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion at 346 n. 7 (finding it interesting that 1942 Restatement of Judgments completely excluded criminal cases from its scope). The “efficiency concerns that drive the collateral estoppel policy on the civil side are not nearly as important in criminal cases because criminal cases involve a public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal results that outweighs the economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine.” Rodriguez, 11 S.W.3d at 322, quoting U.S. v. Mollier, 853 F.2d 1169, 1175-77 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). These public interest concerns apparently

    ### Response:
    holding that nonmutual collateral estoppel has no application in criminal cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    775.087, Florida Statutes (2006) (the 10/20/Life statute). Appellant was sentenced to thirty years in prison with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence. He was also sentenced to a consecutive period of ten years of probation. , Appellant argues that once the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years under section 775.087, the total sentence could not exceed thirty years, which is the statutory maximum sentence for first-degree felonies under section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2006). Appellant, therefore, contends that the probationary sentence should be stricken. Appellant is correct, and the State concedes the sentencing error, acknowledging that the probationary term should be stricken. See Wooden v. State, 42 So.3d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>), review denied, 51 So.3d 466 (Fla.2010); Brown

    ### Response:
    holding that after the trial court reclassified the seconddegree felony to a firstdegree felony based on the use of a firearm and imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twentyfive years under section 775087 it was improper to impose a sentence that exceeded the thirtyyear statutory maximum penalty for firstdegree felonies under section 7750823b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that the district court erred in giving Loredo credit for twenty-five weeks during which, due to another on-the-job injury, Loredo did not work. Staftex argues that by dividing Loredo’s earnings by twenty-seven, which the district court did to account for Lore-do’s twenty-five weeks on disability, the ALJ violated 33 U.S.C. § 910(d). This argument is without merit. Although section 910(d) states that the ALJ should divide annual earnings by fifty-two, the Board has frequently held that, when calculating annual earnings, an ALJ may account for time lost due to a claimant’s job-related injury. See, e.g., Brien v. Precision Valve, 23 BRBS 209 (1990); see also Hawthorne v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 844 F.2d 318, 320 (6th Cir.l988)(<HOLDING>). Thus, although the ALJ should have increased

    ### Response:
    holding that aljs should account for time lost due to a strike or an injury caused by a strike
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under state law, where it was not adopted in accordance with state procedural requirements and where the county had e discrimination among service providers. NTA contends that the moratorium was imposed in direct response to its application, and that the Town therefore discriminated. Affidavits provided by the Town, however, support its claim that the moratorium was not aimed specifically at NTA. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that the Town has treated other applicants more favorably. As noted above, a valid basis existed for the moratorium. Additionally, the record reflects no “ill will” either towards NTA or towards the telecommunications industry, in general. See AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of the City of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 427-28 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan and Zoning

    ### Response:
    holding that city did not discriminate in the absence of a showing of ill will
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    difficult to see how Ms. Steele can be deemed an “anonymous” caller: she provided her name, location, and occupation to the police. The ample information in the hands of the dispatcher regarding Ms. Steele’s identity is constructively imputed to Officer Hall because Florida courts apply the “fellow officer rule,” which operates to impute the knowledge of one officer in the chain of investigation to another. See Berry v. State, 493 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(an officer receiving a radio transmission to detain a certain individual has authority to stop the person described; the legiti macy of the stop will depend on whether the reporting officer had sufficient grounds to order the person detained); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)(<HOLDING>). The second reason why Ms. Steele was not

    ### Response:
    holding that when a police communique has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion any authorized officer may make an investigatory stop on the basis of that bulletin even though the officer making the stop is not aware of the underlying facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contaminating those prospective jurors who had not read or heard about the case with the responses of those who had. See Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 507-08 (D.C.Cir.1959) (had juror admitted before his fellow jurors that he was influenced because of a newspaper article which reported that prosecutor had stated that the defendant was a vicious criminal, that witness was deathly afraid of the defendant, and that district court did not believe that witness could be protected, “the damage to the defendant would have been spread to the listening other jurors”), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855, 82 S.Ct. 92, 7 L.Ed.2d 52 (1961). The sequestered individual voir dire of jurors “is not unusual, nor viewed with suspicion.” In re Greensboro News Co., 727 F.2d 1320, 1323 (4th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the practice has been endorsed by the

    ### Response:
    holding that newspapers were not entitled to a writ of mandamus challenging district court order providing for in camera voir dire of potential jurors in criminal prosecution since order was made to ensure frank and forthcoming responses and represented a proper balance between first amendment concerns of news media and sixth amendment fair trial rights of the defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reinitiates further conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“[A]n accused, ..., having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”). B. Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Waiver of Rights Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, the police must cease all interrogation. See Ketchum, y of further questioning by initiating communication with the police and voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Substantive questioning may continue only if

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants inquiry as to what was going to happen next was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship and instead evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims brought under the TCHRA, the court AFFIRMS the judgment in all other respects. REVERSED and REMANDED in part; AFFIRMED in part. 2 . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir.2001). 3 . Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir.1992)(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). 4 . See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). 5 . See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 6 . See Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 7 . Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). 8 . See Celestine v. PetrOleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 356 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Blow v. City of San Antonio, 236 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that district court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show that they were better qualified than employees who were promoted in order to make a prima facie case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conviction was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. See Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1310-11. Scanes placed his knowledge and intent at issue by pleading not guilty. See id. at 1298, 1311 (concluding the defendant had placed his intent at issue by pleading not guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine). Scanes’s prior conviction for possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine was probative of his state of mind in this case. Aside from the prior conviction, the only evidence of knowledge and intent presented by the government was the presence and amount of drugs found in the car Scanes was driving. Absent other evidence of Scanes’s state of mind, the prosecutorial need for the evidence was high. See United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1523 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The age of Scanes’s prior conviction also

    ### Response:
    recognizing where the government did not have overwhelming evidence of the defendants predisposition to possess or distribute cocaine or his knowledge about such matters  the extrinsic evidence had a relatively high incremental value and was not easily excludable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    significant danger [to] the physical well being of the community.’ ” Referring to this assessment as a “diagnosis,” the court held that it was error to admit the psychotherapist’s opinion in evidence because the juvenile’s communications were implicit in the diagnosis. Id. at 526. 8 Because of the waiver, we do not view as controlling the intimation in Clancy, supra at 667, that, when the purpose of a hospitalization requires disclosure of a diagnosis, “the purpose is within the privilege” and therefore not admissible. Reference to specific diagnostic terms cataloged in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) would, in most instances, not fall under the privilege. See Lambley v. Kameny, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 278 n.4 (1997) (<HOLDING>). There may, of course, be instances when

    ### Response:
    recognizing dsm as standard authority for diagnostic criteria of mental disorders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its isomers or 1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers” are subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(viii). This mandatory minimum statute, unlike the Sentencing Guidelines, does not differentiate between d-methamphetamine and 1-methamphetamine. See United States v. Maza, 93 F.3d 1390, 1400 n. 4 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1008, 136 L.Ed.2d 886 (1997). When “a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G. §. 5Gl.l(b). See also United States v. Stoneking, 60 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1119, 116 S.Ct. 926,

    ### Response:
    holding that when a statute and a guideline conflict the statute controls
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and we are unpersuaded that the time has come to change the policy with regard to lay conveyances or witness-only closings. Accordingly, we hereby approve UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2. UPL Advisory Opinion approved. All the Justices concur. 1 State Bar Rule 14-9.1 (b) empowers the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Prac tice of Law to address inquiries regarding the unauthorized practice of law. 2 “Lay conveyancing,” authorized by statute in some states, is generally defined as the practice by which non-lawyers close real estate transactions, provide settlement services, or select, prepare and complete certain real estate closing documents. See Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-2.19 (2003) (consumer protection statute authorizing lay settlement services); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-125 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Minn. Stat. § 481.02 (2002) (exempting

    ### Response:
    recognizing authority of nonlawyers to close real estate transactions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in his concurring opinion in Crawford when he said “To its credit, the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official records. See Ante at 56 [124 S.Ct. 1354].” By way of background, in United States v. Figueroa, an unpublished opinion appearing at 2000 WL 963346 (10th Cir.2000) which predated Crawford, we spoke as follows: FN5. Figueroa suggests in his brief that the warrant of deportation or removal which stated that an INS agent had witnessed the deportation in 1997 was not sufficient evidence that he had been deported in 1997. Other courts have found that this warrant is admissible in trial as proof that a defendant was arrested and deported. See United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that warrant of deportation is admissible hearsay under fed revid 8038b to prove defendant was deported
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alabama’s lethal-injection cocktail will cause him to suffer a painful heart attack; and (3) he could suffer a “paradoxical reaction to midazolam.” Ar thur has established a sufficient likelihood that an Eighth Amendment claim will arise during his execution. Second, Alabama’s refusal to afford Arthur access to a telephone will impede his pursuit of that Eighth Amendment claim. The refusal is an “imminent official interference” with Arthur’s right of access to the courts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349, 116 S.Ct. at 2179. Arthur will have no access to the courts—much less meaningful access— if Alabama bars “telephonic access to the courts,” then straps him to a gurney and begins to subject him to a cruel and unusual execution process. See McGehee, slip op. at 58-59, 2017 WL 1381663 (<HOLDING>). Alabama’s refusal to afford Arthur access to

    ### Response:
    holding that a group of death row prisoners who asserted that arkansas failed to guarantee reasonable telephonic access to the courts during their executions sufficiently alleged an accessto courts claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the detectives observed drug transactions being conducted, or that the area was known for drug trafficking. We must, therefore, assess Detective Lockwood’s conduct in light of his actual testimony. As far as the record indicates, Detective Lockwood seized Defendant on the basis of three observed facts: 1) Defendant’s proximity to an area being investigated for gang activity; 2) Defendant’s refusal to “hold up” when told to do so; and 3) Defendant’s rapid flight from his encounter with Detective Lockwood. With respect to the first of these observed facts, we hold that an individual’s proximity to an area being investigated for gang activity is not sufficient, without more, to justify an investigatory stop. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lawson, 929 S.W.2d 406, 408-09

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants presence in neighborhood frequented by drug users was not in and of itself a basis for concluding he was engaged in criminal conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over their management or disposition. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[w]e do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.” Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 125 S.Ct. 694, 700, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005). Day points to nothing — in either ERISA or the caselaw interpreting it — to overcome this reluctance. Day undeniably had “authority or control”, over the “disposition” of the plans’ “assets.” The plans sent to Day checks made payable to him. Day then deposited the plans’ funds -22 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 40 (2d

    ### Response:
    holding a bank is a fiduciary under the disposition clause where it wrongfully disbursed the plans funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3308, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that when a third party gives consent to search a room, that person is not necessarily consenting to a search of the closed containers within the room). For the following reasons, I would hold that it did not. According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant’s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin’s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476

    ### Response:
    holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    result in underfunded plans that could not pay appropriate benefits to their beneficiaries. Id. at 1451; see also Santa Monica Culinary Welfare Fund, 920 F.2d at 1494; New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund v. Boening Bros., Inc., 891 F.Supp. 81, 86 (N.D.N.Y.1995), aff'd, 92 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.1996). The instant matter, as well, involves a provision essential to the management of the Welfare Fund and the Pension Fund to ensure the employers are contributing in accordance with their obligations. Because the Welfare Fund and the Pension Fund are dependant upon participant contributions, the collection power attributed to the Trustees of the Funds is essential to the Funds management and viability. Contra Jaspan v. Glover Bottled Gas Corp., 80 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 77, 136

    ### Response:
    holding that liquidated damages provision in trust agreement would not bind nonsignatory because it was merely helpful to the trustees but  not essential to  management of the funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Guy name and logo in the operation of the business.” (Doc. No. 60-A3.) This sentence does not support a construction that the term “exclusive” places an affirmative duty on the Defendants to protect the Plaintiffs from third-party infringement. Moreover, aside from the term “exclusive,” the agreements are entirely devoid of any indication that the Defendants assumed the affirmative duty to protect the Plaintiffs from third-party infringement. In the alternative, the Plaintiffs argue that the term “exclusive” is ambiguous, and the Court should therefore consider parol evidence to clarify its meaning. However, a term is not ambiguous where the ambiguity arises only after a court considers potential inconsistencies between contract terms and extrinsic evidence. Lambert, 680 So.2d at 590 (<HOLDING>). “The court must give full force to the plain

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court impermissibly created ambiguity by comparing the contracts to extrinsic evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    display in altered form. “The act complained of’ for the purposes of § 14.03(4)(b) is thus the display of the altered sculpture, not the isolated, onetime act of dismantling in 1988. The acts prohibited, therefore, have occurred continually since 1988, and a new cause of action has, in effect, accrued each day, with the three-year limitations period beginning to run each day that the piece has been displayed. In this regard, the limitations provision operates much like the New York common laws doctrine that continuous or recurring wrongs, such as nuisance or trespass, continually give rise to new causes of action. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422, 438 N.Y.S.2d 496, 420 N.E.2d 377 (1981); cf. Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). This action was commenced on February 23,

    ### Response:
    holding federal copyright laws threeyear statute of limitations not to bar acts of infringement occurring within three years of action despite fact that related earlier acts of infringement were barred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We apply those principles here. Given the divers possibilities that attend this situation, we are uncertain what procedural course the state trial court would take if asked to rule on the competence claim. That uncertainty dooms the procedural default defense. Id. at 213. Of course, our double-barreled conclusion that the Commonwealth waived its nonexhaustion defense and that it cannot mount a successful procedural default defense does not compel us to adjudicate the competence claim on the merits. A federal court may choose, in its sound discretion, to reject a state’s waiver of either nonexhaustion or procedural default. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134-35, 107 S.Ct. 1671; Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1065 (5th Cir.1998); cf. Oakes v. United States, 400 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In exercising this discretion, concerns of

    ### Response:
    holding in a federal prisoners habeas case under 28 usc  2255 that the district court may raise the question of procedural default even if that defense was waived by the government
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    essential elements of the Extension Phone Exemption). The parties did not brief the issue of whether the “intercepting equipment” used by Mother qualifies for the Extension Phone Exemption, leading the Court to believe it is undisputed that this element of the Extension Phone Exemption is met. Nonetheless, the Court will briefly address it. Father alleges that Mother “set up a recording device on her own telephone arid intercepted the conversations.” (Comply 16.) The Tenth Circuit has held that a recording device attached to a home telephone extension, such as that alleged in this case, qualifies for the Extension Phone Exemption because it is the telephone receiver, and not the recording device, that constitutes the intercepting mechanism. See United States v. Harpel 91 (E.D.Ark.1998) (<HOLDING>). In Scheib, which presented a factual scenario

    ### Response:
    holding that the extension phone exemption applied to situations where a parent records his childs phone conversations from a phone extension within the parents home without any analysis of the recording partys purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aff'd, 767 F.2d 518 (8th Cir.1985); Riley v. Ambach, 508 F.Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y.1980). As Springdale School District, supra, indicates, placement in a state school for the blind or deaf may be contrary to the “mainstreaming” requirement of the EAHCA. It all depends on the individual child. Nonetheless, the state, having accepted the funds of the federal government and acceded to the administrative and appellate scheme of the EAHCA, has an overriding duty to provide an appropriate IEP for every handicapped child capable of benefiting from one. This overriding obligation may require that some children be placed at KSB, who do not meet its criteria, if such placement is the only way an appropriate IEP can be designed for them. See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1491-92 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), aff'd sub nom. Honig, 108 S.Ct. at 607

    ### Response:
    holding that whenever the local agency refuses or wrongfully neglects to provide a handicapped child with a free appropriate education that child can be best served on the regional or state level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    subject matter, partitioning different topics — “consent regular items,” “planning and zoning,” “operation business,” “council policies,” and “appointments,” Village of Ruidoso Resolution 2012-16 at 3 — into different segments of the meeting without allowance for overlap. It would be hard for a city council to conduct its business without a similar structure. Even if the public input portion is analyzed on its own, the Court cannot reasonably conclude that the Governing Body has intentionally elevated it to the level of a traditional public forum. The Governing Body has not left open a courtyard to public protest or opened a university classroom to all comers on a fírst-come-fírst-served basis. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (Powell, J.)(<HOLDING>). The Governing Body has placed numerous

    ### Response:
    holding that where a university routinely provides university facilities for the meetings of registered organizations it may not selectively disallow use for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insufficient to constitute “some ev 343, 345 (1992) (defendant’s ability to be “properly oriented regarding his location” and “fully aware of the facts and circumstances occurring around him” was inconsistent with the intoxication defense); State v. Netter, 79 So.3d 478, 483 (La.Ct.App.2011) (testimony that the defendant “was not stumbling or staggering” was inconsistent with the intoxication defense); State v. Williamson, 668 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo.Ct.App.1984) (defendant’s ability to s ndana over his face and wrap a shirt around the weapon that he used to stab Eggleston demonstrates a significant amount of design in planning the crime, which is inconsistent with the assertion that he was unable to form any specific intent that night. See Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind.1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Shell, 307 Md. at 62, 512 A.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants ability to give directions and make decisions on a course of action for himself was inconsistent with the intoxication defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not sue Keeley & Associates, Inc. I do not doubt the majority’s suggestion that the trial court probably would have granted a motion to consolidate this action with Integrity’s action. But no rule of law required Keeley & Associates, Inc., to file suit or risk losing its claim. The effect of the majority’s expansion of the rule of claim preclusion embodied in Civ.R. 13(A) to bind nonparties essentially creates a procedural rule of “compulsory intervention.” Such a rule is not contemplated by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and contravenes Civ.R. 13 and possibly Civ.R. 24. “[I]t appears that the traditional view is that a defendant may counterclaim only in the capacity in which he has been sued.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank (C.A.2, 1981), 658 F.2d 875, 886 (<HOLDING>). Following this rule, the court in Durham v.

    ### Response:
    holding that bank could not bring counterclaim in its capacity as trustee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact remain regarding additional information that Officer Cox may have had at the time he made the arrest, which could affect the determination of whether Cox is entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, the Court will deny Defendant Cox’s claim for qualified immunity, and deny summary judgment to Cox on Plaintiffs section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest in Count I. b. Defendant Cox: Excessive Force Plaintiff claims that Cox injured her during the course of placing handcuffs on her. The right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from excessive force by the state is clearly established. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 888 F.2d at 901; Holt v. Artis, 843 F.2d 242, 246 (6th Cir.1988); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (<HOLDING>). Beyond the general principle, the “contours

    ### Response:
    holding that graham v connor clearly establishes the general proposition that the use of force is contrary to the fourth amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal fees) upon parties but not attorneys.” Id. at *4. Appellants now ask us to reverse the district court’s decision. II. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), states in relevant part: “An order remanding [an erroneously removed] case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of removal.” The statute, however, does not state expressly who may be required to make such payment. Appellants contend that both removing parties and their lawyers are liable, while appel-lees assert that only removing parties are liable. As of yet, no circuit court has confronted this issue, and the district courts that have addressed it are badly divided. Compare Creek Ventures, LLC v. World Parts, LLC, 2004 WL 1166642, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2004) (<HOLDING>); Marketplace Illustrated Inc. v. Intrex

    ### Response:
    holding that  1447c does not apply to counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    duties as an attorney. Id. Speech made pursuant to an attorney’s obligation as an attorney under the Rules of Professional Conduct does not, alone, transform that speech into speech made pursuant to his official employment duties. In sum, Brown has adequately alleged that she spoke on matters of public concern and her speech was made outside of her official duties. Accordingly, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, Brown has established that her speech was protected by the First Amendment. 2. Refusal to be Compelled to Make False Statements The Second Circuit has been quick to identify the difference between an employee’s affirmative speech—typically in the form of a complaint—and an employee’s refusal to be compelled to speak in a certain manner. Ross, 693 F.3d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>); see also Jackler, 658 F.3d at 238. Both

    ### Response:
    holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance  than an affirmative statement of misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir.2005). A. IAC Claim F(2): Failure to present mitigation evidence Frierson alleges that Lieman rendered constitutionally defective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase that included Frierson’s extensive drug history; early childhood head trauma, mental impairments and organic br r.1999) (concluding that counsel was ineffective where counsel failed to investigate dysfunctional family background, drug history, and evidence of organic brain damage); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). [2] The imperative to cast a wide net for all

    ### Response:
    holding that counsels performance was deficient for failing to investigate readily available evidence of mental impairment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to trial. On March 17, 1989, four days after she fell on the Sega property, the plaintiff went to the defendant’s Stop & Shop store in West Hartford to purchase carnations. As the plaintiff was leaving the crowded floral department, she started down an aisle that she had previously used. The plaintiff found that the aisle was blocked by one of the store’s employees who was holding a watering can and standing next to cart of flowers. The plaintiff then walked down a narrower aisle when she encountered a woman who had bent down to look at some flowers. As she passed the woman, the plaintiff looked down and saw that a small area of the floor was covered by water and petals. The plaintiff slipped on the water and fell, landing on her right hi Conn. App. 553, 554-55, 559 A.2d 723 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Zarembski v. Three Lakes Park, Inc., 177

    ### Response:
    holding supermarket employees caused plaintiffs injury by stacking cartons in dangerous manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Def.’s Mot. at 13. Accordingly, the court turns directly to the dispositive question: whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the defendant’s asserted non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally retaliated against the employee. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494; Laurent, 544 F.Supp.2d at 22 n. 3 (concluding that the defendant’s articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiffs termination also rendered an examination of the prima facie case of retaliation unnecessary). At a minimum, the plaintiff must offer some evidence of a causal relationship between his involvement in protected activity and his nonselection. See Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    juvenile system prior to trial pursuant to Section 6322(a). These factors are listed in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) and address the issue of when a defendant is amenable to the juvenile system. The Juvenile Act also provides that in determining whether a juvenile’s case should be transferred from juvenile court for a criminal proceeding, the factors set forth in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) are to be applied. Applying the rules of statutory construction found in the Statutory Construction Act, we find that it was the legislature’s intent that the trial court would also utilize the factors set forth in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) in determining whether a juvenile is amenable to the juvenile system prior to sentencing. See In re Pittsburgh Beer Corp., 216 Pa.Super. 71, 260 A.2d 493 (1969) (<HOLDING>). To hold otherwise would render tiie Juvenile

    ### Response:
    holding that statutory construction act applies when statute does not define meaning of key terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    qualifies in general, there is nonetheless an unresolved issue as to whether it qualifies in Ms. Abbott’s particular case. Wé address each of these assertions. 1. Reproduction Writ Large. The question of whether reproduction in large constitutes a major life activity under the ADA is not free from doubt. The ADA itself does not define the term “major life activities,” and the few available judicial precedents reveal divergent opinions. Compare Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F.Supp. 797, 804 (N.D.Ill.1996) (finding that reproduction is a major life activity) and Erickson v. Board of Govs, of State Colleges, 911 F.Supp. 316, 323 (N.D.Ill.1995) (same) and Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F.Supp. 671, 679 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (same) with Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) and Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881

    ### Response:
    holding that reproduction is not a major life activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contractor status. In re FedEx, 869 F.Supp.2d at 986 (citing McDonnell v. Music Stand, Inc., 20 Kan.App.2d 287, 886 P.2d 895, 899 (1994)). FedEx maintains it cannot unilaterally terminate its relationship with Plaintiffs; rather, FedEx can only terminate the OA without the contractor’s consent in limited circumstances, such as if the contractor breaches the terms of the agreement. (OA, ¶¶ 3(a), (b), 12.1, 12.3). Further, if a contractor disputes his termination, the OA provides that the dispute can be submitted to arbitration. (OA, ¶¶ 12.1, 12.3) FedEx observes that Missouri courts have found that less restrictive termination provisions favor independent contractor status. (Consol. Opp., p. 30, citing Kirksville Pub’g Co. v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 950 S.W.2d 891, 899 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>)). Plaintiffs argue that even though the OA

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to discharge factor supported contractor status even though the company was only required to provide thirty days notice to discharge a motor carrier
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reversal. Gonzalez was stopped at a border checkpoint at Bridge 2 in Laredo, Texas, when she entered the United States from Mexico driving a van. A border patrol officer referred her to the secondary inspection area, because Gonzalez appeared nervous and had glanced toward the ceiling of the van. In the secondary inspection area, a canine alerted to all four corners of the roof. An x-ray revealed an anomaly in the roof of the van. An officer drilled into the roof and discovered forty packages of cocaine having a total weight of forty-eight kilograms, hidden in a very sophisticated manner in a compartment in the top rear portion of the roof. Incorrect jury instructions are generally not considered structural errors. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 530, 532, — L.Ed.2d-(2008) (<HOLDING>). We apply the plain error standard of review

    ### Response:
    holding that instructional errors that do not categorically vitiate all the jurys findings  are trial errors as to which harmless error analysis applies not structural errors emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted quoting neder v united states 527 us 1 11 119 sct 1827 144 led2d 35 1999
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the “channels of trade and marketing efforts are directed to a very educated and highly sophisticated group.” Appellees’ Br. at 30. Andrx also claims that this factor favors it “because the products are not in direct competition” since each should be prescribed under somewhat different circumstances. Id. The problem with Andrx’s approach is that neither customer sophistication nor the relationship between the goods is relevant to determining whether the goods are “marketed through the same channels and advertised through the same media.” Lapp, 721 F.2d at 463. There are other Lapp factors that take those issues into account. “[W]e [do] not discount the strength of plaintiffs case in one area because of weakness in another; we weight ] each factor separately.” Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476 (<HOLDING>). We find that the district court clearly erred

    ### Response:
    holding district court erred in failing to count the similarities in channels of trade and target audience for plaintiff due to district courts view that other lapp factors weighed against plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.W.2d 681 (Ark.1980). Under this record and based upon the jury findings, I would affirm and reform the judgment to $410,830 being the damages occasioned by the failure to pay. Since the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 1 . The majority also says: “We defer all changes in this common law rule to our Texas Supreme Court.” (citing Hancock v. Express One International, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, writ requested)). This court has not relied upon that maxim to avoid its responsibility in the past. See e.g. Hauck v. Sabine Pilots Service, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1984), aff'd, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.1985) (creating an exception to at will termination); Tidelands Automobile Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Garrard v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 708 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fair consideration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this analysis, the Court concludes that the Trustee’s claims to recover principal for constructive fraudulent conveyance under NYDCL §§ 273, 274 and 275 must fail. In her papers and at the Hearing, the Trustee has made clear that she does not dispute that the Defendants provided “fair equivalent” value under the NYDCL in exchange for the repayment of principal because such repayment extinguished a common law claim, such as restitution, that the Defendants may have had against Dreier LLP. Courts have recognized that reduction of a restitution claim satisfies an antecedent debt in the context of a fraudulent scheme. See Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1342 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United

    ### Response:
    holding that debtors payments to investors were for reasonably equivalent value because such payments reduced the amount of the investors claims for rescission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    determine whether it included the preservation of potential evidence following a customer injury. The courts found that the primary duty of the companies (a cab company and ski resort) did not extend to the preservation of their customers’ financial interests following an injury and therefore they did not have a duty to preserve evidence for potential lawsuits. Id. Applying these examples, the court in Elias determined that the hospital’s primary responsibility is dispensing healthcare and that requiring it to preserve all evidence for potential products liability suits would present too great a burden on its primary purpose. Id. A “fairness” analysis was utilized and the court considered the third-party’s “primary purpose” to determine whether a general dut . 206, 734 P.2d 1177 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Coley v. Arnot Ogden Mem. Hasp., 107 A.D.2d

    ### Response:
    holding absent some independent tort contract agreement voluntary assumption of duty or special relationship of the parties the new tort of the intentional interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence should not be recognized in kansas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    checked a box that indicated that he wanted to appeal all of the issues listed on the Statement of the Case and any Supplemental Statements of the Case that he had received. See id. The May 2001 Substantive Appeal form, again signed by Mr. Robinson and attorney Cameron, contains little more. The argument section of that appeal form contains only the following statement: “I disagree with all of the conclusions in your office’s Statement of the Case, dated April 18, 2001. The [r]egional office failed to consider all of the evidence and failed to follow the correct legal standards in reaching its conclusions.” R. at 174. The presence of attorney Cameron throughout the appeals process before the Agency is a significant factor that solidifies our conclusion. See Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1283 (<HOLDING>); see also Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that vas obligation to sympathetically read a clearandunmistakableerror motion does not apply to pleadings filed by an attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1999 WL 109566 (E.D.La. March 2, 1999); Barna v. United States, No. 95 C 6552, 1997 WL 417847 (N.D.Ill. July 23,1997) (reasoning that the jury is entitled to know about anything, including work product, that influenced an expert witness’s opinion in order to assess credibility); 8 Charles Allan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2016.2 at 251-52 (2d ed.1994); Cf. Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638 (D.Kan.2000) (addressing only the disclosure of fact work product, as opposed to opinion and mental impression work product). However, several courts, and at least one commentator, have reached the opposite conclusion. The leading case rejecting the “bright line” rule is Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289 (W.D.Mich. 1995) (<HOLDING>). See also Nexxus Prods. Co. v. CVS New York,

    ### Response:
    holding that the advisory committee note should be read only to require disclosure of factual material contained in otherwise privileged documents and that clear and unambiguous language would be required to override the work product privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for sanctions. 11 . A fee-shifting provision is distinguishable from a sanction. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52-53, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (distinguishing fee-shifting rules from sanctions by stating that fee-shifting rules ""embody a substantive policy, such as a statute which permits a prevailing party in certain classes of litigation to recover fees,” whereas sanctions are not outcome dependent). But, even fee-shifting is not necessarily the automatic consequence of loss. See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West 2012) (permitting fee shifting only where the government fails to prove that its position was not ""substantially justified”); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (<HOLDING>); but see Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award

    ### Response:
    holding that for a defendant to recoup attorneys fees under  706k of title vii a court must find that the plaintiff litigated his or her claim beyond the point where it became frivolous unreasonable or groundless or where plaintiff acted in bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the issue is necessary. At the administrative hearing Plaintiff testified that he has been unable to obtain treatment consistently because he lacks insurance or other means to pay for such. (Tr. 215-20). Plaintiff also reported that one of the reasons he has often not sought treatment was because he “don’t want to” and that he only recently “accepted” that he suffers from manic depression. (Tr. 214, 220). These latter statements by Plaintiff are significant given that one of the symptoms of bi-polar disorder is that the sufferer often fails to discern or acknowledge the existence of the illness and, therefore, declines or fails to recognize the need for treatment. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 401 (4th ed.2000) (<HOLDING>); Bipolar Disorder, available at

    ### Response:
    recognizing that sufferers of bipolar disorder may not view their symptoms as pathological
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinion in this ease was decided during the preliminary injunction stage does not impact the applicability of the law-of-the-case doctrine in this case. Rather, the prior panel clearly determined that § 16-12-80 banned all advertising to even legal consumers, and, thus, violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. As such, this Court’s prior legal conclusion was binding on the district court, just as it is now binding on us. See Roe v. State of Alabama, 68 F.3d 404, 408 (11th Cir.1995) (applying the law of the case and stating that “[ajlthough the law established by the prior panel was announced in a preliminary injunction posture, ... the principle of law adopted was clear”); Nat’l Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 430 F.2d 957, 960 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the lawofthecase doctrine applies to preliminary injunctions and stating that tjhe exception to law of the case where evidence on a subsequent trial is substantially different is inapplicable where by the prior appeal the issue is not left open for decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    VanHarken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir.1997) {Patsy expressly rejected a requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before suing under § 1983); Jeremy H. v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 283 n. 20 (3d Cir.1996) (“the policies of section 1983 strongly disfavor the imposition of additional exhaustion requirements”); Thornquest v. King, 61 F.3d 837, 841 n. 3 (11th Cir.1995) (“a section 1983 claim cannot be barred by a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust state administrative remedies with respect to an unreviewed administrative action”); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir.1995) (“[EJxhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a section 1983 claim.”); Wilbur v. Harris, 53 F.3d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. Two, 31 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to  1983
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relied on by defendant.”); Mahaska State Bank v. Weiler (In re Weiler), Adv. Proc. No. 01-20105, 2003 WL 25932294, at *1 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa May 27, 2003) (con ducting evidentiary hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment in adversary proceeding); Anderson v. Beardsley (In re Beardsley), 118 B.R. 120, 121 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1990) (“The Court held a final evidentiary hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and finds the relevant matters as established at the hearing to be as follows.... ”). See also United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming district court’s judgment after district court held motion for summary judgment in abeyance, conducted an evi-dentiary hearing, and then granted summary judgment). Cf. Wolgast v. Richards, 463 B.R. 445, 452 (E.D.Mich.2012) (<HOLDING>). C. This Approach Secures the Just) Speedy,

    ### Response:
    holding federal rule of civil procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    507 U.S. at 732-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Knowles, 29 F.3d at 951. In this circuit, “[i]t is self-evident that basing a conviction on an unconstitutional statute is both ‘plain’ and ‘error’ .... ” Knowles, 29 F.3d at 951. Alfaro’s argument that §§ 1326(b)(1) and (2) are unconstitutional, however, fails in light of Almendarez-Torres and Fifth Circuit precedent. As Alfaro recognizes, in Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court effectively rejected his argument. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219. Almendarez-Torres has not been overruled and is still good law. Additionally, this court has repeatedly rejected arguments like the one made by Alfaro as being foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez-Villa, 346 F.3d 568, 570-71 (5th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Delgado-Nunez, 295 F.3d 494,

    ### Response:
    holding that almendareztorres remains binding despite apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rules 5 and 40. 5 The factors to be considered by a judicial officer in granting or denying bail, such as the accused's ""character, family ties, employment, financial condition, length of residence, community ties"" have been described as ""best determined by the court in which the person is apprehended if the person happens, as is the case here, to be a resident of the district in which apprehended."" U.S. v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J., dissenting). 6 For example, the prosecutors in the charging district should retain the option of waiting until a defendant arrested in another district first appears before the magistrate judge of the indicting district to move for detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). 7 But even the judicial officers of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses and the weight of the evidence against the defendant of  3142g1 and 2 are best assessed in the charging district
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under an equitable estoppel theory. The district court in the present ease noted that Poncho’s agreement constituted “an express contract to support the child.” Concluding its case survey, the court stated, in part, that the doctrine of equitable adoption as recognized in New Mexico should not be limited to cases of decedents’ estates, but that, in the appropriate case, the doctrine may be used in domestic relations cases. The court determined that this case was an appropriate case. Further, the district court determined, based on what occurs in statutory adoptions, that if an adoptive father is obligated to support a child, it follows that the biological father should be relieved of that duty. {31} No New Mexico case has addressed whether the doctrine of equitable adoption can be a (<HOLDING>). Yet several cases have extended the

    ### Response:
    holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that are fundamental: 1) errors committed in death penalty cases; and 2) instances where the “evidence is totally insufficient as a matter of law to establish the commission of a crime.” Id. at 230. The instant case falls within the latter category as we will next explain. Three elements must be sufficiently established to prove the crime of criminal mischief: 1) the defendant injured or damaged specified property; 2) the property belonged to another; and 3) the injury or damage was inflicted willfully and maliciously. § 806.13, Fla. Stat. (2004); see also Insignares v. State, 847 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (acknowledging that the offense of criminal mischief requires that the defendant intend to damage the property of another); C.B. v. State, 721 So.2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). The offense of criminal mischief derives from

    ### Response:
    holding that damage to the property of another is an essential element of the offense of criminal mischief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which a district court may depart below statutory mínimums and did not include such language in subsection (a), it should be presumed that Congress intended not to disturb statutory mínimums through application of the § 3553(a) factors. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (“[Wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, through the statutory minimum set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(iv), Congress “otherwise specifically provided” that the § 3553(a) factors do not control. See Samas, 561 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>); Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at 1361-62 (same).

    ### Response:
    holding that  3553a did not permit courts to sentence below the statutory minimums in 21 usc  841b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the members of this class” of Mexiean-Americans); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 528, 46 S.Ct. 619, 70 L.Ed. 1059 (1926) (invalidating ordinance requiring that accountant records of businesses be kept in English, Spanish, or local dialects of the Philippines, thereby excluding the use of Chinese); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646 (1927) (“the Constitution p 61 n. 1 (9th Cir.1980) (plaintiff class defined by district court as.“Spanish-Surnamed” or “Spanish Language” persons), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919, 101 S.Ct. 1364, 67 L.Ed.2d 345 (1981); United States v. Uvalde Consol. Indep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir.1980) (“the fourteenth amendment clearly extends to protection of any group of persons invidiou upp. 919 (S.D.Tex.1979) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F.Supp. 752

    ### Response:
    holding that speakenglishonly rule violated title vii because defendant could not show business necessity and uniform enforcement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    971 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc) (acknowledging our jurisdiction to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over Rule 60(b) motion). We DISMISS the remainder of the Millers’ appeals for lack of jurisdiction until such time as the district court rules on the Millers’ pending Rule 60(b) motions. VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 1 . The district court’s order was based on our decision in Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir.1979). However, Smith was decided before Rule 4 was amended to suspend the effect of a notice of appeal when a Rule 60(b) motion is filed no later than ten (10) days after judgment is entered. See United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 2 . We need not decide whether a Rule 60(b)

    ### Response:
    holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the cornerstone principle that “insurance is fundamentally based on contingent risks which may or may not occur.” Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1992). Thus, the known-loss rule protects insurers from unwittingly insuring losses that have already occurred, as opposed to risks of loss, see Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 997 F.2d 172, 179 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Because insurance policies ... are designed to insure against fortuities, a fraud is worked when they are misused to insure a certainty”), and the exception for losses known to the insurer protects insureds by resolving the question of coverage in favor of the insured, see N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Rossitto, 171 Vt. 580, 582, 762 A.2d 861, 864 (2000) (mem.) (<HOLDING>). Here, neither of those concerns is present

    ### Response:
    recognizing policy of this court to favor complete coverage when interpreting insurance contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of blocks forming steps that enable people to scale it, the Patagonia Lake wall is not scalable and is cordoned off. In light of these factors, we conclude that the ADOT memo was irrelevant and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Admitting The Notice Of Claim For The Purpose Of Impeaching Hernandez. ¶ 8 Hernandez next protests the admission of his notice of claim for the purpose of impeaching his trial testimony. According to the notice of claim: At about, 8:30 p.m. Mr. Hernandez was walking on a trail leading to the lake marina. As Mr. Hernandez and Michael followed the trail, Mr. Hernandez stepped forward, believing he was on the trail, fell off a cliff, and fell app 45, 594 P.2d 1039, 1041 (App.1979) (<HOLDING>). Because a party’s credi bility is always

    ### Response:
    holding that insureds sons prior inconsistent statements impeached his more recent claim that he acted accidentally
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 572. We did so “by treating drug quantity and type, which fix the maximum sentence for a conviction, as we would any other material fact in a criminal prosecution: it must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, subject to the rules of evidence, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 568. Buckland is not altogether clear about whether the penalty provisions of § 841(b) are elements of an aggravated offense or are sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements. In fact, we rejected the distinction altogether, stating that “[t]he days of semantical hair splitting between ‘elements of the offense’ and ‘sentencing factors’ are over” and overruling case law to the contrary. Id. at 566 (citation omitted). Yet, if material facts such as dru (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1146, 123 S.Ct. 948,

    ### Response:
    holding that for purposes of advising a defendant of the elements of a charge during a plea colloquy drug quantity is the functional equivalent of a critical element even though ajdmittedly  a finding of drug quantity is not necessary to convict a defendant of violating    841a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As applied here, the police had a reason to believe, according to common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances, •' that Barrett lived at 2721- Rosina Avenue and was currently located • inside. The unidentified caller clearly stated that Barrett was present at the address. The dispatcher confirmed that the last police contact with Barrett occurred, at that address and reported that Barrett was the homeowner. Although this latter fact turned put to be false (Ricky Barrett, Sr. was the actual homeowner), it is undisputed that Barrett lived in the house and there- is no evidence that police acted in bad faith. Once police, arrived at the house, the sound of voices and movement inside perpetuated the belief that Barrett was inside. See Route, 104 F.3d at 62-63 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the fact that the voices and sounds

    ### Response:
    holding that the sound of a television on the inside of the house and the presence of a car in the driveway were sufficient to form the basis of the reasonable belief that the suspect was in the home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jeopardy. V. WHARTON’S RULE Appellant also contends that Wharton’s Rule operates to bar her conviction and punishment under Code § 18.2-22 for conspiracy to commit murder. Thus, she concludes, the trial court erred in denying her motion to have the conspiracy convi 862 (12th ed.1932)). In other words, Wharton’s Rule precludes conviction for both the substantive offense and the conspiracy to commit that offense when the substantive offense “is of such a nature as to necessarily require the participation of two persons for its commission.” Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 774 n. 5, 95 S.Ct. at 1288 n. 5, (emphasis added) (quoting 1 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 89, at 191 (1957)); see also Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 122, 53 S.Ct. 35, 37-38, 77 L.Ed. 206 (1932) (<HOLDING>)- Thus, “[ajpplication of the rule is dependent

    ### Response:
    holding with respect to the application of whartons rule that where it is impossible under any circumstances to commit the substantive offense without cooperative action the preliminary agreement between the same parties to commit the offense is not an indictable conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    following decisions: McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.1976); Crooks v. Warne, 516 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.1975); United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1972); and Powell I, 392 F.Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff'd as modified, 542 F.2d 101 (1976). 20 . Cases from this Circuit included United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F.Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y.1971) (confinement in Attica’s special housing unit in wake of Attica riots involved ""harsh reduction"" of privileges, and thus cannot be imposed absent minimum procedural safeguards; Sostre procedures deemed adequate), aff’d, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1972); Carter v. McGinnis, 320 F.Supp. 1092 (W.D.N.Y.1970) (<HOLDING>); and Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F.Supp. 1247,

    ### Response:
    holding inmates in segregation unit without charges being filed against them and without informing them of reasons for such confinement violated inmates due process rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a major deficiency noted by the district court in its January 4, 1994, Order. Hughes’ supplemental affidavit supporting her 59(e) motion presented evidence that the same male sergeant who, was not disciplined for one unlocked door incident was also not disciplined when a second incident occurred while he was the sergeant on duty. In RGI, Inc. v. Unified Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 658, 662 (4th Cir.1992), this Court held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider a supplemental affidavit in .support of a 59(e) motion after the district court reasoned that the litigant had offered “no justified reason” why the additional material was not presented earlier. Accord Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 395-96 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1254, 131

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying 59e motion when litigants only justification for not presenting supplemental evidence earlier was that its lawyer thought it was unnecessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    care of later on as things progressed”); Reilly Test., Tr.III at 162 (stating that wiring was not in compliance with governing regulations, but ""[i]n the short term, absolutely, it was very safe”; also testi fying that the crew’s long-term intention was to bring the wiring ""up to code”). 31 . For example, at trial, the defendants posited that the plaintiffs were terminated because of ""a pattern of disruptive activity.” Gour-guechon Test., Tr.IV at 19. The defense also claimed that all the plaintiffs were involved in some form or another in the rewiring inci there is no indication that Riverboat assumed the availability of punitive damages in the course of calculating its proposed damages. 33 . See also Brown v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 968 F.2d 1220, 1992 WL 161045, at *2 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 34 . See Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys.,

    ### Response:
    holding that it is within the courts discretion to award both reinstatement and punitive damages for violation of  2114 although finding that the district courts decision not to award such remedies did not constitute an abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    themselves to be aggrieved by any final agency action either in the implementation of the regulation or in having any offers-in-compromise denied”. Id. at 659. They lacked standing because they posited a “highly speculative and uncertain” injury “based on the Secretary not having written the regulation in the way they believe it should have been written.” Id. Brooks, however, is not controlling and, in any event, distinguishable. First, unlike the plaintiffs in Brooks, this plaintiff has alleged that he applied for a refund and was denied. Am. Compl. ¶ 22. He hasn’t reapplied under the Notice procedure, but the law does not require him to reapply every time the IRS changes its mind or superceding case law appears. See Starkey v. United States, 635 F.Supp. 1007, 1009 (W.D.Ark.1986) (<HOLDING>); Scully v. United States, 108 Ct.Cl. 310, 70

    ### Response:
    holding that a second refund claim based on a change in the law does not constitute a different claim and that congress did not intend for taxpayers to file successive claims based on the same facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We do not reach the other grounds discussed by the district court in the disposition of this case. III. CONCLUSION We have reviewed Reyes’s claim that her supervisor’s conduct violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment, which forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. We do not consider whether Maschmeier’s conduct was unreasonable, because there was no seizure in this case. AFFIRMED. 1 . Drug Abuse Resistance Education. This is a program designed to teach elementary school children about the dangers of drugs. 2 . The injury was, however, covered by workers' compensation. 3 .Seizures of public employees, in circumstances dissimilar to those of this case, have been reviewed elsewhere. See, e.g., Driebel, 298 F.3d at 627; Aguilera v. Baca, 394 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1214 (C.D.Cal.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fagan, 28 M.J. 64, 69

    ### Response:
    holding that sheriffs deputies were not seized for fourth amendment purposes when ordered to remain at work to be questioned in connection with an internal investigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the fact almost none of these courts actually addressed whether § 506(c) requires an actual expenditure or, alternatively, whether the incurrence of a cost or the extension of credit suffices for recovery under § 506(c). See, e.g., In re Visual Indus., Inc., 57 F.3d 321, 324-26 (3d Cir.1995); In re Senior-G & A Operating Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 1290, 1298-1300 (5th Cir.1992). Instead, these courts merely refer to an “expense” or “expenditure” in the context of a general discussion about the requirements of § 506(c). In addition, ... the Eighth Circuit[ ] has rejected the argument that because a debt was merely incurred, rather than an expenditure paid, § 506(c) does not permit the secured creditor to be surcharged. See IRS v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 5 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the most significant problem with

    ### Response:
    holding that unpaid payroll taxes could be surcharged to secured creditor even though no funds were advanced to the debtorinpossession or to the bankruptcy trustee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal advice from University counsel and, furthermore, that her communication to him was made in confidence. Confidential communications are those “communications which the client either expressly made confidential or which he could reasonably assume under the circumstances would be understood by the attorney as so intended.” State v. Schubert, supra, 235 N.J.Super. at 221, 561 A.2d 1186. Furthermore, confidential communications may be disclosed to a non-client or non-party who shares the client’s interest, without surrendering confidentiality. See In re State Comm’n of Investigation Subpoena No. 5441, 226 N.J.Super. 461, 466-67, 544 A.2d 893 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 382, 550 A.2d 484 (1988). In this case, Sharp had a reasonable expectation of con pp. 502, 506 (D.D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>); L.S.B. Indus., Inc. v. Gomm’r, 556 F.Supp.

    ### Response:
    holding that an employees communications to general counsel requesting legal advice remained confidential even though they were distributed to other employees involved in the matter because such limited dissemination does not amount to a breach of confidentiality in the corporate attorneyclient context
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal.App.2d 39, 50 [76 Cal.Rptr. 350]; Friedman v. Knecht, 248 Cal.App.2d 455, 462 [56 Cal.Rptr. 540].) As any competent attorney is aware, access to the courts is not an end in itself but only one means to achieve satisfaction for a client. If this can be obtained without resort to the courts—even without the filing of a lawsuit—it is incumbent upon the attorney to pursue such a course of action first. (See ABA Code of Prof. Ethics, canon 15; Cal. State Bar, Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 6-101(2).) It is equally well established legal practice to communicate promptly with a potential adversary, setting out the claims made upon him, urging settlement, and warning of the alternative of judicial action. (See 4 Cal. Practice (1968 ed.) Sett p.3d 1, 25 [105 Cal.Rptr. 414] (<HOLDING>).) The Restatement also describes the privilege

    ### Response:
    holding absolutely privileged the filing of a mechanics lien prior to the judicial proceeding to foreclose it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the bankruptcy court’s 9/15/03 order denying confirmation of the plan was not final at the time it was issued “because the Debtors remained free to propose an alternate plan.” In re Bentley, 266 B.R. 229, 233 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.2001); see Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir.2000) (stating, “If the order was not intended to be final — for example, if the order addressed an issue that left the debtor able to file an amended plan ... appellate jurisdiction would be lacking.”). But even if the 9/15/03 order denying confirmation of the plan was not final at the time it was issued, the parties assert that the order became final after October 27, 2003, when the bankruptcy court entered its order dismissing the case. See In re Bentley, 266 B.R. at 234 (<HOLDING>). In In re Parque Forestal, Inc., this Court

    ### Response:
    holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co., 186 Ill.App.3d 238, 132 Ill. Dec. 617, 540 N.E.2d 357 (1989), a mortgage had been deemed fraudulent because the mortgagor never signed the mortgage or held title to the mortgaged property. The Illinois court held that the loss caused by the fraudulent mortgage was covered, stating that “[njotwithstanding that the policy ... insured [the situation] where the title was vested otherwise than as stated in schedule A ..., the1 policy also covered loss or damage resulting from the invalidity or unenforce-ability of the mortgage lien.” Id., 132 Ill. Dec. at 620, 540 N.E.2d at 360 (emphasis added) (citing Bank of Miami Beach, 239 So.2d at 97); see also Citicorp Sav. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 840 F.2d 526, 529-30 (7th Cir.1988) (applying Illinois law) (<HOLDING>); Ferrell, 213 So.2d at 520 (holding that a

    ### Response:
    holding that the mortgagors legal incompetence at the time of the execution of the mortgage was a covered risk under the title policys invalidity or unenforeeability provision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Richard and Patricia Lee appeal a final summary judgment in which the trial court ruled that, pursuant to section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1999), it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Lees’ action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the authority of the Leon County 54 So.2d 249, 250(Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(citing Stafford with approval); Nikolits v. Delaney, 719 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. KAHN, VAN NORTWICK

    ### Response:
    holding claim that an assessment is made in violation of section 193155 is an action to contest an assessment and is governed by section 1941712
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (9th Cir.2007). In his pro se brief, Jimenez-Carrillo contends that his prior convictions under California Health and Safety Code Section 11377(a) and California Penal Code Section 273a were not aggravated felony convictions for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Subsequent to Jimenez-Carrillo’s sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Lopez v. Gonzales, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 625, 633, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006), in which it held that “a state offense constitutes a ‘felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act’ only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.” Because Section 11377(a) does not qualify as a drug trafficking offense under Lopez, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See United States v. Figueroa-Ocampo, 494 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, as the government concedes, the

    ### Response:
    holding that lopez applies to criminal sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    good faith in attempting to relet the premises, and second, any rentals received by the lessor as a result of the reletting must be deducted from the balance of rent due from the lessee. Coast Fed., 362 So.2d at 984. Biscayne retook the vacated premises, made good faith efforts to re-let on JPAY’s behalf, and deducted what it got from a partial sublet from JPAY’s unpaid rents due up to the date of the JPAY I final judgment. Its actions belie an intent to accelerate. RES JUDICATA ISSUE JPAY I is not res judicata as to JPAY II. Under the doctrine of res judica-ta, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action and is conclusive of all issues which were rais (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). The record clearly establishes that Biscayne

    ### Response:
    holding that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for a later installment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    environment during these separate periods of time.” Id. In contrast, neither Byars nor the Coca-Cola Defendants sought summary judgment on the issue of Byars’ entitlement to benefits under the “any occupation” definition. Thus, the district court granted summary judgment to the Coca-Cola Defendants on a claim for which they had not sought summary judgment. Although a court may sua sponte grant summary judgment on a claim not presented in a summary judgment motion, the court is required to give notice to the parties that it intends to address the claim on summary judgment. Here, the district court provided no notice that it intended to rule on the “any occupation” definition of disability. This was error. See Imaging Bus. Machs., LLC v. BancTec, Inc., 459 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Massey v. Cong. Life Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 1414,

    ### Response:
    holding that sua sponte grant of summary judgment without notice to the parties constitutes reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    some value. See Household Int’l, 286 F.Supp.2d at 378. We therefore conclude that the Supreme Court of Illinois would not recognize Policyholders’ tacit misrepresentation theory. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Policyholders’ fraud claims under New Jersey law. Our research does not disclose any New Jersey case permitting the theory advanced by Policyholders. In the absence of a specific request for the type of coverage excluded by the FIE, we do not believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that an insurer’s failure to notify an insured that it was not covering all of their business functions would constitute a representation that it was in fact covering all of their business functions. See generally Wang v. Allstate Ins., 125 N.J. 2, 592 A.2d 527, 532 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Policyholders could show

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no common law duty of a carrier or its agents to advise an insured concerning the possible need for higher policy limits upon renewal of the policy absent a special relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in who was child’s natural father. Id. at 20-34. ¶ 6 Mother’s father, appellant Jackie Wyland, also testified on his own behalf. Wyland testified that following the birth of child, as a consequence of appellee’s late-night phone calls and threats of kidnapping, he did order appellee to not come onto his property. Id. at 44-45. Wyland also testified that while he did order appel-lee not call their residence, he never told Claar she was not allowed to see child. Id at 46-47. Wyland acknowledged appel-lee’s presence at the hospital when child was born but stated mother never told him appellee was the birth father. ¶ 7 The trial judge heard this testimony and apparently found appellee credible. We will not disturb this finding. See Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711 (Pa.Super.2002) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 8 “The doctrine of estoppel in paternity

    ### Response:
    holding that because the trial court sitting as the trier of fact conducts an evidencebalancing test from the vantage point of being best able to judge credibility of witnesses and the weight to be assigned thereto we will defer to its opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to speak to You. Defendant was never given the opportunity to deliver his statement to the jury. B. The Court correctly holds that counsel’s failure to fulfill her responsibility to fully inform defendant of his right to allocution, and failure to discuss with defendant the pros and cons of exercising the right as well as the particular purpose and limits of an allocution statement, was deficient. See ante at 278, 736 A.2d at 493. The Court’s conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced as a result, however, is founded on several crucial analytical errors. As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the Court vacillates between holding that defendant’s allocution would not have “sub stantially affected” and would not have “substantially altered” the jury deliberations. Compare ibid, (<HOLDING>) with id. at 279, 736 A.2d at 494 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that a statement of remorse by defendant would not have substantially affected the jurys deliberations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitations period. VI. The Attempted Monopolization Claim In addition to the conspiracy claims, West Penn alleges that UPMC violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by attempting to monopolize the Allegheny County market for specialized hospital services. The elements of attempted monopolization are (1) that the defendant has a specific intent to monopolize, and (2) that the defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct that, taken as a whole, creates (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S.Ct. 884, 122 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396, 25 S.Ct. 276, 49 L.Ed. 518 (1905); LePage’s Inc. v. SM, 324 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &

    ### Response:
    holding that a court should consider a defendants anticompetitive conduct as a whole rather than considering each aspect in isolation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as “more a matter of when the court should exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction, rather than its lack of jurisdiction under the principles of justiciability.” Id. B. Whether Count II Of Hartford’s Complaint Is Ripe Reviewing Hartford’s claim for indemnification asserted in Count II of its Complaint in light of the circumstances of this case and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Count II is not ripe for adjudication at this time. Under the first prong of the Step-Saver analysis, the parties’ interests are considered adverse when actual harm will result if the declaratory judgment is not granted. 912 F.2d at 647-648. In this case, the Court concludes that Hartford has not demonstrated the actual harm required to establish adversity. Perlberger, 900 F.Supp. at 773 (<HOLDING>); Westport Ins. Corp. v. Howell, 2005 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that the adversity of the parties interests as to the duty to indemnify will not be complete until after the resolution of the underlying action when it will be clear whether the insured can assert a claim for indemnity from his insurer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to exercise ordinary care in providing tools, machinery, and appliances that are reasonably safe.’ Id. at 997 (emphasis added); see also Greer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 475 Pa. 448, 380 A.2d 1221, 1222 (1977). The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, however, “substitutes a quick and inexpensive scheme to provide compensation for work-related injuries in place of the common law process where the employee must sue the appropriate parties for damages. Employers pay benefits at a set rate and they are immune from common-law 163, 401 A.2d 345, 346 (1979) (rejecting the contention that the WCA and the Occupational Disease Act deprive Pennsylvania courts of jurisdiction over claims arising from diseases not covered by these acts); Dooner v. DiDonato, 601 Pa. 209, 971 A.2d 1187, 1202 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

    ### Response:
    recognizing a state law tort claim for negligence arising under a duty to provide a safe work environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hoyt argued that by attaching the affidavits of his mother and niece to his PCR motion, he raised a claim sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. Both this Court and our supreme court have held that “where an affidavit is overwhelmingly belied by unimpeachable documentary evidence in the record such as, for example, a transcript or written statements of the af-fiant to the contrary[,] to the extent that the court can conclude that the affidavit is a sham[,] no hearing is required.” Id. at 1022 (¶ 22) (quoting Sandifer v. State, 799 So.2d 914, 917 (¶8) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)). Our supreme court has explicitly held supporting affidavits to be a “sham” when belied by the record. Id. at 1023 (¶23); see also Kirksey v. State, 728 So.2d 565, 568 (¶ 12) (Miss.1999) (<HOLDING>). This Court found that Hoyt’s claims were

    ### Response:
    holding no evidentiary hearing was required where the affidavits of the defendant and his wife were directly contradicted by the defendants sworn testimony during the plea hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Juan Carlos Guzman appeals from the 75-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for import th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that district court need not accept the governments recommendation of a minor role reduction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    extension of immunity is in furtherance of the policy underlying the doctrine.”); Moses, 549 A.2d at 957 (“While it is true that immunity from civil liability in judicial proceedings has been applied most frequently in defamation actions, many courts, including those in Pennsylvania, have extended the immunity from civil liability to other alleged torts when they occur in connection with judicial proceedings.”); Thompson v. Sikov, 340 Pa.Super. 382, 490 A.2d 472 (1985) (applying absolute privilege to bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). However, we note that the absolute privilege does not apply to bar Dr. Green-berg’s abuse of process claim, which we discuss, infra. Freundlich & Littman, LLC v. Feierstein, 157 A.3d 526, 535, 2017 WL 712911, at *7 (Pa. Super. 2017) (<HOLDING>). Before addressing that issue, we add one

    ### Response:
    holding that judicial privilege does not apply to the appellants claims for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nevertheless, the terms of the search warrant were not contravened by the seizure of the pellet gun. This gun was not seized in an indiscriminate manner, but with ample reason to believe that, in these circumstances, it was of the same ilk as the other weapons discovered in the Division Street arsenal. Furthermore, our review of the pertinent facts compels the conclusion that the district court did not err in finding that the other unspecified items were also properly seized. For example, the gas and electric bill, the refund notice, and the operator’s license constitute evidence linking Wardrick to the premises where the illegal firearms were found. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); see also United States v. Williams, 623 F.2d 535 (8th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the holsters were properly seized—

    ### Response:
    holding seizure of plumbing bill proper where search warrant described cocaine and heroin because bill constituted mere evidence showing that defendant occupied premises where drugs found
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the act's exemptions be construed narrowly. See Brouillet, at 793. We also reject the trial court's suggested construction. Although the trial court did give the exemption a narrow interpretation, the trial court's interpretation brings RCW 42.17.310(1)(j) into conflict with our court rules establishing the work product rule. The protection of the work product rule is triggered prior to the official initiation of litigation and extends beyond the official termination of litigation. See Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wn.2d 392, 400, 706 P.2d 212 (1985) (explaining that the work product rule attaches to documents prepared prior to trial when the specific parties involved have expectations that litigation will occur); Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wn.2d 198, 210, 787 P.2d 30 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Dever v. Fowler, 63 Wn. App. 35, 47, 816 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the protection of the work product rule continues after litigation has terminated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Miller v. State, 926 So.2d 1248, 1259-60 (Fla.2006) (rejecting as both procedurally barred and without merit claims that (1) Florida’s capital statute fails to provide a standard for determining that aggravating circumstances “outweigh” mitigating circumstances, fails to define “sufficient aggravating circumstances,” and fails to adequately define the aggravating circumstances; (2) Florida’s capital sentencing procedure lacks the independent reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances required by Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 918 (1976); and (3) the aggravating circumstances have been applied in a vague and inconsistent manner, and juries have received unconstitutionally vague instructions); Kilgore v. State, 55 So.3d 487, 511-12 (Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>); Wyatt v. State, 71 So.3d 86, 112 (Fla.2011)

    ### Response:
    holding that a challenge to the constitutionality of execution meth ods is procedurally barred if it is not raised on direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Evid. 403. Id., 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 788. According to the Supreme Court, this holding rested “on the proposition that the presumption of innocence continues with the defendant after his acquittal and so erodes the probative value of the evidence of the previous crime that it is more prejudicial than probative, making it inadmissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1; Rule 403.” State v. Lynch, 337 N.C. 415, 419, 445 S.E.2d 581, 582 (1994). Although the principle set forth in Scott would not operate to bar the presentation of evidence that Defendant possessed cocaine and digital scales on 10 February 2005 given Defendant’s subsequent conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia, See Stager, 329 N.C. at 303, 406 S.E.2d at 890 (<HOLDING>), it does operate the bar the presentation of

    ### Response:
    holding that a prior conviction may be a bad act for purposes of rule 404b if substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant committed both acts and the probative value is not limited solely to tending to establish the defendants propensity to commit a crime such as the crime charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    process of discovery in the lawsuit. In other words, Stroud appears to believe that the statute of limitations merely requires him to litigate his claims to completion within two years of receiving discovery materials that he believes prove his claim. The Court understands that Stroud is proceeding pro se and therefore may be entirely sincere in this misapprehension. It is nonetheless still a misapprehension. A statute of limitations limits the time for bringing a civil lawsuit based on the date when the claim accrued, which, in this case, is the date Stroud discovered — meaning realized — that he had reasonable grounds to believe he had a cause of action. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1451 (8th ed.2004); see also Cintron-Luna v. Roman-Bultron, 668 F.Supp.2d 315, 320 (D.Puerto Rico 2009) (<HOLDING>). Litigants rarely have all the evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that fcra statute of limitations begins to run when a consumer discovers the facts giving rise to his claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States v. Edwards, 526 F.3d 747, 755-56 (11th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). To make this determination, we will consider all the evidence presented at trial and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 574 (11th Cir.2011). We have defined “commercial advantage” as “a profit or gain in money obtained through business activity” and “private financial gain” as “an additional profit specifically for a particular person or group.” United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir.2002). No evidence of actual payment or of an agreement for defendant to be paid is needed; evidence that the defendant acted for the purpose of financial gain is sufficient. See United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1066 (11th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). We have upheld a conviction under §

    ### Response:
    holding that punishment under  1324a2bii does not turn on the financial success of the smuggling venture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not violate equal protection of the laws. Indeed, courts have repeatedly upheld rate increases and disparities far greater than the one involved here. (See City of Berkeley, at pp. 1344-1345; Park ’N Fly of San Francisco, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1213-1214.) Disposition The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. Huffman, Acting P. J., and McConnell, J., concurred. The petition of all appellants for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 24, 2003. George, C. J., did not participate therein. 1 All statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise specified. 2 All constitutional references are to the California Constitution unless otherwise specified. 3 Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142 (<HOLDING>); Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Assn.,

    ### Response:
    holding proposed ballot initiative prop 24 the let the voters decide act of 2000 that embraced two separate and unrelated subjects of the transfer of power of apportionment from the legislature to the supreme court and the compensation of state legislators and officers violated the singlesubject rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misled into believing that the product is endorsed by the Food and Drug Administration for use or in consumers being misled about the harmfulness of the product because of such regulation, inspection, approval, or compliance. Pub.L. No. 111-31, § 2(46). This finding notwithstanding, an exercise of statutory interpretation yields the conclusion that § 331(tt)(4) is not intended to encompass non-commercial speech. In § 331(tt)(4), the phrase “through the media,” which is the only phrase that could conceivably encompass non-commercial speech, follows directly after the terms “label or labeling” and immediately precedes the term “[through] advertising.” Each of these terms is modified by the phrase “directed to consumers with respect to a tobacco product.” See Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1588 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only

    ### Response:
    holding that an ambiguous term may be given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    government. (Id. at 16.) Smith also sought to impress upon the jurors’ minds that various nicknames associated with drug dealers had been improperly attributed to Michel. (Id. at 13.) In short, Judge Crigler observed, “the trial transcript makes clear that many of Michel’s claims about how Smith represented him during trial are patently false.” (Id. at 16.) Judge Crigler also took a step back from the specific, substantive details of Michel’s testimony and observed generally that Michel’s “demeanor and conduct while testifying” lent further weight to a finding of incredibility. (Id. at 14.) In making its own independent review of the transcript from the evidentiary hearing, this court notes that Michel was argumentative, contentious, evasive, and unresponsiv 4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 374 (2002) (recognizing

    ### Response:
    recognizing a presumption that a plea of guilty is final and binding if the plea was made during a properly conducted hearing pursuant to rule 11 of the federal rules of criminal procedure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to provide motive of robber when identity is hotly contested “too attenuated and possesses] too many gaps” (quotation omitted)). The resulting inference imparted to the jury is: because the defendant is a drug addict he has the general intent to steal, and because drug addicts steal, it is safe to conclude that this particular drug addict is the unknown culprit in this case. Such reasoning allows the impermissible inference of propensity that the rules of evidence are designed to prevent. Our decision in Kim, as well as cases from other states, reveals that when courts have allowed a prior bad act to be introduced to prove motive, the prosecution actually presented sufficient alternate evidence to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Kim, 153 N.H. at 325, 328 (<HOLDING>); see State v. Carapezza, 191 P.3d 256, 261,

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of defendants gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims but claimed he did not kill them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entered. The district court did not err in concluding that termination of appellant’s parental rights was justified under four statutory grounds, and the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. Affirmed. 1 . J.M.'s father, A.M., made no appearance at the termination trial, and his parental rights to J.M. were also terminated. The father has not appealed. 2 . Appellant presently retains parental rights to another child. 3 . The abatement doctrine, as applied in criminal cases, implicates a number of policy concerns. Although the doctrine was historically based on the view that criminal convictions serve a purely punitive function, modern views have shifted to a broader view of the criminal justice system. Carlin, 249 P.3d at 758; Bevel, 111 S.E.2d at 794 (<HOLDING>). Abatement undermines those goals, including

    ### Response:
    recognizing that abatement rests on the outdated premise that criminal convictions and sentences serve only to punish the convicted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    81 F.3d 103, 106 (9th Cir.1996); In re Stanton, 766 F.2d at 1285-86. Creditor Roger Virtue still has leave to file an amended complaint subject to the restrictions imposed by the bankruptcy court, and any legal errors affecting the parties’ claims can be appealed after the conclusion of the adversary proceeding. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (dismissal of a complaint with leave to amend is not a final, appealable order). Further, the collateral order doctrine does not apply here because no final decision has been made regarding the Chapter 11 Trustee’s claim to immunity from Virtue’s potential amended claims. See Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir.2009); cf. Curry v. Castillo (In Re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, we are in no position to rule on the

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    helpful if the district court instituted procedures to retain copies of the unfiled complaints as part of the miscellaneous file in which the injunction is imposed. 11 . Initially, this court granted the defendants' motion for summary affirmance in part. See Powell v. Department of Justice, No. 86-5680 (D.C.Cir. April 20, 1988) (unpublished order) (affirming the dismissal of Powell’s constitutional claims). More recently, however, we issued an order denying the remainder of the Bureau of Prisons’ motion for summary affirmance. In addition, we sua sponte reversed the district court’s judgment as it related to Powell’s Privacy Act claims and remanded the case for further consideration. See Powell v. Department of Justice, No. 86-5680, Order at 1 (D.C.Cir. June 20, 1988) (to be published) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 12 . One of Powell’s

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no legitimate reason for the bureau of prisons bop to refuse to amend a record already made public with regard only to powells correct residence address
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Exhibit 1. 43 . The court assumes that the advice given by the financial advisors to their clients was consistent with their adamant defense of low values during the sworn testimony at the Valuation Hearing. 44 . Following the Valuation Hearing, the court issued two letter rulings requiring re-running of Debtors' business model and recalculation ■ of TEV. During the process of recalculating values the principal parties agreed to a term sheet that ultimately was embodied in the Plan. 45 . The value of Debtors was to be determined as of the effective date of the Plan. See Code § 1129(b)(2)(B). Coleman, during the Hearing, told the court he was pleased with his May 2005 valuation that ranged between $7.4 billion to $8.7 billion. It was his view that that amount, bear d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that in determining whether there has been a substantial contribution pursuant to section 503b3d the applicable test is whether the efforts of the applicant resulted in an actual and demonstrable benefit to the debt ors estate and the creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and orders served upon such defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The notice of removal must be filed within thirty days after a defendant receives or is served with a copy of the state court complaint, or within thirty days of his receipt of some “other paper” from which the removability of the case is first ascertainable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Within the thirty-day period prescribed by § 1446(b), a defendant may freely amend its notice of removal. And the majority of courts have recognized — at least in more recent times — that even after expiration of this thirty-day period, a defendant may still be allowed to amend its removal petition in order to cure defective allegations of jurisdiction. See, e.g., D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The authorization for such amendments derives

    ### Response:
    holding that amendment of removal petition was properly allowed to correct jurisdictional allegations in removal petition which were defective or faulty due to defendants failure to specifically allege the citizenship of the parties at the time the suit was brought and at the time the removal petition was filed missing allegation was not a fatal omission which could not be cured by amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1209 (11th Cir. 1981). He is also correct that the Court is bound by such precedent unless it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation. See In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015). However, the SEC rightly points out that Rule 14e-3, the supplementary rule Avent is charged with violating in Claim Two, was adopted after Smallwood was decided. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3; see also Doc. No. [1], p. 33 — 37, TO.00-109. Rule 14e-3 prohibits insider trading “without requiring a showing that the trading at issue entailed a breach of fiduciary duty.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666-67, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 2214, 138 L.Ed. 2d 724 (1997). In this respect, a claim under § 14(e) and a claim under § 10(b) are distinctly different. See id. at 652, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 2214 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court concludes that, to the extent

    ### Response:
    holding that a person violates  10b and rule 10b5 when he misappropriates confidential information  in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purposes” inquiry. Plaintiffs offer two rejoinders. First, they contend that the NIST Study is not “compiled for a law enforcement purpose” because “[i]t is not connected to an investigation.” Pis.’ Mot. at 4. That argument misconstrues the law. The Court of Appeals consistently has held that records do not have to be linked to a specific investigation to be properly withheld under Exemption 7(E). For instance, in Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the court held that IRS materials related to law enforcement activities “outside of the context of a specific investigation” met the threshold for materials “compiled for law enforcement purposes” under Exemption 7(E). See 294 F.3d 71, 73, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In so holding, it observed that 2, 146-48 (D.D.C. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 872

    ### Response:
    holding that computer transaction and function codes that reveal how to navigate and retrieve information from a law enforcement database were properly withheld under exemption 7e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to explain how the video portion of the MVRs captured any criminal investigation. In contrast, the Authority in the present case submitted affidavits as to how it investigated Requester’s claim and the circumstances under which it downloaded and reviewed its recordings when undertaking a noncriminal investigation of a claim. As noted, Mr. Stoker stated that the Authority’s claims adjuster reviewed the recordings as part of its investigation. Even though Mr. Stoker indicated that the adjuster’s review of the recordings was reviewed in the course of investigating Requester’s property damage claim, were related to and, indeed, part of the noncriminal investigation such that they constituted investigative materials. See Fennell v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 149 A.3d 101, 105 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the adjuster found the

    ### Response:
    holding that the requested materials a copy of a report or anything put on record regarding the commissions investigation into a tree stand that was allegedly too close to a house fell within noncriminal investigation exemption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has no authority to re-examine in detail the facts surrounding a conviction or imprisonment; such matters are within the sole discretion of the appropriate (usually district) court or executive officer with the authority to reverse, set aside, or pardon a claimant’s original conviction.”); Lott v. United States, 11 Cl.Ct. 852, 853 (1987) (“Taken together, the statutory provisions [28 U.S.C. §§ 1495 and 2513] do not confer upon the Claims Court the power to review and overturn convictions.”). The Court of Federal Claims may hear a claim for money damages for unjust imprisonment only after a court has reversed a plaintiff’s conviction on the grounds of innocence or if the President of the United States has pardoned the plaintiff. Brown v. United States, 42 Fed.Cl. 139, 141-42 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Lott, 11 Cl.Ct. at 853 (holding that “the

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiff could not demonstrate that his conviction had been reversed or set aside on grounds of innocence plaintiff failed to meet the threshold for any potential recovery under 28 usc  1495 and 2513
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court has not created a ‘magic number’ number that, once overcome, raises a presumption that numerosity is satisfied.”). Moreover, such an approach would be contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 446 U.S. 318, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), that “[t]he numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.” Id. at 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698; see also Moore’s Federal Praotioe § 23.22[l]|b] (“To the extent that any ‘presumption’ effectively alters the b , however, has never had difficulty dealing with hundreds of party plaintiffs or with single plaintiff ‘test’ cases.”); O’Hanlon v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 204, 206-207 (1985) (<HOLDING>) In addition, “the ease of identifying [class]

    ### Response:
    holding joinder appropriate for 39 potential plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are a valid time, place or manner restriction.” The district court proceeded to consider the Ward factors and concluded that: (1) the restriction is independent of the content of the speech within the walkway; (2) the elimination is narrowly tailored to serve security, safety and asset protection purposes; and (3) the elimination leaves open ample alternative channels for .Plaintiffs’ speech. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). We have explained that a “district court has inherent authority to modify a preliminary injunction in consideration of new facts.” A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir.2002) (citing System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349, (1961)) (<HOLDING>). Here, Defendants’ security concerns about

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court has wide discretion to modify an injunction based on changed circumstances or new facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    form signed by Luckner. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, and entered judgment against St. Paul in the amount of its UM policy limits of $25,000. St. Paul contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment against it, because the “other insurance” language in the policy should have been applied to preclude recovery of any UM benefits. We disagree, and hold that St. Paul waived any application of the “other insurance” clause by failing to timely raise the issue in the trial court. Generally, a defense which is not pled in the answer or affirmative defenses is waived, and may not be raised for the first time in a post-trial motion. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 and 1.140(h); see also Republic Nat’l Bank v. Araujo, 697 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). An affirmative defense is a defense which

    ### Response:
    holding argument based on economic loss rule waived when raised for first time in posttrial motions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    passenger’s door and ordered Garcia out of the car. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (police may order driver out of car during an otherwise legal traffic stop); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to passengers); Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 369 (2d Cir.2000) (“We focus first on the constitutionality of the initial stop because if a stop is lawful, passengers and drivers have no Fourth Amendment interest in not being ordered out of the stopped vehicle.”); Dhinsa, 171 F.3d at 723 (noting that, in course of legal stop, the officer “took [defendant’s] car keys [and] opened the passenger-side front door”); People v. Edwards, 222 A.D.2d 603, 635 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (2d Dep’t 1995) (<HOLDING>); People v. Vasquez, 106 A.D.2d 327, 483

    ### Response:
    holding that officers were permitted to open door after stopping car for illegally tinted windows
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    C.J. Joshua Walker appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. We reverse as to grounds one and two of the motion because the postconviction court failed to attach records to its order that conclusively refute those grounds. We affirm as to ground three. Walker was convicted of numerous offenses, including attempted first-degree murder, false imprisonment, burglary, aggravated battery, and attempted robbery. His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Walker v. State, 86 So.3d 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Following his appeal, he moved to vacate his sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Walker alleged his counsel was ineffective

    ### Response:
    recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rejection in bankruptcy. And, to be sure, under § 365, if a debtor rejects an execu-tory contract, “it does not completely terminate the contract.” Med. Malpractice Ins. Ass’n v. Hirsch (In re Lavigne), 114 F.3d 379, 386-87 (2d Cir.1997). But Northwest did not reject the CBA at issue pursuant to § 365. It acted with the au thority of a court order entered pursuant to § 1113. Contract rejection under § 1113, unlike contract rejection under § 365, permits more than non-performance; it allows one party, with the court’s approval, to establish new terms that were not mutually agreed upon, the antithesis of a status quo. A carrier’s obligation to comply with those new terms cannot be reconciled with the continued existence of its prior contract. Compare In re Lavigne, 114 F.3d at 389 (<HOLDING>), with Comair, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots’ Ass’n,

    ### Response:
    holding under  365 that because the rejection does not terminate all contractual and statutory obligations the parties are not absolved from compliance with the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As the D.C. Circuit has observed, “RFRA’s judicial relief provision is couched in broad terms: ‘A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. ’ ” Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1024 (D.C.Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c)). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (providing that “the term ‘government’ includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States”). The Act itself does not provide a damages remedy or waive the government’s sovereign immunity with respect to a claim for damages. Webman, 441 F.3d at 1025-26 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, as noted, it does specifically

    ### Response:
    holding that rfras waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to monetary damages the acts reference to appropriate relief was susceptible to more than one interpretation and thus was not an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and protective orders are issues within the sound discretion of the motion or trial judge,” Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 159 (1999), as is “the admission of evidence, particularly expert testimony.” Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 485 (2000). “Where good cause is shown, the Court ‘may make any order which justice requires to protect a party . . . from undue burden or expense.’ ” Stanley Realty Holdings v. Watertown Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 468 (Mass.Super.Ct. 2004), quoting Mass.R.Civ.P. 26(c). For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted. See Beckman Indus., v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); see also San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 187

    ### Response:
    holding that broad allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning do not satisfy the rule 26c test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the Forfeiture Act to file a motion to vacate the forfeiture. See, e.g., People v. $30,700 United States Currency, 199 Ill.2d 142, 262 Ill.Dec. 781, 766 N.E.2d 1084 (2002) (analyzing motion to vacate for lack of notice); In re Forfeiture of $2,354.00 United States Currency, 326 Ill.App.3d 9, 260 Ill.Dec. 148, 760 N.E.2d 565 (2001) (affirming decision of trial court to vacate forfeiture); People v. Smith, 275 Ill.App.3d 844, 212 Ill.Dec. 200, 656 N.E.2d 797, 801 (1995) (listing cases in which a decision by a unit of government was declared void by Illinois courts for lack of notice). The motion to vacate would have given Robinson the chance to argue for the return of his property, and therefore was a fully suitable remedy. Cf. Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Robinson does not deny that the motion to

    ### Response:
    holding that a civil cause of action for wrongful conversion of personal property is an adequate postdeprivation remedy for drugrelated property forfeitures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Tur v. FAA, 104 F.3d 290, 292 (9th Cir.1997). The purpose of this restriction is to prevent litigants from using a damages claim as a collateral attack on a pending FAA order, see Crist, 138 F.3d at 804, and to allow courts to identify and dismiss damages claims that are actually “thinly disguised attempts] at an end-run around the jurisdictional limitation imposed by [§ 46110].” Mace, 34 F.3d at 860. The collateral attack doctrine prevents plaintiffs from crafting constitutional tort claims either as a means of “relit-igatfing] the merits of the previous administrative proceedings,” Tur, 104 F.3d at 292, or as a way of evading entirely established administrative procedures. See Green v. Brantley, 981 F.2d 514, 517, 521 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But a damages claim is not “inextricably

    ### Response:
    holding that district court had no jurisdiction over bivens claims challenging an faa order where neither plaintiff nor his attorney  pursued the matter through any appeal to the faa administrator or otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an insurance contract in order to construe it against the insurer.” Henning Nelson Construction Co. v. Fireman’s Fund American Life Insurance Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn.1986) (citations omitted). We agree with the district court that the regulatory exclusion is not ambiguous. 765 F.Supp. at 549. The plain language of the regulatory exclusion bars coverage for any claim against the directors and officers of the bank based on any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the FDIC. When read as a whole, the regulatory exclusion covers any claim, direct or secondary, brought against the directors and officers of the bank by the FDIC in any capacity. See American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 944 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir.1991); cf. FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F.Supp. 1355, 1357 (M.D.La.1992) (<HOLDING>); FDIC v. Zaborac, 773 F.Supp. 137, 141-42

    ### Response:
    holding phrase based upon or attributable to is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 4-21-311(d). On appeal, the plaintiffs -argue that, “[g]iven that [they] ... filed suit within one (1) year of the last act in a hostile environment, their claims are timely.” But they identify no specific facts probative of a hostile work environment that occurred during the year that preceded the filing of their complaints. Instead, they simply assert that, “[f]or purposes of computing the applicable period of time, it is important to note that Plaintiffs’ claims for racial discrimination are under a ‘hostile working environment theory.’ ” Because no allegations were made of specific incidents that occurred within the one-year period, we conclude that the THRA claims are time-barred. See Brown v. City of Springhill, No. 01:06-0098, 2008 WL 974729 at *4 (M.D.Tenn. April 8, 2008) (<HOLDING>). C. Discrete acts of discrimination We now

    ### Response:
    holding that where the plaintiffs allegations concerning a hostile work environment consist of facts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint such a claim is timebarred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contention and determined that Throneberry committed an offense in Ferguson’s presence or within his view by failing to stop at the end of the alley before entering the street. The evidence also shows that Throne-berry’s act of “fishtailing” out of the alley is a misdemeanor offense under section 545.420 of the transportation code, which provides that “[a] person may not participate in any manner in ... an exhibition of vehicle speed or acceleration.” Id. § 545.420(a)(5). Though section 545.420 of the transportation code is entitled “Racing on Highway,” courts have rejected the narrow interpretation that the statute only applies where a defendant is involved in some sort of a speed competition with another vehicle. Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. State, 829 S.W.2d 894, 896

    ### Response:
    holding that accelerating a car so that it threw gravel on police car was enough to satisfy exhibition of speed violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    standing, it would have had to claim that the regulations thwarted some actual or potential interstate operation. The Court concludes that YVMH has prudential standing to sue for the alleged violations. The Complaint adequately alleges that the challenged regulations burden YVMH’s interstate business. Specifically, YVMH alleges that if it were allowed to perform elective PCI’s, it would 1) provide elective PCI to out-of-state residents; 2) buy necessary PCI equipment from out-of-state vendors; and 3) recruit physicians and staff from outside Washington to perform PCI. (Ct. Rec. 1 at 6.) If these facts are true, the Department burdened YVMH’s interest in participating in interstate commerce. Cf. Oregon v. Heavy Vehicle Elec. License Plate, Inc., 157 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1169-70 (D.Or.2001) (<HOLDING>). YVMH need only plead that it has interstate

    ### Response:
    holding that state restrictions on electronic license plates might constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce so the claim fell within the zone of interests protected by the dormant commerce clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relief is accompanied by an affidavit stating that the practice or procedure set forth pursuant to the provisions of section two is known to exist by the agency or official therein described and that reliance on administrative relief would be futile. G.L.c. 231A §3. In this case, there is no allegation that any DIA practice would preclude Percoco’s obtaining administrative relief. Finally, the decision to grant declaratory relief is generally a matter within the court’s discretion. G.L.c. 231A §3 states: The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment . . . where such judgment . . . would not terminate the uncertainly or controversy giving rise to the proceedings or for other sufficient reasons. See also National Shawmut Bank v. Morey, 320 Mass. 492, 497 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Here, a discretionary denial is particularly

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the court has historically retained the discretion to decline purely declaratory relief and that glc 231a 3 codifies this discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to and was not prejudiced by the duration of the investigation. 35 Cowell also admitted her personal responsibility for keeping track of the scope of her privileges before the second HC. 36 Regarding Cowell’s argument that the IC exceeded the scope of its authority, the second ARC found the IC acted within the bylaws. 37 Mathews, 87 F.3d at 638 (stating that reports by a preliminary investigative committee and by an outside reviewer, even though they conflicted with a report prepared by the physician’s expert, were “not so obviously mistaken or inadequate as to make reliance on them that the informal procedures used throughout the review process leading to the revocation of privileges satisfied the adequate notice and procedures element of § 11112(a)(3)); Singh, 308 F.3d at 30, 43-44 (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1487 (9th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that procedures were adequate even though the physician did not have the opportunity to challenge the results of an audit before requesting a hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and voluntary exposure to the danger). This Court has recognized ""the harsh reality that crime can and does occur despite society’s best efforts to prevent it.” Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So.2d 1368, 1372 (Ala.1986). It is the police officer's courage and sense of duty that society depends on for protection against violent criminals. The debt society owes its law enforcement officers, however, is not responsibly laid on property owners, by this Court's invention of a new tort action. We also note that other jurisdictions have addressed this issue and have concluded that a premises owner cannot be held liable for injuries sustained by a police officer when the officer is acting in the line of duty. See, e.g., Lenthall v. Maxwell, 138 Cal.App.3d 716, 188 Cal.Rptr. 260 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552,

    ### Response:
    holding police officer who was shot by occupier of premises could not recover from premises owner for injuries the officer should have reasonably expected to sustain while engaged in the line of duty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this sub-chapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Act____ 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Congress enacted this section to stop employers from discharging or harassing their employees in order to stop the employees from obtaining their statutory based rights. West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 244-46 (6th Cir.1980). An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. In Baxter v. C.A. Muer Carp., 941 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1991), the Sixth Circuit held that it was within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether exhaustion was necessary where the terms of a benefit plan needed to be clarif Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Curry v. Contract Fab. Inc. Profit Sharing

    ### Response:
    holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Area Transit Auth., 205 F.3d 428, 433 (D.C.Cir.2000). As discussed previously, Plaintiffs allegation regarding alleged retaliation in the removal of her partitions does not meet the prima facie requirements for retaliation because it did not constitute an adverse employment action—thereby failing the second prong of the prima facie test. See supra Section III(A)(l)(iii). However, Plaintiff cannot establish the third prong of the prima facie case—the “causal connection” requirement—with regard to her assertion that Mr. Columbia denied her a within-grade increase in 1995 based on retaliatory motives. To prove a causal connection, Plaintiff must make a “showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee’s protected activity, a Garrett v. Lujan, 799 F.Supp. 198, 202 (D.D.C.1992) (<HOLDING>); Townsend v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth.,

    ### Response:
    holding that almost a year between plaintiffs eeo activity and the adverse employment decision is too great a length of time to support an inference of reprisal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the challenged specification from the balance of the appellant’s misconduct. We do not, however, consider the appellant’s actions in a vacuum. Instead, consistent with MCM (2005 ed.), Part IV, 1162c(2)(a)-(i), we note the following aggravating factors supporting the appellant’s conviction of the challenged offense: (1) the appellant was a Marine noncommissioned officer who was not legally separated from his wife. See United States v. Thompson, 22 M.J. 40, 41 (C.M.A.1986) (stating that noncommissioned officers, by virtue of their rank and authority, have the responsibility to maintain high personal standards of conduct); (2) the appellant committed his adulterous acts with Ms. E in his quarters on board a military installation. Cf. United States v. Green, 39 M.J. 606 (A.C.M.R.1994)(<HOLDING>); (3) as a result of his initial encounter with

    ### Response:
    holding adultery was prejudicial to good order and discipline when it occurred in the barracks where other soldiers could see or find out about it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    documents offered as substitutes were true and correct copies of the trial exhibits. The dealership produced no evidence tending to show that any of the duplicate exhibits was not a correct copy. Arguing that thousands of documents had been produced during discovery and many of these documents were confusingly similar, the dealership made a running objection to all of the substituted exhibits. Comparing the substituted documents to their corresponding descriptions in the original statement of facts, we find that the substituted exhibits are substantially the same as the original trial exhibits. None of the dealership’s objections create serious doubts about the authenticity, accuracy, or completeness of the substitutes. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, No. B14-91-00539-CV, slip op. at 20, 24 (<HOLDING>); Adams, 845 S.W.2d at 326 (finding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant was entitled to a new trial since he did not agree to the substituted exhibits and alternatively because the substituted exhibits were incomplete and of questionable accuracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    request for information will result in costs over $40.00, to provide cost estimate to requestor identifying and explaining charges to be imposed). Those documents are not the subject of this appeal; the only documents at issue here are those the DA sought to withhold. 34 . Id. § 552.101. 35 . Because we conclude that the DA provided evidence to support the trial court’s determination that there were compelling reasons to withhold the documents from disclosure, we do not reach the DA’s argument that it was not required to show a compelling reason. 36 . 166 S.W.3d 342 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). 37 . Id. at 350. 38 . Id. (‘TTjhe governmental body must ... show that its cl g that logs of inmate correspondence are confidential by constitutional law); Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-100 (1975) (<HOLDING>). 43 . Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 552.101,

    ### Response:
    holding that portions of library circulation records linking identities of individual patrons to materials accessed by those patrons are confidential by constitutional law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs entirely fail to demonstrate how the central holding of Gray — that government attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits based on their conduct in initiating and prosecuting child neglect actions — does not apply to their claims against defendant Furse. See id. Furthermore, even if it were the case that defendant Furse had acted in bad faith and fallen under the ""spell” of Carolina Lundebye, such behavior would not vitiate the absolute immunity conferred under Gray and Butz. See Gray, 243 F.3d at 575 (noting that ""[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith”); cf. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 8 . FIS and Stein Lundebye also argue that

    ### Response:
    holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Park had a duty to protect its tenants from a dangerous condition immediately adjacent to its land under the facts of this case. As a landlord, Angeles Park had a duty ""to maintain the common areas of the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the tenants’ use.” Degel, 129 Wn.2d at 49. (citing Geise v. Lee, 84 Wn.2d 866, 529 P.2d 1054 (1975)). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, however, imposes liability upon a landowner for harm caused ""by a condition on the land.” Angeles Park did not own or operate the irrigation canal. No case in Washington directly addresses this issue. The majority of jurisdictions do not impose a duty upon landowners to protect people on their land from dangers on adjacent land. See Corcoran v. City of San Mateo, 122 Cal. App. 2d 355, 265 P.2d 102 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Accord Cousins v. Yaeger, 394 F. Supp. 595

    ### Response:
    holding that landowners have no duty to erect a fence or barrier to prevent people from injuring themselves upon other peoples property due to conditions natural or artificial which may exist and over which one has no control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could properly look beyond an ambiguous assault statute to charging documents, the terms of the plea agreement, or some comparable judicial record to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an assault conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(l v.Code § 9A.36.021(l)(a) except the term “recklessly” is omitted. See supra, n. 4. When asked to state what he did in his own words, Defendant made the following admission: “On 6/12/011 assaulted Ms. How-land which caused substantial bodily harm in Mason County.” These admissions show Defendant intended to both assault his victim and use physical force against her, thus bringing his state conviction within the parameters of § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii). Compare United States v. Ortega-Estrada, 207 Fed.Appx. 903, 906 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). While Defendant’s admissions are almost

    ### Response:
    holding defendants admission that he threatened his victim and cut her with a knife contained in his statement of defendant on plea of guilty filed in washington state court conclusively demonstrated his second degree assault conviction qualified as a crime of violence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that because it is ""unclear from [Dada ] whether the filing of a motion to reopen will be construed as a request to withdraw the voluntary departure ... individuals may consider explicitly requesting withdrawal....” Dada v. Mukasey Q&A: Preliminary Analysis and Approaches to Consider, AILF (June 17, 2008), http://www.ailf.org/lac/ chdocs/Dada-FAQ.pdf (last visited June 28, 2011). 6 . This is not to say that Patel’s counsel is without fault. To the contrary, the quality of Patel’s representation before the immigration court and on appeal leaves something to be desired. Out of an abundance of caution, more competent counsel, with little added effort, would have avoided any ambiguity by explicitly requesting withdrawal of voluntary departure in the motion to reopen or i 434 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Rojo-Resendiz v. Mukasey, 297 Fed.Appx. 292

    ### Response:
    holding the bia did not err in denying aliens motion to stay voluntary departure period pending determination on the motion to reopen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    11 U.S.C. Section 105(a) to determine whether sanctions should be imposed against the Respondents in connection with their actions relating to the Recusal Motion; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that a Continued Status Conference shall be held on the Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 and the Motion for Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 on July 26, 2007 at 11:00 a.m.; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that a Final Evidentiary Hearing on the Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 and the Motion for Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 shall be held on August 28, 2007 at 10:00 a.m. 1 . Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . See also, Walton v. LaBarge (In re

    ### Response:
    holding bankruptcy courts are not listed in section 451 and it is indisputable that as presently constituted they are not article iii courts and therefore lack jurisdiction to award fees pursuant to 28 usc section 2412d1a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Such acts have only an attenuated effect on the contracts at issue, at most making performance by the timber contractors unprofitable. We hold that the phrase “acts of Government” in the context of Provision B8.21 does not cover such acts. Our sister circuits have held that government policies that affect the profitability of a contract but do not preclude performance should not be considered “acts of government” for force majeure clause purposes. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir.1987) (rejecting claim for relief under force majeure where the government of Saudi Arabia acted to cause a collapse in world oil prices, making a contract unprofitable for one party); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). “A force majeure clause is not intended to

    ### Response:
    holding that a government order denying a request from a utility to pass increased coal prices along to its customers did not excuse utility from a longterm contract to buy coal even though contract was unprofitable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indicate that identifying the proper FDCPA subsections is typically sufficient for pleading purposes. See, e.g., McMillan v. Collection Professionals, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir.2006) (complaint simply alleging that a collection letter was “confusing” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g was enough to survive a motion to dismiss); Som, 573 F.Supp.2d at 358-59 (complaint alleging violations of enumerated FDCPA subsections adequately stated a claim to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)); Edwards v. Zigler, 2009 WL 3429661, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 22, 2009) (granting motion to dismiss FDCPA claim, but specifically noting that plaintiff did not specify which statutory subsection was allegedly violated); Stark v. Hudson & Keyse LLC, 2008 WL 4866046, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, this case is virtually identical to a

    ### Response:
    holding that a single violation of 15 usc  1692e was enough to allege civil liability under the fdcpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prejudiced.” Asbill v. Housing Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir.1984). We have implied approval of this harmless error approach in other cases, analyzing whether an error in one of multiple claims submitted to the jury was harmless. See Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Anchor Media Tel., Inc., 45 F.3d 546, 555 (1st Cir.1995) (while the invalid claim “was not the primary focus of lappellee’s] case,” counsel mentioned it in opening and closing arguments and'called a witness specifically to testify to this aspect of the case); Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 950 (1st Cir.1989) (“In this instance, we cannot say the error was harmless. A substantial amount of plaintiffs proof addressed the [erroneous claim]”); Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). We follow the harmless error approach here in

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant was not harmed by submission of invalid fraud claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the federal constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. V; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. See generally Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), overruled in part on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Until Reed was decided, when a jury, instructed that it could convict for conduct that did not constitute an offense (or constituted some lesser offense), returned a general verdict, the conviction amounted to fundamental error, notwithstanding the existence of alternative, legitimate theories of guilt the evidence could support. See Mosely v. State, 682 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Arline v. State, 550 So.2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); see also Horn v. State, 677 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). The United States Supreme Court has held “the

    ### Response:
    holding enhancement on a general verdict for felony murder impermissible on account of possession of a firearm because possession of a firearm was an essential element of one but not all of the predicate felonies the state relied on to prove felony murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has also drawn the line at “abstract” claims. In particular, the Court has consistently rejected standing based on the general interest of a litigant in having government act pursuant to the law. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 3326, 82 L.Ed.2d at 571 (denying standing to bring a claim for an “ ‘abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution’ ’’(quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S, 208, 223 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2933 n. 13, 41 L.Ed.2d 706, 720 n. 13 (1974))). Such claims present only a generalized grievance because “ ‘all citizens [have an interest] in constitutional governance.’ ” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1725, 109 L.Ed.2d 135, 148 (1990) (quoting Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217, 94 S.Ct. at 2930, 41 L.Ed.2d at 716) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, psychological and mental injuries

    ### Response:
    holding citizen had no standing to bring an eighth amendment challenge to the execution of another person because the lawsuit only alleged a general interest in government acting in compliance with the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”). AFFIRMED. 1 . The defendant has spelled his last name as ""Hayward” and “Heyward.” The magistrate judge found that the former spelling is correct, amended the case caption, and ordered all subsequent filings to conform with that spelling. We use that spelling throughout this opinion. 2 . Hayward also does not point to any evidence that the sentencing court in fact relied on the residual clause when it concluded his prior convictions are violent felonies. Without that evidence, he cannot show that his sentence was unconstitutional under Johnson. See Beeman v. United States, 817 F.3d 1215, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017)

    ### Response:
    holding that to prove a johnson claim the movant must show thatmore likely than notit was use of the residual clause that led to the sentencing courts enhancement of his sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    directed to a specific type of self-referential table in a computer database were not abstract because they focused “on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e,, the self-referential table for a computer database)”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to automating part of a preexisting method for 3-D facial expression animation were not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a particular type.”). Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a “new and useful technique” for performing a particular task were not abstract. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (<HOLDING>); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform were not abstract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 (2005) (defining “crime of violence”); United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that North Carolina conviction for breaking and entering qualified as predicate violent felony offense for purposes of Armed Career Criminal Act), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1463, 164 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006). Jordan also asserts that the district court erroneously counted his state conviction for assault inflicting serious bodily injury as a predicate offense for career offender purposes given that he committed that offense on September 2, 2005, which was after he distributed cocaine on July 21, 2005, the conduct that formed the basis of the instant offense. We agree. See USSG § 4B1.2(c); United States v. Williams, 29 F.3d 172, 174 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Although the assault conviction did not

    ### Response:
    holding that convictions sustained subsequent to the conduct forming the basis for the offense at issue cannot be used to enhance a defendants status to career offender
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This presumption, however, could be rebutted by showing a contrary intent mutually manifested by the parties. Such a presumption would not work a hardship on the mortgagee since, in virtually all instances, he is the drafter of the mortgage note and can thus include within the note a clause stating that the note is not subject to prepayment. This would put the mortgagor on notice that he will in all probability be restrained from selling the land for the duration of the term. If he signs the note containing such a provision, he will then be bound by it even though it may restrain his right to its sale or use. Id. at 65-66, 468 A.2d at 461. In dicta, the Mahoney court went on to temper its holding by stating that .3d 864, 880-81, 489 P.2d 1113, 1123-24, 97 Cal.Rptr. 849, 859-60 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.2d 311,

    ### Response:
    holding the enforcement of a dueonencumbrance clause to be an unreasonable restraint on alienation unless the borrowers conduct endangers the lenders security
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    apply here. In Place, the court held that exposing an individual's luggage located in a public place to a dog sniff did not constitute a ""search"" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637. Nevertheless, in applying Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, we have ruled that Colorado law affords broader protections in some instances than the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(""Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.""); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(""Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal (Colo.1995)(<HOLDING>). An individual must have a reasonable

    ### Response:
    holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interpreted as generally requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before undertaking a search or seizure. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (stating that under the Fourth Amendment “a warrant must generally be secured”); State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008) (“[A]s a general matter, law enforcement officials cannot conduct a search [or effect a seizure] without having first obtained a valid warrant.” (citations omitted)). Indeed, warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, and any evidence discovered as a result of a warrantless search or seizure is subj mes a seizure is not susceptible of precise definition. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tenn.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that there is no litmuspaper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a  seizure
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The burden is on Elliott to show his entitlement to the relief sought. Williams, 199 S.W.3d at 464; see also Escalante v. Rowan, 251 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.App.-[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. filed); Hall v. Provost, 232 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); Franka v. Velasquez, 216 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Elliott did not make any assertion before the trial court, and makes none before this Court, that the acts for which Kele-men sued him were in the general scope of his employment. Further, the record contains no evidence to support a finding that Elliott’s general scope of employment included the assault of Kelemen. We thus conclude that Elliott failed to meet the burden required for dismissal under section 101.106(f). See Escalante, 251 S.W.3d at 727 (<HOLDING>). Any dismissal under section 101.106(f) would

    ### Response:
    holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he attached to his January 2014 application to correct his military records, which states that: During my EifS physical the physician diagnosed me with depression. He also noted that I was never referred for further evaluations for my epilepsy and shoulder as I should have been. He documented that I “could not” do push ups (but I was never given a profile (P3)) and I cannot do overhead work. AR at 210 (emphasis existing); see also AR at 462 (same document included with plaintiffs January 27, 2014, application for correction of military record). But, neither of these documents demonstrates that plaintiff raised his shoulder injury as a ground for unfitness. And so, plaintiff has waived any claim related to his shoulder injury. See Parks v. United States, 127 Fed.Cl. 677, 680 (2016) (<HOLDING>). The aforementioned documents similarly fail

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff waived claims that he failed to raise in petition before the relevant military correction board
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts to “cases” or “controversies.” See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article Ill’s prerequisites reflect the “common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Consequently, in order for this court to have jurisdiction over a case, each plaintiff must have standing to bring their claim. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 50 the governmental conduct alleged. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343. (1975) (finding lack of standing where city residents failed to show a causal relationship between town’s zoning practices and alleged injury); National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228 (D.C.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). A plaintiff will not have standing if this

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff failed the second and third prongs of standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    original records under the management of George Treadwell and The Drifters, Inc. See Trans. at 711. It was also undisputed that Thomas, Hobbs, and Green were replacement singers hired by the Drifters in 1959 — five years after George Treadwell started managing the group in 1954. See Pretrial Order, Stip. Fact Nos. 4, 6, 7-12, 18; see also Trans, at 601-08. Moreover, there was no dispute that The Drifters continued to perform and record hit records after Hobbs left the group in 1961, and after Green left in 1964. See id. The evidence also showed that Johnny Moore joined Treadwell’s Drifters in 1954 and that, after his military service, he worked for Treadwell’s Drifters, without interruption, from 1963 until 1979. See Trans. at 602-03; see also Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.l999)(<HOLDING>). These facts support a reasonable inference

    ### Response:
    holding that departed members of the platters had no rights to the groups name because the original manager continued to use the name and manage the remaining platters members
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under that solicitation, and did not get an award. See Benchmade Knife Co. v. United States, 79 Fed.Cl. 731, 737 (2007) (dismissing as untimely under the Blue & Gold Fleet waiver rule because ""Ben-chmade knew the solicitation was unrestricted prior to submission of its proposal, and yet, waited until after contract award to [awardee] before filing a protest at the GAO’’); Erinys Iraq Ltd. v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 518, 533 n. 7 (2007) (rejecting protestor’s argument to the extent it involved a challenge to the solicitation’s terms after receipt of proposals); Scott v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 151, 154 n. 2 (2007) (finding protestor had no standing to challenge the terms of a solicitation after contract award); Moore’s Cafeteria Servs. v. United States, 77 Fed.Cl. 180, 184-85 (2007) (<HOLDING>). In contrast in Esterhill Boat Service Corp.

    ### Response:
    holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Missouri law, upheld a preconception tort cause of action by a child who alleged that defendants’ malpractice in performing a Caesarean section on the mother during a prior pregnancy caused her uterus to rupture during her subsequent pregnancy with plaintiff, resulting in premature delivery and serious impairments. Acknowledging the lack of authoritative precedent, the Court of Appeals concluded on the basis of Missouri caselaw concerning prenatal injuries that Missouri courts would recognize a cause of action based on a preconception tort. Id. at 25-26. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d 348, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), was the first of several preconception tort cases that implicated erythroblastosis fetalis, the condition that caused the injuries 851 (Mo.1993) (<HOLDING>); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342 (Okla.1993)

    ### Response:
    recognizing infants preconception tort claim based on allegations that medical centers misidentification of mothers rh negative blood as rh positive led to doctors failure to administer rhogam following earlier pregnancy causing mothers rh isoimmunization to inflict severe damage to child of subsequent pregnancy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the source of the Municipality’s authority to secure the construction site stemmed from its proprietary capacity under the contract, and not its sovereign capacity. Because the Municipality is not alleged to have engaged in a sovereign act, there is no substantial constitutional claim that would support a cause of action pursuant to § 1983. Thus, here, the Municipality’s acts of terminating the construction contract and temporarily detaining OSSAM’s property do not give rise to constitutional claims cognizable under § 1983. Finally, to the extent that OSSAM complains about its exclusion from the construction site, OSSAM had no constitutional right to access the Municipality’s construction site that would give rise to a § 1983 cl Fin. Corp., 282 F.2d 439, 447 (9th Cir, 1960) (<HOLDING>); Brasier v. United States, 223 F.2d 762, 766

    ### Response:
    holding that tjermination of the government contract  frustrated appellant in obtaining anticipated profits and advantages therefrom but  qrustration and appropriation are essentially different things there was here no taking of appellants property which entitled the company to just compensation under the fifth amendment citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 18, 28 (2d Cir.2002) (“The ‘management or disposition’ language ... refers to the common transactions in dealing with a pool of assets [including] selecting investments.”) (quoting Johnson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 19 F.3d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir.1994)). Some circuits have held that the exercise of any authority or control — discretionary or not — over management and disposition of plan assets satisfies prong two of subsection (i). See e.g., Leimkuehler v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 713 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir.2013) (“[I]nsofar as ‘management or disposition of assets’ is concerned, there is no separate requirement of discretionary authority or control”) (emphasis added); Briscoe v. Fine, 444 F.3d 478, 493 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). These cases may be perceived as being in

    ### Response:
    holding that a party with contractually limited discretion was a functional fiduciary because he possessed and used the power to write checks on the erisa plan account
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is ultimately assigned, not the local facility in which [the prisoner] sits awaiting transfer to that facility.’ ” Id. at 413. Taylor involved a prisoner, previously sentenced on state charges, who was transported multiple times from a county jail to federal custody and returned to the county jail before the prisoner was tried in fed l under Article V(c) was necessary to achieve general compliance with the statutory mandate and not to protect the prisoner from being prejudiced if his trial was delayed for more than 180 days after demand). Defendant argues that the IAD applies to prisoners who have been sentenced and are incarcerated, and that it is immaterial whether incarceration is at a temporary detention facility or at the priso 08 WL 3834089, at *3 (W.D.Va. Aug. 15, 2008) (<HOLDING>), recommendation adopted by United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding that the governments argument that the iad did not apply because the prisoner had not been assigned to a permanent facility was not persuasive in light of the supreme courts holding in bozeman
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1983 actions against the validity of [the District of Columbia] tax system[] in federal courts,” McNary, 454 U.S. at 115, 102 S.Ct. 177. B. Comity Bars Federal Court Jurisdiction over this Challenge to a Tax Sale. Although there is some disagreement regarding whether plaintiffs may bring challenges to local tax sales in federal court, this Court maintains its position that federal courts do not have “subject-matter jurisdiction over ... suit[s] seeking to set aside or undo the sale of ... property] at a tax auction” because “a tax sale ... ‘is a mode of tax collection’ ” and the FTIA bars challenges to the “collection” of taxes. Miller, 2007 WL 1748890, at *3 (quoting Wright v. Pappas, 256 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir.2001)); see also Dawson v. Childs, 665 F.2d 705, 710 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Miller specifically relies on the FTIA,

    ### Response:
    holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin a tax lien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we thus treat the acquisition of Miss Belterra from the manufacturer as a retail transaction subject to Indiana use tax. IC. § 6-2.5-3-2(a). As such, the purchase price paid to the manufacturer by Pinnacle constitutes the consideration required by the statute. I.C. § 6-2.5-4-1(a), (b). Conclusion We reverse the decision of the Tax Court, and enter summary judgment in favor of the Department. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J,, concur. BOEHM, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., joins. 1 . In contrast our research reveals that several jurisdictions have expressly provided that capital contributions are excluded from use tax. See, eg., Md.Code Ann. Tax-Gen. § 11-209(c)(1)(iv) (LexisNexis 2010) (''Transfers-(1) The sales and use tax does not 2d 619, 625 (2003) (<HOLDING>). BOEHM, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully

    ### Response:
    holding that transfer of property to llc involved no consideration for state conveyance tax purposes because it was a unilateral act and not the result of a bargainedfor exchange
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appeal pro se the Tax Court’s decision, following a bench trial, in favor of the Commissioner in their action contesting tax deficiencies for the years 1988 through 1997. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482. We review de novo a Tax Court’s conclusions of law. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). We affirm. The Tax Court properly sustained the deficiency determination based on Forms 4340 for the years in question. See Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 535-36 (9th Cir.1992). Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the IRS officer is not required to provide them with documentary evidence and copies of statutory notices verifying that all procedural steps were properly taken. See Hansen v. United States, 1 F.3d 137,138 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Tax Court properly held that petitioners

    ### Response:
    holding that form 4340 is probative evidence in and of itself and shows in the absence of contrary evidence that notices and assessments were properly made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “unfair and deceptive act or practice” but we note that the provisions of the act are to be “construed liberally.” Fla. Stat. § 501.202. A practice is unfair under the FDUTPA if it “offends established public policy” or is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So.2d 773, 777 (Fla.2003). The Palmer Law Firm argues first that Plaintiffs lack standing to maintain a claim because they did not purchase services or goods from the firm and therefore are not “consumers” able to sue for a FDUTPA violation. There are several cases that support the firm’s argument that only consumers may sue for damages under FDUTPA. See, e.g., Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd., 635 F.Supp.2d 1339, 1349-50 (S.D.Fla.2009) (<HOLDING>); Cannova v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff as a nonconsumer was not entitled to bring a claim for monetary damages under fdutpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entire change of parties.’ ” Parke, Davis & Co v Grand Trunk Ry System, 207 Mich 388, 391; 174 NW 145 (1919) (citation omitted). The misnomer doctrine applies only to correct inconsequential deficiencies or technicalities in the naming of parties, for example, “ ‘[w]here the right corporation has been sued by the wrong name, and service has been made upon the right party, although by a wrong name Wells v Detroit News, Inc, 360 Mich 634, 641; 104 NW2d 767 (1960), quoting Daly v Blair, 183 Mich 351, 353; 150 NW 134 (1914); see also Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co v Plywood Products Corp, 311 Mich 226, 232; 18 NW2d 387 (1945) (allowing an amendment to correct the designation of the named plaintiff from “corporation” to “partnership”)!)] and Stever v Brown, 119 Mich 196; 77 NW 704 (1899) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to

    ### Response:
    holding that an amendment to substitute the plaintiffs full names where their first and middle names had been reduced to initials in the original complaint would have been permissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    924.34, Fla. Stat. (1999) (directing appellate courts to have judgment for lesser offense entered when evidence did not prove conviction but did prove lesser offense); see also Burrell, 601 So.2d at 629; Warram v. State, 788 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing conviction for burglary because evidence was insufficient and remanding for adjudication on lesser charge of trespass). Santiago also argues that fundamental error occurred because the record does not show that the venire was sworn prior to voir dire. This court has held “that fundamental error is not established by a record that fails to demonstrate, one way or the other, whether the venire received the oath required by [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure] 3.300(a).” Pena v. State, 829 So.2d 289, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the record here fails to demonstrate,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the venire may be separately sworn
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the parties. The report simply recommended that the situation would improve if the parties lived closer to each other, thus making it easier for Appellee to exercise her visitation, which in turn would lead to less friction. This is not the standard for determining whether a custody order should be modified, nor is the fact that Dr. Bloomfield found “no overwhelming” reason to keep the status quo. Nota-' bly, the custody evaluator did not suggest changing custody; rather, he suggested the situation would improve if the parties lived closer together. In Ogilvie, this court reiterated that parents’ inability to communicate does not satisfy the substantial change requirement for modification. 954 So.2d at 701. See also Sanchez v. Hernandez, 45 So.3d 57, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>); Ring v. Ring, 834 So.2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding father seeking custody modification needed to prove more than merely an acrimonious relationship and a lack of effective communication in order to show a substantial change
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a defendant is under no obligation to put forward evidence on his or her own behalf. As Hall correctly points out, when the prosecution raises the spectre of a flawed alibi and the defendant chooses not to offer any alibi evidence, it may well leave the jury with an unfavorable impression of the defendant. In any event, whether it was improper for the prosecutor to comment on potential alibi witnesses under the facts of this case is an issue we need not reach in order to dispense with Hall’s appeal because improper prosecutorial remarks standing alone cannot justify a new trial unless they “undermined the fairness of the trial and contributed to a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); see also Mealy, 851 F.2d at 903 (<HOLDING>) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

    ### Response:
    recognizing that even if the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct we must reexamine the improper remark in light of the entire record to determine whether the remark deprived the defendant of a fair trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.Supp. at 507 (citing Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 917 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.App. 1996); Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 305 Pa.Super. 120, 451 A.2d 451 (1982)). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to certify a class for settlement purposes only. Prudential I, 962 F.Supp. at 508. A settlement class is “a device whereby the court postpones the formal certification procedure until the parties have successfully negotiated a settlement, thus allowing a defendant to explore settlement without conceding any of its arguments against certification.” GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 786. “In certifying a class for settlement purposes, the Court must abide by the ordinary Rule 23 requirements ____” Prudential I, 962 F.Supp. at 508; see also GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 778 (<HOLDING>). “Thus, a settlement class must satisfy the

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 23a requirements must be satisfied as if class were to litigate its claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    673, 676 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Abbott v. City of Kaufman, 717 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1986, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Gottlieb v. Hofheinz, 523 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ dism’d w.o.j.). In determining whether appellant raised a fact issue precluding summary judgment, we must consider whether the booking officer’s “use” of the booking room falls within the realm of “use” of personal property as contemplated in § 101.021(2) of the Act. “Use” has been defined in the context of the Act as “to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose.” Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at 33 (interpreting “use” in the context of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. ART. 6252-19, § 3, repealed, now § 101.021(2) of the Tex 0 (Tex.1976) (<HOLDING>) with Overton Memorial Hosp. v. McGuire, 518

    ### Response:
    holding that universitys failure to provide football player with proper protective gear to be used as part of his football uniform brought the case under  1010212
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the claims which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim which may have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided. 71 Haw. at 463, 795 P.2d at 278 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Because the instant appeal does not arise out of a ""new action"" the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. See Robinson, 65 Haw. at 652, 658 P.2d at 296-97; Cain .2d 845 (1967). 7 . Similarly, we have occasionally overruled our analyses of certain rules of court although the language of the rules has remained unchanged. See, e.g., State v. Young, 73 Haw. 217, 220-22, 830 P.2d 512, 514-15 (1992) (<HOLDING>); State v. Balauro, 73 Haw. 70, 71, 828 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that pursuant to hrpp rule 5 the waiver of the right to jury trial must be either in writing signed by the defendant or in open court from the mouth of the defendant and overruling state v olivera 53 haw 551 497 p2d 1360 1972 to the extent that it countenanced waiver by trial counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaint alleges that Colleton was negligent in its own right. Accordingly, because the Agreement only required CareFirst to provide a defense to Colleton “for claims arising solely on the basis of vicarious liability or ostensible or apparent agen cy,” CareFirst was not required to provide Colleton a defense at the onset of the litigation. We recognize Grant’s attorney “stipulated” during the Grant trial that his only cause of action against Colleton was a vicarious liability claim. However, the record reflects this stipulation was made as part of the settlement agreement. Thus, as of the date of the stipulation, when CareFirst arguably was required to provide a defense to Colleton, Colleton was no longer in need of a defense. See Hartsville, 382 S.C. at 547, 677 S.E.2d at 580 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the settlement agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is confident that, in determining the sequence in which motions will be considered, North Carolina judges will continue to be mindful of longstanding exceptions to the mootness rule and other factors affecting traditional notions of justice and fair play. See, e.g., Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 371, 451 S.E.2d 858, 867 (1994) (concluding that even assuming the named plaintiff’s claims were moot, termination of the class representative’s claim did not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class because the claim was “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ therefore, the plaintiff could continue to represent the interests of the class if the action were certified) (citation omitted); see also Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 60 (1991) (<HOLDING>) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

    ### Response:
    recognizing that  some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representatives individual interest expires 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    post-conviction procedures, they must comport with fundamental fairness. While we do not disagree with this assertion, Finley does not support Petitioner’s argument. Rather, the Court in Finley rejected the argument that when a State chooses to offer the assistance of counsel to those seeking collateral relief from convictions, the Federal Constitution dictates the exact form such assistance must assume. Id. at 559, 107 S.Ct. 1990 (“In Pennsylvania, the State has made a valid choice to give prisoners the assistance of counsel without requiring the full panoply of procedural protections that the Constitution requires be given to defendants who are in a fundamentally different position — at trial and on first appeal as of right.”). See also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68-69, 129 S.Ct. 2308 (<HOLDING>). In reaching this conclusion we are mindful of

    ### Response:
    holding that when the state offers collateral review due process does not dictate the exact form of such review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not the arbitrator, to decide.”); Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 64 F.3d at 739 (explaining that a determination about whether a grievance included a particular claim was a matter of “substantive arbitrability”). Conversely, Plaintiff describes the issue as one of procedural arbitrability. See Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 64 F.3d at 739 (“Procedural arbitrability ... concerns such issues as ... ‘whether grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a particular dispute [or] whether such procedures have been followed or excused.’ ”) (quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)). See also Schooltime Transp., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1459, Civil Action No. 96-10261-FHF (D.Mass.1996) (<HOLDING>). Given that the underlying issue is inherently

    ### Response:
    holding that the determination regarding whether bus drivers should be subject to a probationary period is properly left to the arbitrator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    liability would not be futile. Among other duties, life tenants are legally bound to pay property taxes during the continuance of their estate. Chapman v. Chapman, 526 So.2d 131, 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). A life tenant who commits an unreasonable act which results in damage to the corpus of the property or the remain-dermen may be liable for damages. Id. This is independent of the law making a trustee personally liable for defalcations in handling the trust. See Flagship Bank of Orlando v. Reinman, Harrell, Silberhorn, Moule Graham, P.A., 503 So.2d 913, 916 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205 as to liability of a trustee for breaches of trust causing losses to trust); see also Beaubien v. Cambridge Consol., Ltd., 652 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, leave to amend should have been

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error to dismiss complaint against individual defendants who had acted as agents of corporate trustee who could be held personally liable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    202 (1986). 12 . United States v. Jamas Day Care Ctr. Corp., 152 Fed.Appx. 171, 173 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Olson v. GE Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 950 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir.1993))). See also Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822. ("".. etter (18 months prior to the Petition Date) informing the Debtor that no further shipments would be made if the Debtor's account was not current, the Debtor made 30 payments to DFI, ranging from 28-127, with an average days-to-pay of 53.3. After the March and April 2007, the Debtors made 77 transfers to DFI, ranging from 21-91 days, with an average of 38 days-to-pay. 50 . See generally Paterson Supp. Dec. 51 . See generally Trisio Dec. 52 . See Molded Acoustical, 18 F.3d at 224-25 (<HOLDING>). See also Elrod Holdings Corp., 426 B.R. at

    ### Response:
    holdings that when a debtorcreditor relationship has been cemented long before the onset of insolvency  we should pause and consider carefully before further impairing a creditor whose confident consistent ordinary extension of trade credit has give the straightened debtor a fighting chance of sidestepping bankruptcy and continuing in business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence concerning the faked left syndrome: III. Sudden Emergency Instruction The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury regarding sudden emergency. First, we note that Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(e) provides: “When error is predicated on the giving or refusing of any instruction, the instruction shall be set out verbatim in the argument section of the brief with the verbatim objections, if any, made thereto.” The Estate did not set out the instruction or its objections verbatim in the argument section of its appellants’ brief. Ordinarily, an appellant waives the issue by failing to comply with this appellate rule. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 831 (Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>). Waiver notwithstanding, we note that the

    ### Response:
    holding under the prior appellate rule that the defendant waived the issue by failure to comply with ind appellate rule 83a7 which required a verbatim copy of the refused instruction and the verbatim objections thereto if any in the argument section of the brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the plaintiffs claims. Thus, even where a party “is not technically suing for breach of' contract,” the forum selection clause can still apply if “the entire controversy centers around which party’s interpretation of the contract is thé correct one.” Int’l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 116 (5th Cir.1996). That quite accurately describes this dispute. Plaintiffs ' argue, with colorable support, that the October 2014 Settlement Agreement released them from claims such as those in the Kentucky Action. (ECF No. 14 at 11-19.) Vine contends the opposite. (ECF No. 23 at 19-24.) The correct interpretation of the October 2014 Settlement Agreement is therefore directly at issue. See also John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).' 3. The Second Amended Kentucky Complaint The

    ### Response:
    holding that a broadly worded forum selection clause extending to any dispute arising  in relation to  the contract easily encompasses a dispute in which the contract is raised as a defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (""To recover on a cause of action for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, the plaintiff must show: (1) there was a reasonable probability that he would have entered into a business relationship .... ”); see also Verkin v. Melroy, 699 F.2d 729, 733 (5th Cir.1983) (requiring knowledge of prospective relationship). 17 . See CF & I Steel Corp., 623 S.W.2d at 715 (""Interference with a business relationship is similar to the tort of contract interference. It is not necessary to establish the existence of a valid contract, but the interference with a general business relationship is actionable only if the defendant’s interference is proven to be motivated by malice.”); see also Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1196 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Verkin, 699 F.2d at 733 (requiring intent to

    ### Response:
    holding that the difference between interference with contract and prospective relations is that second tort requires showing of malice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impairment who needed assistance to load and unload from a school bus, carry books and materials, and use the restroom was not eligible under IDEA because she did not need special education)). The minor changes may constitute related services. Even if the modifications are interpreted as related services, however, Plaintiff would still be ineligible under IDEA because a child who “only needs a related service and not special education ... is not a child with a disability” under IDEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(2)(i); see also Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 894, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 82 L.Ed.2d 664 (1984) (“[T]he need for what otherwise might qualify as a related service does not create [eligibility].”); Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D., 616 F.3d 632, 641-42 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The record also reveals that the current

    ### Response:
    holding that physical and occupational therapy are related services and a students need for them does not create eligibility under idea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances, a spouse can be required to maintain life insurance for the purpose of protecting the financial well-being of the other spouse. Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Fla.1989). Under the facts of the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring that the former husband maintain a life insurance policy to secure the alimony awarded to the former wife. However, the amount of the coverage which the former husband was ordered to maintain lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis — the record contains no evidence of the former husband’s insura-bility at the time of the final hearing or the cost of the proposed insurance and, thus, the former husband’s ability to pay that unspecified cost. See Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So.2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Further, as in Merkin v. Merkin, 804 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an order requiring a party to purchase life insurance to secure a support obligation must have the requisite evidentiary basis and reversing for further proceedings to reevaluate the life insurance requirement set forth to secure child support obligations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or servants, [corporations] must, as matter of sound public policy, be held liable for all the acts of their agents and servants who commit wrongs while performing the master's business, and in the scope of their employment; and this to the extent of liability for punitive damages in proper cases.""). 20 . Embrey, 442 A.2d at 970; see also, eg., Goddard, 57 Me. at 222-23; Thorne v. Contee, 80 Md.App. 481, 565 A.2d 102, 110 (1989) (""[The tortious act of the servant done in the course of his employment is ordinarily the legal act of the master.""); Gifford v. Evans, 35 Mich. App. 559, 192 NW.2d 525, 529 (1971) (""Respondeat superior provides in essence that the act of an employee during the course of his employment is legally the act of the employer.""). 21 . See Embrey, 442 A.2d at 973 (<HOLDING>); see also Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that it was appropriate for trial court to award separate punitive damages awards against an employee and his vicariously liable employer because this would enable each award to be based on the two defendants differing financial status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    -, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1156, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). Thus, “the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.” Id. In Orozco-Acosta, we held that warrants of removal are “not made in anticipation of litigation” but are prepared to record the movements of aliens. 607 F.3d at 1163. We have since extended Orozco-Acosta to a number of other A-file documents, concluding that they are likewise not made in anticipation of litigation and thus are non-testimonial. See United States v. Valdovinos-Mendez, 641 F.3d 1031, 1034-35, 1034 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Rojas contends that Orozco-Acosta’s approach

    ### Response:
    holding that the warrant of removal warning to alien ordered deported and order from the immigration judge were nontestimonial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    management of the company without becoming personally liable for the entity’s debt. Id. [¶ 11] Although a majority of members and owners of the M.A.H.D. Group could take action on its behalf to render it liable for its debt, see N.D.C.C. § 10-32-42, there is a difference between the company itself being hable for its debt and individual owners of the company being personally liable for its debt. Under N.D.C.C. § 10-32-29 and the articles of organization of the M.A.H.D. Group, owners and members of the limited liability company generally are not, merely because of that status, personally liable for a judgment, decree or order of a court, or in any other manner for a debt, obligation or liability of the company. See Water, Waste & Land, Inc. v. Lanham, 955 P.2d 997, 1001-04 (Colo.1998) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 12] Moreover, the operating agreement for

    ### Response:
    holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of its damages are calculable, it does not show a way to calculate damages for American’s claims of loss of goodwill and other intangibles. We agree. As we have already stated, the intangible types of injuries testified to by Balsom are the types of injuries to which a dollar value may not easily be assigned. Martin, 671 S.W.2d at 710. A remedy is not adequate simply because some of the proven damages are calculable. See Tex. Indus. Gas v. Phoenix Metallurgical Corp., 828 S.W.2d 629, 532 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (“For a legal remedy to be adequate, it must give the applicant complete, final, and equal relief.”); see also Towers v. Grogan, No. 01-97-00946-CV, 1998 WL 191760, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 23, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). We conclude and hold that American proved

    ### Response:
    holding that although some breach of contract damages were calculable specific damages for which grogan sought injunctive relief were intangibles incapable of being measured by damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nuanced analysis. See Summers, 666 F.3d at 202 (“[T]he report invited the jurors’ attention to the data’s numerical identifiers. Admission of the report presented, an unnecessary risk that the jury would improperly evaluate the DNA evidence based on its lay perceptions of what the data meant rather than on [the witness’s] expertise and any potential inaccuracies in his conclusions that might be developed on cross-examination”). The allele table articulated by numerical identifiers the DNA profiles of defendant and decedent, as well as that of the bloodstains found on evidence seized from the scene of the crime. These “statements” clearly constituted solemn declarations made for the primary purpose of establishing facts relevant to a criminal prosecution. Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2716 (<HOLDING>). The DNA testing was performed to aid the

    ### Response:
    holding that statements were testimonial in nature because they were incontrovertibly    affirmations made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact in a criminal proceeding quoting melendezdiaz 129 sct at 2532
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    meeting Sheriff Cutler focused on performance problems prior to Haverda’s suspended termination; and (9) a documented history of positive performance reviews. The district court characterized Haverda’s rebuttal evidence as merely disagreeing with the assessment of his performance, as arguing that Appellees’ evidence is merely subjective, and as arguing that reliance on the Jail condition to demote him is flawed. The court went on to hold that Haverda’s offered evidence was unavailing and that Haverda had failed to rebut Appellees’ showing that they would have demoted Haverda in the absence of his protected speech. In reaching this conclusion, the district court disposition have generally done so only when the employer’s reasons have not been controverted. See Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1151 (<HOLDING>); see also Beattie, 254 F.3d at 604 (finding

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff did not present evidence of retaliation and therefore the plaintiff failed to allege facts that would allow a rational jury to conclude that the employers reasons for termination were pretextual
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that a dog sniff outside a storage unit is not a search be cause the odors detected “were all entirely outside the locker, where anyone who tried could have detected them.” 307 Or. 19, 761 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1988). Appellant has not cited a case in which a dog sniff outside a self-storage unit was held to be a search under the Fourth Amendment, nor has our research revealed one. Appellant argues that the privacy interest in a self-storage unit is greate 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). Under the rationale followed in Kyllo and Ca-balles for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a person’s expectation of privacy in a storage unit is limited because the unit is not a place where a person seeks refuge or conducts frequent personal activities. Compare State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn.2002) (<HOLDING>). Our interpretation of the decisions of the

    ### Response:
    holding that warrantless entry into icefishing house violated fourth amendment because the structure is erected and equipped to protect its occupants from the elements and often provides eating sleeping and other facilities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the project. Symons, 94 N.C. App. at 541-42, 380 S.E.2d at 551. The subcontractor failed to pay the supplier for the costs of the equipment. Id. This Court held that the surety on a bond executed by the project’s general contractor was liable to the supplier for these equipment costs. Id. at 546, 380 S.E.2d at 553; see also Beachcrete, Inc. v. Water St. Ctr. Assocs., L.L.C., 172 N.C. App. 156, 159, 615 S.E.2d 719, 721 (2005) (permitting subcontractor to recover under payment bond, despite not being a party to the payment bond, where the bond “expressly state [d] that it was for ‘the benefit of any subcontractor, materialman or laborer.’ ”); Boatwright Distribution & Supply, Inc. v. N. State Mech., Inc., No. COA09-1077, 2010 WL 3464837 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, NCDOT required APAC to

    ### Response:
    holding that surety was liable to subcontractor on payment bond because payment bond applied to any claimant who among other things supplied materials that were reasonably required for use in the performance of the subcontract 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    child reaches the age of majority — his parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right to his companionship is extinguished. Russ, 414 F.3d at 791. But that is not the argument Mehserle makes as to Grant’s relationship with his father. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 487-88 (9th Cir.2010) (recalling previous admonishments that we decline to address arguments not made distinctly in an appellant’s opening brief). Moreover, in past cases, we have recognized a parent’s right to a child’s companionship without regard to the child’s age. See Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1986) (recognizing, at least in passing, parents’ right to the companionship and society of their deceased 22-year-old son); see, e.g., Lee, 250 F.3d at 685-86 (<HOLDING>); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419

    ### Response:
    holding that a mother successfully stated a violation of the fourteenth amendment by alleging that the los angeles police department recklessly deprived her of the companionship of her mentally disabled adult son
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and facially neutral and there is no allegation that it has any discriminatory effect.” Br. of Appellees 36. Additionally, the City maintains that the Ordinance is consistent with the purpose and plain language of the Consent Decree. A. 1. In assessing a First Amendment claim relating to private speech on government property, we must first identify the nature of the forum at issue — here, the City’s flag standards affixed to its light posts. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (explaining that “[t]he right to use government property for one’s private expression depends upon” the nature of the property); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As our Court has recognized, “[i]n deciding

    ### Response:
    recognizing forum based approach to assessing speech restrictions that government places on its property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    VII claim, was premised on the identical allegation that Defendants retaliated against him for filing a complaint of race discrimination with the EEOC. Similar to the Title VII retaliation claim, Harper’s abuse of process claim and his claim of retaliation for filing a worker’s compensation claim related to facts precipitating or arising out of his termination; the complaint alleged that the “animus and malice” that led to his retaliatory termination also motivated Defendant Kelly and Childress’s decision to seek personal protection orders against Harper. Because these claims shared the same nucleus of operative facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them. After the district court denied Ha , 1334 (6th Cir.1989) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Jones, 931 F.2d at 1090 (“Roadway may have

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim under michigan law was not preempted because the statelaw tort of retaliatory discharge creates rights independent of those established by the collective bargaining agreement further holding that discrimination claim was not preempted even though the employer was likely to rely on provisions of the cba in its defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CD is nonnegotiable, it is assignable by its terms and was in fact assigned to the Bank; and (2) the CD “ ‘is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment,’ and as such qualifies as an instrument as defined by Va.Code Ann. § 8.9-105(1).” The bankruptcy court rested its decision in part upon Panel Publishers, Inc. v. Smith (In re Kelly Group, Inc.), 159 B.R. 472, 480-81 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1993), which held that promissory notes and certificates of deposit bearing the terms “nonnegotiable and nonassignable” are instruments under Va.Code § 8.9-105(l)(i). Kelly also rejected the argument that such documents should be characterized as “ of Southwest Florida (In re Kroh Brothers), 101 B.R. 114, 119-120 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989) (<HOLDING>); Cadle Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 200 W.Va.

    ### Response:
    holding that nonnegotiable certificates of deposit are instruments within the meaning of ucc article 9 even if transferability is severely restricted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Regulations); Bureau of Prisons Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 540.14 (1997) (requiring prison staff to open and inspect all incoming general correspondence and allowing staff to read outgoing correspondence of inmates in federal medium and high level security institutions). Hence, the Postal Service regulation regarding mail covers is irrelevant in appellant’s ease, and the DOC was justified in monitoring his mail. Further, even if the DOC had violated the Postal Service’s regulations regarding mail covers, Felipe still would not be entitled to the suppression of his letters because suppression is not an available remedy for violations of agency regulations that fail to raise constitutional questions. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-57, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ani 138 F.3d 390, 392 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence obtained in violation of internal revenue service regulations was admissible at the criminal trial of a taxpayer accused of bribing a service agent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    these doctors. See Appellants’ Brief at 38-44 (citing, inter alia, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441 (1914); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1907)). This argument is patently frivolous. The Supreme Court decisions upon which appellants rely have either been expressly overruled, see, e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19,129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 533-37, 69 S.Ct. 251, 255-57, 93 L.Ed. 212 (1949) (expressly rejecting the Adair-Coppage interpretation of the Due Process Clause), or are clearly inapposite, see Greene, 360 U.S. at 508, 79 S.Ct. at 1419 (<HOLDING>); Schware, 353 U.S. at 239-47, 77 S.Ct. at

    ### Response:
    holding that in the absence of explicit authorization from either the president or congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and crossexamination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more than two thirds of the members of the putative class are citizens of New York. 2 . Although section 405(h) only bars federal jurisdiction over actions against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof, courts have consistently held that the exhaustion requirement applies to actions against otherwise private entities that contract with CMS under Medicare Parts C and D. See Uhm v. Humana, 620 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.2010) (Part D); Manorcare Potomac v. Understein, No. 8-.02-CV-1177-T-23EAJ, 2002 WL 31426705 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 16, 2002) (Part C); Phillips v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., No. C 11-02326, 2011 WL 3047475 (N.D.Cal. July 25, 2011) (Part C); cf. Bentley v. Wellpoint Cos., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8963, 2012 WL 546991, at *6 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citing Bodimetric Health Servs. v. Aetna Life

    ### Response:
    holding in context of claim against medicare administrative contractor that the fact that plaintiff is suing private entities provides no relief from the jurisdictional bar of  405h
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    potentially creating an enormous windfall for the current shareholders. Bangor Punta, 417 U.S. at 716, 94 S.Ct. 2578. Here, in contrast, any recovery by Plaintiff Trust will be for the benefit of Think3’s creditors and will not result in a windfall for Think3’s current shareholders, as discussed below. Second, the Bangor Punta doctrine is not applicable in bankruptcy proceedings brought for the benefit of creditors. The Supreme Court in Bangor Punta indicated that the doctrine does not apply to actions that are brought “on behalf of any creditors.” Bangor Punta, 417 U.S. at 718 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. 2578. In bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, courts have found that the unjust enrichment rationale of Bangor Punta is inapplicable. See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1207 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); KSC Recovery, Inc. v. The First Boston

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Burke’s overreaching. Of course the bankruptcy judge did state that the fee only covered professional services and he did apply a fifteen percent reduction factor. Unfortunately, the record does not provide any solid support for that figure and does not reveal whether the proscription found in Bankruptcy Rule 219(c)(3) has been violated. When the attorney for the operating receiver has clearly claimed compensation for time spent performing professional and non-professional services the bankruptcy court is required to cull the non-professional time to insure that the attorney is compensated only for professional services. The bankruptcy judge can, in turn, place this burden on the attorney claiming the fee. Cf. In Re Orbit Liquor Store, 439 F.2d 1351, 1354 (5th Cir. 1971) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case Burke admitted that he

    ### Response:
    holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Illinois law, which permits victims to seek civil judgments to enforce unsatisfied criminal restitution orders, does not change the criminal origins of the restitution order and therefore find ing that the resulting civil judgment fell within the exception to discharge 74 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2004) (disagreeing with the debtor that a novation occurred, thus substituting a potentially nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(15) for a dischargeable debt, when the debtor executed an agreement post-divorce regarding liability for his share of the parties’ joint tax obligations stating “a tiger does not change its stripes”); Moore v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 297 B.R. 332, 347 (Bankr.D.Mass.2003) (“It is well established, however, that claim preclusion does not bar a bankrup 248 (Bankr.D.N.H.1995) (<HOLDING>). The Debtor argues that Brown and Archer were

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtor may not silently transform a health education assistance loan nondischargeable under 42 usc  292fg into dischargeable debt by entering into a settlement agreement that is approved by the court pursuant to which the debtor consents to judgment against him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-4(b)(2) (providing other examples). Regardless of the form that the distribution alternative takes, an “optional form of benefit” is always tied to “an accrued benefit” or “a retirement-type benefit.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.411 (d) — 3 (g)(6) (ii). That is, with immaterial exceptions, the lump-sum payment has to be connected with the employee actually retiring. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23). But here, the plaintiffs aren’t retiring or taking a retirement-type benefit. They want to receive the annuity and keep on working for Finkl. Yet nothing in the Act, regulations, or case law suggests that an annuity to non-retired workers would qualify as an “optional form of benefit” under the Act. Cf. Arndt v. Security Bank S.S.B. Employees’ Pension Plan, 182 F.3d 538, 549-42 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ross v. Pension Plan for Hourly Employees of

    ### Response:
    holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guilty. The jury had before it, in defendant’s own handwriting, a document that the State credibly argued was a confession that defendant had raped a female friend and had forcible, non-consensual anal intercourse with her. In addition, the jury was told — through the State’s improper cross-examination questions — that an expert had determined that defendant had “a prominent elevation on the psychopathic deviant scale,” as well as being a risk taker willing to do things others do not approve of for the personal enjoyment of doing so. We cannot conclude that the combined effect of an admission of rape and non-consensual anal intercourse together with an expert assessment of psychopathic deviancy was non-prejudicial. See State v. Canady, 355 N.C. 242, 246, 559 S.E.2d 762, 764 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 616, 419 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that although neither of the trial courts errors when considered in isolation were necessarily sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial the cumulative effect of the errors created sufficient prejudice to deny defendant a fair trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to corpora tions, see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74, 26 S.Ct. 370, 378-79, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906), and an individual cannot assert his personal privilege in order to defeat a subpoena for corporate records, even if the records contain information incriminating him, see Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. at 88-89, 94 S.Ct. at 2183-84; United States v. White, 322 U.S. at 699, 64 S.Ct. at 1251, and even if the documents were drafted by him in his capacity as a corporate officer. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1580 n. 11, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976) (stating that “[t]he fact that the documents may have been written by the person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege”); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. at 378, 31 S.Ct. at 543 (<HOLDING>). “In producing records as an officer of the

    ### Response:
    holding that where an officer of a corporation has possession of corporate records which disclose his crime there is no ground upon which it can be said that he will be forced to produce them if the entries were made by another but may withhold them if the entries were made by himself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    need not determine that the evidence sought is in fact on the premises to be searched, or that the evidence is more likely than not to be found where the search takes place. The magistrate need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit. United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985) (emphasis in original, citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989). Last, this Court has concluded that in cases involving ongoing narcotics businesses, lapses of several months — and up to two years in certain circumstances— are not sufficient to render the information in an affidavit too stale to support probable cause. See Pitts, 6 F.3d at 1369-70 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 525

    ### Response:
    holding that fourmonth lapse between crack sale involving defendant in different location and affidavit was not enough to render information stale where affidavit supported inference that defendant was more than a onetime drug seller
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    response to seri ous and considered comments by experts, that agency renders the procedural requirement meaningless and the EIS an exercise in “form over substance.” See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1142. Here, the BLM gave short shrift to a deluge of concerns from its own experts, FWS, the EPA, and state agencies; the BLM neither responded to their considered comments “objectively and in good faith” nor made responsive changes to the proposed regulations. Id. “[P]ublic scrutiny [is] essential to implementing NEPA,” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b), and the BLM was required to “assess and consider ... both individually and collectively” the public comments received during the NEPA process and to respond to such in its Final EIS. Id. § 1503.4(a); see Center for Biological Diversity, 349 F.3d at 1167 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that the BLM violated

    ### Response:
    holding that the agency in that case violated nepa when it failed to disclose and discuss responsible opposing scientific viewpoints in the final statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trust income was payable to her husband for life and thereafter to the taxpayer’s parents. Upon the death of the surviving parent, the trust was to be divided equally among her grandchildren then living or, if any grandchild had died, to that grandchild’s child or children. In 1972, some 33 years after the creation of the trust and when the taxpayer’s mother, who was one of the life beneficiaries, was still alive, the taxpayer disclaimed his interest in the trust. The taxpayer argued that the word “transfer” in the Treasury regulation referred to the vesting or distribution of the property and that the “reasonable time” during which he could make a disclaimer did not begin to run until that interest vested upon the death of the last surviving life tenant. See Keinath, 480 F.2d at 63-64 (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer’s

    ### Response:
    holding that time within which disclaimer of vested remainder interest subject to divestiture must be filed begins to run when interest becomes indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity that is after death of life beneficiary not testator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that all three confer discretion and make application a condition of eligibility. Plaintiff takes no position on whether the 1965 or 1973 plan applies but argues that the 1995 plan does not apply because it was enacted after Pickard’s right to benefits vested. I conclude that the 1965 plan controls. Plans or plan amendments that take effect after an employee has terminated employment generally do not affect the employee’s right to benefits. Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt, Inc. Employee Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 661 (10th Cir.1990) (stating that an employee is entitled to benefits in accordance with the terms of the plan as of the date of termination from employment); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 403 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Pickard terminated employment in 1966, at

    ### Response:
    holding that plan amendment which took effect after benefits were received was inapplicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    II In Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994), a case involving the 1990 California budget impasse, the Ninth Circuit held that the State violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(b), by making payments to State highway maintenance workers that were up to 15 days late. The court found it impossible to distinguish between late payment and nonpayment of minimum wages for purposes of determining whether an employer has violated the FLSA. Biggs, 1 F.3d at 1540-41. The court held that “payment of minimum wages is late if not done on payday.” Id. at 1543. It is undisputed that the State is plaintiffs’ “employer” for purposes of the FLSA. See Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). It also is undisputed that the State failed

    ### Response:
    holding that under the flsas liberal definition of employer the state welfare agencies are the employers of ihss providers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plaintiff from that danger to make out a constitutional violation. Id. at 530-31. Deliberate indifference requires the following: ""[TUhe environment created by the state actors must be dangerous; they must know it is dangerous; and ... they must have used their authority to create an opportunity that would not otherwise have existed for the third party's crime to occur.” Johnson, 38 F.3d at 201. 9 . Because we hold that Piotrowski’s allegations fail on other grounds, however, we do not reach the question of whether her allegations satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) threshold for alleging a ""state-created danger” theory of § 1983 liability. 10 . When a § 1983 cause of action accrues is a question of federal law. Id. 11 . See also Chapman v. Homco, Inc., 886 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067, 110 S.Ct. 1784,

    ### Response:
    holding that limitations period on employment discrimination claim triggered on date of discharge not on date of discovery of discriminatory intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property, cause bodily injury to Jason Jenson [sic] by striking Jason Jenson [sic] on the back and face, then you will find the defendant guilty of Robbery as charged in the indictment. The evidence showed that appellant grabbed Jason’s bike and tried to take it from him. During the incident, Jason received bruises to his back. Appellant also hit Jason in the mouth. Jason testified that his mother bought him the bicycle. Even though appellant did not gain possession of the bicycle from Jason, this is not necessary in order to be convicted of robbery. See Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 29.-02(a)(1) (Vernon 1989). See White v. State, 671 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). Viewing the evidence in the light most

    ### Response:
    holding that no completed theft is required in order to constitute robbery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hector V. Luna appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his third amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging false arrest, equal protection and due process violations, and several state law c -90 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Because Luna failed to allege facts to

    ### Response:
    holding a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under the civil rights act if the allegations are mere conclusions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conduct violative of both statutes. The two areas not common to both circles represent sets of conduct reached only by one or the other statute. This situation is also described by the following common mathematical notation: 5 . See supra p. 693 n. 1. 6 . During oral argument, government counsel provided an illustrative example of the type of conduct that falls within the scope of § 7206(5), but is not covered by § 7201. A drug dealer may have an outstanding tax obligation and decide to submit an offer-in-compromise. On the Form 656, the drug dealer may falsely state that the “source of funds” is legitimate business activity, but otherwise fill out the forms accurately and correctly. Under those circumstances, the drug dealer could not be prosecuted for tax evasion un th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hale, No. 91-5597, 1992 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for corrupt persuasion of a jury witness under either 18 usc  1503 which prohibits obstruction of justice or 18 usc  1512 which prohibits tampering with a witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — and thus granted the petition and ordered that the appeal be reset for oral argument. Kaiser, 496 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.1974) (per curiam). The case, however, settled before the second oral argument was to be held, and thus the Fifth Circuit never addressed whether the parents in that case came within the reach of Gaudet. See Kaiser, No. 73-2653, Clerk’s Order (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1975). 32 .See Tidewater Marine Towing, Inc. v. Curran-Houston, Inc., 785 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.1986) (parents brought general maritime negligence action on behalf of the alleged ""common-law wife"" of the decedent who had lived and was killed in Louisiana; affirming dismissal of the case, since Louisiana law did not recognize the validity of “common-law” marriages); Ivy, 585 F.2d 732, adhered to en banc, 606 F.2d 524 (<HOLDING>); S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744 (mentioning in one

    ### Response:
    holding that dependent parents could not recover lossofsociety under the jones act where the jury had found no unseaworthiness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    commence until 1,335 days after his arrest and 830 days after his arraignment. As an initial matter, the State argues that Myers’s speedy-trial claims are procedurally barred because he did not pursue the issue to a ruling by the trial court. This argument is incorrect. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a defendant can waive the right to a speedy trial forever by failing to timely assert it. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182. As this Court held in Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001), “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court.” See also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1323 (Miss.1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we do not find Myers’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants failure to consistently badger the prosecution to bring him to trial did not eliminate his speedytrial claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to satisfy the requirements of Rule 17(c). Br. at 3-4. The Court will address each argument in turn. A. Nasdaq and Its Subsidiary SRO Do Not Enjoy Absolute Immunity from Third-Party Subpoenas in Criminal Cases Nasdaq Stock Market is undisput-edly a national stock exchange registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and thus, by statute, a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) with attendant regulatory, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority subject to SEC approval and oversight. See In the Matter of the Application of Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration as a National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 34-53128, 2006 WL 92913 (Jan. 13, 2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(26), 78f, 78s(b); see also Lanier v. Bats Exchange, Inc., 838 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Nasdaq asserts that by virtue of its

    ### Response:
    recognizing considerable authority of sros like nasdaq stock market
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were criminal because (a) they were payable to the court rather than to the complaining party; (b) they were not conditioned on compliance with a court order; (c) they were not tailored to compensate the complaining party; and (d) they were imposed for punitive purposes); Buffington v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 913 F.2d 113, 133 (4th Cir.1990) (vacating sanctions imposed by trial court as “civil contempt” for violation of discovery obligations; observing that fines were ordered payable to the court, rather than to the complaining party; concluding that the fines were a form of criminal contempt, which could not be imposed without compliance with due process procedures required for criminal contempt proceedings); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1438, 1442-44 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The bottom line is that resolution of

    ### Response:
    holding that 25 surcharge added to fees that otherwise would be compensatory was a criminal contempt sanction even though it was payable to the adverse party and not to the court reversing order for sanctions because court did not follow procedural requirements for criminal contempt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not that settlement negotiations were ongoing. In the paragraph preceding the sentence that the plaintiff quotes, the Administrative Judge explains that the settlement agreement had to be read reement’s terms read into the record and the parties’ oral acceptance, the defendant has shown that the parties entered into a settlement agreement on October 26, 1994, which waived the plaintiffs discrimination claims in the present case. The plaintiff also argues that she did not have the proper knowledge, volition, or capacity on October 26, 1994, to enter into a settlement agreement. Opponent’s Amended Responsive Submission in Response to Exhibit D of the Court’s Order, at 4. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 & n. 15, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1021 & n. 15, 39 L.Ed.2d 147, 160 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff claims that she suffered from

    ### Response:
    holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    social security numbers gathered in the course of the Secretary’s official duties; this disclosure prohibition does not apply to the IDOL. Thus, in Sawyer terms, these Claimants are not “members of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted” or of the “particular class” sought to be protected by section 2 — 123(h). Claiman 3, 395 N.E.2d 541, 32 Ill. Dec. 311 (rejecting implied private action under the 1957 Retail Installment Sales Act); Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473, 3 Ill. Dec. 834 (rejecting implied private action under the age discrimination act and Missouri statute). 2 This fifth factor was arguably stated in one pre-Sawyer opinion: In Sherman v. Field Clinic (1st Dist. 1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 21, 392 N.E.2d 154, 161, 29 Ill. Dec. 597, 604 (<HOLDING>), the court observed that the allegations

    ### Response:
    recognizing implied private action under the collection agency act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fails to appreciate that for causation to be “definitely established,” i.e., “directly and primarily” and “inevitably and naturally, not possibly or probably,” both foreseeability and certainty must be established, as plaintiffs have done in this case, and the court so held. As California Federal Bank further explained, the purpose of “definitely establishing]” a causal connection between the breach and loss is so the non-breaching party will not be awarded more than if the contract had been performed. In this case, the court’s determination that TFC is entitled to a damage award of $109.309 million meets the “definitely established” standard in that the award does not exceed the Government’s contractual promise that Transohio Savings could treat the $157.5 mil 160 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Gwartz v. Jefferson Memorial Hospital Assoc.,

    ### Response:
    holding under illinois law that injuty to the corporation does not  prevent suit by an investor who suffers a distinct personal injuty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person’s duty to the enterprise. Id. (emphasis added). This section also . does not preclude Rian’s claim for indemnity because he has not been “found liable to the enterprise.” Id. Indeed, the jury was not asked whether Rian should, have any liability to the Partnership. Rather, all of the jury questions asking about Rian’s conduct related to alleged liability to Dr. Cravens, not to the Partnership. And in response to the only question asked of the jury about Rian’s conduct toward the Partnership, the jury .found that he acted in good faith. Therefore, Rian has not been found liable to the Partnership, and section 8.102(b)(3)(A) does not preclude his claim for indemnity. See id. The Partnership next argues that there is no evidence that Rian actually incurred attorneys’ fees in the 9) (<HOLDING>). Section 74.351(b)(1) of the civil practice

    ### Response:
    holding physician entitled to recover attorneys fees actually paid by malpractice insurer because physician was personally liable in the first instance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to prosecute caused a delay of significant duration; (2) whether there was notice to plaintiff that further delay would result in dismissal; (3) likely prejudice to defendant because of further delay; (4) a balance between court calendar congestion against plaintiffs right to an opportunity for a day in court; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions. Id. at 254. “No one factor is dispositive, and ultimately we must review the dismissal in light of the record as a whole.” Id. In ruling on Appellant’s motions to reopen and for reargument, as well as in the underlying dismissal, the district court did not adequately address these factors or sufficiently explain its reasoning to enable us to review the district court’s reasoning. See Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 180 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record

    ### Response:
    holding that although the district court was not required to discuss each of the factors on the record a decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit of the district courts reasoning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Gearren, 660 F.3d at 610. 2. Alleged Misstatements Plaintiffs allege Morgan Stanley and Jamesley communicated with Plan participants through “SEC filings, annual reports, press releases and Plan documents ..., which included and/or reiterated . these statements.” (Compl. ¶ 243.) The SEC filings were incorporated into the SPDs and Form S-8 registration statements. (Compl. ¶ 243.) These communications, Plaintiffs allege, were actionable misstatements. (Compl. ¶¶ 245-47.) With respect to Morgan Stanley, Plaintiffs’ argument fails becáuse the Company was not “a Plan administrator responsible for communicating with Plan participants, [and] therefore [did not] act[] as a Plan fiduciary when making the statements at issue.” Citigroup, 662 F.3d at 143-44; Gearren, 660 F.3d at 611 (<HOLDING>); Fisher, 469 Fed.Appx. at 60. Accordingly,

    ### Response:
    holding defendants were not liable under erisa because the alleged misstatements were made while acting in a corporate rather than erisa fiduciary capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C.2007); see also Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 41 n. 18 (D.C.1989). 7 . Among other things, Love argues that the District of Columbia is where he resides and where, through Ready Staffing, his relationship with USA Waste was centered. 8 . USA Waste argues that Maryland is where Love was injured; where the conduct causing his injury occurred; where USA Waste is incorporated and does business; and where it exclusively utilized Love's services. 9 . See Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 239-40, 210 F.2d 868, 873-74 (1954) (“[I]n an employee-employer suit, if some workmen’s compensation act purports to bar the action, that bar will be applied in the forum.”); see also Dominion Caisson Corp. v. Clark, 614 A.2d 529, 532 (D.C.1992) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

    ### Response:
    recognizing continuing applicability of jonathan woodner where defendant is plaintiffs statutory employer obligated to provide workers compensation coverage under another jurisdictions law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bad-faith’ may be assigned. Canal Indent. Co., 593 S.E.2d at 46 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Thomas v. American Global Ins. Co., 229 Ga.App. 107, 493 S.E.2d 12 (1997) and Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992)). Thus, while Georgia courts have found that a statutory claim for bad faith pursuant to O.C.G.A § 33-4-6 may be made only by the insured, under O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, “a right of action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property,” and a party may assign a cause of action involving a tortious injury to his property, including a tort claim for bad-faith failure to settle. S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 227 Ga.App. 191, 489 S.E.2d 53, 57-58 (1997) (citing Jefferson Ins. Co., v. Dunn, 224 Ga.App, 732, 482 S.E.2d 383 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that under ocga  441222 all choses in action arising upon contractmay be assignedso as to vestthe title in the assignee  and after a loss the claim of the insured like any other  chose in action could be assigned without in any way affecting the insurers liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as your informal attempt to filing a complaint. You may then submit a grievance regarding the issue if you feel Lt. Hollifield didn’t resolve it. I’m also attaching your requested [§ ] 1983 form. 24 .In this regard, plaintiff contends that: [h]ow could I have exhausted administrative remedies when' I did not know you had to: And I did not know the address. Plus [PRCC] never gave me any response from the grievance forms I filled out. When I heard you had to write to the administrator my 1983 form was already mailed and processed. It was to (sic) late. If I could have gone to the law library, I could have done this correctly. And I would have known about the Exhaustion [of] Administrative Remedies. 25 . See Johnson v. Edlow, et al., Civil Action No. 98-466 (E.D.Va. Feb. 12, 1999) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff's allegation in his August 28, 1998

    ### Response:
    holding that inmate plaintiff satisfied  1997ea where he attempted to exhaust all available administrative remedies but was prevented from doing so by prison personnel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § -2520(b)(3). We review that order for abuse of discretion. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(3). The district court is correct in its conclusion that courts recognize that an illegally taped conversation is admissible for impeachment. Two of our sister circuits have considered the issue and reached such a conclusion. In United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1973), a criminal defendant denied during cross examination that he was engaged in bookmaking. In rebuttal and for impeachment purposes; the government sought to introduce, without a prior evidentiary hearing, taped conversations of the defendant which indicated his involvement in bookmaking. The Fifth Circuit held’that in light of Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (<HOLDING>), that even if the wire tap had been illegal,

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence seized in violation of a defendants fourth amendment rights was admissible for purposesof impeachment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fees to a defendant. It opined that subsection one governs personal injury actions where the plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed $25,000 to the extent it is not modified by subsection four. Gillihan II at 267, 92 P.3d at 517. The plurality concluded that subsection four simply changes two parts of subsection one (concerning the specific requirements for plaintiffs to receive an award of attorney fees). Id. Under this view, in subsection four, the use of the word “claimant” in the phrase “there shall be taxed and allowed to the claimant ... attorney’s fees,” means attorney fees shall be taxed and allowed to either a plaintiff or defendant claiming attorney fees in an action meeting the other requirements of the statute. Id. There 101 Idaho 187, 191, 610 P.2d 546, 550 (1980) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there can be “no reasonable

    ### Response:
    holding legislatures removal of language allowing director to approve change in nature of water use prior to bills passage can only be interpreted as intent that director not have that power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for themselves. Second, Scheetz was not the only witness to the incident. Jurors may hear from several witnesses who were also present for all or part of the incident, including some who were in a better position to view the events than Scheetz. Because Scheetz is but one of many individuals present at the revocation hearing, the likelihood that he could sway the jury by subtly imparting to them his firsthand knowledge of events is largely eliminated. Whatever remote possibilities of such conduct that remain can be curtailed through vigorous monitoring to ensure that Scheetz does not improperly imply that any witness’s version of events is inaccurate or otherwise provide impermissible unsworn testimony. See Fonten Corp. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 469 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, I conclude that Judge Scoles’s decision

    ### Response:
    holding that trial judge ably ensured that counsel did not cross any lines by warning counsel not to imply that any witnesss version of events was inaccurate and monitoring counsels actions at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    highly fact-intensive nature of determining monopoly power. A defendant “deserves summary judgment if it can establish that, as a matter of indisputable fact, it lacks sufficient [market] power.” Town Sound v. Chrysler, 959 F.2d 468, 479 (3d Cir.1992). The Third Circuit recognizes that “the question of market power is certainly dependant on factual findings, and some older cases did state that summary judgments against plaintiffs are particularly disfavored in complex antitrust cases,” however, “many courts, including the Supreme Court, have more recently held defendants entitled to summary judgment in antitrust cases ... the standard of F.R.C.P. 56 remains the same.” Id. at 481; see also Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

    ### Response:
    holding summary judgment is an essential tool in the area of antitrust law because it helps avoid wasteful and lengthy litigation that may have a chilling effect on procompetitive market forces
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and no provision in the document suggests that it is final or intended to be immediately implemented. As such, unlike the September agreement between Yae-kle and Andrews, the document here does not satisfy the exception made for final, written, fully executed agreements provided for in section 18-22-802(2.5). It therefore remains protected as confidential under section 307 of the Dispute Resolution Act. Absent that document, we are left with a slim record on which to perform a common law contract analysis. There is nothing to suggest the terms of any agreement; rather there are only Chotvacs's actions in removing the fence (in accordance with the inadmissible document) and Lish's prompt objection to those actions. Cf. Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 117, 155 P.2d 161, 164-65 (1944) (<HOLDING>). No other admissible evidence supports

    ### Response:
    holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proffered explanation is a matter of genuine dispute, but the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination is deemed not to be genuinely controverted. This is the view adopted by the Eighth Circuit. • ■ (Emphasis in original). Plaintiffs arguments rest, at bottom, on the contention that defendant did not treat him fairly, gave erroneous reasons for his firing, and ’willfully misrepresented the fact of his discharge. Under the law of this Circuit, none of these contentions, even if true, are enough without more to support an inference of illegal discrimination. The employment discrimination statutes are not meant to transform “at will” employment into perpetual employment where equal treatment is guaranteed to all employees and termination is legal only “f n. 3 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct. 1273,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an employer may develop arbitrary ridiculous and even irrational policies as long as they are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    compensation hearings. For example, R.C. 4123.10 provides: “The industrial commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of procedure.” Similarly, the Ohio Rules of Evidence statutorily do not apply to unemployment-compensation hearings. In this regard, R.C. 4141.281(C)(2) provides that “[h]earing officers are not bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure.” Such proceedings are no more or less significant than Dayton Civil Service Board hearings. And the foregoing statutory provisions express the concept recognized by this court in Haley, and others. See, e.g., Day Lay Egg Farm v. Union Cty. Bd. Of Revision (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 555, 556, 577 N.E.2d 84 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in reviewing a decision of an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    now adopt the same interpretation of the time of the injury for the purposes of the notice requirement of the LGTCA.” Moreover, Piselli is factually distinguishable from the case sub judice, because it involved a tort action against a private party, not a governmental entity, and it turned on C.J. § 5-109, titled “Actions against health care providers.” Thus, the Piselli Court discussed limitations in the context of a common law tort action against a medical provider; it did not address a legislatively created right of suit against a local governmental entity, for which the Legislature has waived immunity conditioned upon the provision of notice of the claim within the statutorily prescribed period. Cf. Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates, Inc., 380 Md. 670, 674, 846 A.2d 433 (2004) (<HOLDING>) Therefore, for purposes of limitations in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the state enjoys sovereign immunity in regard to tort actions unless the legislature waived immunity pursuant to a specific statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    93A claim against Surf Site, the Court finds that the counterclaim against the City is tenable based upon the particular facts alleged by Boston/Logan. Although the Consumer Protection Act “contains no explicit indication that governmental entities are to be liable under its provisions”, United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee, 402 Mass. 228, 521 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1988), no court has held that municipalities are exempt from Chapter 93A claims so long as they are “acting in a business context”, functioning in “trade or commerce” as that statute requires. Park Drive Towing, Inc. v. City of Revere, 442 Mass. 80, 809 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also B & R Realty Co. v. Springfield Redevelopment Auth., 708 F.Supp. 450 (D.Mass.1989) (<HOLDING>). Whether a municipality has acted in a

    ### Response:
    holding that the city of springfield was potentially liable under chapter 93a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The question is whether evidence that Pyle made a threatening call to Franco after the criminal offense was relevant to show that Pyle was motivated to exaggerate the amount of the losses he sustained as the result of the theft. We conclude that such evidence, offered for that purpose, would have been relevant to show bias. Therefore, Franco was entitled, as a matter of Due Process, to explore Pyle’s potential bias, as evidenced by Pyle having made a threatening call to Franco after the criminal incident. By precluding that inquiry, the Superior Court erred. We conclude, nonetheless, that although the trial court erred, the error was harmless. “Violations of the minimal due process right to confrontation ar , 1102-03 (3d Cir.1990); State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 140 P.3d 930 (2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47

    ### Response:
    holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    upon population are deemed general legislation and are specifically authorized by our state Constitution. See Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 20; DeFazio, 562 Pa. at 436, 756 A.2d at 1105. Here, the Legislature found that some urban municipalities in Pennsylvania and elsewhere are attempting to solve the seemingly intractable problems facing their school districts by adopting mayor-led models of control and remediation. In our view, the Legislature could reasonably have believed that social issues interrelated with education, such as crime, poverty, and a weak tax base, are more severe in urban school districts than in rural ones, and sufficiently so to warrant special treatment under the EEA. See generally Danson v. Casey, 33 Pa.Cmwlth. 614, 624 & n. 13, 382 A.2d 1238, 1243 & n. 13 (1978) (<HOLDING>), affd 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979); Abbott

    ### Response:
    recognizing the financial plight of urban school districts and the fact that municipal services in such areas cost more than in rural areas citing comment pennsylvanias state aid to education formula a goal of uniform equalized education 30 pitt lrev 41 196869
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prospective in-junctive relief. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir.1996). The claim for prospective injunctive relief must, however, be based upon federal law; regardless of the type of relief sought, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims in federal court against state officials that are based upon state law. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121, 104 S.Ct. at 919. Applying these principals to the instant case, plaintiff conceded at oral argument that defendant the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is an arm of the state of Pennsylvania and therefore protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Pa. Const, art. 5, §§ 1, 2 (creating the Pennsylvania state judicial system, including the Supreme Court); Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 731-32 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -; 115 S.Ct. 62, 130

    ### Response:
    holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2 Minneapolis, Minn.Code of Ordinances § 21.10. In contrast, the Fire Chief is limited in his authority to the operations of the Fire Department. 9 Minneapolis, Minn.Code of Ordinances § 173.20. Thus, even though Chief Forte may have had final authority to determine whom to promote to Arson Investigator and also to design the particular procedures to, be used when doing so, he was not authorized to establish policy regarding employment practices, including policy regarding consideration of an employee’s union status or activity in making promotion decisions. See Greensboro, 64 F.3d at 966. As a matter of law, that authority rests with the Civil Service Commission and the City Coordinator, not the Fire Chief. Cf. Bechtel v. City of Belton, 250 F.3d 1157, 1158, 1161 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In sum, without authority delegated to him,

    ### Response:
    holding no municipal liability in light of city administrators ultimate authority to approve or rescind departmental personnel decisions despite evidence that the fire chief was in charge of establishing rules regula tions policies and procedures for the operation of the fire department
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    principles. 12 . John Buchanan also argues that his sentences under counts five and six were duplicitous of the firearm charges contained in counts three and four. This argument lacks merit. Counts three and four, applying 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), required only that the defendant use or carry a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense. Count five, alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), required the possession of an automatic weapon; and count six, applying 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), required that the defendant not only possess a firearm, but that he also be a convicted felon. Thus counts five and six involve distinct elements not required by counts three and four. Under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United S 2d 603 (1994); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1219 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). John Buchanan was thus not placed in jeopardy

    ### Response:
    holding in the administrative forfeiture context that jeopardy does not and cannot attach until one is made a party to a proceeding before a trier of fact having jurisdiction to try the question of guilt or innocence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Becker, this court stated that a six-year time span between drug offenses is too great to be relevant. 230 F.3d at 1232. We do not view that statement as a per se temporal rule, however, as the court in that case went on to assess other factors bearing on relevance: the probative value and the similarity of the offenses. See id. at 1232-33; see also United States v. Burse, 150 F. App’x 829, 831 (10th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (affirming the use of an eight-year old drug conviction, and noting that Becker “relied heavily on a fact-specific analysis of the relevance of the prior crimes”). Indeed, other Courts of Appeal routinely uphold the admission of prior drug convictions older than the ones in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Gaddy, 532 F.3d 783, 789 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296,

    ### Response:
    holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    There is in our view no intrinsic or fundamental incompatibility between the strictures currently imposed upon magistrates under R. l:15-l(c) and the more extensive restrictions of the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law. Moreover, there is no reason that the limitations of R. 1:15-1 should be deemed to be the sole and exclusive limitation upon the practice of law by members of the Judiciary. The absence of any expression of preemptive intent in the rules adopted by this Court governing the conduct of attorneys and judges, as well as the long-established policy of judicial acceptance of statutory arrangements touching upon this Court’s constitutional prerogatives, distinguish the situation here from the one involved in Wajert v. State Ethics Commission, 491 Pa. 255, 420 A2d 439 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 9 ln so ruling we acknowledge that it is

    ### Response:
    holding pennsylvania state ethics act unconstitutional as applied to former judges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tests revealed levels of toxins in the soil which were within the statutory limits just a short time after the Commonwealth’s tests revealed the opposite, it would certainly have buttressed Appellees’ argument that the tests do not provide consistent results sufficient to prove Appellees’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and provided Appellees with a reasonable opportunity to contest the Commonwealth’s evidence. Under Trombetta, nothing more is required. See Trombetta, supra (noting the defendants had ""alternative means of demonstrating their innocence”); Elmore v. Foltz, 768 F.2d 773, 778 (6th Cir.1985) (under Trombetta, what ""matters is that some reasonable alternative means exists for attempting to do what one would have attempted to do with the destroyed evidence”); Haywood, supra (<HOLDING>); Revolorio-Ramo, supra (holding the

    ### Response:
    holding that where a photograph of a defendant wearing a particular shirt exists the destruction of the shirt does not violate due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    enforcement officers, investigating a defendant father for alleged sex offenses committed against his daughter, intentionally misinformed the defendant that his daughter was pregnant. Id. at 113, 572 S.E.2d at 167. After determining that “[t]he use of false statements and trickery by police officers during interrogations is not illegal as a matter of law[,]” our Court turned to other factors to determine the admissibility of the defendant’s statement. Id. at 114, 572 S.E.2d at 167. Our Court found that: (1) the interrogation tactics employed “did not implant fear of physical violence or hope of better treatment;” (2) the defendant “was not tricked about the nature of the crime involved or possible punishment;” (3) the officer “did not subject defendant to threats of h 00, 609 (1994) (<HOLDING>). BRYANT, Judge. I concur in the result reached

    ### Response:
    holding that implicit threats or promises did not render a defendants statement involuntary when a review of the circumstances reveals that the defendants independent will was not overcome so as to induce a confession that he was not otherwise disposed to malee internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confession, it might, in some cases, render that violation harmless. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193-94, 107 S.Ct. 1714. Recently, in Crawford v. Washington, -U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court receded from the Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), “indicia of reliability” test and held that “[w]here. testimonial evidence is at issue, ... the Sixth Amendment demands what common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. We have previously recognized that admissions by acquiescence or silence do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1999); see also United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048, 123 S.Ct. 2112,

    ### Response:
    holding that the confrontation clause did not guarantee the defendant the right to crossexamine a speaker whose state ments were imputed to the defendant as adoptive admissions of a party opponent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An expression of this policy is found at 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) which provides in essence that all claimants, including administrative claimants, whose claims are accrued in the same chapter shall be reimbursed pro rata. Consistently with this policy, all administrative expenses are on parity as to payment.” In other words, to allow Debtor’s counsel to collect more than the other administrative claimants is a violation of the equality of distribution required under 11 U.S.C. § 726(b). There is no priority among administrative claimants. In re Grigg Clothing Co., 62 B.R. 1016 (Bankr.D.S.D.1986). Debtor’s counsel argues that disgorgement is discretionary and urges the Court to so hold. See United States v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn (In re Unitcast, Inc.), 219 B.R. 741 (6th Cir. BAP 1998)(<HOLDING>). We agree that disgorgement is discretionary

    ### Response:
    holding that  726b does not compel disgorgement from professionals in every case of administrative insolvency but is a remedy within the discretion of the bankruptcy court under  330 and 331
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    limitation, delays occasioned by wind, rain, lightning, and storms” makes the Resort’s two-year completion obligation illusory. These “far less compelling reasons” are similar to those Judge Steele determined to be “certainly broad enough to allow the Seller to excuse completion on a wide variety of events.” Id. A provision in an ILSFDA-governed agreement which extends the completion period for delays not qualifying under Florida’s impossibility of performance principles renders the obligation to complete the condominium within two years illusory. Id. at *5 & n. 5 (giving as examples of excused performance under Florida law for “excessive rain” or heart attack of president of developer); cf. Rondini v. Evernia Properties, LLP, NO. 07-81077-Civ, 2008 WL 793512 (S.D.Fla. Feb.13, 2008) (<HOLDING>). The remaining issue is whether the last

    ### Response:
    holding sellers obligation not illusory where contract allowed extensions for delays caused by acts of god the unavailability of materials strikes other labor problems governmental orders or other events which would support a defense based upon impossibility of performance for reasons beyond defendants control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d at 497. In Higgins, the plaintiffs sued both the United States and the manufacturer of a missile seeking damages for exposure to toxic gas which escaped into the air at a missile silo near their home. Id. at 494. During cross-examination of one of the plaintiffs, a letter written by his treating physician was read into evidence. The letter questioned that the toxic gas caused the injuries and rather might have been caused by aspiration of a piece of popcorn causing infection. Id. at 497. The plaintiff objected, contending the letter constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court overruled the objection, finding that the letter was admissible under Rule 803(6). Id. Other jurisdictions have reached similar results. Pineau v. Home Depot, Inc., 45 Conn.App. 248, 695 A.2d 14, 17 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Fanelli v. di Lorenzo, 187 A.D.2d 1004, 591

    ### Response:
    holding letter from specialist to treating physician fell within business entry exception to the hearsay rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    insufficient to establish effective service of process. The court’s conclusion is an unwarranted upheaval of settled agency law. The district court correctly found “nothing in the record” to support Graham’s actual authority as an agent to receive service of process for the individual defendants. Accordingly, I conclude that service of process was ineffectual-.. 1 . Minn.Stat. § 541.076 (2014) 2 . Offutt, however, never mailed ""a hard . copy” of the process papers to Graham. 3 . See, e.g., In re J.M.T., 759 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn.2009) (“First-class mail, even if received, is simply not personal service. Personal service requires delivery to the party or to an appropriate representative.” (citing Minn. R. Civ. P, 4,03)); Kmart Corp. v. Cty. of Clay, 711 N.W.2d 485, 489-90, (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>); Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that service was ineffectualbecause the plaintiff did not deliver copies of the petition to the individual personally or leave copies with any person at the individuals usual places of abode and because the plaintiffs alternative attempt to serve by facsimile was not authorized by rule 4
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 164 (citing State v. Agtuca, 12 Wash.App. 402, 529 P.2d 1159 (1974)); accord 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1294 (1998). Appellate review of a trial court’s actions in polling a jury is a two-fold process, involving both a'question of fact and of law. First, we review as a factual question the trial court’s determination concerning unanimity on a clearly erroneous standard, granting some deference to the trial judge, because a “trial judge, in determining whether a juror has freely assented to the verdict, not only hears the juror’s response, but observes the juror’s demeanor and tone of voice during the course of the polling of the jury.” People v. Cabrera, 116 Ill.2d 474, 108 Ill.Dec. 397, 508 N.E.2d 708, 714 (1987); see also United States v. Luciano, 734 F.2d 68, 70 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879

    ### Response:
    holding that deference is due trial courts determination regarding jurors ultimate assent to the verdict because of trial judges nearness to the proceedings citing amos v united states 496 f2d 1269 1273 8th cir1974
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... [is] generic.”) (quotation omitted, alterations in original); In re Northland, Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1558 (Fed.Cir.1985) (because Bundt is generic term, proffered evidence of secondary meaning irrelevant). A party asserting unregistered trademark rights bears the heavy burden of establishing those rights. Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 140 (4th Cir.2000) (affirming summary judgment that “ale house” for food and drink establishment is generic). 1. Resolution of Genericness Through Summary Judgment Schwan’s looks to the Fifth Circuit for the proposition that genericness is an issue that may not be resolved in summary judgment. See Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Exam’rs, Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). But the Eighth Circuit has held that a mark

    ### Response:
    holding summary judgment improper where generic status and likelihoodofconfusion are factintensive inquiries that cannot be conducted properly without a trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interests. A court must reach this conclusion independently based on the facts in the record.” Id. at 339. Similarly in McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash'.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254 (1987), the Supreme Court of Washington addressing competing presumptions of paternity held that: “the mere filing of a paternity action does not automatically imply that the action is in the child’s best interest. A court must reach this conclusion independently based on the facts in the record and the recommendations of the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the child.” Id. at 262. There, the 988, 993 (1995) (recognizing that the best interest of the child is a paramount consideration in determining whether to order blood tests); Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, although not specifically

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court must specifically consider whether it would be in the best interest of the child for the case to proceed before a putative father may be permitted to seek blood tests in an attempt to rebut the presumption of paternity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to watch television, exercise in a gymnasium, and work in the kitchen. Then the prosecutor listed all the things the four-year-old victim would never be able to do, such as go to school, get in fights with her sister, and worry her mother. In addition, the prosecutor argued that because of defendant’s conduct, Alecia never knew her sister or mother. At the very end of his argument, the prosecutor turned his attention to the murder of Mr. Worley: James Worley I’m sure had dreams. He had aspirations. And he had things he wanted to do in his life. Elton McLaughlin took that away from James Worley. He took that away from James Worley for three thousand dollars. Although defendant concedes that the United States Supreme Court overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, 483 U.S. 1056, 97 L. Ed. 2d 820

    ### Response:
    holding that use of a victim impact statement during sentencing violated the eighth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    business in Illinois. 5 . The complaint lists five defendants connected with the development of Elk Crossing Mall: Patrick F. Daly and Associates, Inc., the architect for Elk Crossing Mall; D.E.I., Inc., the contract purchaser of the land on which the Elk Crossing Mall was built; Dalan/Jupiter, Inc., a developer of Elk Crossing Mall; Mid-America Real Estate Corporation, the leasing agent for Dalan/Jupiter, Inc. and Elk Crossing Mall; and Patrick F. Daly, an officer, director, and shareholder of Patrick F. Daly and Associates, Inc., D.E.I., Inc., and Da-lan/Jupiter, Inc., and owner of a limited partnership interest in Elk Crossing Mall. 6 . See Nelson v. Monroe Regional Medical Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1563-65 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 502 U.S. 903, 112 S.Ct. 285, 116 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that patients who were denied medical treatment on nonemergency basis had standing to bring antitrust action against medical center
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be claimed by prescription. Furthermore, Henry Street cannot tack any time before 1994 to meet the 21 years required for continuous and uninterrupted use to establish a prescriptive easement. So long as Conrail owned the Avis line, Henry Street and its predecessors could not claim prescriptive use of any crossing over the railroad. Therefore, Henry Street’s prescriptive easement claim fails. Henry Street’s “claims” of laches, waiver, and detrimental reliance are likewise unavailing for the same reason its claim for a prescriptive easement fails. These defenses rise no higher and are deserving of no greater protection than its claim based upon a prescriptive easement that would not permit one to take property from a government entity. See Williamstown Borough Authority, 591 A.2d at 715 (<HOLDING>); Glen Hope Borough v. Kitko, 424 Pa.Super. 67,

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of laches cannot succeed where the analogous claim of adverse possession fails
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    memorialized in the calendar, which suggested that the document was accurate. Appellant cannot prevail on either claim. The record reveals that the calendar was mentioned briefly only to explain why Maureen Welsh, Appellant’s parole officer, instituted parole revocation proceedings against him in October, 1995. The Commonwealth presented evidence that the calendar existed and triggered parole revocation proceedings, but did not read the contents of the calendar to the jury. As the trial court admitted the calendar for a legitimate purpose and none of the incriminating information contained in the exhibit was divulged when it was introduced, see N.T., Feb. 9, 2000, at 76-77, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Palsa, 521 Pa. 113, 555 A.2d 808, 810 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s secondary complaint that the

    ### Response:
    holding that certain outofcourt statements offered to explain the course of police conduct may be admissible because they are not offered for the truth of the matters asserted but rather to show the information upon which the police acted the trial court must balance the prosecutions need for the statements against any prejudice arising therefrom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and was served the Corrected Amended Complaint on or around October 11, 2013. Pis.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal [Dkt. #42], Nor do plaintiffs contest the applicable statutes of limitations. Id. However, plaintiffs contend that filing the initial Complaint, which named MPO Williams in the caption, commenced the litigation against her and tolled the applicable statutes of limitations. Id. I disagree. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states: “A civil action i 70 (D.C.1980) (en banc) (“Super.Ct.Civ.R. 3 requires only the filing of a complaint to commence an action and thereby toll the statute of limitations.”), it is Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, which governs service. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4; see, e.g., Henderson, 517 U.S. at 672, 116 S.Ct. 1638 (<HOLDING>). Rule 4(m) provides, in relevant part: “If a

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 4 displaced service provision in the admiralty act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Creasman court concluded that because the real property and account at issue were titled in the name of the deceased female partner, “they must both be regarded as belonging to her estate.” Id. Notably, the Creasman court also treated the division of property between the intimate partners as an initial question of what property would become part of the decedent’s estate. See id. ¶21 In subsequent cases, this court distinguished Creasman and began to question the validity of its presumption. Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 553-55, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976) (noting that this court had developed numerous exceptions to the Creasman presumption to avoid inequitable results and indicating a willingness to overrule it); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72, 76-77, 81, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In 1984, in In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a living intimate partner could demonstrate an implied partnership existed despite the creasman presumption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    event, not reasonably foreseeable, which completely breaks the connection between the defendant’s negligent act and the plaintiffs injury. An intervening cause breaks the chain of events so that the defendant’s original negligent act is not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury in the slightest degree. Appellees’ App. at 47. The Estate did not object to these instructions. During closing arguments, the Defendants argued, without any objection from the Estate, that Dyer’s speed was the proximate cause of his death. We conclude that the Estate waived any argument that Dyer’s speed could not be an intervening or proximate cause of Dyer’s death by failing to object at trial. See, e.g., Estate of Hunt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Henry County, 526 N.E.2d 1230, 1236 n. 5 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied; see also Ind. Trial Rule 51(C)

    ### Response:
    holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discrimination violated her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment). All other circuits to have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117-18 (2d Cir.2004); Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 382-83 (4th Cir.2003); Thigpen v. Bibb Cnty., Ga., Sheriff’s Dep’t, 223 F.3d 1231, 1239 laintiff who alleges that his equal protection rights were violated, and requests remedies for those alleged violations under § 1983 has stated an independent basis for [his § 1983] claim ... even if the claims arise from the same factual allegations and even if the conduct alleged in the § 1983 claim also violates Title VII”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1575-76 (<HOLDING>); Ratliff, 795 F.2d at 624 (emphasizing “[a]

    ### Response:
    recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    offenses, it is presumed that sentences for these offenses will be served concurrently. State v. Crocker, 409 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn.1987). But under certain circumstances, consecutive sentences may be imposed without departing from the sentencing guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F. For example, when a defendant has “[mjultiple current felony convictions for crimes against persons” and the presumptive disposition for the offenses is commitment to the commissioner of corrections, consecutive sentencing is permissive without departure from the sentencing guidelines. Id. Permissive consecutive sentencing is available under this exception only when the presumptive disposition for the offenses is commitment to the commissioner of corrections. Id.; see also Watkins, 650 N.W.2d at 743 (<HOLDING>). If permissive consecutive sentencing is not

    ### Response:
    holding that when prior felony sentence for crime against person has not been discharged and imprisonment is presumptive for current felony sentence permissive consecutive sentencing is available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be the shooter (and, therefore, might be carrying a gun). Upon being asked to exit the vehicle, the defendant balked; instead of exiting, he uttered more profanity, further heightening Officer Hyland’s legitimate concerns. Even without that further incitement, the pat-frisk would have been permissible. Once an officer has formed a reasonable belief that a detained person may be armed and dangerous, a pat-down for protective purposes is, without more, deemed reasonably related in scope to the stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868; United States v. Ivery, 427 F.3d 69, 72 (1st Cir.2005). Thus, when the defendant refused to accede to Officer Hyland’s request, the officers were constitutionally entitled to remove him from the vehicle and pat-frisk him. See Soares, 521 F.3d at 121 (<HOLDING>). The defendant discourages this holding and

    ### Response:
    holding removal from car and patfrisk constitutional when defendant among other things refused to remain still and used profanity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where government employer “faces nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime, obligations that hundreds of thousands of other employers, public as well as private, have to meet”), overruling Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct., 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). When Congress lawfully exercises its power under the Commerce Clause, state and local governments cannot avoid complying with the resulting. regulation simply by pointing to a “sacred province of state autonomy.” Id, (quotation ojnitted); see also, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 555 n. 2 (6th Cir.1987) (explaining that “[t]he traditional concept of state sovereignty is, of course, no longer the focus of this analysis”); Dressman v. Costle, 759 F.2d 548, 557 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Instead, states must seék relief from federal

    ### Response:
    holding that kentucky counties tenthamendment challenge to the clean air act obviously fails under garcia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supplemental post-judgment proceedings under Rule 69(a) where the factual predicate of the alter ego claim was substantially distinct from the facts proving the underlying claim and no independent basis for federal jurisdiction existed). In the present proceeding, Futura seeks to hold the Commonwealth accountable for the existing MD judgment as an alter ego of CDC. Like piercing the corporate veil, an alter ego claim presents a substantive theory seeking to establish liability on the part of a new party not otherwise liable. See Futura II, 144 F.3d at 12 (describing alter ego theory as “a substantive theory for imposing liability upon entities that would, on first blush, not be thought liable” and as requiring “a subsequent and distinct inquiry”). See also Sandlin, 972 F.2d at 1217-18 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Futura has consistently characterized

    ### Response:
    holding that federal enforcement jurisdiction does not reach alter ego claims unless sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the underlying action as they involve different legal theories
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA. A. UCL and FAL 1. Plaintiffs Allege a Money or Property Loss The UCL and FAL provide a private right of action only if Plaintiffs have “suffered injury in fact and [have] lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17204; Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758, 788, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666, 233 P.3d 1066 (2010). “[P]laintiffs who can truthfully allege they were deceived by a product’s label into spending money to purchase the product, and would not have purchased it otherwise, have ‘lost money or property’ within the meaning of Proposition 64 and have standing to sue.” Kwikset, 51 Cal.4th at 317, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 246 P.3d 877; see also Clayworth, 49 Cal.4th at 788, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666, 233 P.3d 1066 (<HOLDING>); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713

    ### Response:
    holding that overcharges paid as a result of a pricefixing conspiracy were sufficient to support ucl standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it occupied the space until a month or two before the trial in June 1988. Based on these facts, we conclude that Catalina Cafe, Inc., the tenant, vacated the premises at the earliest in April 1987. Further, appellants cannot claim abandonment of the premises until their efforts to sublease the space to other investors failed in June 1987. The “material act” by the landlord about which appellants complain is that Rotana provided inadequate parking for Catalina Cafe. Coleman testified that this parking problem surfaced the first Friday night that Catalina Cafe was open for business in September 1985. Even using the earlier date of April 1987 for the abandonment, we hold that this twenty-month delay is not within a reasonable time as a matter of law. Metroplex Glass, 646 S.W.2d at 265-66 (<HOLDING>). In addition, it was appellants’ burden to

    ### Response:
    holding that seventeenmonth delay in abandoning premises is not within a reasonable time as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Amtrak policy, refused to grant the plaintiffs request to post a political advertisement on a large billboard located in Penn Station. Id. at 376, 115 S.Ct. 961. Lebrón claimed that the vice president’s refusal violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 377, 115 S.Ct. 961. The District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that Amtrak was a government actor because it maintained “close ties to the Federal Government.” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and concluded that a congressional act created Amtrak wherein Congress specifically stated that Amtrak was not a government entity. Id. at 378, 115 S.Ct. 961. The Supreme Court’s inquiry in Lebrón .3d 919, 921-22 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 516, 136 L.Ed.2d 404 (1996)(<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, the court concludes

    ### Response:
    holding that because the president of the united states appointed only eight out of the fifty members who sat on the red cross board of governors the plaintiff failed to satisfy the third prong of the lebron test therefore the red cross was not a government actor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “desired” factual finding is that she was not involved in a conspiracy with the Chita’s Colombian contacts. We do not believe, however, that such a finding is the “only one rationally supported by the record below.” Rather, the non-hearsay evidence presented at trial makes it plausible that Díaz-Pérez was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. In fact, Count One of the Indictment charged both defendants with “aiding and abetting each other, and others to this Grand Jury unknown.” Additionally, while the tape recordings between Chita and his Colombian contacts do not mention Díaz-Pérez by name, the Colombian contacts did indicate that the informant would be contacted by a female schoolteacher in Puerto Rico. See United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 716 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1005, 122

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no plain error in district courts failure to make an unrequested petrozziello finding because enough evidence existed to support a finding based on a preponderance of the evidence that the codefendants were participating in a conspiracy at the time the statements were made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    docket sheets, which provide an index to the records of judicial proceedings. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), and its progeny, the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment grants both the public and the pr 1070 (3d Cir.1984) (determining that “the First Amendment embraces a right of access to [civil] trials”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Numerous federal and state courts have also extended the First Amendment protection provided by Richmond Newspapers to particular types of judicial documents, determining that the First Amendment itself, as well as the common law, secures the public’s capacity to inspect such records. See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10-13 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. United States

    ### Response:
    holding that the district of rhode islands blanket policy of refusing to file memoranda of law that counsel were required to submit in connection with motions violated the first amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 456); see Afognak Logging, 31 P.3d at 786 (""Discretionary function immunity precludes liability for harm caused by the type of planning decisions that involve policy formulation. In contrast, operational decisions-those made while executing or implementing existing policies-are not immune."" (internal citations omitted)). 14 . Angnabooguk v. State, 26 P.3d 447, 456 (Alaska 2001) (emphasis added). 15 . Sanders, 944 P.2d at 456 (quoting Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47, 64 (Alaska 1981)). 16 . 26 P.3d at 454-59. 17 . Id. at 456. 18 . - Id. at 458 (quoting Harry Stoller & Co., Inc. v. City of Lowell, 412 Mass. 139, 587 N.E.2d 780, 785 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 . - Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted); see Adams v. City of Tenakee Springs, 963 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Alaska 1998) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Angnabooguk, 26 P.3d at 459 (citation

    ### Response:
    holding that citys decision whether to allocate funds to hire firefighters was an immune planning decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complained of, and (2) did not timely file a postjudgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tex.R.App. P. 26.1. It is not considered an equitable proceeding, so the appellant is not required to show diligence or lack of negligence. Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex.1996) (discussing the predecessor writ of error proceeding). A bill of review is an independent equitable action brought by a party to a previous suit who seeks to set aside a judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or by appeal. Caldwel etitioner is entitled to a remedy by bill of review and the parties revert to their original status as plaintiff and defendant. Id. See also, Wood v. Brown, 819 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>); Westcliffe, Inc. v. Bear Creek Constr., Ltd.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a default judgment cannot withstand a direct attack by a defendant who was not served in strict compliance with the appropriate service rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jury. The Court of Appeals additionally determined that Dr. Witten’s testimony that he slipped in the operating room constituted a judicial admission of negligence. “A judicial admission ... is a formal act of a party (committed during the course of a judicial proceeding) that has the effect of removing a fact or issue from the field of dispute; it is conclusive against the party and may be the underlying basis for a summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.15[4], at 590 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis omitted). Testimony of a party may constitute a judicial admission if “deliberate and unequivocal and unexplained or uncontradict-ed.” Bell v. Harmon, 284 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Ky.1955). y.1973) (<HOLDING>); Downing v. Drybrough, 249 S.W.2d 711

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a customer was negligent in failing to observe a bundle of grocery sacks on the floor before stepping toward it is a jury question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    merits. See, e.g., Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir.1982) (“The thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principle that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.”). And, in furtherance of this principle, we have, on rare occasion, allowed Rule 15 amendments after judgment is entered. Nevertheless, it does not appear that we have ever allowed an amendment to a § 2255 motion after the § 2255 motion is denied. We need not determine whether the allowance of such an amendment is permissible here because the motion to amend is futile and would be barred even if it were timely. Oleson’s proposed amendment is subject to the § 2255 one-year statute of limitations affirmative defense. See Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Oleson’s July 24, 2000 amendment is not

    ### Response:
    holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to “capital crimes.” Id. at 922-23. ¶ 75. After the death penalty was reinstated, this Court was again asked to examine the meaning of “capital offenses” in Ex parte Dennis, 834 So.2d 369, 372 (Miss.1976). Judge Mills wrote: [I]n Ex Parte Dennis, the Mississippi Supreme Court clarified its holding in Hudson and reiterated the “historic definition of a capital case as one permitting the death penalty.” 334 So.2d 369, 372 (Miss.1976). The Dennis Court also interpreted Miss.Code Ann. § 1-3-4 in light of the Mississippi Constitution, reasoning that, while, the legislature could define “capital” by statute as carrying the penalty of death or life imprisonment, this statutory definition did not change the meaning of the word as it was used in § 29 of the State Constitution. Id. at 372-73 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Dennis Court characterized the

    ### Response:
    holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guilt with respect to the charged murder. Indeed, in view of the finding instruction’s provision that the Commonwealth must prove that appellant either “acted as an accessory before the fact or conspired with ... Hulbert in the commission of the killing” (emphasis added), it is clear that proof of the referenced conspiracy is not the sole basis upon which appellant’s liability as an accomplice in the murder could rest. Proof that appellant participated in the murder as an accessory before the fact would also suffice to establish appellant’s guilt. Hence, we cannot say, viewing the applicable legal elements of murder in the abstract, that proof of the referenced conspiracy is “required” in this context to prove the charged murder. See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (<HOLDING>); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that in the context of a bloekburger double jeopardy analysis proof of the specific intent to kill is not required in a malicious wounding case because code  18251  which requires proof that the accused had the intent to maim disfigure disable or mu  uses the disjunctive or in its description of the required intent for that offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was filed on behalf of the Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, Minnesota District Judges Association, requesting this court as a whole to remove Chief Justice Peter S. Popovich from participation in connection with a pending petition for modification of Canon 3A(7), Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the court declines to rule on the motion to remove one of its members from participation in a pending proceeding and refers it to Chief Justice Popovich for his individual decision. MEMORANDUM It has long been the practice of this court to honor decisions of its individual members as to whether to participate in a pending proceeding. See State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361 (Minn.1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 1003, 98 S.Ct. 707, 54 L.Ed.2d 746 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have declined to rule on this

    ### Response:
    holding that the question of recusal of a supreme court justice is to be left to the individual justice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    finding that would give the previous conviction a greater enhancement effect amounts to a second prosecution for that offense. The prohibition against double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions or multiple punishments for the same offense. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998). However, double jeopardy does not apply to noncapital sentencing enhancements because an enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender is not a new jeopardy or an additional penalty for the earlier offense. Id. at 728. Therefore, double jeopardy does not prevent the State from having “a second opportunity to present its proof of the prior ... conviction” in a noncapital sentencing proceeding. Bell v. State, 994 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). In this ease, because the use of appellee’s

    ### Response:
    holding that double jeopardy does not prohibit state in subsequent prosecution from offering proof that appellant was the person convicted in a prior conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    110 days before the beginning of the fiscal year 2011, September 12, 2010, as required by Section 3 of Act 111. Andreozzi’s June 8, 2011 letter, stating that the parties agreed to resolve the remaining issues by arbitration, cannot constitute proper written notice of arbitration for the fiscal year 2011 because it was dated more than 5 months after the start of the fiscal year 2011. Because the Union failed to timely provide written notice of arbitration containing specifications of issues in dispute to the Borough and serve it upon the Borough Council president, the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to award the Borough police officers wage increases for the fiscal year 2011. See City of Phila. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 564 Pa. 290, 768 A.2d 291, 296 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Plymouth Twp. Police Dep’t v. Plymouth Twp.

    ### Response:
    holding that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to consider an issue which was not included in the written notice of arbitration and was added on the first day of the arbitration hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reliance. 4. Goodyear did not adequately disclaim its implied warranty of merchantability under Ohio law, because its disclaimer did not contain the word “merchantability.” 5. A genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Goodyear conspicuously disclaimed its implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 6. A genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Goodyear’s disclaimer of liability fails of its essential purpose. 7. The court shall reserve judgment until trial as to whether Goodyear’s disclaimer of liability is unconscionable. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The parties, as well as the court, agree that the Ohio law governs all substantive issues in this case. See Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Rev.Code § 1301.05 (providing that Ohio

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal district court sitting in diversity must apply its forum states choice of law rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    & Breach, 859 F.Supp. at 1534 (citing cases). Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5 Cir.1996). Another useful summary of the law is found in the Gillette case viz: Section 43(a) is a remedial statute and should therefore be broadly construed. See Seven-Up, 86 F.3d at 1383; Gordon & Breach, 859 F.Supp. at 1532. The statute is not so broad, however, that it includes all statements made by one competitor about its or another competitor’s product. See Garland, 895 F.Supp. at 279 (“[T]his court has found no indication that Congress, through its use of the language ‘commercial advertising or promotion,’ intended to extend Lanham Act coverage to every isolated alleged misrepresentation made to a potential customer by a business competitor.”); Mobius Mgmt., 880 F.Supp. at 1021 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate

    ### Response:
    recognizing that  43a does not have boundless application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the UCL by being “immoral, unethical or oppressive” or where its harm to the consumer outweighs its benefits. See, e.g., Paduano v. Amer. Honda Motor Co., 169 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1469, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 90 (2009); Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 134, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 221 (2007); Californians for Population Stabilization v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 58 Cal.App.4th 273, 286, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 621 (1997). However, the UCL sounds in equity and therefore there is no right to a jury determination as to whether a defendant’s conduct was unfair under the statute; the court must make this factual determination. Hodge v. Superior Court, 145 Cal.App.4th 278, 282-85, 51 Cal. Rptr.3d 519 (2006); see also Steinberg Moorad & Dunn, Inc. v. Dunn, 136 Fed. Appx. 6 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court must determine whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that it was not harmless error for court to submit to a jury whether defendants conduct was unfair under the ucl
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court did not err in granting summary judgment to AAIC. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 1 . James S. Easter, Jr. died during the pendency of these proceedings. Pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43, Edward R. Easter and Jeannette I. Easter have been substituted as parties in his place. 2 . Murray failed to file a timely notice of appeal of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and .2d 855, 859 (7th Cir.1985) (concluding that intervention under Rule 24 requires interest greater than that of standing). Because it did not explicitly mention standing — or even Rauscher — we will not assume that the Court in Treesdale contemplated standing in relation to its analysis of intervention and we need not today resolve the i 123 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Auto. Underwriters Corp. v. Graves, 489 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the injured party had standing to appeal the declaratory judgment in favor of the insurance company and noting that it was decisive to the holding that dairyland named the injured appellants in its declaratory judgment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injuries. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Tupelo, Inc. v. Long, 362 So.2d 182, 184 (Miss.1978) (citing Struthers Wells-Gulfport, Inc. v. Bradford, 304 So.2d 645 (Miss.1974); Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, 233 So.2d 811 (Miss.1970)). The court explained that, in most cases, the time of a work-related injury will be found to coincide with the accident; however, there may be instances where the extent of the injury could not reasonably have been ascertained by medical evidence at the time of the accident. Id. at 185. Accordingly, “the two-year limitation statute does not begin to run until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained.” Id. at 184 (citations omitted); see also Quaker Oats v. Miller, 370 So.2d 1363, 1366 (Miss.1979) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 8. Here, the ALJ determined that based on

    ### Response:
    holding the time period for filling a claim does not begin to run until the claimant judged by the standard of a reasonable person recognizes the nature seriousness and probable compensable character of his injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the information filed by the Statewide Prosecutor. Nor did he ever file a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. Instead, he pleaded no contest to the charges against him without preserving any alleged errors or reserving his right to appeal any pre-plea rulings of the trial court. Now, five years after the plea, he seeks to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Statewide Prosecutor in this untimely rule 3.850 motion. I recognize that if the Statewide Prosecutor files an information but lacks jurisdiction to prosecute the case, the trial court’s jurisdiction is not properly invoked. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 917 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); cf. Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736 (1927) (<HOLDING>). As such, any judgment arising from that

    ### Response:
    holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the third element of the offense, that he was a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 6 . Even a Class 5 felony is punishable by a term exceeding one year. Colorado Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401. 7 . Banks also argues that the assessment of one point for committing the instant offense within two years of release from custody for another offense was in error, because he served time for the other charge after the instant conduct and not before. USSG § 4A1.1 (e), comment (n.5) (noting that this section applies only if the conduct occurs after the release from custody). The government admits this error. As a result, Banks has 13 criminal history points, not 14. Nevertheless, he is still in criminal history category VI. See United States v. Evans, 285 F.3d 664, 674 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). LOKEN, Chief Judge, concurring. I join the

    ### Response:
    recognizing as harmless miscalculations that have no effect on the ultimate category
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1074 (La.1981). The record clearly reflects that the trial court considered the sentencing guidelines in particularizing defendant’s sentences. The trial judge stated for the record the circumstances he took into account and their factual basis in imposing sentence on the defendant. The trial court has wide discretion in imposing sentence, and a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be deemed constitutionally excessive absent manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210 (La.1982). Focusing on the constitutional claim advanced by the defendant, the jurisprudence suggests that the defendant’s individual sentences are neither shocking nor grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crimes committed. See State v. Anderson, 603 So.2d 780 (La.App. 1 Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), writ granted in 6part and denied in part, 609

    ### Response:
    holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been significantly lower in spring 1997, Craig's earnings would not have required restatement, and the stock value would not have plummeted. 13 . The government cites only a withdrawn version of Romero-Rendon, 198 F.3d at 748, withdrawn by 220 F.3d 1159. The government maintains that Romero-Rendon states that preponderance of the evidence is an adequate standard where the defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the sentencing report. The superceding version of our decision in that case, however, did not so hold. 14 . Berger's reliance on Staten and Zolp is misplaced. Neither Staten nor Zolp focused on the standard of proof, and therefore neither calls into question our holdings in Riley, Armstead, or Garro. See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Staten considered the viability of

    ### Response:
    holding that where a statement is merely a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panels full attention it is not binding on later panels
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), made it clear that no “taking” is established “simply by showing that [plaintiffs] have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest [in air space] that they heretofore had believed was available for development ....” As in Penn Central, Greenspring continues to be able to use its building as it has in the past, and the Ordinance does not prohibit all air development, just development higher than 35 feet. Moreover, the rationales cited by the County to support its enactment of the Ordinance clearly fall within those recognized by the courts as reasonable bases for zoning laws. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 828-29 (4th Cir.1995)(<HOLDING>). In urging passage of the Ordinance, County

    ### Response:
    holding that proper bases for zoning determinations include concern about further growth in rural areas residential density community aesthetics traffic congestion and water supplies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maria Antonia Herrera Estrada, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for r 5) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Herrera Estrada’s refusal to

    ### Response:
    holding that minor abuse during brief detention did not compel finding of past persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and case law, it possessed no authority to compel visitation between a child and a person who is not a parent. Further, the court ruled that Florida law does not recognize a claim for specific performance of a contract for visitation with an unrelated third party. Because we are considering a question of law in determining whether the allegations of a complaint state a cause of action, we review an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action by the de novo standard of review. Agu lding that, because no compelling state interest underlies grandparent visitation statute, such a statute is unconstitutional as an impermissible government interference in a parent’s fundamental right to rear a child); Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036, 1039-40 (Fla.2000)(<HOLDING>). In adopting the explicit constitutional right

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing courts to recognize grandparents as having the same standing as parents for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child where the child actually resided with the grandparents in a stable relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ma, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen and review de novo due process claims. Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.2004). We deny the petition for review. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Ma’s motion to reopen due to the lack of prejudice from her former attorney’s failure to file an application for cancellation of removal, where Ma has not established plausible grounds for success on the merits of such an application. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Singh, 367 F.3d at 1190 (stating

    ### Response:
    holding that the absence of plausible grounds for relief rebuts the presumption of prejudice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    According to LGE, Intel’s sale of microprocessors and chipsets to Defendants was n fendants’ contention that a patentee may not impose more onerous conditions on someone who purchases the patented device from a licensee than on the licensee. However, the mere fact that LGE is entitled to impose conditions on the sale of the essential components of its patented products does not mean that it actually did so here. To the contrary, Defendants’ purchase of the microprocessors and chip-sets from Intel was unconditional, in that Defendants’ purchase of microprocessors and chipsets from Intel was in no way conditioned on their agreement not to combine the Intel microprocessors and chipsets with other non-Intel parts and then sell the resultant products. Cf. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 709 (<HOLDING>). Nor does the fact that Intel informed its

    ### Response:
    holding that conditional sales of patented devices are not per se illegal but remanding to the district court to determine if the sales at issue were actually conditional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    suit to continue in both the state and federal courts would likely subject all of the parties to conflicting legal obligations in a manner prohibited by Rule 19(a)(2)(ii). As the district court noted, in the instant case both courts are being asked to make determinations on the validity and interpretation of the Agreement, creating a high likelihood of incongruous results. In previous cases we have ruled that the increased potential for inconsistent judgments is grounds for finding a non-joined party necessary. See Real Driveaway Co., 173 F.3d 915, 918-19 (4th Cir.1999) (continuing without the necessary party is impermissible because permitting the suit to proceed without un-joined parties could subject a joined party to conflicting legal obligations); Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1286-87 (<HOLDING>). See also Window Glass Cutters League of

    ### Response:
    holding that the potential for factual and legal whipsaw favored finding that the unjoined party was necessary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). 45 . Id. 46 . Contracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 655, 666 (D.Kan.1999). 47 . Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1902 (2014). 48 . An heir at law is the person ""designated by statute who succeeds to the estate of a deceased person.” Johnson v. McArthur, 226 Kan. 128, 596 P.2d 148, 152 (1979). When a deceased leaves children but no spouse, the children are the heirs at law. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-506. Here, William Draughon left children and no spouse. Thus, the heirs at law are his children. 49 . Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.080.1 (2014). 50 . Whether this case is decided in a federal court sitting in Kansas or Missouri has no bearing on whether Kansas or Missouri law applies. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) (<HOLDING>). 51 . 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 52 . Richards v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    answered with “three mistakes.” None of the three mistakes, however, commented on the IME results that Briggs had a sedentary functional capacity. Therefore, Liberty reasonably concluded that Dr. Anchor’s failure to comment suggested that he agreed with the IME’s conclusion that Briggs had a. sedentary capacity. Even considering the facts in the light most favorable to Briggs, this case amounts’to Briggs’s treating physicians and the non-treating physicians having conflicting clinical findings. Although Liberty cannot arbitrarily ignore the opinions of Briggs’s treating physicians, it reasonably may choose to value the opinions of its own medical consultants over his treating physician. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, an independent medical examiner and an

    ### Response:
    holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions although administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to credit them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the government presented insufficient evidence to prove that (1) he was part of the conspiracy and (2) that he conspired to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. To evaluate a sufficiency claim like Bantam’s, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government’s favor. United States v. Conrad, 507 F.3d 424, 432 (6th Cir.2007); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Then we ask whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ba th Cir.2008) (stating that evidence of repeat purchases supports the inference that a defendant is a co-conspirator, not merely a buyer or seller); United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 334 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539, 545

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants involvement in repeat drug transactions with coconspirators supported the inference that he was a coconspirator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to hear fewer than all of such witnesses, that should also be within the court’s discretionary power and a reviewing court should reverse only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. See Sims, 21 Ill. 2d at 434 (House, J., specially concurring, joined by Bristow and Klingbiel, JJ.); cf. Brooks, 115 Ill. 2d 510 (where material witness rule restrictively interpreted as requiring the testimony of those present during the alleged misconduct). The trial court was satisfied that the ruling on the motion to suppress was supported by the evidence and saw no need to call Owen, Lacy or the red-haired officer. Considering Owen’s trial testimony that he was present at the 1 a.m. interview and that defendant confessed in detail (see People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23, 36 (<HOLDING>)), Spivey’s testimony that defendant said that

    ### Response:
    holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if any. And again, Herrington’s cited cases on this point are distinguishable and not to the contrary. For example, in In re Gould, irreparable harm existed because if the decision to set aside the sale and order rebidding was not immediately appealable, “doubts would linger in any subsequent sale of the property, impeding administration of the estate.” In re Gould, 977 F.2d at 1041; see also In re Irvin, 950 F.2d at 1319. Moreover, it is unpersuasive to argue, as Herrington does, that this case is comparable to appeals from the initial decision regarding the appointment of an examiner or trustee, which the Fourth Circuit has found to be final and immediately appealable. See Dalkon Shield, 828 F.2d at 241; see also In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The decision to review on immediate appeal

    ### Response:
    holding that order appointing trustee is immediately appealable and citing numerous cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule, but emanates from the inherent power of the court. See A. Hollow Metal Warehouse v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 700 F.Supp. 410, 411-12 (N.D.Ill.1988). Not only is a motion to reconsider an allowable method of reviewing a prior order, it is the most appropriate and advantageous method of seeking relief from an interlocutory order for a party to pursue. The beneficial aspect of distinguishing between the two methods of relief is readily apparent when the strict standard for granting relief under Rule 60(b) is contrasted with the practically unbridled discretion of a district court to reconsider a previous interlocutory order. Compare Greene v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. of America, 764 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir.1985), and United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 604 (3d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>), with Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Wiseley, 884

    ### Response:
    recognizing plenary power of district court to alter interlocutory orders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Const, amend. VI. “The right to trial by an impartial jury ‘guarantees ... a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’ ” Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 359 (4th Cir.2006) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). The analysis of the Defendant’s juror bias claim begins with the Supreme Court’s holding in McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), “that to obtain a new trial [on a juror bias claim], a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845; Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We believe the district court properly found

    ### Response:
    recognizing the applicability of the mcdonough standard to federal criminal proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constitute adverse employment actions under Title VII. While the federal courts have consistently held that suspen sions “with pay” are not adverse employment actions, they have just'as consistently.,- held that suspensions “without- pay” constitute adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Luster v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 652 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir.2011) (“Luster’s suspension without pay before he resigned was an adverse employment action sufficient to satisfy the third element for purposes of summary judgment.”); D.D.C.2013) (Plaintiffs arguments that, “in light of her five-day unpaid suspension and administrative leave, she has suffered an adverse employment action ... are well founded”); cf. Jones v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:05-CV-137, 2007 WL 1574115, at *7 (S.D.Ohio May 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Esparza’s two three-day

    ### Response:
    holding oneday unpaid suspension not an adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him the Passenger Sales Representative or Account Manager positions because he suffered no adverse employment action. “An adverse employment action is one which is more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An adverse employment action works a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000). “Because there are no bright-line rules, courts must pore over each case to determine whether the challenged employment action reaches the level of ‘adverse.’ ” Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir.1997). “Ex-ampies of materially adverse changes include termi 21, 132 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (<HOLDING>). There are some circumstances under which a

    ### Response:
    holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff's expert witness in order to sanction Plaintiff for noncompliance with a scheduling order. We note, however, that the reasons for the trial court’s sanction would seem to disappear on remand. 2 . At oral argument, Defendant raised for the first time the issue of waiver, claiming Plaintiff did not adequately object to Instruction No. 17 and therefore cannot now complain about its insufficiency. Pursuant to our rules of civil procedure, ""[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection.” Utah R.Civ.P. 51; see also Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Utah 1980) (<HOLDING>); Van-Dyke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distribs.,

    ### Response:
    holding defendants assignment of error failed because in taking exception to instruction defendant had not specified claimed error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jury instructions explaining the purpose for admitting prior bad acts evidence and advance notice of the intent to introduce such evidence provide additional protection to defendants. See Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. We review the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. See id. at 995. Hodge does not challenge the reliability of the admitted evidence. Rather, he contends that it was irrelevant, unnecessary, and unduly prejudicial. We conclude, however, that the evidence of Hodge’s 1996 drug transactions was relevant and necessary in that it tended to show the existence of a continuing narcotics business and therefore to show Hodge’s knowledge of the drug trade and his intent to distribute the cocaine found in his Jeep. See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 264-65

    ### Response:
    holding that a notguilty plea places defendants intent at issue and evidence of similar prior crimes can thus be relevant to prove intent to commit charged crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In other words, by the nature of the proceedings, the individual does not have the liberty of arranging for the test himself, so the statute makes at least one provision for police assistance, which is police transportation to the independent testing facility. However, that the statute does not provide for a phone call to obtain the necessary funds should not foreclose that individual’s right. Indeed, to hold as such would render meaningless the requirement of the statute that the individual be given the opportunity to obtain an independent chemical analysis of his blood, and would further sanction police misconduct in misinforming an indmdual about the test and preventing an individual from obtaining such a test. See State v. Weaver, 86 Ohio App.3d 427, 621 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Other jurisdictions having similar statutory

    ### Response:
    holding that suppression of stateadministered breath test is necessary where the accused is denied access to a telephone despite his requests to arrange an independent chemical test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of law, unless one of the aforementioned exceptions applies. To infer otherwise from cases where this Court has been less than precise in applying the well-established analytical framework for suicide cases seriously undermines the doctrine of stare decisis as it applies to this particular line of jurisprudence. 31 250 Ga. App. 472 (552 SE2d 865) (2001). 32 188 Ga. App. 106 (372 SE2d 265) (1988). 33 See Purcell, 250 Ga. App. at 475 (1); Brandvain, 188 Ga. App. at 116 (3) (b). 34 Purcell, 250 Ga. App. at 475 (1). 35 Id. 36 See id. at 475-76 (2). 37 See Brandvain, 188 Ga. App. at 109-10. 38 See id. at 111. 39 See id. at 112 (2). 40 Id. at 112-13 (2). 41 Id. at 116 (3) (b) (punctuation omitted). 42 See id. 43 Cf. Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200-01 (1) (296 SE2d 693) (1982) (<HOLDING>); Peterson, 315 Ga. App. at 375-78 (3)

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Balanced against the potential for confusion is the intent expressed by at least 2,000 Minnesota registered voters that their candidates and presidential electors appear as representatives of the Reform Party. Those Minnesota voters indicated their desire to have Hagelin and Gold-haber on the ballot as representatives of the principles espoused by the Reform Party, and we do not lightly set aside their wishes. Instead we find a strong presumption in favor of giving effect to the wishes of those nominators. Indeed, this court has allowed the party name on the ballot to differ from that on the nominating petition in only two instances. In both instances the court acted to give effect to the party name protection act, however. See Lind v. Scott, 87 Minn. 316, 318, 92 N.W. 96, 97 (1902) (<HOLDING>); Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 220, 92

    ### Response:
    holding petition nominating candidate under social democratic party violated party name protection act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the arbitration provision in this case falls very much within the holding in Thomas. Accord Kovacs v. Carnival Corp., 2009 WL 4980277, Case No. 09-22630-CV-HUCK (S.D.Fla. Dec. 21, 2009) (remanding case because, inter alia, [there would be a prospective waiver of plaintiffs U.S. statutory remedies if the Court were] to compel arbitration of seaman’s Jones Act claim where Panamanian law would apply at arbitration); Pavon v. Carnival Corp., Case No. 09-22935-CV-LENARD (S.D.Fla. Jan. 20, 2010) (remanding seaman’s Jones Act claims in part because to arbitrate such claims would [prospectively waive Jones Act’s imposition of] strict liability on employers for the negligence of its employees); see also Sorica v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., Case No. 09-20917-HUCK (S.D.Fla. Aug. 4, 2009) (<HOLDING>) [.] The Court is not persuaded by the argument

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a provision providing for arbitration under bermuda law in a bermuda forum of a jones act claim is void under the thomas analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law. These questions are abstractly interesting, but ultimately unimportant in the resolution of this matter. National Association anticipated Chevron’s framing of judicial review of agency statutory interpretation as an inquiry into an agency’s delegated authority and its action within that authority. “Chevron is principally concerned with whether an agency has authority to act under a statute.” Arent v. Skalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C.Cir.1995). Chevron analysis “is focused on discerning the boundaries of Congress’ delegation of authority to the agency; and as long as the agency stays within that delegation, it is free to make policy choices in interpreting the statute, and such interpretations are entitled to deference.” Id.; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. at 2170-71 (<HOLDING>). With these principles in mind, it is evident

    ### Response:
    holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    than it would be without the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Vallejo, 532 Pa. 558, 616 A.2d 974, 976 (1992). Here, the trial court refused to permit Elliott to introduce evidence that Nardone died in 1994 after assaulting his girlfriend, finding that such evidence had no bearing on whether Elliott committed the victim’s murder in 1992. N.T., Oct. 24, 1994, at 168-71. Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. The fact that Nardone may have physically assaulted a woman in 1994, causing her to inflict injury upon Nardone, does not make it more probable than not that Nardone, and not Elliott, murdered the victim in 1992. Elliott’s contrary theory constitutes nothing more than rank speculation. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 554 Pa. 1, 720 A.2d 679, 686 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Cook, 544 Pa. 361, 676 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions combined with the above noted judicial and legislative recognition of this privilege, overcome any impediment caused by the Advisory Committee’s decision to not list this privilege in its draft. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47, 100 S.Ct. 906 (noting that Rule 501 did not freeze the law governing privileges but directed the federal courts to “continue the evolutionary development” of privilege law). Conclusion Given the “overwhelming public interest” in providing physicians with a confidential context in which to evaluate the effectiveness of life-saving techniques and procedures, the Court is compelled to recognize the self-critical analysis privilege in the context of morbidity and mortality conferences and will apply it in this ease. See Harris Methodist, 970 F.2d at 101 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Clearly the public good —

    ### Response:
    recognizing an overwhelming public interest in promoting improvement in health care through the mechanism of physician peer review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    establish pretext so as to make summary judgment improper. In this case, while the indirect evidence and direct evidence are independently sufficient to allow the Chuangs to proceed to trial, it is the cumulative evidence to which a court ultimately looks. 1. Indirect Evidence It is not quite accurate to say that at this point the burden of production shifts back to the Chuangs. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, a disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of the employer’s proffered reasons. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., — .U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at

    ### Response:
    holding that if factfinder rejects employers proffered nondiseriminatory reasons as unbelievable it may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination without additional proof of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    explanation of its failure to call the witness. In such instances, the State cannot meet its burden as a matter of law, unless there is sufficient other evidence to overcome the inference. But the cases do not hold that before police interrogate a suspect at least two officers must be present so that one can corroborate the other in the event of a suppression hearing. Neither do the cases require police to obtain a written acknowledgment and written waiver of rights. As indicated by the Supreme Court in State v. Myers, where circumstances demonstrate that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that a defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights, the fact that a corroborating witness was not produced is not critical. See Myers, 86 Wn.2d 419, 428-29, 545 P.2d 538 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Here, the detective failed to ask Haack to

    ### Response:
    holding that signed waivers and police testimony describing the procedure used to obtain the waivers were sufficient to find a voluntary waiver of rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In exchange for a favorable plea, Edens apparently could have provided valuable testimony undermining Lemons’ defense. Edens had witnessed the conspiratorial conversation that took place between Lemons and Rider and arguably could have testified that Lemons was not forced to participate in the robbery, contrary to Lemons’ claim. It appears that Edens was the least culpable defendant in this case and his observations regarding his more culpable codefendant Lemons might have been offered in exchange for a plea agreement with the government. No such effort was made on Edens’ behalf because such an arrangement would have been in direct conflict with Lemons’ defense. See Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 397 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2307, 73 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Edens contends that Schultz failed

    ### Response:
    holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a conflict of interest he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one defendants behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the eodefendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    position, whereby it could be allowed to mislead the trier of fact as to the contents of the inadmissible writing. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Marie Gorostieta to testify as to the amounts contained in the medical bills. IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 142 The Gorostietas allege that the trial court erred in removing a sentence from a requested jury instruction that had been taken verbatim from section 41-6-80 of the Utah Code. In addition, they argue that the court erred in giving jury instructions 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28. Parkinson counters that the jury instructions given by the court covered all aspects of the applicable law in this case and there was no prejudicial error in removing the sentence complai W.2d 646, 654 (Tex.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 128 Vt.

    ### Response:
    holding that statute allows admissibility of evidence by affidavit to prove reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Superior Court's ruling. See Commonwealth v. G. Williams, 586 Pa. 770, 895 A.2d 1261 (2006) (per curiam). 6 . In G. Williams, we also held that the sanctions prescribed by Megan's Law II for an SVP’s non-compliance with the Act’s RNC provisions, which provided a minimum penalty of lifetime probation, qualified as punitive, and were unconstitutional inasmuch as they came into play only upon judicial factfinding by clear and convincing evidence, in violation of Apprendi. We struck and severed those provisions, which have since been recodified and diminished. G. Williams, 832 A.2d at 985-86. Their validity is not presently before us. 7 . Neither court considered whether and to what extent the offending provisions were severable from Megan’s Law II. Cf., e.g., G. Williams, 832 A.2d at 986 (<HOLDING>). Because we reverse the trial courts’ rulings,

    ### Response:
    holding certain penalties that applied to noncompliant svp unconstitutional but determining that those provisions could be severed from the rest of megans law ii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and that the EEOC routinely treats such questionnaires as charges. See id. (considering EEOC’s treatment of questionnaire as a factor in determining whether a charging party manifested intent to activate the administrative process). UPS contends, however, that the EEOC did not actually treat Mr. Jones’s questionnaire as a charge. It notes that the EEOC twice told Mr. Jones that it was not treating the questionnaire as a charge of discrimination and that it never notified UPS that a charge had been filed, which it ordinarily must do within ten days of the filing of a charge, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a). But the EEOC later sent Mr. Jones a dismissal and notice of his right to sue, which indicates it ultimately treated the questionnaire as a formal charge. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1321 (<HOLDING>). Even though the EEOC ultimately treated the

    ### Response:
    holding that the eeocs ultimate response combined with  other relevant facts would convince a reasonable person that plaintiff manifested her intent to activate the administrative machinery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    orders of probation. Ms. Clussman preserved the necessary points by filing motions pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). First, the sentences imposed in count II of each case — sixty months in prison followed by two years of probation — are illegal, because Ms. Clussman was convicted of third-degree felonies in each of these counts. A sixty-month term of imprisonment is the maximum sentence that the trial court could have legally imposed for a third-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). The state concedes error on this point. Next, the trial court did not orally pronounce special conditions of probation 3 and 20 at sentencing. They must therefore be stricken from the written order of probation. See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the trial court erred by imposing a

    ### Response:
    holding special conditions of probation must be imposed at sentencing and may not be imposed at resentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    species of professional negligence where the parties involved have been in a professional relationship. See Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d 738, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1979); See abo Architectural Malpractice: Toward an Equitable Rule for Determining When the Statute of Limitations Begins to Run, 16 Fordham Urb.LJ. 509 (1988). Also, we note that some jurisdictions explicitly require direct privity for the malpractice statute of limitations to apply. See Fla.Stat. § 95.-ll(4)(a) (1991); Baskerville-Donovan v. Pensacola Exec., 581 So.2d 1301 (Fla.Í991). 5 . Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that engineers and architects are professionals for purposes of statutes of limitations for malpractice actions. See e.g. Board of Regents v. Wibcam Mullins Birge, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 478 (Neb.1988) (<HOLDING>); Vandevelde v. Falb City Builders, Inc., 744

    ### Response:
    holding that architects and engineers were professionals for purposes of twoyear statute of limitations for professional negligence actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (""The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.”); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer ""not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement""); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act ""would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination”). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (<HOLDING>), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated,

    ### Response:
    holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sufficient evidence that, if believed, would convince the average mind of Kingsland’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The state’s evidence showed that the drugs were found in the pickup, that neither the driver nor Kingsland owned hio-1, 2003 WL 23108, at ¶ 6-12 (concluding that insufficient evidence supported driver’s conviction for possession of cocaine when driver sped up after a police cruiser pulled behind him, the packet of crack cocaine was not in driver’s reach or line of sight, no one saw driver duck down, it was dark outside and inside the truck, and the state merely speculated that the defendant rather than the passenger placed the packet on the floor beside the transmission hump); see also State v. Smith, Logan App. No. 8-04-40, 2005-Ohio-3233, 2005 WL 1503954, at ¶ 7 (<HOLDING>). {¶ 21} Likewise, we do not believe that the

    ### Response:
    holding that insufficient evidence supported the defendants conviction for possession of cocaine when officers executed a warrant on a small oneroom apartment and found large quantities of crackcocaine in plain view although the defendant supplied police with a false name when they questioned him at the apartment there was no evidence that the defendant had drugs on his person or that he had ever used cocaine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is consistent with how the agency has interpreted “intended use” outside of the ANDA approval context to mean “the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs.” 21 C.F.R. § 201.128. Under that regulation, intent “is determined by such persons’ expressions” or “may be shown by the circumstanc ows FDA to permit Sandoz to promote misbranded drugs. But the ANDA approval stage is not the point in time at which FDA must evaluate a generic’s purpose beyond that which is set forth in the ANDA itself. If Sandoz improperly deviates from that stated purpose by marketing its drug for the Colorectal Indication, FDA can pursue a later enforcement action to ensure the generic is labeled accurately. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Because FDA’s interpretation of the Orphan

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a manufacturers direct advertising or explicit promotion of a products offlabel uses is likely to provoke an fda misbranding or intended use enforcement action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a jury trial. Id., 546 A.2d at 1224. Although it is indeed true that the PHRA to a large extent reflects the aims and substance of Title VII, in deciding whether a statutory right to a jury trial exists, it is the remedial provisions of the two laws that are crucial. Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to provide for bench trials exclusively in all Title VII actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4). However, prior to that amendment, federal courts based their determinations that plaintiffs had no right to a jury trial under Title VII on the equitable nature of the remedial provisions of that act. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, in Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s

    ### Response:
    holding that back pay was an integral part of title vips equitable remedies and that therefore no right to jury trial existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy differs slightly from the Prodigy policy in that XL’s policy requires only that notice of a claim be given “as soon as practicable” and does not contain a clear-cut reporting deadline. See id. at 379 n. 7 (discussing difference between standard “claims-made” and “claims-made-and-reported” policies). However, the same reasons for requiring the insurer to demonstrate prejudice ap ply: FIC gave notice of the claim within the policy’s scope of coverage, i.e., before XL could “close its books” on the policy. Because XL was not denied the benefit of the elaims-made nature of its policy, it could not deny coverage based on FIC’s immaterial breach of the policy’s prompt-notice provision. See id. at 377; see also PAJ, Inc. v. The Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Tex.2008) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an immaterial breach does not deprive the insurer of the benefit of the bargain and thus cannot relieve the insurer of the contractual coverage obligation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to.” S left the motel on the following morning, leaving the defendant a note in which “she told him she liked him.” The charges against the defendant were filed on the following day. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere, specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. At the outset, the defendant makes clear that he does not attempt to defend his conduct; indeed, he freely acknowledges that it is reprehensible. What he does defend is his right to be charged under a statute which embraces such conduct. Thus, while he suggests that he may have been prosecuted for lewd cohabitation, § 798.02, Fla.Stat. (1981); prostitution, § 796.07, Fla.Stat. (1981); see Tatzel v. State, 356 So.2d 787 (Fla.1978) (<HOLDING>); or contributing to the delinquency of a

    ### Response:
    holding constitutional the defining of licentious sexual intercourse without consideration as prostitution under section 79607
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or both the county where the death occurred and the county where the injury occurred. 58 A.L.R.5th 535, 599-607. The first category of states looks to the county where death occurred. These states focus on the fact that wrongful death actions do not arise until there has been a death. Department of Transportation v. Evans, 269 Ga. 400, 499 S.E.2d 321 (1998) (affirming the appellate court decision in Evans v. Dept. of Transp., 226 Ga. App. 74, 75,485 S.E.2d 243 [1997]); Wentz v. Montana Power Co., 280 Mont. 14, 19, 928 P.2d 237 (1996); Gabriel v. School Dist. #4, Libby, 264 Mont. 177, 180, 870 P.2d 1351 (1994); Engel v. Gosper, 71 N.J. Super. 573, 579, 177 A.2d 595 (1962). See McDaniel v. Reed, 613 So. 2d 758, 760 (La. App. 1993); but cf. Keele v. Knecht, 621 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 1993) (<HOLDING>). A second category of states looks to the

    ### Response:
    holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CBT and of changing economic conditions. Like the apportionment factors in 1945, the “entire net income” base, added in 1958 (L.1958, c. 63, § 3), was derived substantially verbatim from its New York statutory counterpart. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 107 N.J. 307, 315-16, 526 A.2d 1029, 1033-34 (1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 66, 109 S.Ct. 1617, 104 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989). By the time the New Jersey Legislature adopted the “entire net income” base, New York had long since amended its property factor expressly to include “rented” real property. The Legislature, however, did not adopt the New York property factor amendment. N.Y.Tax Law § 210(10) (added by L.1949, c. 848, § 3); see Airwork Serv. Div. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 290, 294, 478 A.2d 729, 731 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662,

    ### Response:
    holding purposeful and deliberate omission on enactment of new jersey sales and use tax of exemption found in new york counterpart act which served as the model for new jersey act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must be built. Gaithersburg West and Aspen Hill are candidates for becoming impact districts, but further plans for these areas must be completed before the County can make a decision. The validity of impact fees or taxes to fund construction of public roads has been the subject of litigation in several jurisdictions. The appellate courts in those jurisdictions, like the Court of Appeals in Eastern Diversified, have generally abrogated the fees on the ground that the municipality exceed ed its authority. New Jersey Builders Ass’n v. Bernards Township, 108 N.J. 223, 528 A.2d 555, 560 (1987); Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So.2d 371, 375-76 (Fla.App. 4th Dist.1975). See also Albany Area Builders v. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 47 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630, 546 N.E.2d 920, 923 (N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). The distinction between those cases and the

    ### Response:
    holding guilderlands local law was preempted by new york state law which provided a comprehensive scheme for funding road construction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.”), with U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt., n. (l)(B)(iv) (defining a “drug trafficking offense” as “an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.”); see also United States v. Ford, 509 F.3d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). If Mr. Barrow’s more recent conviction is for

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the terms controlled substance offense and drug trafficking offense have nearly identical ussg definitions and using past decisions interpreting drug trafficking offense to analyze a challenge involving a controlled substance offense because the issues raised in those past decisions were closely analogous to the issue in the present case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to encroach upon the jury’s traditional domain. Villalon, 956 N.E.2d at 704. The court further determined that its juvenile waiver statute did not implicate Apprendi's “core concerns”: [T]he waiver statute does not set forth the elements of an offense, does not provide for a determination of guilt or inno cence, and is not directed to consequences after adjudication of guilt. It does not provide a sentencing enhancement correlated with the State’s proof of a particular fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute does not implicate the core concerns of Apprendi. Villalon, 956 N.E.2d at 704. Thus, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that he was entitled to have a jury determine the facts supporting the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction. Villalo 919 (Ct. App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); People v. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d 685,

    ### Response:
    holding that statute allowing for transfer of juvenile to adult criminal court does not implicate apprendi because the judges transfer determination does not subject the juvenile to enhanced punishment it subjects the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial court or challenge Judge Carlson for cause. Wylie has not shown how he was prejudiced by any conversations between Judge Cranston’s secretary and Judge Carlson. We find no plain error. SENTENCING ISSUES Wylie contends that a separate conviction for failure to stop, AS 28.35.050, failure to assist, AS 28.35.060, and failure to contact the authorities, AS 28.35.080, violate double jeopardy because the felony offense of failure to assist is a lesser-in-eluded offense of the misdemeanor failure to stop and failure to contact the authorities. The Supreme Court of Alaska has characterized these statutes as an interlocking scheme, not greater or lesser offenses. Convictions for both offenses would not appear to violate double jeopardy. See Drahosh v. State, 442 P.2d 44, 49 (Alaska 1968) (<HOLDING>). In Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69,

    ### Response:
    holding that leaving the scene and failing to render assistance are separate and distinct offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Owens’ repeated forgetfulness and his wondrous recollection of a never-before-mentioned incriminating conversation. Crumpler could have—and indeed appears to have—exposed Owens’ duplicitous motivations for providing testimony without depending on the fact that Owens once fancied himself the “smartest man in the world” be revealed in open court. See, e.g., Tr. vol. 13, 123-25, 134-35, 138-40. Compare Tr. vol. 13, 123 (“A [Owens:] I don’t know what a perjury conviction is.”), with 134 (“Q [Counsel:] But you drew the line at perjury? A [Owens:] I did.”) and 135 (“A [Owens:] I came to the conclusion that to keep the house of cards together, I would have to commit perjury. And that was a line that I was not willing to cross.”). See United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 630 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Not only was Crumpler’s proposed line of

    ### Response:
    holding that limitation on scope and breadth of crossexamination did not significantly curtail effectiveness of witness crossexamination because crossexamination was lengthy and extensive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Corbet Craddock owned the parcel in 1980, the Keeper’s argument would still miss the mark. After all, Bailey’s research suggests that Corbet Craddock died in 1983. Moreover, the Keeper’s argument ignores the plaintiffs’ contention that Nellie Craddock lacked authorization to object for Corbet Craddock. Thus, from the same discrete source, the Keeper cites (allegedly) favorable evidence and disregards unfavorable evidence. Such cherry-picking embodies arbitrary and capricious conduct. See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 237 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations omitted) (indicating that “there is no APA precedent allowing an agency to cherry-pick a study on which it has chosen to rely”); cf. Shaw v. AT&T Umbrella Ben. Plan No. 1, 795 F.3d 538, 541, 546-47 (6th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, this argument fails. The Keeper

    ### Response:
    holding that under erisa a plan administrators decision to deny an employee longterm disability benefits is arbitrary and capricious if the administrator ignores favorable evidence  and selectively reviews the evidence it does consider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Crain counsels that a proper contract instruction communicates an “objective theory” of contract law. Id. at 916 (citation omitted). We believe that the district court provided an “objective theory” of contract law under Arkansas law and did not abuse its discretion. Having reviewed the jury instructions on the whole, we conclude that they fairly and accurately represent the evidence and applicable Arkansas law in light of the issues presented to the jury- Potlatch next argues that the district court erred when it provided the following jury instruction: Where a contract contains no express ag ., 773 F.2d 987, 989 (8th Cir.1985) (under Arkansas law, only a contract of an indefinite duration may be terminated at will); Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308, 310 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Delong v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an employment contract of an indefinite duration is terminable at will
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    creditors. See Matter of Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir.1990) (adopting the ""conceivable effect” formulation of the test for “related to” jurisdiction as set forth in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984)). 71 . The Court notes an absence of controlling Eleventh Circuit law on whether Rule 9(b) applies to claims of constructive fraudulent transfers and acknowledges the split in authority regarding this issue. See In re Oakwood Homes Corp., 325 B.R. 696, 698 (Bankr.D.Del.2005) (""There is no question that Rule 9(b) applies to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy which include a claim for relief under §§ 544 or 548, whether it is based upon actual or constructive fraud.”); contra In re Syntax-Brillian Corp., 2011 WL 3101809 *7 (Bankr.D.Del. July 25, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Regardless of whether Rule 9(b) applies to

    ### Response:
    holding that constructively fraudulent transfers are governed by rule 8
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims against the State of Louisiana is GRANTED. Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Hall’s Section 1983 claims against Jindal and Caldwell is DENIED. 2. Qualified Immunity In support of their motion, Jindal and Caldwell argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials sued in their individual capacities “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” James v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 526 Fed.Appx. 388, 391-392 (5th Cir.2013) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366,

    ### Response:
    holding that officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this firm will initiate an action in small claims court to collect the debt.” Id. The combined effect of these passages, in Reiner’s view, is to convey the idea that the consumer’s debt must be paid within thirty days, regardless of whether the consumer disputes the debt in question. Pl. Mem. at 5 (citing Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1998)). Reiner responds by asserting that, even if its statement regarding the time to cure a default was ambiguous, it cured any such ambiguity by including a statement in the letter that, “YOU MAY DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THE DEBT ... IN WRITING WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER ... OTHERWISE, THE DEBT WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE VALID.” Pl.Ex. 5; see also McStay v. I.C. System, Inc., 308 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The court finds that the language in Reiner’s

    ### Response:
    holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    manifested its intent to preempt 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by imposing misdemeanor penalties for violations of 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I), in contrast to the felony penalties associated with 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As this court has held, however, the fact that Congress has passed a specific statute with lenient penalties does not indicate that Congress intended to preempt a more general but more severe statute that would apply to the same offense. See Anderez, 661 F.2d at 407 (citations omitted). Furthermore, appellants fail to consider a crucial difference between 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(I) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Section 1857(1)(I) does not mention materiality and thus imposes no materiality requirement upon the government, cf. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 117 S.Ct. 921, 927, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997) (<HOLDING>), while § 1001 does have an explicit

    ### Response:
    holding that 18 usc  1014 has no materiality requirement because the statute does not so much as mention materiality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authorizing the use of force. Stewart’s complaint fails to meet this requirement. The adminisrators’ alleged policy of spraying prisoners with pepper spray for refusing to follow directions falls within the wide-ranging zone of deference accorded to prison officials in shaping “prophylactic or preventive measures intended to reduce the incidence of ... breaches of prison discipline.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Likewise, allegations that the administrators authorized corrections officers to dispense pepper spray across entire pod areas whenever an individual prisoner acts in a disruptive manner, and that they authorized the use of an “Israeli fogger” device, both fail to show that excessive force was used. Cf. Gomez, 298 F.3d at 903-04 (<HOLDING>). Deliberate Indifference. The district court

    ### Response:
    holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    all claims. MCL 600.2932(3). The Legislature also provided the court with authority to issue writs to permit the recovery of possession: “In an appropriate case the court may issue a writ of possession or restitution to the sheriff or other proper officer of any county in this state in which the premises recovered are situated.” Id. The cause of action stated under MCL 600.2932 is broader than that provided by the common-law claim for ejectment and the equitable action to quiet title— even when those causes of action are considered together; a careful reading shows that it includes any claim, whether actual or potential and without regard to the legal or equitable theory underlying the claim, as long as the claim concerns competing interests in land. See Adams, 276 Mich App at 714-721 (<HOLDING>). The only limits are those applicable to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a claim under mcl 6002932 includes all actions to decide interests in land even when the claim involves fraud or rescission and holding that the 15year period of limitations applies to such an action rather than the shorter periods applicable to typical claims for fraud and rescission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are satisfied. 3. Class Period Defendants seek a hearing to consider the range of stock prices over the proposed Class Period and possible reasons that may have contributed to the decline in Herley’s stock prices. In addition, Defendants seek to have the Court consider evidence concerning when Defendants first knew or should have known about the non-performing equipment claims that led to the April 26, 1994 press release. In effect, Defendants want the Court to make a decision on the merits during its consideration of the pending motion. To determine these issues at this time is inappropriate. Preliminary assessment on the merits should be deferred until later in the proceedings. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2152-53, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Sherin v. Gould, 115 F.R.D. 171, 174-75

    ### Response:
    holding that the court has no authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of an action to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which would constitute unlawful activity for purposes of The Travel Act is extortion, and for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has not plead extortion. D. Additional RICO Infirmities The Complaint also fails to state a RICO claim for reasons unique to each subsection of § 1962. To state a violation of § 1962(a), Plaintiff must allege that Defendants used income received from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in or establish an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. The Complaint fails to allege that Defendants received income from racketeering activity, acquired an interest in an enterprise, or established an enterprise. Therefore, for the reasons mentioned above, no violation of § 1962(a) has been stated. See Morin, 835 F.Supp. 126, 131-32 (<HOLDING>). No violation of § 1962(b) is stated because

    ### Response:
    holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to distribute, and to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and three counts of possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Serrano contends that the district court’s imposition of a 57-month sentence was unreasonable under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). A sentence is reasonable when the dist d.2d 832 (2006); see also United States v. Mix, 450 F.3d 375, 381 (9th Cir.2006) (amended) (“A district court is not required to refer to each factor listed in § 3553(a).”). Serrano makes three further contentions, all of which are foreclosed by our previous decisions. See United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 919-924 (9th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1484, 164

    ### Response:
    holding that retroactive application of postbooker remedial scheme does not violate ex post facto principles and that delegating authority to probation officer to assess drug treatment costs is not plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    First court declined to apply the fiduciary shield doctrine. Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 790,104 S.Ct. at 1487). In a more recent case, however, that same court, applied the fiduciary shield doctrine to defeat general jurisdiction. Garner v. Furmanite Australia Pty., Ltd., 966 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). In Garner the First Court of Appeals found no general jurisdiction against an employee of a company because the fiduciary shield doctrine protects the employee from personal jurisdiction when the employee’s actions are on behalf of his employer. Id. at 803. The Gamer opinion cited to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Stuart v. Spademan, as its source for the fiduciary shield doctrine. Id. (citing Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>)). There are a few other Texas cases that

    ### Response:
    holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is conferred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings, Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001), and we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that petitioners failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.2005). Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the IJ’s interpretation of the hardship standard falls within the broad range authorized by the statute. See Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1004-06 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioners’ due process challenge to the BIA’s decision is foreclosed by Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We do not consider whether petitioners

    ### Response:
    holding no due process violation where the bia affirms the ijs decision without issuing a separate opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of defendants-opening the doors for some of them to enjoy relief from a facially unconstitutional statute and closing the doors for others-raises concerns of due process, due course of law, equal protection, and equal access to courts. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 19; Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1500, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966) (“This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.”); Vaughn v. State, 931 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“The only right that the federal constitution confers to criminal de m. App. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 350 (Tex.

    ### Response:
    holding texas flagdesecration statute facially unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (applying finality and res judicata to agency decisions when the requirements of statutory and legal exceptions are not met); Strott v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 114, 117 (1991) (determining that the rules of issue and claim preclusion can form “a rational basis for a jurisdictional date denying judicial review to some and granting it to others” and that “ ‘issue and claim preclusion’ ... historically called ‘res judicata’ ... means that decisions once made are not subject to reexamination except for compelling reasons”). Traditionally, the principles of finality include two subdoctrines: (1) “Claim preclusion,” which addresses the preclusive effect of a judgment upon the subsequent relitigation of a claim or cause of action, see Bissonnette v. Principi 18 Vet.App. 105, 110-11 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Link v. West, 12 Vet.App. 39, 44 (1998)

    ### Response:
    holding that res judicata prevents relitigation of a claim that was previously the subject of a valid and final decision of this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injured party in as good a position as it would have been in but for the breach.” Id. We have stated that the “failure to allege cognizable damages compels the dismissal of the complaint.” Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1234 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 388, 70 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In this case, PONI alleges that as a result of MVP’s breach of the contract, PONI was required to pay a top-heavy contribution of $137,087.17 for the years 1991-1998, pay a fine of $5,000, and incur costs of $35,000. Analogizing to back-taxes cases, MVP argues that there was no harm because PONI would have had to pay the contribution amount even if MVP performed the top-heavy testing. MVP Br. at 35-37; see DCD Programs Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1451 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, MVP argues PONI would not have

    ### Response:
    holding that back taxes paid to the irs as a result of disallowed deductions are not recoverable damages against promoters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When warned by St. Peter that his threat of picketing Blue Cross constituted prohibited secondary activity, Coleman brazenly responded that he didn’t care. But there is more evidence from which this Court easily can infer an intent to exert unlawful pressure. During his deposition, Bouthillette explained that Lima, also an authorized agent of Local 254, told him during a recorded phone conversation that Local 254 would contact Blue Cross in order to sabotage Intercity’s relationship if the cleaning company did not accede to the union’s wishes. This testimony is bolstered by the transcriptions of those calls. Bouthillette’s conversation with Lima provides insight into Local 254’s reasons for calling St. Peter and corroborates St. Peter’s statement. See Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 756 (<HOLDING>). The evidence presented by plaintiff is not

    ### Response:
    holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remedy under § 4112.05. If so, Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiffs pursuit of administra tive relief precludes him from also getting relief from bringing a civil action under § 4112.02(N). The interpretation of the Ohio General Assembly’s intent in drafting an election of remedies into Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code is a matter of state law. The Ohio Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the issue of whether an EEOC filing equates with the election of an administrative remedy under § 4112.05, but it has expressed an unwillingness to interpret Chapter 4112’s election of remedy scheme to preclude an individual from pursuing both a federal and state law claim for age discrimination. See Morris v. Kaiser Engineers, Inc., 14 Ohio St.3d 45, 471 N.E.2d 471, 474 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Further, after Morris, the Sixth Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff who had previously filed a claim of age discrimination under  410117  411214 prior to recodification was not barred from later filing a charge with the ocrc under  411205 in order to meet the prerequisites for filing a federal age discrimination claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 (referring to AHUG as “plaintiff” suing “on behalf of its members”; the members were not named as “plaintiffs”).) 14 USCIT R. 10(a) states that “ [e]very pleading must have a caption with the court’s name, a title[,] a court number, and a Rule 7(a) designation. The caption of the summons and the complaint must name all the parties; the title of other pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally to other parties.” USCIT Rule 10 corresponds to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10. Congressional intent behind Rule 10, which discounts claims where the complaint fails to sufficiently identify a party, is rooted in concern for providing notice to the parties in an action and protecting the public interest. See Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 160 (N.D. Cal. 1981)(<HOLDING>). Although AHUG claims that three utility

    ### Response:
    holding the purpose behind fed r civ p 10 is not solely one of administrative convenience but serves to apprise the parties of their opponents and it protects the publics legitimate interest in knowing all the facts and events surrounding court proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he was not a percipient witness to the events in the alley. At best, he could only testify to what he heard as he was taking a shower. Given the tangential nature of the testimony he offered, his testimony would not have undermined the evidence offered by the State. Similarly, although there was evidence that Tapia and Suarez heard shots in the alley and that they would have testified that they saw a red Blazer exit the alley after the shots, their testimony would not have contradicted or undermined the prosecution’s case. Unlike those cases in which we have found that the deficient performance was prejudicial, here, the additional witnesses would not have provided Villagrana with an alibi or exonerating evidence. See, e.g., Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to investigate and present the confession of a third party deprived defendant of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    child. Cohen reasoned that if a set-off of social security benefits had been intended, provision therefor should have been made in the settlement agreement which required child support. Similarly, in the case before us, if the intentions of the parties had been to permit a set-off for social security payments, the settlement agreement should have so provided. See Craver v. Craver, 649 S.W.2d 440 (Mo.1983) (refusing to permit, as a matter of law, a set-off of social security payments to the wife drawn on the husband’s account against support payments owed by the husband). We are cognizant of the husband’s argument that the wife waived her right to full alimony by not objecting to the reduced payments for approximately fifteen months. See Stephenson v. Stephenson, 52 So.2d 684 (Fla.1951) (<HOLDING>). But waiver is the intentional relinquishment

    ### Response:
    recognizing waiver by acquiescence as a possible defense to an action for past due alimony but finding no waiver under the facts presented
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and sport hunters somewhere, maybe everywhere, are tuning in. And for purposes of causation, these hunters must be tuning in for the first time because there is no dispute that, as a matter of federal law, it has long been legal to hunt captive-bred members of the three antelope species in the United States. Next, at least some hunters who receive the signal will journey to North Africa to search for one of the small number of scimitar-horned oryx, ad-dax and dama gazelle that live in the wild— all because these hunters picked up the signal. This is just so much speculation. 2006 WL 6198320, at *6. 9 . Even if the plaintiff maintained standing to bring suit, Section 127 is valid under the Constitution. The plaintiff argues that under United States v. Kl .3d 1170 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, where there is ambiguity regarding

    ### Response:
    holding that where congress has directed the agency to issue a rule without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule  congress has amended the law and does not offend the constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Therefore, the State argues that by alleging appellant committed aggravated assault, the indictment also alleges appellant committed serious bodily injury, which, according to the above line of cases, would satisfy the notice requirement. While the state’s argument is persuasive, we cannot agree that merely alleging appellant committed “aggravated assault” is equivalent to alleging he caus App.1990) (indicating that death caused by “stabbing with a knife” provides notice). Cases following Beck have held that an indictment alleging “serious bodily injury” is sufficient notice of the state’s intent to seek a deadly weapon finding, if the indictment also alleged the serious bodily injury was caused by some act or instrument. See Ex parte Brown, 773 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>); Gilbert v. State, 769 S.W.2d at 536-37

    ### Response:
    holding that indictment alleging defendant committed attempted murder by stabbing with a knife was proper notice of intent to seek deadly weapon finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been compensated for its loss in various ways. The district court construed the letter as a “motion for an order determining the amount of [Burress’s] restitution balance” and referred the matter to a magistrate judge. After the parties’ submission of various documents and the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court issued an order reducing the restitution owed by $9,650. Burress filed a pro se motion for reconsideration within ten days and filed a timely pro se notice of appeal from the district court’s denial of the motion. On appeal, Burress first attempts to challenge the legality of the district court’s restitution order, contending it violates the rule established in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) (<HOLDING>), and was not the product of independent

    ### Response:
    holding that the victim and witness protection act limits the amount of restitution to the loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis of the offense of conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at any time inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. The defendant argues however that he should not be subjected to impeachment through his prior felonies just because he cross-examines a witness about his statement. The defendant relies on Foster v. State, 182 So.3d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), in support of his position. There, the Second District held the defendant was entitled to have the jury hear the remainder of his statement without placing his credibility in issue. We agree that the defendant’s position is supported by Foster. But, Foster runs contrary to section 90.806(1) and our prec edent. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 857 So.2d 949, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). The defendant’s position is also contrary to

    ### Response:
    holding that the court properly allowed the state to admit the defendants convictions as impeachment evidence once the defendant elicited exculpatory statements through the interrogating officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was justified by an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn.2001). The commissioner concedes, and we agree, that no exception to the warrant requirement applies here. We, therefore, conclude that the officer’s entry into the garage is unreasonable. Thus, the fruits of the officer’s warrantless entry, including the ensuing interview and the evidence of intoxication, must be suppressed. The commissioner argues for the first time on appeal that, even if the officer entered Haase’s garage in violation of the warrant requirement, the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 105 (Minn.1999); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Generally, we will not consider matters that

    ### Response:
    holding that an exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule applies where the police would have obtained the evidence if no illegality had occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    debtor’s discharge order was granted and after the deadline had passed for objecting to exemptions (and no party objected to his homestead exemption); chapter 7 case was filed March 20, 2012; the debtor received his discharge on April 25, 2013; then on June 21, 2013, the debtor sold his homestead, netting proceeds of $813,935.77 and the debtor did not reinvest the proceeds within 6 months; trustee filed an adversary proceeding seeking turnover of homestead sale proceeds on April 11, 2014; court held (in the context of debtor motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) that only closing of the Chapter 7 case, rather than discharge of a debtor, would immunize homestead proceeds from the six-month rule). But see In re D’Avila, 498 B.R. 150, 159-160 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.2013) (J. Davis) (<HOLDING>). 42 . DE # 71 in the Bankruptcy Case. 43 . See

    ### Response:
    holding that the texas proceeds rule is only applicable in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case and would not apply where the debtor sells homestead property postpetition in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would not have understood it as assertion of right to remain silent after responding to questions for 30 minutes), rav’d on other grounds, 90 N.Y.2d 632, 665 N.Y.S.2d 30, 687 N.E.2d 1313 (1997); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (stating that “officer need not stop his questioning unless the suspect’s invocation of rights is unambiguous, and the officer is not required to clarify ambiguous remarks”); Midkiff v. Virginia, 250 Va. 262, 462 S.E.2d 112, 115-16 (1995) (concluding that suspect’s statements during interrogation, expressing “reservations about discussing the case,” did not amount to an unequivocal invocation of right to remain silent; therefore, police were not required to cease interrogation); Vermont v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 658 A.2d 54, 65 (1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 837, 116 S.Ct. 117,

    ### Response:
    holding that the rationale of davis applies equally to a defendant who has waived his rights and later ambiguously invokes the right to remain silent during  interrogation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contemporaneous affidavit filing requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) would be negated if a plaintiff was allowed to bring an ordinary negligence claim without an affidavit, and then later add claims for professional negligence after the expiration of the statute of limitation. Fales, however, is inapplicable to the instant situation. There, the plaintiff originally brought a medical malpractice claim, but failed to attach the requisite expert affidavit. Fales, supra, 263 Ga. App. at 461. The plaintiff instead filed an amended complaint that included an expert affidavit, claiming that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 allowed an amended complaint to cure a failure to file an affidavit. Id. at 461-462. This Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument. Id. at 462; see also Roberson, supra, 302 Ga. App. at 407 (<HOLDING>). Here, on the other hand, Engler did not raise

    ### Response:
    holding that ocga  91191 does not allow a plaintiff suing for medical malpractice to cure a failure to attach an expert affidavit through amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under section 153. To hold otherwise would allow trustees, custodians, and others charged with assets of an estate to act with apparent impunity after confirmation of a plan, subject only to the restraints of moral and state law. Because Congress has given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in bankruptcy, we cannot support the thesis that we must rely on state law or the vicissitudes of conscience to further the policies of a confirmed plan. Given the circumstances of this case, the federal court properly exercised jurisdiction under section 153. Notwithstanding the analysis above, a defendant may not allege the absence of an element of the crime to question the jurisdiction of the court once he pleads guilty. See Bartholomew v. United States, 286 F.2d 779, 781 (8th Cir.1961) (<HOLDING>). Property of the estate under section 153 is

    ### Response:
    holding defendant by pleading guilty admits all essential elements of offense charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not otherwise directly relate the Fire text, the conversations were, at most, tangentially related to the continued inclusion of the Fire text in the Hannon Applications, and therefore did not constitute a substantial event. See Astor Holdings, Inc. v. Steefel, Levitt & Weiss, P.C., 2003 WL 21108316, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2003) (“The advice given at the May 2001 meeting, even if it were to continue the New York action, was tangential to the core of the alleged malpractice, which was the advice to file the action in the first place. The advice given at the May 2001 meeting cannot be considered a substantial part of Steefel’s overall malpractice, the majority of which occurred in California.”) (emphasis in original); see also Loeb v. Bank of Am., 254 F.Supp.2d 581, 587 (E.D.Pa.2003) (<HOLDING>); Circle Group Internet, Inc. v. Atlas,

    ### Response:
    holding in a legal malpractice case where defendants allegedly failed to disclose a conflict of interest that incidental events such as the correspondence and calls plaintiff relies on that have only some tangential connection with the dispute in litigation were not enough to support venue where the plaintiff resided
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) the age of his 1991 conviction and corresponding prison sentence, (2) the de mini-mus risk that his criminal conduct in a school zone actually presented to children given the time of the crime (1:45 in the morning) and (3) the so-called “parsimony” principle. The first two claims amount to little more than disagreeing with the weight that the sentencing judge afforded to certain aspects of the sentencing factors. This exercise, however, is peculiarly within the sentencing court’s discretion, and Gallardo offers no meritorious reason to interfere with that judgment. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49

    ### Response:
    holding that judgment calls on the weight to be given various relevant factors are for the sentencing court not for this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted); see also City of Worcester, 839 F.Sup. at 88 (“[T]he mere fact that [the defendant] was involved in an incident that would possibly subject it to litigation is not dis-positive of the determination of whether the memorandum was prepared in anticipation of litigation”); Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., 195 F.R.D. 610, 614-15 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (“Not all documents created or produced by a company can be categorized as protected by work product simply because a company’s internal investigation is co-existent with a present or anticipated lawsuit that is the same subject matter of the litigation”); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989, 133 F.R.D. 515, 520 (N.D.Ill. 1990) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). While the involvement of an attorney is

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a particular document is subject to the work product protection depends on whether the subject matter of the document concerns preparation or strategy or the appraisal of the strengths or weaknesses of the companys case or the activities of the attorneys in preparing their case or is at least primarily concerned with legal assistance and not simply underlying evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AK’s testimony was not the testimony of CK, the person AK was quoting, but that of a third witness, Mr. Mills, who was also recounting other statements by CK through a different exception to the hearsay rule. At least in cases involving the abuse of young children and the residual exception, the reported decisions do not appear to compel the Government to choose between several witnesses to essentially the same or similar out-of-court statements by the child. Most of those decisions, however, have not made a substantive comparison of the evidence offered, even though it is apparent that multiple sources were admitted at trial. In McGrath, the Court of Military Appeals considered two out-of-court statements by the victim even though she testified at trial and did not limit the G ) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Powell, 22 M.J. 141

    ### Response:
    holding childvictims statement to police investigator admissible under residual exception as well as identical corroborating statement to babysitter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    brief: that the government did not need additional time to conduct debriefings with Mr. Shuck or to find additional witnesses, that the continuance did not result in the government locating additional witnesses for its case-in-chief, and that the continuance was not proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C). Because these arguments were not raised in Mr. Watson's opening brief, they are waived. See, e.g., United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 12 n. 2 (10th Cir.2013); United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 894 (10th Cir.2012). 9 . Indeed, Williams is part of our long line of cases rejecting the grant of an ends-of-justice continuance where the district court failed to make any specific ends-of-justice findings. See, e.g., United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Doran, 882 F.2d at 1515 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the endsofjustice continuances were inappropriate because no endsofjustice findings were made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Payments now satisfy § 71(b)(1)(D) when the divorce order is silent if background principles of state law mandate that the payments necessarily terminate upon the death of the payee spouse. See generally Hoover v. Comm’r, 102 F.3d 842, 845-47 (6th Cir.1996); Zinsmeister v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (2000). Because neither the temporary orders nor the permanent orders in this case expressly state whether Lovejoy’s obligations would continue in the event his ex-spouse died, we look to Colorado law. Colorado has adopted the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (“UDMA”), which states that “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is termi r. 14, 1996) (same), with Wells v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507 (Jan. 5, 1998) (<HOLDING>). This split of authority interpreting

    ### Response:
    holding that the obligation does not terminate upon death
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with a four-year figure, the majority erroneously assumes that Paz could have raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as soon as his attorney filed Paz’s opening brief in that appeal. That is utter nonsense. In order to make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a defendant must show not only deficient performance by counsel but also prejudice resulting therefrom. Thus, Paz could not state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal under the Strickland test until he had suffered the prejudice of losing on appeal. Hence, the date from which the majority should set its clock is the date the appeal became final. Cf. Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 835 P.2d 1293 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Paz’s appeal was decided on June 13, 1990,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. We reject all three arguments. Agent Sandberg interviewed Herrera after she was arrested. He took rough notes during the interrogation and later compiled a report based on those rough notes. The government gave a copy of the report to Herrera, but did not turn over Agent Sandberg’s rough notes. Under the facts of this case, any error in failing to turn over the rough interview notes would have been harmless because Herrera did not allege that the final police report misrepresented or omitted her statements, nor that it attributed to her any statement she did not make. See Fed.R.Cr.Proc. 16(a)(1)(A) (requiring disclosure of “substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant”); United States v. Griffin, 659 F.2d 932, 938 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Herrera did not raise a color-able

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants remarks cannot be a statement for jencks act purposes when the agent testifies as a government witness because it does not represent the agents own words
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to dismiss pendent state law claims, in the usual case in which all federal law claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. In such a case, state-law claims should be dismissed. Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988); citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130; see also Mercado-Garda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir.1992); Rivera v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 264 (1st Cir.1992); Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645 (1st Cir.1990); cf. Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, 3 F.3d 476, 478 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that when the district court disposed of the adea claims the pendent claims became subject to dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Associated General Contractors v. Smith, 74 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.1996), that a needs requirement for state registration of an apprenticeship program is preempted by ERISA. Smith, however, relied substantially on our overturned decision in Dillingham Construction N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 57 F.3d 712 (9th Cir.1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 316, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791. See Smith, 74 F.3d at 929-30. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in reversing our decision in Dillingham, substantially altered the ERISA preemption analysis for apprenticeship plans. Consequently, we cannot rely on Smith, but instead must apply the ERISA preemption analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Dillingham to the Oregon needs requirement. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). I. “REFER TO” Dillingham held, first, that

    ### Response:
    holding that when intervening supreme court case law is clearly irreconcilable with a prior circuit decision a panel of this court is bound by the later and controlling authority and should reject the prior circuit opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    citation omitted). 65 . Hall, 856 N.Y.S.2d 540, 886 N.E.2d at 166 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 66 . United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. 690). 67 . Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24, 120 S.Ct. 673 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 68 . Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 69 . Redding, 129 S.Ct. at 2649 n. 3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)). See also Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560, 99 S.Ct. 1861. 70 . People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 856 N.Y.S.2d 540, 886 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (2008) (<HOLDING>). 71 . Conceivably, Scott might have fastened

    ### Response:
    holding that a visual body cavity inspection may be conducted based on reasonable suspicion but if the visual inspection reveals the presence of a suspicious object inside the body cavity schmerber requires the police to obtain a warrant authorizing the removal of the object unless there are exigent circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conclude that defendant has waived reliance on this condition. Under Pennsylvania law, a waiver of legal rights can arise by “a clear unequivocal, and decisive act of the party claimed to have waived its rights, with knowledge of such right and evident purpose to surrender it.” Keenan v. Scott Township Auth., 151 Pa.Cmwlth. 225, 616 A.2d 751 (1992). See also, Evcco Leasing Corp. v. Ace Trucking Co., 828 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.1987). Waiver may be effected by a party’s words or conduct. When waiver is implied from conduct, it applies in those situations that would support equitable estoppel. Penn Mutual Life Ins. v. Bank of New England, 756 F.Supp. 856 (E.D.Pa.1991); Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 186 A.2d 399 (1962). See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F.Supp. 1513 (D.D.C.1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus for an implied waiver to be operative,

    ### Response:
    recognizing equitable estoppel under the magnusonmoss act to hold that plaintiffs who had not presented their vehicles to dealers as required by the warranty were not barred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    364 F.3d at 503. 2. Subjective Symptoms and Credibility When addressing the issue of subjective symptoms, the ALJ recognized that “consideration must be given to subjective allegations.” The ALJ went on to determine that Tuohy’s statements concerning her subjective symptoms were not credible. This finding was based on the inconsistency between Tuohy’s testimony and various medical reports. Specifically, Tuohy stated that she would be unable to work because she is unable to concentrate and she often falls asleep in the middle of conversations. Yet, medical reports show that Tuohy remained alert and mentally clear. In addition, Tuohy was able to concentrate during the hearing and did not fall asleep in the midst of her testimony. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). In fact, one physician, Dr. Thompson, stated

    ### Response:
    holding that an aljs decision to discount a subjective claim of drowsiness was supported by substantial evidence where the alj noted among other things that the claimant did not appear drowsy at the hearing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. at 1170 (quoting, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (original emphasis)). Based on the evidence before it, the court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to assert a classification based on sex and held that “the proper classification, if there was one at all, was the group of persons with whom [the defendant] had or sought to have a romantic affair.” Id. at 1172. Other courts have similarly rejected attempts to label sex-neutral harassment or discrimination as “sex discrimination” or “sexual harassment” merely because it followed the break up of a consensual relationship between a man and a woman. See, e.g., Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School, 715 F.Supp. 862, 869 (N.D.Ill.1989) (<HOLDING>). This court finds the rational of Succar,

    ### Response:
    holding that in a quid pro quo case when an employer penalizes an employee after the termination of a consensual relationship the employee has to show that the penalty was a result of the employees refusal to give in to demands for additional sexual relations and not simply the result of anger over the failure of the past relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See id. In the instant case, the District Court imposed civil rather than criminal contempt on Yashinsky because the order compensated the plaintiff for its costs and attorney fees and imposed the daily fine in order to coerce Yashinsky into complying with the subpoena. A court can use its contempt power to punish a party, but using contempt to punish is criminal rather than civil contempt. See id. at 827-28, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (citing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911)). Civil contempt cannot be converted into criminal contempt at a later stage because an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded a defendant in any other criminal proceeding. See id. at 826, 833, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, Yashinsky is not required

    ### Response:
    holding that an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded the defendant in any other criminal proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    outweigh the public’s right to of access. In re The Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470 (6th Cir.1983)(citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., supra, 710 F.2d at 1179). In terms of whether any interests justify the Court’s exercise of its supervisory powers to deny access not only to Dr. Fabian’s report, but also to any other competency reports that will be filed, it is true that mental evaluations and presentence investigation reports are traditionally kept from the public eye during pretrial and trial stages of the criminal proceeding: Presentence reports, which are similar in nature to mental evaluations, due to the sensitive and private information that they include, aré traditionally kept under seal. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt; 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir.1989)(<HOLDING>); R.C. § 2951.03(D)(providing that, under Ohio

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1074, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (“[A] judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court’s affirmation of the conviction.”); Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir.2001) (“Congress imposed a ‘1-year period of limitation’ on section 2255 motions, which runs, in this case, from ‘the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.’ ”). Baldayaque filed his pro se petition on November 28, 2000, more than 30 months late. However, the court believed that the facts of Baldayaque’s case suggested that the limitations period might be equitably tolled, rendering the petition timely. See Green, 260 F.3d at 82 (<HOLDING>). The court appointed counsel for Baldayaque to

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable tolling is available for petitions filed pursuant to 28 usc  2255
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Americans with Disabilities Act, were not taken into account; (2) he was not given notice that an 1-60 such as the one he submitted would result in disciplinary action; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Wheeler argues that the district court erred in determining that his claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because he was sentenced under Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149 and thus could not recover good-time credits. Regardless whether Wheeler’s claims were barred under Heck, the district court did not err in dismissing his claims because he did not have a liberty interest in any of the rights of which he was deprived at the hearing. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958-59 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 508 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that 30day loss of cell and commissary privileges does not implicate due process concerns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the present case the Plaintiff did no mailing or transmitting out of state. The bank deposits made by Plaintiff were for services performed in Utah and were deposited in Utah banks. The insurance forms were for services performed in Utah and were delivered to persons in Utah. Plaintiff has shown that, as a business regulated or licensed by the State of Utah, the company participated in accreditation testing by receiving, evaluating, and returning cultures to a company acting on behalf of the State of Utah, but located in the State of California. The court does not find that such activity is engaging in commerce. More importantly, it is only Plaintiffs activities that are relevant to a determination on whether he is an employee “engaged in commerce.” Wirtz, supra, 263 F.Supp. at 233 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff admits that he did not ship any

    ### Response:
    holding that the facts supporting a claim that an employee is engaged in commerce within the meaning of  207a1 are dependent upon his individual activities not the nature of the employers business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a PMPA defense. Id. at 1440. See also State Oil v. Khan, 839 F.Supp. 543 (N.D.Ill.1993) (remanding action for forcible entry and detainer originally brought by franchisor in state court where PMPA presented only a defense); Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., Inc. v. D'Arpino, 112 F.R.D. 668 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (remanding eviction action to state court, finding defense of preemption under PMPA irrelevant to determination of removal jurisdiction). While Sunoco has cited cases holding that the PMPA preempts various state statutory or common-law claims, those cases do not implicate a federal court’s removal jurisdiction, because the plaintiffs in those cases pled causes of action under both the PMPA and state law in federal court. See, e.g., Shukla v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 115 F.3d 849 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Yonaty v. Amerada Hess Corp., 2005 WL 1460411

    ### Response:
    holding that fraud claim concerning nonrenewal of franchise agreement was preempted by pmpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proscribed at 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7203. Appellant’s Br. at 10; see 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203, 7206 (2012). He claims that this court has “not had to set boundaries between [tax] evasion and [tax] obstruction” and asks that we do so now. Appellant’s Br. at 12. The government rejects Soren-sen’s proposition. Because Congress enacted separate tax-crime statutes, the government has the “plenary power to choose which charge it will bring.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. The Supreme Court “has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may proseeute[ ] under either....” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the governments broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions including its power to select the charges to be brought in a particular case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assessment of the constitutional issue allegedly involved in a mandatory repayment plan under the Bankruptcy Code.’’ Id. The debtors allude to similar concerns, but fail to develop such an argument. 21 . Id. at 239 n. 6. 22 . Id. 23 . See In re Ryan, 267 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D.Iowa 2001); In re Freunscht, 53 B.R. 110, 112 (Bankr.D.Vt.l985)(Congress intended § 707(b) to apply only -to debtors doing business; individual debtors could not be compelled to submit to a repayment plan); In re Brophy, 49 B.R. 483, 484 (Bankr.D.Hawai’i 1985) (court agreed with Graham and found that § 707(b) ""was not intended to be a vehicle by which individual debtors would be forced to submit to a plan of repayment against their will.”); but see In re Lenartz, 2001 WL 35814401 at *1 (Bankr.D.Idaho May 3, 2001) (<HOLDING>). 24 . In re Lenartz, 263 B.R. 331, 335

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain language of  706b authorized conversion of an individual debtor to chapter 11 over his or her objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the facts alleged:... Although we draw any reasonable inferences available on the face of the complaint in the investors’ favor, we also must look to plausible, non-culpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct in evaluating an inference of scienter.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court must not scrutinize each of Plaintiffs’ allegations in isolation, but rather assess all of the allegations holistically. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326, 127 S.Ct: 2499. Finally, the “complaint must allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter for each defendant with respect to each violation.” Mizzaro, 544 F.3d at 1238. Thus, the group pleading doctrine does not apply to the PSLRA’s scienter requirements. In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1341 (SD.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>); Druskin, 299 F.Supp.2d at 1322 (same). As a

    ### Response:
    holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the amount demanded in the notice of claim. City of Phoenix v. Fields, No. 1 CA-SA 07-0152, 219 Ariz. 88, 193 P.3d 782, 2008 WL 1796039, at *7, ¶ 19 (Ariz.App. Apr.22, 2008). ¶ 10 Yollin met this requirement. He expressly told Glendale that he would “release the City of Glendale and their agents and employees from any liability associated with th[e] claim” for $150,000.00. While Yollin explained that he was still incurring medical expenses, wage loss and pain and suffering and was willing to negotiate, the terms of the letter were an offer of settlement, and Yollin would have been bound if Glendale had accepted the offer. See Savoca Masonry Co. v. Homes & Son Constr., 112 Ariz. 392, 394, 542 P.2d 817, 819 (1975); Muchesko v. Muchesko, 191 Ariz. 265, 269, 955 P.2d 21, 25 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Yollin even stated that, although he was

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorneyproffered offer may bind the client
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction.” Courts have found the principal in a closely-held corporation who signs a document, although in his official capacity, or causes a false or misleading document to be filed in bad-faith personally liable for Rule 9011 sanctions. See In re Memorial Estates, Inc., 116 B.R. 108 (N.D.Ill.1990); Midwest Properties No. Two v. Big Hill Investment Co., 93 B.R. 357 (N.D.Tex.1988); In re D & V Construction, 150 B.R. 362 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1993); County of Chesterfield v. Tamojira, Inc., 197 B.R. 815 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995); accord, Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd. Inc.), 40 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir.1994); In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 136 B.R. 545 (9th Cir. BAP 1992) on appeal after remand 77 F.3d 278, 282 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Chisholm Co., 166 B.R. 706

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 9011 allows a bankruptcy court to sanction attorneys parties and individuals that sign and file false documents in badfaith with the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    random testing of police officers under the Fourth Amendment because, like the customs employees in Von Raab, police officers carry firearms and participate in drug interdiction. The Supreme Court of Hawaii, analyzing random testing of police officers under a state constitutional provision similar to New Jersey’s Article I, Paragraph 7, has reached the same result. McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, 71 Haw. 568, 799 P.2d 953, 958-59 (1990). Hawaii’s high court relied on the police officers’ diminished expectations of privacy and on its finding that the “testing program [was] not more intrusive than needed” to uphold the Honolulu Police Department’s random testing program. Id. 799 P.2d at 958-59. But see Guiney v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 411 Mass. 328, 582 N.E.2d 523, 526 (1991) (<HOLDING>). -D- The PBA argues that the special needs

    ### Response:
    holding boston police departments random drug testing program unconstitutional under state constitution because body searches cannot be justified by some generalized sense that there is a drug problem  and that random urinalyses of police officers will solve or at least help to solve the problem or its consequences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Government from “bringpng] a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). To determine whether the fírst-to-file bar applies, the Fourth Circuit has adopted the “same material elements” test. Carter, 710 F.3d at 182-83 (joining the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. circuits). Applying this test, a later-filed action is not based on the facts of a pending action when it identifies a new defendant who is not a subsidiary of an already-named defendant. See In re Nat. Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litig. (CO2 Appeals), 566 F.3d 956, 962 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The identity of a defendant constitutes a material element of a fraud claim.... ”); see also U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 218-19 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, because the Lutz-Webster Complaint

    ### Response:
    holding that firsttofile bar applied to when primary difference was named subsidiaries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to make individual assessments against Debtors because they are jointly and severally liable for the debts of the Partnership under California law. This argument overreaches under state law. Superficially, the IRS’s argument is logical. The IRS assessed unpaid employment taxes against the Partnership in 1994, 1995, and 1996. Therefore, under federal law, the IRS has a right to bring proceedings against the Partnership to collect those taxes for up to ten years after assessment, in this case until 2004, 2005, and 2006. 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1). Under California law, general partners such as Debtors are “liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.” Cal. Corp.Code § 16306(a); see also Young, 283 F.2d at 910 (<HOLDING>). Because the assessed employment taxes are a

    ### Response:
    holding that under california law partners are personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the partnership including its tax liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federal civil rights statutes which did not already contain such provisions. Senate Report, supra, at 1, [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 5909. For purposes relevant here, the Act did no more and no less than codify the case law of cost-shifting in civil rights litigation. “[T]here is nothing in the legislative history of § 1988 which even remotely suggests that the treatment of out-of-pocket costs should in any way change as o a result of the enactment of § 1988,” Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d at 1279 n. 17. Decisions in the courts’ of this circuit have awarded expenses reimbursements liberally as appropriate to the specific litigation. See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346, 349 (5th Cir.1980) (telephone and postage); Loewen v. Turnipseed, 505 F.Supp. 512, 517-19 (N.D.Miss.1980) (<HOLDING>); Crowe v. Lucas, 479 F.Supp. 1258, 1263

    ### Response:
    holding that awards should be limited to normally billable expenses but generously awarding among other things travel food and lodging expenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    witness affidavits, Tatum’s guilty pleas, and the security footage. The district court denied qualified immunity on Tatum’s claims that Robinson used excessive force by pepper spraying and choking him. Robinson appeals. II. This court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff. Tolan v. Cotton, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam); Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2010). See also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (ex-f plaining court should not adopt a party’s version of events if a video “clearly contradicts” its version of the story); Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). To overcome an assertion of qualified

    ### Response:
    holding a plaintiff does not create a genuine issue of material fact by offering a dark and often unintelligible video coupled with an entirely speculative and wishful recitation of events that is neither substantiated by anything displayed in the video nor by the memory of any observer or participant present at the altercation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Coburn in his thorough and thoughtful opinion in Triffin v. Bridge View Bank, 330 N.J.Super. 473, 750 A.2d 136 (App.Div. 2000), on which the Appellate Division here relied. As Judge Coburn explained, after [the check’s] untimely return and with full knowledge of its dishonor, [the assignee] has no vested interest in the timely payment or return of these cheeks____Any argument to the contrary would misconstrue the nature of an enforcement action under [N.J.S.A. 12A:4-302]. It is a cause of action for a breach of statutory duty, not an action for collection of a negotiable instrument. [Id. at 478, 750 A.2d 136 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co., 813 F.Supp. 423, 428 (E.D.Va.1993), aff'd, 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>).] We likewise note that Triffin can gamer no

    ### Response:
    holding only payee has standing to bring suit for banks violation of midnight rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    October 2, 2007 letter about her to the ODAR’s Office of Special Counsel was libelous. The State court action was removed to federal court. The federal district court dismissed Anderson's claims against Stier and substituted the United States as the defendant pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The federal court then dismissed Anderson’s libel, slander and defamation claims based on limitations and dismissed her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit recently reversed, holding that Stier, not the United States, was the proper party because he was acting outside the scope of his employment when he allegedly defamed her. See A Local 2607, No. Civ. A. 05-0408 RMU, 2005 WL 3275903 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Here, the alleged defamatory statements were

    ### Response:
    holding that supervisors libel claims against supervisee and supervisees union representative were preempted by csra because statements giving rise to supervisors claims were made during course of administrative grievance against supervisor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inventory and that the post-fire fair market value of AHC’s smoke-damaged inventory was $0, to the extent these findings include the 3.7% of AHC’s inventory consisting of completed, stage-three hats, the credible evidence supporting the findi gnizing that replacement valuation is proper to compensate an owner for damage to personal property when no market value exists for the personal property damaged); Pringle, 629 S.W.2d at 157 (same). AHC elected application of the replacement-value damage model, and the trial court correctly concluded in conclusion of law number 10 that a replacement valuation applied to AHC’s smoke-damaged inventory. See, e.g., Pasadena State Bank, 149 Tex. at 50, 228 S.W.2d at 128; Int’l-Great N. R.R. Co., 46 S.W.2d at 670; Celanese Ltd., 75 S.W.3d at 598 (<HOLDING>); Pringle, 629 S.W.2d at 157 (same). We

    ### Response:
    recognizing different factual situations may dictate application of a different valuation ie other than fair market value of the damage to the property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    walked toward the abandoned SUV, not along the gravel trail. (Docket No. 370 at p. 79.) Officer Vega observed no other individual or human activity. Id. Officer Vega knew that the Eduardoño-type vessel had approached the protected cove approximately 500 feet away and had at least three occupants, and that a fourth suspect drove the SUV. (Docket No. 370 a p. 75.), The PRPD helicopter had informed Officer Vega that the three occupants of the vessel fled towards the shore and remained at large. (Docket No. 369 at pp. 84-85.) Officer Vega instructed defendant Mercedes to stop, placed defendant Mercedes on the ground and conducted a security, frisk. (Docket No. 388 at p. 17.) These actions constitute a Terry stop, not an arrest. See United States v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). The facts known to the arresting officers

    ### Response:
    holding that officers action of putting suspects on the ground and searching for weapons was within the scope of a terry stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    B to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6, ¶ 31. 38 . First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand attached as Exhibit B to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6, ¶ 32. 39 . First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand attached as Exhibit B to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6, ¶ 33. 40 . First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand attached as Exhibit B to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6, ¶ 34. 41 . First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand attached as Exhibit B to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7, ¶¶ 40-42. 42 . Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762, 765 (10th Cir.1988). 43 . 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶523.10[2], at 523-76-523-77 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed. rev. 2009). 44 . Colo.Rev.Stat. § 987) (<HOLDING>). 59 . Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1379 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding the intent of parties can be inferred from sufficient details contained within the consent judgment indicating the parties understood the consent judgment operated as a final adjudication of the factual issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exclusive to one department, we have also used the terms “primary,” “core,” or “essential.” See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994); Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 567 (Utah 1984); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 688 (Utah 1977). But we have never been willing to be more precise than this. See Thatcher v. Industrial Comm’n, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178 (1944). A necessary corollary to the doctrine that some powers or functions belong exclusively to the members of one branch is that there must be powers and functions which may, in appearance, have characteristics of an inherent function of one branch but which may be permissibly exercised by another branch. See Matheson I, 641 P.2d 674, 676 (Utah 1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 226

    ### Response:
    holding that narrowing of field of potential judicial appointees before governor appoints partakes of elements of the appointment power but is not so inherently an executive function as to preclude participation by the legislative branch in that narrowing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an estimated total cost to exceed one hundred million dollars. O.R.C. § 4123.35(0). 6 . It was within the BWC’s discretion to determine whether Messer had met the requirements to self-insure the Casino Project. See Ohio Adm.Code § 4123-19-16(B) (“The purpose of this rule is to establish standards by which the administrator may permit a responsible self-insuring employer to self-insure a construction project entered into by the responsible self-insuring employer pursuant to division (O) of section 4123.35 of the Revised Code.”); see also Ohio Adm.Code § 4123-19-16(C) (acknowledging that ”[t]he administrator's authority to grant self-insured status for a construction project is permissive”); State ex rel. Vaughn v. Indus. Commission of Ohio, 69 Ohio St.2d 115, 119, 430 N.E.2d 1332 (1982) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. Medcorp, Inc. v. Ryan, 10th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the bwc has substantial discretion in determining whether to revoke a companys selfinsured status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    461 U.S. 238, 248-49, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) as authority. Olim defined the type of discretion which would not create a liberty interest: “If the decision-maker is not ‘required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria,’ but instead ‘can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all’ the State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest.” Olim, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747 (citations omitted). Based on its reading of Olim, the Adams court concluded that subsection © created a liberty interest. The Adams court reasoned that the word “shall” in subsection © expressly mandated that prison officials permit visitation to “every committed person.” See also Logan, 1989 WL 112726 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, it found subsection ©’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the term shall constituted mandatory language and quoting cain v lane 857 f2d 1139 1145 7th cir1988
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    herein, this purported dispute is not relevant to the resolution of this case. 4 . Defendants allege that Capitol Specialty refused to negotiate a settlement offer made jointly to defendants and the law firm of Grant E. Morris that specifically contemplated that defendants’ insurer would fund no more than the $7 million limit of the Policy and that Morris’ insurer would fund the remaining $1 million. (Defs.' Opp’n at 14.) Capitol Specialty argues that it has no duty to defend or settle a claim if there is no coverage for the claim under the Policy. (PL's Reply at 12.) See Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. Traveler’s Indem. Co. of R.I., 896 F.Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C.1995) (""An insured’s claim of bad faith breach of contract against its insurer fails if coverage for the unde upp.2d 147, 157 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if defendants’

    ### Response:
    holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.” Id. at 1359. The law must be applied to each invention at the time it enters the patent process, for each patented advance has a novel relationship with the state of the art from which it emerges. Thus, we do not try here to predict and adjudicate all the factual scenarios to which the written description requirement could be applied. Nor do we set out any bright-line rules governing, for example, the number of species that must be disclosed to describe a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with each invention, and it changes with progress in a field. Compare Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (<HOLDING>), with In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1334

    ### Response:
    holding an amino acid sequence did not describe the dna sequence encoding it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the public employer is not liable if it demonstrates that it would have taken the same adverse action even absent the protected speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. With these principles in mind, I turn to Anemone’s allegations. 1. Relationship of Anemone’s Speech to Matter of Public Concern “As a general rule, speech on ‘any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community’ is protected by the First Amendment.” Morris, 196 F.3d at 110 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684). Speech relating to public corruption and/or a public entity’s failure to adequately or properly investigate such corruption lies comfortably within these categories of protected expression. See, e.g., Vasbinder v. Ambach, 926 F.2d 1333, 1340, 1341 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that employees contact with fbi regarding defendants potential fraud theft and misallocation of public funds was a matter of public concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4 . Bardin testified that her net monthly

    ### Response:
    holding that child support should have been made retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Dr. Wentworth’s November 2010 opinion: (1) there was no record support for Dr. Wentworth’s restricted limitations on Maestas’s lifting, sitting and standing when in fact the limitations on lifting are inconsistent with Dr. Wentworth’s November 2011 assessment that Maestas could lift a maximum of 20 pounds and lift 10 pounds frequently; and (2) this opinion was inconsistent with Maestas’s physical therapy reports showing overall improvement, decreased pain and symptoms as well as treatment reports indicating minimal pain or tenderness. The ALJ gave the following specific and legitimate reasons for assigning Dr. Wentworth’s November 2011 opinion only some weight: Maestas’s activities and clinical findings did not support this opinion. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The Commissioner’s determination at Step Two

    ### Response:
    holding that the alj must make findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of a treating physician
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiff in return for an $867,000 letter of credit that would be canceled in the event the plaintiff prevailed on appeal. The circuit court further ordered the plaintiff to pay the annual premium on its letter of credit and the defendant to file an appeal bond in an amount sufficient to cover the plaintiffs taxable costs. On appeal, the defendant argued that the judgment should be vacated, to which the plaintiff responded by requesting affirmance plus costs, which, the plaintiff claimed, should include its premium costs for the letter of credit. A panel of this Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff and, in the final paragraph of the opinion, ordered the plaintiff to file a bill of costs, “includ[ing] the cost of the letter of credit incurred as a re NE2d 1259 (Ind App, 1996) (<HOLDING>). B. INTERPRETATION OF MCR 7.219(F)(2) Given

    ### Response:
    holding that a bank fee for a letter of credit to secure a stay pending appeal was not a taxable cost where no statute or court rule allowed such a cost and where the letter of credit was unnecessary and therefore a discretionary expense to which the opposing party had objected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)); accord Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). 43 . Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). 44 . Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. 45 . See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138; Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). 46 . Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526. 47 . See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 (indicating that accusatory questioning is relevant, but does not necessarily establish a coercive environment); Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170 (<HOLDING>); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 357 (Utah

    ### Response:
    recognizing import of accusatory statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in merit and may not have been sufficient to require a hearing, see United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2 Cir. 1983), cert. denied,_U.S__, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed.2d 818 (1984), the court made no determination to that effect. The SEC’s good faith cannot be deemed irrelevant as a matter of law to a determination whether its request for interlocutory equitable relief should be granted. Cf. United States v. Second National Bank, 502 F.2d 535, 548 (5 Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912, 95 S.Ct. 1567, 43 L.Ed.2d 777 (1975). 6 . See also SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1344 (5th Cir.1978) (""the seriousness of permanent injunctions has triggered closer appellate scrutiny of SEC injunctions than was found in earlier decisions""); SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 7 . The Treasury Department is authorized to

    ### Response:
    recognizing the developing judicial attitude toward closer appellate scrutiny of the issuance of injunctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not exclusively. The evidence before the district court supports its conclusion that geographic scoping is an original act of selection. Besides BAP-CO’s evidence, Donnelley presented evidence on the uniqueness of its different scoping choice to cover the greater Miami area in two North and South Miami regions. In addition, Donnelley elicited testimony from Louis Sudholz on Donnelley’s decision to cover the geographic region between Dallas and Fort Worth in a “Mid-City” directory. Based on such evidence' of how classified publishers could easily select geographic regions that do not strictly follow the boundaries of cities, it is clear that the selection-of a geographic region is not “practically inevitable.” See Feist, 499 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1297, 113 L.Ed.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). The evidence before the district court also

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the alphabetizing of names in a white pages is an ageold practice that is unoriginal and practically inevitable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the due process clause.” Snaman v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 275 (Table), 1992 WL 33924, *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1992) (Unpub.Disp.). Because the Henrys did not raise such a constitutional challenge, the FDIC has had no opportunity to argue whether the regulation has a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. It is clear, however, that insuring the deposits of depository institutions while simultaneously setting limits on such insurance by establishing a maximum deposit insurance amount constitutes a legitimate government interest. Requiring the aggregation of deposits maintained by a depositor at a single institution, and limiting insurance for revocable trust accounts to certain categories of beneficiaries, appears to be rationally related to this interest. See id.

    ### Response:
    holding that the particular method is not rationally related to legitimate government interest if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any approval, assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer.” Id. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II). But none of these broad powers encompasses the right to reclassify deposits without authorization, where to do so has the effect of zeroing out a depositor’s funds, as occurred here. Indeed, such an action would be antithetical to the FDIC’s “basic mission [which] is to protect insured depositors.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 595 (D.C.Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, a general allegation of statutory authority cannot suffice here; rather, the Court must look to each provision to see whether it affords FDIC-R the authority it claims. Cf. Nashville Lodging, 59 F.3d at 242 (citing O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 85, 87, 114 S.Ct. 2048) (<HOLDING>). In short, FDIC-R cannot cite to any specific

    ### Response:
    holding that a revision of the fdi act does not displace preexisting state law except where there is an explicit federal statutory provision or in those few and restricted cases where there is a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that she quit Luria’s because of the English-only policy and Mr. Merrill’s comment regarding people with heavy accents answering the phones, expressly stating that there was no other reason for quitting. In the later affidavit opposing the defendant's motion for summary judgment, she stated that she was subjected to daily derogatory remarks and hostile jokes about her Spanish accent by Mr. Bombara, was warned on a daily basis to speak English only, and that Mr. Merrill walked through the store each day snapping his fingers stating ""no Spanish, no Spanish.” To the extent that these new allegations vary from the sworn testimony for the purpose of creating a material issue of fact or law, they are rejected. Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>). Other assertions of facts regarding the

    ### Response:
    holding that facts alleged in an employees affidavit were insufficient to raise an issue of fact for the purposes of defeating a summary judgment where the affidavit contradicted the employees earlier deposition statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Allen, 211 F.3d at 975. And, importantly, the controlled buy does not stand on its own; rather, it serves to bolster Compton’s credibility as an informant. “It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that ‘corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,’ thus providing ‘a substantial basis for crediting the [informant’s] hearsay.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). By substantiating one detail of Compton’s story — a detail, moreover, unique to Brian Howard’s modus operandi — the controlled buy reduced the chance that Compton’s tip was a “reckless or prevaricating tale.” Id.; see also Gunter, 551 F.3d at 480-81 (<HOLDING>). For this reason, we find unavailing

    ### Response:
    holding corroboration of named informants statements some of which included suspects hearsay enhanced informants reliability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    respects.”). While federal courts have not interpreted the Interstate Land Sales Act’s contribution clause, the language in Section 1709(d) is virtually identical, in pertinent part, to the contribution clauses in the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f), and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(f) & 78r(b), which frequently have been construed by federal courts. Courts interpreting the contribution language in the Securities Acts consistently have found that payment by a potentially liable party is a precondition to that party seeking contribution from a jointly liable party. See, e.g., Asdar Group v. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 99 F.3d 289, 295-96 (9th Cir.1996); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Mustek, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 578-79 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), aff'd on other grounds, Musick, Peeler &

    ### Response:
    holding that when contribution is brought as a separate cause of action rather than through thirdparty practice the plaintiff ointtortfeasor must allege that it has paid more than its fair share of the liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the legislature clearly intended that the amendments apply prospectively at sentencing for crimes committed on or after June 13, 2002.” Id. at 190-91. We further stated: These amendments explicitly state that a defendant’s criminal history includes “washed out” convictions. Laws of 2002, ch. 107, § 2(13). Further, the legislature directed sentencing courts to consider these previously “washed out” convictions when calculating offender scores if the current version of the SRA requires consideration of that type of conviction. Laws of 2002, ch. 107, § 3(18). Id. at 191. ¶16 To review, we have applied sentencing statutes prospectively and have thus declined to apply the definition of criminal history to retroactively revive previously washed out convictions. See Smith, 144 Wn.2d at 674-75 (<HOLDING>); see Cruz, 139 Wn.2d at 193 (holding 1990 SRA

    ### Response:
    holding 1997 sra amendment does not apply retroactively to revive appellants previously washed out juvenile adjudications
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acting in conformity with closing argument was not so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial — especially in light of the trial justice’s previous jury instruction on this point and defendant’s withdrawn objection to the evidence in question. As a result, we are convinced that the court’s error in failing to instruct the jury to disregard this argument does not require a new trial because, absent the prosecutor’s improper argument, it is clear to us beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict anyway. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-12, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1982, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 108 (1983) (applying harmless error analysis to prosecutor’s improper closing argument). See also In re Shannon B, 725 A.2d 893, 895 (R.I.1998) (<HOLDING>); State v. McKone, 673 A.2d 1068, 1075

    ### Response:
    holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court: All right. Thank you for how each of you efficiently did that. I’ll see everybody at 2:30. The court declared the recess without ruling on Abell’s objection. When court re convened at 2:30 p.m., the prosecution and defense made their opening statements and the State began its case in chief. Three days later, on June 12, the jury found Bui guilty of capital murder and recommended a death sentence. On July 11, 1986, the court accepted the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Bui to death. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. B. The United States Supreme Court vacated both appellate decisions and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See Bui v. Alabama, 499 U.S. 971, 111 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    premised on the idea that “there is no justification for providing a federal forum where there are non-diverse parties on both sides of the lawsuit.” Exxon, 545 U.S. at 562, 125 S.Ct. 2611. T F.Supp.2d 318, 322 (D.Conn.2007) (finding that the inclusion of a state agency as a defendant ""destroy[ed] complete diversity”); Tomback v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 05 Civ. 3157, 2005 WL 2596449, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 13, 2005) (finding no diversity jurisdiction due to inclusion of the California Commissioner of Insurance in a suit against diverse insurers); Batton v. Georgia Gulf 261 F.Supp.2d 575, 583 (M.D.La.2003) (finding that ""[njowhere is there any provision allowing diversity jurisdiction where a non-citizen state is a party”); Jakoubek v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 3 25 So.2d 880, 881 (1946) (<HOLDING>)). The Florida District Court relied on the

    ### Response:
    recognizing fsba as corporate body in context of whether it was authorized to issue refunding bonds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the latest, on the date of the filing of the complaint, January 24, 2013, the 'statute of limitations would have expired three years later in January 2016. Further, the three unlitigated claims were nonsuited on February 20, 2015, and had to be refiled within one year. The claims were not refiled. Thus, on March 3, 2016, when appellants filed their motion to dismiss with prejudice the three unlitigated claims, those claims no longer could be litigated by appellees. Accordingly, those three unlitigated claims were no longer a bar to finality, and the court’s May 2, 2016 order denying the motion to dismiss with prejudice the three unlitigated claims constituted a final order from which appellants timely appealed. See Deer/Mt. Judea Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. 393, at 7-8, 430 S.W.3d at 36-37 (<HOLDING>); Mountain Pure LLC, 366 Ark. 62, 233 S.W.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an order denying a motion for reconsideration constituted a final order because at the time the order was entered all nonsuited claims had been adjudicated and were no longer a bar to finality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    could not be excluded. If, however, the blood on the box spring is from a mixed sample, i.e., from more than one donor, then defendant cannot be excluded. The reason is that the 4 allele, which defendant possessed, was present in the blood stain. Based on other evidence, the prosecution established that the box-spring stain was a mixed sample. Courts in New Jersey and in other jurisdictions have admitted results of PCR technology and the DQ Alpha test as scientifically reliable. See State v. Dishon, 297 N.J.Super. 254, 277, 687 A.2d 1074 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 144, 693 A.2d 112 (1997) (finding that testimonial hearing was unnecessary to establish the general acceptance of DQ Alpha DNA testing); State v. Williams, 252 N.J.Super. 369, 381, 599 A.2d 960 (Law Div.1991) (<HOLDING>); State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 897 P.2d 152

    ### Response:
    holding that overwhelming and persuasive evidence pointed to general acceptance of pcr process and dq alpha test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2009 filing well outside the limitations period. The fact that Mr. Gobert filed an Application for Post Conviction Relief/Appeal Out of Time in July 2009 does not change this result. First, although the filing of a state motion for post-conviction relief tolls the § 2244(d)(1)(A) limitations period, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), no tolling occurred here because Mr. Gobert’s state motion for post-conviction relief was filed after the § 2241(d)(1)(A) limitations period had already expired. Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001). Second, because the Oklahoma courts denied Mr. Gobert’s request to appeal out of time, these proceedings do not count toward the direct review process for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Orange v. Calbone, 318 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Nor do we find a basis for equitable tolling.

    ### Response:
    holding that the granting of an application to file an appeal out of time is considered part of the direct appeal process under oklahoma law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a provision in the Youthful Offender Act which provides that: “[N]o youthful offender shall be committed ... for a substantive violation [of probation] for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, ... or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years.” § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2004). Christian argues that his violation cannot be classified as substantive because the State did not charge and convict him of any new crime related to his illicit drug use. As such, he argues that this violation must be classified as technical or nonsubstantive, and that he could only be sentenced to six years in prison. We reject this argument based upon our precedent in Robinson v. State, 702 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). In Robinson, as in this case, the state did

    ### Response:
    holding that illicit drug use because it is also a crime constitutes a substantive violation of youthful offender probation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S. Rep. No. 102-342, at 47 (1992). 15 . 28 U.S.C. § 2679, the Westfall Act, does not provide for substitution for . claims ""brought for a violation of the Constitution” or claims brought for violations of statutes which otherwise authorize a cause of action against the named defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). A Bivens action, discussed in Section III.C infra, would be the cause of action for pursuing such claims against the Federal Defendants individually. 16 . Defendants raised a third argument: Plaintiffs’ apparent failure to administratively exhaust their claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). (Def.’s Mot. at 22-23). Because there is some doubt as to whether that requirement is jurisdictional, see, e.g., United States v. Wong, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015) (<HOLDING>), and because other bars to jurisdiction exist

    ### Response:
    holding that provision requiring exhaustion within two years of injury was not jurisdictional and was subject to tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute, however, applies to a more restricted class of cases. We observed in Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 560 So.2d 272, 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), that the “requirement[s] of rule ll[are] directed at three substantive prongs: the factual basis of the paper, the legal basis of the paper, and its legitimate purpose.” In contrast, section 120.57(1)(b)5 was enacted to punish only the filing of a pleading or paper for an improper purpose. Nevertheless, the similarity between the statute and the rule has prompted us to rely on the federal cases interpreting the rule as persuasive authority. See Mercedes; Procacci; see generally, Department of Prof’l Regulation, Div. of Real-Estate v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). Applying principles of federal law, we held

    ### Response:
    holding that a state statute modeled after a federal statute will take the same construction in the florida courts as its prototype has been given in the federal courts insofar as such construction is harmonious with the spirit and policy of florida legislation on the subject
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs relief months and perhaps years earlier than would be possible in a litigation environment. The Proposed Settlement provides that class members may begin submitting claims if and when the Court issues its Final Order and Judgment. Additional benefits would then be provided if and when the Proposed Settlement receives final appellate court approval. Accordingly, the likely complexity and duration of continuing the litigation weighs in favor of approving the Proposed Settlement. C. Class Reaction to the Proposed Settlement Has Been Overwhelmingly Favorable and Weighs in Favor of Class Approval 156. The Court finds that the favorable reaction of the Class and the regulators weighs in favor of approving the Proposed Settlement. See Bell Atlantic Corp., 2 F.3d at 1313-14 n. 15 (<HOLDING>); Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115,

    ### Response:
    holding that small proportion of objectors constituted tacit consent to settlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from which the claim arises with such particularity that the defendant or claimant will be able, without moving for a more definite statement, to commence an investigation of the facts and to frame a responsive pleading.” Id. Rule E(2)(a). “If the conditions for an in rem action appear to exist, the court must issue an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of the action.” Id. Rule C(3)(a)(ii)(A). It is well settled that claims for breach of charter and cargo damage give rise to maritime liens. See Rainbow Line, 480 F.2d at 1027 (“The American law is clear that there is a maritime lien for the breach of a charter party....”); RR Caribbean, Inc. v. Dredge “Jumby Bay”, 147 F.Supp.2d 378, 381 (D.Vi.2001) (<HOLDING>); Demsey & Assocs., Inc. v. S.S. Sea Star, 461

    ### Response:
    recognizing a maritime lien for breach of a partially executed charter party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims set forth in Counts III, TV and I respectively. Count VIII alleges a claim for “inducing refusals to deal under the Illinois Antitrust Act.” Although Menasha did not raise a refusal to deal allegation in its Sherman Act claims, the threshold requirement of defining the relevant market is applied with equal force in the context of refusals to deal. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595, 105 S.Ct. 2847, 86 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985). Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the Court’s discussion of Menasha’s Sherman Act claims, News America is entitled to summary judgment on Counts V-VIII of Menasha’s Complaint. See A & A Disposal and Recycling, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc., 279 Ill.App.3d 337, 215 Ill.Dec. 954, 664 N.E.2d 351 (1996)(<HOLDING>). Menasha’s Unfair Competition and Tortious

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs failure to establish a welldefined relevant market entitles a defendant to summary judgment for claims under section 3 of the illinois antitrust act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim because the lack of a grievance process causes no injury to their constitutional right of access to the courts. See Tucker v. Angelone, 954 F.Supp. 134, 136 (E.D.Va.1997). In any event, the factual record flatly contradicts any claim of intimidation. Accordingly, Blagman’s claim in this regard fails as well. IV. For the reasons stated above, defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and Blagman’s complaint dismissed. As judgment may be entered based on the facts, there is no need to review defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. An appropriate Order will issue. 1 . Although Blagman has since been released from SDC, thus mooting his claims for injunc-tive relief, his claim for monetary damages remains. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1049 n. 1

    ### Response:
    holding that inmates transfer mooted claims for injunctive and declaratory relief but that claims for monetary damages were not moot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be community property. After conducting a choice-of-law analysis, id. at 505-06, 286 Cal.Rptr. 714, the California Court of Appeal rejected the husband’s claim, based on its conclusion ""that California, and not Nevada [where the property was located], is the state which has the most significant relationship to the parties and issues in this case.” Id. at 506, 286 Cal.Rptr. 714. The dispute in the present case involves a claim by a California-based third-party creditor, on property located in California, giving California an interest in the application of its law. 3 . Other community property jurisdictions with statutes similar to A.R.S. § 25-214 also recognize that estoppel principles may apply. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 300 n.6, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Colo. Nat’l Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35

    ### Response:
    holding that a spouse was bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party because of her knowledge and acquiescence to the conveyance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court concludes that awarding preclusive effect to an arbitration award which, “in full and final resolution of the issue submitted for determination,” rejected unfair competition and antitrust claims does not undermine the purposes of the Federal Trade Commission Act or the Sherman or Clayton Acts, particularly in view of recent Supreme Court decisions which reflect increased recognition of the federal policy favoring arbitration and a retreat from the American Safety doctrine. See Cullen v. Paine Webber Group, 689 F.Supp. at 277 (decision of arbitration panel addressing the predicate acts underlying RICO claims may be given preclusive effect, providing the elements necessary for preclusion are satisfied); see also Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 855 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time

    ### Response:
    holding that unfair competition claims are arbitrable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirements.” Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 746, 104 S.Ct. 2720, 2726, 81 L.Ed.2d 615 (1984). The Court also that the objections portion of the statute was drafted in such a way as to minimize any delay in the agency’s investigation. See id. To this end, the Court noted that a customer wishing to challenge a subpoena “must assert his claim within a short period of time.” Id. A district court, citing Jerry T. Obrien, has held that “[I]f a motion to quash is not timely filed ... a district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the challenge.” Mackey v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 1997 WL 114801 *1 (D.Conn.1997); see Friedman v. Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of State, 1992 WL 321510, *1 (D.D.C.1992) (<HOLDING>). Applying these standards to the case at hand,

    ### Response:
    holding that untimeliness is sufficient grounds for denying a motion to quash
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be subjected to a pat-down for weapons. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 295. The Terry standard must be met, and that standard requires that the well-founded suspicion be directed at the particular individual to be searched. Here, specific facts cast suspicion on Horrace. It was undisputed that the driver’s movements were made in Horrace’s direction and that Horrace was in close proximity to the suspicious movements. Additionally, the trooper testified that he was concerned that the driver had concealed a weapon in Horrace’s jacket. These facts negate Horrace’s claim that the trooper’s pat-down search was part of a general, routine (and plainly impermissible) practice of patting down passengers after the driver’s arrest. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 452-53, 688 P.2d 146 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, because Terry provides that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a generalized suspicion of those questioned in highcrime area was insufficient to justify terry frisk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1145, 1151 (C.D.Cal.1999) (“The language of Section 3621(e)(2)(B) has not been amended since Downey was decided and it remains plain and clear; the BOP may not use a sentence enhancement to conclude that a prisoner has not been convicted of a nonviolent offense.”); Kilpatrick v. Houston, 36 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1330 (N.D.Fla.1999) (BOP regulation that automatically excludes from eligibility any prisoner whose offense “involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm” is invalid). Guido v. Booker, 37 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1300-1302 (D.Kan. 1999) (“This Court is compelled by the rationale in Fristoe to find that the BOP has improperly denied early release to petitioner under P.S. 5162.04 on the sole basis of sentence enhancements.”); Hicks v. Brooks, 28 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1273 (D.Colo.1998) (<HOLDING>); Gavis v. Crabtree, 28 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1267

    ### Response:
    holding that the revised regulation allows the bop to categorically exclude prisoners who are convicted of nonviolent offenses based upon sentence enhancements in violation of the unambiguous statutory language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are not per se unenforceable, the Texas Supreme Court in In re Prudential expressly “echo[ed] the United States Supreme Court’s admonition [in Brady v. United States ] that “waivers of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’ ” Id. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court equated the Texas standard for a “knowing and voluntary” prelitigation contractual jury waiver with the “knowing and voluntary” standard utilized in criminal cases like Brady to assess the validity of a defendant’s pretrial waiver of a jury trial via a guilty plea. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132; see Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 1469. But see L & R Realty v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 246 Conn. 1, 715 A.2d 748, 755 (1998) (<HOLDING>)- This was a logical step by the supreme court

    ### Response:
    holding in commercial loan transaction that it is appropriate to apply a lower standard in determining the enforceability of prelitigation contractual jury trial waivers than for waivers in criminal cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ownership, there may still be a claim of copyright infringement if the licensed use goes beyond the scope of the license. MacLean, 952 F.2d at 779. However, Lowe testified that he gave Storch the beat so that Storch could give it to Dr. Dre for a song, and that is exactly what happened. Lowe suggests that the defendants must come forward with evidence other than Lowe’s own testimony to establish a license. However, Lowe fails to realize that his own testimony is evidence that establishes the license necessary to defeat his claim. III. Lowe also challenges the award of attorney’s fees. We review the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fee for abuse of discretion under §§ 505 of the Copyright Act. See also, Gen’l Universal Systems, Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 148 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). A district court is entrusted with

    ### Response:
    holding that such fees are discretionary but routinely awarded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    having “blasted ... on two occasions, ... ha[ving] only made one sale of rock[,] ... [and having acted] under an agreement ... which provided that they would not themselves operate or allow any other person to operate ‘any mining or quarrying business.’ ” Jennette, 2000 WL 1121550, at *7. The Court of Appeals described the single sale of rock as “an incidental commercial transaction which standing alone is not indicia of an industrial, commercial or business establishment in operation,” id. (internal quotations omitted), and also gave weight to the lack of equipment necessary to conduct mining operations: It is undisputed that [the] property never had .. nsideration of the grandfather clause in Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208. See, e.g., Lamar Adver. Co., 1986 WL 2639, at *4 (<HOLDING>). The diminishing assets doctrine, however,

    ### Response:
    holding that a company had not abandoned billboards because the nature of the industry requires varying levels of outdoor advertising at different times thereby justifying several periods of nonuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1977, ch. 95V2, par. 11 — 1501(b)). Moon, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 658. The parents argued that a parent’s authority, discretion and control in rearing a child should prevail over the Contribution Act. The appellate court disagreed and held that the discretion and control of the parents were already circumscribed by the legislature’s imposition of a specific statutory duty to oversee their child’s actions with respect to the operation of a bicycle. The appellate court also noted that the parent-child immunity doctrine is a doctrine that has been steadily eroded by Illinois courts. Moon, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 661. In other cases, however, the immunity has prevailed over the law of contribution. See Buell v. Oakland Fire Protection District Board, 237 Ill. App. 3d 940, 605 N.E.2d 618 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Stephens v. Cozadd, 159 Ill. App. 3d 452, 512

    ### Response:
    holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a defendant has the right to be present at every stage of his trial; and if a defendant is being tried for a capital felony, that right cannot be waived. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 29, 381 S.E.2d 635, 651 (1989), sentence vacated, 497 U.S. 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), on remand, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991). Not every error caused by a defend ant’s absence requires reversal as these errors are subject to a harmless-error analysis. Id. at 33, 381 S.E.2d at 653. To begin, we consider the instance when defendant was not present for the pretrial conference. On 7 September 1993 the trial court noted for the record that on 3 September 1993 a conference was held at which defendant was not present although his attorneys were. According to the trial court, at the c 6, 717 (1992) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 464

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial does not arise before the trial begins
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Villafuerte v. Lewis, 75 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir.1996), analogous to “plain error” review in federal court. The Arizona doctrine preserves for appeal issues that “may be so important that overriding considerations concerning the integrity of the system will excuse a party’s failure to raise the issue in the trial court.” State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 812 P.2d 626, 628 (1991). Although the Arizona Supreme Court has noted that fundamental error “usually, if not always, involves the loss of federal constitutional rights,” id., Castillo’s mere assertion of fundamental error does not mean he asserted a federal constitutional claim; claims subject to fundamental error review may consist entirely of assertions under Arizona law. See Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, an argument of “fundamental error”

    ### Response:
    holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the effect of Section 321(a) compliance, as nothing in Section 321(a) conditions compliance on intent. Id. at 143-44. 2 . Neither the EPA nor Murray contests the district court's decision to partially deny Murray injunctive relief. 3 . The only detail of the evaluation duty that Section 321(a) provides is that the duty includes ""investigating threatened plant closures or reductions in employment allegedly resulting from [CAA] administration or enforcement.” 42 U.S.C. § 7621(a). However, Section 321(a) explicitly notes that these investigations need only be conducted ""where appropriate,” id., and thereby renders them a matter of agency discretion unreviewable under Section 304(a)(2). See Guilford Cty. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Wilson, 348 F.Supp.2d 548, 556 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (<HOLDING>); cf. Michigan v. EPA, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute providing that a state shall offer training and assistance if appropriate leaves the state with discretion in providing training and assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seven times whether he wished to continue talking without an attorney before the defendant clearly stated that he would continue talking. We see nothing improper about Munck’s responses to the defendant’s ambiguous statement. See State v. Sundstrom, 131 N.H. 203, 207 (1988) (finding that officers responded properly to defendant’s ambiguous statement by explaining that he could request a lawyer to be present at any time and by clarifying his indecision by asking defendant who his lawyer was and whether he wanted to speak with his lawyer at that time or later); see also State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 128 (1989). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the defendant did not unambiguously assert his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. See Sundstrom, 131 N.H. at 207 (<HOLDING>). Instead, the defendant made an ambiguous

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants statements i dont know and later theres no hurry in response to officers question about whether defendant wanted to call his attorney did not indicate that he was seeking counsel at that time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    inspection advisory, examining, and appeals board in accordance with 208 not later than the 10th day after the date on which written notice of the action or determination is mailed....” Id. § 802.7. Section 208.3 then allows any person aggrieved by a decision or ruling by the board to appeal again to the district court of Dallas County within thirty days after receiving notice of the board’s decision. Id. § 208.3. Nothing in the record establishes that TCI attempted to appeal the revocation of its permit; therefore, it failed to take advantage of any of the administrative procedures for reviewing the revocation. Thus, the City was not given the opportunity to exercise its full discretion in considering plans for the building before TCI demolished it. See Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). Because there was no final decision regarding

    ### Response:
    holding in land use situations courts have concluded in order for a regulatory takings claim to be ripe there must be a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abusive. The evidence supports the jury’s finding of guilt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Conclusion After thoroughly reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that there is no reversible error and accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, 1 . Nurse practitioners can prescribe medication as long as they are supervised by a physician. 2 . Within the appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, she asserts that the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions as to the definition of ""knowingly.” Because the appellant did not challenge the jury instructions in a motion for new trial, any issue regarding jury instructions has been waived. See Tenn. R.App. P. 3(e); see also State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997)

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant relinquishes the right to argue on appeal any issues that should have been presented in a motion for new trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the claimant has been harmed and “ ‘no other claimant or creditor has an interest in the cause.’ ” Fisher, 155 F.3d at 879 (quoting Koch, 831 F.2d at 1348). “[Allegations that could be asserted by any creditor could be brought by the trustee as a representative of all creditors. If the liability is to all creditors of the corporation without regard to the personal dealings between such officers and such creditors, it is a general claim... “A trustee may maintain only a general claim. His right to bring a claim depends on whether the action vests in the trustee as an assignee for the benefit of creditors or, on the other hand, accrues to specific creditors.” Fisher, 155 F.3d at 879-80 (quoting Koch, 831 F.2d at 1348-49); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1280 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Steinberg v. Buczynski, 40 F.3d 890,

    ### Response:
    holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    crops to be planted, grown or produced on [the] property in the future.” Sw. Ga. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. James, 180 Ga.App. 795, 350 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1986). Under Georgia law, a crop disaster payment is the result of a “loss[ ] ... or damage to” crops “to be planted, grown, or produced.” O.C.G.A. § 11-9-102(a)(63)(D); Sw. Ga. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 350 S.E.2d at 788. Bracewell’s crop disaster payment is “proceeds” under the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code. Bracewell received the payment for “the loss of ... or damage to” his crops. O.C.G.A. § ll-9-102(a)(63)(D). Bracewell’s payment is “from property of the estate,” see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6), because the expected crop yield was a levia-ble and cognizable property interest under Georgia law. See Sw. Ga. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 350 S.E.2d at 787 (<HOLDING>). Thanks in part to the creditors seeking

    ### Response:
    holding that a creditors security interest in all crops now growing or may hereafter be planted grown or produced within seven years from the date hereof and all proceeds therefrom granted the creditor a right to receive money from a reduced yield even though no profit was made internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the analysis required by OCGA § 5-6-48 (c) and remanding the case with direction that findings of fact be issued); Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857-58 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003) (“Failure to make [findings of fact] mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case with the direction that findings of fact be entered on these issues.”); Crenshaw v. Ga. Underwriting Ass’n, 202 Ga. App. 610, 611 (1) (414 SE2d 915) (1992) (reversing and remanding the denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal when the trial court failed to make findings of fact, and instead, ruled on the motion “without elaboration”). 12 See Postell v. Alfa Ins. Corp., 327 Ga. App. 194, 196 (757 SE2d 661) (2014) (vacating a trial court’s order that “summarily dismissed the no E2d 447) (1998) (<HOLDING>); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App.

    ### Response:
    holding that ajlthough ocga  5648 c sets forth the conditions upon which the trial court may dismiss an appeal for delay it does not by its terms require the court to make a formal recitation of those conditions in its order and affirming a trial courts dismissal order which found that the delay was unreasonable but had no express finding that the delay was inexcusable punctuation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [ (LLDPE) ], very low density polyethylene [ (VLDPE) ], ultra low density polyethylene [ (ULDPE) ], metallocene-catalyzed linear low density polyethylene resin [ (mLLDPE) ], or blends thereof.” Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *26 (emphasis added). That is, Multilayer argued the very claim construction that we now adopt. Multilayer cannot now allege that the layers of element (b) of claims 1 and 28 do not have to be “made from” the listed resins. See Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Transclean Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 474 F.3d 1298, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The consequence of our construction of element (b) is that claim 10 is invalid. Claim 10 recites, in relevant part, “[t]he multi-layer, thermoplastic 336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). “[Wjhere ... claims are susceptible to only

    ### Response:
    holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    here, whether there is a duty to fence in a waterway that is located within or adjacent to a park. However, once an entity undertakes to provide that protection, it is obligated to use reasonable care in providing it. For as long as Riverside Park has been in existence, there has been a fence separating the park from the Jordan River. Guardian Cynthia Stuckman asserts that she reasonably relied upon the integrity of the fence in allowing her son to play alone in the playground. If the jury should choose to believe Stuckman’s assertion, then it could find that either the City, the State, or both breached a duty owed to children playing in the park. This holding is supported by case law in several states. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co., 220 Cal.App.3d 1, 269 Cal.Rptr. 196 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Lukasiewicz v. City of Buffalo, 55 A.D.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that federally funded housing project incurred duty when it erected fence on property bordering creek duty was breached when housing project allowed fence to fall into disrepair
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy, the parties vigorously disputed at trial the amount of damages, if any, that RM Kids sustained due to the title defect. Indeed, the primary focus of the trial, because of its implications as to both liability and damages, was the dispute as to whether and to what extent the alleged title defects, indicated by Exhibit C, diminished the subject property’s market value. And both this Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia have taken the position that “when on entering upon trial the insurer disputes the amount of loss claimed by the insured, interest o (774 SE2d 216) (2015) (punctuation omitted). 37 Id. at 454-55 (punctuation omitted). 38 Id. at 455. 39 Doss & Assoc., 325 Ga. App. at 461 (4). 40 Int’l Indem. Co. v. Collins, 258 Ga. 9 Ga. App. 54, 58 (2) (576 SE2d 38) (2002) (<HOLDING>). 46 Estate of Callaway v. Garner, 297 Ga. 52,

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of insurer on badfaith claim because reasonable dispute existed as to whether policy covered insureds claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allegations are effectively restricted by the charge’s application of the law to the facts, which limits the jury’s deliberations to the allegations in the indictment supported by evidence. Id.; see also Sandig v. State, 580 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). The Court of Criminal Appeals has evaluated cases on this issue and explained: Superfluous abstractions, those not necessary to an understanding of concepts or terms contained in the application paragraph, are generally innocuous. Reversible error only occurs in the giving of an abstract instruction when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law which the jury must understand in order to implement the commands of the application paragraph .... The inclusion of a merely su rkana 2012, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>); Trevino v. State, 440 S.W.3d 722

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over eight million members from throughout the country, making joinder, consolidation, and intervention impracticable. Consequently, there appear to be no other available means to adjudicate this controversy and the class action device appears the only rational avenue of redress for many class members. b. Individual Plaintiffs Have Little Interest in Controlling the Prosecution of Separate Actions 95. Rule 23(b)(3) indicates that the first factor is “the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions.” The test is whether the interest of most class members in conducting separate lawsuits is so strong as to require denial of class certification. See, e.g., McClendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 39, 45 (D.N.J.1986) (<HOLDING>). 96.Here, class members have little incentive

    ### Response:
    holding class action to be superior adjudication method where individual class members had no interest in controlling prosecution of individual actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    dictionary meaning that arguably lowers the State’s burden of proof on an essential element of a crime cannot be reasonably categorized as a juror examining “his or her own conscience from within.” Cf. Robinson, 438 F.3d at 363. Moreover, to rely on a dictionary definition of an essential element (specifically, the essential element in the alleged crime in this case), is clearly straying from the instructions given by the trial judge. Indeed, as the dissent in the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision noted, the “universal rule appears to be that a dictionary constitutes extraneous material that may not be consulted by a jury.” Bauberger, 176 N.C.App. at 477, 626 S.E.2d at 708 (Geer, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504-06 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In sum, to be sure it is by now clearly

    ### Response:
    holding that consulting a dictionary definition for the meaning of malice constituted the consideration of extrinsic information finding prejudice under the chapman harmless error standard and affirming the district courts grant of conditional habeas relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    homeowners’ association is clearly given a conditional right to repurchase. But, as evidenced by section 16 of the purchase agreement, that right is not exclusive: “Seller” M.V.P. has its own conditional right to repurchase. Accordingly, the Matts’ first assignment of error is not well taken. {¶ 25} The Matts’ second and third assignments of error both deal with whether the Matts timely and sufficiently complied with the requirement that they commence construction of their home within 60 months of the filing of their deed. For purposes of clarity and convenience, the two assignments of error will be considered together. {¶ 26} The right to repurchase in this case is a condition subsequent. See Bruner-Goodhue-Cooke-Cranz Agency Co. v. Smith (1927), 25 Ohio App. 21, at 29, 157 N.E. 407 (<HOLDING>); see, also, Trailsend Land Co. v. Virginia

    ### Response:
    holding that a condition subsequent presupposes an existing obligation that is to be defeated or forfeited if the condition is not fulfilled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shot on one of its properties. Id. at 17. The reasoning applied in Trammell Crow, like the reasoning applied in Timber-walk, should not apply to the instant case, for the same reasons discussed here. Moreover, Chief Justice Jefferson, in a concurring opinion, explained that bare application of the Timberwalk factors might not allow for consideration of all relevant factors. See id. at 18 (Jefferson, J., concurring). For example, Chief Justice Jefferson noted that the ‘‘prior-similar-incidents inquiry” under Timberwalk does not properly ""account for crimes that may have been eminently foreseeable despite their never having occurred at a particular place before.” See id. at 19. This same reasoning applies here. Although the record does not show that Love 690 S.W.2d 546, 549-50 (Tex.1985) (<HOLDING>). Here, Whataburger operated a late night

    ### Response:
    holding that criminal conduct of third party is not superseding cause that relieves negligent actor from liability when criminal conduct is foreseeable result of actors negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to agree with the district court’s construction of the function of this means-plus-function claim, and disagrees only with its finding that the specification did not disclose a corresponding structure. Because this means-plus-function term is a computer-implemented one, the patent must disclose more than a general purpose processor; it must also include an algorithm to perform the function. See Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333 (“In cases involving a computer-implemented invention in which the inventor has invoked means- plus-function claiming, this court has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor.”); see also Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). The district court found that the ’616 patent

    ### Response:
    holding that however an algorithm is expressed it must be a stepbystep procedure for accomplishing a given result citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Division over the next five years. 575 F.3d at 1355. The Federal Circuit then discussed whether the demonstration of the protestor’s “substantial chance” of receiving the contract award but for the alleged agency error, the traditional test for standing in bid protests and the test proposed by the government in Weeks Marine, is the proper standard for pre-award bid protests: We have not had occasion to discuss what is required to prove an economic interest, and thus prejudice, in a ease such as this, where a prospective bidder/offeror is challenging a solicitation in the pre-award context. In such a ease, it is difficult for a prospective bidder/offeror to make the showing of prejudice that we have required in post-award bid protest cases. See, e.g., Statistica, 102 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). The reason of course is that, in a case such

    ### Response:
    holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Weiss, 82 Wn.2d at 211. 44 Frazier, 102 Wash. at 380. 45 Perry v. School Dist. 81, 54 Wn.2d 886, 898, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959). 46 See Witters II, 112 Wn.2d at 365; Graham, 84 Wn.2d at 817; Perry, 54 Wn.2d at 896; Visser v. Nooksack Valley Sch. Dist. 506, 33 Wn.2d 699, 711, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); Frazier, 102 Wash. at 375-76, 380. See also Weiss, 82 Wn.2d at 211. 47 G. Gallup, Jr., The People’s Religion: American Faith in the 90’s 45, 58-59 (1989). 48 American Psychiatric Ass’n, Committee on Religion and Psychiatry, guidelines (Dec. 1989). 49 88 Wn.2d 867, 871, 568 P.2d 758 (1977). 50 Id. at 871 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968)). 51 392 U.S. at 106. 52 Accord Community Council v. Jordan, 102 Ariz. 448, 451, 456, 432 P.2d 460, 463, 468 (1967) (<HOLDING>). 53 Perry, 54 Wn.2d at 897 (citation omitted).

    ### Response:
    holding reimbursement to a religious institution the salvation army for emergency services expenditures permissible under article ii section 12 of arizona constitution an identical provision to article i section 11
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the aberration is an established one and one that has been recognized ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ a total of five[ ] consecutive cases in this Court. It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court’s expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs. Id. (internal citation omitted). The majority opinion ends by reciting the holding of Toolson that “the business of baseball” is exempt from antitrust legislation based on stare deci-sis and congressional inaction. See id. at 285, 92 S.Ct. 2099. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285, 92 S.Ct. 2099. Although h , 457 (W.D.Wash.1995) (<HOLDING>). A different interpretation of Flood can be

    ### Response:
    holding that floods reaffirmation of toolson extended immunity to the business of baseball
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    including, but not limited to, calls relating to political campaigns.” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-446(A). Based on the express language of the statute, the Fourth Circuit found that it was content based; the statute made facial content distinctions and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. Cahaly, 796 F.3d at 405. By contrast, the IADMS does not target political speech or any other type of speech. The Plaintiff argues that the IADMS burdens political speech and therefore requires the Court to apply a strict scrutiny analysis. However, the Supreme Court has analyzed content-neutral laws that impact political communications using the time, place, and manner scheme applied to other content-neutral laws. See, e.g., Members of the City Council of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. at 803-05, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (<HOLDING>). The Plaintiff attempts to analogize the

    ### Response:
    holding that a law prohibiting signs on public property in order to preserve aesthetics could be applied to politicalcampaign signs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    163, 166 (1994). The problem here is with the veracity prong as it is evident that the information in the affidavit comes from a first-time informant with no track record in the past. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 403 Mass. 483, 486 (1988); Commonwealth v. Parapar, 404 Mass. 319, 322 (1989). While conceding that the affidavit does not establish the general veracity of this initial informant, the government argues that the specific reliability of the informant’s tip is sufficiently enhanced by other factors to cure the veracity defect. See Commonwealth v. Parapar, supra at 322. Even though the initial informant did supply some detail in his description of the criminal activity alleged, that tip is not enough, by itself, to satisfy the veracity prong. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, supra at 487 (<HOLDING>). Independent police corroboration of a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that specificity of detail can contribute to reliability but noting that other indicia of reliability are usually present
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court made several findings that undermine plaintiffs’ general personal jurisdiction arguments with respect to NCB, including that: (1) “[njeither NCB’s office or that of [SNCB] was in existence at the time plaintiffs commenced their actions”; (2) “[p]laintiffs’ contention [that SNCB continued to operate after it was officially closed in early 2001] is, at best, mere speculation, unsupported by the relevant factual circumstances”; (3) “[t]he supporting exhibits submitted by plaintiffs do not demonstrate, nor even give rise to a reasonable inference, that NCB maintained an aviation division or ... derived revenue from aviation-related activities in the United States”; and (4) “[t]he dubious and Wiese Sudameries, No. 03 Civ. 1681(LAP), 2004 WL 2199547, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004) (<HOLDING>). In these circumstances, we agree with the

    ### Response:
    holding that an interactive website allowing clients to bank online was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over a foreign bank
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    spend considerable time resolving this issue. The need to commit judicial and litigants’ resources to a matter that Congress could have resolved by more precise legislative drafting frustrates efforts to reform and streamline the American legal system. V. ORDER ACCORDINGLY, it is ordered th F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (11th Cir.1991) and FDIC v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089, 1095 n. 6 (7th Cir.1991) and Northern Mariana Islands v. Kawano, 917 F.2d 379, 381-82 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1116, 113 L.Ed.2d 224 (1991) and Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 872 F.2d 1416, 1424-25 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990) and Leake v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 695 F.Supp. 1414, 1415-18 (E.D.N.Y.1988), aff'd 869 F.2d 130, 131 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). See generally Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732,

    ### Response:
    holding that the bradley presumption is the better rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a fraudulent or evil motive, or a conscious act that willfully and wantonly disregards the rights of another.” Don Buchwald, 281 A.D.2d at 330, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 9. In addition, the burden of proof for punitive damages is “clear and convincing evidence.” See Randi A.J. v. Long Island Surgi-Center, 46 A.D.3d 74, 86, 842 N.Y.S.2d 558, 568 (2d Dep’t 2007) (“[Although we are aware that a different view has been expressed by other courts as to the requisite evidentiary standard, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that the standard of proof regarding the imposition of punitive damages was clear and convincing evidence.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Munoz v. Puretz, 301 A.D.2d 382, 384, 753 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1st Dep’t 2003) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). The Court finds both

    ### Response:
    holding that an award for punitive damages must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trail use in a “Rails-to-Trails” taking liability determination. The government’s argument that trail use is irrelevant to the taking determination is directly contrary to this precedent. This court recently rejected the government’s arguments that the United States is not responsible for trail use in Jenkins v. United States, 102 Fed.Cl. 598, 619 (2011). As the Jenkins opinion explains, the Trails Act scheme does not, as the government contends, authorize only that the railway right-of-way will not be deemed abandoned for railroad purposes if the corridor is railbanked. The preemption of abandonment and the attendant blocking of the reversionary interest, which gives rise to the taking, is expressly conditioned on a trail operator reaching an agreement with t (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the court finds unpersuasive the

    ### Response:
    holding the federal government responsible for the immediately foreseeable consequences of its actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff from requesting declaratory relief for cardinal change. Id. at 32. First, the Government wrongly asserts that the provision in SLA No. 2 reestablishing completion dates precludes the cardinal change claim in the May 12, 2009 Complaint. Id. at 33. SLA No. 2 states that GSA has the right to seek a termination or extend the Delivery Date, if Plaintiff does not reach 80% completion by the Delivery Date. Gov’t Ex. A (“[I]n the event the premises will not be 80% complete by the Delivery Date ... the Lease provides the Government the right to either seek to terminate the Lease or extend the Delivery Date.”). GSA, however, cannot terminate a contract for default, if the contractor is asked to perform a cardinal change. Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1446 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, SLA No. 2 simply reestablished new

    ### Response:
    holding that a cardinal change provides the contractor with a legal right to avoid the contract discharges the contractors duty to perform and relieves the contractor of the default termination and its consequences
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[a] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his plea of guilty.” Williams, 23 F.3d at 634. Instead, relying on Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(e), the Second Circuit stated that a defendant must show a “fair and just reason” for the withdrawal. The reason offered was that Williams had discovered, after pleading guilty, that he had a possible entrapment defense. The district court refused to accept that as grounds for permitting, as a matter of its discretion, the withdrawal of the guilty plea because the entrapment defense was foreclosed by the facts of the case. Id. at 635. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. Accord United States v. Mader, 251 F.3d 1099, 1104 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Neither Williams nor our recent holding in

    ### Response:
    holding that a criminal defendant must provide a fair and just reason to support withdrawal of his guilty plea even when that plea has not yet been accepted by the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in noncapital cases, neither the Sixth Amendment nor. the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a unanimous jury verdict in a state trial. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972). In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 629, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), a plurality of the Supreme Court avoided extending the federal unanimity requirement to a state capital defendant, by concluding that even if the unanimity requirement applied it would not provide relief to the defendant. The defendant in Schad, 501 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. 2491, was indicted by a state grand jury for capital murder, which the relevant statute def 1, 936 (1976) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. Quick,

    ### Response:
    holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of firstdegree murder
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sheriff did not present a political question); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) (concluding that an Ohio election law making it difficult for a new political party to gain access to state ballot did not present a political question). 177 . 531 U.S. 70, 121 S.Ct. 471, 148 L.Ed.2d 366 (2000). 178 . 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000). 179 . See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 271 (2002); Robert 859, 867 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988), rev’d, Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.1989); State ex rel. Grimes County Taxpayers Ass’n v. Tex. Mun. Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258, 274 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ dism’d) (<HOLDING>); C.E. Carter v. Hamlin Hosp. Dist., 538 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the determination of the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state is a political question solely within the power prerogative and discretion of the legislature and not subject to judicial review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Law §§ 290 et seq., and her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for, inter alia, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history, and we affirm the district court’s judgment. We hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on Kearney’s age-discrimination claims. Regarding Kearney’s reassignment to the Criminal Unit, the district court held that no evidence supported the element of Kearney’s prima facie case requiring proof of a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. See Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (setting forth this requirement); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The district court was correct to require

    ### Response:
    holding that claims under the adea and the nyshrl are subject to the same analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and concluded that the substance found in defendant’s jacket was cocaine. Ms. Charlesworth did not testify at trial. Defendant did not object to Officer Tucker’s testimony or the admission of Ms. Charlesworth’s re ortunity to cross-examine Ms. Charlesworth. Therefore, admitting the report and permitting Officer Tucker to testify to its contents violated defend-ant’s Confrontation Clause rights. “A violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2009). Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine wit 53, 158 (2010) (<HOLDING>); State v. Meadows, — N.C. App. —, —, 687

    ### Response:
    holding that lay opinion based on physical appearance is not enough to identify crackcocaine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    C.J. In this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the former wife raises numerous arguments. We find that the trial court did not make the required statutory findings related to timesharing, equitable distribution, and the amount of child support. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. First, we agree with the former wife that the trial court erred in providing for equal time-sharing without an accompanying finding that such an arrangement is in the best interests of the children. See Jeffers v. McLeary, 118 So.3d 287, 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“The Father is correct that ‘a trial court must make a finding that the time-sharing schedule is in the child’s best interests.’ ”); Winters v. Brown, 51 So.3d 656, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); Clark v. Clark, 825 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a trial court must make a finding that the timesharing schedule is in the childs best interests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    where Congress was regulating commercial activity. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964) (prohibiting refusal of restaurant service to interstate travelers); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) (prohibiting refusal of hotel accommodations to interstate travelers); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968) (regulating wages of employees of business engaged in interstate commerce); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (regulating loan sharking); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (regulating coal industry); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>). In both Lopez and Morrison, by contrast, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing these examples are by no means exhaustive but the pattern is clear
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    C.A.F.E., where appropriate. 2 . According to Kennedy, he was the organizer of four chapters of C.A.F.E. (Carolina Alliance of Fair Employment), which he stated is involved in challenging corruption of the police and sheriff’s departments, assisting persons terminated from employment, and providing help with school matters and other issues affecting the community. 3 . For better understanding of the issues involved in this opinion, we will follow the Supreme Court's directive and use the following language to refer to the two parts of a slander action. A statement is (1) either defamatory per se or defamatory per quod, and (2) either actio .E. 889 (1935); Turner v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 165 S.C. 253, 163 S.E. 796 (1932); see Sandifer v. Electrolux Corp., 172 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.1949) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we dismiss Kennedy’s arguments in

    ### Response:
    holding under south carolina law where words themselves do not impute the commission of a crime the juiy may consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether statement was defamatory because it charged the commission of a crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is defined as ""First Health Strategies, Inc., or such other firm, person or corporation appointed by the Trustees to perform the duties required herein to be performed by the Contract Administrator."" Id. at ALS52 (Art. I) (emphasis added). 9 . The court overrules plaintiff's objections to defendants' evidence (Bates Stamped ALS197-200, see Kurzon Decl. Ex. G) since it has already reviewed the materials. However, this additional material has no impact on the outcome here. 10 . The court also noted that its construction was consistent with law applicable to Social Security claims. Bruce, 2003 WL 21005313, *6 n. 12 (citing Willis v. Callahan, 979 F.Supp. 1299, 1305 (D.Or.1997)). See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 833, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Defendants also rely on Smith v. Unum

    ### Response:
    holding that unlike the social security disability program erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to the opinions of treating physicians and noting that there are critical differences between the two programs that nothing in erisa requires employers to establish employee benefit plans and that erisa does not mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan quotations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    many cases”). See also United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir.1979) (""[T]he facts necessary to show probable cause to arrest are not necessarily the same as those required to show probable cause to search."") (citing Melvin). In this case, as in Melvin and not Brouil-lette, it is clear that a shooting had occurred. Mendenhall had been placed at the scene with a gun. Mendenhall was suspected of having a nine-millimeter pistol and two nine-millimeter shell casings had been recovered at the scene. Obtaining and testing Mendenhall's weapon would have resolved the question of whether Mendenhall’s weapon had been fired and, if it had, whether it was the weapon used in the shooting. Cf. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (<HOLDING>); Rojas, 671 F.2d at 165 (""[Pjrobable cause to

    ### Response:
    holding that government may search for mere evidence of a crime and that in the case of mere evidence probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Finally, the standard for employer liability under CEPA is lower than under § 1983, as New Jersey imposes re-spondeat superior liability upon employers. See Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 420-21, 650 A.2d 958 (1994). The practical implication of these differences, in this case, is that some of the incidents supporting Plaintiffs’ free speech claims may not suffice to survive summary judgment under a CEPA theory. Most notably, Roberts Taylor’s claim that she was put “on the outs” with the heads of the City Attorney’s Office in retaliation for her objections to illegal contracts is not a sufficiently “adverse” act to be actionable under CEPA. Cf. Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 336 N.J.Super. 395, 415-16, 765 A.2d 217, 228-29 (App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>). A closer question is whether Sunkett’s

    ### Response:
    holding in suit under njlad that a supervisors decision to no longer socialize with a worker or be cordial would not alone alter the conditions of employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 . While I must begin the sentencing process by ""correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range,” Gall v. United States, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), I may reject a sentence within the range ""because a sentence within the Guidelines fails to reflect the other [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors or 'because the case warrants a different sentence regardless.’ ” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir.2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). 2 . Though the defendant's wife owned the guns seized from the house, the defendant at the least constructively possessed them, and therefore may share his wife’s status as a collector. See United States v. Mojica, 214 F.3d 1169, 1171-74 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Moit, 100 F.3d 605, 606-07

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who had constructively possessed a shotgun that was owned by his brother and used solely for lawful sporting purposes was entitled to a reduction under ussg  2k21b2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in any way excuse or justify noncompliance by the other [parties].” (Charla Cert., Exhibit “A,” pg. 2). Because the Administrative Order makes each responsible party fully liable for complying with its terms, the Novak Group’s continued payment of remediation costs advances its own self-interests, not simply the interest of the Debtor’s estate. In order to avoid the assessment of civil penalties by the EPA, the remaining members of the Novak Group have no choice— they must continue the remediation efforts irrespective of whether the Debtor participates. When examined from this perspec tive, the Novak Group’s payment is not an actual benefit to the estate directly furthering the Debtor’s reorganization efforts. See In re Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc., 228 B.R. 816, 821 (Bankr.D.Del.l999)(<HOLDING>). As such, the Novak Group has not demonstrated

    ### Response:
    holding that a claimed expense must directly and substantially benefit the bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were for traffic offenses. He contends that the court in sentencing him to the maximum sentence available only looked at the number of his past crimes, not their nature. He argues that the court in sentencing him should have examined the actual fraud that occurred in the case as opposed to basing its sentence on the potential fraud alleged by the government. Furthermore, Perkins asserts that the district court should have determined the need for the sentence imposed, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), as well as the kinds of sentences available pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3). We review sentences imposed under the post-Booker advisory Guideline scheme for reasonableness. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.2005); Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-63, 125 S.Ct. at 765-66 (<HOLDING>). Following the Booker decision, we have held

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate court review sentences for unreasonableness in light of the  3553a factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demands national treatment. “The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions” and itself “represents an instrument of interstate commerce.” Amer. Libraries Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y.1997). See also Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.2008) (“Online services are in some respects like the classified pages of newspapers, but in others they operate like common carriers such as telephone services.”). Thus, “[t]he Internet, like ... rail and highway traffic ..., requires a cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations.” Pataki, 969 F.Supp. at 182; cf. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S.Ct. 4, 30 L.Ed. 244 (1886) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed

    ### Response:
    holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discretion over whether to remove the case; the court does have discretion, however, over where to remove the case. Smith, supra, 96 Md.App. at 385 n. 4, 625 A.2d 349. The threshold question for the circuit court on a motion for removal — whether there is reasonable ground to believe the allegation that the moving party cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in the county in which the action is pending — is a mixed question of law and fact concerning a constitutional right. Accordingly, on appeal, we review that threshold determination de novo. See Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220-21, 792 A.2d 1160 (2002) (reviewing de novo the judgment of the trial court on a motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial); Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310, 765 A.2d 97 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that whether the defendants confession was voluntary was a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an express trust for another. Begier, 496 U.S. at 59, 110 S.Ct. 2258. Therefore, any action brought by the trustee against Defendants would not bring property into the estate for the benefit of the creditors. Instead, such a suit would recover misappropriated trust property for Cannon’s clients, the beneficiaries of the express trust who lost their money upon the collapse of his schemes. Accordingly, because the trustee asserts causes of action in the non-core proceeding alleging harm to the beneficiaries of the express trust, he lacks standing to maintain this suit against Defendants. See In re Van Dresser Carp., 128 F.3d at 947. We find support for our conclusion in several cases from the Second and Eleventh Circuits. See Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944

    ### Response:
    holding that a trustee had no standing to pursue claims of fraud against the debtors accountant because under connecticut law those claims belonged to investors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    class actions and medical malpractice claims, made applicable to pending causes of action. See id. The majority of House Bill 4 did not apply to pending cases, but applied only to those cases filed after its general effective date — September 1, 2003. Id. § 23.02(d), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 899. Even if one accepts the dissent’s view that the Statute is remedial in the sense that it merely deprives Satterfield of a remedy for her accrued and pending claims against Crown Cork, the Statute would still be unconstitutional because it applies retroactively and fails to provide Satterfield, and other potential claimants, a reasonable time to bring suit after the enactment of the new law and preserve their vested rights. See Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 254-55 (same); see also

    ### Response:
    holding that procedural or remedial statutes may not be applied to pending suits at the time they become effective if doing so would destroy or impair rights that vested before the statutes effective date
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269, 35 S.Ct. 783, 785, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915); State v. Titus, 933 P.2d 1165, 1170, 1171-72, 1173-74 (Alaska App.1997); Turpin v. State, 8 luences on their deliberations — for example, fraud, bribery, threats or coercion by third parties, or other acts of third parties in obstruction of justice. Van Huff v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Alaska 1992); West v. State, 409 P.2d 847, 852 (Alaska 1966). However, allegations of intimidation or verbal coercion by other jurors during the deliberative process do not qualify as outside influences. Evidence Rule 606(b) precludes a court from receiving testimony concerning the kinds of allegations made by the juror in Kailukiak’s case. See United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 914 (3rd Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Judge Wood acted properly when he refused to

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of one jurors purported intimidation or harassment of another juror falls squarely within the core prohibition of federal evidence rule 606b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or lung cancer — directly caused by smoking— who continue to smoke, not because they do not suffer gravely from the disease, but bécause other factors such as the addictive nature of the product impacts their ability to stop'. This is an unreliable basis on which to rest a credibility determination. Shramek, 226 F.3d at 813. In applying these rules set forth in Shramek, the court in Seals stated that even assuming the doctor’s statements did constitute a prescribed course of treatment, “the [claimant]’s failure to stop smoking does not necessarily constitute a refusal to follow that prescribed treatment. A willful refusal to follow treatment may not be assumed-from a mere failure to accomplish the recommended change.” Seals, 308 F.Supp.2d at 1250 (citing McCall, 846 F.2d at 1319) (<HOLDING>). The court found evidence in the record that

    ### Response:
    holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official policy, the district court dismissed the breach of contract claim because “the allegations in the complaint fail[ed] to show that a contract existed between [Leibowitz] and [Cornell] ensuring her employment indefinitely,” Leibowitz, 2005 WL 267560, at *6, and the implied-in-fact contract claim because her allegations were “inconsistent with a finding that the parties agreed, by their conduct, to be bound to a contract affording [Leibowitz] lifetime employment,” id. at *7. The allegation, however, that there existed an unofficial Cornell policy that created a contractual relationship — be it express or implied in fact — between Leibowitz and Cornell is sufficient to meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the Equal Pay Act claim, the

    ### Response:
    holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    she contracted non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma from toxic chemicals in the drinking and bathing water of Camp Lejeune. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “the time between first exposure to a cancer-causing agent and clinical recognition of the disease is called the latency-period. Latency periods vary by cancer type, but usually are 15 to 20 years, or longer.” Indeed, according to Dr. Michael L. Gross’s testimony at a Congressional hearing regarding Camp Lejeune’s allegedly contaminated water, cancer in the affected marines and their families would not manifest for “10-15 years.” Moreover, many cancers like non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma provide no indication of their cause. Here, those exposed to the water at Camp Lejeune could not have 4-Ohio-322, 639 N.E.2d 425 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz.

    ### Response:
    holding 10year statute of repose violated state constitutional right to remedy in personal injury and wrongful death suits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    present case. Such a waiver must be explicit. See Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir.1991). There is no waiver in New York law, nor in any documents submitted to this Court. Furthermore, in his appellate brief, Tornheim fails even to allege that the State has somehow consented to suit. Additionally, we find unavailing Tornheim’s argument that, because he is challenging the constitutionality of State statutes, his claim escapes the Eleventh Amendment bar. Tornheim cites several Supreme Court decisions to support his argument, including Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03, 104 S.Ct. 900 (discussing Eleventh Amendment implications where state officials act ultra vires their authority), Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (<HOLDING>), and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of costs.” McDonald v. Union Carbide Corp., 734 F.2d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 1984). Even assuming that Griffin qualifies as a prevailing party, we find no abuse of discretion here. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that gen erally, “costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). This provision creates “a strong presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs.” Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 1150, 67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981)). The presumption, however, is not irrebutable. For example, the rule itself confers upon the district court the discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d); see Folloder, 767 F.2d at 131-32 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it explicitly cautions that an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a court can exercise its discretion not to award costs to a prevailing party as long as the court states its reasons for refusing to permit the award
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l) of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging Eighth Amendment claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, see Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we vacate and remand. We conclude that Funtanilla adequately alleged deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Specifically, Funtanilla alleged that while he was in the suicide prevention cell, “defendant Rubles observed him once during the night cutting his arm.” (Complaint at 2, ¶ 10). See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (<HOLDING>); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knew that prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a civil penalty of $250,000 was imposed for the kind of conduct Reyes engaged in here. Accordingly, this factor provides no guidance in assessing the constitutionality of the award. Considering all of the Gore guideposts, we conclude that the jury’s award was unconstitutionally excessive in violation of due process and therefore properly remitted by the district court. Because the punitive damages award was excessive under the Due- Process Clause, we need not decide whether it was also excessive as .a matter of federal common law. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2626-27, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008). Constitutional torts are governed by the federal common law, subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 34, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (<HOLDING>). In Exxon Shipping, the Court held that the

    ### Response:
    holding that damage remedies in  1983 suits are determined by looking first to the common law of torts both modern and as of 1871
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    565, 567-68, 777 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (Ct.App.1989). In this case, Doe concedes that the officer was justified in stopping him. The state argues that the officer was also justified in conducting a Terry frisk because the encounter occurred at night, the officers were responding to a possible burglary, Doe and his friend were dressed in black, and police had responded to a break-in or burglary report at the church one week prior to this incident. Several jurisdictions have concluded that certain crimes, like burglary, by their very nature are so suggestive of the presence and use of weapons that a frisk is always reasonable when officers have a reasonable suspicion that an individual might be involved in such a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 347 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Barnett, 505 F.3d 637, 640

    ### Response:
    holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the statute. This is not a tenable reading of the statute, and is indeed contrary to precedent. The Supreme Court cases interpreting the safe harbor make clear that the safe harbor is not limited to acts which only produce information for the FDA but protects all acts, even interim research steps and acts that might produce other useful data, ""as long as there is a reasonable basis for believing that the [act] will produce the types of information that are relevant to [a submission to the FDA].” Merck, 545 U.S. at 208, 125 S.Ct. 2372. We have interpreted this language of the safe harbor to allow alleged infringers to use “data from tests for more than FDA approval,” such as for fund raising and other business purposes. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). RADER, Chief Judge, dissenting. By

    ### Response:
    holding that the alleged infringers intent or alternate uses of test data are irrelevant to its qualification to invoke the section 271e1 shield
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the extent that it is determined reasonable during contract negotiations.”).) Alternatively, it argues that the contract cabins profit to no more than 10% of the reimbursable costs. (See id. (noting that ""the combination of profit and administrative cost must not exceed 10%”).) KRA on the other hand argues that the contract is silent as to profit under hybrid contracts and that therefore such profit is permitted without limits. 6 . In its brief, KRA also seems to broadly challenge all of PWDC’s FY 2009 disallow-ances. But the administrative and indirect cost disallowances are the only ones that KRA points to with any specificity. We therefore find that KRA has failed to preserve its arguments regarding PWDC's other disallow-anees. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that it is well settled that casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal citing simmons v city of philadelphia 947 f2d 1042 1066 3d cir 1991
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wrong.” Id. at 2. In Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959), the United States Supreme Court followed the “maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong” in holding that the defendant was estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense where the defendant had induced the delay in plaintiff bringing suit. Id. at 231-32, 79 S.Ct. 760. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court held that if the plaintiff was justifiably misled by the defendant into a good faith belief that he could begin his action outside the statute of limitations, plaintiff was entitled to have the case tried on the merits. Id. at 235, 79 S.Ct. 760; see also Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Plaintiff also argues

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable tolling is allowed where the complainant had been induced or tricked by his adversarys misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    finally determined the Ramsey prices for each combination. While its description of this process is, charitably speaking, rather opaque, it appears that this involved finding the optimum total cost (including operating costs and incremental and fixed air traffic services costs) for each combination based on the demand elasticity and the difference between price and incremental cost. Subtracting out the operating costs yielded the “Ramsey price” for each category, including both incremental and fixed costs. Significantly, the study noted that “[t]he allocation of those common and fixed costs depends heavily on the overall flight cost. As the price of air traffic services becomes a smaller fraction of total costs, the optimization will assign a higher Ramsey price to higher cost flights (<HOLDING>).” GRA Study at 51. Finally, the Ramsey prices

    ### Response:
    holding all else constant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    applications,” their secondary road determinations “rely heavily on maps produced by state and federal transportation authorities,” a reasonable source to bolster its goal of “establishing] eligibility criteria for CAHs” to be consistently applied. Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Cross-Mot. 13, ECF No. 26; see also DAB Final Decision 4, ECF No. 18 (“CMS lack[s] the resources and capacity for making case-by-case judgments about the driving characteristics of every stretch of highway in the United States” but bases its judgments on “objective criteria.”) (internal citations omitted). The Court, while not able to engage in fact-finding or reweighing of the evidence in evaluating this judgment, finds that the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Roland, 2010 WL 70855, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Combined with the congressional goal of

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the secretary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court’s opinion in Salinas. Accordingly, this case presents a situation similar to Miller v. Gammie, in which we held that “where the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-judge panel should consider itself bound by the later and controlling Cir.1993)). The evidence at trial showed that Schoenberg collected protection money for the Erne on behalf ir.2002) (noting, in case of defendants convicted under §§ 1962(c) and (d) that, although the two are legally distinct crimes, “[t]he substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy counts required the defendants to be found guilty of at least two racketeering acts or predicate acts.”); United States v. Bennett, 44 F.3d 1364, 1374 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 4. Gavaldon’s challenge to Count Two: Not an

    ### Response:
    holding that in addition to the elements of the substantive violation a rico conspiracy requires proof of the additional element of an agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it. 8 .The Court is aware of the split in authority on whether a district court retains jurisdiction after class certification is denied. See Ronat v. Martha Stewar Living Omnimedia, Inc., No. 05-520, 2008 WL 4963214, *6, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91814, at *21-22 (S.D.I11. Nov. 12, 2008) (collecting conflicting cases). The Third Circuit has not ruled on the issue and district courts within the circuit have come to conflicting conclusions. Compare Atlass v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 07-2720, 2007 WL 2892803, *1 n. 1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72603, at *2 n. 1 (D.N.L Sept. 25, 2007) (Debevoise, S.D.J.) (no jurisdiction if no certification order) with Allen-Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 07-4087, 2009 WL 1285522, *3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39555, at *14 (E.D.Pa. May 5, 2009) (Joyner, D.J.) (<HOLDING>). The Court respectfully disagrees with the

    ### Response:
    holding that the court retained cafa jurisdiction even though class certification was denied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on its claims of law enforcement purpose. Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-1872, 202 F.Supp.3d 86, 101, 2016 WL 4074130, at *6 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2016); see also Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mem. Op., ECF No. 306 at 12. The BOP explains that the documents it withholds under Exemption 7 were generated as part of the BOP’s “law enforcement mission of protecting inmates, staff, and the community.” 3d Christenson Decl. ¶ 26. Furthermore, many of the responsive records were located in the BOP’s databases. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13, 44, 53, 64, 95, 105, 126, 140, 143, 162, 176. Past decisions in this jurisdiction have held that .similar records were compiled for law enforcement purposes. See, e.g., Mingo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 793 F.Supp.2d 447, 453 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Holt v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 734 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that records pertaining to an altercation involving over 50 inmates and maintained by the special investigative office at that facility were compiled for a law enforcement purpose because they were created in connection with the bops responsibility to protect  inmates staff and the community internal quotation marks and citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official has a corresponding duty, and no other adequate and appropriate remedy at law exists. Fagan, 41 A.3d at 818. Moreover, this Court has explained that mandamus can compel the performance of an official duty, “even where the existence and scope of such duties must be found and defined in the course of the mandamus action itself.” Delaware River Port Auth. v. Thornburgh, 508 Pa. 11, 493 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1985). First, I conclude that, when viewed in the proper light, the amended complaint contains sufficient facts to demonstrate that Appellants have a clear legal right. Specifically, it is indisputable that criminal defendants are constitutionally enti- tied to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Appellants’ complaint avers facts which, if

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at p. 5 (“If the debtor is allowed to have access to her funds though loans or due to financial hardship, then the debtor’s creditors should also be entitled to those funds.”). There are cases decided under New York law which support the proposition that the kind of access which the Debtor enjoys with respect to the CREF account would render an antialienation provision invalid for § 541(c)(2) purposes. In particular, courts have “struck down” such provisions insofar as they pertained to an Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”), based on the fact that the debtor had the right to withdraw funds from the account at any time (and even though the withdrawal could trigger adverse tax consequences under 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)). See In re Taft, 171 B.R. 497, 503 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1994) (Holland, J.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd in pertinent part and rev’d in part on

    ### Response:
    holding that a simplified employee pension which is a kind of ira see 26 usc  408k was not a valid spendthrift trust and making note of the debtors ability to obtain withdrawals from the pension  for any reason subject merely only sic to a minimal tax penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to consider in considering whether there was a felony murder sequence of events here. All the evidence indicates that first there was this beating and the killing of Marion Smigiel. Then there was the taking of property.” The trial court subsequently sustained the prosecution’s objection to the above-quoted argument and directed the jury to disregard it. Was this an abuse of discretion? No. While an attorney is afforded wide latitude in making arguments, he may not misstate the law. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1994); People v. Buckley, 282 Ill. App. 3d 81, 89 (1996). The “sequence of events” here, i.e., the fact that the armed robbery may not have been completed until after the death of the victim, is of no legal significance. See People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 97 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The defense was permitted to and did argue to

    ### Response:
    holding that it was immaterial that the armed robbery did not commence prior to the fatal gunshots
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notice” and vacates order confirming plan). Similarly, in the case before me, Debt- or’s conversion notice ended the chapter 13 case, effectively vacating the order confirming the chapter 13 plan and depriving it of any res judicata effect. Therefore, by electing to convert his case, Debtor was no longer obligated under the terms of the plan. 3. The funds in the plan “vested” in the creditors upon transfer to the trustee. Some courts have held that upon receipt by the trustee, plan payments are “vested in” creditors holding allowed claims and cannot thereafter be divested. See e.g. In re Pegues, 266 B.R. 328 (Bankr.D.Md.2001) (finding once chapter 13 debtor makes payment under confirmed plan, he relinquishes all rights to that payment); In re Hardin, 200 B.R. 312 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Galloway, 134 B.R. 602

    ### Response:
    holding that confirmation vests rights in creditors under  1306 and other equitable factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cost they would have incurred to have the project completed. The contractor argued that completion of the project would constitute economic waste so that the owners were entitled to recover only the difference between the market value of the structure if completed and the market value of the work performed. Id. at 1320. In refusing to accept the contractor’s argument, the Utah court held that the breaching contractor bears the burden of proving, “affirmatively and convincingly,”' that completion would result in economic waste and, further, that the breaching contractor in this case failed to demonstrate unreasonable economic waste by its failure to present evidence necessary to take the market value approach. Id.; see also Shell v. Schmidt, 164 Cal.App.2d 350, 330 P.2d 817, 827 (1958) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959, 79 S.Ct. 799, 3

    ### Response:
    holding that the breaching contractor has the burden to affirmatively and convincingly prove that economic waste would result and that a substantial part of what has been done must be undone
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    compensation actions are governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. See § 25-5-88, Ala.Code 1975, and Rule 81, Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P., governs the procedure for finding a party in contempt of court, and an employer who is a party to a workers’ compensation case may be sanctioned for contempt by a trial court’s following that rule. See Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois v. Griner, 809 So.2d 808, 814-15 (Ala.2001). In the case of a finding of a constructive criminal contempt, the court may impose imprisonment or a fine to punish the contemnor. See Rule 70A(e)(l), Ala. R. Civ. P. That fine, however, may not take the form of workers’ compensation benefits, but should be a separate award altogether. See Argo Constr. Co. v. Rich, 603 So.2d 1078 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). In this case, as the employee acknowledges,

    ### Response:
    holding that circuit court could assess attorneys fees against contemptuous employer for violating order to pay medical benefits but the fees would be separate and additional to the medical benefits awarded and not based on a percentage of those benefits but on the reasonable amounts incurred by employee in enforcing order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Ins., 1997 ME 226, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 1258, 1261 (citing Nyer v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 601 A.2d 626, 627 (Me.1992)). “The standard of review is ‘limited to whether the [governmental agency] abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record.’ ” Davric Maine Corp. v. Maine Harness Racing Comm’n, 1999 ME 99, ¶ 7, 732 A.2d 289, 293 (citation omitted); see also CWCO, Inc., ¶ 6, 703 A.2d at 1261 (stating that, in reviewing an administrative agency decision, the issue before the court is not whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the agency, “but whether the record contains competent and substantial evidence that supports the result reached.”); Bischoff v. Bd. of Trustees, 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me.1995) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 9] An administrative decision will be

    ### Response:
    holding law court will not overturn conclusions supported by competent and substantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    revocation of supervised release are attributable to the original conviction, not a punishment for a new offense). The Crawford, holding does not apply to supervised release revocations because they are not “criminal prosecutions” under the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47-48 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985-86 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 342-43 (2d Cir.2004), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 99 n. 5 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844 n. 4 (8th Cir. 2004); cf. Ash v. Reilly, 431 F.3d 826, 829-30 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Next, Crawford argues the court’s admission

    ### Response:
    holding crawford does not apply to parole revocations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be resolved in favor of preemption. Cedeno v. IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., No. 06-CV-6438, 2008 WL 3992304, at *6, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65337, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2008) (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 50951, 50966-67 (Sept. 30, 1996)). NYGBL § 349 declares unlawful “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a). “[A]s a general matter, claims brought under broad consumer deceptive practices such as [NYGBL] § 349 are not preempted because they simply seek to enforce truthfulness in commercial transactions, which is expected of federal thrift institutions as a baseline matter.” McAnaney, 665 F.Supp.2d at 167; see also Binetti v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 446 F.Supp.2d 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, “OTS field preemption applies

    ### Response:
    holding that nygbl  349 is a commercial statute of general applicability which while having an incidental impact on lending relationships is excepted from ots preemption under 12 cfr  5602c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be substantively unconscionable. But in Jones, the Court struck down a one-sided arbitration provision in a short-term loan agreement which allowed the lender to enforce its rights in the circuit court but required the borrower to submit any counterclaims to arbitration. 696 N.W.2d at 220. Only one of the cases plaintiffs cite involves a franchise agreement. In Bolter v. Superior Court, 87 Cal.App.4th 900, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 (2001), the Court struck down an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement that required the California franchisees to arbitrate their claims against the franchisee in Utah. All of the other cases upon which plaintiffs rely, however, involve consumer credit card or purchase agreements. See Coady v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 299 Wis.2d 420, 729 N.W.2d 732 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Powertel v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570

    ### Response:
    holding arbitration clause in credit card agreement unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the same way and explained that the relevant mental distinction between intentional discrimination and “reckless disregard” for federally protected rights is essentially the same as the well-known difference between a “knowing” and a “willful” violation of a criminal law. See 469 U. S., at 126-127. While a criminal defendant, like an employer, need not have knowledge of the law to act “knowingly” or intentionally, he must know that his acts violate the law or must “careless[ly] disregard whether or not one has the right so to act” in order to act “willfully.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 395 (1933), quoted in Thurston, 469 U. S., at 127. We have interpreted the word “willfully” the same way in the civil context. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U. S. 128, 133 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Construing §1981a(b)(1) to impose a purely

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain language of the fair labor standards acts willful liquidated damages standard requires that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute without regard to the outrageousness of the conduct at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Grant, 109 Wn.2d at 556; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284 (the state may require “clear and convincing” evidence of an incompetent patient’s wishes as a condition for allowing the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment). ¶40 As this court has recognized, the State’s interest in the preservation of life may permit the State to compel a patient to accept life-sustaining treatment. Colyer, 99 Wn.2d at 124. However, if the patient’s condition is hopeless and there is “ ‘no reasonable possibility of returning to a cognitive, sapient state,’ the patient’s right of privacy outweighs the State’s interest in preserving life.” Id. at 134 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (<HOLDING>)). Similarly, the State’s interest in

    ### Response:
    recognizing right to withhold lifesustaining treatment from a formerly competent adult in a permanent vegetative state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or (4) plans that have combinations of any of these three features. In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 418 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1993) (quoting Christy & Skeldon, Shumate and Pension Benefits in Bankruptcy, 2 J.Bankr.L. & Prac. 719, 725 (1992)) (hereinafter “Christy & Skeldon”). Some courts have held that “ERISA qualified” means that a plan satisfies both ERISA and the IRC. However, this approach has been criticized because creditors could reach plan benefits if an employer fails to amend a plan to comply with a change in the tax law. In re Hall, 151 B.R. at 418, n. 17 (quoting Christy & Skeldon at 725). Notwithstanding this possibility, the Hall court held that a plan is “qualified” when it is satisfies both the IRC and ERISA. Id. at 419. See also In re Sirois, 144 B.R. 12, 14 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (<HOLDING>); In re Wit-wer, (“ERISA qualified plans are

    ### Response:
    holding that a plan is qualified if it complies with erisa and the irc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the adverse credibility determination because it relates to “an example of the very persecution from which [Kola] sought asylum.” Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n. 3 (“An inconsistency and an omission are ... functionally equivalent”). While the IJ was mistaken in finding that Kola had backtracked from this testimony (the IJ relied on testimony regarding the previous day’s activities), this limited error does not require a remand: the other findings, particularly the inconsistencies regarding the beating and medical care, make clear that the result would not have changed absent the error. See Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401-02 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). As the IJ found, Kola’s lack of corroborating

    ### Response:
    holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wherein she informed him of the need for documentary evidence, and that she had several phone conversations with Lin. It does not adopt these as findings, nor does it find that the content of any conversations with Lin were about the substance of the case as opposed to prodding Zhong to finalize arrangements to retain her. The BIA makes no finding that counsel’s preparation for the hearing e Cir.2000). Tf counsel was unprepared to present Lin’s claim, she should have sought to withdraw as counsel, even as late as the date of the hearing. Lin’s right to a full and fair presentation of his claim included the right to have an attorney who would present a viable legal argument on his behalf supported by relevant evidence, if he could find one willing and able to do so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (<HOLDING>); Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th

    ### Response:
    recognizing right to privately retained counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sum of those icons or features, copyright protection. Thus the critical question becomes whether the screen display and graphical user interface are protectable as a compilation: whether the selection and arrangement of the icons, the layouts of the windows on the screen, and the dialog boxes which comprise the graphical user interface are themselves protectable as expression. In most cases, while the constituent elements of the user interface or screen display are not independently protectable, the user interface is protectable as a compilation with respect to its “unique selection and arrangement of all these features.” See Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1994); Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co. Inc., 89 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural

    ### Response:
    holding that a user interface here a screen display itself an audiovisual work may be entitled to copyright protection as a compilation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ground that Plaintiff could not show a genuine issue of material fact with respect to causation. Plaintiff timely appeals. We have held, relying on Supreme Court guidance in the realm of qualified immunity, that a district court may permit successive motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity. Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1997). We have also assumed the propriety of successive motions for summary judgment outside the context of qualified immunity. See Cable & Computer Tech. Inc. v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., 214 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2000) (analyzing grant of summary judgment on promissory estoppel claim after district court granted earlier summary judgment motion on contract claim); Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 591 F.2d 74, 79-80 (9th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Many of our sister circuits have held that

    ### Response:
    holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appearance for trial and should anticipate the enlargement of travel restrictions In this case, the appearance bond specifically states that defendant has “been given a copy of the conditions of [his] release and agree[s] to obey all the conditions listed.” Thus surety was aware that defendant was released subject to conditions and so it should have contemplated that these conditions could be altered. Indeed, condition of release #5 states that defendant was not to travel outside of Essex, Caledonia, or Orleans counties “without written permission from this Court.” The enlargement of defendant’s travel area to other counties is nothing more than the court granting permission as contemplated by the conditions of release. See People v. Rincon, 603 P.2d 953, 955 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (<HOLDING>). As in Egan, a change in the reporting method

    ### Response:
    holding that bond was not materially altered when court granted permission for the defendant to travel outside of the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the amendment to rule 9.146 requiring the clerk, in dependency and termination of parental rights appeals, to issue mandate as soon as practicable. PARIENTE, J., concurring. I wholeheartedly concur with the Court’s adoption of the recommendations of the Commission on District Court Performance and Accountability to address ongoing issues of unnecessary delay in dependency and termination of parental rights appeals. The Commission’s recommendations and this Court’s adoption of these amendments are based on the recognition that for every day of delay on appeal, which is added to the length of the prior ongoing court proceedings, the future of the child is in limbo to his or her potential detriment. See, e.g., N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 843 So.2d 898, 903 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). As the Commission stated: While courts,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that any delay in the disposition of a case concerning the termination of parental rights could result in potential detriment to the child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    483 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex.1972) (setting forth definition of fair market value). 24 . If AHC's single Sale — five years after the fire — of 1,330 stage-three smoky hats to Outback Traders can somehow be construed as establishing a market for all of AHC’s remaining 17,140 completed, stage-three smoke-damaged hats, the trial court’s judgment could be modified by lowering AHC’s inventory damage award by $1,139,351.23. This figure is computed as follows: by taking the total value of all stage-three smoke-damaged hats — $1,188,539,54, and subtracting the credit already given to Wise Electric to exclude the 1,330 smoky hats sold to Outback Traders from'■ AHC’s inventory damage award — $49,188.31, the total equals $1,139,351.23. 25 . For these same reasons, we reject Wi 2d 72, 76 (Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Wise Electric does not challenge

    ### Response:
    holding any error in admitting testimony of witness describing chemical pump was harmless because it was cumulative of admit  ted exhibit displaying pump and trial testimony of other witness about pumps function
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of perspective between administrative intervention and judicial adjudication, the court ruled that employment discrimination claims filed in court are “governed by the three-year period of limitations ... applicable to ‘an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute!.]’ ” Id., 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d at 93 (quoting N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2003)). Ac cordingly, as in Murphy, I find that the administrative limitations period found in the CADA does not apply to employment discrimination claims that are not brought before the CCRC. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that claims for wrongful discharge are the most appropriate analogue to ERISA 510 actions. See Myers v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 26 Fed.Appx. 855, 864 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Woods v. Halliburton Co., 49 Fed.Appx. 827,

    ### Response:
    holding that under kansas law a wrongful discharge claim is the most appropriate analogue to erisa 510 claims and applying a twoyear limitations period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plea agreement convinces us that the district court afforded him adequate due process. AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . See United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir.2006) (""In the absence of the government's objection to [the defendant's] appeal based on his appeal waiver, the waiver is not binding because the government has waived the issue.”). 2 . See Fed.R.Crim.P. ll(b)(l)(K) (stating that “the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands ... the court's authority to order restitution”). 3 . United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 4 . United States v. McIntosh, 280 F.3d 479,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in cases where, as here, the parties have specified an exclusive arbitral forum, but that forum is no longer available. Some courts, particularly the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have held that Section 5 does not apply in such instances. See In re Salomon Inc. S’holders’ Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 560 (2d Cir.1995) (defining the term “lapse” in Section 5 to mean “a lapse in time in the naming of the arbitrator or in the filling of a vacancy on a panel of arbitrators, or some other mechanical breakdown in the arbi trator selection process” and holding that Section 5 is therefore inapplicable to cases where the specifically designated arbitrator becomes unavailable); Dover Ltd. v. A.B. Watley, Inc., No. 04-7366, 2006 WL 2987054, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.18, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Other jurisdictions have interpreted Section

    ### Response:
    recognizing that section 5  is inapplicable when the parties have specified an exclusive arbitral forum but that forum is no longer available
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at Lloyd's, 156 N.H. 333, 934 A.2d 517, 522 (2007); cf. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 69, 223 Ill.Dec. 350, 679 N.E.2d 801, 807 (1997) (employing the “continuous occurrence” rubric where workers suffered hearing loss attributable to many years of exposure to high noise levels). Justice SAYLOR, dissenting. I would dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently granted. My reasoning follows. In some lines of insurance law decisions, it is difficult to discern the degree to which the courts are applying conventional principles of contract construction or layering doctrinal innovations over salient policy terms based upon practical or equitable considerations. See, e.g., J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 534 Pa. 29, 38, 626 A.2d 502, 507 (1993) (<HOLDING>). From my own point of view, I believe that it

    ### Response:
    holding that exposure to asbestos as well as all phases of an ensuing disease independently trigger coverage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    participate in his detention or questioning. The Court finds that there are factual disputes regarding whether Kukowski participated in Nathan Smith’s detention and whether she allowed him to remain handcuffed in violation of his constitutional rights. The Court therefore believes that, based on the record before it, summary judgment on Nathan Smith’s claims against Kukowski is not appropriate. A. THERE IS A FACTUAL DISPUTE WHETHER KUKOWSKI PARTICIPATED IN NATHAN SMITH’S DETENTION AND QUESTIONING. As an initial matter, the Court notes that, in their Response, the Plaintiffs make no attempt to dispute Kukowski’s factual assertions that she did not hear, observe, or experience the detention of Nathan Smith in any way, that she did not speak to or question Nathan Smith, (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). “The district court has discretion to go

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court has no affirmative obligation to plumb the record to procure material facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defenses that may apply or to challenge the amount of the computational adjustment. I.R.C. § 6230(c)(4) (emphasis added). As the United States Supreme Court recognized, the court in a partnership-level TEFRA proceeding is “not required to shut its eyes” to the tax consequences of the court’s decision, even if the “formal adjustment” of the partners tax liability will occur at a subsequent proceeding. See Woods, 134 S.Ct. at 666. The statute of limitations defense successfully raised by BASR in this case was held to be a partnership-level item by our appellate court. See BASR Partnership, 795 F.3d at 1364 (“[T]ax is paid only on the partner’s individual returns, but [a partnership’s] tax treatment is determined and assessed at the partnership level”); see also Keener, 551 F.3d at 1363 (<HOLDING>); Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d 1301, 1307

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute of limitations is a partnership item under tefra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disagree with our determination that the language of the relevant documents establishes that the parties entered into a single contract, rather than multiple contracts, she concludes that the trial court’s summary judgment order and judgment should be reversed and that this case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the grounds that the record reveals the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning the extent, if any, to which the parties intended that the Infrastructure Agreement and the Addendum should be treated as sealed instruments. In concluding that such a factual issue exists, our dissenting colleague relies upon decisions such as Security National Bank v. Educators Mut. Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 86, 96, 143 S.E.2d 270, 277 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Pickens v. Rymer, 90 N.C. 282, 283-84 (1884),

    ### Response:
    holding that the record revealed the existence of a factual issue concerning whether the instrument in question had been executed under seal given that the particular contract in question bore three signatures only one of which was affixed adjacent to the word seal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts de novo.” Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1230. The district court properly applied a two-level enhancement because “the offense involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.” U.S.S.G. § 2Ll.l(b)(6); id. cmt. n. 5 (“Reckless conduct to which the adjustment from subsection (b)(6) applies includes ... carrying substantially more passengers than the rated capacity of a motor vehicle or vessel....”). Watson piloted an overcrowded vessel at- a high rate of speed, at night, without any navigational lights on, and then attempted to evade the Coast Guard. That conduct is sufficient to warrant the two-level enhancement. See United States v. Gonzalez, 394 Fed.Appx. 570, 575 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fuentes-Nodarse, 606

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not clearly err in giving twolevel enhancement for similar conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sentence.” However, the dis trict court erred in summarily dismissing Owens’ claim. Summary dismissal is appropriate in very limited circumstances, and this is not one of them. Thus, we reverse and remand to allow the district court to reconstrue Owens’ petition as a civil rights claim or to allow Owens the opportunity to amend. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 . ) (""[A] federal court may construe a § 1983 action as a habeas petition, or a habeas petition as a § 1983 action."") (internal citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 519 U.S. 918, 117 S.Ct. 285, 136 L.Ed.2d 204 (1996). Cf. Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1347-48 & n. 13 (<HOLDING>). 5 . Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-37

    ### Response:
    holding 1 that the district court properly construed one  1983 claim as a habeas petition but improperly summarily dismissed it and 2 that the district court should have construed another  1983 claim as a habeas petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the taking of their depositions, plaintiffs will be able to recover the $25.00 cost for failure to cancel the taking of a deposition in time. 12. Electronic Research (CALR) Plaintiffs’ bill of costs seeks $669.46 for LEXIS legal research. Because § 1920 does not provide for the recovery of electronic research, these costs are disallowed. Avirgan, 705 F.Supp. at 1546-47. Some courts have held that, “[w]hile computer assisted legal research fees are not taxable as costs, they may be ‘considered as expenses incident to attorney’s fees.’ ” Essenburg v. Reub Williams & Sons, Inc., Civil Action No. 385-679, slip op. at 9, WL 8534 (N.D.Ind. March 18, 1987) (citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F.R.D. 385, 394 (N.D.Ill.1986)); Fressell v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 103 F.R.D. at 112-15 (<HOLDING>); Friedlander v. Nims, 583 F.Supp. 1087,

    ### Response:
    holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.” The current statute, therefore, places a very heavy threshold burden on a grandparent seeking to intervene in a SAPCR. Notably, although former section 102.004(b), unlike amended section 102.004(b), permitted a grandparent who established substantial past contact with a child to intervene to seek managing con-servatorship under former section 102.004(b) without also having to prove standing to file an original suit for managing conservatorship, most grandparent in-tervenors did make such proof and thus would also have been able to satisfy the more stringent requirements for intervention imposed by the 2005 amendment to section 102.004(b). See Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 455-56 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); In re C.M.V., 136 S.W.3d at 285 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that when children had resided with grandparents for several months during pendency of divorce proceedings grandparents had standing to intervene and seek managing conservatorship under former section 102004b and section 1020039
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rules based on either the source of the problem or the intended beneficiary of the ruling would only disserve the vital competing interests of the Government and the defendant”). Where, however, the jury indicates to the court that unanimity was achieved, at some point, on one or more counts, Maryland Rule 4-327(d) points the way for a trial judge to a reasonable alternative to the declaration of a mistrial. Thus, prior to declaring a mistrial without consent on those counts, the trial judge generally should take steps to determine that genuine deadlock exists as to those counts. See, e.g., United States v. Razmilovic, 507 F.3d 130, 137-40 (2d Cir.2007) (conducting a fact-specific inquiry into whether the jury was deadlocked genuinely); In re Ford, 987 F.2d 334, 340 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). One reasonable alternative is an inquiry into

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to instruct the jury regarding a partial verdict where the judges examination of the tentative verdict sheets revealed no indication of jury unanimity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    refuse to allow the party to support designated claims or defenses, strike out pleadings, or dismiss the action. See id. Therefore, based upon the text of RCFC 37, especially the focus of its remedies, it does not appear to the court to be an appropriate source of authority upon which to base any sanction or remedy in this case. 3 . The RCFC are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and, except for ""a limited number of changes ... deemed necessary to accommodate procedural requirements particular to this court[,] ... [the text of RCFC 16] fully conforms to the text of FRCP 16.” RCFC 16 Rules Committee Note (2000). For this reason, the RCFC and the FRCP are often treated as being analogous. See Principal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 144, 157 (2006) (<HOLDING>). 4 . This fact pattern is clearly analogous to

    ### Response:
    holding that frcp 16 is virtually identical to rcfc 16 in the case of waiver for failure to file a pretrial motion and therefore applying standards developed under the federal rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Summary J. at 7. [I]t is of the highest importance that the public health shall be safeguarded by all proper means. It would be unreasonable to suppose that in the grant to the gas company of the right to use the streets in the laying of its pipes it was ever intended to surrender or impair the public right to discharge the duty of conserving the public health. The gas company did not acquire any specific location in the streets; it was content with the general right to use them; and when it located its pipes it was at the risk that they might be, at some future time, disturbed, when that state might require for a necessary public use that changes in location be made. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com. of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 25 S.Ct. 471, 473, 49 L.Ed. 831 (1905) (<HOLDING>). Washington law is consistent: The company’s

    ### Response:
    holding that requiring the utility to relocate its pipes at its own expense did not constitute a legal injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We think it probable that original trial counsel did not know that Gates was the suspicious person seen by witnesses in the area. Clearly, counsel did not know of Schweer’s contact with a person fitting Gates’ description in the nights preceding Schweer’s murder, including the fact that Schweer caught this individual trying to break into a truck. We conclude Harrington did not have the “essential facts” of the police reports so as to allow the defense to wholly take advantage of this evidence. As the Nevada Supreme Court stated under similar circumstances, “[0]nly access to the documents themselves would have provided the range and detail of information necessary to fully understand the implications of the police investigation.” Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Wilson v. State, - So.2d -, -, 2002

    ### Response:
    holding oral disclosure of identity of another suspect was not sufficient to avoid brady violation for failing to produce police investigatory reports
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.’ Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights provides, ‘That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges ... or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.’ The reference to ‘jury’ in our organic laws, refers to a jury as constituted under the common law, unless the contrary plainly appears. See State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354, 361, 609 A.2d 337, 340 (1992); State v. Ledger, 175 Wis.2d 116, 499 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Ct.App. 1993) (citing State v. Gollmar, 32 Wis.2d 406, 145 N.W.2d 670, 671-72 (1966)). Cf. Bryan v. State Roads Comm’n, 356 Md. 4, 14, 736 A.2d 1057, 1061 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41, 53, 359 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the 1992 amendment to article 5 of the maryland declaration of rights permits a six person jury in all cases except criminal cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the reports themselves into evidence but, rather, challenged the introduction of the “subjective findings or anything that may have been said to the examiner” as well as the “comments that are in the report[s] which are attributed to the children” during the examinations that appear in the reports. The trial court permitted the reports to be admitted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(6) as a record of regularly conducted activity. The trial court concluded that “the subjective findings of the examiner are admissible” because they were recorded “for a business purpose and it’s part of a regularly conducted activity.” The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court’s analysis in this respect, as do we. See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 303 (Tenn, 2008) (<HOLDING>). We also note for the record that during oral

    ### Response:
    holding that to the extent medical records may be properly categorized as business records such records are properly categorized as nontestimonial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendant could not be held individually liable under the plaintiffs CFEPA claim pursuant to section 46a-60(a)(1). Id.; see also Cox v. Namnoun, No. 3:95CV37 (AVC), slip op. at 12 (D.Conn. Sept. 26, 1996) (noting that the Connecticut legislature extended liability to “any person” in other sections of CFEPA, but only to an “employer” in section 46a-60(a)(1), and concluding that section 46a-60(a)(1) does not provide for individual supervisory liability). But see Swanson v. Envirotest Sys. Inc., No. 3:98CV751(AHN), 1998 WL 928415, at *3 (D.Conn. Dec. 18, 1998); Armstrong v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., No. 3:97CV1557(AHN), 1998 WL 342045 at *4 (D.Conn. May 14, 1998); Murphy v. Burgess and Norwalk Economic Opportunity, Inc., No. 3:96CV1987(AHN), 1997 WL 529610 at *3-5 (D.Conn. July 16, 1997) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. Service Merchandise, Inc., No.

    ### Response:
    holding in murphy and declining to reconsider in swanson and armstrong that in light of the differences between the statutory scheme and remedial provisions of cfepa and title vii cfepas discrimination provisions were intended to impose individual liability on supervisors who hold positions of power control and authority and who use that power control and authority to engage in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Such cases, naturally, frame their discussion in terms of Congress’ exercise of the purse strings under Article I: The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.” There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531 (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). At least one subsequent opinion has posited

    ### Response:
    holding that section 6010 of the developmentally disabled assistance and bill of rights act did not unambiguously condition receipt of federal funds on providing residents of disabled home a right to appropriate treatment services and habilitation in the setting that is least restrictive of the persons personal liberty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as charges-to-earn ings, as required by GAAP. “The term generally accepted accounting principles ... is a term of art encompassing a wide range of acceptable procedures, such that an ethical, reasonably diligent accountant may choose to apply any of a variety of acceptable accounting procedures when that accountant prepares a financial statement.” Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[T]he failure to follow GAAP is, by itself, insufficient to state a securities fraud claim.” In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir.1999); see also Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.1999); accord Coates v. Heartland Wireless Communications, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 417, 430 (N.D.Tex.2000) (Coates III); cf. Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (<HOLDING>); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    default judgment from challenging the enforceability of the contract. Finally, the Court must decide whether the contract is enforceable. If the contract is unenforceable, then there is no debt upon which the Plaintiff may maintain its complaint for an exception to the discharge. See Mandalay Resort Group v. Miller (In re Miller), 292 B.R. 409, 412 (9th Cir. BAP 2003) (“Absent an enforceable prepetition debt, there is no debt to except from discharge.”) The answer is found in 37 U.S.C. § 701(c), which states that “[a]n enlisted member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps may not assign his pay, and if he does so, the assignment is void.” 37 U.S.C. § 701(c). Military retirement is considered “pay.” See Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594, 605, 112 S.Ct. 1619, 118 L.Ed.2d 243 (1992) (<HOLDING>) Based upon the plain language of § 701(c), the

    ### Response:
    holding that military retirement benefits are to be considered deferred pay for past services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3 .The material facts are not in dispute. This recitation of facts is taken almost verbatim from the Opening Brief filed on behalf of Richards. 4 . Supr. Ct. R. 8. 5 . See Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 271 (1974). 6 . Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). See also Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360 (Del.1994). 7 . United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988). 8 .Id. 9 . Id. at 27, 108 S.Ct. 864. 10 . Id. 11 . Id. at 29, 108 S.Ct. 864. 12 . United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988). 13 . Id. at 33, 108 S.Ct. 864, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (emphasis added). 14 . See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1357 (Del.1991) (<HOLDING>). 15 . Miller v. State, 750 A.2d 530 (Table)

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecutors repeated comments that the defendant could have denied knowledge of the drugs or rebutted the trafficking charge by testifying were so prejudicial as to constitute plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. At first blush, both the rationale and method of analysis in preemption cases are straightforward: § 301 was intended “to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 404, 108 S.Ct. at 1880. Therefore, preemption will be found only if the application of state law “requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 413, 108 S.Ct. at 1885; see also Ackerman v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The question, in sum, is whether “the state

    ### Response:
    holding that if the state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement the claim is independent for  301 preemption purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    attorney’s fees (R. at 106), ond brief (bearing ""15” as a handwritten page number) begins mid-sentence, even though the previous page (bearing “14” as a handwritten page number) concluded with the end of its last paragraph. Given this, it appears that Jones may have omitted one or more pages from his brief when he filed it. Jones has not taken any action to correct his brief or otherwise inform the Court of a problem with this filing. 8 . By not challenging the bankruptcy court’s decision to construe the Application as seek-tag to be appointed as special counsel on behalf of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and by not addressing § 327(e) in his briefs, Jones has waived any argument on these issues. Landstrom v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670, 678 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Because Land was a Chapter 11 bankruptcy,

    ### Response:
    holding that appellants waived any claim of error as to the portion of the lower courts ruling that they did not expressly challenge on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress was legislating over federal territory. Like the district court, we ""believe! ] that Congress has jurisdiction over interstate commerce [ (the Amendments Act's basis for jurisdiction)] just as it has jurisdiction over federal territory. Congress would have the same power to federalize state causes of action asserting either basis for jurisdiction.” O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 770 F.Supp. 448, 453 (C.D.Ill.1991). 6 . We address this particular issue of duty of care for a public liability cause of action in greater detail later in the opinion. See infra part II.C. 7 . In supporting his position of unconstitutionality, Mr. O'Conner invites our attention to a number of pre-Amendments Act cases. See, e.g., Stibitz v. General Pub. Util. Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 997 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S.Ct. 1187,

    ### Response:
    holding that public liability action did not arise under pre1988 priceanderson act for article iii purposes and therefore federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    express and the basis and reasons for. them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). A litigant that fails to comply with Rule 26 “without substantial justification” is barred from having its expert testify at trial ""unless such failure is harmless.” Walter Int’l Prods., Inc. v. Salinas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1410 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Prieto, 361 F.3d at 1318 (citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Likewise, a motion for a new trial should not be granted if the error was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Romero, 552 F.3d at 1324. We have found that the failure to timely disclose all aspects of an expert’s testimony was not prejudicial in circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. See Lakeman v. Otis Elevator Co., 930 F.2d 1547, 1554 (11th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155,

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony on matters not noticed where the appellants trial counsel was well versed in those matters and capable of crossexamining the experts effectively
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (4) failed to object that his punishment was cruel and unusual. We find no merit in appellant’s contentions, each of which is addressed individually. 1. Failure to Object to Victim Impact Testimony. Appellant asserts his counsel should have objected to testimony by the victim and the victim’s family members that was presented before the trial court assessed punishment. Appellant contends that failure to object to a victim impact statement made before sentencing under section 42.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and reversible error. We disagree with appellant because article 42.03 does not restrict the information contained in a PSI report before the pronouncement of sentencing. See Fryer v. State, 68 S.W.3d 628 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). At the PSI hearing, the State called the

    ### Response:
    holding victim impact statement statutes did not prohibit court from considering victims recommendations in presentence report
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and washers, for example, are typically manufactured in standard sizes. Similarly, polishing discs, bags for oil presses, vacuum cleaner bags, and filter bags all are generally manufactured for use with particular models and machinery upon importation. 24 . See, e.g., Baxter Healthcare Corp. of Puerto Rico v. United States, 182 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed.Cir.1999) (considering classification of rolls of material for use as gas-exchanging membrane of oxygenator, and concluding that material cannot be classified as part of oxygenator because ""[a]t the time of import, the individual parts cannot be discerned from the roll, and the roll nowhere marks or otherwise identifies the individual parts to be made from it”); Harding Co. v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A. 250, 252-53, 1936 WL 2945 (1936) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Buss & Co., 5 U.S. Cust.App.

    ### Response:
    holding that item made from asbestos yarn wire and mixture of other materials used for the sole purpose of making brake linings was properly classified as manufacture of yarn rather than as part of automobile because individual brake lining parts to be made from material were not identified or otherwise fixed with certainty and instead had to be individually cut to custom fit each brake shoe made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    obstructed justice in giving what it characterized as false and misleading testimony at the first trial and the suppression hearing that preceded the first trial. Wood responded that the conviction that was obtained after the first trial was overturned on appeal, and could not be used to enhance a sentence imposed after a separate trial where he did not testify. Wood also argued that the fact that the jury chose not to credit his testimony during the first trial did not render that testimony perjurious. During the sentencing hearing, the district court sustained the government’s objection to the PSI, finding that Wood had given false testimony at his first trial and suppression hearing. The district court relied on United States v. Has No Horse, 42 F.3d 1158, 1159-1160 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The district court stated that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants attempt to obstruct justice does not disappear merely because his conviction has been reversed on grounds having nothing to do with the obstruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Mr. Johnson’s case when the Supreme Court is about to answer the very question he has raised. III. We are aware of this Court’s recent suggestion that “this Court necessarily must apply § 2244(b)(2) under a tight time limit in all cases, since the statute expressly requires us to resolve this application within 30 days, no matter the case.” In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151, 1157 n. 9 (11th Cir.2014). Anything Henry said about § 2244(b)(3)(D) is dicta because it was not necessary to decide the issues then before the Court. See United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n. 10 (11th Cir.2009) (“As our cases frequently have observed, dicta is defined as those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” (quotation omitted)) 969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 117

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his case. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir.1982). Although “[a] defendant’s right to counsel of his choice is not an absolute one,” United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir.1979), we have consistently recognized that the right of an accused who retains an attorney to be represented by that attorney is “‘a right of constitutional dimension’ ”, United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir.1973) (quoting United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825, 90 S.Ct. 68, 24 L.Ed.2d 76 (1969)). Hence the “[ejhoice of counsel should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court.” United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir.1976); see also United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 203 (2d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872, 98 S.Ct. 217, 54

    ### Response:
    recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Ms. Watkins received preferential treatment. Indeed, nothing in the record demonstrates that Ms. Watkins received promotions or any other benefit for which she was not qualified resulting from Mr. Burton’s interactions with Ms. Watkins. Further, Ms. Montgomery offered no evidence to rebut Mr. Kaufman’s statement that Ms. Watkins received a higher level of training as part of a new office policy to remedy the office’s previous failure to adequately train new employees. In sum, Ms. Montgomery’s allegations are “vague, eonclusory or facially insufficient” as to any preferential treatment Mr. Burton afforded Ms. Watkins and fail to trigger the Board’s jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). See Johnston, 518 F.3d at 910; Dumas v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 789 F.2d 892, 894 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we also reject Ms. Montgomery’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonfrivolous allegation of board jurisdiction is one which if true would establish a prima facie case that the board has jurisdiction over the matter at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Leavitt informed Ridgely of this further contact, but Ridgely responded to the worker’s compensation claims that were enclosed with the letter. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 38. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could infer that Ridgely had knowledge of the letter. Addressing the temporal proximity, the plaintiff sent the November 2006 letter two months before Ridgely proposed the plaintiffs termination. Def.’s Reply at 21. This district has varied as to whether two months is sufficient to establish a causal connection. See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149

    ### Response:
    holding that a two month period might be enough  to prove the causation prong
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unexplained by the court, directly contradicts United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir.2007), and United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704 (5th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 191, 181 L.Ed.2d 99 (2011). Finley held that no warrant is required for a search of an arrestee’s cell phone, including text messages and call records, incident to lawful arrest. 477 F.3d at 259-60. Officers arrested Finley at the scene of a traffic stop, searched his person and seized a cell phone from his pocket. Id. at 254. The officers retrieved call records and text messages in the search of Finley’s cell phone. Id. In Curtis, we relied on Finley to hold that an officer could search a defendant’s cell phone, including text messages, incident to his lawful arrest. 635 F.3d at 711-13 (<HOLDING>). 3. Finally, we consider whether the district

    ### Response:
    holding that finley authorizes a police officer to search the electronic contents of a cell phone recovered from the area within an arrestees immediate control
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    personal injury and to consider the full range of tort-type damages to compensate for the injury. I cannot conceive that the Legislature intended that the Commission act as a separate forum for the collection of personal injury damages, presumably after hearing from expert medical witnesses on both sides as to the nature and extent of the injury. To vest such extraordinary and indeed unbridled authority in the Commission is quite at odds with the statutory purpose. The Commission, as an administrative agency created by statute, has no inherent powers; its authority cannot reach beyond the warrant provided for it by the statute. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Services, 283 Md. 677, 393 A.2d 181 (1978). See also Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 575-77, 325 A.2d 740 (1974) (<HOLDING>). It is no answer to say, as the Court does,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statute creating the maryland human relations commission did not grant the commission power to make monetary awards for compensatory or other damages particularly in the absence of any statutory guidelines or limitations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to decide the § 8371 bad faith claim.... ”). But Nealy directly conflicts with, and therefore is preempted by, the FAA. The FAA prevents state law from undermining parties’ contracts to arbitrate. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-59, 63-64, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995) (upholding arbitration of a punitive damages claim under a contractual arbitration provision, notwithstanding New York state law allowing only courts — but not arbitrators — to award punitive damages); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (“Congress [through the FAA] intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”); cf. Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion In this context, we hold that

    ### Response:
    holding that a choiceoflaw clause without more did not evidence contractual intent to opt into pennsylvania law governing arbitration standards
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for guidance in our interpretation of Ohio law.”). Gayer argues that she falls under the protection of the Ohio handicap discrimination statute because Continental regarded her as being disabled. She points out that Continental’s refusal to employ her as an ASA was based upon her inability to lift over 40 pounds. According to Gayer, this action constitutes evidence that Continental regarded her as being disabled. We disagree. For “a covered entity [to] entertain misperceptions about the individual-it must either believe that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (<HOLDING>). But Gayer has not demonstrated that

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs who were nearsighted job applicants with fully correctable vision failed to state a claim that the airline regarded them as disabled in violation of the ada
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” We have interpreted Bruton as prohibiting the presentation of a redacted statement that “draws the jury’s attention to the fact that a name was omitted and invites the jury to fill in the blank.” United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1280 (8th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Garcia, 836 F.2d 385, 390-91 (8th Cir.1987)). We find constitutionally problematic cases “in which the redacted statement alerts the jury to the fact that a name available to the prosecution has been purposely omitted ... [T]his may improperly lead the jury to infer that the omitted name must be the defendant’s.” Garcia, 836 F.2d at 390; see also Gray v. Maryland, — U.S. -, -, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1156, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Valdez never mentioned in his confession the

    ### Response:
    holding that redactions that replace a proper name with an obvious blank the word delete a symbol or similarly notify the jury that a name has been deleted render the admission of a codefendants confession unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the school to the student’s actions. The Plaintiff has not alleged, nor provided any evidence, that the harassing students were acting on behalf of or with authority from SKCS. Therefore, although constructive notice principles properly attach between employer and employee in the Title VII context, they do not attach between the alleged harassing student and the Defendants’ in this Title IX ease. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011, n. 11. 4. Title VII’s Criteria Applied to Hostile Learning Environment It is now well established that two forms of sexual harassment violate Title VIPs prohibitions against workplace inequality: 1) quid pro quo and 2) hostile work environment harassment. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1304-05 (2d Cir.1995); see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73, 106 S.Ct. at 2408 (<HOLDING>). It is the “hostile environment” category that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the guidelines would be meaningless or perfunctory. One such case was Harle v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Telegraph Press), 540 Pa. 482, 658 A.2d 766 (1995), where we permitted the suspension of benefits without requiring the employer to establish job availability because the employee returned to a job that was identical to his previous position. In Harle, we reasoned that the application of the job availability requirement would be superfluous because the employee actually returned to employment identical to his pre-injury employment. Id. at 768 (finding that employee’s return to work “obviated the need for employer to produce evidence of job availability”); see also Dillon v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Greenwich Collieries), 536 Pa. 490, 640 A.2d 386 (1994) (<HOLDING>). In sum, while the Kachinski guidelines

    ### Response:
    recognizing that employer is not obligated to produce evidence of change in physical condition as required by kachinski when modification request is based solely on job availability and allowing employee the benefit of same rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the challenged action is essentially legislative in nature rather than quasi-judicial, such that it should not be subject to administrative review. As the preceding analysis suggests, we reject this characterization. Although the approval of a settlement agreement is superficially at issue, Petitioner’s challenge is directed at the underlying decision to permit the proposed development to proceed. Both the minutes of the February 27, 2002, City Council meeting and the settlement agreement clearly reflect that a development decision pertaining to the Sam’s Club property was made. Such site-specific development determinations are properly classified as quasi-judicial in nature. See W. Old Town Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Albuquerque, 1996-NMCA-107, ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 495, 927 P.2d 529 (<HOLDING>). The fact that the City’s quasi-judicial

    ### Response:
    holding that a zoning decision pertaining to a specific property is not a legislative act but is rather quasijudicial in nature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional or reckless misconduct.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 302, cmt. n (1930); see also Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951). Under these circumstances, a defendant “is required to anticipate and provide against all of these misconducts” regardless of whether the “third person’s misconduct is or is not criminal at common law or under a statute.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 302, cmt. n. Moreover, a defendant “is subject to liability only for such harm as is within the risk ... caused by the quality of the employee which the employer had reason to suppose would be likely to cause harm.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958); see also Argonne Apartment House Co. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C.Cir.1930) (<HOLDING>). To prevail on a theory of negligent hiring,

    ### Response:
    holding that employers knowledge of employees criminal conviction for intoxication did not put employer on notice that employee might be a thief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of supervised release, with special conditions to include custodial arrangements at a mental health facility. ANALYSIS A. Motion for Disqualification Vaught argues that the district court improperly denied his Motion for Disqualification of Judges from Middle District of Tennessee. We review a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) motion to disqualify for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir.1990). Under that statute, a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). We have defined this to mean that “a judge must recuse himself if a reasonable, objective person, knowing all of the circumstances, would have questioned the judge’s impartiality.” Hughe ir.2002) (<HOLDING>). B. Sentencing under USSG § 2A2.1 (Attempted

    ### Response:
    holding no abuse of discretion where judge had personal relationship with government witnesses but had not had contact with them for over ten years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Here, however, CNI did not make that choice. CNI’s charter requires board approval to waive sovereign immunity. The charter provides: To sue in its corporate name and, notwithstanding the immunity possessed by the Corporation as a wholly owned corporation of the Chickasaw Nation, to permit by written resolution of the board of directors enforcement of leases, contracts, agreements and mortgage instruments to which the Corporation is a party, against the Corporation in tribal court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by agreement of the board of directors.... MBF argues that CNI’s charter has a sue- and-be sued clause, which expressly waives immunity. Some courts have held that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause does waive tribal- ain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407-08 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that CNI’s charter

    ### Response:
    holding that a tribes agent who has apparent authority may waive immunity without board approval
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Once an attorney provides evidence of his billing rate, the burden is upon the defendant to present evidence establishing “a good reason why a lower rate is essential.” Gusman, 986 F.2d at 1151. A defendant’s failure to do so is essentially a concession that the attorney’s billing rate is reasonable and should be awarded. Here, other than an affidavit regarding paralegal rates, the Board presented absolutely no rebuttal evidence. And while the district court recognized this fact, “[n]otably, ... Defendant has not submitted any affidavits or other evidence to contradict the $275 per hour rate ... and Mr. Howard’s evidence ... remains unrebutted,” it only applied it to the last of the five years in question. This was improper. See Pressley v. Haeger, 977 F.2d 295, 299 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). B. The district court also abused its

    ### Response:
    holding that court was required to award an attorneys billing rate where defendant had submitted no evidence on fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At the prior supplemental hearing, claimant indicated that the medication he was taking for pain was Extra Strength Tylenol and Extra Strength Excedrin, both nonprescription medicines. At the latest supplemental hearing, claimant testified that he was taking Nalfon, which the Physician’ 7) (stating that evidence of conservative treatment permits the ALJ to discount the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of an impairment); Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 409 F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir.2005) (noting with approval the ALJ’s consideration of the nature of plaintiffs treatment as having been “routine and conservative” in making his credibility decision) (internal quotation marks omitted); Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir.2000) (same); Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, and finally, as to Appellant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a physicians conservative medical treatment for a particular condition tends to negate a claim of disability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    lack of standing because plaintiffs did not allege any specific contract lost on account of race. 921 F.2d at 1205-06; accord Capeletti Brothers, Inc. et al. v. Broward County, 738 F.Supp. 1415, 1417 (S.D.Fla.1990) (plaintiff failed to specify particular project by which it suffered injury), aff'd, 931 F.2d 903 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2871, 115 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1991). AGO also alleges that it has been forced to discriminate in the award of its subcontracts so as to comply with the ordinance, presumably with a loss of profits. Again it fails to cite any specific subcontracts involved. Plaintiff has not alleged specific noneco-nomic harm either. See U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Since AGC has not demonstrated any injury, we

    ### Response:
    holding noneconomic harm satisfies article iii standing requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 2254(a) review will often require consideration of legal arguments not addressed by the state court in its opinion. In this case, for example, we must consider the McKaskle question that the state court avoided and, in doing so, we consider the “alternative rationale” advanced by the respondents for affirming the Arizona court’s decision. Nevertheless, even on § 2241 de novo review, we would reject an alternative and unrelated legal argument of the type advanced by the respondent in Van Lynn. As with any de novo review, our § 2241 review is confined to the alleged wrong and the actual course of events at trial and on appeal. We cannot invent a constitutional sequence of events to justify that which simply did not happen. Cf. Hirschfield v. Payne, 420 F.3d 922, 928-29 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, when the constitutional right

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal court could not consider under  2254d1 a rationale offered by the state for the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion for selfrepresentation when that rationale would have constituted a discretionary denial of the motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnotes omitted). The “plain view” doctrine is one of the “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” that may justify a warrant-less seizure. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (“It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The “plain view” doctrine may also validate a warrantless search of an item, so long as the item could lawfully have been seized. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326, 107 S.Ct. at 1153 (“It would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be seized an d.2d 378 (1994); United States v. Foolodi, 703 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The officers who executed the arrest warrant

    ### Response:
    holding that a probable cause determination should consider the facts and circumstances known to the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 375 (3rd Cir.2001) (stating that “[a] sentencing court can, of course, reject the results of a plea negotiation if it concludes that the resulting agreement is not in the best interest of justice”). Therefore, at this stage, the Court must determine whether to accept and be bound to the specific provisions of the Plea Agreement. After careful deliberation, the Court exercises its discretion and declines to accept the Plea Agreement. The Court concludes that two provisions of the Plea Agreement, discussed below, are not in the best interests of justice and do not serve the public’s interests because they do not adequately address Guidant’s history and the criminal conduct at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Greener, 979 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). A. Probation As mentioned previously, the

    ### Response:
    holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by coneluding the plea would not adequately represent the defendants criminal conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    during the course of the carjackings and who was harmed by the carjacking itself, it is incontrovertible that the victims of the offenses were the same. Section 3D1.1 mandates that “[w]hen a defendant has been convicted of more than one count, the court shall: (1) [g]roup the counts resulting in conviction into distinct Groups of Closely Related Counts.... ” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 3D 1.2 further provides that “counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped.” Use of the word “shall” in the statute indicates that Congress intended grouping to be mandatory if the appropriate requirements are met. See Matter of DP Partners Ltd. Parternship, 106 F.3d 667, 670-71 (5th Cir.1997); see also Manatee County, Fla. v. Train, 583 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Because the firearm conspiracy count and the

    ### Response:
    holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of his official duties[.]” OCGA § 16-10-24 (a) (emphasis supplied). See Martinez v. State, 322 Ga. App. 63, 65 (2) (743 SE2d 621) (2013) (conviction for misdemeanor obstruction “requires proof of some form of knowing and wilful opposition to the officer”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Mitchell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 293, 297 (2) (718 SE2d 216) (2011) (“as one of the essential elements of this misdemeanor offense, the state must show that the defendant committed the act knowingly and wilfully”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, Green argues that his knowledge was not at issue in this particular case because he admitted at trial that he knew the person from whom he ran was a law enforcement officer. But there are other types of knowledge relevant to a misdemeanor obst 139) (1913) (<HOLDING>). The other acts evidence was relevant to the

    ### Response:
    holding in addressing crime of obstructing an officer in serving or attempting to serve or execute a legal process or order that it is not enough that the accused should know that the person attempting to make the arrest is an arresting officer it must also appear that he knew that the officer was attempting to execute a lawful process or order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    App.1983), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1984)). A similarly longstanding axiom is that the compulsory counterclaim rule is designed to foreclose the possibility of duplicative litigation. Hence, Florida courts encourage a “broad, realistic interpretation” of the rule that allows the rule to accomplish its goal. Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp. v. Justen 932 F.2d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Stone v. Pembroke Lakes Trailer Park, Inc., 268 So.2d 400, 402 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1972)), If the court determines as a matter of law that a counterclaim is compulsory in nature, a party’s failure to raise the. counterclaim in earlier litigation constitutes a waiver of the claim. Yost, 570 So.2d at 352; see also Republic Health v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 755 F.2d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Florida courts use a “transaction or

    ### Response:
    holding that the determination of whether a counterclaim is compulsory is made as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Allen v. Ohio Dept of Job & Family Servs., 697 F.Supp.2d 854, 894 (S.D.Ohio 2010); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir.2000). Thus, the question before the Court is whether Ofc. Schmidt could reasonably believe that sexual discrimination against his wife, who was not an employee of the Cheverly Police De- partment, could constitute an employment discrimination claim under Title VII. Although a retaliation claim may lie in the case of “third-party retaliation,” the cases that have allowed such claims involved cases where both the person filing the discrimination complaint and the person adversely affected were employees or former employees of the same company. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178, 131 S.Ct. 863, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, in Reece v. Pocatello/Chubbuck

    ### Response:
    holding that an employee who was terminated after his fiancee filed a charge of discrimination had standing to sue employer for retaliation where his fiancee was employed by the same company
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    salary and bonus package fails for similar reasons. The parties did not agree on an amount, they set no formula, and they did not even relate Murchison’s review to profitability. Moreover, testimony as to the amounts Neeley received as bonuses in two previous years hardly establishes a course of dealing which would justify an inference that review of the bonus portion of the package would generate a similar bonus in years to come. Such evidence certainly demonstrates nothing about the salary component of the package. Even.assuming that the parties intended the promise to carry legal force, therefore, its lack of definiteness deprived the jury of a basis for enforcing it. The district court properly held it unenforceable. See Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. 1974) (<HOLDING>). C. We move beyond the decision of the

    ### Response:
    holding insufficiently definite bonus agreement that did not establish amount or method for determining amount of payment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not appropriate. A clerical error amendment can correct a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written sentencing order. However, the clerical error provisions cannot be invoked when no clerical error appears in the contemporaneous pronouncement of sentence and execution of the written sentencing order, and the claim of clerical error is based on the State’s desire to change from the agreed “unconditional discharge” disposition. That disposition, imposing an unconditional discharge and terminating probation, occurred in March 2003. Any subsequent effort to change that disposition, reinstate Forbis’s probation, and find a probation violation based on events occurring after March 2003, was invalid. See State v. Shackelford, 672 A.2d 1097, 1098-99 (Me.1996) (<HOLDING>). Forbis’s motion to dismiss the subsequently

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may not change the term of sentence by subsequent amendment after the sentence becomes final
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    65 (2000); Stanl custody determinations that arise in dependency proceedings, other courts have recognized a preference for placing the child with a fit parent, where the child was removed from the home based on the conduct of the other parent. See, e.g., In re D.S., 52 A.3d 887 (D.C. 2012) (recognizing a parental preference in neglect proceedings in the absence of evidence that the parent is unfit or that granting custody to that parent would be detrimental to the children’s best interest); In Interest of M.M.L., 900 P.2d 813 (Kan. 1995) (recognizing that a parent’s fundamental right to the care of his or her child may not be disturbed absent a finding of parental unfitness or substantial endangerment to the child’s welfare); Matter of Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (<HOLDING>). This preference is rooted in these

    ### Response:
    holding that when the child was removed from the home because of the fathers actions the mother who had never been adjudicated an unfit parent had a superior right to custody as against third parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his reasons for not wishing to testify on the other — to satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh the considerations of “economy and expedition in judicial administration” against the defendant’s interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. Baker, 401 F.2d at 977. ¶ 36. Defendant failed to make such a showing here. In its pretrial decision, the trial court found that defendant presented no specific evidence that its refusal to sever the counts would necessarily chill defendant’s right to remain silent or take the stand. As the court explained, defendant was presumed innocent and he had the right, regardless of the court’s decision, to decide whether to testify at trial. See Johnson, 158 Vt. at 350, 612 A.2d at 1117 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 37. By failing to renew his motion to sever

    ### Response:
    recognizing that trial court has considerable discretion in deciding whether severance is necessary when counts are joined as part of a common plan or scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    filed a complaint. CONTACT: Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP William Lerach, 800/449-4900 wsl£mwbhl.com Douglas Declaration at Exhibit 3. There is no dispute that the plaintiff filed the notice within 20 days of filing the complaint or that the moving class members moved for appointment as lead plaintiffs and approval of their attorneys as lead plaintiffs’ counsel within 60 days of publication of the notice. The plaintiff published the notice on the same date it filed the Complaint and the moving parties filed their motion 60 days later on October 30, 2000. Nor is it disputed that the Business Wire is a widely circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service within the meaning of the Act. See In re Nice Systems, 188 F.R.D. at 216 and n. 8 (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Court considered the motion

    ### Response:
    holding that the business wire satisfies the acts widely circulated businessoriented wire service requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a grand jury investigation. I A federal grand jury in the District of Nevada is busy investigating the financial transactions of a certain company. Attorney Christopher Kiernan represented several witnesses who were called before the grand jury. The government, seeing the potential for a conflict of interest among his clients, moved to disqualify Kiernan from his multiple representation. The district court held a hearing pursuant to Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Upon determining that the witnesses had waived their right to conflict-free counsel and that the government had not made a showing sufficient to overcome these waivers, the district court denied the motion without prejudice. Shortly . 368, 375, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The later cases obviously cast doubt on the

    ### Response:
    holding that the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or loss; and (ii) another for mental anguish “of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result [at the time of the formation of the contract].” Id. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 351(1), cmt. a, at 135 (1981)(“A contracting party is generally expected to take account of those risks that are foreseeable at the time he makes the contract. He is not, however, liable in the event of breach for loss that he did not at the time of contracting have reason to foresee as a probable result of such a breach.”); 11 Williston, On Contracts § 1347-1348 (3d ed. 1957). The doctrine instructs that if damages are too speculative they will not be awarded. See Silva v. Albuquerque Assembly & Dist. Freeport Warehouse Corp., 106 N.M. 19, 20, 738 P.2d 513, 514 (1987)(<HOLDING>). The denial of recovery for emotional distress

    ### Response:
    holding damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract whether express or implied in the absence of a showing that the parties contemplated such damages at the time the contract was made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasoning has emerged. Compare Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Properties XVIII), 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.) (reviewing split in cases but and holding that “even if some limited new capital exception were viable” under the Code it did not apply on facts of case), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 866, 113 S.Ct. 191, 121 L.Ed.2d 134 (1992); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.1990) (questioning vitality of new value exception); In re Drimmel, 135 B.R. 410 (D.Kan.1991) (finding that new value exception no longer exists), aff'd sub nom. Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir.1993); Piedmont Assocs. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 132 B.R. 75 (N.D.Ga.1991) (same) with In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1039, 114 S.Ct. 681,

    ### Response:
    holding that new value exception still exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Yarbrough refiled their Rule 59(e) motion in case number CV-2009-900753.80. RCH now argues that that April 5 motion was untimely because a motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment must be filed “not later than thirty (30) days after entry of the judgment,” and Hackel and Yarbrough’s April 5 motion was filed in case number CV-2009-900753.80 on the 31st day after the judgment was entered. Rule 59(e). Accordingly, RCH argues, that untimely Rule 59(e) motion did not toll the 42-day period for filing a notice of appeal, and the notice of appeal filed by the appellants on July 24, 2012 — 141 days after the trial court’s March 5 judgment — was untimely, thus making it necessary for this Court to dismiss the appeal. See Miller Props., LLC v. Green, 958 So.2d 850, 851-52 (Ala.2006) (<HOLDING>). We agree with RCH that the motion filed on

    ### Response:
    holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and therefore, the pleading failed to demonstrate that the officers’ actions were performed “without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully [cause] injur[y]” to appellant’s place of business and residence. Town of Port Deposit, 113 Md.App. at 416, 688 A.2d 54. Thus, this Court finds that appellant’s complaint did not sufficiently allege that the officers acted with actual malice, and the circuit court correctly granted the officers’ motion on that basis. In addition, there is no special relationship between appellant and the police officers eliminating government immunity and imposing tort liability on the officers. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 306 Md. 617, 634-35, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986) (<HOLDING>). “In order to impose a special relationship

    ### Response:
    holding that police procedures set forth in the transportation article requiring officers to detain and investigate drunk drivers did not provide injured pedestrian with a civil cause of action absent police assuming a special relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    however, has effectively eroded the reasoning of these cases. See e.g., Coastal Group, Inc. v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 274 N.J.Super. 171,179-180, 643 A.2d 649 (App.Div.l994)(finding the Act applicable to commercial entities and stating that “both Unifoil and Werner & Pfleiderer were based on an overly expansive reading of .Spring Motors[ Distributors Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1983) ], which is inconsistent with [state statutory provisions] as well as with state decisional law”); see also Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. American Crane Corp., 79 F.Supp.2d 494 (D.N.J.1999)(Greenaway, J.)(corporate purchaser of crane stated claim against manufacturer under the Consumer Fraud Act); Florian Greenhouse, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Corp., 11 F.Supp.2d 521 (D.N.J.1998)(Walls, J.)(<HOLDING>); Alloway v. General Marine Indus., 149 N.J.

    ### Response:
    recognizing the availability of a cause of action by manufacturer against supplier under consumer fraud act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    all issues— including liability—to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 44.1(b); Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy Co., 23 S.W.3d 372, 380 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g)(relying on Rule 44.1(b) of the Texas Rules of Procedure to remand the cause on all issues, including liability, because damages were unliquidated and appellant contested liability). In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 2 , Villanova also signed a document in which he represented that the statements in his loan application were true and correct. 3 . Villanova executed the special warranty deed on the same day he purchased the property. 4 . Instead, Villanova placed the 3, 407 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Because HSOA does not raise this argument on

    ### Response:
    holding that a statement that the affiant is senior vicepresident and secretary of a corporation asserting a special appearance is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the corporations contacts with texas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    month without interest. Finally, as to attorney’s fees, the husband was ordered to pay the wife’s attorney $500 per month until he had paid the full $38,000 that the court found was owed. No interest was ordered on the fee obligation. ATTORNEY’S FEES The only evidence with regard to the wife’s attorney’s fees was the wife’s testimony that she lacked the ability to pay her own fees, which she placed at “about $38,000.” The trial court found that the wife’s attorney’s fees of $38,000 were reasonable and that the wife had a need for fees and the Husband had the ability to pay the fees. The court made no findings as to the number of hours reasonably expended or an hourly rate. The court’s failure to make those findings was error. See Abernethy v. Fishkin, 638 So.2d 160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>), disagreed with on other grounds, Kelson v.

    ### Response:
    holding that reversal is required where a trial court fails to make specific findings as to the reasonable number of hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate as mandated by florida patients compensation fund v rowe 472 so2d 1145 115051 fla1985
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    added.) It is undisputed that Hoy gave notice of his claim for compensation to the attorney for Alpha Corporation, and that the Alpha Corporation attorney understood this claim to extend not only to judgments, but also to all “money due,” including settlement proceeds. Consequently, Hoy satisfied the statutory notice requirements for establishing an attorney’s lien. Second, although at least one jurisdiction requires counsel to bring a separate action against his client to enforce an attorney’s lien, Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah Ct.App.1989), we align ourselves with the majority of jurisdictions which hold that an attorney’s lien may be enforced either through a separate action or incident to the underlying litigation. See Gee v. Crabtree, 192 Colo. 550, 560 P.2d 835 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636

    ### Response:
    holding that the attorneys charging lien may be asserted and enforced in the civil action which gave rise to the lien claim or in an independent action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    First, the DOC and the CIA invoke the National Security Act of 1947, requiring the CIA director to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(6), and requiring protection of the functions, names and official titles of CIA personnel, id. § 424. Second, the DOC and CIA invoke § 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. 403g, exempting the CIA from any law that requires publication or disclosure of the organization or function of the CIA, or any information with r Government Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 107(a)(2), which prohibits public disclosure of government employees’ reports to supervising ethics offices. See Meyerhoff v. EPA, 958 F.2d 1498, 1502 (9th Cir.1992); Judicial Watch v. Rossotti, 285 F.Supp.2d 17, 30 (D.D.C.2003) (<HOLDING>). Fifth, the DOC properly invokes the Patent

    ### Response:
    holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New Mexico, Wyoming, and Utah are eminently reasonable individuals and that each and every one of them is attempting to do justice in all cases that come before them. Nevertheless, reasonable judges make mistakes sometimes, even big, unreasonable mistakes. In those situations, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to grant habeas relief. See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 259, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007) (concluding Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ resolution of petitioner’s claim was not a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (concluding Texas state court factual finding was unreasonable); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 35 . In his dissent, Judge O'Brien asserts

    ### Response:
    holding that the maryland court of appeals application of stricklands governing legal principles was objectively unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction over the state law claims. D. Ct. Op. at 27 n. 17. The court found that even though Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.337 (criminalizing indecent language in the presence of women or children) had been invalidated by the Michigan Supreme Court, other statutes, criminalizing conduct for which Leonard had not been charged, supported the arrest, viz., §§ 750.103 (swearing), 750.170 (disturbing a meeting), and 750.167 (disorderly person). Therefore, based upon these statutes, Robinson had probable cause to arrest Leonard because he had violated the plain language of those statutes and Robinson was “to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.” D. Ct. Op. at 12. See also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The district court denied Leonard’s First

    ### Response:
    holding that an officers subjective reason for making an arrest need not include the criminal offense that later establishes probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    challenge the computation of the compensatory damages. 7 . Although some of these events did take place prior to the plan’s confirmation, the claims are not barred by res judicata because the breaches ' of fiduciary duty did not occur until well afterward. The pre-confirmation events are looked at only for background, pattern of activity, and for evidence of motive. See n.4, supra. 8 . We also find that the punitive damages were proportional to the compensatory damages, léss than a 2 to 1 ratio, and that there is therefore no need to discuss a possible conflict between Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (suggesting that punitive damages disproportionate to compensatory damages may violate due process), and Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 803 (<HOLDING>). See Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952

    ### Response:
    holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ford, the Estate says it is clear that the release extinguished the liability of the driver, Henry. In the instant case, the lack of a release discharging Henry (or his estate) from liability as a joint tortfeasor is not fatal to a finding of good faith. “The Contribution Act does not set forth a specific form that a release must take and does not even require the release to be in writing.” Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc., 387 Ill.App.3d 915, 327 Ill.Dec. 273, 901 N.E.2d 1006, 1016 (2009). Given the per person limit for bodily injury coverage on the Hartford policy, Evelyn’s release of Hartford’s liability for uninsured motorist coverage in exchange for the full policy limits achieved the same result as a release of Henry from tort liability. See Lard, 327 Ill.Dec. 273, 901 N.E.2d at 1016 (<HOLDING>). The payment by Hartford to Evelyn was in

    ### Response:
    holding in a mass tort situation with over ninety plaintiffs that plaintiffs acceptance of the settlement agreement amounted to an implied release satisfying the contribution acts release requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). The court does not weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine if the evidence creates a genuine issue for trial. Sagan, 342 F.3d at 497 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). III. DISCUSSION A necessary element of each of Plaintiffs claims against the City is a showing that an employment relationship existed between her and the City. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII); Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.2000) (observing that “Congress chose to limit Title VII liability to employers only”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA); Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 992 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2202(1) (ELCRA);

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that courts are sharply split on whether the exception for statements respecting the debtor’s financial condition should be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Id. at 112-13 (collecting cases). “A broad interpretation would include any statement that reflects the financial condition of the debtor. On the other hand, a narrow interpretation would find that a statement relates to financial condition only when it provides information ‘as to [a debtor’s] overall financial health.’ ” Id. at 112 (internal citations omitted). 56. Several courts have addressed whether certain statements speak to the overall financial health of the debtor sufficient to satisfy the narrow interpretation of the exception. See id. at 113 (citing Weiss v. Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 504 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Sansoucy, 136 B.R. 20, 23

    ### Response:
    holding that statement about debtor lacking present ability to pay was essentially statement of insolvency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the omission affected his substantial rights. Brown’s reliance on United States v. Neal, 509 Fed.Appx. 302 (5th Cir.2013), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 183, 187 L.Ed.2d 125 (2013), is misplaced as it is distinguishable. Therefore, Brown has not shown plain error. AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). 2 . See id. 3 . See id. 4 . United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). 5 . See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(B). 6 . See United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 722, 726 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83,

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts failure to advise defendant of right to plead not guilty and right against selfincrimination were implicit in the courts discussion of the rights he would lose if he pleaded guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I believe the finding of arbitrariness is additionally supported by the South Carolina Constitution, which, unlike the United States Constitution, has an express privacy provision. See S.C. Const, art. I, § 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated.... ”). While our constitution’s privacy provision does not transform a purported privacy interest into a fundamental right for purposes of applying the strict scrutiny test, I believe it does inform the analysis of whether a state law is arbitrary and lends addition al support to the conclusion that section 23-3-540(0 is unconstitutional. Cf. State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 649 S.E.2d 479 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, I concur in result to reverse and

    ### Response:
    holding that by articulating a specific prohibition against unreasonable invasions of privacy the people of south carolina have indicated a higher level of privacy protection than the federal constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    medical examiner must furnish “full description of the effects of disability upon the person’s ordinary activity”). The Court holds that medical evidence is required to support this criterion of a 40% disability rating — regulation of activities. The next question for the Court is whether there is a plausible basis for the Board’s findings that “there is no medical evidence that the veteran’s activities are restricted” and, therefore, a higher initial disability rating of 40% is not warranted under DC 7913. R. at 8; see Johnston v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 80, 84 (1997) (applying established caselaw that degree of disability under the rating code is a finding of fact subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of review by this Court); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 53 (1990) (<HOLDING>). This question turns on whether there is

    ### Response:
    holding that when court applies the clearly erroneous standard court may not reverse boards finding of fact if after court reviews the record in its entirety the finding is supported by a plausible basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contracts. We hold that Act No. 26 substantially impairs the contractual relationship by mandating that all CGL policies be legislatively amended to include a new statutory definition of occurrence and by applying this mandate retroactively. While the dissent believes the new provision merely clarifies existing law, we find the statute fundamentally changes the definition of occurrence. In Newman, this Court suggested “that a CGL policy may provide coverage where faulty workmanship causes third party bodily injury or damage to other property besides the defective work product” leaving open the possibility there may be instances where coverage might not be provided. 385 S.C. at 193, 684 S.E.2d at 544 (emphasis added); see also Crossmann, 395 S.C. at 50 n. 6, 717 S.E.2d at 594 n. 6 (<HOLDING>). In doing so, Newman examined the interaction

    ### Response:
    holding we elect to adhere to our precedent in newman 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    425. In fact, a vast majority of classes that meet the requirements of rule 23(b)(1)(B) inevitably will satisfy the rule 23(b)(3) requirements. 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 4.01, at 4-5. Due process does not turn on such formalistic distinctions. C. The Distinction Between Law and Equity. The majority’s argument that applying Shutts to rule 23(b)(1) would render all mandatory class actions unconstitutional, is also premised on a faulty understanding of the distinction between law and equity. See maj. op. at 987 n. 16. What the majority fails to acknowledge is that the distinction between money damages and equitable remedies preserves mandatory class actions in the vast majority of cases, including traditional common fund cases from equity. See Newberg on Class Actions § 1.18, at 1-46 (<HOLDING>). The only cases affected by Shutts are modern

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the majority of actions that meet the requirements of rule 23b1 seek equitable relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not purchase the homes as businesses. The defendants have the better argument. The thrust of the complaint is that the plaintiffs’ investment in rental properties in Detroit resulted in a loss to them, either because the defendants misrepresented the condition of the properties and the likely rate of return or they breached their contracts. Under Michigan law, “if an item is purchased primarily for business or commercial rather than personal purposes, the MCPA does not supply protection.” Zine v. Chrysler Corp., 236 Mich.App. 261, 273, 600 N.W.2d 384, 393 (1999); see also MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 880 F.Supp.2d 785, 792 (W.D.Mich.2012). Moreover, the MCPA does not apply to investors. Quartell v. Great Lakes Bancorp, 183368, 1996 WL 33347624 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 17, 1996) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs have failed to state a valid

    ### Response:
    holding that the mcpa does not apply to property purchased for investment purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    transferred Woodbridge to Friendship in 2000, Friendship continued to operate Woodbridge as a public school. We agree with Friendship and the trial court. This case is controlled by the principle that municipal property devoted to a public use may not be acquired by adverse possession and the doctrine of nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the sovereign”) is directly applicable. During the time the District owned the Woodbridge property, it held title in its governmental capacity and operated it as a public school. Thus, the Woodbridge property was dedicated to a public use and could not have been acquired by private landowners by prescription. Town Comm’rs of Centreville, supra, 87 A.2d at 601; see also Lysicki v. Montour Sch. Dist., 701 A.2d 630 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1997) (<HOLDING>). There is no hint in this record that the

    ### Response:
    holding no private landowner can adversely possess property of the school district because school districts are agents of the commonwealth and are therefore immune from the running of time against them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). In deciding whether a seizure has occurred, a court considers whether “if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; see People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 390 (1990) (approving the use of the Mendenhall standard). As a general rule, all seizures must be reasonable, and the reasonableness of a seizure depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference from law enforcement officers. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 614-15, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2578-79 (1975); see Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402 (<HOLDING>). Thus, a person may not be seized unless there

    ### Response:
    holding that it is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to order a passenger to stay at the scene of a traffic stop because the public interest in officer safety outweighs the minimal intrusion to that passengers liberty interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    speedy-trial argument to be disingenuous due to his seven requests for continuance. ¶ 46. Although Bateman’s requests for continuance caused the most significant delay to Bateman’s trial date, this Court has held that well-taken motions for continuance may justify delay in a criminal trial. Flora v. State, 925 So.2d 797, 815 (Miss.2006). This period must be subtracted from the total period of the delay. See Taylor, 672 So.2d at 1259. Therefore, the State is left with an unexplained 380-day delay in this case, representing the time between his arrest and his first motion for continuance. This period does not include the 120-day continuance ordered sua sponte by the trial court, which was justified and will not count against either side. We must weigh this factor in Bate-man’s (<HOLDING>). ¶ 49. This Court has held that a defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial two months before his trial began did not satisfy this barker factor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Torts § 159. See also In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d at 348. 128 . See Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403, 419 (1883). 129 . See Rockland Bleach & Dye Works Co. v. H.I. Williams Corp., 242 Md. 375, 219 A.2d 48, 55 (1966) (noting that where surface water that invades plaintiff's property is ""accompanied by large quantities of mud and other debris” an action in trespass would lie) (citing Cahill v. Baltimore City, 48 A. 705 (Md.1901); Guest v. Commissioners of Church Hill, 90 Md. 689, 45 A. 882 (1900)). 130 . See id. 131 . See Maryland Heights Leasing, Inc., 706 S.W.2d at 225. 132 . Yarema, 516 A.2d at 1004. 133 . Rosenblatt, 642 A.2d at 188. 134 . Id. at 189. 135 . Id. at 185 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519). Accord Yommer, 257 A.2d at 141 (<HOLDING>). 136 . Rosenblatt, 642 A.2d at 186. 137 .

    ### Response:
    holding that the doctrine of strict liability applies where an owner of residential property brought a claim against the owners of a gasoline station immediately adjacent to a private residence after gasoline leaked into the property owners well
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with such notice and hearing’).” 101 So.3d at 752. Thus, the failure to serve a motion in accordance with Rule 5 might result in a violation of an opposing party’s due-process rights and can render a judgment entered pursuant to the motion void. See Pirtek USA, LLC v. Whitehead, 51 So.3d 291, 295 (Ala.2010) (quoting Orix Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 9 So.3d 1241, 1244 (Ala.2008), quoting in turn Ins. Mgmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So.2d 209, 212 (Ala.1991)) (“ ‘ “A judgment is void ... if the court rendering it ... acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.” ’ ”). Our supreme court has recognized that the failure to serve a motion or other paper in compliance with Rule 5(a) will not always result in a due-process violation. See Woodruff, 101 So.3d at 752-53 (<HOLDING>). But, in this case, we hold that Morris has

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    review the tax court’s factual findings for clear error, its legal conclusions de novo, and its application of the law to the facts for clear error. Kikalos v. Comm’r, 434 F.3d 977, 981-82 (7th Cir.2006); Yasha v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir.1988) (“The question whether a particular transaction has economic substance, like other questions concerning the application of a legal standard to transactions or events, is governed by the clearly erroneous standard”). Section 6901 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the IRS to proceed against the transferees of delinquent taxpayers to collect unpaid tax debts. But the statute provides only a procedural device for proceeding against a taxpayer’s transferee. See Comm’r v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 42-43, 78 S.Ct. 1047, 2 L.Ed.2d 1126 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Substantive liability is governed by state

    ### Response:
    holding that the predecessor to  6901 is purely a procedural statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    protection clause because the PRC districts are not equally apportioned on the basis of population. Cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 416, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977) (“The Equal Protection Clause requires that legislative districts be of nearly equal population, so that each person’s vote may be given equal weight in the election of representatives.”). “In calculating the deviation among districts, the relevant inquiry is whether the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen, the aim being to provide fair and effective representation for all citizens.” Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 701, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); id. at 703, 109 S.Ct. 1433 (<HOLDING>). {49} The record is devoid of any evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that a population deviation of 78 violated the oneperson onevote ideal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (9th Cir.1989). Petitioner must show that counsel’s appellate advocacy fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, Petitioner would have prevailed on appeal. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-86, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000); see also Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n. 9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “A failure to raise untenable issues on appeal does not fall below the Strickland standard.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir.2002); see also Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, appellate counsel does not have a

    ### Response:
    holding that appellate counsel could not be found to have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise issues that are without merit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment” for a serious medical need. Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There is evidence in this record that prison officials simply refused to follow the directions of Plaintiff’s treating physician with respect to treatments designed to combat the onset of AIDS. Plaintiff’s medical need for the treatment was serious, and there is evidence that the officials were deliberately indifferent to that need. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). There also is evidence that Plaintiff was

    ### Response:
    holding that a prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he ignores the instructions of the prisoners treating physician
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    347-48, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619-20, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). 66 . Article 38.23(a) provides, No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused.on the trial of any criminal case. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 619-20. 67 . See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484, 83 S.Ct. at 416; Smith v. State, 542 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); State v. Mayorga, 876 S.W.2d 176, 177 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994), aff'd and remanded, 901 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). 68 . See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417; Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 744, 750 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). 69 . See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,

    ### Response:
    holding attenuation analysis applicable under article 3823 as a method of determining whether evidence was obtained in violation of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also Weaver v. Frick, No. 98-15362, 1999 WL 191413, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar.15, 1999) (“[A]n attorney appointed by the court does not act under color of state or federal law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant.”); Anderson v. Sonenberg, Nos. 96-5192, 96-5308, 1997 WL 196359, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Mar.13, 1997) (“[Pjublic defenders and other attorneys appointed to represent defendants in federal proceedings are not federal officials for purposes of Bivens.”)-, Bradford v. Shankman, No. 85-5150, 1985 WL 13659, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 1985) (“[A] private attorney and a federal public defender do not act under color of federal law for purposes of a Bivens action.”); cf. Davis v. United States, No. CIV-06-1376C, 2007 WL 983206, at *6 (W.D.Okla. Mar.29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Because McCaughey is not a federal officer,

    ### Response:
    holding a federal public defender is not a federal officer for purposes of a bivenstype action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Viktor was, aligned with the political opinion of his employer simply by the fact that he worked as a government official enforcing, government policies. See Aguilera Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir.1990) (“[Petitioner]’s status as a government employee caused the opponents of the government to classify him as a person ‘guilty’ of a political opinion.”). Viktor also has established that his troubles with Hidro arose on account of that actual or imputed political opinion. Our cases make clear that a victim who is targeted for exposing government corruption is persecuted “on account of’ political -opinion. Retaliation for investigating or publicizing corruption by political figures is by its very nature a political act. Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We have held, for example, that “retaliation

    ### Response:
    holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nassau Communities Hosp., 54 F.Supp.2d 141, 147 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (dismissing hostile work environment claim where plaintiff's supervisor briefly touched her on two occasions); Salem v. Software Guidance & Assistance, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8437, 1997 WL 777402, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1997) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff’s supervisor “made sexually charged remarks, commented on the size of women’s breasts, and at one point touched plaintiff’s rear-end”); Samuels v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Services, No. 94 Civ. 8645, 1997 WL 253209, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1997) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff complained of a sole incident of being poked in the breast during a fire drill); Gonzalez v. Kahan, No. CV 88-922, 1996 WL 705320, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996) (<HOLDING>); Lamar v. Nynex Serv. Co., 891 F.Supp. 184,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs allegation that her professor gave her a brief bear hug was insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adjudication. Safeco also maintains that it did properly object to the dismissal of the complaint even though it was not required to do so. We find both of Safeco’s contentions to be without merit. This court has previously held that a defendant must object to a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41, to preserve a counterclaim capable of independent adjudication, HardwickMorrison Co. v. Mayland, 206 Ga. App. 426 (425 SE2d 416) (1992), and to provide plaintiff with notice that it intends to pursue its counterclaim. Thus, in Hardwick, this court held that defendant’s failure to object to a voluntary dismissal of the main action containing a counterclaim resulted in dismissal of the counterclaim. See also Moore v. McNair, 145 Ga. App. 888 (245 SE2d 25) (1978) (<HOLDING>). However, in addition to arguing that it was

    ### Response:
    holding that upon appellees failure to object to appellants voluntary dismissal the action including appellees counterclaim was dismissed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 201 N.C. App. 726, 689 S.E.2d 601, 2010 WL 10963 at *3-4 (2010) (unpublished) (applying common law principles of contract law, such as offer and acceptance, to a claim filed under the Workers’ Compensation Act). This Court has held that a lapse in employment and subsequent rehiring via a “last act” made in North Carolina created a contract that was “made” in North Carolina for jurisdictional purposes under Section 97-36. Baker v. Chizek Transp., Inc., 210 N.C. App. 490, 711 S.E.2d 207, 2011 WL 904271 at *4-5 (2011) (unpublished). Similarly, under the common law of contracts, a modification to the terms of a contract may create a new underlying contract that was “made” in North Carolina. See, e.g., Spartan Leasing Inc. v. Pollard, 101 N.C. App. 450, 457, 400 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Section 97-36 also employs the phrase

    ### Response:
    holding that an addendum letter was a new contract because it modified a prior lease agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the government designated certain of Kiernan’s clients as targets of the investigation, and moved once more to disqualify Kiernan from his multiple representation. The district court held a second Wheat hearing in January of 1999, and this time granted the motion to disqualify Kiernan. Kiernan filed a notice of appeal from that order on behalf of his clients, and the appeal was expedited. II Before we can reach the merits, we must consider whether we have jurisdiction. Appellants assert that we do, pursuant to the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). In support of their position, they cite cases from the 1970s that allow such appeals. See In re Investiga 04 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449

    ### Response:
    holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    than four years ago, contains in excess of 350 entries at present. Klayman's failure to properly cite to the record or to identify the rulings of which he now complains has significantly and needlessly increased the difficulty in determining which of the hundreds of rulings in this case are now at issue. Nonetheless, to the extent the Court has been able to determine which of its rulings are likely described by Klayman in his Affidavit, the Court has identified these decisions above. 3 . The Court is also cognizant that section 455 imposes a duty upon this Court to consider recusal sua sponte, and, for this reason as well, shall proceed to consider Klayman’s substantive allegations in support of his Motion to Disqualify. See United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 955 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 4 . While Klayman's initial motion for

    ### Response:
    recognizing that section 455 requires judges to consider recusal sua sponte 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    established by this court. See Firefighter’s Inst. for Racial Equal, ex. rel. Anderson v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.2000)(affirming district court for striking an untimely disclosure of expert and expert’s report under Rule 16). If the Declaration is viewed as a “supplement” setting forth information, reasoning and opinions in order to cure that part of her Report’s deficiencies, Rule 26 required such things to be disclosed in her critical initial Report. “The purpose of ... supplementary disclosures is just that — ... to supplement. These disclosures are not intended to provide an extension of the deadline by which a party must deliver the lion’s share of its expert information.” Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands,

    ### Response:
    holding that district court did not abuse its discretion for excluding experts supplement disclosure since rule 26a requires that the initial disclosures be complete and detailed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Craft, 685 So.2d 1292, 1295 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>). TORPY, C.J., LAWSON and LAMBERT, JJ.,

    ### Response:
    holding that after trial court follows procedure outlined in nelson v state 274 so2d 256 fla 4th dca 1973 and denies motion to discharge counsel court is not thereafter obligated to inform defendant of his or her right to selfrepresentation absent an unequivocal request for selfrepresentation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argues that the lower courts erred in finding that Mother established cause under Section 2901 to proceed with the anticipated adoption of Children by Grandfather despite the fact that Mother did not relinquish her parental rights. Specifically, Father emphasizes that the purpose of permitting the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights in the context of an adoption is to “protect the integrity and stability of the new family unit,” Appellant’s Brief at 10, which he maintains would not be achieved by the proposed adoption in the instant case because Grandfather would not b ccording to Father, both of those cases demonstrate that cohabitation is essential to forming a family unit and, thus, an adoption is not permitted where the parties will not be living together as an in (2001) (<HOLDING>). Relying on those cases, Father asserts that

    ### Response:
    holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“Where class certification is later denied, the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable period of limitation with respect to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action”); Carlson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 370 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) (citing American Pipe and explaining that “[c]ase law is clear that tolling starts with the filing of the action and continues until certification of the class”); Hyatt Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N.C., 801 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Mo.Ct.App.1990) (determining that class action complaints “tolled the statute of limitations on behalf of all putative [fir L.Ed.2d 357 (1981); Rose v. Ark. Valley Environ. & Util. Auth., 562 F.Supp. 1180, 1192 (1983) (<HOLDING>). But see Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the appropriate focus of inquiry  should simply be upon the extent to which the claims asserted in the earlier class proceeding have in fact placed a defendant upon notice of the claims presently at issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for earnings that otherwise would be paid to and earned by the injured worker during the disability period after the marriage. There are no Arizona cases regarding the nature of workmen’s compensation received after the dissolution of marriage. No issue was raised in Jurek regarding the nature of workmen’s compensation, 124 Ariz. at 596 n. 1, 606 P.2d at 812 n. 1, nor the nature of future loss of earnings after dissolution. It is our opinion that such benefits paid to the injured worker after the dissolution of marriage for injuries received during the marriage are the separate property of the worker after the dissolution. According to general community property law principles, when a marriage is dissolved, the earnings of each individual after the dissol S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979)

    ### Response:
    holding railroad retirement benefits are not community property by congressional action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 594-95 (reasoning jury may have followed erroneous instruction). We must now determine whether the trial court’s failure to read the instruction was a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3); see McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 333. Here, the concerned instruction defined assault and contained the essential element of specific intent. State v. Eastmond, 129 Wn.2d 497, 502, 919 P.2d 577 (1996); State v. Byrd, 125 Wn.2d 707, 713-14, 887 P.2d 396 (1995). Omitting the instruction orally was an error of constitutional magnitude because it relieved the State of its burden of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Eastmond, 129 Wn.2d at 502; Byrd, 125 Wn.2d at 713-14; see also State v. Iosefa, 77 Haw. 177, 880 P.2d 1224, 1230 (Ct. App. 1994) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether the constitutional error

    ### Response:
    holding trial courts failure to recite a presumption of innocence instruction seriously jeopardized the defendants federal constitutional right to due process and a fair trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DENSO Japan has technical and license agreements with its United States subsidiaries, including DENSO Tennessee, which manufacture components that eventually are sold to Toyota. There is no evidence that DEN-SO Japan had a general business presence in Texas through its efforts to support any of its United States subsidiaries. See Reid, 130 S.W.3d at 220. Even when amassed, DENSO Japan’s contacts simply are not “continuous and systematic general business contacts” sufficient to support general jurisdiction. See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 171. We conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding that it could exercise general jurisdiction over DENSO Japan. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868; PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 170-71 (<HOLDING>); CSR, Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595

    ### Response:
    holding that isolated trips to texas more than 1500000 in purchases from texas vendors and two contracts with texas entities were not substantial enough to support general jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.2002) (same), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1004, 123 S.Ct. 1911, 155 L.Ed.2d 835 (2003). The government introduced evidence of several threats Sampson made to correctional officers and others after he was charged in this case. Although a close question, the evidence of possession of a “shank” both before and after the murders, an attempted escape from prison, and threats to correctional officers and others, examined in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sampson was likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future which would be a continuing and serious threat to the lives and safety of prison officials and inmates. See Swisher v. True, 325 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 971, 123 S.Ct. 2668,

    ### Response:
    holding that shank possession combined with threats was sufficient to show future dangerousness under virginia law and therefore petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice for strickland purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 349 claim is not preempted, to the extent that plaintiffs seek relief for deceptive acts and practices incident to the alleged breach of the mortgage agreements with defendants. (See Defs.’ Opp. Mem. at 51 (“Defendants violated GBL § 349 and similar state consumer protection laws by demanding and collecting the Disputed Fees when they were not owed by Class members.”).) Cedeno is plainly distinguishable, because plaintiff has asserted that specific contractual provisions have been breached when the Disputed Fees were collected from plaintiffs, and thus the GBL § 349 cause of action does not seek to “set substantive standards or establish particular requirements for lending operations in the state of New York.” Binetti, 446 F.Supp.2d at 220; see also Cassese MTD Opinion at 31-33 (<HOLDING>). However, the Court notes that in their

    ### Response:
    holding gbl  349 claim and breach of contract claims not preempted gbl  349 complements rather than conflicts with the federal regulatory scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    50, 400 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1990). None of the statutes cited by defendants purport to create a private cause of action. Plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendants’ claims based on various Georgia criminal statutes is therefore GRANTED. 2. Common Law Conversion Defendants also assert a claim for common law conversion. (Defs.’ Counterclaims [5] at ¶¶ 154-156.) This claim is based on plaintiffs failure to pay proceeds pursuant to the terms of Grongie’s life insurance policies. (Id.) Georgia law is clear that a claim for conversion “does not lie on account of a mere failure to pay money due under a contract.” Morris v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 208 Ga.App. 443, 444, 430 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1993). See also, Faircloth v. A.L. Williams & Assoc., Inc., 206 Ga.App. 764, 768, 426 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1992) (<HOLDING>) and Unified Serv., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 218

    ### Response:
    holding that contract debt  was not subject to an act in tort for conversion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or setting a limitation on the number of tests per year. Taste concedes that this claim is reviewed for plain error because he did not object below. To establish plain error, Taste must demonstrate that the district court erred, the error was plain, and the error affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 1126, 185 L.Ed.2d 85 (2013). If these requirements are met, the court will exercise its discretion to correct the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1126-27 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We conclude that the district court did not err in imposing the special condition. See United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882, 884-885 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming error, any improper delegation

    ### Response:
    holding that when the district court imposed drug testing in connection with a special condition of substance abuse program participation  it was  not required to specify the number of drug tests a defendant must undergo as a part of the treatment program
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any machine gun. The term “firearm” does not include an antique firearm unless the antique firearm is used in the commission of a crime. A firearm is, by definition, a deadly weapon because it is designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive which is likely to cause death or great bodily injury. If the firearm is discharged or it is used to put the victim in fear to commit an aggravated assault or a robbery, it is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. This is true regardless of whether the firearm is loaded or capable of being fired. See Waldo v. State, 728 So.2d 280, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), quashed on other grounds, 759 So.2d 674 (Fla.2000) (noting that in Miller v. State, 613 So.2d 530, 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), this Court upheld Miller’s conviction for aggravated ass 970) (<HOLDING>). The defendant argues, and the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that an unloaded gun used in the commission of an aggravated assault is a deadly weapon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    injury....” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 477 Pa. 190, 383 A.2d 887, 889-90 (1978). The evidence in this case was that Christina knocked the victim down with a punch in the face and then kicked him in the face while he was down. Because the victim’s only arguably “serious” injuries were to the trunk and legs, Christina himself—as opposed to his codefendants—may not actually have caused the “serious” injury. Nonetheless, considering the circumstances of the assault (three attackers against one victim who was soon lying on the ground), we cannot say that the evidence of Christina’s acts during the assault is insufficient to support a jury finding that he intended to inflict serious bodily injury on his victim. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The Pennsylvania courts’ conclusion that

    ### Response:
    holding that a petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    265 (Tex.1969). See also Angus Chemical Co. v. IMC Fertilizer, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). In other words, State Farm’s duty is to pay its insured; third parties can recover proceeds under the policy only insofar as their rights derive from Fullerton’s right to recover proceeds. Thus, although Texas courts have not yet decided specifically whether tort plaintiffs who seek insurance funds are in privity with an insured who pleads guilty to murder, we hold that under Texas law the Buckners are in privity with Fullerton because of the derivative nature of their recovery under the policy. This result places Texas among the bulk of other jurisdictions that have considered the question. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 421, 425 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Tradewind Ins. Co. v. Stout, 85 Hawai'i 177,

    ### Response:
    holding that when the victim of an insured defendant derives her rights to collect insurance proceeds directly from the rights of the insured defendant they are in privity by virtue of sharfing a legal interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (2) provided false information and advertising; (3) made misrepresentations regarding the benefits, advantages, or dividends of a policy; (4) made a misrepresentation that induced a policy holder to allow an existing policy to lapse or to forego insurance; (5) mad preemption inquiry is the same as with any other state-law claim: A court must ask whether the cause of action addresses an area of exclusive federal concern and whether it directly affects the relationship between the traditional ERISA entities. Accordingly, courts have held that claims under the Texas Insurance Code are not preempted where the claim is not premised on the right to recover benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan. See, e.g., Transitional Hospitals Corp. v. Blue Cross, 164 F.3d 952, 955 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons given above — namely, that

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on  the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv-0274-DFH-TAB, 2007 WL 2413026, *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (in determining whether party is “debtor collector,” focus “is not on the events of the particular transaction but on the principal purpose of the defendant’s business and/or the defendant’s regular activities”) (citing Kaltenbach). In the case at bar, the evidence does not support plaintiffs allegation that the Massey defendants were “debt collectors” under the § 1962a(6) general definition. Plaintiff does not argue that the “principal purpose” of Shapiro & Massey is the collection of debts, but he does contend that the law firm, and Gary Massey, regularly collect or attempt to collect debts, and hence qualify as debt collectors. See Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). However, an affidavit by Gary Massey

    ### Response:
    holding that a person may regularly render debt collection services even if these services are not a principal purpose of his business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections ... The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information ..., and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the particularities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are sat 5, 509 (10th Cir.1991) (setting aside summary judgment where no notice was given to defendant); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 663 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982) (<HOLDING>). See also, In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759

    ### Response:
    holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1982). Assuming that the Clubs have a property interest in the club permits issued by the TABC, they cannot demonstrate that they were denied due process. “[WJhen a legislature extinguishes a property interest via legislation that affects a general class of people, the legislative process provides all the process that is due.” McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 499, 504 (5th Cir.1993). The Clubs argue that § 32.03(k) affected a small number of establishments and was narrowly focused on certain SOBs, notwithstanding its broad language and statewide applicability. The Clubs erroneously focus on the total number of establishments ultimately affected by § 32.03(k). The proper focus, however, is on whether the legislature intended to single out certain individuals or establishments. See id. (<HOLDING>). Section 32.03(k) was intended to affect every

    ### Response:
    holding that a law extinguishing property rights of certain government employees did not violate due process where the act was intended to affect every employee first emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument. Fred I. Palmer, Sr. (Palmer), president and creditor of debtor, Durability, Inc., appeals from a district court order affirming an order of the bankruptcy court holding Palmer’s $500,000 claim against debtor subordinate to a $1,618,331.80 claim asserted by Fourth National Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa, Oklahoma (FNB). Palmer and FNB are the named defendants in this adversary proceeding brought by the trustee to determine the validity, priority, and extent of defendants’ liens, as well as to avoid certain allegedly fraudulent transfers. We do not, at this time, reach the merits of the issues raised by Palmer, because we hold that our jurisdiction over this premature appeal has not yet been established. See Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1534, 103

    ### Response:
    recognizing federal courts duty to determine matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it becomes apparent that jurisdiction may be lacking
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    include: the presence of any additional evidence which corroborates the proffered hearsay; the type of and centrality of the issue that the hearsay is being offered to prove; and the source of the hearsay, including the possibility of bias or motive to fabricate. This is not an all-inclusive list, as other factors may affect a court’s evaluation of reliability. Furthermore, the facts and circumstances of a particular case may undermine the trustworthiness of hearsay evidence that otherwise might enjoy a high degree of reliability. Compare United States v. Penn, 721 F.2d 762, 765-66 (11th Cir.1983) (noting the general reliability of urinalysis drug tests and permitting admission in probation revocation hearing) with Wilson v. State, 70 Md.App. 527, 534, 521 A.2d 1257, 1261 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Courts have looked to various considerations

    ### Response:
    recognizing that other courts have found the type of test reliable but finding that this particular urinalysis test was unreliable since the lab did not perform a backup test or identify lab test results and state left questions about how probationers diabetes affected the results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress’s general policy that “state proceedings ‘should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately [the Supreme] Court.’ ” Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.E , 659 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (5th Cir. Unit A 1984) (upholding injunction forbidding certain plaintiffs in federal class action suit from pursuing litigation in state court in South Carolina and rejecting as frivolous plaintiffs’ contention that denying them opportunity to sue for damages under more favorable South Carolina law deprived them of property without due process of law); Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 946-47 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Samuel C. Ennis & Co., Inc. v. Woodmar Realty

    ### Response:
    holding that third exception to antiinjunction act permits federal courts to enjoin state court relitigation of matters finally adjudicated in federal court including matters that were not raised but could have been raised in federal proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order, Deputy Commissioner Phillips did not intend to provide Ammons with TTD benefits in addition to full salary when she entered the January Award. Indeed, as noted by Deputy Commissioner Phillips in the July Award, “double recovery is not contemplated by [the Workers’ Compensation Act].” To “clarify” the January Award “so that there was no confusion between the parties regarding benefits[,]” Deputy Commissioner Phillips amended the January Award on her own motion. Rather than attempting to provide relief from some erroneous finding or conclusion, as Ammons suggests, the amendment to the January Award properly sought to “clarify” Deputy Commissioner Phillips’ intentions regarding the benefits awarded. Cf. Alston v. Fed. Express Corp., N.C. App. -, -, 684 S.E.2d 705, 707 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the amendment of the January Award

    ### Response:
    holding that in a situation where the parties could not agree on how to interpret the trial courts order pursuant to rule 60b6s grand reservoir of equitable power the trial court had jurisdiction to revisit its order so that its intentions could be made clear
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more than an agreement for Chassidie to attend counseling while David’s petition requesting access under section 153.3161 of the family code was pending. In fact, the associate judge’s report contemplates that the counselor could determine that the Harveys were not entitled to exercise David’s possession and access at all pending the resolution of his suit. Thus, we conclude and hold that Chassidie’s and her counsel’s mere signatures alone on the July 19, 2006 associate judge’s report do not constitute an agreed order conferring standing on the Harveys prior to their filing pleadings in intervention. See, e.g., Oryx Energy Co. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., 895 S.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1995, writ denied); cf. In re D.C., 180 S.W.Sd 647, 649-50 (Tex.App.Waco 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, Chassidie’s counsel’s signature on

    ### Response:
    holding that agreement as to form and content did not constitute agreed judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony in his favor must prevail.”). Where, as here, a defense witness’s claim of privilege shields material testimony from cross-examination, however, this balance weighs against the defendant. The trial court held a voir dire hearing to determine whether the subject matter concerning which the witness intended to assert the Fifth Amendment was collateral. She fairly concluded that it was not. See Fed.R.Evid. 611(b) (giving court authority to exercise reasonable control over examination of witnesses to “make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth”). In considering similar types of challenges brought under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we have applied an abuse of discretion standard. See Berrío-Londoño, 946 F.2d at 160 (<HOLDING>). We apply the same abuse of discretion

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike witnesss testimony on direct examination when witness asserted fifth amendment on collateral matters on crossexamination particularly when witness was required to invoke privilege in presence of jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Griffin’s request because Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) does not apply to property subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1996) (motion for return of property may be defeated by demonstrating that the property is subject to forfeiture). Contrary to Griffin’s contentions, Griffin cannot bring his request under 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 704, or 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491 and 1495. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise its equitable jurisdiction because the forfeiture was part of Griffin’s conviction and sentence, and Griffin had adequate remedies at law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a)(1), (2); Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39-41, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 324

    ### Response:
    recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demonstrated a completed act, the jury necessarily found Harris attempted a robbery with a firearm. The State argues that in order to commit a robbery, one must first attempt to commit a robbery. We recognize the facial logic in the State’s argument. However, a comparison of the elements of an attempt to the elements of a completed robbery shows that by finding that Harris committed the robbery, the jury could not have found all of the actual elements of an attempted robbery. Elements of a robbery include that the defendant took property from the person or custody of the victim and that the property was of some value. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 15.1. An attempt is a category two lesser included offense of robbery. See id.; see also Wilson v. State, 635 So.2d 16, 17 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>). In contrast to robbery, one of the elements

    ### Response:
    recognizing that attempts are category two lesser included offenses and that the judge should not instruct on an attempt if the evidence only supports a completed offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court recognized, however, [that the fact] ‘[t]hat the agreement is required does not make it unenforceable, absent other factors.’ ... The trial court did not find oppression or surprise, and we agree. The stand-alone arbitration agreement was not hidden, but prominently featured as part of the employment application, and there are no ‘other indicia of procedural unconscionability.’ The adhesive nature of the agreement[, however,] is evidence of some degree of procedural un-conscionability,” citing Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 797, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (2012)). (5) Whether the Arbitration Agreement is Substantively Unconscionable The foregoing analysis indicates that the arbitration agreement was somewhat unconscionable procedurally. Cf. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1284 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the court can find that it is

    ### Response:
    holding that there was only minimal procedural unconscionability despite defendants overwhelming bargaining power its concession that the contract was nonnegotiable and its drafting of the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    provides the statutory basis for holding meetings of creditors in a bankruptcy case. Section 341(a) provides that following the commencement of a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, “the United States trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of creditors.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 341(a). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2003 governs the commencement and continuance of the meeting. Rule 2003(e) provides that “[t]he meeting may be adjourned from time to time by announcement at the meeting of the adjourned date and time without further written notice.” Fed. R. BANKR.P. 2003(e). The Debtors argue that the § 341(a) creditors’ meeting was deemed concluded thirty days after the September 23, 2005 meeting, triggering the thirty day deadline for the Trustee to file objections. The 992) (<HOLDING>); In re Friedlander, 284 B.R. 525, 527

    ### Response:
    holding that where the trustee fails to announce an adjourned date and time within thirty days of the date on which the meeting of creditors was last held the meeting will be deemed to have concluded on the last meeting date
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the June 30, 2003 order by holding Evans in contempt when the Fourteenth Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the validity of this order? (2) Is the June 30, 2003 order void? (3) Is the June 30, 2003 order improper because it is not supported by the evidence and because the trial court did not comply with the requirements of the Texas Mental Health Code? (4) Is the June 30, 2003 order improper bec applicable statutes, the trial court lacked authority to order them to provide outpatient mental health services to Campbell. We conclude that the record shows the Bexar County Parties have a direct interest in this issue that was decided by the trial court’s June 30, 2003 order in a way that binds them. See West Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 583-84 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. App. Dist.,

    ### Response:
    holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the state asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the APA did not apply to the United States Probation Service. The court held that the exclusion for the Probation Service was “warranted not by the functions it performs ... but-by its status as an auxiliary of the courts, which, unlike agencies of the executive branch, are specifically excluded” from the APA. Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C.Cir.1974). Accordingly, the court will dismiss the United. States Probation Office from this action. However, plaintiffs Complaint also specifically includes claims against not just the Probation Office but also the United States Fish & Wildlife Service. There is no question but that the Fish. & Wildlife Service is governed by the APA. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff will be granted a period to

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs had standing to bring apa claims against the fish and wildlife service
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the associational rights of defendants convicted of racketeering offenses. Section 3582(d) provides that a court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment upon a defendant convicted of a felony set forth in chapter 95 (racketeering) or 96, (racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations) of this title, . ■.. may include as a part of the sentence an order that requires that the defendant not associate or communicate with a specified person, other than his attorney, upon a showing of probable cause to believe that association or communication with such person is for the purpose of enabling the defendant to 'control, manage, direct, finance, or otherwise participate in an illegal enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d) (1994); cf. United States v. Sotelo, 94 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, Felipe was convietéd of participating

    ### Response:
    holding that while no federal statute authorizes a court to restrict the communications of an inmate convicted of mailing threatening communications 18 usc  3582d does authorize a district court to restrict the communications of an inmate convicted of racketeering offenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Henry Ryskamp appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s order dismissing his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review de novo, Gorospe v. Comm’r, 451 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir.2006), and we affirm. The Tax Court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Ryskamp was never issued a notice of deficiency or a notice of determination. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6213(a), 6330(d); see also Gorospe, 451 F.3d at 968 (the Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and its subject matter jurisdiction is defined by Title 26 of the United States Code); Abrams v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1356, 1356-57 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We deny Ryskamp’s motions filed on June

    ### Response:
    holding that a prefiling notification letter from the internal revenue service was not a notice of deficiency and therefore the tax court had no jurisdiction over the taxpayers petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the Microtek entities each carry on substantial business activity in that district. MLI is incorporated in California, has its principal place of business in California, and has admitted to engaging in the allegedly infringing activities in California. MIDSDI has contested jurisdiction in this district because it does not engage in infringing activities anywhere in the United States and because it has no place of business in Virginia and engages in only insignificant Virginia sales activity, but MIDSDI admits that its secondary place of business is in the transferee district. MEI has two retail stores in California where it admittedly sells Image-Deck units. Because Mil has not yet been properly served, it suffices to note that, although 72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>). However, the record here establishes that

    ### Response:
    holding that minimum contacts exist if the defendant has purposely directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). So it is with “harangue” and “oration” in this statute. The prohibitions surrounding “harangue” and “oration” demonstrate concern with disruptions of the Supreme Court’s order and decorum. These prohibitions include the use of “firearmfs],” “firework[s],” “explosive[s]” and “set[ting] fire to a combustible.” See 40 U.S.C. § 6134. After the “combustible” clause, the statute’s language shifts to “make a harangue or oration,” and “utter loud, threatening, or abusive language.” Id. These sundry prohibitions are not merely various noises — they all tend to disrupt the Court’s operations. That concern should illuminate the construction of “harangue” and “oration.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (<HOLDING>). By keeping this concern in mind, the use of

    ### Response:
    holding that a statutes words even when marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth rather than meticulous specificity are clear based on what the ordinance as a whole prohibits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be hazardous to the lives of more than one person and that a great risk of death was knowingly created. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 327 N.C. 599, 605-06, 398 S.E.2d 314, 317-18 (1990) (discussing use of a weapon, whereas the case at bar involves a device, i.e., a vehicle). As to whether defendant’s Jeep was hazardous to the lives of more than one person, “ [i]t is well settled in North Carolina that an automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a feckless or dangerous manner.” State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 164, 538 S.E.2d 917, 922 (2000). The conclusion is unavoidable that a vehicle driven at a high rate of speed by an intoxicated operator is normally hazardous to the lives of more than one person. See State v. McBride, 118 N.C. App. 316, 319-20, 454 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1995) (<HOLDING>). As to whether defendant knowingly created a

    ### Response:
    holding that a recklessly operated vehicle constituted a device which in its normal use is hazardous to the lives of more than one person and any reasonable person should know that an automobile operated by a legally intoxicated driver is reasonably likely to cause death to any and all persons who may find themselves in the automobiles path
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    664 N.E.2d 1240 (“Only upon completion of the PHC review may the physician proceed to the second step, which is to commence an action under [N.Y. Pub. Health Law § ] 2801-c to enjoin the hospital from improperly denying or terminating staff privileges.”). The primary jurisdiction rule, see supra note 12, requiring that a physician whose privileges have been denied or terminated file an initial complaint with the PHC is subject to several narrow exceptions. The first exception is that the physician does not have to file a complaint with the PHC in cases wherein the physician’s privileges have been terminated for reasons that do not pertain to medical care, and therefore do not invoke “the particular expertise of the PHC.” Tassy v. Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., 296 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The second exception to the § 2801-b primary

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff physician alleging race and national origin discrimination was not required to pursue his claims initially with the phc because the hospitals basis for revoking his privileges was sexual harassment allegations and not patient care deficiencies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procedural error at sentencing. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (<HOLDING>). The district court explained its sentence

    ### Response:
    holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the DOL and that she cashed the check for the whole amount. Therefore, the Court will grant Aftermarket’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of Mion’s waiver of her FMLA claims. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Aftermarket’s motion for summary judgment. An Order consistent with this opinion will be entered. 1 . The parties have not submitted the WH-58 Form at issue, and the Court has not been able to obtain one from the Department of Labor. However, the court in Cuevas v. Monroe Street City Club, Inc., 752 F.Supp. 1405 (N.D.Ill.1990) (mem.op.) quoted the DOL’s WH-58 form as reading, ""Your acceptance of back wages due under the Fair Labor Standards Act means that you have given up any right you may have to bring suit for such back wages.” Id. at 1414 (<HOLDING>). 2 . The final FMLA regulations, are not

    ### Response:
    holding under 29 usc  216c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    County is a “Person” Under the FCA The court considers two factors in determining whether the County is a “person” under the FCA: (1) the text of the statute; and (2) its legislative history. The statute renders liable “any person who” submits false claims to the federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The FCA does not define the term “person” as used in § 3729(a). However, the civil investigative demand provision of the act includes in its definition of person “any State or political subdivision of a State.” 31 U.S.C. § 3733(1)(4). In addition, courts have interpreted the statute to include states among the “person[s]” who may file qui tam actions under § 3730(b). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Woodard and State of

    ### Response:
    holding that in light of the legislative history of  3730b congress viewed the states as persons who could be qui tam plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fraud Act to policyholders across the country was impermissible because the Act, by its own terms, does not apply to consumer transactions involving nonresidents that occur outside Illinois. Moreover, in State Farm’s view, the certification of the nationwide class violated Illinois’ choice-of-law rules, as well as the full faith and credit clause, the due process clause, and the commerce clause of the federal constitution. A determination by this court that the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply, by its own terms, to the out-of-state transactions at issue in this case would render it unnecessary to address State Farm’s choice-of-law and constitutional arguments. Accordingly, we consider the scope of the Consumer Fraud Act first. See, e.g., Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 370 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Because the scope of the Act is a question of

    ### Response:
    holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the gate was necessary for the Hunts' use of their property. Because the Hunts had properly stated the inquiry as focusing on the Richardsons’ use of their property, we assume the trial court misstated the Richardsons’ names in this portion of its ruling. 7 . The Richardsons did not comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) by filing a separate statement of facts in opposition to the one filed by the Hunts in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment. Regardless, the Richardsons filed a response to the motion, citing testimony from the evidentiary hearing held on the application for TRO. The trial court was required to consider that evidence in deciding the merits of the Hunts’ motion. State ex rel. Corbin v. Sabel, 138 Ariz. 253, 256, 674 P.2d 316, 319 (App.1983) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Squaw Peak, this court applied the

    ### Response:
    holding that in ruling on summary judgment motion the court is required to consider portions of verified pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file which are brought to the courts attention by the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that casual driv rump any employee leave policies or “refusal to ride” practices that on occasion allow drivers to be skipped over for various secular reasons. First, skipping over Weber constitutes more than a de minimis expense because this unduly burdens his co-workers, with respect to compensation and “time-off’ concerns. As the district court found, skipping over Weber to avoid pairing with a female driver may adversely affect other drivers. For example, the run Weber passes up might lead his substitute to accept a shorter run than she might otherwise, which provides less compensation and is therefore less valuable. Weber’s substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. See Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The mere possibility of an adverse impact on

    ### Response:
    holding that hardship need not be quantifiable in economic terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future,” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845. Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) A guardian ad litem will be appointed for defendant Kevin L. King. (2) The Bureau of Prisons’ request to commit defendant King for an additional period of time (doc. no. 62) will be set for an additional hearing where the court will hear from defendant King’s guardian ad litem as to whether defendant King waives the statutory four-month limit under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). * The court draws no conclusion, however, as to the waivability of the constitutional reasonableness limit under the due process clause that § 4241(d) aims to protect. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Do-nofrio, 896 F.2d at 1303 (""The due process

    ### Response:
    holding that a criminal defendant committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable amount of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order. Petitioner is correct that we have limited jurisdiction over reinstatement of deportation orders. See Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir.2008). But we do not have a reinstatement of deportation order here. The government is enforcing the 1992 deportation order for the first time because Banuelos never left the country after the 1992 order was issued. The government concedes that it incorrectly filled out the 1-294 warning letter it gave Mr. Banuelos, making it appear that he was found “to have reentered the United States illegally.” The faulty form, however, does not change the legal status of Mr. Banuelos’s removal, it merely misstated the consequences attached to his removal. Cf. United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perez-Torres, 15 F.3d 403,

    ### Response:
    holding that warning letter that incorrectly stated penalty for reentry did not violate due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the mere creation of a security interest against a business partner’s interest in the business impacts a property interest owned by the business and the other owners that requires due process protections. See Bankhead v. Walker, 846 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (noting that procedural due process protections apply only to deprivations of life, liberty, or property). That is all that the original dissolution decree here did — it granted Christina a security interest against Jeffs ownership interests in the Crider Entities. We acknowledge and agree that the Crider Entities were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to any enforcement or foreclosure of Christina’s security interests. See Brant v. Krilich, 835 N.E.2d 582, 588 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Crider Entities did successfully

    ### Response:
    holding llcs were entitled to notice of proceedings supplemental instituted by a judgment creditor to attempt to obtain judgment debtors interests in the companies to pay judgment debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citing Carter; same); Stevens v. State, 823 So.2d 319, 321-22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[T]he trial court abused its discretion in finding that the greater weight of the evidence supported findings that Stevens willfully and substantially violated her probation.”); Mier v. State, 58 So.3d 319, 321-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citing Carter; holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding willful and substantial violation); Kaduk v. State, 959 So.2d 817, 818-20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Carter; same); Grizzard v. State, 881 So.2d 673, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (quoting Carter’s statement that appellate court must determine whether trial court’s finding of willful and substantial violation was arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable); Lane v. State, 761 So.2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    None of the FDA letters advised Thomas of his right to appeal an adverse decision to the agency head. Moreover, the FDA did not respond to Thomas’ appeal of his constructive denial as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). On April 15, 2008, when the Clerk of Court received Thomas’ complaint, Thomas was entitled to the benefit of constructive exhaustion under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C). The FDA’s letter demanding pre-payment of the search fees came too late; Thomas had already submitted his complaint for filing. And, in any case, the FDA’s letter dated April 16, 2006 still did not satisfy the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) and (ii), and would have failed to revive the exhaustion requirement even if Thomas had received it before filing suit. Cf. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 64 (<HOLDING>). On these facts, Thomas is entitled to

    ### Response:
    holding that if an agency responds even if late before the plaintiff files suit the administrative exhaustion requirement is revived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaint, filed after the two-year statute of limitations for the claims which it contained.” Id. Thus, even though Williams’ § 1983 claim arises from the same incident as her tort claims, and even though her original complaint was filed within two years of that incident, her § 1983 was time-barred because the tort claims were not timely filed. Williams argues, however, that the defendants waived their limitations defense to all her claims by not asserting it in their answer to the second amended complaint or at any other time during the next twenty months. This argument of course is frivolous with respect to her § 1983 claim insofar as the defendants moved to dismiss that claim as soon as Williams amended her complaint to add it. See Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). That leaves only Williams’ contention that

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to plead affirmative defense to original complaint does not amount to waiver where defense is raised in response to amended complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claim fails because he has not generated a genuine issue of material fact that BVU perceived him as haying an impairment that significantly restricted his ability to perform any major life activities. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 524, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (concluding summary judgment is proper where ADA plaintiff fails to show that he is “regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs”). Therefore, the court concludes that BVU is entitled to summary judgment on Dose’s - claim that he was discriminated against because he was regarded as being disabled. D. Nondiscriminatory Reason For Dose’s Discharging Even if the court were to assume, arguendo, that Dose has made out a prima facie case, summary judgment is appropriate here becaus Postal Workers Union Nat’l, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); cf. Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 216 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that employer was entitled to discharge employee after he threatened life of his supervisor even if such misconduct was caused by employees disability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discussion supra Part III.B.l, pp. 12770-72. In those circumstances, state contract law, not the federal regulations, would govern the resolution of contract-related questions, such as whether a contract was formed, what terms the parties agreed to, and whether the contract was breached. See, e.g., Fair, 148 F.Supp.2d at 626 (“While federal regulations authorize the existence of payphone compensation contracts, whether the specific agreements at issue in the present case are illegal will be determined by state law.”). As in the context of ratemaking, where private contracts have replaced rigid rate prescriptions, state contract laws provide a background that is not only consistent with, but is integral to, the market-based mechanism of the federal regulations. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1146(<HOLDING>). The state law claim is even stronger when the

    ### Response:
    holding that state consumer protection laws do not conflict with 47 usc  201 and 202
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in markets that were much more heavily populated. Given that the event and attendance range in the 2005 Report was based on objectively verifiable demographic data, a fact-finder could conclude with reasonable certainty that the Event Center would be unable to generate much more than about 105 events and 320,000 attendees in a given year. See Convergent, 948 F.2d at 516 (emphasis added). This is especially the case given the data from the more conservative 2001 Feasibility Study. Nonetheless, despite the fact that several of the Defendants specifically commissioned these studies, or were intimately aware of their contents, the Official Statements, perhaps unreasonably, projected a substantially higher annual number of events (133) and attendees (480,000). See Kaplan, 49 F.3d at 1375 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, as with the executive in

    ### Response:
    holding that a future projection is misleading when a speaker makes that projection with knowledge that it is unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in detail in Part III.A, neither the Original nor the First Amended Complaints stated a claim for compensation discrimination. Therefore the statute of limitation was not tolled for that claim as it would have been for the promotion discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims properly raised. IV Plaintiffs have also challenged the district court’s order decertifying the compensation discrimination class. To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the district court’s decision to decertify the post-2000 compensation discrimination class, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the named Plaintiffs concede that they do not have standing with regard to the post-2000 claim. See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the

    ### Response:
    holding that named plaintiff who did not have a viable claim against defendant could not serve as a class representative and vacating class certification accordingly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 1330. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kimbrough, standing alone, did not provide the court with authority to reduce Lawson’s sentence. See Moreno, 421 F.3d at 1220-21. Although Lawson argues that the court incorrectly found that he qualified as a career offender, and that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, both of these issues lay outside the limited scope of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, and the court lacked authority to address these arguments. See Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781-82. AFFIRMED. 1 . Moreover, we note that Lawson did not raise the issue of whether he was incorrectly sentenced as a career offender until he filed his reply brief. Accordingly, even if this argument were meritorious, we would not address it. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.2008)

    ### Response:
    holding that we do not address an argument raised for the first time in a litigants reply brief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of hashes for use in its hash-based filtering system was integral to the success of MagnetMix because, without the identifying hashes, Lime Wire’s customers could simply use its P2P software application to illegally download copyrighted content from other users for free, instead of purchasing such content legally through MagnetMix. In light of this commercial rationale for procuring hashes, counter-defendants’ mandatory licensing regime effectively raised the costs for Lime Wire and other retail distributors whose business models relied on hash-based filtering technology, thereby reducing the ability of such distributors to compete effectively with other intrabrand retailers selling counter-defendants’ music. See Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, 219 F.3d 92, 98, 101-02 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Although “the primary purpose of the

    ### Response:
    holding that coordinated efforts  to impose costs upon plaintiff as a way of stifling competition states claim under sherman act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violating the ADA, any more than an employer’s refusal in the past to construct a women’s restroom would justify a refusal to hire female employees. The ADA allows an employer to adjust the workplace environment on a case-by-case basis, adopting only those changes that are reasonably necessary to refrain from discriminating against the disabled individual or individuals in question. The ADA hardly broke new ground when it incorporated this type of affirmative duty. The Equal Protection Clause often requires states to take affirmative measures to eliminate or prevent discriminatory systems. For example, states with racially discriminatory reapportionment plans must redraw their congressional districts. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The logic of the University’s argument here

    ### Response:
    holding that the states reapportionment plan might violate the equal protection clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acting Chief Judge. Tony Fisher appeals from his judgment and sentence for possession of cocaine. We find merit only in his argument that the trial court erred in failing to pronounce conditions of probation eight and twenty, which require him to pay for drug testing, because they are special conditions. See Smith v. State, 702 So.2d 1305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). The issue of whether these conditions are

    ### Response:
    holding that the requirement that a defendant pay for drug testing is a special condition of probation which must be pronounced at sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct. We hold that it does not. Id. at 600,121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court also noted that Congress “has authorized the award of attorney’s fees to the ‘prevailing party’ in numerous statutes in addition to those at issue, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat. 402, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C § 1988,” and stated that “we have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently .... ” Id. at 602-603, n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 1835. This statement echoed the Court’s previous statement in a case a 67 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). That being said, the First Circuit has not

    ### Response:
    holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc  1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    324.30101(r) (“ ‘[rJiparían owner’ means a person who has riparian rights”) (emphasis added); MCL 324.30101(s) (“ ‘[r]iparian rights’ means those rights which are associated with the ownership of the bank or shore of inland lake or stream”). The use of “has” indicates that MCL 324.30101(r) refers to landowners who already possess riparian rights—it does not extend riparian rights to new groups of property holders. In addition, the statute nowhere mentions that it abrogates the common law, nor does it evince intent to do so. See Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 22 n 57; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (“The Legislature is presumed to know the common law, and any abrogation of the common law must be explicit.”). See also Stidham v Algonquin Lake Community Ass’n, 133 Mich App 94, 98; 348 NW2d 46 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant

    ### Response:
    holding that tjhe existence of the inland lakes and streams act subsequently recodified as part 301 of nrepa does not preclude plaintiffs commonlaw remedies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ient facts that, if proven true, would entitle him to prospective injunctive relief in the trial court. We therefore overrule McCraw’s first issue. 3. Characterization of the SORP as a Criminal Statute In his third issue, McCraw argues that “[a] declaratory judgment is not available to determine the status, rights or other legal relationships arising under a penal statute.” Civil courts generally do not “have jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of, or issue a declaratory judgment determining the constitutionality of, [penal statutes].” State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1994). However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly found that Texas’s sex offender registration laws are “civil and remedial, and not criminal or punitive.” Rodriguez, 93 S.W.3d at 68, 77-79 (<HOLDING>), This finding regarding the nature of sex

    ### Response:
    holding that the texas legislatures intent in enacting the sorp was civil and thatthe 1997 amendments were not so punitive in purpose or effectas to transform whatwas clearly intended as a civil regulation into a criminal penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The relevant standard for purposes of Rule 26(c) is whether “ ‘good cause’ exists to protect th[e] information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality.” Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.2002). This “good cause” standard presents a lower burden for the party wishing to seal documents than the “compelling reasons” standard. The cognizable public interest in judicial records which underlies the “compelling reasons” standard does not exist for documents produced between private litigants. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1134 (“When discovery material is filed with the court ... its status changes.”); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (<HOLDING>). The “good cause” standard is not limited to

    ### Response:
    holding that different interests are at stake with the right of access than with rule 26c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    need to resolve a significant federal constitutional question” — both of which are essential Pullman prerequisites. Batterman v. Leahy, 544 F.3d 370, 373 (1st Cir.2008) (emphasis added). “Rather,” as the court later explained, it “assumed that, like many similarly situated plaintiffs, At-water had chosen to proceed first in [state court] because he thought he had a greater likelihood of success there.” And the reason behind the court’s “order of closure for statistical purposes” — which is what the court called it — practically leaps off the printed page of that document: “to avoid the necessity of counsel to appear at periodic status conferences, or file status reports .... ” Certainly this is not the stuff of a Pullman abstention. See generally Duty Free Shop, Inc., 889 F.2d at 1183 (<HOLDING>). If that were not enough to sink Atwa-ter’s

    ### Response:
    holding that england and its reservations are not relevant  where the purpose of the abstention is not clarification of state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    observed). Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Comm’rs, 794 So.2d 1270 (Fla.2001). DHSMV argues that the circuit judge should have issued an order to show cause and given it an opportunity to respond. Although Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(h) states that “[i]f the petition demonstrates a preliminary basis for relief ... the court may issue an order directing the respondent to show cause,” the second district recently held that “the court must issue an order to show cause as to why relief should .not be granted.” Evergreen Tree Treasurers of Charlotte County, Inc. v. Charlotte County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 810 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (emphasis added); see also Rightler v. Pompano Beach Police and Fireman’s Pension Fund, 467 So.2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). Although the circuit court noted no response

    ### Response:
    holding that circuit court violated the essential requirements of the law in not issuing an order to show cause after receiving a facially sufficient petition for writ of certiorari
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    who fails to comply with a levy, without reasonable cause, when required -to do so shall be liable to the government for a penalty in the amount of fifty percent of the amount recovered. Treas.Reg. § 301.6332-1(b)(2) finds reasonable cause where there is a bona fide dispute concerning the amount of property to be surrendered pursuant to the levy or the legal effectiveness of the levy. Although the regulation is unclear as to whether priority issues raise such bona fide disputes, cases interpreting the statute have found reasonable cause when a defendant has brought a wrongful levy action prior to remittance or where there was a dispute over the applicability of the defenses to a § 6332 claim. See supra p. 460-61. See United States v. Donahue Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Texas Commerce Bank-Fort Worth, N.A. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that bona fide dispute over whether bank actually  possessed property belonging to taxpayer is reasonable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its contract permit for the purpose to serve Robinson as a contract carrier. C.H. Robinson at 4. If-there was confusion at Best regarding whether or not Best was operating under a contract or common carrier authority, Best should have applied to the ICC for a determination of its status under 49 U.S.C. § 10925(e) at the time the contract was entered into or executed. The Trustee has focused at length on the shipper’s/broker’s failure to comply with the law of contract carriers and the Supreme Court’s finding in Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc. that when a carrier fails to file the rates it negotiated in a common carrier case, it is no excuse for a shipper to plead ignorance of this fact in an undercharge proceeding. 497 U.S. 116, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 111 L.Ed.2d 94 (1990) (<HOLDING>). This Court cannot accept the Trustee’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a defense to an undercharge claim in a negotiated rates case that is based upon the finding that the undercharge claim is an unreasonable practice is not valid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    breach of the rule established in Edwards is [ ] a technical violation of Miranda, not a Fifth Amendment violation.”). Accordingly, even if we were to accept Howard’s argument that his statement to Polk, including his request to speak to the FBI, was obtained in violation of Edwards, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine would not bar-admission of Howard’s confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitch-ins. Only if Howard could show that his statement to Polk was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and that insufficient time had passed to dissipate the taint, might the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine bar admission of Howard’s subsequent confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitch-ins. Cf. Correll, 63 F.3d at 1290 (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o

    ### Response:
    holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    chapter 815 as a criminal proceeding from commencement by filing a complaint “to final judgment on behalf of the state.” Iowa Code § 801.4(13). We must determine, then, whether the postacquittal proceedings that are the subject of this appeal occurred prior to “final judgment on behalf of the state.” Id. The legislature chose to make the process for obtaining reimbursement for the costs of legal assistance part of the criminal case. The State is not required to initiate a separate suit against a person acquitted of criminal charges to recover these costs. Rather, “all costs and fees incurred for legal assistance” automatically become “due and payable to the clerk of the district court by the person receiving the legal assistance ... within thirty days of the acquittal or 402 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Our interpretation of the governing statutes

    ### Response:
    holding because washington statute provided for acquitted defendants recovery of attorney fees by motion in criminal action rather than in independent civil action postacquittal attorney fees and costs were incurred in defense of criminal action and therefore subject to reimbursement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agreements themselves bear witness to this concern by obligating JWP promptly to transmit to the AUSA plaintiffs copies of JWP’s unaudited quarterly and audited annual financial statements, its SEC filings, all audit reports submitted to JWP by its independent accountant and, on an annual basis, no-default certificates from its independent accountant. See, e.g., Ex. 9, at ¶ 5A, attached to Perschetz Aff. Thus, allegations of accounting fraud like those contained in the class action complaints disclosed in JWP’s Form 10-Q, coupled with the announcement that JWP’s CFO had been relieved of his duties, should have greatly concerned the AUSA plaintiffs, who are extremely sophisticated investors. See Lenz v. Associated Inns & Restaurants Co. of America, 833 F.Supp. 362, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that the information

    ### Response:
    holding that sophistication of investor is relevant factor in determining when plaintiff placed on inquiry notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because the evidence relating to the application of recreational use immunity conflicts on material points, the facts must be determined by the fact finder, and summary judgment is precluded. III. A landowner’s recreational use immunity does not depend on the plaintiff’s activity at the time of injury ¶40 As a final note, there is some suggestion that the application of recreational use immunity turns on whether Camicia was cycling home from work or merely for pleasure when she was injured. We reject this view as insufficiently protective of landowners who open their land for recreational purposes. Where the land at issue is shown to be recreational, immunity does not depend on whether the plaintiff was actually engaged in recreation at the time of injury. See Gaeta, 54 Wn. App. at 609 (<HOLDING>); Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that whether the public invitee may have some commercial purpose in mind was irrelevant to recreational immunity instead by opening up the lands for recreational use without a fee the landowner brought itself under the protection of the immunity statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted)). 24 .See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137-38, 147-48, 129 S.Ct. 695 (concluding that where law enforcement violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights due to a ""bookkeeping error by another police employee” the exclusionary rule did not apply because suppression would not serve the end of deterring wrongful police conduct as the ""error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest”). 25 . See Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2428-2429 (finding application of the exclusionary rule inappropriate and the good faith exception applicable where the law enforcement officers relied on binding judicial precedent that seemingly sanctioned their actions and they acted in objectively reasonable reliance on this precedent). 26 . 460 U.S. 276, 281, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 27 . 468 U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82

    ### Response:
    holding that traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement from one place to another
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    describe a Fourth Amendment “seizure” because they tell us that the plaintiffs, in fact, did not submit to whatever restriction on their freedom Deputy Krieger attempted to impose. Id. (“A seizure occurs only when a person submits to the show of lawful authority... ,”). Nor do the plaintiffs’ other allegations state a claim under the Fourth Amendment. Ms. Christensen complained of being watched by Deputy Krieger as she went about her duties as an employee of a local gas station. At these moments, however, she did not enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy. In her job at the gas station, she appeared in plain view of the public, and Deputy Krieger had no particular vantage point unavailable to the public generally. See United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, where Ms. Christensen’s job exposed her

    ### Response:
    holding that a hospital employee caught on video in the mailroom of the hospital enjoyed no legitimate expectation of privacy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    days had passed, that his symptoms were associated with the pain that he had experienced for the first time while he was working on April 27, 2011. In sum, the board’s findings about the work incident and the sensations that claimant experienced appear to be inconsistent with the board’s ultimate finding that claimant did not know, when he experienced the pull in his testicle, that he had been injured. That ultimate finding is the predicate for the board’s legal conclusion that claimant had good cause for not notifying employer of the injury within 90 days. Because the board’s order includes inconsistent factual findings and does not include a rational explanation of how those findings logically lead to its conclusion, the order lacks substantial reason. See Hamilton, 266 Or App at 682 (<HOLDING>); Christman v. SAIF, 181 Or App 191, 197-98, 45

    ### Response:
    holding that the order was not based on substantial reason when the board failed to show how the facts that it identifies connect to its conclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the revivor of an action is a statute of limitation, rather than a statute relating to pleading, practice, or procedure”). Moreover, the revival statute “has always been strictly construed.” Daniel, 445 S.W.2d at 701. “[T]he period set forth in the statute is mandatory and not subject to enlargement.” Hammons, 887 S.W.2d at 338. However, this alone does not felly answer whether the stay provision of the Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association Act can have any effect on the revival limitation period, which is an issue of first impression in Kentucky. This Court’s review of foreign cases applying analogous provisions has revealed only two states to have addressed the issue, and there is a split of opinion between them. Compare White v. Haydel, 593 So.2d 421, 422 (La.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>), with Skrbic v. QCRC Assoc. Corp., 761 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that insurance guarantee association stay statute did not suspend limitation period because action was not pending when stay was entered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the proposition that “failure to establish ownership in the person or entity alleged as owner results in a failure of proof.” Dissent, at 112. However, both Freeman and Hudson were decided before the Court of Criminal Appeals rendered its decisions in Malik and Gollihar. Prior to these cases, the State was bound by the allegations in the charging instrument, regardless of the materiality of the allegations. See Freeman, 707 S.W.2d at 603 (“Of course, if the State alleges that such person is the ‘owner,’ it then has the burden of proof to establish that fact beyond a reasonable doubt, and a failure to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt will result in an acquittal being entered on behalf of the defendant.”); see also Commons v. State, 575 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). The “rule” enunciated in each of these cases

    ### Response:
    holding that although state was not required by statute to allege the owner of property in prosecution for changing price tags on merchandise when state chose to make a descriptive averment of that person it was obligated to prove the allegation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 207 Mont. 409, 673 P.2d 1277, 1280-81 (1984) (giving a criminal conviction preclusive effect against a third party because the third party’s rights derived from the convicted insured’s insurance and because of an identity of interest at the time of the criminal trial); New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Brower, 161 N.J.Super. 293, 391 A.2d 923, 926 (App.Div.1978) (finding privity in part because the victim “stood in the shoes” of the insured for the purposes of recovering proceeds); In the Matter of Nassau Ins. Co., 78 N.Y.2d 888, 573 N.Y.S.2d 447, 577 N.E.2d 1039, 1040 (1991) (following D’Arata’s holding that criminal convictions bar third parties from claiming insurance proceeds); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reuter, 299 Or. 155, 700 P.2d 236, 241 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Decisions to the contrary are both less

    ### Response:
    holding that the victim of a sexual assault was in privity with her assailant because of her status as a claimant and potential judgment creditor of the convicted insured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    approved in Derrickson v. State, supra, there is nothing in the decision which indicates the demise of such requirements. Logic would seem to indicate that the five Derrickson foundational requirements of admissibility remain viable after Delaware’s adoption of its Uniform Rules of Evidence. This is so since such evidence can be most prejudicial unless safeguards are maintained. The scholarly opinion by Judge MacKinnon in United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C.Cir.1973) highlights the need for a showing of substantial relevance before such evidence may be admitted: The threshold requirement of admissibility of such hearsay statements of fear of defendant in homicide cases is some substantial degree of relevance to a material issue in the case. While there are o.2d 811 (1983) (<HOLDING>). A case which, in my view, correctly reflects

    ### Response:
    holding inadmissible testimony dealing with the deceased victims fear of defendant where defendant claimed the victim had been accidently shot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to support its finding at a bench trial that the State’s prosecution was not time-barred. Decided October 14, 2015 Reconsideration deni E2d 79) (2005) (noting that because amendment of the accusation did not constitute the commencement of a new prosecution, the previous arraignment of defendant was sufficient). 13 See Vanorsdall, 241 Ga. App. at 875 (2) (a). 14 State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga. App. 481, 483 (2) (243 SE2d 675) (1978), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Outen, 289 Ga. 579, 581 (714 SE2d 581) (2011). 15 Tuzman, 145 Ga. App. at 483 (2). 16 Lee, 289 Ga. at 97 (punctuation omitted). 17 278 Ga. 598 (604 SE2d 789) (2004). 18 Id. at 604 (1) (footnote omitted). 19 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 20 Jenkins, 278 Ga. at 604 (1). 21 Id. (footnote omitted). 22 See id. (<HOLDING>). 23 See id. 24 Cf. Schaff v. State, 275 Ga.

    ### Response:
    holding that if the state prevails on this issue before trial the defendant may still require the state to prove at trial that the charge is not barred by the statute of limitations emphasis supplied
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744; see also Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub, 624 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir.2010) (referring to and applying the “two prong” test outlined in Lugar). “Conduct that is formally ‘private’ may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character that it can be regarded as governmental action.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 847, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982) (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hollander, 624 F.3d at 34 (<HOLDING>). A private entity, however, does not become a

    ### Response:
    recognizing ac tions of nominally private entities are attributable to the state under certain circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the IRS, but argues against application of the statute of limitations. See Appellee’s Sur-re-ply at 3. First, Pransky asserts that the IRS brought the issue of its 1987 assessment before the Bankruptcy Court when it filed its proof of claim, thus the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised its jurisdiction. See Appellee’s Br. at 28. The debtor further argues that even if his complaint was technically barred by the statute of limitations, the Bankruptcy Court could properly evaluate the legalit 84 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835

    ### Response:
    holding that although 11 usc  505a2b does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the irs before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim but the debtors assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the internal revenue code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    European Community opinion that separation of powers remains a legitimate basis for invoking the rule. See European Cmty. I, 150 F.Supp.2d at 477 (“abstention under the revenue rule is never warranted in the absence of genuine separation of powers concerns.”); see also European Cmty. II, 186 F.Supp.2d at 235 (“the concerns underlying the current version of the revenue rule are satisfied where the proper coordinate branch adequately confers its blessings on jurisdiction.”). Ecuador further criticizes the revenue rule as incongruous with the act of state doctrine. This Court does not find such incongruity. The act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts from questioning the acts of a foreign sovereign within its own territory. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 423-24, 84 S.Ct. 923 (<HOLDING>). The doctrine traditionally applies when the

    ### Response:
    holding that us court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate a contract dispute regarding the cuban governments expropriation of defendants sugar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see RCW 10.93.070(2) (authorizing a Washington peace officer to enforce traffic or criminal laws across jurisdictions “[i]n response to an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property”). 2 We have previously said an appellate court must approach claims of constitutional error asserted for the first time on appeal by first “satisfy[ing] itself that the error is truly of constitutional magnitude — that is what is meant by ‘manifest’.” State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 688, 757 P.2d 492 (1998). “If the claim is constitutional, then the court should examine the effect the error had on the defendant’s trial according to the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California."" Id.; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967) (<HOLDING>). 3 70 Wn. App. 573. 4 159 Wn.2d 918. Kirkman

    ### Response:
    holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    expensive and 'Underper-forming investment options: at the time the Plan selected the JP Morgan target date funds, JP Morgan Chase Bank was trustee of the Plan, JP Morgan Retirement Plan Services was record-keeper for the Plan, and the 2013-2014 financial disclosures state that “[c]ertain plain investments are managed or significantly influenced by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A.” Id. ¶51 (emphasis in original). Terraza further alleges that this “relationship and influence inappropriately affected and compromised the Plan’s investment op tions.” Id. ¶ 52. When viewed collectively, the Court can reasonably infer from, these allegations that the Defendants engaged in a flawed decision-making process by selecting and retaining the challenged investment options. See Braden, 588 F.3d at 596-98 (<HOLDING>). The Court also notes that, at least with

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where he alleged that the plan offered funds that charged higher fees than available alternatives that underperformed during the relevant time period and that were included in the plan because of improper influence by the plans trustee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a bankruptcy petition simply to forestall and delay a state court action, with no intention to effectuate a legitimate reorganization, constitutes an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code”); Cinema Service Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584, 585-86 (3d Cir.1985) (upholding imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 on party which “did not file its [Chapter 11 bankruptcy] petition for the purpose of reorganization but solely for delay”); In re Trina Assocs., 128 B.R. 858, 872 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1991) (pointing out that “it is recognized that seeking the protection of the automatic stay to derail a foreclosure is only appropriate when the Debtor intends to and has the wherewithal to reorganize”); In re 2218 Bluebird Ltd. Partnership, 41 B.R. 540, 546 (Bankr. S.D.Cal.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Powers, 135 B.R. 980, 993

    ### Response:
    holding that filing of chapter 11 proceeding solely to invoke the protec tion of the automatic stay without an intent to reorganize amounted to abuse of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the incidents are too different in kind, and too remote in time, from the offense to which he pled guilty. The Sentencing Guidelines do not place an explicit time limit on the previous activities that a court may consider in finding a “pattern of activity,” and there appears to be no case support for the proposition that previous events can be too remote in time to amount to a pattern. While this court has not addressed the “remote in time” question in a prece-dential opinion, other courts have addressed this issue. See United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir.2002) (“Nothing in § 2G2.2(b)(4) or its current commentary requires a temporal nexus between any instances of sexual abuse or exploitation.”); United States v. Woodward, 277 F.3d 87, 90-92 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lovaas, 241 F.3d 900, 903-04

    ### Response:
    holding that incidents of sexual abuse that occurred from 19741978 could establish a pattern of activity for purposes of sentencing in 2001
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This contact is not enough to preserve his parental rights. J.M.M. has been in placement for over twenty-seven months. Given Father’s failure to perform parental duties and given that he has been unable to remain out of jail for any period of time, we agree with the trial court in terminating his parental rights. The termination was supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. ¶ 14 Father’s third and fifth allegations assert that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights when he did not have assistance of counsel. How ever, after reviewing Father’s brief, we find that he has not made a colorable argument on appeal. Therefore, we find that this argument is waived, and we will not address this issue. Cf. Commonwealth v. Irby, 700 A.2d 463, 464 (Pa.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15 In conclusion, we find that the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. “Absent objection, ... [a] district court ha[s] a right to assume that [the affected party] agree[s] to the magistrate’s recommendation.” Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 571, 88 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985). Additionally, “failure to raise objections to the R & R waives that party’s right to review in the district court and those claims not preserved by such objections are precluded upon appeal.” Davet v. Macearme, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992); see also Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-51 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27

    ### Response:
    holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in a magistrates recommendation as well as the magistrates failure to make additional findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Partnership presumably relies on business. organizations code section 8.102(a)(2), which provides in pertinent part that an enterprise may indemnify a governing person or delegate against expenses “that are reasonable and actually incurred by the person in connection with a proceeding.” Id. § 8.102(a)(2) (emphasis added). The business organizations code does not define “actually incur” or “incur,” nor do any of the parties point us to any caselaw definitions that would guide our analysis. We have not located any cases analyzing “actually incurred” as used in section 8.102(a)(2), but we note that the supreme court has addressed a provision in chapter 74 of the civil practice and remedies code that contains similar language. See Garcia v. Gomez,.319 S.W.3d 638, 642-43-(Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>); Aviles v. Aguirre, 292 S.W.3d 648, 649

    ### Response:
    holding some evidence existed that physician incurred fees because services had been performed on the physicians behalf
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the sale, K & V had a duty to disclose to Brown in writing “in no smaller than 10 point type [that] ‘This vehicle’s title contains the designation “salvage” or “rebuilt”.’ ” Id.; see also Trailmobile, Inc. v. Cook, 540 So.2d 683 (Ala. 1988) (indicating that the Act established a standard of conduct for persons or corporations who come within its terms and created a duty for such persons or corporations to comply with the Act; such obligation is written into contracts by operation of the Act). The fact that Brown signed a number of documents indicating that she was purchasing the vehicle “as is” did not relieve K & V of its obligation to disclose to her that the vehicle was a salvage vehicle in accordance with § 32-8-87(p). See Danley v. Murphy, 658 So.2d 483 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). We note that Danley v. Murphy, supra, was

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in certain circumstances a fraud claim is not necessarily precluded by an as is purchase contract for the sale of a used automobile that had a salvage title
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without an administrative hearing, § 1553’s pre-deprivation procedures, coupled with its provision for judicial review, provide BCI with sufficient protection against the risk of erroneous deprivation. The opportunity to participate in the investigation of the DOE’s OIG and submit a written rebuttal is no substitute for the opportunity to test adverse evidence and cross examine witnesses during a hearing. “[T]he primary function of the investigator is not to make credibility determinations, but rather to determine simply whether reasonable cause exists to believe that the employee has been discharged for engaging in protected conduct.” Brock, 481 U.S. at 266, 107 S.Ct. 1740. Additionally, a written rebuttal does not permit the fact-finder to assess the credibility of a witness. See id. (<HOLDING>). Nor does this court’s review provide

    ### Response:
    holding the opportunity to cross examine witnesses predeprivation is unnecessary where the statute provided for a postdeprivation hearing appropriately reserving fjinal assessments of the credibility of supporting witnesses  to the administrative law judge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supplied). This significant textual change does not suggest that courts should interpret OPA’s claims provision as having the same scope as CERCLA’s. On the contrary, the change in the text, combined-with evidence that Congress was aware of CERC-LA when it enacted OPA, suggests that Congress intended the change in OPA’s language to have substantive consequences and purposely rejected the CERCLA approach limiting the presentation requirement to those claims asserted against the Fund. See Brown, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 556; NRA, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 541-42. Appellants’ invocation of the doctrine of reading statutes in pari materia is misplaced. While it is true that similar statutes should be read consistently, see, e.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 26 F.2d 1096, 1097 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Second, the doctrine of reading statutes in

    ### Response:
    holding that clean water acts notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule 2016(a) requires an attorney seeking compensation to file an application “setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested.” Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016(a). Mr. Desselle argues that he only has to prove to this Court that the services provided were reasonable and necessary pursuant to section 330(a). However, a fee application which sets forth with specificity the exact nature of the services rendered, the time expended, and the expenses incurred is a prerequisite to this Court making a determination that the services were reasonable and necessary. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Charles N. Wooten, Ltd. (Matter of Evangeline Refining Co.), 890 F.2d 1312, 1326-27 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Muslin v. Golden Triangle Film Labs, Inc. (In

    ### Response:
    holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    true here. Our decision in United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.2001), does not require a different result. Murillo did not involve expert testimony about the struc ture of drug trafficking organizations. Rather, Murillo involved “unknowing drug courier” modus operandi testimony — expert testimony that drug traffickers do not routinely entrust large quantities of drugs to people who are unaware that they are transporting them. Id. at 1176. In that case, we held that “unknowing drug courier” testimony was admissible in a drug possession case involving over one million dollars worth of methamphetamine and cocaine to attack the defendant’s defense that he was “simply an unknowing courier.” See id. at 1176-77; see also United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230

    ### Response:
    holding that unknowing drug courier testimony was admissible in a complex drug importation case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States Constitution requires that orders from sister states be valid before another state’s court may afford them full faith and credit, especially such orders which violate due process for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of his contention, he alleges improper service in the Florida action to reduce his support obligation to a judgment. In this case, the trial judge found, based upon Bess’s Rule 60, SCRCP, motion, that Bess should be afforded an opportu nity to be heard on his objections to registration of the Florida order even though he did not file a response within the twenty-day time period. Because there was no appeal from that order, it is the law of the case. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Eagle Lake & Golf Condominiums, 310 S.C. 473, 475, 427 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1993) (<HOLDING>). At the hearings held following issuance of

    ### Response:
    holding a trial judges unappealed procedural rulings become the law of the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In our estimation, the cited cases have no bearing on our decision today. There is a separate and independent basis upon which we can be assured that we do have appellate jurisdiction with respect to the Bissonnette ruling of May 16, 2000. That second and independent basis is the fact that, on February 1, 2006 (the same date that the trial justice signed the “Final Judgment”), a separate order was signed by the trial justice. That order explicitly indicates that, in view of the law of the case doctrine, the trial justice considered himself to be bound by the Bisson-nette ruling y among American appellate courts as to the pragmatic approach to be taken with respect to the adequacy of a notice of appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248, 112 S.Ct. 678, 116 L.Ed.2d 678 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 67 n.

    ### Response:
    holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the bankruptcy court’s orders surcharging Law’s homestead exemption and imposing discovery sanctions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and for clear error its factual findings. Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir.2004). We review for an abuse of discretion the imposition of discovery sanctions. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1156 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm. The BAP properly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order granting the trustee’s surcharge motion because the surcharge was calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by the debtor’s misconduct, and was warranted to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process. See Latman, 366 F.3d at 786 (<HOLDING>); see also Onubah v. Zamora (In re Onubah), 375

    ### Response:
    recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtors exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the conduct for which Sassano is being sued could not have been taken in his capacity as a nominal officer of Wealth Management. The court disagrees. As explained above, Sassano did not hold his title with Wealth Management. He held his title with CIBC, which is a registered broker-dealer. CIBC's argument fails for that reason alone. 96 . 888 A.2d 204, 215 (Del.2005). 97 . See Pl.’s Tr. Ex. 8; Manual at 26. 98 . Def.’s Tr. Ex. 1. 99 . Sassano was wholly successful in this litigation, and is therefore entitled to all reasonable fees he incurred in bringing it. See Bylaws, Article IX (stating World Markets will indemnify Sassano “to the full extent permitted by the laws of the State of Delaware ... ”); see also Fasciana v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 178, 184 (Del.Ch.2003)

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff awarded advancement after litigation should only be entitled to an indemnification of those expenses reasonably proportionate to the level of success he achieved in the litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 502(b)(7) limited Beck’s claim arising from Johnson’s alleged breach of his personal guaranty. The court held that § 502(b)(7) did not apply “because the terminated employment relationship did not run between Johnson and Beck, and Johnson hence was not directly entitled to the protection of the statute.” Id. at 470. In reaching its conclusion, the court examined the nature of personal guaranties, and concluded that, as guarantor, Johnson would be hable for the full amount due under the contract notwithstanding any limitation on its allow-ability in the corporation’s case. See id. at 470-71. The court therefore held that § 502(b)(7) does not limit the claim of an employee against the guarantor of an employment contract. See also In re Danrik, Ltd., 92 B.R. 964, 972 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>); Kopolow v. P.M. Holding Corp. (In re Modern

    ### Response:
    holding that comparable provision  502b6 does not literally apply to limit claims of landlord against guarantordebt or and that equities weigh against limiting claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is substantial ground for difference of opinion and is unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ arguments to revise this conclusion. Plaintiffs’ case for reconsideration relies primarily on the contention that the question is not controlling because “First National Bank of Nevada ([ ]FNBN[ ]) originated loans in both of the trusts at issue herein, thereby creating a common set of ‘concerns’ which conferred standing on Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 to sue on both trusts.” Pis.’ Mot. at 2. This argument, nowhere found in plaintiffs’ briefing in opposition to defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss, is flatly contradicted by the First Circuit’s previous ruling on standing in this case. See Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 770-771 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). As defendants point out, “[plaintiffs have

    ### Response:
    recognizing the possibility of an exception to the requirement that named plaintiffs must themselves possess claims against each defendant but concluding that in our case  the necessary identity of issues and alignment of incentives is not present
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an expectation of privacy while in jail in concluding that the tapes were admissible, we hold that the court misapplied the law. Rather, the district court’s focus should have been on the question of whether Defendant consented to the monitoring of his telephone calls such that the third exception to the coverage of the Abuse of Privacy Act was satisfied. {13} Although the district court did not properly apply the law in deciding whether the tapes were admissible, we review the entire record to determine whether it supports the State’s argument on appeal that Defendant consented to the monitoring and recording of his telephone calls, and therefore the provisions of the Abuse of Privacy Act were not violated. See State v. Martinez, 94 N.M. 436, 439-40, 612 P.2d 228, 231-32 (1980) (<HOLDING>); State v. Beachum, 83 N.M. 526, 527, 494 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an appellate court considers the entire record on appeal not just the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in affirming the denial of a motion to suppress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statements. The district court agreed with Koerber, stating that “unless the defendant knows all of the evidence the government intends to rely upon, it kind of puts him in a hard burden to say what he is going to argue is excluded.” Id. at 962. The district court required the government to file an initial brief on this issue. The government argues that it did not engage in any impropriety by filing this motion. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by considering this motion as part of its pattern-of-neglect analysis. We note that the government did not move to reconsider within the time to appeal the district court’s suppression order but instead waited until after it had our court dismiss its appeal. United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). And as the district court noted, the

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion for reconsideration in a criminal case must be filed within the 14day period for filing a notice of appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cell phone may be conducted without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, No. 07-CR-20605-1, 2013 WL 55693, at *4-5 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 3, 2013) (rejecting arrestee’s contention that the officers who arrested him unlawfully searched the contact list on his cell phone, and recognizing the manifest need to preserve evidence as justification for an officer’s retrieval of certain information from a cell phone seized incident to an arrest); United States v. Slaton, No. 5:11-131, 2012 WL 2374241, at *8-9 (E.D.Ky. June 22, 2012) (upholding search of cell phone including text messages, because the search occurred at the time and the place of arrest). In addition, several state supreme courts have allowed a search of at least some of the digital con 5945802, at *14 (D.Vt. Nov. 6, 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. DiMarco, No. 12 CR 205 RPP,

    ### Response:
    holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of § 924(c) and simply remanded the cases for resentencing for the “firearm” offense. Id. at 809-10, 814. We conclude that, under these circumstances, the panel erred in holding that the defect in the § 924(c) count in the indictments was not subject to plain error review pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See id. at 806-07. We have previously held that a defendant’s claim that he has been convicted of a crime other than one charged in the indictment is subject to plain error review if asserted for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Writers & Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 8, 12-13 (2d Cir.1997). Similarly, we have applied plain error review when an error might have resulted in an improper sentence. See United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason for applying another rule to

    ### Response:
    holding that an arithmetical error that increased a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Carmona v. Wal-Mart Stores, E., LP, 81 So.3d 461, 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Leach v. Salehpour, 19 So.3d 342, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). However, because the trial court’s decision to apply rule 1.540(b)(3) was purely a question of law, we apply a de novo review to that decision. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Paiz, 68 So.3d 940, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Mourning v. Ballast Nedam Constr., Inc., 964 So.2d 889, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). I. Rule 1.540(b)(3) is not applicable in this case. Rule 1.540(b)(3) specifically addresses fraud or misconduct of an adverse party. This includes situations where a party or their counsel participates in misconduct by a witness. Cf. Estate of Willis v. Gaffney, 677 So.2d 949, 950-51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Had Maddalena alleged that Casteel encouraged

    ### Response:
    recognizing that motion for relief from judgment may be properly filed pursuant to rule 1540b3 where party induced witness to commit perjury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state plans “to provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency [responsible for the Medicaid program] to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness,” § 1396a(a)(3), and generally states that the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services should withhold future Medicaid payments to states, that fail to comply with § 1396a of the Act, see § 1396c. Medicaid regula tions regarding the fair hearing process are more extensive, but they are not incompatible with § 1983 enforcement. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.200-250 (2002); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 348, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (commenting specifically upon the “limited state grievance procedures for individuals” in the Medicaid Act); id. (<HOLDING>); accord Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521, 523, 110

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs ability to invoke  1983 cannot be defeated simply by the availability of administrative mechanisms to protect the plaintiffs interests alteration in original and quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal basis for granting the relief sought by the applicant. For example, the contention that an involuntary confession was admitted in evidence against him is a distinct ground for federal collateral relief. But a claim of involuntary confession predicated on alleged psychological coercion does not raise a different “ground” than does one predicated on alleged physical coercion. In other words, identical grounds may often be proved by different factual allegations. So also, identical grounds may often be supported by different legal arguments, or be couched in different language, or vary in immaterial respects. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (citations omitted); see also People v. Scheer, 184 Colo. 15, 19, 518 P.2d 833 (1974) (<HOLDING>). We use this standard to assist our review of

    ### Response:
    holding that previous crimp 35 attacks on the voluntariness coercion and adequacy of advisement of defendants guilty plea precluded raising a similar attack alleging that defendant did not understand the nature of the charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has the duty to support his or her children.... A spouse who fails to discharge a duty of support is liable to any person who provides necessaries to those to whom support is owed.”). Ultimately, the Legislature codified a parent’s common law liability for necessaries provided to his or her children in section 151.001(c) of the Family Code, which provides that “[a] parent who fails to discharge the duty of support is liable to a person who provides necessaries to those to whom support is owed.” Tex. Fam.Code § 151.001(c). As noted by the court of appeals, we recognized in two cases decided more than a century ago that attorney’s fees for services rendered for the benefit of a child may, under some circumstances, be treated as necessaries under the common law. See Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373 (<HOLDING>); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 11 S.W. 1101,

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees are necessaries in a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4871 (emphasis added). Similarly, Senator Harrison A. Williams expressly stated that the congressional intent was for ERISA to codify the principles of traditional trust law: The objectives of these provisions are to make applicable the law of trusts; ... to establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan assets, and to provide effective remedies for breaches of trust. 120 Cong.Rec. S-15737, Aug. 22, 1974, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186 (emphasis added). Thus, permitting the set-off in this case would effectuate Congress’s intent, by making available to the Pension Fund a common law remedy utilized in pre-ERISA days by state and federal courts for breaches of trust. See, e.g., In re Watson, 449 N.E.2d 1156 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Van Nostrand’s Will, 177 Misc. 1, 29

    ### Response:
    holding that successor trustee properly applied former trustees undistributed income to satisfy prior judgment for improper distribution of trust corpus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the letter and the spirit of the ADA.” 527 U.S. at 484; see also Waldrip v. Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 656 (5th Cir.2003) (""[N]either the Supreme Court nor this court has recognized the concept of a per se disability under the ADA....”). 4 . Additionally, in his motion for summary judgment, Arrington stated that SW Bell should have accommodated his disability by allowing him additional time to complete his jobs. But Arrington also conceded that he never requested that SW Bell provide him with any reasonable accommodations. 5 . To the extent that Arrington's response to SW Bell's motion for summary judgment can be read to imply that the diabetic foot ulcers on his feet substantially limited his major life activity of ""walking,” it fails as a matter of law. Cf. Talk, 165 F.3d at 1025 (<HOLDING>). 6 . Everett's statement refers to a document

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiffs ability to walk was not substantially limited simply because she walked with a limp moved slower than other people and was required to wear special orthopedic shoes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assistance claim relating to failure to investigate competency, the Petitioner must show that counsel acted deficiently and that there was resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Counsel acts deficiently, if he does not act as a reasonably objective attorney would under the circumstances. Savino, 82 F.3d at 599. “An attorney’s duty, of course, does not mandate the exploration of the issues of sanity and/or competency in every instance.” Wood v. Zahradnick, 430 F.Supp. 107, 111 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978). However, when “the facts known and available, or with minimal diligence accessible, to defense counsel raise a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s mental condition, counsel has an affirmative obligation to make further inquiry.” Id. (<HOLDING>). If such reasonable doubt is raised, “a lawyer

    ### Response:
    holding that there was ineffective assistance because counsel did not take even the first step of requesting a mental examination when the defendants rape and robbery of a sixtysevenyearold woman for no reason was of such a bizarre nature as to call into question the petitioners mental condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    224 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir.2000); see also Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2593, 153 L.Ed.2d 782 (2002). 2 . Under CPL § 440.10, a state court would have discretion, but would not be required, to deny Pratt's allegation that counsel’s failure to pursue an alibi defense constituted ineffective assistance, as the trial record failed to provide an adequate basis for review on direct appeal. CPL § 440.10(2) mandates denial if ""sufficient facts appear on the record of the proceedings underlying the judgment to have permitted, upon appeal from such judgment, adequate review of the ground or issue raised upon the motion ...."" CPL § 440.10(2)(c); see People v. Delarosa, 287 A.D.2d 735, 736, 732 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Pratt's alibi allegation falls under

    ### Response:
    holding that question of whether trial counsel failed to serve a timely alibi notice is a matter dehors the record which could not be reviewed on direct appeal and therefore should not result in a mandatory denial under cpl  440102b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    coverage in order to trigger indemnity. To determine whether the claim is within coverage, one must look to the provisions of the indemnity agreement itself. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Napier Elec. & Const. Co., Inc. 571 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky.Ct.App.1978). Under Kentucky law, parties may contract “for indemnification for — among other things — the costs incident to potential legal liability as well as for the legal liability itself.” See Thompson v. The Budd Co., 199 F.3d 799, 806-07 (6th Cir.1999). Thus, there are two conceivable bases for holding an insurer liable for, insured’s legal liabilities — a .judgment or a contractual agreement covering potential legal liability. Martin Cnty. Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 792 F.Supp.2d 958, 961 (E.D.Ky.2011) (<HOLDING>) a judgment; or 2) a contractual agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that there are only two conceivable bases for holding an insurer liable for its insureds liabilities 1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and with gross negligence ... describes conduct that ‘by its nature, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.’ ” Farnsworth, 92 F.3d at 1009 (quoting USSG § 4B1.2, cmt. n. 2.); see also United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2003) (summarizing Farnsworth as holding “[gjrossly negligent driving while intoxicated self-evidently posed ‘a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’ ”) (quoting USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2)). We see no reason to depart from this interpretation. Finally, Moore does point out that several recent cases have held that DUI offenses are not crimes of violence; however, these cases address very different “crime of violence” definitions. E.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, — U.S. -, -, -, 125 S.Ct. 377, 379, 382, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d at 1204, 1205-06 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding dui causing serious bodily injury is not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Aran Wricnt, Artuur R. Mircer & Epwarp H. Coorer, Practice anp Procepure § 4403 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing res judicata as a judicial creation). Specifically, res judicata encompasses the doctrine of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Mack, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 29, 221 P.3d 194. "" '[Cllaim preclusion corresponds to causes of action;] issue preclusion corresponds to the facts and issues underlying causes of action.'"" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, ¶ 31, 194 P.3d 956). 7 . Mack, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 29, 221 P.3d 194 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 . See id. 9 . Id. (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ¶ 34, 73 P.3d 325); see also id. 1 Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 621 (Utah 1983); see also Salt Lake Citizens Cong., 846 P.2d at 1251 (<HOLDING>). 15 . See, e.g., Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho

    ### Response:
    recognizing that because claim preclusions purposes are advanced utah courts have applied the doctrine to administrative agency determinations since at least 1950
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not have enough information to opine on whether A.Q.W. should be placed with Dolores. Dolores testified she first became aware appellant was the child’s father about thirty days before the termination hearing when appellant told her. She said appellant wants to be a father to A.Q.W., and both she and appellant want A.Q.W. placed with her if appellant’s parental rights were terminated. She said appellant was upset when he thought he might lose his parental rights if he was sent to prison. She said her son is not a “bad person.” She did not agree his parental rights should be terminated because he has not had a chance to be a father, she thought he would be a very good father, and “[h]e wants this child.” Appellan ding same); In re 91 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Here, appellant was not confirmed as A.Q.W.’s

    ### Response:
    holding that departments preparation of several service plans designed to help a parent regain custody of her child and parents failure to complete requirements of the service plans constituted reasonable efforts on the states part to return the child to the mother under the first element of section 1610011n
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J.N.’s placement had Dr. Renehan excluded the parents from the communication. (Doc. 12 at 7). The court disagrees that Dr. Renehan intended to send the email to the parents but does not address the merits of plaintiffs’ IDEA claims at this juncture. 11 . To the extent that earlier decisions in this circuit adopted a strict approach to waiver in which inadvertent disclosure to a third party necessarily waives privilege, more recent authority has eschewed that approach. Compare United States v. Rockwell Int’l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir.1990) (“The attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications that are intended to be disclosed to third parties or that in fact are so disclosed.”), with Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d 827, 856 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), and In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . The closest Tracey comes to stating a figure is at paragraph nine of his certification in which he states ""in anticipation of an adverse decision by the Board, in May, 1988, I spoke to Edwin Starner, Director of Human Resources at First Atlantic, to get his feelings about how much severance I might receive in the event I were fired. He acknowledged that given my contribution to the Bank over the 25 years that I had been associated with it, that he felt that two weeks per year of service was reasonable."" Tracey Cert., ¶ 9. 11 .Plaintiff does not claim that the alleged plan for severance pay was an ""employee pension benefit plan” under ERISA. It appears that such a claim could not legitimately be made. See Wolcott v. Nationwide Mat. Ins. Co., 664 F.Supp. 1533, 1537-38 (S.D.Ohio 1987) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Tracey concedes that, assuming ERISA

    ### Response:
    holding that an extended earnings plan was not an employee pension benefit plan because the payment of benefits was not contingent upon retirement or the employee attaining a certain age
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach. Wright v. Christian & Smith, 950 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ). To recover compensatory damages, the plaintiff must prove that he suffered some pecuniary loss as a result of the breach. Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Homburg, 20 S.W.3d 741, 758 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.); Multi-Moto Corp. v. ITT Comm. Fin. Corp., 806 S.W.2d 560, 569 (Tex.App.Dallas 1990, writ denied). Such losses must be the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.1981) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 354 (1854)); see, e.g., Stuart v. Bayless, 964 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); Swanson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that loss of contingency fees that lawyers might have earned from other clients was not foreseeable and directly traceable to clients failure to pay amounts due under contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Hospital System’s frustration, we are convinced that the district court acted correctly in leaving treatment to the political branches. For the reasons given, we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the Hospital System’s claim for a writ of mandamus. Ill Cape Fear Health System also sought “a declaratory judgment in its favor that HHS’s delay in adjudication of Medicare appeals violates federal law.” Because we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Hospital System failed to state a claim upon which mandamus relief could be granted, it follows that we must also affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Hospital System’s declaratory judgment claim. See Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 843, 849, 187 L.Ed.2d 703 (2014) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the district court is

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paso 1994, pet. ref'd). Texas Rule of Evidence 103 provides that an objection to “offered” evidence outside the presence of the jury will apply to the evidence when it is admitted before the jury without having to repeat the objection. Tex.R. Evtd. 103. Because only Cabbie’s testimony concerning appellant’s nickname was “offered” outside the presence of the jury, appellant’s objection did not preserve error with regard to the additional testimony about his nickname that was subsequently offered by other witnesses. Moreover, because the subsequent witnesses referred to appellant’s nickname, any error in allowing Cabbie to refer to appellant’s nickname was cured by the unobjected-to testimony of the subsequent witnesses. See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third

    ### Response:
    holding that overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence is received without objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    citing State v. Kirk (1985), 493 A. 2d 1271. Therefore, defendant's reliance on Barcia is inapposite to the case sub judice. Applying the balancing test of Brown as articulated in Michigan State Police v. Sitz, supra, the neutral roadblock set up by the Cleveland Police based on public complaints and entailing only brief intrusions upon law-abiding citizens was reasonable and consistent with Fourth Amendment guarantees. Since Detective White had a lawful justification for the intrusion of the roadblock, when he observed first-hand the clear bag with green vegetation in defendant's breast pocket, its owner's privacy interest in that item was lost. Detective White was justified in seizing the evidence pursuant to the ""plain view"" exception. See Horton v. California (1990), 110 L. Ed. 112 (<HOLDING>); Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding inadvertence of discovery is not essential if items are in plain view
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    figure.” Id. at 417. Unlike the board’s vote in Rogue Flyfishers, the health policy, as applied, has a direct effect on persons other than DOC employees. It directly affects the inmate and whether the health care provider will provide medical treatment. Furthermore, there is no further action necessary, as in Rogue Flyfishers, before the health policy affects an inmate. A health care provider either provides or refuses to provide a medical procedure based on the provisions of the health policy. We therefore conclude that the health policy constitutes a rule and not an internal management directive. Therefore, the DOC should have followed rulemaking procedures in adopting the health policy. Because the DOC did not adopt the health policy as a rule, the health 844, 561 P2d 674 (1977)

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants internal office memorandum directing staff to deny all new applications for adult services programs was not an internal management directive because the impact on the public was direct persons seeking benefits    are denied benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and, whether it unreasonably interferes with work performance' or, as here, a tenant’s living conditions.”) (quoting Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.2000)); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.1996) (hostile housing environment cause of action is analyzed under the more familiar Title VII standard, which requires that for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive that it ""unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of the premises”); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir.1993) (finding that sexual harassment creates an actionable form of housing discrimination and incorporating Title VII standards into analysis); Cavalieri-Conway v. L. Butterman & Associates, 992 F.Supp. 995, 1007 (N.D.Ill. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 15 . Courts have concluded virtually

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim for sexual harassment is cognizable under two theories 1 allegations supporting a hostile environment claim andor 2 allegations supporting a conditional tenancy or quid pro quo claim which accuses housing management of premising a lease or lease conditions on the exchange of sexual favors and stating that courts rely on a title vii analysis in reviewing hostile environment claims of sexual harassment under the fha
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577-78, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992), whether the suspect is in the presence of uniformed officers, Garcia, 358 N.C. at 397, 597 S.E.2d at 737, and the nature of any security around the suspect, State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 52, 56, 497 S.E.2d 409, 411, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943, 142 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1998). Defendant is an adult male with prio leave the interview room without supervision or escort, we believe it unlikely that any civilian would be allowed to stray through a police station. Defendant was in an area not open to the public, and the prevention of unsupervised roaming in such a space is hardly the type of restriction that a reasonable person would associate with a formal arrest. See State v. Medlin, 333 N.C. 280, 290-92, 426 S.E.2d 402, 407-08 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus, under the totality of the

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant who was constantly in the presence of officers and escorted to the rest room was not in custody and it is also unlikely that anyone would have been permitted to wander unmonitored around police headquarters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs argument, however, ignores the only relevant inquiry under Section 207(a): Whether or not Defendant properly calculated Plaintiffs’ overtime pay. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant actually and in fact paid them at a lower hourly rate than the posted rate. Furthermore, “Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were paid time and a half of the [lower 12 hour shift rate] for each hour work [sic] in excess of 8 hours in a single day.” The parties therefore do not dispute the calculation Defendant employed, but which rate qualifies as the “regular rate” under 29 C.F.R. § 778.110(a). Defendant contends that the “regular rate” has been judicially defined as the hourly rate “actually paid” to an employee. See York v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 48 F.3d 919, 921 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360,

    ### Response:
    holding that an employees regular rate of pay is the hourly rate actually paid the employee for the normal nonovertime workweek for which he is employed  quoting walling v youngermanreynolds hardwood co 325 us 419 425 65 sct 1242 89 led 1705 1945
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The term “lunchtime” is commonly understood to mean the midday meal, associated with noon. Thus, Sergeant Darby’s choice of 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. comports with the “lunchtime” mandate. The “lunchtime” designation provided the field officers with a standard. Additionally, the standard was more restrictive than that in Crouch. We find that Sergeant Darby’s choice of an 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. time frame would not subject an individual to an arbitrary invasion of his reasonable expectation of privacy. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50, 99 S.Ct. at 2640. Nothing in the record suggests the decision to execute the checkpoint during those hours involved an effort “to target a specific person or a specific group of people.” Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 527, 532, 489 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Sergeant Darby was merely following

    ### Response:
    holding that a checkpoint employed neutral criteria and thus complied with lowe and simmons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to support a trial court’s choice of sanction. See Hummer v. Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., 140 N.C. App. 270, 285, 536 S.E.2d 349, 358 (2000) (reversing sanction of $2,500.00 imposed as compensation for an increase in attorney’s malpractice insurance deductible when the order contained no finding that he had purchased such insurance and the evidence did not support a finding that the increase was due to the pending suit); Davis, 121 N.C. App. at 160, 464 S.E.2d at 711 (reversing and remanding for additional findings when “there is nothing in the order to explain the appropriateness of the sanction imposed ($6,692 in attorney’s fees) or to indicate how the court arrived at that figure”); Rivenbark v. Southmark Corp., 93 N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 378 S.E.2d 196, 200-01 (1989) (<HOLDING>). While the same findings of fact may not be

    ### Response:
    holding that sanctions may not be imposed mechanically but rather the circumstances of each case must be carefully weighed so that the sanction properly takes into account the severity of the partys disobedience
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the inquiry into the protected information would reveal that the employee was unable to perform, work related functions or was a danger to the health and safety of the workplace”). Some disability-related inquiries aimed at curbing sick leave abuse may fall within the business necessity exception. The problem here is that DOCS has not offered sufficient evidence to prove either this business necessity or any other. We also note that what constitutes a business necessity will undoubtedly vary in different workplaces. The needs of correctional facilities for secure and adequate staffing are particularly strong, and in other contexts, courts have recognized the special circumstances of such facilities. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 n. 29, 99

    ### Response:
    recognizing that generally federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to man age a volatile environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relief against eleven of Defendants’ store locations. District courts have differed as to how far associational standing will extend in an ADA case when the defendant is a nationwide chain. Some courts have held that an organization lacks representative standing to sue on behalf of unnamed members and therefore can seek injunctive relief only against those specific locations at which a named member has encountered alleged ADA violations. See Hilton Hotels, 2009 WL 6067336, at *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126645, at *14 (finding allegations that “unnamed members encountered accessibility barriers at various unnamed Hilton hotels” was “simply too vague” to confer associational standing on an organizational plaintiff); see also Clark v. Burger King Corp., 255 F.Supp.2d 334, 345 (D.N.J.2003) (<HOLDING>). These courts would require a plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that the organizational plaintiff has representative standing to assert ada violations only in so far as the named member has standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of those alleles.”). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, evidence that Hilario’s DNA matched that of the blood found on defendant’s clothing had ""little probative value without Quartaro’s expert testimony — “[e]vidence of a match based on currently used testing processes is meaningless without evidence indicating the significance of the match.” Id. at 109 (quotin issue, was the very witness that the Supreme Court deemed necessary in Bullcoming: “the analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation even if they possess ‘the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.’ ” Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2537 n. 6); see also United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 71 (D.C.Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d 382, 385

    ### Response:
    holding that because a witness testified that he authored the reports at issue and was available for crossexamination at trial the admittance of those reports presented no confrontation clause problem under bullcoming
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    344 B.R. 829, 831 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2006) (""Under BAPCPA, vehicles purchased within the 910 days preceding the filing of the petition may no longer be bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims, but rather must be treated as fully secured.”) (emphasis added); In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716, 721 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.2006) (“In order to be confirmed, a Chapter 13 plan must provide one of three options to secured creditors” under § 1325(a)(5)) (emphasis added); In re Robinson, 338 B.R. 70, 73-74 (Bankr. W.D.Mo.2006) (noting that the parties do not dispute that the creditors of 910-claims ""are entitled to secured claims for the total amount of their claims, regardless of the value of the respective vehicles, and the Debtor cannot bifurcate them.”); In re Scruggs, 342 B.R. 571, 575 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 543, 544

    ### Response:
    holding that a 910claim is fully secured and requires that interest be added to the payment to arrive at the present value of the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the condition of private individuals, we conclude that it is more akin to the laws of “contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, [or] descent,” than to an assertion of sovereignty like “the power to tax [or] grant franchises.” Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (quoting Israel & Smithson, supra, at 296) (internal quotation marks omitted). The result we reach here with regard to chapter 253B is in accord with results reached in other states. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that section 1360(a) expressly granted a state court subject matter jurisdiction to civilly commit a tribal member as a sexually dangerous person. In re Commitment of Burgess, 262 Wis.2d 354, 665 N.W.2d 124, 133 (2003); see also Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676, 687 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Applying Caba-zon, the Wisconsin Supreme

    ### Response:
    holding that the wisconsin supreme court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in determining that public law 280 conferred civil jurisdiction to the state of wisconsin to commit burgess an enrolled member of an indian tribe as a sexually violent person
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as recently fabricated or the witness must have a motive for testifying falsely. (See People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, 501.) Obviously, the motive for defendant to testify that his statements were coerced existed prior to and when he made the writings. Defendant also asserts that the writings were also admissible under the curative admissibility or the completeness doctrines. The curative admissibility doctrine was not invoked at trial by defendant and, further, is irrelevant to the issue here. See 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence §15, at 731 (1983) (prior introduction of inadmissible evidence estops subsequent objection to other inadmissible evidence offered by opposing party); Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Bunding (1904), 210 Ill. 39; People v. Higgins (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 912, 931 (<HOLDING>). The completeness doctrine permits an opposing

    ### Response:
    holding curative admissibility doctrine is not intended to operate so as to permit a party to introduce irrelevant evidence merely because his opponent brought out some evidence on the same subject but is limited to situations where necessary to eradicate undue prejudicial inference which might otherwise ensue from the introduction of the original evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ground that the search of his computer was untimely because the motion, if pursued on this basis, would not have been granted by the district court. IV. CONCLUSION We hold that the district court did not err in denying Wolfs application for post-conviction relief because Wolfs counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. Accordingly, the district court’s order summarily dismissing Wolfs application for post-conviction relief is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal. Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LANSING concur. 1 . Several other jurisdictions have dealt with this issue and also held forensic examination of computers conducted after a search warrant expired to be constitutional. See United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1097

    ### Response:
    holding the search of a computer after the warrant had expired constitutional because despite the delay probable cause for the search continued to exist
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prescribed by the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, the court must apply the Guidelines as they existed at the time of the crime. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § lBl.ll(b)(l) (2000); United States v. Omoruyi 260 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir.2001). Prior to November 1, 2000, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) (1999) provided for a two level increase in offense score if the offense involved a “violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree or process.” In interpreting that version of § 2F1.1(b)(4)(B), we held that a bankruptcy proceeding was not a “judicial process” and that a bankruptcy rule did not constitute a “judicial order.” See United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 226-28 (3d Cir.1999). However, on November 1, 200 Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). According to Brennan, the ending date of the

    ### Response:
    holding that application of an amended version of the guidelines to a conspiracy which continues both before and after the amendment does not violate the ex post facto clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue of fact that her case of diabetes is a covered disability. See id. at 483-84, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (stating that it would be “contrary to both the letter and spirit of the ADA” to cover a “diabetic whose illness does not impair his or her daily activities” on the theory that “if [she] failed to monitor [her] blood sugar levels and administer insulin, [she] would almost certainly be limited in one or more major life activities”); Schaefer v. State Ins. Fund, 207 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.2000) (vacating denial of summary judgment and remanding in light of Sutton to determine if Plaintiff had raised a triable issue of fact as to whether her “Type II” diabetes was an ADA-covered disability); Teachout v. N.Y. City Dep’t. of Ed., No. 04-CV-945, 2006 WL 452022, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Sepulveda v. Glickman, 167 F.Supp.2d 186, 191

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff had not raised a triable issue of fact as to impairment of eating as substantial life activity where his diabetes required him to eat regular and small meals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    monetary relief directly related to a change in discharge status. The monetary requests in plaintiffs Complaint are for “pain and suffering” resulting from the claimed incident of sexual harassment. See id. at 8. Plaintiff does not claim that he was illegally discharged and is owed back pay related to his service or discharge. Nor may plaintiffs request for a change in his military records be entertained by this court as a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2006). The APA permits review of final agency action that seeks equitable relief other than money damages. 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, plaintiffs claim, viewed as an APA claim, does not fall within the jurisdiction of this court. See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); McNabb v. United States, 54 Fed.Cl. 759, 767

    ### Response:
    holding that the uscfc does not have apa jurisdiction to consider nonmonetary suits to correct military records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in custody requests the presence of a lawyer before further interrogation.”). In this case, the interrogation video reveals Detectives Neal and Richardson did precisely what the law forbids. After Thomas requested counsel, the detectives not only continued discussing Thomas’s case, but they also pressed on her the possible “benefits of cooperation” as well the penalties of disobedience. See Gomez, 927 F.2d at 1539. In doing so, Detectives Neal and Richardson unmistakably violated Edwards’s “rigid prophylactic rule.” See Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir.1990), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92-96, 105 S.Ct. 490, 491-93, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The Government claims Thomas’s statements

    ### Response:
    holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Kinoshita is inconsistent with federal policy favoring arbitration”). But see Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1994) (equating “arising out of’ with “arising under” and adhering to the logic of Kinoshita and its progeny). The Fourth Circuit has similarly refused to take the restrictive approach of the Kinoshita line of cases. In Peoples Security, the court construed an arbitration clause containing the following language: Any question, charge, complaint or grievance believed to constitute a breach or violation shall be immediately communicated between counsel and the party alleged to be in breach of the agreement shall have five days to respond, Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 409, 410 n. 1, 413 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). At least one court has speculated that

    ### Response:
    holding that a clause requiring arbitration if any dispute arises by the parties hereto as to the rights or liabilities incident to this agreement is broad enough to cover claims alleged under texas statutes governing insurance and deceptive trade practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.” Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis added). Faretta does not address whether a trial court can offer a procedural benefit to a defendant that necessarily requires the defendant to waive his or her Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Pasha correctly notes that the trial court’s offer of counsel on November 19, 2012, simultaneously included a procedural benefit: permitting Hernandez to refile and relitigate Pasha’s previously denied motions. However, contrary to Pasha’s assertion, the trial court’s offer did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation because the trial court did not force Pasha against his will to accept Hernandez as counsel. See id. at 807, 835-36, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the record reflects that the trial

    ### Response:
    recognizing that when a defendant voluntarily intelligently and unequivocally elects to proceed without counsel under the sixth amendment a court cannot force the defendant to accept counsel against his or her will
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Violence Coal., 542 F.3d 794, 796-97 (10th Cir.2008). In its June 21, 2011 order, the district court carefully examined the factual background of the case against each of the grounds for relief cited by Mr. Leo and concluded that the motion should be denied. We affirm for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court. Mr. Leo cited Rule 60(b)(1), which provides that the district court may grant relief from a judgment on the grounds of mistake. But as the court pointed out, “the ‘mistake’ which [Mr. Leo] claims— that he has only recently realized that he sought a different position than what he alleged in his complaint—is not the type of mistake contemplated by Rule 60(b)(1),” R. Vol. 17 at 4, citing Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Leo next argued that he was entitled to

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 60b1 relied is available only where 1 a party has made an excusable litigation mistake or an attorney in the litigation has acted without authority from a party or 2 where the judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1, 2, 6 and 7, as there is some evidence of Coastal’s negligence proximately causing Plaintiffs damages. However, the Court concludes that Chapter 95 ... preempts Francis’fs] common[-]law claims against Coastal.... Accordingly, this Court likely erred in submitting any liability question other than one comporting with the statute. The jury answered no to the sole question pertaining to the statute. This Court therefore has a duty and obligation to disregard all other answers made by the jury. Exclusive Remedy In his first issue, Francis contends that the trial court erred by disregarding the jury’s ve o. 14-01-00432-CV, slip op. at 11, — S.W.3d —, —, 2003 WL 21664163 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 17, 2003, motions for rehearing and for rehearing en banc pending; not yet reported) (<HOLDING>); Kelly, 27 S.W.3d at 570-71 (affirming summary

    ### Response:
    holding that chapter 95 precludes commonlaw negligence claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion for May 2nd. On April 27th, Mocega’s attorney filed a motion for a thirty-day extension to obtain an expert report. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). Other than the affidavits already on file, no evidence was offered at the May 2nd hearing. At the conclusion, the trial court revoked his reconsideration order of April 25th. In a written order, the trial court stated two grounds: (1) appellant’s counsel had notice of the April 3rd submission setting, and (2) the thirty-day grace period of section 13.01(g) could not extend more than 210 days after filing. Being only human, the trial court could not have foreseen our opinion several months later rejecting the second ground. See Pfeiffer v. Jacobs, 29 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Based on Pfeif-fer, Mocega’s first point must

    ### Response:
    holding 30day grace period could begin at any time so long as it was filed before the hearing on the defendant doctors motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    612-617, aqd repealing article 593.1. These articles more closely track the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 6 . Another prerequisite to class certification is that ""[o]ne or more members of a class, who will fairly insure the adequate representation of all members, may sue or be sued in a class action on behalf of all members.” La. C.C.P. art. 592. We do not reach the issue of whether this requirement has been met. 7 . The comments also note that ""[t]he only similarity between the joint obligation of AngloAmeri-can law and the joint obligation of Louisiana (the conjoint obligation of the civil law) is the name. See Preliminary Statement to Book I, Title III, Chapter 1.” La. C.C.P. art. 591, Comment (b). 8 . See Vizier v. Howard, 165 So.2d 655 (La.App. 1st Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>); Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So.2d 646 (La.App. 1st

    ### Response:
    holding that for a class action to be maintained all class members must have a common and undivided interest in the property or matter involved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.” Essentially, the State seeks a tax refund. The federal government argues that the contributions imposed under the Transitional Reinsurance Program do not constitute an “internal-revenue tax,” and- thus, do not fall under the jurisdictional grant from 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). The federal government cites a recent case from the Tenth Circuit, where that court held that a “coal reclamation fee” assessed by the Department of the Interior did not constitute an “internal-revenue tax” within the meaning of § 1346(a)(1); thus depriving the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Wyodak Res. Dev. Corp. v. United States, 637 F.3d 1127, 1129 (10th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The Sixth Circuit, however, takes a “broader

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs claim properly belonged only in the court of federal claims under 28 usc  1491
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2034, 173 L.Ed.2d 1120 (2009). Even in his presentation of this excited-utterance rationale on appeal, Mr. Pursley has been unable to specify the content of Mr. Youngblood’s expected testimony on the issue. See Hernandez-Urista, 9 F.3d at 84 (affirming denial because defendant “failed to specify the content of the expected testimony”); Bloomgren, 814 F.2d at 585 (affirming denial in part because defendant failed to “reveal with specificity the substance of each of the individual witnesses’ testimony”). More importantly, Mr. Pursley cross-examined Mr. Cluff, Mr. Floyd, and Mr. Moltzan and, therefore, had the opportunity to ask about Mr. Cluffs physical and mental state after the assault. Thus, the testimony of Mr. Youngblood, who moved Mr. Cluff to a new cell a few minutes p h Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1118

    ### Response:
    holding that a rule 17b application filed on last day of governments case lacked timeliness and supported district courts limitation on subpoena requests
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Ramirez which holds that ex-felons exclusion from not voting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 418 U.S. at 56, 94 S.Ct. 2655. Thus, the Court grants summary judgement to the State on Plaintiffs Equal Protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. B. Plaintiffs’ Claim that Felon Disenfranchisement Violates the First Amendment Plaintiffs also contend that the felon disenfranchisement provision violates the First Amendment as well. However, it is clear that the First Amendment does not guarantee felons the right to vote. See Howard, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984, at *2 (“The First Amendment creates no private right of action for seeking reinstatement of previously cancelled voting rights.”); see also, Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F.Supp. 1304 (E.D.Wash.1997) (<HOLDING>). This Court agrees with the holding of Howard

    ### Response:
    holding that to hold the same constitution that specifically recognizes felon disenfranchisement under  2 of the fourteenth amendment but also prohibits disenfranchisement under another amendment would be to interpret the constitution in an inconsistent manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    390, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz.Ct.App.1982); Snibbe v. Superior Court, 224 Cal.App.4th. 184, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 548 (2014); Fischer v. Hartford Hosp., 31 Conn.. L. Rptr. 291 (Conn.Super.Ct.2002); State ex rel. Wilfong v. Schaeperkoetter, 933 S.W.2d 407 (Mo.1-996) (en banc). Therefore, these decisions are incongruous with this Court’s firmly established rules of statutory construction: “The intent of a statute is determined from what [its author] said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used.” Peters v. Great W. Bank, Inc., 2015 S.D. 4, ¶ 7, 859 N.W.2d 618, 621 (emphasis added) (quoting City of Rapid City v. Estes, 2011 S.D. 75, ¶ 12, 805 N.W.2d 714, 718); Hannon v. Weber, 2001 S.D. 146, ¶ 8, 638 N.W.2d 48, 50 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). [¶22.] The rule of the foregoing decisions

    ### Response:
    holding requirement of plaintext analysis applies equally to all statutes whether authored by the legislature or this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    windows as personal property, an agreement on which Wells Fargo relied when determining what steps were necessary to protect its security interest in the property. Although the agreement between the parties is not binding on any third party without notice of the agreement, it is binding as between the only two parties to this particular dispute, Debtors and Wells Fargo. IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Debtors’ Objection to Claim # 22 of Wejls Fargo Financial National Bank is overruled. 1 . Doc. 45. 2 . 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). 3 .Doc. 63. 4 . Id. at ¶ 13. 5 . Proof of Claim No. 3. 6 .Proof of Claim No. 22. 7 . Objection to Claim # 22 of Wells Fargo Financial National Bank (Doc. 45). 8 . See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 9 . 298 B.R. 382, 387 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2003)

    ### Response:
    holding that in a bankruptcy proceeding state law governs the rights of the parties with regard to interests in property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision was therefore not “contrary to” the governing legal principles set forth in our cases. Andrade’s sentence also was not materially indistinguishable from the facts in Solem. The facts here fall in between the facts in Rummel and the facts in Solem. Solem involved a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. 463 U. S., at 279. The defendant in Rummel was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. 445 U. S., at 267. Here, Andrade retains the possibility of parole. Solem acknowledged that Rummel would apply in a “similar factual situation.” 463 U. S., at 304, n. 32. And while this case resembles to some degree both Rummel and Solem, it is not materially indistinguishable from either. Cf. Ewing v. California, ante, at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the state court did not

    ### Response:
    recognizing a twilight zone between solem and rummel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Manor Town Protective Ass'n v. City of N. Las Vegas, 91 Nev. 713, 541 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975) (plain error is so substantial as to result in injustice); Fertile ex. rel. Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481, 779 A.2d 1078, 1085 (2001) (the standard for plain error is whether error had clear capacity for producing unjust result); Chavez v. Board of County Comm’rs., 130 N.M. 753, 31 P.3d 1027, 1039 (Ct.App.2001) (fundamental error applies, for example, when there is no jurisdiction or issue is a matter of public interest affecting large number of people); Elezaj v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 992, 657 N.Y.S.2d 399, 679 N.E.2d 638, 638 (1997) (only intermediate appellate court has discretion to review unpreserved error); Rau v. Kirschenman, 208 N.W.2d 1, 9 (N.D.1973)(<HOLDING>) (on petition for rehearing); Goldfuss v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing exception to preservation rules for fundamental error that is highly prejudicial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    specific intent of violating ERISA. Humphreys, 966 F.2d at 1043. The District Court suggested that since plaintiff did in fact obtain extensive medical benefits under Weastec’s health benefits plan and was never denied reimbursement, a reasonable jury could not find that Weastec engaged in prohibited conduct with the specific intent of violating ERISA, However, the statute indicates only that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in conduct for the purpose of interfering with his rights, not that the employer’s conduct actually had the effect of interfering with his rights. Other courts have recognized that a plaintiffs receipt of ERISA-protected benefits does not preclude an ERISA claim under § 510. See, e.g., Kowalski v. L & F Prods., 82 F.3d 1283, 1287 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under  510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one customer acknowledgment form prior to the events giving rise to the instant litigation. This in and of itself hardly establishes a prior course of dealing sufficient to allow Christy to unilaterally include the arbitration provision in the contract. Moreover, the fact that Christy repeatedly sent its customer acknowledgment form to PCS does not establish a course of dealing; the multiple forms merely demonstrated Christy’s desire to include the arbitration clause as a term of the contract. See In re CFLC, Inc., 166 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir.1999) (“Course of dealing analysis is not proper in an instance where the only action taken has been the repeated delivery of a particular form by one of the parties.”); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 104 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion We hold that Christy’s customer

    ### Response:
    holding that the repeated sending of a writing which contains certain standard terms without any action with respect to the issues addressed by those terms cannot constitute a course of dealing which would incorporate a term of the writing otherwise excluded under  2207 because the repeated exchange of forms by the parties only tells buyer that seller desires certain terms given sellers failure to obtain buyers express assent to these terms before it will ship the program buyer can reasonably believe that while seller desires certain terms it has agreed to do business on other terms those terms expressly agreed upon by the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment when the parole officer reasonably believes such search is necessary in-the performance of his duties.” Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250-52 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975). Defendant does not argue the state parole officers here lacked a reasonable belief that a search was necessary in the performance of their duties. He contends only that the parole officers lacked jurisdiction to conduct the search in Indian country. The parties have not cited, and the Court has not located, a case directly on point. The law is clear, however, that the State of South Dakota cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d 463, 467

    ### Response:
    holding that state failed to assume even partial jurisdiction in compliance with public law 280
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free “to disregard the police and go about his business,” California v. Hodari D., the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature. The Court made precisely this point in Terry v. Ohio: “Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991 S.E.2d 120, 128-29 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Viewed in light of these legal principles,

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant was not seized when two officers approached the defendant on a public street and asked him questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    work product and was exempt from disclosure-as no showing was made that any of the exceptions set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b) applied. In this case, the lower court ordered production of the witness statements solely because they were sworn affidavits. No showing was made by Respondents to the trial court that any of the exceptions of rule 1.280(b) applied. The court compelled production of these witness statements without conducting an in camera inspection to determine if the statements at issue were actually work product and without finding that Respondents would be unable to secure the equivalent without undue hardship. This constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law. See Ashemimry v. Ba Nafa, 847 So.2d 603, 605-06 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). We find that the trial court’s order departs

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error to order discovery in a civil case of a recorded statement allegedly made in preparation for a criminal prosecution without an in camera inspection or additional findings with regard to work product immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are no longer relevant, so I consider only whether the declaratory judgment action here would serve any useful purpose and whether fairness and judicial economy are served by entertaining it. “The purposes of declaratory judgments are to ‘clarify[ ] and settl[e] the legal relations at issue’ and to ‘terminate and afford relief from uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.’ ” Tempco, 819 F.2d at 749. Where the substantive suit would resolve the issues raised by the declaratory judgment action, the declaratory judgment action “serve[s] no useful purpose” because the controversy has “ripened” and the uncertainty and anticipation of litigation are alleviated. Id.; see also Associated Mills, Inc. v. Regina Co., Inc., 675 F.Supp. 446, 448 (N.D.Ill.1987) (<HOLDING>); Wireless Marketing Corp. v. Cherokee, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    addressed in a condemnation action and whether Appellants have suffered injuries which are recognized in condemnation actions. {43} The power of eminent domain has been deemed a power inherent in the notion of sovereignty and “only limited by the constitutions of federal and state governments.” State ex rel. Red River Valley Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Fourth Jud. Dist., 39 N.M. 523, 527, 51 P.2d 239, 241 (1935). The state may appropriate or damage private property under its inherent power of eminent domain without the owner’s consent. The primary condition to the exercise of eminent domain is the constitutional requirement to pay just compensation. The requirement to pay just compensation is historically grounded in the common law recognized right of private pr 136, 646 P.2d 561, 563 (1982) (<HOLDING>). {45} The legislature has granted

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to be compensable consequential damages must affect some right or interest that is different in kind not merely in degree from that suffered by the public in general
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that an employee can prevail against his or her employer, notwithstanding Collins, in state-created danger cases); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 424-25, 431 (3d Cir.2006) (treating plaintiffs’ state created danger doctrine claim as separate and distinct from Collins); Ramos-Pinero v. Puerto Rico, 453 F.3d 48, 55 n.9 (1st Cir.2006) (assuming the state-created danger doctrine could be a theory of liability notwithstanding Collins, but rejecting plaintiffs’ claim on the merits); Gormley, 93 A.3d at 362-63 (concluding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, rejecting the defendants’ reliance on Collins, and holding that the state-created danger doctrine applied). But see Slaughter v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 682 F.3d 317, 321-23 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 4. Applying the State-Created Danger

    ### Response:
    holding that collins barred a plaintiffs claim against a fire department even though plaintiff raised a statecreated danger claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Community corrections centers are residences in the community with custodial structure and strong emphasis on guidance and counseling. These centers serve those inmates who qualify and who should benefit from a gradual reintegration into society. 6 . Section 21.1a was added by Section 5 of the Act of August 24, 1951, P.L. 1401, as amended, 61 P.S. § 331.21a. 7 . The Court noted that while a convict may be on parole from a particular offense, he might be confined in prison for another offense, in a mental institution or in an enemy prison camp during a war. While not literally “at liberty,” that parolee would not be entitled to credit on his sentence for these types of confinement. 8 . See also Wagner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 846 A.2d 187 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See also McMillian v. Pennsylvania Board

    ### Response:
    holding that time spent at a facility was not the functional equivalent of incarceration where no force would be used to restrain anyone who left without permission and where staff members were counselors and not law officers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    status, an applicant must demonstrate “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The incidents to which each petitioner testified do not meet the legal definition of persecution. Although Wijaya faced harassment and discrimination when his church services were disrupted, these incidents did not rise to the level of persecution, which include “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993). Similarly, the assaults and robberies that both petitioners suffered do not meet this standard. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). There is nothing in the record to suggest

    ### Response:
    holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or total cancellation or rescission, and this rule has been repeatedly asserted by this Court. Id. at 84, 76 S.E. at 124-25; accord Syl. Pt. 3, Core v. New York Petroleum Co., 52 W.Va. 276, 43 S.E. 128 (1903) (“Under such a lease, the remedy for a breach of an implied covenant is ordinarily not by way of forfeiture of the lease in whole or in part, but by an action for damages caused by such breach.”). The preference for legal remedies over equitable ones with regal'd to oil and gas lease disputes evolved as a natural result of the legal system “favor[ing] ... the vesting of estates” based upon the significant investment intrinsic to oil and gas exploration and development. United Fuel, 93 W.Va. at 655, 117 S.E. at 904; see Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir.1905) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding this leaning towards monetary

    ### Response:
    recognizing large expense incident to the work of exploration and development
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the cooperating witness. As informed juries will expect other corroborating elements, such evidence is typically provided. There is no objective reason why such witnesses should be inclined to lie to suit the government, regardless of whether there is an agreement for their testimony. Where an agreement exists, testimony substantially at odds with other evidence known to the government regardless of admissibility, runs the risk that the witness will lose the benefits contemplated by the agreement in addition to a perjury charge. In either event, the witness is subject to perjury. The incentive to be truthful may thus be enhanced, not necessarily reduced, by the existence of the witness’ agreement with the government. See United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) (citing cases). It is common knowledge that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its provisions will be triggered “after a loss, provided [the insured] elect[s] to repair or replace the damaged dwelling.” (Policy at 33; Def.’s Mot. for JMOL at 8.) Travelers argues that the ARCP Endorsement “is not available until plaintiffs have replaced the destroyed dwelling and the cost of the replacement has exceeded the Dwelling limit.” {Id. at 33.) Nothing in the ARCP Endorsement indicates that “elect” should be interpreted to require an insured to actually complete the repair or replacement of their dwelling, rather than evincing an intent to repair or replace their dwelling. In fact, Travelers’ interpretation of the clause would read out the ARCP Endorsement’s use of the word “elect” entirely. Cf. Minich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 CaI.App.4th 477, 122 Cal. Rptr.3d 769 (2011) (<HOLDING>). At the very least, the clause is ambiguous,

    ### Response:
    holding that an insured was not entitled to recover through their endorsement coverage where the policy actually required the insureds to repair rebuild or replace their  covered property before the endorsement would be triggered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a reasonable time. After the motions filing date, the D.C. Circuit rejected the reasoning of these circuit courts and held that the police had to obtain a warrant to use a GPS tracker to monitor a defendant for 28 days. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C.Cir.2010). Considering the majority of circuit courts that addressed the issue held that no warrant was required for a GPS device, counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress was not “objectively unreasonable.” That the Su preme Court ultimately reached the opposite conclusion in United States v. Jones, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012), more than one year after Dray-ton’s plea, does not render counsel’s performance “objectively unreasonable.” See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we DENY Drayton’s application

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to predict future law or to anticipate arguments that blossomed after trial is not a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his father’s death, and the district court thereafter warned Solimán it would not grant any further extensions. Although Solimán asserts he was residing out of state when the court entered an order warning of no further extensions, a litigant who invokes the processes of the federal courts is responsible for maintaining communication with the court during the pendency of his lawsuit. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (“A party, not the district court, bears the burden of keeping the court apprised of any changes in his mailing address.”). Solimán waited until several days after his father’s death and within a few days of the revised deadline to file his March 29 extension motion. See Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We further note that, although the district

    ### Response:
    holding district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on summary judgment motion where inter alia plaintiff had been given repeated notices court intended to rule on motion and it was plaintiffs burden to rebut defendants evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See id. at 70-71, 107 S.Ct. 367; see also Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J of Adams & Arapahoe Cntys., 735 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding trial court’s finding that employer’s leave policy reasonably accommodated employee’s need not to work on several holy days where the policy “jeopardized neither [the employee’s] job nor his observation of religious holidays”). On the other hand, to be, reasonable, an accommodation need not provide a “total” accommodation; that is, Kellogg is not required to guarantee Plaintiffs will never be scheduled for a Saturday shift, nor is Kellogg required to provide an accommodation “that spares the employee any cost whatsoever,” Pinsker, 735 F.2d at 390-91; see also Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146-46 & 146 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>), “[A]ny reasonable accommodation by the

    ### Response:
    holding that although of course an employee is not required to modify his religious beliefs a reasonable accommodation need not be on the employees terms only
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a civilized community.’” Fleming v. Hymes-Esposito, 2013 WL 1285431, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (quoting Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90 (1983)). Indeed, courts in New York have disallowed IIED claims based on findings that various types of conduct, although highly anti-social and offensive, do not rise to the level of extremity and outrageousness required to plead an IIED claim. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abodeen, 29 A.D.3d 431, 816 N.Y.S.2d 415, 432 (2006) (plaintiffs allegations that his supervisor “displayed .., nude photos [of plaintiff]” in the workplace “does not show conduct sufficiently outrageous to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Seltzer v. Bayer, 272 A.D.2d 263, 709 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that dumping a pile of cement on neighbors sidewalk tossing lighted cigarettes into his backyard throwing eggs on his front steps and threatening once to paint a swastika on his house  do not rise to the level of outrageousness or the kind of deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment or intimidation required to state an iied claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not be stored. We thus find the district court’s reliance on Denson in its decision below to be misplaced. B. Applicability of the Act to This Case Having determined that the district court erred in requiring a special nexus between a record of First Amendment activities and the agency’s system of records, we must turn to an examination of whether the agency violated the Act by making the videotape of the meeting with the analysts. The threshold issue in this regard is whether the videotape is a record of the exercise of First Amendment rights. We do not think the fact that the means of storing information in this case was a videotape makes it any less a record for purposes of the Act. See Save the Dolphins v. United States Department of Commerce, 404 F.Supp. 407, 410-11 (N.D.Cal.1975) (<HOLDING>). As long as the tape contains a means of

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion picture film is a record for purposes of the freedom of information act 5 usc  552 1976
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    figure by the average for the first 11 hours, and points out that the effect of this step was “to diminish the increase[d] [risk of driving in Hour 11] by dividing the heightened risk at the 11th hour by an average that includes that heightened llth-hour risk.” Public Citizen Br. 50. We express no view on the validity of FMCSA’s statistical method, but we agree with Public Citizen that — once again — the agency offered no explanation for its decision during the rulemaking and failed even to respond to the petitioner’s argument in its brief. Although we apply a deferential standard of review to an agency’s use of a statistical model, we cannot uphold a rule based on such a model when an important aspect of its methodology was wholly unexplained. See U.S. Air Tour Ass’n, 298 F.3d at 1008 (<HOLDING>). 2. Public Citizen further contends that the

    ### Response:
    holding that when a models methodology is challenged the agency must provide a complete analytic defense quoting small refiner lead phasedown task force 705 f2d at 535 internal quotation mark omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    63 N.Y.2d 575, 483 N.Y.S.2d 973, 975, 473 N.E.2d 223, 224 (1984). In the absence of an express lease duration (or an express term of perpetuity), New York law assigns a lease term, usually a short one. See N.Y.Real Prop. Law § 232 (McKinney 1989) (where parties fail to specify, lease of New York City property ends October 1 following possession); see also Restatement (Second) of Property § 1.5, and Comment (d) to that section (“Where the parties enter into a lease of no stated duration and periodic rent is reserved or paid, a periodic tenancy is presumed. The period thus presumed is equal to the interval for which rent is reserved or paid to a maximum periodic tenancy of year to year.”); N.Y.Real Prop.Law §§ 232-a (notice to terminate month to month tenancy in New York City), 232-c (<HOLDING>); 28 Mott Street Co. v. Summit Import Co., 34

    ### Response:
    holding over of tenant after expiration of term effect of landlords acceptance of rent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more likely to suggest the culpability of the defendant by reference to something other than the facts of the charged crime. This case is distinguishable from Wimberly v. State, 41 So.3d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), where we found certain statements by the prosecutors in closing argument to be “improper and objectionable.” Id. at 302. In a case where the prosecution had problems with its witnesses’ memories, one prosecutor argued that the neighborhood where a shooting occurred was a “close community” where people “want to protect each other” and “certainly don’t want to talk to police.” Id. We found this argument was “improper for the reason that these comments were completely unsupported by any evidence at trial.” Id.; accord United States v. Price, 346 F. App’x 796, 803-04 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Flowers v. State, 858 A.2d 328, 331-32

    ### Response:
    holding improper a prosecutors comments on the character of a neighborhood and its inhabitants where there was no supporting evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resolved only the contractual violations alleged by plaintiff, and the “distinctly separate nature of [his] contractual and statutory rights [was] not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence.” Id. at 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011. The preclusive doctrines of election of remedies, waiver, res judicata, and collateral estoppel were therefore inapplicable “in light of the collective-bargaining agreement’s failure to address arbitration of Title VII claims.” 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1467 (explaining the reasoning behind Gardner-Denver's holding); see also Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 50 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (“The policy reasons for rejecting the doctrines of election of remedies and waiver in the context of 70, 80, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998) (<HOLDING>); 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (2009) (holding

    ### Response:
    holding unionnegotiated waiver of employees right to judicial forum for statutory claims must be clear and unmistakable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the mandamus count. Thereafter, a second amended complaint was filed which again contained a count against the City for mandamus. The City moved to dismiss Alexander’s second amended complaint arguing that the issuance of a certificate of completion is discretionary and thus an improper subject matter for mandamus. The trial court granted the city’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. Alexander now appeals. As this Court has previously stated: “Mandamus is a recognized remedy to require a public official, who is clothed with the authority, to discharge his duty.” City of Miami Beach v. Sunset Islands 3 & 4 Property Owners Ass’n., 216 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). See also, e.g., Puckett v. Gentry, 577 So.2d 965, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). To that end, an act is deemed ministerial

    ### Response:
    holding that mjandamus is a common law remedy used to enforce an established legal right by compelling a person in an official capacity to perform an indisputable ministerial duty required by law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and [b] a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results. Waters v. Blackshear, 412 Mass. 589, 590, 591 N.E.2d 184, 185 (1992) citing Restatement 2d of Torts, § 13 (1965) (emphasis supplied). In addition, Blackshear held that “[a] result is intended if the act is done for the purpose of accomplishing the result or with knowledge that to a substantial certainty such a result will ensue.” Id. at 590-91, 591 N.E.2d 184 citing W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts, § 9, at 41 (5th ed.1984). This definition parallels the § 523(a)(6) scienter requirements for “wilful” under Geiger. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61, 118 S.Ct. 974; see also Pettey v. Belanger, 232 B.R. 543, 546^7 (D.Mass.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it is a bedrock principle of

    ### Response:
    holding that the debtors liability for sexual assault and battery in massachusetts falls squarely within the exception contained in  523a6
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by overruling precedent is State v. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. 210, 857 P.2d 593 (1993). In Ikezawa, this court reiterated that State v. Stone, 65 Haw. 308, 651 P.2d 485 (1982), was overruled by State v. Balauro, 73 Haw. 70, 828 P.2d 267 (1992), which held that the six-month period under HRPP 48(b), within which a criminal trial must be commenced, is tolled when a later charge is the same or is required to be joined with the original charge. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. at 221-22, 857 P.2d at 598-99. The Ikezawa court held that the principle stated in Balauro constituted a new rule and, after conducting a balancing test as to whether to apply the new rule retroactively, found that purely prospective application was more appropriate. Id.; see also State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657, 665-67 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 28 . The U.S. Supreme Court has also

    ### Response:
    holding that this courts decision in state v cuevas 53 haw 110 488 p2d 322 1971 in which we invalidated a statute imposing the burden upon a defendant to disprove the existence of malice once the act of killing is proved by the prosecution and which overruled cases that previously upheld the statutes validity announced a new rule that should be accorded pipeline retroactive application
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not illegal, as most jurisdictions do not compel suspects to furnish documentation outside the context of traffic violations. In any event, New Mexico law is not entirely clear on whether someone in Mo-cek’s shoes might be required to answer basic questions about his identity, such as a request for his address. But Officer Dilley’s only request was for documentation, and failing to show documentation, in isolation, during an investigative stop for disorderly conduct might not amount to concealing one’s identity. Nonetheless, Officer Dilley is entitled to qualified immunity. A reasonable mistake in interpreting a criminal statute, for purposes of determining whether there is probable cause to arrest, entitles an officer to qualified immunity. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231,129 S.Ct. 808 (<HOLDING>); Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1159 (resolving

    ### Response:
    holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    specifically intended to promote the mail fraud scheme. Finally, Bohn contends that his money laundering convictions are subject to dismissal because there was no evidence that he intended to aid IDM in concealing the source of the funds. The money laundering counts charge Bohn with violating two subsections of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Subsection (a)(2)(A) requires proof of intent to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity, while subsection (a)(2)(B)® requires proof of knowledge that the transportation was designed to conceal the proceeds of the unlawful activity. Although the government indicted on both subsections, it was only required to prove one or the other. See United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1265 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Westine, No. 92-3664, 1994

    ### Response:
    holding that when an indictment charges several acts conjunctively under a statute which subjects several alternative acts to the same punishment the government need only prove violation of one of the alleged acts to prove violation of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indict on the case, Dallas refused to hear the case, and they had evidence to the contrary.” James was then asked, ""And so when they came to you the first time, they told you, Dallas County didn’t want to have anything to do with this.” James responded, ""Basically, yeah.” 4 . Appellant does not argue Raquel is an accomplice to the offense or treat her as such in his brief, although the State asserts she is. Even if she is an accomplice, an issue we need not decide, the Facebook evidence is proper corroborating evidence. See Maynard v. State, 166 S.W.3d 403, 413-14 (Tex.App.Austin 2005, pet. ref’d) (using one accomplice’s out-of-court statement to corroborate another accomplice witness's testimony); see also Johnson v. State, 354 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Both the Revised Civil Statutes and the

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to hear this application would be confronted with the 1995 panel’s determinations of precisely the same issues. There are no new issues raised by the application, which appears to have been undertaken as a substitute for an appeal that was never pursued following the 1995 decision. A new panel would have no basis for setting aside the 1995 panel’s findings and would, therefore, be compelled to enter judgment dismissing the application. The situation is such that there are no factual issues in dispute, and the standing committee is entitled, therefore, as a matter of law, to a judgment dismissing the application. See also In re Application of Kliger, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (September 26, 1997) (Licari, Fracasse, and Pittman, Js.) (20 Conn. L. Rptr. 435, 437) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, Eberhart is

    ### Response:
    holding that waiver of right to reapply was valid and that applicant was therefore estopped to apply for readmission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this Court will address each of the IRS arguments in turn. 1. Marshaling as Applied to the United States The IRS contends that the doctrine of marshaling, as a matter of law, cannot be applied to the United States. This Court does not believe that application of a per se rule of such breadth is warranted. The IRS cites to five cases outside of this Circuit as authority for its assertion that the United States is immune to the marshaling doctrine: United States v. Herman, 310 F.2d 846, 848 (2nd Cir.1962)(stating that the Court would not “subject the government to a requirement that it marshall [sic] assets in favor of junior lienors, as this would create an extreme burden on the collection of revenue, unauthorized by statute.”); In re Ackerman II, 424 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.1970)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Eshelman, 663 F.Supp. 285,

    ### Response:
    holding that a junior lienor cannot invoke the marshaling doctrine to prevent the united states from enforcing tax liens against property as to do so would create a substantial burden unauthorized by statute upon the collection of federal revenue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    15 .See Allen v. State, 636 So.2d 494, 497 n. 5 (Fla.1994) (""Unlike the federal Constitution, the Florida Constitution prohibits ‘cruel or unusual ' punishment.’ Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const. This means that alternatives were intended.”). See also Tillman v. State, 591 So.2d 167, 169 n. 2 (Fla.1991) (""The use of the word ‘or’ indicates that alternatives were intended.”). 16 . See Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const. (""[Cjruel or unusual punishments] ... are forbidden.""). 17 . The federal criteria, by comparison, vary. The United States Supreme Court has analyzed a number of government practices under the federal ""cruel and unusual” provision, including the imposition of death on special groups of defendants, see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that it is not cruel and unusual to execute the mentally retarded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decades after enactment of the Act. Essential a tool as the rule may be to fair elections, it cannot reasonably be viewed as a statutory mandate violated by the Board’s actions in this case. Id. at 278-79. Rather than “disregarding] a specific and unambiguous statutory directive,” UFCW Local 400, 694 F.2d at 278, the Board in fact was exercising a power specifically granted to it under § 9(c)(1) of the Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c)(1). Indeed, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Ap peals for the Third Circuit have interpreted this statutory provision to vest the Board with “wide discretion” over representation proceedings. Wells Fargo Guard Services v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 363, 370 (3d Cir.1981), relying on NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330, 67 S.Ct. 324, 327-28, 91 L.Ed. 322 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Although the Act allowed the Board to decide

    ### Response:
    holding in part that congress has entrusted the board with a wide degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    coerced resignation. Thus, we move to the question whether Nivette presented sufficient evidence that age discrimination was a determinative factor in the decision not to renew her teaching contract. C. Discriminatory motive/pretext. Nivette was not required to show that the District hired an individual who was not in her protected class in order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231. But because Halverson subsequently hired an individual who was the same age as Nivette, once the District came forward with a nondiseriminatory reason for not rehiring Nivette, Nivette could not rest on her prima facie showing alone to get the age-discrimination question to a jury. See Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). “The critical prima facie inquiry in all

    ### Response:
    holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.” (Emphasis added.) This does not speak to the burden of proof with respect to any substantial change after the allegedly defective product leaves the seller’s hands. The Restatement (Second) provides little guidance on what constitutes “substantial change,” see id. § 402 cmt. p, much less the burden of proof on the question. 23 . Ford asserts that the ""vast majority of jurisdictions"" place the burden of negating substantial change exclusively on the plaintiff. In most of the cases Ford cites, however, it was undisputed that some change had occurred in the product. See, e.g., Glassey v. Continental Ins. Co., 176 Wis.2d 587, 500 N.W.2d 295, 300-301 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Rients v. International Harvester Co., 346

    ### Response:
    holding that the replacement of the cap of the subject spray tank constituted a substantial change
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of infertility. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D.Ill.1994) (“ ‘Related’ is a generous choice of wording, suggesting that interpretation should favor inclusion rather than exclusion in the close cases.”)- However, for reasons discussed below, this court finds that infertility is not encompassed by the phrase “related medical conditions.” The PDA is a remedial statute, and as such, it should be liberally construed. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 684, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2032-33, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Nevertheless, the word “relates” should not be interpreted to be without bounds. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1682, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Under the rules of statutory construction,

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrase relates to should be interpreted to limit the breadth of erisa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that in fact interest was accruing daily at a rate equivalent to 500% per year and that defendants have .tried to collect this interest from her. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion. The court recognized that district courts are divided on the question whether a debt collector must disclose that the amount of the debt will increase over time due to interest of fees. Compare, e.g., Jones v. Midland Funding, LLC, 755 F.Supp.2d 393, 397-98 (D.Conn.2010) (requiring debt collectors to disclose the fact that interest is accruing and inform consumers of the applicable interest rate),. adhered to on reconsideration, No. 3:08-CV-802 RNC, 2012 WL 1204716 (D.Conn. Apr. 11, 2012), and Dragon v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 483 F.Supp.2d 198, 203 (D.Conn.2007) (<HOLDING>), with Pifko v. CCB Credit Servs., Inc., No.

    ### Response:
    holding that collection notice was potentially misleading because least sophisticated consumer could conclude that total amount stated as due was due at any time when in fact it was increasing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demotion, the Agency focuses solely upon the timing of the letter. This ignores the email, which was received well before the events giving rise to Mathews’s placement on administrative leave. A causal connection is therefore not impossible to show. Furthermore, even if there had only been the one letter, it too was received by the Agency prior to its decision to demote Mathews. Although he had been placed on administrative leave prior to its receipt, there is no indication the decision to demote him had already been made. Mathews has satisfied his burden of showing a causal connection between his complaints and his subsequent demotion, and the requisite prima facie showing has thus been made. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for writ of certiorari on direct appeal. Davis argues, that, although he did not cite the Fourth Amendment in his discussion of this issue or cite any Supreme Court precedent, his use of the phrase ""the fruit of the poisonous tree” constitutes ""widely recognized language from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).” (Doc. No. 95 at 20.) Given its findings herein, the court need not and declines to address Davis' argument. 38 . The court notes that, even if the Supreme Court of Alabama erroneously decided on rehearing that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals already had adjudicated a Fourth Amendment claim, that fact would have no consequence as to the applicability of Stone. See Christian v. McKaskle, 731 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 39 . The court notes, that if the court was

    ### Response:
    holding that stone applies even though state habeas court erroneously held that petitioners fourth amendment claim had been adjudicated on direct review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its employees, and Angela D. Self, M.D. ... is clearly below the accepted standards of medical care. The medical records are such that one cannot be certain what was going on other than that he was receiving mail order prescriptions. [Emphasis added.] This same standard of care was repeated, specifically mentioning only Dr. Self, in a later section of the report. According to the Clinic, Rushing fails to specifically describe the standard of care applicable to Dr. Self, Dr. Mercau, and the ... Clinic, i.e. what steps should have been taken and when. Rushing fails to state when [James] allegedly should have been examined and what assessments, testing, or evaluation allegedly should have been done and what such testing and evaluation allegedly would have sho x.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the conduct of Dr. Self that the report

    ### Response:
    holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the complainant and the Petroleum Club inspired the complainant to bring forth new details of the sexual assault. The complainant also allegedly filed a lawsuit against the Petroleum Club and appellant. This information was brought before the jury. The complainant testified that she had talked to attorneys regarding a civil suit against the Petroleum Club and appellant. She also stated her attorney had made a settlement demand to the Petroleum Club. Thus, the jury, knowing of the complainant’s potential lawsuit against the Petroleum Club and appellant, could draw their own conclusion as to its effect, if any, on her credibility in this case. The jury disregarded appellant’s defense as was its right. Moore v. State, 804 S.W.2d 165, 166 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility

    ### Response:
    holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    through international waters or airspace. See Sugiyama, 846 F.2d at 572; Perez, 776 F.2d at 801. Cabaccang expressly overruled settled law. 332 F.3d at 635 (“To the extent that Sugiyama and Perez address the transport of drugs through international airspace on a nonstop domestic flight, they are overruled.”). Alaimalo could not have raised his claim of innocence in an effective fashion prior to Cabaccang, at which point he had already exhausted his direct appeal and § 2255 motion. See Triestman 124 F.3d at 379; Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610; contra Harrison, 519 F.3d at 961 (noting that case law at the time of petitioner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 “invited the very argument” raised in the purported § 2241 petition); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 958, 963 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The government argues that Alaimalo’s actual

    ### Response:
    holding that where petitioners  2255 motion was still pending at the time the supreme court effected a material change in the applicable law he had an unobstructed chance to raise his actual innocence claim in the pending petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    another portion of testimony where, during redirect examination by the prosecution, one of the detectives commented on Davis's credibility. The court of appeals affirmed the admission of this testimony on grounds that defense counsel opened the door to it during cross-examination. Because of the court of appeals' holding, that portion of challenged testimony is not encompassed within the granted certiorari questions, and we do not consider it here. 2 . Section 16-10-201, C.R.S. (2012), permits the introduction at trial of a witness's previous inconsistent statement, not only for the purpose of impeachment but also for the purpose of establishing a fact. A witness's actual or feigned memory loss is tantamount to denial. See People v. Pepper, 193 Colo. 505, 508, 568 P.2d 446, 448 (1977) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Baca, 633 P.2d 528, 529

    ### Response:
    holding that a witnesss prior inconsistent statements are admissible even in the event of that witnesss actual or feigned memory loss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to federal court.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 413 F.3d at 907 (stating that § 1144(a) provides an affirmative defense against claims not completely preempted by ERISA). However, it would be grossly inaccurate to suggest that removal is foreclosed. Rather, if the claim falls under § 1132, it is completely preempted by federal law and thus removable. Neumann, 376 F.3d at 779-80. Plaintiff interprets the Court’s order to implement a two-part test, by which establishing preemption under § 1144 is an absolute prerequisite for complete preemption under § 1132. This, however, is incorrect. Finding a claim completely preempted under § 1132 is not dependent upon first finding express preemption under § 1144. See Harris v. Deaconess Health Servs. Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 889, 893 (E.D.Mo.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, preemption under both sections

    ### Response:
    holding that judicial analysis of the preemption under  1144 cannot help a federal court determine whether it has subjectmatter jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    head back and opened his mouth, and tears ran down his face. The bizarre scene the officers encountered when they entered Room 204, the outward signs of Appellant’s unconsciousness, and the testimony of record, permit the conclusion that the officers were unable to determine at that time whether Appellant was truly unconscious or merely feigning his condition. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the officers had probable cause for the impermissibly admitted into evidence his recorded, non-Mirandized statements to Nurse Geyer. This court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit a defendant’s non-Mirandized statements under an .2d 315 (1981), rev’d on other grounds, Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.1986) (habeas corpus proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Fulfilling the state action requirement is

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecution could not admit in its caseinchief statements vickers gave to a psychologist associate employed at the state prison because the employee failed to give miranda warnings to vickers before questioning him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court should be affirmed. BROWN, Ju 458, 172 L.Ed.2d 331 (2008). Because Carter’s trial counsel did not object to the instruction at trial, his appellate counsel would have been required to raise the issue on direct appeal as fundamental error. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that when we consider a claim of fundamental error, “we look to the jury instructions as a whole to determine if they were adequate.” Ringham v. State, 768 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ind.2002), reh’g denied. Even in cases of “clear Spradlin error,” the Indiana Supreme Court has refused to vacate an attempted murder conviction if “the instructions as a whole sufficiently suggested the requirement of intent to kill.” Williams v. State, 737 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind.2000) (citing Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ind.2000)) (<HOLDING>). Here, the instruction first provided that

    ### Response:
    holding that the jury instructions taken as a whole sufficiently informed the jury of the states burden of proving that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him that he would be notified as soon as a decision was made. After over a year had passed, Knight, on his own initiative, contacted the clerk seeking information about the status of his case. Until the clerk responded, Knight had no way of knowing that his state remedies had been exhausted. The law is clear that he could not file a federal motion until his pending state application was denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(e). Therefore, he had every reason to delay such filing until he knew that state relief had been denied. Such circumstances meet the requirements of Sandvik so that Knight was entitled to have the time limitations of AEDPA equitably tolled until the date that he received notice that the state court had denied relief. See Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that lack of knowledge of state court decision may provide basis for equitable tolling when prisoner acts diligently
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Van Gorder claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that he was prejudiced by having a sheriffs deputy seated at the defense table during trial. Under New York law, “[w]hen courtroom security measures are challenged as inherently prejudicial, the question arises whether the security measures presented a risk that the jury’s deliberations were infected.” People v. Terry, 188 A.D.2d 1020, 591 N.Y.S.2d 666 (4th Dep’t 2002) (finding no such risk of infection where “presence of deputies in the courtroom, without more, was not inherently prejudicial,” and record did not disclose, directly or by inference, that the jury’s verdict was affected by the presence of the uniformed deputies) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) (<HOLDING>)); People v. Brown, 136 A.D.2d 1, 13, 525

    ### Response:
    holding that presence of uniformed officers during trial is related to states legitimate interest in maintaining custody during proceedings four uniformed state troopers sitting behind petitioner in first spectator row not prejudicial even though there also were eight security guards and two sheriff deputies in the courtroom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exactly this type of testimony (and not just lineup and photo spread identifications). Statements of prior identifications are admitted as substantive evidence because of “the generally unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as compared with those made at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions.” FED. R. EVID. 801, advisory committee notes. We noted in Brink, 39 F.3d at 426, that evidence is generally admitted under 801(d)(1)(C) “when a witness has identified the defendant in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.” We explained that this Rule then permits a third person to testify regarding the previous statements of the eyewitness. Id.; see also United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 899

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony of fbi agent regarding bank tellers out of court identification was properly admitted under 801d1c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Andrade, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)). The Court concluded in Andrade that two consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences with the possibility of parole, imposed under California’s three-strikes law on the basis of two petty theft convictions, did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1175; see also Ewing v. California, — U.S.-, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (<HOLDING>). On the basis of Andrade and Ewing, we

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    states. Any such conflict must be determined on an issue-by-issue basis. Veazey v. Doremus, supra., at 248, 510 A.2d 1187; Gantes v. Kason Corp., supra., at 484, 679 A.2d 106, Fu v. Fu, supra., at 118, 733 A.2d 1133, Erny v. Estate of Merola, supra., at 100, 792 A.2d 1208. A review of the consumer fraud statutes of the various states, and the cases decided thereunder demonstrates the existence of numerous actual conflicts on various issues between provisions of the NJCFA and those of the statutes enacted by other state es under the NJCFA in connection with the purchase of goods and services for commercial or business uses, see, e.g., City Check Cashing v. The National State Bank, 244 N.J.Super. 304, 309, 582 A.2d 809, (App.Div.), certif. den. 122 N.J. 389, 585 A.2d 391, (1990) (<HOLDING>); Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster,

    ### Response:
    holding that 1 the njcfa applies to corporations and other business entities when they are acting as consumers because business entities are considered a person under the act and no reason exists to treat it differently and 2 to be a consumer in respect to a transaction the business entity must be one who uses the goods and thereby diminishes their economic utility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without unreasonable delay” by the party seeking relief. N.C.R. App. P. 22(b). As the underlying history of the writ demonstrates, the remedy should be promptly sought for enforcement of the improperly denied legal right. An award of damages for delay in compliance with the legal duty is therefore not authorized in North Carolina in an action for the writ of mandamus. Further, although not controlling authority, decisions of our sister jurisdictions provide guidance on this question of first impression. We find that other jurisdictions which, like North Carolina, lack specific statutory authority for award of damages in a mandamus action have similarly determined such a right does not exist as a matter of law. See Hayes v. Civ. Ser. Com’n of Metro Gov., 907 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. App. 1995) (<HOLDING>), see also Smith v. Berryman, 199 S.W. 165 (Mo.

    ### Response:
    holding when the state statute did not abrogate the common law rule the only available damage remedy in a mandamus action was one for making a false return and damages for the delay in doing the thing the mandamus sought to command could not be sought in the mandamus action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    significant injuries. ¶ 19. The photographs of Hicks’s injuries, however, show that he had only minor scratches following the attack on his mother. The evidence at trial contradicts his testimony that he acted in self-defense. Hicks testified that he did not hit his mother with the ironing board; rather, he had only tried to push her away with it. Hicks testified that when he left his mother in the house after the attack, she just had “a few nicks” on her. The photographs and testimony contradict both of those claims. Further, Officer Kufel testified that when he went to the crime scene to photograph it and to gather evidence, he did not find a steak knife. ¶20. An officer is allowed to describe his first-hand observations of injuries. See Seal v. Miller, 605 So.2d 240, 244 (Miss.1992) (<HOLDING>). However, officers may not give expert

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony from an officer that she did not perceive any evidence to indicate that a car had spun before hitting a pole did not require any special expertise or skill it was enough that the witness had firsthand knowledge of what was present at the scene
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    denying immunity is therefore “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. at 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 2806. But this exception to § 1291’s jurisdictional final order requirement depends on a summary judgment decision that actually denies an absolute or qualified immunity defense. See, e.g., Bines v. Kulaylat, 215 F.3d 381, 385-86 (3d Cir.2000) (dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction defendant’s interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment; refusing to entertain qualified immunity argument raised for first time on appeal). An interlocutory appeal may also of course be taken from a decision that fails or refuses to decide a claim of immunity that has been squarely presented to the district court. See Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 334-36 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, the defendants did not move

    ### Response:
    holding district courts order postponing ruling on defendants qualified immunity defense was immediately appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a single act or a series of acts to constitute a unit of prosecution for willful injury, then it certainly had the wherewithal to do so when drafting section 708.4(1). More complicating is the fact that our court has construed certain criminal statutes without express reference to a “series of acts” or a “course of conduct” to include a series of acts as a single unit of prosecution. Compare State v. Amsden, 300 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1981) (finding the jury should have been instructed on the joinder of a series of acts in a theft case when the prosecution charged the defendant with one count of first-degree theft based on five separate acts, even though Iowa Code section 714.2 refers only to the “theft of property”), with State v. Melia, 231 Iowa 332, 339, 1 N.W.2d 230, 233 (1941) (<HOLDING>). When criminal statutes are ambiguous, we

    ### Response:
    holding the defendants act of firing five shots very close together where two deaths resulted constituted not a single act but a series of acts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in ... this title, any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows.... ”). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi, courts routinely held that § 841(b) imposed a strict liability punishment scheme based solely on the type and quantity of drugs possessed by the defendant and that a defendant’s knowledge of the type and quantity was not relevant to the sentencing decision. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia-Gonzales, 172 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.1999); United States v. Strange, 102 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Salazar, 5 F.3d 445, 446 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir.1987). Rodriguez nevertheless argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi, wherein the Court held t 4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 936, 124 S.Ct. 363,

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi did not change the governments mens rea burden under  841 and the defendants knowledge with regard to the exact nature or for that matter the exact amount of a controlled substance is not a fact that increases the penalty under  841b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a pleading that’s earlier filed in this case, and here’s what it said, and then we don’t have to go down the road of and there was another party in the case that got dismissed out on summary judgment. The abandoned pleading related to factual averments Goodrich had once asserted against Jester, an entity no longer in the case and whose identity and interests would have to be explained to the jury if the abandoned pleading were to be received in evidence. Again assuming, for the sake of argument, that the abandoned pleading was actually admissible, confusion of the issues is a recognizable ground for refusing to receive otherwise admissible evidence and we would find no abuse of discretion in refusing to receive it under the circumstances present here. See Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 56 (<HOLDING>). Point II is also denied and the judgment is

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence when the potential for jury confusion and the introduction of collateral issues justified the exclusion of evi dence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the purposes of a motion to remand. See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir.1997). 3 . The Eleventh Circuit employs the ""unanimity rule,” which requires that all defendants consent to removal. See Tri-Cities Newspapers, Inc. v. Tri-Cities Printing Pressmen and Assistants, Local 349, 427 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir.1970); Miles v. Kilgore, 928 F.Supp. 1071, 1076 (N.D.Ala.1996). This rule is subject to the following exception: ""unless and until the case is remanded it is not necessary that a fraudulently or improperly joined defendant join with the other defendants in a petition for removal.” Erkins v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 866 F.Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D.Ala.1994) (citations omitted); see also Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n. 1 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 713

    ### Response:
    holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in common areas is generally premised on the control a landlord maintains over the common areas.” (Footnote omitted). The duty to maintain these areas in a reasonably safe condition extends not only to the tenant but “includes the members of his family, his guests, his invitees, and others on the land in the right of the tenant.” Landay v. Cohn, 220 Md. 24, 27, 150 A.2d 739, 741 (1959). “It has been held that a child on the land at the invitation of the child of the tenant is entitled to the benefit of the landlord’s obligation in this respect.” Landay v. Cohn, supra, 220 Md. at 27-28, 150 A.2d at 741. Other cases recognizing that the landlord owes a duty to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe condition include, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Macke Laundry Service Co. v. Weber, 267 Md.

    ### Response:
    holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship,” the First Amendment precludes judicial resolution of the dispute. Rayburn, supra, 772 F.2d at 1168-69 (citing Bagni, supra, 79 Colum.L.Rev. at 1545). Cases in both the federal system and our own courts indicate that when an employee engages in “ministerial functions” for the employer, courts may not exercise jurisdiction over a suit to enforce the employment agreement. Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1356-58; Natal, supra, 873 F.2d at 1578; Rayburn, supra, 772 F.2d at 1168, 1171-72; Southwestern Baptist, supra, 651 F.2d at 283-85; see Little, supra, 929 F.2d at 947-48; cf. Chavis, supra, 93 N.J. at 112, 459 A.2d 674 (<HOLDING>). Those cases rely on the sound proposition

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment precludes judicial inquiry into propriety of removal procedures followed in defrocking of deacon
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not merely prescribe a procedure, but rather a substantive right of a defendant to a reduction in its liability for fault that is fairly attributable to others and not to it. See Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 739 (5th Cir.1999) (applying § 85-5-7 after stating that “for a diversity action, we apply state substantive law”). Moreover, in terms of intendment and effect in general, app (D.N.J.1999) (applying conflicts analysis to issue of apportionment of fault to determine whether Maryland or New Jersey law substantive law governed); Stingley v. Raskey, 1995 WL 696591, at *7 (D.AIaska 1995) (describing right of third-party plaintiff to an equitable apportionment of fault between all parties as substantive right); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F.Supp. 679, 680 (E.D.Mo.1979) (<HOLDING>). Having determined that the issue under

    ### Response:
    holding that right of one joint tortfeasor to implead a second joint tortfeasor and have the jury apportion the damages according to their relative degrees of fault was not merely a procedural right but a substantive right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    qualify as a felony drug offense for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841. See Dyer, 136 F.3d at 427-28. As Brown notes, we held to the contrary of Hill’s alleged advice in United States v. Mankins, 135 F.3d 946, 949-50 (5th Cir. 1998), and Brown offers no sound reasons as to why he did not raise this argument in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which he filed nearly nine months after we decided Mankins. See Dyer, 136 F.3d at 422. Although Brown contends, as the factual underpinning for his second ineffective-assistance claim, that he told Hill he had not participated in the recorded phone conversation that formed the basis of his conviction, his contention is refuted by the factual basis to which he admitted as part of his plea agreement. See United States v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not clearly err by

    ### Response:
    holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. 4 . We do not consider any argument that Allen is entitled to relief under R.C.M. 707(a)(1), which provides that ""[t]he accused shall be brought to trial within 120 days after ... [plreferral of charges.” Bums and its progeny appear only to deal with claims of constitutional violations, not violations of military procedural rules. See, e.g., Burns, 346 U.S. at 139, 73 S.Ct. 1045 (explaining that federal civil courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed alleging the proceedings under which they were convicted ""denied them basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution”) (emphasis added); Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Allen’s counsel effectively

    ### Response:
    holding that for a federal court to have jurisdiction to review courtmartial proceedings the asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimension 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    matter jurisdiction is defined as “the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 540. Here, it is clear that the Marion Superior Court possessed jurisdiction over the general class of cases to which this petition belonged. First American filed a petition for review of an order issued by the Commissioner, head of an administrative agency, as contemplated by the AOPA. See Ind.Code § 4-21.5-5-2. The Commissioner’s argument that First American failed to exhaust its administrative remedies as set forth in Indiana Code section 4-21.5-5-4 goes towards the jurisdiction of this particular case, and is thus a procedural and not jurisdictional error. See Kennedy v. Town of Gaston, 923 N.E.2d 988, 994 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (<HOLDING>). Because the Commissioner raises this alleged

    ### Response:
    holding that the alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the unsafe building act was a procedural rather than jurisdictional error and was thus waived when it was not raised in a timely fashion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the restrictive covenant was an overbroad, unreasonable restraint of trade since it not only prohibited Fine from soliciting CTI’s clients, but also prohibited her from “otherwise” communicating with the former clients to accept business, without solicitation and regardless of who initiated the contact. We agree. “While a prohibition involving some affirmative act on the part of the former employee, such as solicitation, diversion, or contact of clients, may be reasonable, a covenant prohibiting a former employee from merely accepting business, without any solicitation, is not reasonable.” (Footnotes and emphasis omitted.) Waldeck v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 590, 592 (583 SE2d 266) (2003). See also Singer v. Habif Arogeti & Wynne, PC., 250 Ga. 376, 377 (1) (297 SE2d 473) (1982) (<HOLDING>); Akron Pest Control v. Radar Exterminating

    ### Response:
    holding that a restrictive covenant was unreasonable and overprotective since it would prohibit the employee from accepting employment from a former client who approached him for services without any prior solicitation on his part
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made by the individual officers, and not a superior officer. At various times when addressing the issue, the trial judge expressed the view that there was nothing he could do regarding defendant’s complaint. Although the judge correctly stated he could not compel witnesses to speak to the defense against their will, he did not lack any authority to remedy the situation in the event he found the allegations to be true. In State v. Boiardo, 172 N.J.Super. 528, 412 A.2d 1084 (Law Div.1980), the trial judge required that a government witness be produced for personal interview by defense counsel, but fully informed “he has an absolute and personal right to either grant or deny the interview” and terminate it at will. Id. at 532, 412 A.2d 1084; see also Carrigan, supra, 804 F.2d at 601, 603 (<HOLDING>); but see R. 3:13-2(a) (limiting circumstances

    ### Response:
    holding that under the extraordinary circumstances found by the district court it was not an abuse of discretion to order that defendants be permitted to take depositions of the witnesses in the presence of their attorney and the governments counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citing United States v. Ross, 654 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir.1981)). The twist in this case comes about because there was no timely motion to stay the mandate; this court did issue its mandate and then denied Pete’s motion to recall the mandate. With the mandate in effect, the district court resumed jurisdiction over the case. See United States v. Ruiz-Alvarez, 211 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2000) (“Once a mandate issues, ... jurisdiction over a criminal case automatically revests in the district court.”) (emphasis in original). As a result, the government did not have to, and did not, wait until the Supreme Court denied Pete’s cer-tiorari petition before filing the indictment in the district court. Instead, the indictment was filed while Pete’s certiorari petitio ; Crooks II, 826 F.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Van Brandy, 726 F.2d 548,

    ### Response:
    holding that even though the trial date had already been set and the motion or proceeding actually caused no delay in the start of the trial the period of pendency of the motion or proceeding was nonetheless excludable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ground for difference of opinion” on the issue. A party’s disagreement with the district court’s ruling is insufficient to demonstrate a “substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, No. CVF046663RECLJO, 2005 WL 3470653, at *2 (E.D.Cal.2005). The moving party must make “some greater showing.” Napa Community Redevelopment Agency v. Continental Ins. Co., No. C-94-3284 DLJ, 1995 WL 714363, at *3 (N.D.Cal.1995). For example, courts have held this factor is satisfied when there is a lack of binding authority on an issue, which is subject to differing interpretations. See, e.g., Maestri v. Westlake Excavating Co., Inc., 894 F.Supp. 573, 578 (N.D.N.Y.1995); see also, Wells Fargo Bank v. Bourns, Inc., 860 F.Supp. 709, 717 (N.D.Cal.1994) (<HOLDING>). Third, an immediate appeal from the order

    ### Response:
    holding the available precedent left substantial ground for difference of opinion  when the issues  have not been squarely addressed by the ninth circuit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other case and on no other plea, shall an action be sustained ... [and] no alleged irregularity in the assessment, or in the process or otherwise, shall be construed or taken to affect the title of the purchaser, but the same shall be declared to be good and legal. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller,- Pa. -, 143 A.3d 358 (2016) (quoting Act of 1815). A five-year redemption period applied if the property was purchased by the county commissioners at tax sale. 11 . As our High Court acknowledged in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 620 Pa. 1, 65 A.3d 885, 886-887 (2013), various Pennsylvania statutes, such as the Municipalities Planning Code, define natural gas as a mineral. See 53 P.S. § 10107; see also Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207, 964 A.2d 855, 858 (2009) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Our High Court reasoned that such a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that while natural gas may be classified as a mineral under the municipalities planning code pennsylvania common law has applied a rebuttable presumption in the context of a private deed conveyance that the term mineral does not include oil or gas
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “neither minor nor ministerial matters,” Walling, 327 U.S. at 217 n.57, 66 S.Ct. 494, “[i]f an agency’s subpoena satisfies these requirements, [a court] must enforce it,” Thornton, 41 F.3d at 1544. To the extent the Fourth Amendment is implicated by the use of an administrative subpoena, satisfaction of these requirements also satisfies that amendment. See Walling, 327 U.S. at 208, 66 S.Ct. 494 (“[T]he Fourth [Amendment], if applicable, at the most guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be ‘particularly described,’ if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are relevant.”); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2443, 2453, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) (<HOLDING>). Ordinarily, “an investigation terminates once

    ### Response:
    holding for an administrative search to be constitutional under the fourth amendment the subject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker which requirement would be satisfied by an administrative subpoena
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have found the statute of limitations begins to run: (i) at the time of arrest, see Wallace v. City of Chicago, 471 F.Supp.2d 894, 898 (N.D.Ill.2004) (applying Illinois law, and holding that the statute of limitations on a false imprisonment claim begins to run at the time false imprisonment begins); Leatherwood v. Key West, 347 So.2d 441, 442 (Fla.App.1977) (“The cause of action for false arrest and imprisonment accrued on the day of plaintiffs arrest .... ”), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 131 (Fla.1978); Brooks v. Pennington, 995 So.2d 733, 737 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (stating that “a complaint for false arrest and false imprisonment accrues on the date of arrest.”); (ii) at the time of arraignment or when legal process is initiated, see Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky.2007)

    ### Response:
    holding that johnsons cause of action for false imprisonmentfalse arrest accrued when he was bound over for trial in march 2003 and not when he was arrested in february 2003 or when he was released in 2006
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are shown: a written agreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate. Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Watts Industries, Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.2005). Only the third element is at issue here. Relying primarily on cases from the Second and Third circuits, Pushpin argues that a refusal to arbitrate can be established only if the non-moving party files a lawsuit or is ordered to arbitrate a dispute and fails to do so. See, e.g., LAIF X SPRL v. Axtel, S.A. de C.V., 390 F.3d 194, 198 (2d Cir.2004) (“A party has refused to arbitrate if it commences litigation or is ordered to arbitrate th[e] dispute [by the relevant arbitral authority] and fails to do so.”); PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli, 61 F.3d 1063, 1066 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In PaineWebber, the Third Circuit held that

    ### Response:
    holding that an action to compel arbitration accrues only when the respondent unequivocally refuses to arbitrate either by failing to comply with an arbitration demand or by otherwise unambiguously manifesting an intention not to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are not bound by lower federal court decisions involving either constitutional or statutory interpretation, we do give such decisions due respect in an attempt to create “judicial comity” and avoid forum shopping. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 79-80, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990). We are not bound by lower federal courts because “state courts and the lower federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy the same position; there is parallelism but not paramountey for both sets of courts are governed by the same reviewing authority of the Supreme Court.” State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 36, 214 A.2d 393 (1965) , cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950, 86 S.Ct. 1210, 16 L.Ed.2d 212 (1966) . See also State v. One 1994 Ford Thunderbird, 349 N.J.Super. 352, 364, 793 A.2d 792 (App.Div.2002) (<HOLDING>). We are not free to determine whether Ray’s

    ### Response:
    holding that bjecause there has never been a definitive statement by the united states supreme court clarifying the recognized ambiguity in cooper v california 386 us 58 87 sct 788 17 led2d 730 1967  we are free to adopt our own view of its holding unconstrained by opinions of federal courts of appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assume, without a scintilla of evidence, that Officer Grant informed Vetor, either from memory or by reading from his card, of the consequence of his refusal to submit to a breath test as required by Ind. Code 9-30-6-7(a). We find that Vetor met his burden of proof. In Zakhi, this court determined: To establish an adequate refusal under the implied consent statute, the arresting officer must convey the strong likelihood that suspension of driving privileges would follow the driver’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test. This is accomplished when the police officer informs the accused that refusal to take the test will result in the suspension of driving privileges. 560 N.E.2d at 686-87 (Citations omitted) (Emphasis added). See also Todd v. State, 566 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence in the present case that

    ### Response:
    holding insufficient officers advisement that defendants license may be suspended if he refused to submit to breath test when statute mandates that license will be suspended for refusal of chemical test
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    normal contract principles. Chrysler emphasizes that the Cudas are the parties against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced and that the Cudas’ abandonment application was responsible for the settlement not being approved. We conclude, however, that the Cudas did no more than they were legally entitled to do as the real parties in interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (authorizing party in interest to request a court order of abandonment of a particular property). Additionally, we note that the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court recognized their status as the real parties in interest in approving the abandonment. We do not believe the Cudas can be penalized for taking actions expressly sanctioned by the Code and the appropriate courts. See In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we decline to hold that the Cudas’

    ### Response:
    holding that trustee could not have breached settlement agreement pending court approval by engaging in behavior violative of the agreement since bankruptcy court formally endorsed trustees course of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm. Wright claims that Bureau of Prisons officials have unconstitutionally prevented him from litigating his criminal conviction by seizing his mail and sanctioning him with the loss of phone, visitation, and email correspondence privileges. These claims are not cognizable under section 2241 because they do not concern the manner, location, or conditions of his sentence’s execution. See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, as the district court concluded, the appropriate remedy for Wright’s claims lies in a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1341

    ### Response:
    recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their Eighth Amendment analyses. For example, in MacLean v. State Board of Retirement, 432 Mass. 339, 733 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass.2000), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined the gravity of the offense, the maximum fine that could be imposed, the extent of the unlawful activity, the amount of illegal gain in relation to the penalty, and the harm caused. See id. at 1061-62; see also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339-40, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (comparing the amount of the forfeiture, $357,144, to the gravity of the offense; examining also the harm that the respondent caused); United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir.1998) (taking into account maximum fine that could have been imposed). ¶ 19 Applying these factors here, we conclude that the $135,000 fine asses th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), with Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce St., 574 Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding that forfeiture of farm worth 245000 was not grossly disproportional because the farms value was roughly equal to the wholesale value of the marijuana that was brought to the farm or distributed from the farm during the life of the conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was impossible and therefore that no infringement might be termed “willful.” The Court disagrees. Elimination by manual monitoring would have been difficult and expensive, but not impossible, particularly for images as obviously infringing as the ones at issue here. The evidence shows that Webb-world implemented substantial effort to combat the infringement. Notwithstanding its “compliance program,” Webbworld chose to continue to copy from a newsgroup that essentially advertised by its “centerfolds” name that it carried PEI images. After it was on notice of infringement, Webbworld chose to stay in business without implementing a system that would reliably delete even such obvious transgressions. Such an action constitutes willful infringement. See Broadcast Music, Inc., 855 F.2d at 236 (<HOLDING>). For the five copyright registrations

    ### Response:
    holding that a music vendors choice to stay in business and thereby to continue to infringe copyrighted music was patently willful
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that she was in a committed relationship with B.O.C.’s sister and had no interest in a relationship with a male. The trial court specifically found in the Final Judgment of Paternity that it was the intent of the parties “that [B.O.C.] would provide the donor sperm with which [A.A.B.] became pregnant and that the child would be raised by [A.A.B.] and [B.O.C.’s] sister as the child’s Parents.” In a factually similar Texas case, In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33 (2006), a mother challenged the standing of a sperm donor to pursue a proceeding to establish the paternity of a child conceived through artificial insemination. The mother and her same-sex partner had asked the partner’s brother to act as a sperm donor so that the couple could have a child together. The parties did not pu d 523 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Because B.O.C. was a sperm donor he

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to comply with the statutory requirement of physician involvement prevented the mother from claiming that the sperm donor was not a legal parent under the donor nonpaternity statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    found that there were legitimate reasons for a school's anti-nepotism policy, the dissent overlooks the court's language marking as unconstitutional a public employer’s adverse employment action based only on a protected right. Here, we have just that. Unlike the case in Montgomery, we are not deciding this case on the merits; in viewing the facts in favor of Barrett, he was denied employment only because he was exercising his right to educate his son in a manner of his choice. 4 . In its opinion, the district court cited precedent from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits to support the proposition that dictating where an employee of the school district can send his child to school infringes on the familial rights of that teacher. See Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Stough v. Crenshaw County Bd. of Educ., 744

    ### Response:
    holding that retaliation against a school employee who placed her child in private school violates rights protected under the first amendment and the penumbra of familial privacy rights recognized by the supreme court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff drove his truck over the interstate, endangering not only himself but many others in the process. Plaintiff admitted “waking up” while proceeding down the freeway, not knowing where he was or where the time went. In his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that it was possible that he could run over someone with his truck and not notice it. Indeed, by his own admission, Plaintiffs driving in such condition created “a possibility of extreme danger.” (Plaintiffs Depo., at 108). Although someone with Plaintiffs condition can likely do a plethora of other tasks, driving a gasoline truck weighing several tons loaded with flammable liquid is certainly not one of them. Plaintiff is not qualified for the position of gas delivery driver as a matter of law. See Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 698 (<HOLDING>); accord Chiari v. City of League City, 920

    ### Response:
    holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law is so certified. CUNNINGHAM, NOBLE, SCHRODER, SCOTT, and VENTERS, JJ., concur. ABRAMSON, J., dissents by separate opinion in which MINTON, C.J., joins. 1 . Doe subsequently challenged the registration statute in state court on state law grounds, with the Alaska Supreme Court holding that the statute cannot be applied retroactively. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008). 2 . The Indiana Supreme Court recently held that, as applied to those who committed their crimes before the statute was enacted, Indiana's sex offender residency restriction statute constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the ex post facto clause of the state's constitution. State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145 (Ind.2009). See also Mikaloff v. Walsh, No. 5:06-CV-96, 2007 WL 2572268 (N.D.Ohio Sept.4, 2007) (<HOLDING>). The Mikaloff ap peal was dismissed at the

    ### Response:
    holding that retroactive application of ohios residency restriction statute violates the federal ex post facto clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that appellate courts could extend such jurisdiction if the rulings were ‘inextricably intertwined.’ ” Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Swint, 514 U.S. at 51, 115 S.Ct. 1203). Thus, “the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction ... allows a court of appeals ‘to review an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one.’ ” Montano v. City of Chicago, 375 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir.2004) (quoting Jones v. Info-Cure, Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2002)). To establish pendent appellate jurisdiction, however, Officer Duplain must first establish at least one appealable order, because without an underlying “appealable” order, there can be nothing pendent. See Montano, 375 F.3d at 599 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).

    ### Response:
    holding that pendent jurisdiction allows review of an unappealable order if it is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, seeking to compel the State of New Mexico to negotiate in good faith to achieve a compact permitting class III gaming. In deciding that case, the Court noted that “it appears the majority [of cases] supports the view that IGRA waived tribal sovereign immunity in the narrow category of cases where compliance with IGRA’s provisions is at issue and where only declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.” This majority view (that the IGRA waived tribal sovereign immunity only in the narrow category of cases where compliance with IGRA’s provisions is at issue), was mentioned again recently by the Tenth Circuit in Santana v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 508 Fed.Appx. 821 (10th Cir.2013) (unpublished order and judgment cited pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) (<HOLDING>)). Santana quoted the above-cited language from

    ### Response:
    holding based on oklahoma compact that tribal immunity was not waived for civil tort suits brought in state or federal court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Namely, Dumstrey parks his car in the parking garage in order to be free from the elements, including frigid winters. Id. The dissent from the court of appeals characterizes this use as one associated with the ""privacies of life."" Id. However, to the contrary, courts seem overwhelmingly to hold that parking alone constitutes a use associated with neither an intimate activity of the home nor a privacy of life. See, e.g., Mack v. City of Abilene, 461 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases and indicating that common parking area is not a use associated with curtilage of home); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 705 N.E.2d 1110 (Mass. 1999) (noting that regular and intended use for tenant parking does not give rise to curtilage designation); State v. Harnisch, 931 P.2d 1359, 1364 (Nev. 1997) (<HOLDING>), disapproved of on other grounds by State v.

    ### Response:
    holding that parking in designated parking space open to view does not constitute  intimate activities of the home or the privacies of  life 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the first prong. The Court will deny the relief sought because the petition fails on the first prong — the petitioner has not, for the following reasons, demonstrated an indisputable right to the creation of such an overpayment. A writ must be denied as to this element of the extraordinary relief sought because we hold that the Secretary is already obliged, if the statutory and regulatory requirements are met, to pay attorney fees in an appropriate amount directly to the attorney without regard to any recoupment of any overpayment to the veteran. We note at this point that we make no determination as to whether the attorney would be entitled to the full 20% (or any portion thereof) of the past-due benefits total awarded for all three claims. See Mason Fee Agreement, 13 Vet.App. at 86 (<HOLDING>). a. Interpretation of statutory provision: The

    ### Response:
    holding that direct payment of attorney fees for representation before the court is to be made on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was primarily intended to and did benefit its union and employer parties and not the community in general[,]” despite evidence that community received indirect benefit); California College of Mortuary Science v. County of Los Angeles, 23 Cal.App.3d 702, 100 Cal.Rptr. 558, 560 (1972) (denying exemption to vocational school in mortuary sciences because it did “not benefit primarily t d. of Equalization, 237 Neb. 1, 465 W.W.2d 111, 121 (1991) (denying tax exemp tion to Bar Foundation because it had not shown that it “[was] an institution with the primary or predominant activity of offering regular courses with systematic instruction in academic, vocational, or technical subjects”); PICPA Found. for Educ. & Research v. Commonwealth, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 291, 598 A.2d 1078, 1082, 1083 (1991) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 535 Pa. 67, 634 A.2d 187 (1993);

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner was not entitled to refund as nonprofit educational institution because it operated primarily and predominantly to benefit individuals who have a professional or occupational interest in accounting subjects and only conferred an indirect benefit to the public in general
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2003 accident. And when I questioned her she said, yes, at one point in time she was claiming that she was permanently injured because of that accident. I think that’s something that’s not insignificant and we should keep in mind when we look at the evidence of this particular case. In denying Squires’ motion for a new trial, the circuit court explained that the other pleading merely duplicated Kurtz’s testimony and was more prejudicial than probative. The circuit court further explained its concern that admitting the pleading would have violated the collateral source rule and risked tainting the jury because the jurors would have wanted to know if Kurtz was compensated from the other lawsuit. See Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins. Agency, Inc., 89 S.D. 419, 434, 234 N.W.2d 260, 269 (1975) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 23.] Squires’ main complaint is that he

    ### Response:
    recognizing that compensation from a collateral source indepen dent of the wrongdoer will not reduce the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McLendon’s motion for a mistrial. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is Affirmed. 1 . The court apparently interpreted its prior instruction barring testimony ""about guns” as including ammunition, 1/4/00 Tr. at 6, an interpretation the government does not dispute. 2 . The government explains that it was this evidence, and not testimony concerning the ammunition, that the prosecutor had been attempting to elicit by asking the investigator whether he had recovered ""anything else.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. 3 . See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C.Cir.2003); United States v. Conyers, 118 F.3d 755, 757 (D.C.Cir. 1997). 4 . See United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065

    ### Response:
    holding that juries may infer an intent to distribute narcotics from the presence of firearms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir.2006) (“Exigent circumstances terminate when the factors creating the exigency are negated.”). Moreover, the exigent circumstances that precipitated the initial seizure did not materially change from the beginning of the standoff to the end. This armed standoff was a single Fourth Amendment event, a continuous process of formalizing Fisher’s arrest that began in the early morning hours of October 24. The police maintained a secure perimeter around Fisher’s apartment, and Fisher refused to surrender. Fisher threatened the officers shortly after they arrived, and retained full control of his eighteen guns and ammunition until the end. The entire standoff was an uninterrupted, fluid engagement between Fisher and the police. See id. (<HOLDING>). The mere fact that Fisher was not seen with a

    ### Response:
    holding that in an armed standoff the exigency did not terminate due to the passage of time because bing was at all times dangerous citing tyler 436 us at 510 98 sct 1942
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and scheduling of the services for her special education students clearly falls within the scope of her professional duties”); Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Cent. Sch. Dist., 836 F.Supp.2d 132, 142 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing First Amendment retaliation claim because the plaintiffs “complaints to co-workers and parents cannot be reasonably categorized as falling outside her official duties. It takes no standardized employee handbook or directive from the School District for this Court to conclude that in addition to instructing her students, a teacher should also advocate on their behalf. This includes communicating with other teachers when concerned about a student’s progress ....”); Massaro v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08 Civ. 10678 (LTS) (FM), 2011 WL 2207556, at *3 (S.D.N.Y June 3, 2011) (<HOLDING>), aff'd sub nom. Massaro v. N.Y. City Dep’t of

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs complaints regarding the sanitary conditions in her classroom and the health concerns that arose from them were made pursuant to her duties as an employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    questions, or provided answers arguably favorable to the defense. Because of the vehemence with which the government argues a position with no seeming support in the law, this court pauses to discuss the obligations placed on each of the parties to a trial by the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is a basic tenet of our law that in order to preserve an evidentiary issue for review, the party opposing the admission of the evidence must make a timely objection. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1); United States v. Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir.1999); United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1293 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 770 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1996); Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 625 (1st Cir.1988); see also United State 378, 385 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), and W. Fire Ins. Co. v. Word, 131 F.2d 541,

    ### Response:
    holding that because at least three pages of transcript were recorded before the defendant objected the objection came too late to preserve the objection for appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or inadequate. Rather, it is an added protection provided automatically at no additional cost to Class Members that may or may not otherwise qualify for additional coverage due to their age or health condition. Other courts have agreed that this type of benefit has substantial value to Class Members. See, e.g., Manners, 1999 WL 33581944, at *24, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22880, at *72-73 (stating that “the free protection itself has a value to the Class as a whole, as demonstrated by Class Members’ prior purchase of life insurance.”); Garst v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22666, at *73 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1999) (same); In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Serv. Antitrust Litig., 1986 WL 6531, at *18, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24435, at *60-61 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1986) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 815 F.2d 695 (3d Cir.1987). Moreover,

    ### Response:
    holding that additional free title insurance provided a benefit to class members regardless of whether they made a claim on that insurance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    follow the reasoning of the court of appeals and the Property Tax Administrator, and rule in favor of the taxpayer, Welby Gardens. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Majority opinion. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice HOBBS join in this dissent. 1 . Del Mesa Farms v. Hall, 98CA1611, slip op. at 4 (Colo.App. Aug. 12, 1999) (finding that eggs and replacement laying hens originate from the productive use of the land “in the sense that there were no replacement laying hens until Del Mesa Farms, through animal husbandry, raised them on the land, and no eggs until Del Mesa Farms, again through animal husbandly, created the environment on the land for them to be laid”); Del Mesa Farms v. Bacus, 99CA0527, slip op. at 5 (Colo.App. Feb. 24, 2000)

    ### Response:
    holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 358 (in dicta)-, Louquet, 125 B.R. at 268 (citing In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.1989)); In re Wilson, 157 B.R. 389, 390 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993). 9 . Judge Volinn specially concurred in Powers, stating that the Panel did not need to reach the substantial change issue, since the debtor did not dispute her increased income, and the Panel could affirm using either standard. Judge Vol-inn pointed out that other Ninth Circuit cases run contrary to Witkowski, and that the Anderson dicta should be given ""due deference."" Powers, 202 B.R. at 624. Notwithstanding the insightful concurring opinion in Powers, the Panel addressed the issue of the standard for modification under § 1329 which was before it. Ninth Circuit precedent has been set. In re Ball, 185 B.R. 595, 597 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The modified plan, apparently, would

    ### Response:
    holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the word ""torture” to include both torture and ""extra judicial killing,” except where the context makes clear the more limited meaning is intended. 12 . Plaintiffs argue that these statutes also raise a related but distinct U.S. policy interest in insuring that claims arising out of human rights abuses are adjudicated according to the standards of international law. In arguing for this principle, they assume that the law of nations necessarily provides the substantive standards for evaluating claims brought under the ATCA in situations where the underlying claims involve human rights abuses. While they may well be right that such a principle is implicit in the ATCA, the federal courts have never definitively resolved this choice-of-law question. Compare Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 180-83 (<HOLDING>) with Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777, 781-82

    ### Response:
    holding that international law provides substantive law for atca cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    thirty-four years of age. Although the judge indicated in his findings that he considered the duration of the marriage in determining that permanent alimony was warranted, the court failed to fully articulate why a relatively short marital life required an award of permanent alimony rather than an award of rehabilitative alimony. This is particularly important in cases in which the alimony recipient is of a relatively young age. A younger divorcee has a better opportunity to obtain employment than does an older individual who had been married and out of the work force for many years. See Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113,119-120, 275 A.2d 441 (1971); Skribner v. Skribner, 153 N.J.Super. 374, 376, 379 A.2d 1044 (Ch.Div.1977). Cf. Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 517-518, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Our criticism should not be construed as

    ### Response:
    holding that length of marriage and the proper amount or duration of alimony do not correlate in any mathematical formula
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831)); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (stating that Indian tribes “have power to make- their own substantive law in internal matters, and to enforce that law in their own forums”) (citations omitted); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886) (observing that Indian tribes are “a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations”); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (<HOLDING>). For such reasons, Indian tribes benefit from

    ### Response:
    holding that indian tribes are distinct independent political communities retaining their original natural rights in matters of selfgovernment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nature.” Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Johnson correctly notes that this official policy can be established through only a single decision by a municipal policymaker. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Thus, theoretically, a decision to conduct a roadblock without the proper constitutional safeguards could subject a police department to liability. However, Johnson has not alleged facts that show that the putatively unlawful policy caused the violation of her rights. The Supreme Court has instructed that courts must carefully scrutinize the link between the allegedly improper conduct and the constitutional violation at issue. See Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, Johnson’s rights were violated not

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 2802(c) dealing with franchisee misconduct was proper, but refusing to extend that rationale to § 2802(c)(4)); accord Marathon Petroleum v. Pendleton, 889 F.2d 1509, 1512 (6th Cir.1989) (“[W]e must scrutinize the reasonableness of terminations even when an event enumerated in § 2802(c) has occurred.”). Sun’s contention that courts are not authorized to second guess franchisors’ decisions pursuant to the underlying lease exception in § 2802(c)(4) is grounded in our holding in Lugar that there is no statutory basis to inquire into the objective reasonableness of franchisor business decisions made in conformity with § 2802(c)(4). See 755 F.2d at 58. The Patels challenge the viability of Lugar, arguing that the decision is in conflict with our earlier opinion in Rago, 741 F.2d at 673 (<HOLDING>), and that the 1994 Amendment to § 2802(e)(4)

    ### Response:
    holding that the enumerated events in  2802c are not per se reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counsel was deficient in failing to utilize Music since she could have testified that appellant was “very intoxicated,” he “banged into walls” and “couldn’t really talk,” and that his condition may have been due to “more than alcohol.” Appellant argues that this evidence clearly could have been used to undermine finding the CCP aggravator, and could have supported finding intoxication, which the State’s experts found unsupported by the evidence. However, this Court rejected this claim in Jennings II, 583 So.2d at 318-19. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief because evidence of appellant’s intoxication on the night in question “was well known [at trial], but was abandoned in favor of the identity defense.” Id. at 322; see Engle v. Dugger, 576 So.2d 696, 700 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). As to the sentencing phase, this Court

    ### Response:
    holding that tactical decisions of trial counsel do not justify postconviction relief and that the existence of an additional defense theory does not mean counsel was ineffective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supported the imposition of a sentence “within the range ” applicable to the charged crime and “authorized by the jury finding” that the defendant was guilty of the charged crime-even without a jury’s finding of penetration. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Accordingly, penetration was neither required to be found by the jury nor required to be alleged in the information. This case is controlled by the rule that where the victim injury which is the basis for the assessment of sentencing points is not an element — or the functional equivalent of an element — of the offense and thus not part of the essential facts constituting the offense charged, the victim injury need not be alleged in the information. But see Delgado v. State, 948 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). This view is supported by the decision in

    ### Response:
    holding that assessment of victim injury points was improper because the information did not allege the factual basis for the victim injury points
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Title V of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 323, and I.R.C. §§ 1092 & 1256 (West Supp.1987). Nonetheless, the tax treatment of pre-June 24, 1981 straddle transactions is disputed in approximately 4,400 cases docketed in the Tax Court. See 130 Cong.Rec. S8390 (daily ed. June 27, 1984). While in 1984 the IRS estimated that these cases represented $500 million in potential revenue, id., more recently it has estimated that they involve approximately $8 billion in revenue. See Supplemental Brief for the Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 3. 5 . The Tenth Circuit has since reversed the Tax Court. Miller v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 1274, 1276 (10th Cir.1988); see also Boswell v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. No. 15, 14 (July 26, 1988) [available on WESTLAW, 1988 WL 75868] (<HOLDING>); see infra pp. 645-47. 6 .Although the Tenth

    ### Response:
    holding that tax courts miller opinion will no longer be followed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    35-50-2-6(a) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.2004) provides that a person who is convicted of a Class C felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of four years, with not more than four years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than two years . subtracted for mitigating circumstances. 8 . Welch makes no claim that two of the prior felony convictions relied upon by the trial court to enhance his sentence also supported his habitual offender enhancement. The felonies which supported the habitual offender finding could not standing alone be relied upon as the aggravating factor of a prior criminal record to enhance the sentence. See . McVey v. State, 531 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ind. 1988); Darnell v. State, 435 N.E.2d 250, 256 (Ind. 1982). But see Jones v. State, 600 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Ind.1992) (<HOLDING>). Regardless, aside from the two felony

    ### Response:
    holding that it is permissible for a trial court to consider the same prior offenses for both enhancement of the instant offense and to establish habitual offender status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    define the range of penalties for crimes.”), overruled on other grounds by Zimmennan v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). By extension, we conclude that the prosecutor acts within his authority when he recommends a sentence of life without parole in a capital trial. The Board has no jurisdic tion during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, nor does it have the authority to prescribe whether an offender should be statutorily eligible for parole based on the nature of the crime committed. We therefore reject appellant’s contention that the prosecutor’s election amounts to a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See Wilson v. State, 348 S.W.3d 32, 42-44 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); cf. O’Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 476 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>), superseded on other grounds by statute,

    ### Response:
    holding that a jury does not invade the province of the board when it determines the probability of a capital defendants future dangerousness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the axiom that “[fjederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Federal courts draw their jurisdictional power from explicit grants by Congress, and from Art. III of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. Const, art. III; Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701-02, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). Regardless of whether both parties wish for the federal court to retain indefinite jurisdiction to enforce their settlement agreement, “parties may not confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent.” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir.2004) (citations omitted); see also Collins v. Thompson, 8 F.3d 657, 659 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1127, 114 S.Ct. 2133,

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal court may refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction even though the parties have agreed to it parties cannot confer jurisdiction by stipulation or consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Starrett, 24 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (Dowd, J., concurring) (explaining that “life insurance benefits and pensions are often included in property settlements, yet are, by their nature, ongoing and payment may not begin during the ten-year period following judgment”). Here, the trial court’s conclusion Mary Blomdahl should have moved to enforce payment of her ninety percent interest in Russell Blomdahl’s retirement benefits when he had yet to retire and receive any benefits himself reaches a similarly absurd result because it deprives Mary Blomdahl of her interest in the retirement payments before these payments became due. See Jordan v. Jordan, 147 S.W.3d 255, 262 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (citing Duhamel v. Duhamel, 188 Misc.2d 754, 756, 729 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2001)) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Weber, 322 Mont. 324, 95 P.3d

    ### Response:
    holding the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the owning spouse reaches a pay status
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (finding petitioner had no constitutional right to a proposed plea agreement and was fully aware of the consequences of subsequent guilty plea; “It is the ... guilty plea that implicates the Constitution.”). But the mere acceptance of a guilty plea by the court does not create an immutable bar to subsequent prosecution. See Olmeda, 461 F.3d at 279 n. 7 (2d Cir.2006). There are, “certain circumstances, [where] jeopardy is not deemed to [have] attached] at the time of a guilty plea[.]” Id, Jeopardy fails to attach, for example, where a plea made is conditional on some future occurrence. See Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 8, 107 S.Ct. 2680 (defendant’s guilty plea to second degree murder was conditional on his later testifying against codefendants involved in murder); Smith, 865 F.Supp.2d at 271 (<HOLDING>); Matthews v. Keane, No. 94- CV-2815, 1995 WL

    ### Response:
    holding jeopardy did not attach where defendant pled to one charge but refused to voluntarily withdraw his plea to the second charge in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time the action was taken.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034. That is, “[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed.” Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Parties dispute the level of generality at

    ### Response:
    holding that twostep saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    investment reason for not establishing the short portfolio (e.g., reducing interest payments to Note-holders). Alternatively, it could have been merely an oversight that did not amount to gross negligence. But although this allegation is insufficient by itself, it can be aggregated with the other allegations described above. Taking the allegations as a whole and drawing all reasonable inferences in Bayerische’s favor, we conclude that Bayerische has sufficiently alleged facts plausibly suggesting Aladdin abandoned its role to manage the Reference Portfolio in favor of the Noteholders. Cf. Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 80 A.D.3d 293, 304-05, 915 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep’t 2010), aff'd on other grounds, 18 N.Y.3d 341, 939 N.Y.S.2d 274, 962 N.E.2d 765 (2011) (<HOLDING>). After discovery, the facts that come to light

    ### Response:
    holding as sufficient to survive motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for gross negligence alleging that jp morgan knowingly invested in risky mortgagebacked securities despite stated investment goal of high level of safety of capital and that jp morgan favored other client over plaintiff in so investing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one caveat, however, which turns out to be important in this case. The claimant cannot invoke the presumption by producing an X-ray that simply constitutes evidence of the presence of pneumoconiosis. Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 147, 108 S.Ct. at 433-34; Cook v. Director, OWCP, 816 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir.1987). The chest X-ray produced by the claimant must show the presence of pneumoconiosis by a preponderance of the evidence. Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 147-52, 108 S.Ct. at 433-36. The effect of the presumption is to shift both the burden of production and of persuasion to the employer. Amax Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 772 F.2d 304, 305 (7th Cir.1985); Peabody Coal Co. v. Hale, 771 F.2d 246, 248 n. 2 (7th Cir.1985). But see Underhill v. Peabody Coal Co., 687 F.2d 217, 222 (7th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The presumption may be rebutted by showing

    ### Response:
    holding without extended discussion that the presumption shifts only the burden of production
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under the Pledge, the actions of Majestic, and the handling and administration of the Plan, would be affected. We have often said that a debtor corporation has no property interest in the shares of its stock owned by shareholders. Paso Del Norte, 755 F.2d at 424. However, at the point the shares were issued but undelivered to Templeton, Majestic had possession of the stock, and delivery was necessary to administer the estate pursuant to the Plan (the partial satisfaction of Templeton’s unsecured claim). Whether the undelivered stock was property of the estate is not a critical inquiry, since the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 eliminated § 711 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which had limited bankruptcy jurisdiction solely to the debtor and his property. Compare Paso Del Norte, 755 F.2d at 424 (<HOLDING>) with Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (stating, under

    ### Response:
    holding under the 1898 act that neither the debtor nor its property was involved in stock ownership dispute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he prepare himself for his passing. Accordingly, I would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it. Id. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell’s meaning in this passage is clear: the retributive go r.1994) (denying certificate of probable cause based on state court finding that petitioner “comprehend[ed] the nature ... of his execution ” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1018 (D.Ariz.2001) (noting that Arizona defines competency to be executed in terms of the prisoner’s awareness that the punishment for murder is death); State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543, 564 (La.1986) (<HOLDING>); Billiot v. State, 655 So.2d 1, 15-16

    ### Response:
    holding that louisiana will not execute an individual who lacks the capacity to understand the death penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since no constitutionally acceptable excuse was proffered precluding the procurement of a warrant, I would hold that the grand jury subpoena was an unreasonable search of appellee’s medical records, thus violating his constitutional rights emanating from the Fourth Amendment. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court’s decision to grant appellee’s motion to suppress. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent. BAIRD, OVERSTREET and MEYERS, JJ. join. 1 . Because the court of appeals’ arguments are based solely on the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, this opinion omits any discussion of the Texas Constitution. 2 . At the suppression hearing, the investigating officer testified that he did not go to the hospital on the 1984); (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Riedel, 539 Pa. 172, 651 A.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a subpoena for medical records may be issued only on a reasonable basis thus implying a privacy interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Stearns Weaver, which solely represented Publix, had access to confidential irrelevant information that would not otherwise have been available. Disqualification of a party’s chosen counsel is a drastic remedy that should be used sparingly. Alexander v. Tandem Staffing Solutions, Inc., 881 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); see also Gutierrez v. Rubio, 126 So.3d 320, 2013 WL 1316383 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 3, 2013). The party seeking disqualification has the burden of showing that it is necessary because of actual harm. Coral Reef of Key Biscayne Developers v. Lloyd's Underwriters at London, 911 So.2d 155, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Disqualification is not appropriate if lesser alternatives can alleviate the harm. Id.; Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). We agree with petitioners that the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that before ordering disqualification the trial court should determine whether one party has obtained an unfair advantage over the other which can only be alleviated by removal of the attorney citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    payroll, and sales attributable to in-state value under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, thus lowering the UDITPA fractional multiplier used against taxpayer’s total income and thereby its state taxable income base.”). 25 . While the tax at issue in NCR Corp. was a corporate income tax, similar overstatement of the contribution of subsidiaries to the parent company may occur in the value tax context due to the inclusion of full subsidiary property, payroll, and sales factors in apportionment in circumstances in which the capitalized dividends taken into account in determining the tax base represent merely a portion of the net income or profits of subsidiaries, some of which is retained. 26 . Accord Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 2942 n. 7 (<HOLDING>); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of

    ### Response:
    recognizing as a substantial factor that the state in that case included dividends from the subsidiaries to the parent in its calculation of the parents apportionable taxable income but did not include the underlying income of the subsidiaries themselves
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the like — which do not implicate any violation of the law. And Plaintiff makes much to do about the alleged office romances between Stifel brokers. As was the case with her SOX claim, Plaintiffs complaints are not protected under the MWA just because Plaintiff finds her co-workers’ activities to be disturbing or troublesome. See Hedglin v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn.1998) (dismissing firefighters’ whistleblower claims and finding that the reports that officers attended fire calls while intoxicated was not protected activity because “[w]hile we find such conduct reprehensible, if in fact it did occur, we can find no statute or rule that is violated by such conduct”); Yakubek v. Westbrooke Patio Homes Assoc., No. 97-506, 1997 WL 613667, at *4 (Minn.Ct.App. Oct. 7, 1997) (<HOLDING>); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that employees reports of marijuana smoking in violation of the employ ers drug policy was not protected activity under the mwa and affirming the summary judgment dismissal of her claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    trial. The same reasons that led the court to call so- many extra jurors should have prompted it to consider accommodations for some members of the public to attend. The court does not have to accommodate every person who wants to attend a trial. It does not have to relocate a trial to a sports stadium. It ought to consider use of the largest available courtroom. It must consider options for reserving some seating in the courtroom for interested members of the public, even if that meáns potential jurors are divided into separate groups. Compare People v. Floyd, 21 N.Y.3d 892, 965 N.Y.S.2d 770, 988 N.E.2d 505, 506-07 (N.Y. 2013) (“Mere courtroom overcrowding is not an overriding interest justifying courtroom closure.”) with People v. Rush, 148 A.D.3d 1601, 51 N.Y.S.3d 290, 293 (2017) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 35] We may leave for another day the

    ### Response:
    holding brief exclusion of public from crowded courtroom was not a public trial violation where officer cleared back row of courtroom once first group of jurors had been seated in jury box and attempted to locate those who had been excluded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contingencies that might arise.” ’ Fearson v. State, 662 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (quoting Minnifield v. State, 439 So.2d 190, 192 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (‘[w]e do not consider that ineligibility to earn CIT [Correctional Incentive Time] is a direct consequence of a guilty plea as to which a defendant must be advised before entering a plea’)); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So.2d 990, 991 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) (“‘[W]e hold that potential deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. Accordingly, we find no error in the sentencing court’s failure to inform Romero-Vilca in the Rule 11 Colloquy of his possible deportation.” ’) (quoting United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir.1988)); Minnifield v. State, 439 So.2d 190, 192 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).” Danzey, 703 So.2d at 1020 (<HOLDING>). Although this court recognized just a few

    ### Response:
    holding that being subjected to dna testing was a collateral consequence of conviction having no bearing on defendants sentence so that he was not entitled to be informed of dna testing before pleading guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    decision was “based upon a reasonable interpretation of the plan’s terms and was made in good faith.” Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 944. ERISA plan administrators abuse their discretion by rendering decisions without an explanation, by construing the terms of the policy in a way that conflicts with the policy’s plain language, or by relying on “clearly erroneous findings of fact in making benefit determinations.” Id. The mere presence of contradictory evidence does not necessarily amount to an abuse of discretion. Id. Plaintiff has offered no admissible evidence that UNUM’s interpretation of the preexisting condition clause in the policy is not reasonable. Accordingly, UNUM’s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. See Kracht v. Aalfs Assoc. H.C.P., 905 F.Supp. 604, 614 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>). Accord Bullwinkel v. New England Mut. Life

    ### Response:
    holding that receiving advice or treatment during the exclusionary period for a condition which proves to be the same condition the claimant seeks benefits for qualifies as a preexisting condition regardless of whether there was an accurate diagnosis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on its face allows but one statutory exception to the otherwise comprehensive requirement that prisoners with at least three prior strikes prepay appellate fees. That exception applies only in situations where “the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Apart from this single statutory exception, § 1915(g)’s “in no event” language must be applied. Section 1915(g) represents Congress’ attempt to balance the needs of overloaded judges to hear cases of individuals who have not abused the judicial process in the past with prisoners who have abused the judicial process on at least three prior occasions through frivolous filings. There is no question that § 1915(g) is constitutional. See White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1232-35 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As we have stated previously, “The right of

    ### Response:
    holding that if status is not a fundamental right and that  1915g is rationally related to the legitimate end of deterring frivolous lawsuits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir.1987) (KoZinski, J., concurring). 4 . In its Appendix B, the dissent, going to great lengths in an attempt to prove this point, lists other Guam and Saipan attorneys who might be competent to handle this type of case. In doing so, the dissent winds up proving the solid basis for the district court’s finding: none of these lawyers came forward to say they would have taken this case and at least one of them (J. Bradley Klemm) submitted an affidavit stating that most local firms would be unlikely to take on such a case. Infra. at 713 n. 31. 5 . Courts outside the Ninth Circuit have also recognized that enhancement for factors other than contingency may still be appropriate after Dague. See, e.g., Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 100 (2nd Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053, 113 S.Ct. 978,

    ### Response:
    recognizing a strong presumption that lodestar represents a reasonable fee but noting that other considerations may lead to upward or downward departure from lodestar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims brought by service members that are incident to military service. See e.g., Overton v. N.Y. State Div. of Military and Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir.2004); Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.2000); Hupp v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 144 F.3d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir.1998); Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir.1995); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1461-62 (11th Cir.1990). The Feres doctrine also generally applies to members of the National Guard. See Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 667 n. 1, 673-74, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977) (applying Feres to block a third-party indemnity claim against the United States over the death of a National Guard officer); see also Coffman v. State of Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 58-59 (6th Cir.1997);(<HOLDING>); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding national guardsmans ada and rehabilitation act claims nonjusticiable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rule 12(e) motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(g) (“A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it any other motions herein provided for and then available to the party.”). When presented with an appropriate Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement, the district court shall grant the motion and demand more specific factual allegations from the plaintiff concerning the conduct underlying the claims for relief. Even when a defendant has not formally expressed the need for a definite statement, the district court has the discretion to order a more definite statement, in observance of the Supreme Court’s mandate to facilitate an early resolution of the qualified immunity issue and in order to avoid a waste of judicial resources. See Craivford-El, 523 U.S. at 600-01, 118 S.Ct. 1584 (<HOLDING>); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (“The[] [rules] shall

    ### Response:
    recognizing the district courts broad discretion to utilize civil procedures in a manner that is useful and equitable to the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    produced a total offense level of 12. The District Court also concluded, based on Mr. Crepeau’s criminal history, that he was in criminal history category II. Based on the foregoing, the advisory sentencing range is 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment. The District Court sentenced him to the lowest level of the applicable Guidelines range — 12 months and one day. The only possible error in calculating the advisory sentencing range would be in the District Court’s application of the two-level enhancement because the offense involved more than two threats. But in his plea agreement and at his change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Crepeau admitted that he sent three separate threatening emails to Ms. Lane and one to another bank employee. See United States v. Scott, 441 F.3d 1322, 1327 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stokes, 347 F.3d 103, 106

    ### Response:
    holding that when three distinct threats were made  2a61b2 was properly applied even though there were only two mailings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Trooper O’Donnell testified that he was wearing a long-sleeve Under Armor shirt under his uniform, and the other occupants of the vehicle were also wearing warmer clothing that night. (Hr’g Tr. 15:12-16.) 2 . Trooper O’Donnell testified that the “three occupants in the car displayed signs of over-nervousness that you wouldn’t see for just a simple traffic violation, and it made [him] wonder what was going on within the interior of the car, whether there was further contraband that they didn’t want to be found, narcotics or guns, drugs, weapons, whatever it maybe.” (Hr'gTr. 16:11-20.) 3 . Standing to challenge the search is satisfied, as the Defendant was a passenger in the vehicle. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The Government bears the burden of

    ### Response:
    holding aat a passenger is seized as well as ae driver and so may challenge ae constitutionality of ae stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of counsel where he moved to reopen approximately 12 years after he reasonably should have suspected his attorney’s fraud. See Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 680. Zheng’s purported prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status did not require the IJ to reopen his removal proceedings in the absence of a timely motion to reopen. See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] motion to reopen to consider an application for an adjustment of status must be presented to the [agency] no later than ninety days after the issuance of a final decision by the [agency].”). Because Matter of MS-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349 (BIA 1998) (en banc), does not alter this conclusion, the IJ did not err by failing to consider its applicability to Zheng’s case. See Matter of M-S-22 I. & N. Dec. at 357 (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing  is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(b). Courts have clarified that the discretionary function exclusion is designed to immunize “policy-making or planning,” as opposed to “merely operational” actions. Morgan v. Driscoll, No. CIV.A. 9810766-RWZ, 2002 WL 15695, at *7 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 2002) (citing Alake v. City of Boston, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 610, 666 N.E.2d 1022, 1024 (1996) (“Decisions that require some discretion, but that do not involve social, political, or economic policy considerations are not immunized by § 10(b).”))- A negligence suit concerning the school’s failure to carr 783, 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1305-06 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Under that standard, Matthew’s parents fail

    ### Response:
    holding that a r iother who suffered emotional distress as the result of a doctors negligence at her sons birth which led to the sons death two months later did not have a cause of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and we need not address the Childers’ other arguments. We affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States. AFFIRMED. 1 . The application of the exception does not depend, however, on whether federal officials actually took public policy considerations into account. All that is required is that the applicable statute or regulation gave the government agent discretion to take policy goals into account. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1274-75, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). The Gaubert Court also clarified that low-level employees making discretionary day-today management decisions based on policy considerations also fall within the exception. Id. at 325, 111 S.Ct. at 1275. 2 .See, e.g., Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. United States, 949 F.2d 332 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding the government immune from suit because the decision to post warning signs about the danger of scaling cliffs at dinosaur national monument is part of an overall park plan left to the discretion of the nps
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ark. 374, 380-81, 135 S.W. 896, 898 (1911). It is clear from the statutory definition set forth above that an Arkansas check-casher pays, pursuant to a written agreement, an agreed-upon amount to its customer, less any fee charged pursuant to the Act, upon presentment of the customer’s check payable to the check-casher. In addition, that customer can “repurchase” his or her check within the agreed period of time. In other words, when the customer “repurchases” his or her check, he or she must pay the check-casher the amount of the check. We hold that such a transaction is a loan, as the check-casher is clearly loaning money to its customer for a fee with the expectation of repayment. See, e.g., Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Florida, LLC, 879 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>). b. Whether the fees charged constitute

    ### Response:
    holding that there could be no question that what takes place in a deferredpresentment transaction is essentially an advance of money or a shortterm loan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the petitioner had sought postconviction relief claiming he had been told he would be sentenced to no more than 15 years and that medication he had been given in jail rendered his plea involuntary. Id. at 739. The court did not discuss whether this claim involved “the need for substantial legal research.” Id. at 740. Nevertheless, the court quashed the district court’s decision and remanded the ease to the trial court with instructions that petitioner have counsel appointed and a new evidentia-ry hearing be held. Id. The court explained its decision as follows: Williams’s lack of education and lack of sophistication make clear that he was unable to meet the technical requirements of going forward with the burden of proving his initial allegations, irrespective of the meri DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). As demonstrated by the facts set forth above

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts failure to consider appointing counsel for petitioner in evidentiary hearing was improper where record revealed petitioners lack of education and sophistication petitioner had limited participation in hearing and record indicates that there was abundant doubt raised concerning gordons need for the assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Whitehurst the Fifth Circuit applied a de novo standard of review because the parties agreed that the administrator had not been vested with discretionary authority to interpret the Plan. Id. In this case, however, there is no dispute that the Plan Administrator was vested with discretionary authority to interpret the Plan. When a plan administrator has been vested with discretionary authority to interpret a plan, courts review the administrator’s decisions only for abuse of discretion. See Koehler v. Aetna Health, Inc., 683 F.3d 182, 187 (5th Cir.2012). Application of the abuse of discretion standard may involve a two-step process. See Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir.1992). See also Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1307-08 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). First, courts may determine if the plan

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the reviewing court is not rigidly confined to wildburs  twostep analysis in every case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    follow in substituting the commission for its predecessor agency in pending court cases involving the former commission. In construing provisions of the act, we have previously permitted the commission to substitute itself for the former commission as the party defendant. See Celona v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 544 A.2d 582, 583 n. 1 (R.I.1988) (acknowledging the substitution of the commission for the former commission during the pendency of the litigation). Indeed, any other interpretation would contravene the clear intent of §§ 4 and 6 of the act and would not promote the policies and obvious purposes behind the establishment of the commission as a successor entity to the former commission. See, e.g., Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Advisory to the Governor

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the court will not interpret a legislative enactment literally when to do so would provide a result at odds with its legislative intent and that in this instance the court must interpret the enactment consistent with its policy or obvious purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony.” (punctuation omitted)). 16 Although Taffar was trained in field-sobriety tests at the time of the suppression hearing, he had not yet received such training when he arrested Blanchard. As a result, no field-sobriety tests were performed in this case. 17 See Ewumi, 315 Ga. App. at 657-58 (1); Sanders, 274 Ga. App. at 397-98 (notingthat“[i]f the members of this Court had been sitting as the trier of fact, we might well have found that the officers had probable cause to arrest based on several indicia of impairment,” hut affirming the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient probable cause to support a DUI arrest). 18 Ellison, 271 Ga. App. at 904 (6); see, e.g., Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 231 (491 SE2d 444) (1997) (<HOLDING>). 19 Ellison, 271 Ga. App. at 904 (6); see also

    ### Response:
    holding that there was sufficient probable cause for the defendants dui arrest when the evidence showed that the officer smelled the odor of alcohol on the defendants breath the defendants eyes were bloodshot and watery and his breath test was positive for alcohol
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no authority to amend the concurrent jurisdiction that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600 gives to trial courts during the pendency of an appeal. If we did, it might be sensible to give the trial court an automatic thirty- or sixty-day period of concurrent jurisdiction to resolve any pending restitution issue once a notice of appeal is filed. In the alternative, perhaps the amount of restitution could be established in a separate restitution judgment, in the nature of a civil monetary judgment. This judgment could be separately appealed. Cf. Ulrich v. Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc., 764 So.2d 731 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (allowing separate final appeals of judgment and order awarding attorneys’ fees based upon judgment); Bernstein v. Berrin, 516 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). A sentence or disposition rendered at an

    ### Response:
    holding trial court retains jurisdiction to consider motion for attorneys fees despite filing of notice of appeal of final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with respect to his independent IAC claim, he need not do so to claim ineffective assistance for the purpose of establishing cause” for defaulting another claim); Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 154-55 (3d. Cir.2004) (same); see also Holloway v. Horn, 161 F.Supp.2d 452, 478 n. 12 (E.D.Pa.2001) (same), rev’d on other grounds by 355 F.3d 707 (3d Cir.2004); Holland v. Horn, 150 F.Supp.2d 706, 747 (E.D.Pa.2001) (same); Torrefranca v. Schriro, No. Civ-05-2909, 2006 WL 1981788, at *10 n. 5 (D.Ariz. July 13, 2006) (same). Additionally, one court in this district has adopted the reasoning of the Sixth and Third Circuits. Green v. Johnson, 2007 WL 951686, at *3 (E.D.Va. Mar.26, 2007). 29 .See Orbe v. True, 233 F.Supp.2d 749, 758 (E.D.Va.2002). 30 . See, e.g., Fischetti, 384 F.3d at 154-55 (<HOLDING>); Holloway, 161 F.Supp.2d at 476 n. 12 (stating

    ### Response:
    holding that aedpa does not establish a statutory high hurdle for cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Martin to CPS, Martin had a motive to fabricate her story about the assault. The trial court limited the cross-examination to whether or not CPS investigations existed and whether or not appellant was aware of them if they did. Defense counsel was not permitted to delve into the specifics of the investigations themselves, including the nature of the allegations being investigated. Although appellant’s trial counsel argued the relevance of the evidence he sought to present to the trial court, he did not argue that the court’s limitations on cross-examination amounted to a violation of appellant’s due process rights. Because counsel failed to make this argument in the trial court, it was not preserved for appellate review. See Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339-40 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280

    ### Response:
    holding that because defense counsel failed to alert the trial court that he was requesting relief based on a violation of defendants constitutional rights due process argument was not preserved for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    — does not support an inference that any specific one of the possible facts is itself probable. Probable cause is necessary to support a warrant, not merely one possibility, among many[.]” Defendant argues that that principle is controlling here. He reasons that equally available inferences include that the pornography that he ordered depicted only adults or, because the term “pornography” is itself vague, that the people involved could have been “partially unclothed.” If the affidavit contained nothing else, defendant’s point might be more persuasive. However, there was more. First, defendant was a registered sex offender, having previously been convicted of possession of child pornography. See State v. Westfall, 178 Or App 343, 350-51, 37 P3d 1030, rev den, 333 Or 595 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Second, the fact that, among all the places

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance and felon in possession of a firearm helped support probable cause to search his motel room for evidence of burglary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for two years. A close parent-child relationship with each of the adoptive parents has been established, and her removal would cause severe emotional damage. See Maricopa Cnty., 667 P.2d at 234 (affirming family court’s finding of good cause where the child had resided with the adoptive mother for three years, that a close mother-child relationship had been established, and that the baby’s removal would cause psychological damage). Addition ally, Mother has consistently expressed her desire that Baby Girl be placed with Appellants. ICWA expressly provides that courts should consider the preference of a parent. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (“Where appropriate, the preference of the Indian child or parent shall be considered ...”); see also In the Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Appellants have expressed and

    ### Response:
    holding mothers preference for placement with nonindian adoptive parents was appropriate factor in finding good cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a public entity’s property.” Benton v. City of Rolla, 872 S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Mo.App.1994). More specifically, under § 537.600.1(2) sovereign immunity is waived for injuries caused by the dangerous condition of a public entity’s property. Kanagawa v. State ex rel. Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Mo. banc 1985). However, provisions waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. Id. at 835. A plaintiff seeking to state a claim under the aforesaid provision must show: “(1) a dangerous condition of the property; (2) that the plaintiffs injuries directly resulted from the dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind the plaintiff incurred; and (4) that a public employee negligently created the co 8, 19 (Mo.App.1986) (<HOLDING>); Twente v. Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a sewer trench on sewer district property was not a physical defect arid therefore was not a dangerous condition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 759, 102 S.Ct. at 1398. 44 . Id. at 759, 102 S.Ct. at 1397; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 31, 101 S.Ct. at 2160-61; see also M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 118, 117 S.Ct. at 565. 45 . Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S.Ct. at 1401. 46 . Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 2160. 47 . Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61, 102 S.Ct. at 1398. 48 . Id. at 760-61, 102 S.Ct. at 1398. 49 . Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001. 50 . See In re DM., 58 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). 51 . Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001. 52 . Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67, 102 S.Ct. at 1402. 53 . Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405. 54 . See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28, 101 S.Ct. at 2160. 55 . See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761, 102 S.Ct. at 1399. 56 . Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-32, 101 S.Ct. at 2159-62. 57 . See Tex Austin 1983, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also In re M.I.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347,

    ### Response:
    holding that regardless of harmless error standard applied the conclusion is that the trial courts failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for appointment of counsel under former section 1110a is reversible error the issues involved in the termination of parental rights are of such a serious nature that the trial courts error cannot be treated in any other way
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that summary judgment be granted in its favor because it has presented uncontested evidence that “Plaintiff invited her own harm” and sought out “a known or obvious danger” by intentionally purchasing the cell phones. (Id. at 22-23 (internal quotations omitted).) In her sur-reply, Plaintiff argues that her intent is irrelevant because bad-faith defenses are inapplicable to the TCPA. (ECF No. 64 at 4-5, 7-9.) She also asserts that the doctrines of assumption of the risk and volenti non fi the common law affirmative defenses of assumption] of the risk and volen-ti non fit injuria apply to the TCPA. The Court will therefore follow the FCC’s July 10, 2015, rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. See Morse v. Allied Interstate, LLC, No. 3:13-CV-625, 2014 WL 2916480 (M.D.Pa.2014) (<HOLDING>). See also Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court may not disregard the fccs final orders simply because congress did not specifically grant the fcc express authority to regulate a specific subsection of the tcpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    RO had erred in failing to read the veteran’s disability claim sympathetically to include a TDIU claim, a CUE claim would not be the proper path for correcting that error because the RO had not specifically addressed the TDIU claim and it was still pending before the RO awaiting adjudication. Id. at 1281. We explicitly rejected the government’s contention that the implied TDIU claim was pending and unadjudicated. Id. Relying on Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1383-84, we held that where an RO renders a decision on a veteran’s claim for benefits but fails to address one of the claims, that decision is final as to all claims; the RO’s failure to address the implied claim “is properly challenged through a CUE motion,” not a direct appeal. Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1281; see also Cook, 318 F.3d at 1339 (<HOLDING>). Thus under the rule articulated in Andrews,

    ### Response:
    holding that the statutory scheme provides only two exceptions to the rule of finality of va decisions a cue claim and a claim to reopen based on new and material evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of action for vicarious liability against Gerelco. We note, however, that the Legislature in 2003 expressly provided that the immunities in the statute extended to ""vicarious liability.” Ch. 2003-412, § 14, Laws of Fla. (amending § 440.11(1)). Also, cases suggesting that such vicarious liability is available were either decided under the statute before it was amended in 2003, Wright v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 823 So.2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), or involve the unique context of sovereign immunity where, by statute, a cause of action in negligence against a government employee is barred because an alternative remedy against the employing government is expressly authorized. See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014); see also Aravena v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 928 So.2d 1163, 1168 (Fla.2006) (<HOLDING>); Holmes Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Duffell, 651 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding under the sovereign immunity statute any negligence claim arising under the unrelated works exception against a public coemployee must be brought against the governmental entity employer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    designate his four previous convictions. The Wilson court rejected the argument, stating that “[a]ny defect in this general allegation could have been reached by a motion for a bill of particulars.” Wilson, 251 Ark. at 903, 475 S.W.2d at 544. “The information was sufficient to put the appellant on notice that the charges included the habitual-criminal act and any lack of specificity of the allegation was waived by this appearance and voluntary plea.” Id., 475 S.W.2d at 545. Likewise, there was no error in allowing the amendment because it was filed the morning of trial. The amendment to the felony information was filed prior to the case being submitted to the jury, which under similar circumstances has been held to be timely. Traylor v. State, 304 Ark. 174, 801 S.W.2d 267 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Glaze’s reliance upon Sherman v. State, 30

    ### Response:
    holding that an amendment to a felony information on the day of trial charging the defendant as a habitual criminal was not error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assert a Brady violation, nor does he assert a failure to comply with disclosure obligations under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(C). Aplt’s Br. at 20; Aplt's Rep.Br. at 9. 4 . Campbell testified only that he had a B.S. degree in business administration with a specialization in accounting. 5 . Although the court noted that Thomas would be important specifically to respond to testimony from former WMC employees about Kennedy’s deviation from industry norms, rather than to respond to Campbell, Thomas was retained and qualified for his general expertise in the metals industry. 6 . We also note that one of Kennedy’s witnesses, Lloyd Evan Qualls, had a master's degree in accounting and was employed as an auditor, although Kennedy did not call him to testify based on his accounting e 0th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314

    ### Response:
    holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to crossexamine governments psychiatrist on this point
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (suggesting our focus should be on “whether the crime and not the particular defendant is punishable by more than a year imprisonment”). Jones examined a conviction and sentence under the North Carolina sentencing scheme. 195 F.3d at 206. Like Kansas, North Carolina employed a grid to determine a defendant’s presumptive sentence. Id. Even though Jones faced a maximum penalty of twelve months’ imprisonment, the Class H crime for which he was convicted carried a maximum sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment. Id. at 206-07. The court concluded the statutory maximum for the crime of conviction was thirty months, and was therefore “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Id. at 207; see also United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Hill ignores the structure of § 922(g)(1) and

    ### Response:
    holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    standards. The court finds that although there are issues of fact as to whether certain discrete calculations in fact complied with GAAP, there is insufficient evidence to raise an inference of scienter with respect to the entirety of the 1997 audit and audit opinion. C. Ernst’s Response to Allegations of Fraud, Plaintiffs claim that Ernst failed to properly investigate or otherwise respond to allegations of accounting fraud raised against IKON management during both the 1997 audit and the Special Procedures. Ernst’s conduct during the 1998 Special Procedures is relevant to plaintiffs’ claim that the Special Procedures covered up and continued the 1997 financial statements fraud. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs are correct that if Ernst merely

    ### Response:
    holding that in establishing intentional discrimination in employment proving a defendants efforts to cover up the discriminatory purpose is part of and often considerably assists the greater enterprise of proving wrongful intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a co-defendant creates a Confrontation Clause problem. Therefore, evidence admitted under Rule 806 in a criminal case should be admitted only for the limited purpose of impeachment. 10 . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 11 . At trial, Huerstel claimed he was not involved in the shootings, rather that he lied to the police about his involvement because he feared what Prasertphong might do to him or his family if he told anyone Prasertphong was involved in the murders. Huerstel also claimed the police threatened him and made promises of leniency during his interrogation. 12 . Nor is a request for a parent considered the functional equivalent of a request for counsel. See Fare v. Michael C. 442 U.S. 707, 724, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 13 . The trial court chastised the officers

    ### Response:
    holding a juveniles request to speak to a probation officer is not a per se invocation of fifth amendment rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sought to discharge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the motion. See Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla.2000); State v. Tait, 387 So.2d 338, 340 (1980). We find that claim (6) regarding inadequate funding of CCR is without merit and is further improperly brought as a successive claim. See Remeta v. State, 710 So.2d 543, 546 (Fla.1998); see also Arvelaez v. Buttenvorth, 738 So.2d 326, 326 (Fla.1999). Moreover, Rose has not alleged how he was prejudiced by the inadequate funding. Likewise, we find that claim (7) regarding electrocution is without merit. See § 922.10, Fla. Stat. (1999), amended by ch.2000-02, § 1, Laws of Fla. (""A death sentence shall be executed by electrocution or lethal injection....""); Bryan v. State, 753 So.2d 1244, 1253 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). In claim (8), Rose alleges constitutional

    ### Response:
    holding that floridas current statutory scheme that provides defendants with a choice of either electrocution or lethal injection as the method of execution is constitutional and could be retroactively applied to criminal defendants sentenced prior to the statutes enactment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting.” See Lattany, 845 F.Supp. at 266, see also K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir.1990) 10 . In its holding concerning the application of qualified immunity, the Court discusses the applicability of Cochran's status as a constructive or de-facto guard. 11 . See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941) (""[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of state law”) (internal quotation omitted). 12 . See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 13 . See Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1552

    ### Response:
    holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Orion Logistics to submit to a supplemental examination. ¶ 81. For the reasons stated above, I dissent. ¶ 82. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion. 1 Wis. Stat. § 816.03(l)(a) (""When an execution against property has . . . been returned unsatisfied ... the court. . . shall, upon motion of the judgment creditor, order such judgment debtor, whether an individual, firm, corporation or other association, to appear before the court or judge and answer concerning the judgment debtor's property ....""). 2 Courtyard Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Draper, 2001 WI App 115, ¶ 9, 244 Wis. 2d 153, 629 N.W.2d 38. 3 See ¶ 54, supra. 4 See ¶ 77, infra. 5 Cf. Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Market Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶ 37, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465 (<HOLDING>). regarding assets which ought to be subjected

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the word may in wis stat  26211 allows but does not require property owners whose property is damaged by forest fires to bring a civil action to recover double damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2000 to disclose that FDA certification was rescinded, judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate. Evidence presented at trial indicated that the only reason Safety Technologies had to question the status of FDA certification was that Biotronix 2000 did not promptly verify certification or provide the certification numbers. A reasonable jury could conclude that this alone did not make it unreasonable for Safety Technologies to rely on Biotronix 2000 to communicate the fact that the FDA had rescinded certification. Safety Technologies had a letter from an attorney for Bitoronix Laborato- ríes assuring Safety Technologies that the units had FDA certification. Linda King, the president of Safety Technologies, testified that when she asked John Burne, an officer and agent of Bi 977) (<HOLDING>). Safety Technologies’ damages were not fixed

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudgment interest was not appropriate because the plaintiffs damages were not readily ascertainable because at the time the cause of action arose a fact question remained for the court to determine when the fraud terminated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his or her actual probation begins at a later date.” Kopkey v. State, 743 N.E.2d 331, 339 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied; see also Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 568 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (“Although Crump’s actual probation had not yet begun, a defendant’s ‘probationary period’ begins immediately after sentencing. The violation occurred after Crump was sentenced but before the conclusion of the probationary phases of his sentence. Thus, Crump was in his probationary period.”) (citations omitted); Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Ind.CtApp.1997) (“Once a defendant has been sentenced, the court may revoke or modify probation, upon a proper showing of a violation, at any time before the completion of the probationary period.”); Johnson v. State, 606 N.E.2d 881, 882 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). [10] We also note that, in his petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendants probation before the defendant completed his executed sentence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Piazza, 647 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir.2011). Fleming moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence “that [she] was medicated during trial in violation of [her] right to due process, both because the medication was without medical need and also because it was involuntary.” A panel of this court found on direct appeal that Fleming’s due process claim failed because she “voluntarily agreed to take her medication as a condition of being allowed to proceed pro se.” Arthur, 432 Fed.Appx. at 428 (emphasis added). Thus, due process did not require a determination whether the medication was medically appropriate. Cf. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-82, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not err in concluding

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants have a due process right to avoid the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs absent a finding inter alia that the drugs administered were medically appropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of damages initially awarded by the jury. Because these errors do not in any way affect the jury’s determination of liability by virtue of the Defendant’s negligence per se, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial as to damages only. On remand, the jury should determine a monetary amount that represents fair, full, and adequate compensation for the harm suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendant’s negligence. In accordance with FELA, any amount awarded by the jury cannot be reduced with regard to any contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Payne. See 45 U.S.C. § 53. Once the jury returns an award of compensatory damages, the trial judge must review the amount to determine whether it is against the clear weight of the evidence. Blackburn, 2008 WL 2278497, at 1 (<HOLDING>). If the court finds that the amount of damages

    ### Response:
    holding that the federal standard requiring the verdict to be against the clear weight of the evidence governs in a fela case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were indeed possessed with the intent to distribute. I would respectfully suggest that in circumstances involving equivocal expert testimony, and circumstantial evidence that does not support a conviction, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence fails to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of appellant’s innocence. See Dukes, 227 Va. at 123, 313 S.E.2d at 384. Accordingly, I must dissent. 5 . I also appreciate that the majority apparently does not suggest that a lack of circumstantial evidence in a case such as this can be salvaged by simply having an expert testify in support of a factual or legal proposition. 6 . I would respectfully suggest that the majority’s reliance on the analysis in McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 545 S.E.2d 541 (2001) (<HOLDING>), cannot occur in a vacuum. In my view, the

    ### Response:
    holding that cocaine packaged in two individually wrapped blocks in a single plastic bag supported a finding of distribution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    State — must live by until the next hearing. Accordingly, against the backdrop of the emphasized language, this Court and the Court of Civil Appeals have recognized the unique nature of juvenile proceedings that make an appeal appropriate from any one of multiple judgments that may be entered during the life of a juvenile case. Citing the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion in C.L. v. D.H., 916 So.2d 622 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), we stated in Ex parte T.C., 96 So.3d 123, 130.(Ala.2012), that, “unlike other civil cases, dependency and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings may involve multiple ‘final’ ap-pealable orders before the juvenile case is closed. For example, temporary custody orders are treated as final, appeal-able orders. See, e.g., C.L. v. D.H., 916 So.2d 622 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (<HOLDING>).” Unlike normal civil cases in which a fixed

    ### Response:
    holding that order awarding maternal grandmother primary physical custody of a child in a dependency case was a final appealable order as opposed to a pendente lite order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tex. 209, 1882 WL 9490 (1881); Switzer v. Smith, 300 S.W. 31, 33 (Tex. Comm'n App.1927, judgm't adopted). 8 . On rehearing, York contends that the application of this rule frustrates the purpose of the automatic stay. But the rule is based upon a competing and equally valid principle, that of tire need for ""absolute verity” of judgments that appear regular and are no longer subject to direct attack. See Treadway, 57 Tex. 209, 1882 WL 9490, at *4-5. York could have raised the pending bankruptcy proceeding in the justice court, thereby making the judgment subject to collateral attack, but he failed to do so. In addition, extrinsic evidence is available to challenge a void judgment in a direct attack, such as in a bill of review. 9 . See Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-55 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Sovereign immunity refers to the State’s

    ### Response:
    holding that sometimes court must look at facts involving merits of claim to determine its jurisdiction to hear claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cites Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987), which held that citizen suits under the Clean Water Act must be based on conduct that is ongoing or intermittent, not “wholly past.” However, Gwaltney left unresolved whether discharges are considered “ongoing” where, as here, the conduct that caused the violation has ceased, but the effects of the violation remain. The lower courts have split on this issue: Some courts, interpreting the [Clean Water Act] and Gwaltney expansively, have held that the continuing migration of pollutants from past discharges is sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Section 505(a)(1). See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1312, 1322 (D.Or.1997) (<HOLDING>); Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp. 887,

    ### Response:
    holding a discharge of pollutants is ongoing if the pollutants continue to reach navigable waters even if the discharger is no longer adding pollutants to the point source itself
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were no discussions regarding the endorsement prior to the policy's issuance. There is no evidence as to how or why the endorsement came to be added to Monroe's standard CGL policy. On the other hand, Monroe does not assert that it never intended to provide any ""non-owned"" or ""hired"" automobile liability coverage under its policy; Monroe clearly intended to include the endorsement. The result is that there is no evidence Monroe and IU had reached any agreement regarding the endorsement that was erroneously exeluded or that the endorsement as originally written contravened the parties' expressed intent. As such, there is no proper basis for retroactively reforming the policy against TU's will. See Gierhart v. Consolidated Rail Corporation-Conrail, 656 N.E.2d 285, 287 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Monroe cites to two other pieces of evidence

    ### Response:
    holding reformation was inappropriate where there was no showing that words were inserted which were agreed to be left out or that words were omitted which were agreed to be inserted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    there is no clear indication in the record to suggest that the plaintiffs decedent had previously received services rendered by a medical or psychological professional during the time he was living at the Kountry Kove apartments or on the day he was injured. However, even if there is such evidence, there is no indication in the record that the rendering or failure to render a professional service was causally connected to the accident. Moreover, the term “professional services” is not defined within the policy. Case law supports the proposition that the term “professional services” denotes those services rendered by someone with particularized knowledge or skill in his or her chosen field. See Atl. Lloyd’s Ins. Co. of Texas v. Susman Godfrey, LLP, 982 S.W.2d 472, 476 (Tex.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Chapman v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 35

    ### Response:
    holding that to qualify as a professional service the task must arise out of acts particular to the individuals specialized vocation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (citation omitted); cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., — U.S. —, — - — & n. 2, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2226-28 & n. 2, — L.Ed.2d — (1999) (overturning the constructive or implied waiver principle set out in Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964)). 1. We be Constitution. Accordingly, KSU has not waived its immunity by th 2d — (1999); see Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574, 67 S.Ct. 467, 91 L.Ed. 504 (1947) (“When the State becomes the actor and files a claim against the [bankruptcy] fund, it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had respecting the adjudication of the claim.”); Straight, 143 F.3d at 1389-90 (<HOLDING>); Dekalb County Div. of Family & Children

    ### Response:
    holding that state waived its immunity by filing proofs of claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    11-206 read as follows: “With the approval of the Commission and, except as otherwise provided by law, subject to the provisions of the State Personnel and Pension Article that govern classified service employees, the executive director shall appoint a staff of the Commission.” BR § ll-206(a) (1992, 1996 Supp. superceded). On October 1, 1997, after the administrative law judge had made his ruling, BR § 11-206 was amended. The subsection now reads: ‘With the approval of the Commission and, except as otherwise provided by law, subject to the provisions of the State Personnel and Pensions Article, the executive director shall appoint a staff of the Commission.” BR § ll-206(a). We have based our conclusions on the amended statute. See State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 343, 402 A.2d 876 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Gee v. Mass Transit Admin., 75 Md.App. 253,

    ### Response:
    holding that a statute which affects a matter still in litigation when the statute becomes effective will be applied by a reviewing court even though the statute was not then law when the decision appealed from was handed down unless the legislature expresses a contrary intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disqualification of [the] entire law firm simply because one member of [the] firm previously represented [a] client who is now an adversary of [a] client currently represented by [the] firm."" 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 198 (2005) (citing Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998)). 9 . Plaintiffs might disagree with the phrase ""heavily involved,” to the extent that Plaintiffs state that Wilson's involvement in Defendants' cases was limited to a ""secretarial role.” Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify, p. 6, ¶ 11. However, even assuming her role as a paralegal would be more aptly termed secretarial, that would not make her any less ""heavily involved” under the law. See e.g., Zimmerman, 270 Kan. at 822, 19 P.3d 784 (<HOLDING>). If the matters are substantially related, as

    ### Response:
    holding that the use of a chinese wall could not be used to screen a secretary when she possessed confidential information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nexus element, the Board failed to consider evidence, raising an issue of reviewable legal error. He claims that because he experienced extortion and threats from MS-13 as a consequence of his business ownership, a conclusion of no nexus “ignores [his own] credible testimony.” His argument misses the point. It’s true that the immigration judge found Lopez generally credible, and observed that “there is some support” for Lopez’s fears of MS-13 given the gang’s proclivity toward violence. However, both the immigration judge and Board concluded that it wasn’t Lopez’s business ownership, or his non-compliance with the gang’s demands, that mattered for purposes of the withholding analysis. It was simply his (perceived) wealth. See generally In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 792 (BIA 1997) (<HOLDING>). Lopez thus failed to establish that his life

    ### Response:
    holding that an applicants wealth in the absence of evidence to suggest other motivations will not support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the immigration and nationality act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Affirmed. See Hines v. State, 906 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant can waive credit for time served as part of a plea agreement when the record clearly shows such waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purchasers/mortgagors under the installment land contract, Mackay and Barbara Williams were equitable title holders of the property as soon as the contract was signed. See id. (also applying the doctrine of equitable conversion); see also Clairton Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 438 Pa. Super. 488, 652 A.2d 916 (1995); Kopanuk v. AVCP Regional Hous. Auth., 902 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1995); Williams v. Dudley Trust Found., 675 A.2d 45 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996); Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill. 2d 447, 185 N.E.2d 218 (1962); Farmers State Bank v. Neese, 281 Ill. App. 3d 98, 665 N.E.2d 534, 216 Ill. Dec. 474 (1996); Fellmer v. Gruber, 261 N.W.2d 173 (Iowa 1978); Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 142 N.W.2d 212 (1966); see also Harris v. Mason, 120 Tenn. 668, 697, 115 S.W. 1146 (1908) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable title for property is one derived through a valid contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and numbers set down by electronic recording. Notably, other state and federal courts, applying similar rules of evidence, have also determined that text messages constitute writings for the purposes of the best evidence rule. See United States v. Harry, 927 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1227 (D.N.M.2013) (applying the best evidence rule to text messages); Lorraine v. Market Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 577 (D.Md.2007); State v. Espiritu, 117 Hawai'i 127, 176 P.3d 885, 893 (2008) (noting that the best evidence rule is “particularly suited” to electronic evidence and admitting testimony about text messages under the best evidence rule when original messages and cell phone were unavailable and there was no evidence of proponent’s bad faith); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1013, 123 S.Ct. 1929,

    ### Response:
    holding that text messages sent between computers through an internet chat room were subject to the original writing rule and a printout of the messages was an original for purposes of that rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). We reject Omar’s contention that the INS granted Omar relief that it was without power to provide. Omar further argues that the IJ exceeded the scope of the remand, and that the IJ was, in any event, precluded from considering whether Omar was “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Neither of those arguments was presented to the agency, and we decline to consider them for the first time on petition for review. Omar’s drug conviction made him ineligible for § 212(c) relief notwithstanding his adjustment of status. See De La Rosa v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 551, 553, 555 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because Omar must thus be “deemed, ab initio,

    ### Response:
    holding that an alien is only lawfully admitted for permanent residence for purposes of the ina if his or her adjustment to lawful permanent resident complied with substantive legal requirements and that because the alien failed to show that she had complied with the relevant substantive legal requirements the ij correctly determined that she had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and was not entitled to  212c relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the parties. It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the conviction of Appellant Jack Davis be affirmed. Appellant challenges his conviction on several grounds, none of which has merit. First, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his car because FBI agents lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car. In his opening brief, however, he argues only that his U-turn was legal; he does not challenge the district court’s finding that he failed to stop at the stop sign — a traffic violation that justified the stop. United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C.Cir.1991). Because he failed to challenge this ruling until his reply brief, appellant has waived this argument. PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 438 F.3d 1184, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Even were the issue properly raised, given

    ### Response:
    holding that an argument raised only in fact section of opening brief and in reply brief is not properly raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employed knowledge at his command, made diligent inquiry, and exerted an honest and conscientious effort appropriate to the circumstances, to acquire the information necessary to enable him to effect personal service on the defendant.” McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 831 (1926); see Gmaz, 238 So.2d at 514. Further, “when a ‘red flag’ is waved to a complainant notifying or warning him of facts which put him on a reasonable course of inquiry as to the whereabouts or residence of a party-defendant to his law suit, he is bound to follow that course to its logical end.” Id. Stevens had notice of facts that she should have followed before resorting to service by publication. The record indicates that when Stevens filed her complaint she and her attorney kn (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). Wolfe also argues that the trial court erred

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate the defendant where she failed to follow an obviouslead to the defendants whereabouts by inquiring of the defendants known attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a discrete agency action that it is required to take,” 542 U.S. at 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (emphases in original). The BLM maintains that the duty to inventory wilderness values imposed on the BLM by 43 U.S.C. § 1711 is not such a discrete duty. ONDA challenges the EIS, under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” not under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), as “agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” There is no doubt that it may do so. Once an EIS’s analysis has been solidified in a ROD, an agency has taken final agency action, reviewable under § 706(2)(A). See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(a) (the ROD “[s]tate[s] what the decision was”); see also Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087-91 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Or. Natural Res. Council v. Harrell, 52 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “are directly responsible for the availability of the funds from the statutorily created trust.” In re Milton Poulos, 947 F.2d at 1353 (parties deserved fee award because litigation efforts caused bankruptcy court to “declare[ ] the trust valid and enforceable.”). In such cases, the “common fund” exception of Alyeska entitles the litigant to an attorneys’ fees award out of the trust assets. Nonetheless, if the litigant is not responsible for the availability of the trust funds, the district court cannot award attorneys’ fees to PACA claimants, unless the PACA claimant has another independent legal basis for attorneys’ fees under an Alyeska exception. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259, 95 S.Ct. 1612; see, e.g., Golman-Hayden Co. v. Fresh Source Produce Inc., 217 F.3d 348, 352-353 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Simplot did not create a “common fund” here,

    ### Response:
    holding that where a paca claimant did not create a common trust the attorney fee award was inappropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Goswami v. Metropolitan Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988)). Further, as we have already determined that the trial court -properly struck Duchene’s late-filed response, Duchene cannot rely on that evidence in his attempt to create a question of fact at this time. Second, we note that all three of Duchene’s arguments, i.e., that Hernandez failed to mitigate his damages, that Du-chene made payment to Hernandez, and that there was a possible accord and satisfaction,- center on affirmative defenses that must be affirmatively pled by a defendant. See Tex, R. Crv. P. 94 (listing “accord and satisfaction” and “payment” as affirmative defenses that must be pled by a defendant); see also In Matter of Estate of Downing, 461 S.W.3d 231, 242 n.5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). A defendant must expressly raise affirmative

    ### Response:
    recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”). Plistorically, the Court also viewed the exclusionary rule as preserving the integrity of the judicial process by banishing evidence secured only because government agents violated the Constitution. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 (“To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.”)- The twin objectives of deterring unconstitutional searches and preserving judicial integrity made the exclusionary rule an essential remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393; cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (<HOLDING>). Despite its undeniably laudable purpose, the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that court precedent has implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora” [emphasis added]); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S. Ct 1702, 75 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1983) (“public places historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be public forums” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]). But see United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-28, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1990) (distinguishingpostal service sidewalk from municipal sidewalks and concluding that postal service sidewalk is not traditional public forum after conducting review of nature and history of sidewalk at issue); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836-38, 96 S. Ct. 1211, 47 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 24 The trial court did not engage in a

    ### Response:
    holding that streets and sidewalks inside fort dix military reservation were not traditional public fora
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the damages caused by their conduct and actions described above in a sum exceeding $2,000,000, plus pre- and post-Judgment interest.” Thus, Plaintiffs allege that one of the objects of the fraud perpetrated against them was for Defendants to obtain Simply Goodies’ assets. One of the ways in which this object was accomplished was by depriving Plaintiffs of notice of the foreclosure sale. Although part of the trial will focus on the events that occurred at the Property in Mexico, the part of the trial that concerns Casas Gran des will focus on its purchase of Simply Goodies’ assets. Because Casas Grandes’ contacts with Texas relate to these assets, there is a substantial connection between the forum contacts and the operative facts of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Retamco, 278 S.W.3d at 340-41 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the generic damages paragraph,

    ### Response:
    holding that suit arose from alleged fraudulent transfer of real property located in texas even though the allegedly fraudulent assignment occurred in california
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    12.00. The regulations further provide that in cases where the nature of the individual’s intellectual impairment is such that standardized intelligence tests are precluded, then medical reports specifically describing the level of intellectual function should be obtained. Id. Here, there is no evidence or reason to believe that plaintiff’s impairments preclude standardized intelligence testing. In light of the Secretary’s regulations, such a test should have been administered to plaintiff. Here again, however, the Secretary seeks to avoid this result by shifting the burden to plaintiff. The Secretary asserts that plaintiff had an opportunity to provide evidence of mental retardation, but failed to do so. See Willis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 727 F.2d 551 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The Secretary points out that at the close of

    ### Response:
    holding that 42 usc  405g limits the district courts discretion to remand for reconsideration in light of new evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and McIntyre’s testimony is cast into doubt by the absence of the key statement in his police report from that day. The Court does not determine whether McIntyre’s testimony or Stephens’ notes are credible; instead, it merely finds that they are not overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence that Deskovic made the ejaculation statement. Thus, the Court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists, and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. See Ricciuti 124 F.3d at 130 (“Here, a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence, that [defendants] violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights by conspiring to fabricate and forward to prosecutors a known false confession almost certain to influence a jury’s verdict.”); see also Jocks, 316 F.3d at 138 (<HOLDING>). 2. Qualified Immunity Stephens also argues

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where plaintiff testified that statement written by defendant was false and defendant testified that statement was verbatim and accurate because although there was certainly not overwhelming evidence of falsification a reasonable jury would be entitled to credit plaintiffs testimony and reject defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and valid, despite the fact that the Baltimore City Circuit Court has ordered a new trial in the Wallace case, collateral estoppel would not apply here because the issues litigated in the Wallace case are not identical to the one now before the court. Whether City Homes was negligent and/or made a negligent misrepresentation with respect to the Property is not the same fact or issue as whether the lead poisoning alleged in the Wallace case was accidental. Although the same subject matter is involved, the questions are not identical for purposes of collateral estoppel, as the jury in the Wallace case was not asked to decide whether City Homes actually foresaw or expected the Wallace children’s injuries. See, e.g., Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, City Homes is not precluded from

    ### Response:
    holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 . Poole and Trammell denied that Poole made this statement. R2-33, Exh. 16 at 8(28); Exh. 15 at 16 (59-60). 2 . Although the district court never specifically mentioned Phillips’s race discrimination claim under § 1981, it implicitly rejected it on this basis as well because the analysis for a § 1981 claim is the same as for Title VII race discrimination claims, Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 745 F.2d 1373, 1376 (11th Cir. 1984), and it granted summary judgment as to ""all” of Phillips’s claims. Rl-41. 3 . Even though the suggested comparator here, Yonkman, was fewer than 10 years younger than Phillips, we have held that as few as three years difference in age can satisfy the “substantially younger” requirement. See Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (11th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Damon, 196 F.3d at 1360. 4 . As

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff aged 42 who was replaced by employee aged 39 met the substantially younger replacement requirement under adea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assumption to be ""unsupported speculation about a defendant's background.” Id. at 281. In United States v. Warren, reliance on a PSR statement which was ""by its own terms ... unclear ... whether [the defendant] was the perpetrator or the victim of the frauds recited” was also considered improper speculation. 186 F.3d 358 (3rd Cir. 1999). Neither case is comparable to Soloman’s situation. There was no unsupported speculation about whether Soloman committed any of the crimes at issue; he had been convicted of and sentenced on all the crimes discussed. 4 . To the extent that Soloman seeks review of the denial of the downward departure, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review such a denial that was based on an exercise of discretion. See U.S. v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247-48 (3d Cir.2000)

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an unconstitutional use-of-force policy, summary judgment was proper because Martinez has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Oregon Department of Corrections’ policy is “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (finding a similar policy to be constitutional). However, at this stage in the proceedings, a genuine dispute of material fact precludes granting summary judgment for Fletcher on the grounds of qualified immunity. See Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The evidence submitted by the parties creates

    ### Response:
    holding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage where there was a triable dispute as to whether they were reasonable in shooting a suspect who was not facing or pointing his gun at them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir.2013). Whether to grant such a reduction is within the district court’s discretion, so long as it considers the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) to the extent applicable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); Smalls, 720 F.3d at 195. We review a district court’s decision whether to grant a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir.2010). In so doing, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the district court, but instead consider whether the court’s exercise of discretion was arbitrary or capricious. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Our review of the record demonstrates that

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    already affirmed the portion of the damages award that was not dependent on any tolling theory, see id. at 395, 406, so Rule 37(a), not Rule 37(b), governed post-judgment interest on those damages. Second, Mt. Hood I did not direct the entry of a particular, modified money judgment, but simply remanded to the district court to assess the equitable tolling theory. See Mt. Hood II, 616 F.2d at 395; Mt. Hood I, 583 F.2d at 469. Thus, Rule 37(b)’s limitation on the district court’s authority to award post-judgment interest was simply inapplicable in Mt. Hood II. Physicians may have been led astray by language in Mt. Hood II suggesting that we take an expansive approach to the award of post-judgment interest. See Mt. Hood II, 616 F.2d at 406-07; see also Handgards, 743 F.2d at 1299 & n. 26 (<HOLDING>). However, that language was addressed to the

    ### Response:
    recognizing circuit split
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    499 U.S. at 362, 111 S.Ct. at 1296. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the selection process used to prepare Mid America’s Title Commitment No. 125266 fails to meet this minimal level of creativity. Selecting which facts to include in this compilation of data was not a matter of discretion based on Mid America’s personal judgment or taste, but instead it was a matter of convention and strict industry standards. As the affidavits introduced by Kirk suggest, all title examiners preparing a proper title commitment for the Frankfort property would have referred to the same sources of information and ultimately would have selected the same facts to include in their title commitments. See Victor Lalli Enterprises v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 672 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In essence, Mid America’s selection of the

    ### Response:
    holding that betting charts are not sufficiently original to merit copyright protection because ujnless a publisher were to make a mistake the information in the charts does not vary in the slightest as between publishers and is derived from commonly ascertainable sources
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is actionable as securities fraud is not inconsistent with the Court’s earlier memorandum (Doc. 181) at the motion to dismiss stage. At that time, the in-depth factual analysis needed to determine whether the contracts at issue were “securities” precluded the Court from fully addressing the issue of whether the alleged conduct was actionable as securities fraud. Because the annuity contracts, aside from the QPA-2, were “securities,” the connection between the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of securities is not as attenuated as the twice-removed relationship described in the earlier memorandum. (See Doc. 181 at 37-38.) Accordingly, the alleged pay-to-play scheme may form the basis of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 securities fraud violations. See Burton, 127 F.Supp.2d at 676- 77 (<HOLDING>), vi. Conclusion as to PSLRA The Court

    ### Response:
    holding that pslra barred rico claims based on pension fund scheme involving failure to disclose conflicts of interest and commission arrangements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    omitted); United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir.1990) (“One who has been indicted as a principal may be convicted on evidence showing only that he aided and abetted the offense.”); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir.1980) (“[T]he giving of an aiding and abetting instruction does not violate due process where the state has abolished the distinction between principals and accessories, and where there is evidence before the jury to support the instruction.”); United States v. Beardslee, 609 F.2d 914, 919 (8th Cir.1979) (rejecting the argument that defendant’s due process rights were violated by an aiding and abetting instruction when the indictment did not explicitly charge him with aiding and abetting); Glass v. United States, 328 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>); People v. Garrison, 47 Cal.3d 746, 254

    ### Response:
    holding there was no error in giving an instruction on aiding and abetting when defendant was not charged with aiding and abetting because ajiders and abettors  are chargeable directly as principals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    statute that stated, [n]othing in this article shall constitute a waiver of the immunity of the state from any action. The exercise of authority provided in this article shall not constitute the provision of liability insurance protection under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX of the Constitution. OCGA § 45-9-5. This language is almost identical to OCGA § 36-85-20, the statute at issue here. In Price we examined OCGA § 45-9-5 and concluded that the expressed legislative intent must give way to the mandate of the constitution. Id. at n. 2. In Price we rejected out of hand the assertion that the program of self-insurance did not constitute liability insurance within the meaning of the constitution. See also Martin v. Dept. of Public Safety, 257 Ga. 300 (357 SE2d 569) (1987) (<HOLDING>). We recently rejected a similar argument in

    ### Response:
    holding that selfinsurance program covering employees waived the sovereign immunity of the department of public safety in spite of language contained in ocga  4595
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement. 909 F.2d at 1469 (emphasis added). As the cited language plainly indicates, the Court in Hewlett-Packard focused on the defendant’s intent to induce the acts found to be infringing, and not on the defendant’s intent to infringe the patent. See also Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1986) (noting that liability under Section 271(b) does not require conduct rising to the level of willful infringement); Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Plasti-Clip Corp., 888 F.Supp. 1212, 1222-25 (D.N.H.1994); Maxwell v. K Mart, 880 F.Supp. 682, 685 (D.Minn.1995). Cf. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Dynamis, Inc. v. Leepoxy Plastics, Inc., 831

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff seeking to establish inducement to infringe must show that the alleged infringers actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    burdensome and duplicative state regulation.” Id. (citations omitted). “Federally chartered banks are subject to state laws of general application in their daily business to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes of the NBA.” Id. (citing Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 290, 16 S.Ct. 502, 40 L.Ed. 700 (1896)). “However, the States can exercise no control over national banks, nor in any wise affect' their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “States are permitted to regulate the activities of national banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s ... exercise of its powers. But when state prescriptions 4, 827 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Indiana Nat’l Bank v. Roberts, 326 So.2d 802,

    ### Response:
    holding that the nba preempted a kentucky statute that re quired a national bank as a foreign corporation transacting business in the state to obtain a certificate of authority prior to maintaining suit in a kentucky court as it significantly impaired the banks exercise of authority under the nba
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.” Here, resolution of the issue of whether or not Travelers owes Plaintiff a defense of a cross-complaint filed in a pending state court action “would alter the direction of the current proceedings....""Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. Fred Schakel Dairy, 634 F.Supp.2d at 1092-93 (staying proceedings pending interlocutory appeal of order denying motion to dismiss Clean Air Act claim). Since three of Plaintiffs four claims against Travelers are based upon the duty to defend, “[i]t would be a waste of judicial and party resources to proceed with [these] claims while the appeal is pending.” Id.; see also Watson v. Yolo Co. Flood Control and Water Conservation District, No. 2:06-cv-1549 FCD DAD, 2007 WL 4107539, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 16, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff counters that “a stay will cause

    ### Response:
    holding stay of proceedings pending interlocutory appeal promotes economy of time and effort both for the court and the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in any case, outside the scope of his federal duties as a VA employee. Claus does not, however, deny that at all relevant times Gyorkey was ostensibly acting on behalf of the VA. Indeed, Claus never challenged Gyorkey’s removal petition. Claus contends that Gyorkey was wearing two hats, as both a federal and a private employee, when he recruited Claus and that he should accordingly not be entitled to government immunity for acts undertaken, at least in part, on behalf of Baylor. Claus misapprehends the nature of federal officials’ immunity. The applicable law is clear. Absent an allegation of a tort of constitutional magnitude, federal officials are entitled to absolute immunity for ordinary torts committed within the scope of their jobs. Evans v. Wright, 582 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>). The district court here properly summarized

    ### Response:
    recognizing the restrictive holding of butz v economou 438 us 478 98 sct 2894 57 led2d 895 1978 as applicable only to actions amounting to constitutional violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Baird v. S. Ry. Co., 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617, 619 (1942) (where the deed conveyed a fee); Buhl, 840 S.W.2d at 907 (where the deed limited the purpose of the easement); Noble, 1988 WL 60482, at *1 (where the deed conveyed “a right-of-way on which to construct and operate [the railroad’s] said railroad”); Smoky Mountain R.R. Co. v. Paine Oil Co., 496 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tenn.Ct.App.1973) (where the deed expressly conveyed a right-of-way for railroad purposes); Bell, 39 S.W.2d at 1029 (where the deed conveyed a fee). The language of the granting deed must be the primary guide for the court in construing the scope of the easement. See Henry, 1927 WL 2123, at *2; River City Resort v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. E1999-02567-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 8539, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 21, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Regen v. E. Fork Farms, LP, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that if easement language is clear and unambiguous and does not limit its duration then the court cannot impose such a limitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for life in the current version of the Manual for Courts-Martial). Such punishment increasing circumstances enjoy a long history and are well within the authority of the President to prescribe in the exercise of his powers under Articles 18, 36, and 56, UCMJ. Cf. United States v. Loving, 41 MJ. 213 (1994), aff'd,-U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996). For practical purposes, they are often treated like elements. The distinction may be important for some purposes, however, such as multiplicity analysis. See United States v. Weymouth, 43 M.J. 329 (1995); United States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370 (C.M.A.1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1091, 114 S.Ct. 919, 127 L.Ed.2d 213 (1994). But cf. United States v. Oatney, 45 M.J. 185, 188-189, slip op. at 9-12 (U.S. Armed Forces 30 Sep. 1996)(<HOLDING>). In any event, in this case the issue is not,

    ### Response:
    holding suggests that whether elements are statutory or not is immaterial to multiplicity determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of pro hac vice status, they too must be undone. The findings of Rule 11 violations are set aside, the sanction and admonition are vacated, and the pro hac vice status of Scheck and Brustin is restored. No costs. It is so ordered. 1 . A further version, correcting typographical errors, was filed later that day. The differ-enees between the two versions are not material to these appeals. 2 . This provision requires that in every pleading, or motion or other filing counsel’s signature is a representation that ""the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentia-ry support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” 3 . Compare In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), with Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a jurists derogatory comments about a lawyers conduct without more do not constitute an appealable sanction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    judgment be ALLOWED. 2 See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Summary Judgment footnote 1 (“Plaintiffs Opposition”). 3 Welch also argues that the statement is defamatory per se because it adversely reflects on his abilities in his profession. The court does not analyze this issue but doubts the statement constitutes defamation per se because the statement is not particularly harmful to Welch’s abilities as an engineer. See Bander v. Metropolitan Life, 313 Mass. 337, 346 (1943). Even if it were considered defamation per se, Welch would still have to prove the other elements of a prima facie defamation case, see Commonwealth v. Pratt, 208 Mass. 553, 558-59 (1912), which he cannot do. 4 See also, Underwood v. Digital Equipment Corp., Inc., 576 F.Sup. 213, 217 (D.Mass 1983) (<HOLDING>). 5 Norvold stated in his deposition that, “in

    ### Response:
    holding that whether a person should be considered again for possible employment is an inherently subjective question for the employer as is the employers opinions of its employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to paragraph 6. Plaintiff concludes that the contract is essentially an “as is” contract despite the “illusion of warranty” which appears on the contract’s face. As such, the contract is unconscionable. “A bargain is unconscionable if it is such as no person in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair person would accept on the other.” Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Reinhardt, 428 N.W.2d 672, 673 (Iowa App.1988) citing Smith v. Harrison, 325 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Iowa 1982). When determining whether a contract is unconscionable, the court should examine the following factors: assent, unfair surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining power, and substantive unfairness. Gentile v. Allied Energy Products, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Iowa App.1991) (<HOLDING>) citing C & J Fertilizer v. Allied Mut. Ins.

    ### Response:
    holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the children. [Ibid.] Absent exigent circumstances, changes in custody should not be ordered without a full plenary hearing. R. 5:8-6; Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J.Super. 125, 133, 869 A.2d 451 (App.Div.2005). That is so because, as we have noted in another context, even “a temporary decision to change custody can take on a life of its own, creating a new status quo.” Peregoy v. Peregoy, 358 N.J.Super. 179, 203, 817 A.2d 381 (App.Div.2003). The status quo ante is significant because “[a] party seeking to modify custody must demonstrate changed circumstances that affect the welfare of the child[ j.” Hand, supra, 391 N.J.Super. at 105, 917 A.2d 269; Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 n. 8, 432 A.2d 63 (1981); see Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J.Super. 387, 398, 633 A.2d 1009 (App.Div.1993) (<HOLDING>). There exists, however, an equally weighty set

    ### Response:
    holding that a moving party must demonstrate changed circumstances which would have an impact on the childs welfare
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Brown, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https ://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Shooting_oLMichaeLBrown (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 35 . Shooting of Ezell Ford, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Shooting_of_EzelL_Ford (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 36 . Shooting of Tamir Rice, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Shooting_of_Tamir_Rice (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 37 . Julia Craven, Black Lives Matter Co-Founder Reflects on the Origins of the Movement, Huffington Post (Sept. 30, 2015, 3:19 p.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entiy/black-lives-matter-opal-tometi_us_560clc59 e4b0768127003227 (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 38 . See, e.g., Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 801, 813-16 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2007, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1191, 128 S.Ct. 1230,

    ### Response:
    holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in trial of mother for felony injury to child when after grandmother testified that she had been concerned about leaving a child with mother or suspicious of her when another of mothers young children had diedevidence which had been the subject of a motion in limine the trial court strongly instructed the jurors three times that day and polled them individually the next day about whether they could follow the instruction to disregard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as a defendant to answer as to any wrongful death claim he may assert. The driver of the vehicle that struck Travis was not sued. 2 . Neither party cites Restatement section 352, cited by the Court of Appeals, which provides for vendor liability for harm occurring ""on the land,"" presumably because Travis was not injured on the property. Nor is there any claim asserted under Restatement sections 372 or 373. These sections discuss vendor liability for harm occurring ""outside of the land"" from ""artificial conditions,"" which include ""trees or plants planted or preserved . irrespective of whether they are harmful in themselves or become so only because of the subsequent operation of natural forces."" Restatement § 363 crt. b. 3 . See, eg., Risk v. Schilling, 569 N.E.2d 646, 647-48 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>); Olds v. Noel, 857 N.E.2d 1041, 1046

    ### Response:
    holding that partnership that owned land had no liability for injury occurring in a workshop on the land when only one member of the partner ship had constructed the workshop and used it for a hobby
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Lutherans v. Brock, 251 S.W.3d 621, 627 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). But see 209 S.W.3d 888, 895. This is the identical conclusion reached by the state supreme courts that have considered the question. See, e.g., Me. Dep’t of Transp. v. Me. State Employees Ass’n, 581 A.2d 813, 815 (Me.1990) (stating that “[t]o allow a party to appeal before the rehearing by simply filing a motion to confirm, a motion that would be denied by the court in conjunction with its order vacating the award and directing a rehearing, would be to circumvent [provisions equivalent to TAA (a)(5) ]”); Karcher Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc., 204 P.3d 1262, 1265-66 (Nev.2009) (<HOLDING>); Double Diamond Constr. v. Farmers Coop.

    ### Response:
    holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nature of witness’ availability at original trial date). Due Process {30} Defendant also argues that the delay in concluding the amenability hearing on remand violated his due process rights. “To prevail on a claim that delay in the proceedings violated Defendant’s right to due process, Defendant must prove prejudice and an intentional delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage.” State v. Gibson, 113 N.M. 547, 559, 828 P.2d 980, 992 (Ct.App.1992). The prejudice shown must be “actual” and “substantial.” Id. For the same reasons just discussed, the record does not demonstrate any of these features. Rule 5-604 {31} Defendant argues that the delay in this case also violates the six-month rule, Rule 5-604(B) NMRA 2000. See Michael S., 124 N.M. 732, 955 P.2d 201, 1998-NMCA-041. ¶ 9 (<HOLDING>); Rule 10-101(A)(2) NMRA 2000 (holding rules of

    ### Response:
    holding sixmonth rule applies to youthful offender proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since no Illinois court has squarely addressed this question, for guidance in our decision Dempsey points to similar decisions in New York and California that have held that a mother may not prevent medical malpractice defendants from obtaining the prenatal care records for the period during which the mother was pregnant with the infant plaintiff. In both states, in fact, courts have held that prenatal care records are not exclusively those of the mother but also belong equally to the infant. Accordingly, by filing such a medical malpractice action, either the mother or the infant plaintiff through his mother waives the physician-patient privilege with respect to prenatal care records. See, e.g., Scharlack v. Richmond Memorial Hospital, 102 A.D.2d 886, 888, 477 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187 (1984) (<HOLDING>). See also Hughson v. St. Francis Hospital of

    ### Response:
    holding that the mother can be deemed to have waived the physicianpatient privilege only with respect to the medical history and records pertaining to the period when the plaintiff was in utero during which time there could be no severance of the infants prenatal history from his mothers medical history
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the underlying drug offense, we had no occasion to address the applicable standard of review. Nonetheless, because we think the issue is important, especially in the context of sentencing, we write separately to explain why we think the parties were likely misguided in their assumption. Our premise is simple: We are required to apply “a clear error standard of review for appellate challenges to judicial fact-finding at sentencing,” United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 222 (2d Cir.2005), without regard to whether appellant objected to the trial judge’s factual findings below. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Gall v. United States, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), we review a sentencing court’s factual determinations for clear error. See id. at 597 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Edwards, 496 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentence is subject to reversal if the trial judge selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    include findings of fact which support the determination of what is in the best interest of the child. N.C.G.S. § 5043.2(a) (1987). The determination of what “will best promote the interest and welfare of the child,” that is, “what is in the best interest of the child,” is a conclusion of law, Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 604, 244 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1978), and this conclusion must be supported by findings of fact as to the characteristics of the parties competing for custody. Id. “These findings may concern the physical, mental, or financial fitness or any other factors brought out by the evidence and relevant to the issue of the welfare of the child.” Id. These findings cannot, however, be mere conclusions. See Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 667, 397 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial court made some

    ### Response:
    holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (explicating term ""testimonial”); Michigan v. Biyant, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93, 2011 WL 676964 (2011) (same). 16 . As noted above, Gamory made a Batson challenge to four of the government’s six peremptory strikes. On appeal, he claims that the government used all of its “six” peremptory strikes against African-Americans. The record does not reflect the race of jurors 18 and 20 which Gamory now claims were stricken in violation of Batson. To the extent there is an issue with respect to the race of jurors 18 and 20, Gamoiy failed to make a sufficient record in the District Court to allow us to review this claim. See United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1520 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Further, the government maintains that only

    ### Response:
    holding a party alleging discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges must make a record supporting such allegation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of equity. “Despite the merger doctrine, prior agreements are not merged into a realty deed [that] is signed due to fraud, accident, or mistake.” Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P’ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 161 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex.2005). In equity, Texas law would allow the Cades to sue to reform the deed based, on mutual mistake, but they must bring that claim within the four-year statute of limitations. For the reasons the Court explains, I agree that the law charges the Cades with knowledge of the deed’s contents as of the date they signed it, so they cannot rely on the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations, which expired before they filed suit to reform the deed in February 2011. See Nat’l Prop. Holdings, L.P. v. Westergren, 453 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex.2015) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>) (quoting El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec

    ### Response:
    holding that the law presumes that a party knows and accepts the terms of a contract the party signs andit is not the courts role to protect parties from their own agreements 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the federal motor carrier requirements, the trip lease, or the imputed ICC endorsement to [the lessee’s] insurance policy would alter any party’s rights or duties of contribution. In particular, we make clear that those provisions do not impose on [ICC carrier], as lessee, the status of an insurer with respect to ... the lessor. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 143. Cf. Occidental Fire and Cas. Co. of N.C. v. Brocious, 772 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir.1985), (reaffirming the holding that the same federal requirements applicable here do not absolve lessors of otherwise existing obligations under contracts allocating financial risk among themselves as private parties); Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc., et al, 423 U.S. 28, 96 S.Ct. 229, 46 L.Ed.2d 169 (1975), (<HOLDING>) See also Pratt v. Andrews, 164 Ill.App.3d 606,

    ### Response:
    holding that an indemnification agreement between a lessor and an icc carrierlessee shifting liability to the lessor did not contravene the icc regulations which makes the lessee ultimately responsible for the operation of the vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harries v. Dutton, 594 F.Supp. 949, 961 (M.D.Tenn.1984)C'In the judgment of this Court, the conditions of confinement inflicted on Mr. Harries are so adverse that they have caused him to waive his post-conviction remedies involuntarily.""). Mr. Corner describes the conditions of his confinement in nothing short of Orwellian terms~ He tells us that he is in ""sensory deprivation,"" has no access to legal materials, is permitted nothing in his cell, and must walk continuously for fear of becoming a “veggie.” Mr. Comer’s choice between execution at the State’s hands and remaining in the particular conditions of his confinement may be the type of “Hobson’s choice” that renders his supposed decision to withdraw his appeal involuntary. Cf. Gilbert v. Lockhart, 930 F.2d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir.l991)(<HOLDING>). The record is incomplete as it bears on Mr.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that providing defendant with hobsons choice between incompetent lawyer or no lawyer violates right to counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    635, 638 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). In that case, we stated, “[W]e hold that Ram-Forwarding was entitled to recover attorney’s fees even though it recovered zero damages for its civil theft claim.” Id. However, the reasoning this Court employed was that a party could “prevail” without recovering damages. Id. Given the supreme court’s holding in Intercontinental that a party who does not receive any relief on its claim cannot be the prevailing party under the ordinary meaning of that term, this Court’s prior opinion is no longer a correct statement of the law concerning “prevailing party.” We therefore decline to follow Johns to the extent it has been implicitly overruled by the supreme court’s decision in Intercontinental. See Intercontinental, 295 S.W.3d at 654-55 (<HOLDING>). We overrule Air Starter’s fourth issue. 2.

    ### Response:
    holding jurys finding of liability on partys claim does not bestow prevailing party status when party received no relief on that claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person liability as to each of the alleged control persons. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close these motions [nos. 22 and 25 on the docket sheet]. A conference is scheduled for July 31, 2008, at 3:30 p.m. SO ORDERED. 1 . The facts summarized in this section are drawn from the Complaint (""CompL”) and are presumed to be true for the purpose of these motions. 2 . See CompL ¶ 16. 3 . See id. ¶ 21. 4 . See id. 117. 5 . See id. 6 . See id. ¶ 11. 7 . See id. ¶ 6. 8 . See id. ¶ 13. 9 . See id. ¶ 15. 10 . See id. 11 . See id. ¶ 29. 12 . See id. 13 . See id. ¶ 43. 14 . See id. ¶ 44. 15 . See id. ¶ 45. 16 . id. ¶ 46. 17 . See id. ¶ 47. 18 . See id. 19 . See id. ¶ 51. 20 d 930, 939 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 95 . Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension

    ### Response:
    holding that a pledge is a sale and purchase of a security under  10b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    committing such crimes may be presumed to pose a bona fide risk to the integrity of elections. An infamous crime may include some felonies and some misdemeanors, but crimes marked by gross moral turpitude alone are not sufficient to render a crime infamous for purposes of the Infamous Crimes Clause. Prototypical examples of infamous crimes are treason, perjury, malicious prosecution, and election fraud, all of which were subject to disenfranchisement for at least 26 years prior to the 1850 Convention, see R.L. 1824, ch. 29, § 71, at 150; id. § 31, at 144; R.L. 1824, ch. 35, § 6, at 167; R.S. 1843, ch. 54, § 79, at 999; R.S. 1843, ch. 53, § 77, at 976; R.S. 1843, ch. 5, § 158, at 153. Although most of these examples involve elements of deceit and dishonesty, cf Oldner, 206 S.W.3d at 822 (<HOLDING>), the critical element is that they attempt to

    ### Response:
    holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Rule 35(a) at issue. The facts before this Court clearly indicate that White’s physical condition is “in controversy,” as required by Rule 35(a). White filed this personal-injury action, seeking damages for pain and suffering, including a continuing burning sensation in his foot. White asserts that this ongoing discomfort is caused by the battery acid that he alleges a Wal-Mart employee allowed to leak on him. Wal-Mart argues that the ongoing discomfort is the result of White’s previously existing medical conditions, chiefly poor blood circulation. Because the medical cause of White’s discomfort is clearly in dispute, Wal-Mart has established that White’s “physical condition” is “in controversy.” Compare Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 164 F.R.D. 196, 199 (N.D.Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>), with Neal v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 171 F.R.D.

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff had placed her medical condition in controversy by alleging that she had suffered severe mental or emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to comply with the requirements for filing a third-party claim to the Subject Funds. B. Griffin Lacks Standing to Assert a Claim Notwithstanding the timeliness of Griffin’s attempt to file a third-party petition, Griffin’s prospective petition must be dismissed due to her lack of standing to pursue a claim in the ancillary proceeding. Griffin claims that she is entitled to $17,702.65 in wages, vacation pay, and payroll deductions arising from past services rendered to GDC. (See Griffin Ltr. ¶ 2.) Because Griffin cannot claim ownership or a security interest in any specific assets contained in the preliminary orders of forfeiture, Griffin’s general claim for monies owed to her would only establish her as a general creditor of GDC with a right to payment. See Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1581 (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a general creditor does not have a property interest superior to defendants in any particular asset or funds until he has obtained some judgment and secures that asset or those funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    section 362(a), in enumerating which actions are stayed, differentiates between the debtor, property of the debtor, and property of the estate. In specifying the duration of the automatic stay, paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 362(c) distinguish between acts against property of the estate (the stay continues so long as property remains property of the estate) and all other acts (the stay continues until the case is closed or dismissed or until a discharge is granted or denied). The language “with respect to the debtor” in 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(3)(A) has therefore been an occasion for some bankruptcy courts to “differentiate between the debtor, property of the debtor, and property of the estate”. See, e.g., Jumpp v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 356 Bankr. 789, 794 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Other courts do not see those distinctions

    ### Response:
    holding that the automatic stay terminates as to the debtor personally and as to his nonestate property but that the stay persists as to property of the bankruptcy estate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    702, Plaintiffs injuries, - according to the Injury Report, were treatable with over-the-counter pain medication and an injection, (see Pl.’s Ltr. at unnumbered 2). Plaintiff does not allege otherwise or that he suffered any permanent harm. See, e.g., Sloane v. Borawski, 64 F.Supp.3d 473, 494 (W.D.N.Y.2014) (finding that, even if the defendant did ignore the claimed “broken ribs, ankle fracture and lower right-side back injury,” the “plaintiff cannot meet the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation”); Alster v. Goord, 745 F.Supp.2d 317, 337 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Because hospital records reveal no fractures or dislocation, this injury is not sufficiently serious to meet the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment standard.”); Dallio v. Hebert, 678 F.Supp.2d 35, 44 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Wright, 477 F.Supp.2d 572, 575

    ### Response:
    holding that two black eyes bruising in the kidney area kick marks open lacerations headache and numbness did not constitute serious medical need for eighth amendment purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to an adult, however, may not be for a child because a juvenile is less likely to be able to “determine what is in their own best interest.” JV-500210, 111 Ariz. at 5, 864 P.2d at 562. For that reason, unlike an adult, a juvenile may not reject probation and elect incarceration. Id. ¶ 38 Recently, this court decided State v. Tousignant, 202 Ariz. 270, 43 P.3d 218 (App. 2002). There, we addressed the issue of whether a defendant who violated his probation under Proposition 200 could opt to reject further probation. Id. at 3, 43 P.3d at 218. The Tousignant court held that he could not because A.R.S. § 13-901.01(E) (2001) mandates probation, and incarceration is not an option. Id. at 4, 43 P.3d at 220; see also In re Fernando C., 195 Ariz. 233, 234, ¶ 5, 986 P.2d 901, 902 (App.1999) (<HOLDING>). In so holding, this court overturned the

    ### Response:
    holding that proposition 200 does not apply to juveniles because its goals are redundant with that of the juvenile court system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Legislature intended the statute to apply to unborn children. Hearing on H.B. 1351 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 58th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 22, 2003). This Court has held: ‘When the plain language of a statute is not ‘transparent,’ our codified rules of statutory interpretation direct us to look to the Code itself in determining the meaning of statutory terms.” N. X-Ray Co., Inc. v. State ex rel. Hanson, 542 N.W.2d 733, 735 (N.D.1996) (citing N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02). We review other provisions of the code to assist in the interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2(1)(b). Section 14-10-01, N.D.C.C., states: “Minors are persons under eighteen years of age. In this code, unless otherwise specified, the term ‘child’ means ‘minor’. Age must be calculated from the first minute 50 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Encoe, 110 Nev.

    ### Response:
    holding a pregnant woman who uses cocaine is not criminally liable for delivery of a controlled substance despite the possibility the drug may transfer to her infant postpartum via the umbilical cord
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    he had ""No objection” to the evidence at issue when offered during trial. 2 . Holmes v. State, 223 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007) (“We conclude here, as we did in Bell, that appellant did not waive his right to an article 38.23 instruction, and because he raised a fact issue regarding the legality of the seizure of the cocaine, he was entitled to such an instruction.""); see also Bell v. State, 881 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref d). 3 . Hromadka v. State, No. 1329-00, 2003 WL 1845067 (Tex.Crim.App. April 9, 2003) (not designated for publication). As an unpublished opinion, Hromadka has no precedential weight and must not be cited as legal authority. Tex.R.App. P. 77.3. 4 .See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). 5 . At the time of appellant’s trial and

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction under article 3823 only when the evidence heard by the jury raises an affirmatively contested issue of fact that is material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to reinstate the license or permit to drive.” Section 577.04.1.5. The director, thus, has the burden of proof at the hearing. Rain v. Director of Revenue, 46 S.W.3d 584, 587 (Mo.App.2001). Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 619-20 (italics in original) (footnote omitted). The Director is correct in his assertion that the trial court erroneously declared and applied the law. In its judgment, the court stated: “Upon the evidence offered, adjudged and adduced the Court finds the expressed reason for the [tjrooper’s stop of [Jones’s] motor vehicle to be insufficient and the [o]fficer lacked reasonable suspicion therefor.” The trial court’s reliance on whether Trooper Creasey had a reasonable suspicion for the initial stop is misplaced. See Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 85 S.W.3d 1, 4 n. 4

    ### Response:
    holding that the probable cause requirement for the initial stop and the exclusionary rule do not apply in section 302505 proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    factual predicate of the plaintiffs claim did not occur in the plaintiffs chosen forum.” Id. citing Intrepid Potash-N.M., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 669 F.Supp.2d 88, 95 (D.D.C. 2009). Defendants insist that the material events underlying this action are the corporate decisions underlying the SEC filings, which were made at RPM’s headquarters in Ohio, see Defs.’ Mem. at 13, and plaintiff maintains that the SEC filings themselves are among the material events that should be viewed as having taken place in the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Opp. at 16. There appears to be support for both positions. See Berenson v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., LLC, 319 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding that a claim arose where the corporate decisions were made), and Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d at 1155 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as discussed above, events other

    ### Response:
    holding that some operative facts did occur in the district of columbia where nonfiling or misfilings with the sec occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is for parties to accomplish by agreement things they conclude are more to their advantage than what they could accomplish by litigation. ¶ 17. The Administrative Code prevents DPI from imposing a twenty-five percent bond requirement on an MPCP school in the absence of proof that the school is not financially viable. Travis Tech contends that the Administrative Code bond requirement— which it voluntarily accepted in the Agreement— violates state law. Essentially, Travis Tech argues that parties can never stipulate to provisions that abrogate any part of statutory law. We disagree. ¶ 18. Case law has repeatedly held that although a statute permits certain actions, parties may nonetheless stipulate to the contrary. See Rice v. Gruetzmacher, 30 Wis. 2d 222, 227-28, 140 N.W.2d 238 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Spencer v. Spencer, 140 Wis. 2d 447, 451, 410

    ### Response:
    holding that a workers compensation insurer is entitled to share in a thirdparty settlement under the statutory formula unless it stipulates otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the premises when he has reason to suspect defects existing at the time of the taking of the tenancy and to either repair them or warn the tenant of their existence. [Footnote omitted.] In other words he is under the duty to take those precautions for the safety of the tenant as would be taken by a reasonably prudent man under similar circumstances. Cummings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20, 26, 386 P.2d 27, 31 (1963); see also McLeod v. Newcomer, 163 Ariz. 6, 8, 785 P.2d 575, 577 (App.1989); Udy v. Calvary Corp., 162 Ariz. 7, 11-12, 780 P.2d 1055, 1059-60 (App.1989); Presson v. Mountain States Properties, Inc., 18 Ariz.App. 176, 178-79, 501 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1972); but see W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 63, at 434-435 (5th ed.1984) (hereinafter “Prosser & Keeton”) (<HOLDING>). In Udy, Judge Jacobson concisely explained

    ### Response:
    recognizing the general rule that the landlord is not liable for dangerous conditions existing once the tenant takes possession of the premises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the BOP accepts that there are a number of legitimate penological interests for restricting inmates[’] access to R-rated movies.”).) Among the other governmental interests that are allegedly furthered by the R-rated movie prohibition are institutional security and order as well as inmate rehabilitation. . It is well recognized that maintaining prison security and order and furthering the rehabilitation of inmates are legitimate governmental interests. See Fraise, 283 F.3d at 516 (“It is ... beyond dispute that New Jersey has a legitimate penological interest in maintaining order and security within the prison system.”)(citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-51, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), and Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-92, 107 S.Ct. 2254); Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 128 (<HOLDING>) (quoting O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348, 107 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While it is true that the defendants have taken multiple depositions and produced thousands of documents, the plaintiffs have agreed that all of that discovery can be used in a subsequent action. In addition to requiring a plaintiff to permit a defendant to use discovery in a subsequent case, see, e.g., Jenkins v. Unified School District No. 501, 175 F.R.D. 582, 584 (D.Kan.1997), typically a court imposes as a condition of dismissal without prejudice that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s expenses incurred in defending the lawsuit, which usually include a reasonable attorney’s fee. United States v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 265 F.3d 1157, 1179 (10th Cir.2001) (citing Marlow v. Winston & Strawn, 19 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir.1994)); see also Cauley v. Wilson, 754 F.2d 769, 771-72 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have indicated they will almost

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court may seek to reimburse the defendant for his attorneys fees because he or she faces a risk that the plaintiff will refile the suit and impose duplicative expenses upon him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    weakened if a court can rely on the recollection of those concerned to support a probable cause finding long after the search warrant has been issued."" Id. at 802. ¶ 24. Still, Raflik admits that most federal courts have not seen fit to suppress evidence because of a failure to record some or all of the warrant application. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding suppression inappropriate when the magistrate and prosecutor were unaware that the recording equipment did not work, and where no record was made); United States v. Rome, 809 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1987) (refusing to suppress evidence when the preliminary discussions between the magistrate and the agent were not recorded); United States v. Loyd, 721 F.2d 331 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231

    ### Response:
    holding that suppression is not necessary when the magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of the recorded transcript
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court broad authority to exercise its equitable powers—where necessary and appropriate to facilitate the implementation of other Bankruptcy Code provisions.” Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Nosek (In re Nosek), 544 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.2008) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, while § 105(a) vests bankruptcy courts with inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct, it “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law.” Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, fn. 1, quoting United Sates v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986). Bankruptcy courts have used their authority to impose contempt sanctions pursuant to § 105 in a variety of circumstances. Hardy v. U.S. (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384, 1389-90 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 333

    ### Response:
    holding that section 105 grants statutory contempt powers in the bankruptcy context that may be used to award monetary and other forms of relief for automatic stay violations to the extent such awards are necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of the bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    taught in the annex, were purchased from a source outside the State of Minnesota four times each year. Furthermore, the annex received natural gas from a source outside the State of Minnesota. We conclude that the Church school’s use of materials purchased in interstate commerce, coupled with its use of natural gas from an out-of-state source, satisfy the jurisdictional element of section 844(i). See Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189-90 (supply of gas to private homes is a major interstate activity); United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103, 115 S.Ct. 1838, 131 L.Ed.2d 757 (1995) (trailer’s receipt of interstate utilities sufficient to satisfy 844(i)’s jurisdictional requirement); see also United States v. Milton, 966 F.Supp. 1038, 1041 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>). Congress clearly intended for the statute to

    ### Response:
    recognizing that churches satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of 844i
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Walton’s alleged violations of the Fort Worth Police Department’s sexual harassment policy to Appellant. The Texas Supreme Court has held that a party who wants protection under the Act must report a violation to the proper agency. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 319 (Tex. 2002). The proper agency, in this case, is one that has the authority to regulate under, enforce, investigate, or prosecute a violation of Texas’s sexual harassment and employment retaliation statutes. Id. This court has held that a city’s general authority to regulate under, enforce, and investigate claims of sexual harassment is not enough to make it an appropriate law enforcement authority under the Act. See City of Weatherford v. Catron, 88 S.W.3d 261, 268-69 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Appellee’s sexual harassment and

    ### Response:
    holding as a matter of law that the city is not an appropriate law enforcement authority under section 554002b for the reporting of another employees violation of federal or state sexual harassment laws
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when it attacked “all claims”); see also Wortham, 179 S.W.3d at 201-02 & n.16 (affirming summary judgment on gross negligence when the motion referred to “negligence”; refusing to separately address the appellants’ arguments regarding gross negligence because a finding of ordinary negligence is a prerequisite to a finding of gross negligence; overruling appellants’ issue contending that gross negligence claim was not addressed in the motion). Norman does not otherwise challenge the granting of the summary judgment on negligence or gross negligence. Norman’s third issue is overruled. III. Conclusion Having overruled Norman’s remaining issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1 . Compare Nowzaradan v. Ryans, 347 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (<HOLDING>), with Cobb v. Dall. Fort Worth Med. Ctr.—Grand

    ### Response:
    holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. 3 . Officers found Neeman asleep in a car that was parked askew with its lights on and engine running. After they woke him up, the officers noticed that Neeman had watery, red eyes. Although Neeman passed the field sobriety tests subsequently administered to him, the officers continued to detain him while they visually inspected his vehicle. The officers found marijuana. We held that the detention for the vehicle inspection was appropriately supported by the suspicious circumstances present. Neeman, 2000 WL 489581, *1. 4 . In fact, the Supreme Court has lauded the use of drug-sniffing dogs for their unique ability to directly dispel suspicion quickly and with minimal intrusion. See Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917 n. 7 (<HOLDING>); Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (""[i]n

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the supreme court considers drugdog sniffs often the fastest and least intrusive method of resolving suspicions during an investigative stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (internal quotation marks omitted), we hold that it is categorically a crime of violence under Guidelines section 4B1.2(a)(2). AFFIRMED. 1 . At the time of Crews’s conviction, delivery of a controlled substance under Oregon law was codified at section 475.992. 2 . After granting Crews a downward variance from the sentencing range of 57-71 months, the district court sentenced Crews to 37 months. 3 .Because we hold that Oregon Revised Statutes section 163.175(1)(b) is a ""crime of violence” within the meaning of Guidelines section 4B 1.2(a)(2), we need not determine whether it also meets the generic definition of ""aggravated assault” listed in the Application Notes to Guidelines section 4B1.2. Cf. United States v. Granbois, 376 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jennen, 596 F.3d 594, 600-02

    ### Response:
    holding that a prior conviction for abusive sexual contact under 18 usc  2244a3 was a per se crime of violence within the meaning of the application notes and declining to consider application of the residual clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Code, See Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(6) (Vernon Supp.1997). Section 51.014(6) states that a person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that “denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part upon a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print media ... arising under the free speech or free press clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article 1, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 73.” Id. Therefore, the only defendant entitled to bring an interlocutory appeal is HBO, a division of Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. See Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Hebert, 916 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist .] 1996, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Act of May 25, 1993, 73rd Leg.,

    ### Response:
    holding that under section 510146 only a defendant sued after effective date of statute could seek interlocutory review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whom he believed provided substandard care to his patients and in some cases performed unnecessary invasive procedures. Dr. LoPresti claims that his decision not to refer patients to these specialists was guided heavily by Vermont’s prohibition on unprofessional conduct contained in 26 V.S.A. §§ 1354, 1398, and by numerous provisions of the AMA Principles. Dr. LoPresti asserts that his employers wanted him to make the referrals for financial reasons, notwithstanding the prohibition of such practices contained in the aforementioned ethical codes. He alleges that a discharge based on these grounds violates compelling public policy that restricts an employer’s otherwise unfettered discretion to discharge employees. See Payne v. Rozendaal, 147 Vt. 488, 491-92, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The trial court summarily rejected this

    ### Response:
    recognizing public policy limits on employer discretion in discharging employees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    831 A.2d 1006, 1013 n. 3 (D.C.2003) (quoting Gray v. Gray, 412 A.2d 1208, 1210 (D.C.1980)). ‘“Since a constructive trust is found for the purpose of preventing humans from being successful in shady bits of behavior, it is universally f laches is a complete bar to the appellees’ constructive trust action, because in cases of mixed law and equity, courts “consider themselves bound by statutes of limitations governing actions of law.” King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C.1978). This rule, as the trial court indicated, appears to be mere dicta in this jurisdiction. Courts refer to the rule only to establish that allegations of fraud trigger a well-established exception to the “rule.” See, e.g., Fed. Mktg. Co. v. Virginia Impression Prods. Co., 823 A.2d 513, 528 (D.C.2003) (<HOLDING>); King, supra, 391 A.2d at 1187 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial courts limiting of claims to those occurring five years before the date of filing under laches was reasonable generous even inasmuch as it was two years beyond the statutory limitations pe riod
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    had probable cause to believe that she did. See Lincoln v. Shea, supra at 5 n.l. We therefore proceed to the usual inquiry whether the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff supports a finding that probable cause was lacking. 11 We have no occasion to compare “probable cause” for this purpose with “probable cause” justifying various actions in criminal prosecutions. 12 Cf. Burnham v. Collateral Loan Co., 179 Mass. 268, 275 (1901) (investigation unnecessary where it would be immaterial to crime suspected); Keefe v. Johnson, 304 Mass. 572, 578 (1939) (investigation unnecessary where there is no one of whom to inquire). 13 The test articulated by the Restatement is in accord with the law of a number of other jurisdictions. See Watzek v. Walker, 14 Ariz. App. 545, 548-549 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Kincaid, 335 So. 2d

    ### Response:
    holding that investigation was insufficient prior to prosecution for forgery of check
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of § 1328(a)(3)); Richardson v. Hidy Honda, Inc. (In re Richardson), 221 B.R. 956, 962 (D.Wyo.1998) (concluding that a chapter 7 debtor’s execution of a promissory note evidencing his restitutionary obligation to the victim of his criminal embezzlement did not transform the nature of the debtor’s obligation from a nondischargeable debt for the debtor’s embezzlement under § 523(a)(4) into a dischargeable contractual obligation; rather, in ruling on the dischargeability of the debtor’s obligation on the promissory note, the bankruptcy court could inquire into the circumstances surrounding the debtor’s execution of the note to ascertain whether the debt was derived from the debtor’s alleged embezzlement); McIntyre v. White (In re McIntyre), 328 B.R. 356, 361-62 (Bankr.D.Mass.2005) (<HOLDING>); Ramey v. Barton (In re Barton), 321 B.R. 869,

    ### Response:
    holding that the untimely death of a nondebtor spouse does not transform past due alimony into a dischargeable debt through an assignment by operation of law which would result in excepting the debt from nondischargeability under  523a5 as such an absurd result would be at odds with the intent of the drafters of the bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and were accurate when Pardo originally made them. While predictive statements are typically not actionable, “a defendant does not place itself beyond the reach of the securities laws merely by disclosing information that is predictive in nature ... whether liability is imposed depends on whether the predictive statement was false when it was made.” Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir.1994); Isquith v. Middle South Utilities Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 204 (5th Cir.1988). Here, there is evidence suggesting that Pardo intentionally refused to disclose to LPHI investors that he knew large numbers of active LEs were long. That being the case, there is a genuine question as to whether the CEO “spoke the full truth.” See Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 249 (5th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that Defendants argue that the

    ### Response:
    holding that company officials engaged in fraud by omitting known risks to their business plan although they recognized that signs of such dangers they privately predicted had already materialized
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also had drugs and if Defendant would consent to a search. See Haywood, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93, 1998-NMCA-029, ¶ 15 (explaining that the purpose of an investigative stop can be expanded by specific, articulable facts that cause an officer to reasonably suspect criminal activity). {11} As to Officer Owen’s detention of Defendant, the time between the completion of the HGN test and Officer Owen’s inquiry and search was brief. The detention in question lasted no longer than the time it took for Officer Owen to deliberate about the test results before Officer Seifert discovered drugs on the passenger and notified Officer Owen. The brief time period met the requirements of diligence; the stop in its entirety lasted approximately ten minutes. See Werner, 117 N.M. at 319, 871 P.2d at 975 (<HOLDING>). As to Officer Owen’s questions about drugs,

    ### Response:
    holding that investigation was not conducted with sufficient haste when the defendant was detained for over fortyfive minutes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    also weighs in favor of awarding attorney’s fees. Finally, this litigation served a clear public purpose. Unlike the plaintiff in Farrar, Plaintiffs never sought any extravagant or personal financial benefit. Instead, Plaintiffs wished only to vindicate our collective First Amendment rights. See Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir.1998) (“[Rjecovery under § 1988 is meant to reward those who have undertaken successfully to fulfill the role of a private attorney general.”). While the settlement and receipt of nominal damages did little for Plaintiffs personally, their victory undoubtedly signaled to the MTA the importance of ensuring that its regulations do not intrude upon our most basic constitutional and democratic rights. See Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1224 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court’s decision not to grant

    ### Response:
    holding that a fee award was justified because the ruling against the defendants would encourage the defendants to comply with the first amendment going forward
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.J., and LOWENSTEIN, J., concur. 1 . All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . All rule references are to the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, 2004, unless otherwise indicated. 3 . Section 213.111.2, governing MHRA actions, provides, in pertinent part, that the ""court ... may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages.” (Emphasis added.) 4 . If the appellant were successful in its claim in Point I, that the issue of punitive damages was not subject to trial by jury in a MMPA case, the claim in this point would not be one of submissibility. Rather, it would simply be a matter of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's decision in keeping with the standard of review of Murphy v. Carron 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976) (<HOLDING>). This is so in that as to judge-tried issues,

    ### Response:
    holding that in judgetried cases the judgment will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence is against the weight of the evidence or erroneously declares or applies the law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    14-8 at 397. Ms. Phillips also argues there is no conflict in the activities she did and a finding that she should.be psychiatrically disabled under the “B” criteria. Ms. Phillips notes the regulations specify that even when a claimant can perform many simple tasks, she may have marked restriction in concentration, persistence, or pace if the claimant cannot perform the 'tasks without extra supervision, assistance, or' in accordance with quality and accuracy standards, or át a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, or without undue interruptions or distractions. Thus, Ms. Phillips argues, her undertaking of simple tasks does not prevent a finding of psychiatrically disabled under the Listings. See Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608-09 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Ms. Phillips argues the ALJ did

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that a claimant who suffered from mental impairments could dress appropriately shop for food prepare meals perform chores take care of hygiene and care for a 13 year old son only meant that the plaintiff was not a raving maniac who needs to be locked up but did not contradict opinions of disability from the treating mental health professionals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    They did not specifically relate to the ability of the actual DMT machines used in defendants’ cases to meet the performance standards promulgated by the DOH at the time their breath-alcohol was measured, as required by statute to establish the admissibility of the evidence at trial. See 23 V.S.A. § 1203(d) (providing that test results are “valid” if performed according to DOH performance standards); State v. Rolfe, 166 Vt. 1, 11-12, 686 A.2d 949, 956-57 (1996) (interpreting term “valid” in § 1203(d) to establish threshold of admissibility of test into evidence). In other words, defendants’ allegations did not contest the foundational facts justifying admission of the test results; their arguments went solely to the weight of the evidence. See Rolfe, 166 Vt. at 3, 686 A.2d at 952 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 15. Because defendants’ allegations were

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant may contest foundational facts but not otherwise challenge admissibility of test results
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he is forced to quit involuntarily.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d at 151-52 (and cases cited therein). Case láw generally focuses on two parts of this standard: the employer’s intentional conduct and the intolerable level of the work conditions. Focusing first on the intent requirement, we recognize that in some constructive discharge cases, plaintiffs have been able to establish that employers acted'with the specific intent to prompt employees’ resignations. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Fleet Street Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 161-62 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding jury finding of constructive discharge where evidence indicated that employer nodded affirmatively when plaintiff suggested that the company was trying to force her to leave); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), prompting some district courts in this

    ### Response:
    holding constructive discharge supported by evidence that supervisor told employer he would be fired at the end of a  probationary period no matter what he did to improve his allegedly deficient performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    chief executive of Healthmaster would occur if she had accepted a bribe from a party negotiating with Healthmaster to Healthmaster’s detriment. In contrast, she contends that “false statements on the cost reports submitted to a fiscal intermediary for the Government do not implicate such a trust relationship.” Appellant’s Brief at 26. Significantly, when an arm’s length relationship existed between the defendant and the victim such that the discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant was not directly from the victim, a section 3B1.3 enhancement was held to be improper. See, e.g., Jolly, 102 F.3d at 48-50 (concluding that president of corporation did not stand in a position of trust relative to creditors of the corporation); United States v. West, 56 F.3d 216, 221 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Brunson, 54 F.3d at 675-78 (determining that

    ### Response:
    holding that title of president carried no special weight because it was not the position in the company but the exercise of managerial and professional discretion with re spect to the task hired by a customer to perform that determined eligibility for abuseoftrust enhancement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hindrocket.com in a web browser, and end up at Purdy’s web page, entitled “Official John Hinderaker Site,” which features Hinderaker’s photograph, the rocket graphic, and the inclusion of an altered biography of Hinderaker, all of which contribute to the impression that Hinderaker sponsored or is affiliated with the page. Purdy’s actions are a deliberate attempt to take advantage of Hinderaker’s goodwill, reputation, and prestige in order to divert traffic to Purdy’s web page and to generate publicity. Purdy argues that “hindrocket” is not a mark owned or used by Faegre and that he cannot be liable for appropriating a pseudonym. As long as a pseudonym clearly identifies the plaintiff, it is protected from appropriation. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 922 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Ackerman v. Ferry, No. B143751, 2002 WL

    ### Response:
    holding new jersey law prohibits appropriation of a celebritys nickname
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the portion of the trial addressing Mathews’s charges for public intoxication and intimidation are the same “matter in controversy” for purposes of disqualification or that reversal is required. See Den-ton v. State, 496 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ind.1986) (“While in the usual habitual offender determination the same jury hears both the felony charge and the recidivist charge in a bifurcated proceeding, we have previously held that it is permissible for a different jury than the one who heard the case on the underlying felony charge to determine a defendant’s habitual offender status.”), reh’g denied; Gunter v. State, 605 N.E.2d 1209, 1210-1211 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. Given that Judge Miller did

    ### Response:
    holding that while it was error for the regular judge to disqualify himself for only the habitual phase of the trial the error was harmless
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nonetheless protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because at the time of the statute’s adoption they “were among the peoples then considered to be distinct races”). To state a retaliation claim under § 1981 based on events occurring in the workplace, an employee must show that she suffered a materially adverse action because she engaged in protected activity. See Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011); Silverman v. Board of Education, 637 F.3d 729, 740-42 (7th Cir. 2011). “Individual employees can be held liable under Section 1981 if they ‘participated’ in the retaliatory conduct.” Carter, 778 F.3d at 657, quoting Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896-97 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that thirdparties may be liable under the statute for tortiously interfering with an employees relationship with her employer for racial reasons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    workers’ compensation premiums are entitled to priority. Largely, their conclusions have turned on whether an individual State’s program is monopolistic, requiring the participation of all employers operating within the State, or whether the state system merely “competes” with private insurers or requires employers to get private insurance. Compare New Neighborhoods v. West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Fund, 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir.1989) (West Virginia system is monopolistic and mandatory, thus premiums owed the State are excise taxes entitled to priority) with Brock v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 796 F.2d 481 (D.C.Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013, 107 S.Ct. 1887, 95 L.Ed.2d 494 (1987) and In re Metro Transportation Company, 117 B.R. 143 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (<HOLDING>). The theory goes that where the State has

    ### Response:
    holding that premiums are fees rather than taxes for bankruptcy purposes due to competition in washington dc and pennsylvania workers compensation systems respectively
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest in the case was inadequate because, once Proposal 2 had been passed, “[t]heir interest in seeing Proposal 2 enforced ... ‘[wa]s greatly diminished due to the state’s responsibility in enforcing and defending [Proposal 2] as written.’ ” Coalition, 501 F.3d at 781 (quoting Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 346 (6th Cir.2007)). In line with this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a generalized political or ideological interest is not sufficient to support intervention by right. See Northland, 487 F.3d at 345 (observing that an organization had a weak case for intervention where it had “only an ideological interest in the litigation”); Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Comm., Ltd., 425 F.3d 309, 316-17 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Fed. Elec.

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioncirculating committee was not entitled to intervention in an action challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance because its stake in the case was  so generalized it will not support a claim for intervention of right 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that ‘[w]here there is coercion, there cannot be consent.’ ” United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 828 (11th Cir.1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788, and citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). In essence, the inquiry is whether the consent was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The voluntariness of consent has been addressed by the courts in a variety of contexts. For example, it has been held that knowledge of a right to refuse a search is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent to search. Id. at 234, 93 S.Ct. 2041; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not overcome federal preemption by arguing that defendant operated the train at an excessive speed in light of allegedly hazardous track conditions, such as overgrown vegetation and the angle of the crossing). Wilson v. Kansas City Southern, Civil Action No. 4:01CV323LN, slip op. at 4. In addition to these negligence claims relating to proper lookout, train speed and warnings, plaintiff claims that KCS negligently failed to maintain traffic control devices at the Hickory crossing. In connection with its motion, KCS has presented evidence that federally-funded warning devices, in the form of warning signs, were present at the time of the accident, which are adequate as a matter of law. See Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 357-58, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In response to KCS’s motion on this point,

    ### Response:
    holding that where evidence shows that federal funds were expended for installation for warning devices or signs at railroad crossing state law claims based on adequacy of those warning devices are preempted by the federal railroad safety act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or Judaism. Put differently, the traditional requirements of Christian worship, such as weekly services and periodic prayer, tend to be less time-consuming and disruptive of the SDC program than the requirements of Islamic worship, which involves group services, prayers five times per day, and strict dietary restrictions. Although both Christian and Muslim inmates are given comparable opportunities to practice their religions, the Muslim religion’s more rigorous requirements may mean that SDC’s boot camp regimen has a disparate impact on Muslims. Yet, the Supreme Court has never held that a prison regulation’s disparate impact on an inmate’s unconventional religious practices is constitutionally significant. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Nor is this surprising; a contrary rule would

    ### Response:
    holding that disproportionate impact standing alone was insufficient to prove unconstitutional racial discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of payment; 8) the hired party’s role in hir ing and paying assistants; 9) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; 10) whether the hiring party is in business; 11) the provision of employee benefits; and 12) the tax treatment of the hired party. Darden, 508 U.S. at 323-24, 112 S.Ct. at 1348-49. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address the ADEA in Darden, we find no reason to deviate from the common-law test for purposes of determining employee status under the ADEA. See Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir.1996) (adopting the common-law test “for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under the ADEA” and disregarding decisions to the contrary in other circuits); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); but see Mangram v. General Motors Corp., 108

    ### Response:
    holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the adea must be made in accordance with common law agency principles
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1979) (allowing drawer to bring a conversion action when depositary bank accepted checks containing forged restrictive indorsements and the checks were accepted in violation of the restrictive indorsement); Sun ’n Sand v. United California Bank, 21 Cal.3d 671, 148 Cal.Rptr. 329, 346, 582 P.2d 920, 937 (1978) (allowing drawer to bring a claim of negligence against a depositary bank); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Citizens National Bank, 150 W.Va. 196, 144 S.E.2d 784 (1965) (finding that “the majority of cases hold that the drawer can sue the collecting or intermediary bank on implied contract for money had and received and omit suing the drawee bank, thus relieving the necessity of circuity of actions”); see also G.F.D. Enterprises, Inc. v. Nye, 37 Ohio St.3d 205, 525 N.E.2d 10 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Hartford maintains that “under Maryland law,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the negligence cause of action is preserved under the ucc but denying recovery to a drawer in cases involving a forged drawers signature
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Zhang (son of Jun Yun Zhang) and a proffer interview with Jun Yun Zhang. The court did not clearly err in relying on the PSR and finding that the included statements were reliable. In calculating a defendant’s sentencing range, a court may consider all relevant information that has “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy,” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (2011); United States v. Morales, 655 F.3d 608, 646 (7th Cir.2011), and may adopt the factual findings of the PSR if it has indicia of reliability, Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(6)(D); United States v. Berkey, 161 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (7th Cir.1998). In this case, the grand jury statements and proffer interview provided detailed, corroborated testimony by co-conspirators. See United States v. Ewers, 54 F.3d 419, 421-22 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Both Lili Liu and Tao Zhang admitted to

    ### Response:
    holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Board of Pharmacy Examiners for the regulation of the practice of pharmacy in Iowa. Iowa Code section 147.76 (2007) confers upon the board the authority to “adopt all necessary and proper rules to implement and interpret [chapter 155A].” See also Iowa Code § 155A.3(3) (stating the term “board” in chapter 155A refers to the board of pharmacy examiners). We have previously held similar language in other statutes constituted a clear vesting in the agency of the authority to interpret a statute. Thoms v. Iowa Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 715 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Iowa 2006) (finding a clear vesting of interpretive authority where a statute directed the agency to “adopt ... rules ... and take other action it deems necessary for the administration of the retirement system”); Auen, 679 N.W.2d at 590 (<HOLDING>); City of Marion v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue &

    ### Response:
    holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to an appeal was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel would “risk[ ] expiration of a substantial part and possibly all of the one-year limitations period ..., unless the time devoted to taking the steps required to obtain an appealable judgment were deemed to toll the one-year period.” 332 F.3d at 65. This risk is only greater in light of the issuance of our decision in Fuller, given the potential that defendants may seek the Fuller remedy at a time when a habeas petition would be timely, only to have a panel hold after expiration of the AEDPA limitations period that Moreno-Rivera forecloses such relief. Though it may not be the case that a Fuller remedy is worth pursuing in light of more recent jurisprudence, compare Urinyi v. United States, 607 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Fuller, 332 F.3d at 65 (expressing

    ### Response:
    holding that a  2255 petition seeking only reinstatement of the right to a direct appeal does not render any later petition a second or successive petition under the aedpa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the defendant. Fowler, _N.C. App. at _, _S.E.2d at _. As should be obvious, the search at issue in Fowler was upheld on the basis that the record showed the existence of exigent circumstances justifying an immediate examination of the defendant’s underwear and his anal and genital areas. In Battle, on the other hand, a similar search of the area beneath the defendant’s underwear was invalidated given the absence of exigent circumstances of the type present in Fowler. Smith, on the other hand, upheld a search underneath the defendant’s underwear despite the absence of any exigent circumstances of the sort found in Fowler. According to well-established principles of North Carolina law, we are bound by each of these decisions. Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379

    ### Response:
    holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interests put forward to justify it; (2) alternative means of exercising their rights remain open to the prisoners; (3) accommodation of the asserted rights will trigger a ripple effect on fellow inmates and prison officials; and (4) a ready alternative to the regulation would fully accommodate the prisoners’ rights at a de minimis cost to the valid penological interest. Id. It is undisputed that legitimate security concerns justified Defendants’ decision to suspend Plaintiffs phone and visitation from December 1 through 5, 2007. Once Defendants had installed proper equipment to monitor his conversations, Plaintiffs phone privileges were restored. Moreover, Plaintiff was only denied phone and visitation privileges for five days. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 133-137, 123 S.Ct. 2162 (<HOLDING>). On December 6, 2007, Plaintiff complained

    ### Response:
    holding that a twoyear suspension of visitation privileges did not violate either the first amendments right to freedom of association
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nature in the Plaza, it may be argued that the City has created a limited public forum. Indeed, that is the conclusion reached by both District Judges in the proceedings below. In general, a limited public forum is created when the government opens a nonpublic forum for public expression, but limits expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or the discussion of particular subjects. See Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist. 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.1991). However, as the Supreme Court has noted, “[a] [limit]ed public forum is not created when the government allows selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers.” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679, 118 S.Ct. 1633; see also Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 230 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). There is scant evidence in the record

    ### Response:
    holding that in analyzing whether a limited public forum has been created we consider the nature of the property or means of communication the governments purpose in permitting whatever limited access it has allowed and the conditions of access eg whether permission is required
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appraisal was not an “independent appraisal,” Mrs. Jameson’s estate owns only 80,405 shares of Johnco. E. Constitutionality of the Estate Tax. The Estate raises a challenge to the constitutionality of the federal estate tax. It argues that the tax as applied in this case is an uneonstitutionál direct tax. The Estate concedes that a tax on property actually transferable to a decedent’s heirs is constitutional. It asserts, however, that a tax on the portion of the estate used to pay the estate tax is an unconstitutional tax on a tax, resulting in this case in an effective rate of 92.7% on the property actually received by the heirs. The Estate contends that 0 S.Ct. 356, 74 L.Ed. 991 (1930) (same); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 348-49, 41 S.Ct. 506, 65 L.Ed. 963 (1921) (<HOLDING>); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 82-83, 20

    ### Response:
    holding that the tax was not direct even though the government imposed it on the estate rather than the recipient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We are not persuaded by this argument. Contrary to the scenario contemplated in Jenkins, Barghi presented no evidence disputing the trial court’s earlier rul E2d 460) (2010) (noting differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, and that with a jury trial “[12] persons... sit in judgment..., and... the prosecutor . . . bearfs] the burden of convincing each one of the twelve persons of [the defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that by waiving the right to a jury trial, a defendant “forfeit[s] the voir dire process and his right to have the 12 persons chosen through that process decide his guilt or innocence, and that the judge instead . . . mak[es] that determination.”); Hopkins v. State, 209 Ga. App. 337, 338 (3) (433 SE2d 423) (1993) (physical precedent only)

    ### Response:
    holding that in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge as trier of fact is able to distinguish between competent and incompetent evidence and consider only that evidence which is admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fourth Amendment compels automatic suppression only where there is a “fundamental” violation of Rule 41; fundamental violations are those “rendering] the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards.” United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1975)), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928 (1981). And the Gantt court explicitly found a deliberate violation, thus avoiding the question of whether the violation was “technical” or “fundamental.” 194 F.3d at 994. The Gantt defendant waited three hours and was never able to examine a complete copy of the warrant. Here, there was substantial evidence that Aase received a full copy of the warrant only minutes into the search. 673, 677-78, 495 P.2d 682 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Compare State v. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn. App.

    ### Response:
    holding that under former rcw 6933430 1959 although preferable if defendant is served personally with a copy of the search warrant it was not reversible error when defendant received the warrant the next day
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    concerning the incident.” Section 11165, subdivision (g) specifically includes “the sexual assault of a child ...” in its definition of “child abuse” and subdivision (i) includes licensed psychiatrists and psychologists in its definition of a medical practitioner. Younghanz cites no authority, and we have found none, for considering the right to seek a cure for one’s illness as a fundamental right. He relies on cases holding unconstitutional ordinances restricting the right to seek certain kinds of medical treatment. However, those cases concern an infringement upon recognized fundamental privacy rights relating to personal family matters and family planning. (See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (1983) 462 U.S. 416 [76 L.Ed.2d 687, 103 S.Ct. 2481] (<HOLDING>); Planned Parenthood Federation of America v.

    ### Response:
    holding ordinance restricting availability of abortion unconstitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allegations often fail even to touch upon the elements necessary to prove breach of contract and unjust enrichment. For example, a breach of contract under Alabama law requires: “(1) the existence of a valid contract binding the parties in the action, (2) [the plaintiffs] own performance under the contract, (3) the defendant’s nonperformance, and (4) damages.” Southern Med. Health Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So.2d 98, 99 (Ala.1995). Yet there is no reference to any contract in the complaint. Morrow’s allegation of unjust enrichment is likewise vague. Consequently, the court grants Morrow the opportunity to amend her complaint in order to plead her claims properly. The defendants alternatively argue that, even if Morrow’s claims for breach of contract and unjust 1348 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), with, e.g., Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    934, 937 (Tex.1972). The requisites of promissory estoppel in Texas are (1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1983). For the same reasons Appellants lack standing to assert a breach of contract cause of action, they likewise lack standing to assert a promissory estoppel cause of action. The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Vantage did not make any promise to Appellants; Appellants do not dispute this, but claim only that Vantage made a promise to SFWA. In short, Appellants are not “promisees” who can assert the independent claim of promissory estoppel against Vantage. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also O’Connor’s Texas Causes of Action

    ### Response:
    recognizing promissory estop pel theory may be invoked when promisee obtains promise from promisor that is less than a legally sufficient contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    632 (Utah 1987). Because the length of the delay is only a starting point, we must also evaluate other factors. The second and often dispositive factor involved in questions of speedy trial is the cause of delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92. The trial court found, “All of the delays since charges were originally filed in 1990 have been based on issues of Defendant’s competency to proceed.” That delays caused by questions of competency do not impinge on an accused’s right to a speedy trial is well established. See Johnson, 333 F.2d at 374; United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that where defendant requests mental evaluation, resulting delay does not violate right to speedy trial); Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1268 n. 5 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Because time spent evaluating competency may

    ### Response:
    holding that delay resulting from prior incompetence to stand trial does not violate speedy trial guarantee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resin additive.” U.S. 6,265,055 C2 col. 3 ll. 34-35. The district court construed ""resin additive” to be ""a substance that by its properties is not typically by itself formed into a stretch wrap film layer and that is compounded into a resin”' — i.e., a non-resin substance. Multilayer v. Inteplast, 2013 WL 5972195, at *43. Multilayer does not contest this construction on appeal. Because claim 32 merely describes incorporation of a non-resin, it is not evidence that claim 1 should be open to incorporation of an unrecited resin. See Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1360 (noting that ""[a]lthough 'consisting of' is a term of restriction, the restriction is not absolute” and may permit impurities or ""additional components or steps that are unrelated to the invention”); see also Norian, 363 F.3d at 1331 (<HOLDING>). 6 . While Multilayer also argued in the

    ### Response:
    holding that while consisting of limits the claimed invention it does not limit aspects unrelated to the invention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not decide that question today. The government contends that whenever a portion of a sentencing package is challenged, the -judge modifying the sentencing package should be able to modify any portion of that package as long as the resulting aggregate sentence is less onerous than it was prior to the challenge. This argument is based on the holistic nature of the trial judge’s sentencing decision: .rather than sentencing count by count, the judge looks at the .totality of the defendant’s conduct and fashions a sentencing package he deems to he the appropriate societal response. This government contention has already been accepted by this court as the preferable approach in the context of resentencing after a direct appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 902 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). The context of a Rule' 35 challenge to a

    ### Response:
    holding sentence on some but not all counts illegal but nonetheless vacating all of the sentenceslegal and illegalto allow sentencing judge to refashion new overall sentencing plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    field of boat moorings, and the DNR has done so. The local ordinance directly affects the same subject matter—boat moorings. Yet, the state law expressly provides concurrent jurisdiction to local governments to legislate in the field; boat mooring was regulated locally prior to the enactment of the State Boat Act, see Md. Acts of 1960, ch. 69, § 8(c) (explaining that the Act expressly preempts existing local laws), and local laws existed governing that subject matter; the DNR has recognized the authority of the local governments to act in the field; and the system of state and local regulation has coexisted without chaos or confusion for over 20 years. These factors make plain that the General Assembly did not intend that the st Co., 450 U.S. 311, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981)(<HOLDING>). In this case, we conclude that the amendment

    ### Response:
    holding that a state common law claim against a railroad for failure to provide adequate services after the railroad abandoned a line was preempted by frustration of purpose conflict with the interstate commerce act which delegated to the interstate commerce commissioner the authority to regulate abandomnent of lines by earners and broad discretion in determining whether abandonment should be permitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    question for the district court, not the jury, to decide. Humphries v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 566 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Iowa 1997). Our task is to determine whether the district court was correct in its ruling. B. Analysis. Iowa Code chapter 364 does not define sidewalk. Iowa Code section 321.1(72) defines sidewalk as “that portion of a street between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians.” This definition, however, is of little help because its application is limited to chapter 321. See Iowa Code § 321.1 (“The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them.” (Emphasis added.)); Humphries, 566 N.W.2d at 871 (<HOLDING>). We think two early Iowa cases control our

    ### Response:
    holding that definition in iowa code chapter 321 1995 was expressly confined to that chapter and did not apply to iowa code section 36412 1995
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    qualified immunity and the use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Whether Appellant Crum is entitled to qualified immunity for. his alleged assault on inmate Hill requires a familiar two-pronged inquiry. That inquiry requires a court to determine (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... or shown ... make out a violation of a constitutional right,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)); and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct,” id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151) (<HOLDING>). A. Here, Appellant Crum has conceded that the

    ### Response:
    holding that the sequence of the saucier inquiry is not mandatory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ohrt’s attorney established the factual basis for the plea, the court stated: I’m not going to sentence you today. And I will never sentence you if you meet the conditions that I impose on you now. If you do that, then at the end of the two-year period, the plea that you’ve entered today will be crossed out and vacated and the case will be dismissed. ISSUE Did the district court err in staying adjudication of conviction? ANALYSIS The state argues that the district court erred in deferring adjudication of Ohrt’s conviction and in providing that, upon successful completion of probation, the plea would be vacated and the charge dismissed. The state argues that the circumstances of this case do not support a stay of adjudication. See State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn.1996) (<HOLDING>); cf. State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 541

    ### Response:
    holding that courts have inherent authority in special circumstances to stay adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Potter’s license if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in actual physical control of her car or had been driving while intoxicated. A.R.S. § 28-1321(A), (K). In Love, the supreme court clarified that “even where a defendant is determined to have relinquished actual physical control, if it can be shown that such person drove while intoxicated to reach the place where he or she was found, the evidence will support a judgment of guilt.” 182 Ariz. at 327-28, 897 P.2d at 629-30. Thus, the safe harbor does not immunize an impaired driver from prosecution for DUI if the state can prove that the person had driven while intoxicated before surrendering control of his or her vehicle. Id.; State ex rel. O’Neill v. Brown, 182 Ariz. 525, 527, 898 P.2d 474, 476 (1995) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18 Potter told Officer Stant that she had

    ### Response:
    holding state can obtain dui conviction by proving circumstantially that defendant drove while intoxicated to place where he relinquished actual physical control of vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that would have exempted his property from the hen. Likewise, in Horacek v. Cherry Creek Corp., the Colorado Court of Appeals noted that the wage and withholding, sales, and use tax statutes and ordinance made it clear that mere use of personal property subjected it to the lien even if the using party did not own the property. 28 Colo.App. 258, 472 P.2d 158, 161 (1970) (citing Colo.Rev.Stat. § 138-5-23(1)(a) (“of or used by any retailer under lease”), § 138-1-61(7) (1963) (“owned or used by”), and Denver, Colo., Ordinance § 166.38-1 (“of any retailer or used by any retailer in conducting his business under lease.”)). Cf. Charnes v. Norwest Leasing, Inc., 787 P.2d 145, 146 n. 2 (Colo.1990) (en banc) (citing Colo.Rev.Stat. § 39-26-117(1)(b) (“of or used by any retailer under lease”)) (<HOLDING>). The tax statutes applicable to this case do

    ### Response:
    holding that substantial compliance with the requirements for exempting a lessors personal property from a lien is not enough
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that “it is the corporation that has suffered direct injury, and any damage resulting to the stockholder is merely indirect[.]” Harris, 893 P.2d at 597 (citing Nicholson, 800 P.2d at 1356). In addition, the court noted that “all of the shareholders in this closely-held corporation suffered in the same manner when they were forced to make good on personal guarantees.” Id. As a result, the shareholder could not show that he “suffered a loss that was unique to him alone,” id., and the court therefore affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against the shareholder, id. Harris appears to be consistent with the decisions of other courts that have addressed similar shareholder standing issues in cases involving personal guarantees. See, e.g., Nicholson, 800 P.2d at 1356-57 (<HOLDING>); Marchman v. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 120 N.M.

    ### Response:
    holding that a shareholders status as a guarantor of a corporations debts did not give him standing to assert individual claims against the directors of the corporation where the shareholder was not seeking to enforce any specific obligations owed to him under the terms of the guarantee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Board of Registration in Med., 401 Mass. 172, 183 (1987). Cf. Berrios v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 411 Mass. 587, 595 (1992) (“regulations are . . . void [if] their provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the legislative mandate” [emphasis added]). However, as applied by the board in the circumstances of this case, the regulation provides benefits that exceed those intended by the statutory scheme and authorized by § 35C. Insofar as the regulation is in conflict with the terms of the statute, it is invalid. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass’n v. Board of Registration in Med., supra at 182-183. See G. L. c. 152, § 5 (“commissioner shall promulgate . . . regulations consistent with this chapter”). Cf. Corriveau v. Home Ins. Co., 43 Mass. App. Ct. 924 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Neither the “beneficent design” of workers’

    ### Response:
    holding unenforceable a regulation that would have provided greater workers compensation benefits than permitted by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tried to recreate what work had been done and when it had been done. The Court reduced the fees by $4,000.00. It also became apparent at the hearing that the funds available from the sale of the lake lot will not be adequate to pay the Chapter 7 administrative expenses, the fees due which have been awarded to Dr. Meyer’s dissolution counsel, the fees which have been awarded to Dr. Meyer’s accountant, and the reduced interim fees awarded to Mr. Desselle. The Court, therefore, ordered Mr. Desselle to pay over to the Chapter 7 trustee the $9,656 585-87 (D.Mass.1992) (after finding that the failure to provide detailed records warrants reduction or disallowance of fees, the court reduced a deficient interim fee application by forty-two percent); In re Land, 138 B.R. 66, 71 (D.Neb.1992) (<HOLDING>); In re Cascade Oil Co., Inc., 126 B.R. 99, 105

    ### Response:
    holding the court has discretion to deny compensation to an attorney who does not comply with the code and bankruptcy rules and submits a fee application without sufficient specificity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after an appeal, matters that were either (i) not raised on appeal, but should have been, or (ii) raised on appeal, but expressly rejected by the appellate court. See generally Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Systems Co. v. Maximus, Inc., 259 Va. 92, 108, 524 S.E.2d 420, 429 (2000). The law-of-the-case doctrine has no binding effect on a trial court prior to an appeal. In other words, a trial court may modify or rescind interlocutory orders “at any time before final judgment,” Freezer v. Miller, 163 Va. 180, 197 n. 2, 176 S.E. 159, 165 n. 2 (1934) (citation omitted), and can, to put it plainly, “change its mind while the matter is still pending.” Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va.App. 848, 853, 407 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1991); see also Bennett v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 335, 344, 533 S.E.2d 22, 27 (2000) (<HOLDING>). We have made just this point in the context

    ### Response:
    recognizing even after the entry of a final order judges can change their minds within the rule 11 period
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    obtained jurisdiction for the reasons explained above. 10 . Six of the 80 applications were already under examination during the time that plaintiff had attempted to appeal the examiner’s decisions on the other applications. 11 . The PTO has grouped plaintiff's patent applications into twelve “families”. 12 . It is worth noting that because the statutory framework has changed, this situation will not likely arise again. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A) now provides that the PTO provide at least one § 132 notification (i.e. notification of rejection or reexamination) not later than 14 months after the application is filed. Further, § 154(b)(1)(B) “guarantee[s]” that the examination of a patent application will be complete within three years. If it is not, th tes, 709 F.3d 798 (9th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Sheldon v. Vilsack, 538 Fed.Appx. 644

    ### Response:
    holding that blms management of reclamation project was not a discrete agency action under  7061
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plain meaning of the federal statute.” Dahl at 7. The state plan “directly conflicts with” the federal statute, “which clearly states that providers cannot deny services to a recipient on account of an inability to pay a co-pay.” Id. at 8. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on this issue. Other federal courts have found unlawful state Medicaid plan provisions that allowed providers to refuse services to participants unable to pay a cost-sharing charge, but those courts did not address the issue of past-due co-payments. See Newton-Nations v. Rogers, 316 F.Supp.2d 883 (D.Ariz.2004) (granting preliminary injunction); Spry v. Thompson, 2003 WL 23411996 (D.Or.2003) (Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation), adopted after de novo review, 2004 WL 1050867 (D.Or.2004) (<HOLDING>). The defendants cite Sweeney v. Bane, 996 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a demonstration project authorized by 42 usc  1315 must include the prohibition against refusal of services stated in section 1396oe
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tenth Circuit’s judgment, concluding “despite Digital’s position that it holds a ‘right not to stand trial’ requiring protection by way of immediate appeal, that rights under private settlement agreements can be adequately vindicated on appeal from final judgment.” Id. at 869, 114 S.Ct. 1992. Digital attempted to frame its rights under the private settlement agreement — a broad defense to liability and right not to stand trial — as the equivalent of government officials’ qualified immunity or a criminal defendant’s double jeopardy protection, both of which the Supreme Court previously held provided grounds for interlocutory appeals under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 869-71, 114 S.Ct. 1992; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662, 97

    ### Response:
    holding that a district courts denial of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that it turns on an issue of law is an appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 usc  1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not allow consideration of extrinsic evidence. Jurisdictions adopting the intent rule have developed two formulations with similar purposes. Some jurisdictions hold that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable in an action by a party to a release and a stranger to that agreement. See, e.g., Neves, 769 P.2d at 1054; Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401, 623 A.2d 995, 1003 (1993). Under this formulation of the intent rule, parol evidence of the parties’ intentions is admissible even when the terms of the release are facially unambiguous. See, e.g., Sims, 623 A.2d at 1004 n. 12. Other jurisdictions hold that extrinsic evidence of the parties intent is admissible only when the court determines as a matter of law that the terms of the release agreement are ambiguous. d 1300, 1303 (1983) (<HOLDING>). A distinct minority of jurisdictions

    ### Response:
    holding that release which discharged agents and employees sufficiently identified law firm and individual member thereof who had represented specifically named releasees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    .... ” (emphasis added)). Nor does the child have a vested right in utilizing the Family Law Article paternity provisions to seek support. “[N]o person has a vested right in a particular remedy for enforcement of a right, or in particular modes of procedure, or rules of evidence. The legislature may pass retroactive acts changing, eliminating, or adding remedies, so long as efficacious remedies exist after passage of the act.” 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, supra, § 41.16, at 429 (footnotes omitted). Our holding does not apply to the support already paid by putative fathers and to the arrears they owe in support. Those property rights are already accrued. It would clearly raise problems, particularly in the areas of takings and due 2d 95, 98-101 (Alaska 1999) (<HOLDING>). B. Entitlement to Scientific Testing in

    ### Response:
    holding that a putative father proven not to be the father by blood tests was entitled only to prospective relief under alaskas revisory rule and thus was still liable for child support arrearages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resort to parol evidence is unnecessary. See Glauser Storage, LLC v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141, ¶¶ 21-23, 27 P.3d 565 (excluding parol evidence tending to indicate that a transaction was intended as a mortgage where a contemporaneous agreement unambiguously indicated that the parties intended to convey a present possessory interest rather than a mortgage). The Note was signed on the same day as the Deed, and the first page of the Note was attached to the Deed to provide the description of the Property. The Note unambiguously identified the Property as security for the loan from BMBT to the Millers and even indicated the parties’ intent for the Millers “to actively engage in selling the [PJroperty during the time of [the] contract” to satisfy the Note. Cf. Bybee, 189 P.2d at 122 (<HOLDING>). We agree with the trial court that, read

    ### Response:
    holding that the terms of a contemporaneous contract giving the grantor the right to sell the land unambiguously indicated the parties intent for ownership to remain with the grantor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    So.2d at 1184. In Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So.2d 331, 334 (Fla.1969), the court explained that the holdings of Une and Brooks appear to crystallize in favor of application of the blameless ignorance doctrine in those instances where the injured plaintiff was unaware or had no reason to know that an invasion of his legal rights has occurred. In reality, such a doctrine is merely a recognition of the fundamental principle that regardless of the underlying nature of a cause of action, the accrual of the same must coincide with the aggrieved party’s discovery or duty to discover the act constituting an invasion of his legal rights. (Italics supplied). Monahan, 781 So.2d at 438. But see Yusuf Mohamad Excavation, Inc. v. Ringhaver Equip., Co., 793 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). The appellants argue that this case is

    ### Response:
    holding that the delayed discovery doctrine is not applicable to actions for tortious interference with business relationships defamation or unfair and deceptive trade practices
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trpko Taseski, Bosko Taseski, and TRBO Corporation; It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the franchise agreement between the parties dated July 5, 1993 is terminated; It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendants/counter-plaintiffs Trpko Taseski, Bosko Taseski, and TRBO Corporation shall comply with the terms of the lease option agreement dated October 10, 1993 within SO days; It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendants/counter-plaintiffs shall be liable for plaintiff/counter-defendant’s reasonable costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount to be determined by the Court; 1 . Plaintiff argues that defendants have attempted to use the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to prevent disco ir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Pedrina v. Han Kuk Chun, 906 F.Supp. 1377,

    ### Response:
    holding that district court had ample authority to strike claimants affidavit offered in opposition to governments motion for summary judgment in forfeiture action after claimant invoked fifth amendment and refused to answer governments deposition questions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    finding that since the Douthit v. Jones decision in 1980, the right has been clearly established. Although no cases have been found within the Eleventh Circuit, there is caselaw from other circuits finding that imprisonment beyond the expiration of prisoner’s sentence violates “the eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.” Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993), citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.1989); see also Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir.2001)(granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)(<HOLDING>); Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections,

    ### Response:
    holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    severable — it is separate and distinct and can be easily removed without affecting the other statutory provisions. That only part of RCW 9A.72.010(1) is invalid is not a bar to severing it from the remainder of RCW 9A.72.010(1) and from the rest of the statute. Id. ¶22 The offending language is also functionally separate from the rest of RCW 9A.72.010(1) because the clause “whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law” dictates procedure, while the preceding clause defining “material false statement” dictates substance. When this court has found procedural provisions to be unconstitutional in part, we have upheld the substantive remainder of those statutes. See, e.g., Household Fin. Corp. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952) (<HOLDING>); State ex rel. French v. Clausen, 107 Wash.

    ### Response:
    holding that the invalidity of a provision for a de novo trial in superior court in the appeal section of an act did not affect the validity of the remainder of the appeal section
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    confront and cross-examine witnesses, (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body, and (f) a written statement identifying the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking supervision. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Moreover, we have extended the “protections granted those facin ourt’s failure to inform him that it could impose consecutive sentences constituted plain error. First, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 does not apply to revocation of supervised release proceedings. See Johns, 625 F.2d at 1176. Second, no binding case law addresses whether Boykin’s requirement that a plea be entered knowingly and voluntarily applies in the context of revoking supervised release. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the hearings before the magistrate

    ### Response:
    holding that there can be no plain error where neither we nor the supreme court has addressed an issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. In this appeal from a decision of the tax court, Michael Dodge challenges the court’s assessment of penalties under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6654 for the 2002 tax year. After careful review, see Estate of Korby v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir.2006) (standards of review), we reject as frivolous Dodge’s effort to avoid tax liability by claiming that the Form 1040 does not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), see Lewis v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Patridge, 507 F.3d 1092,

    ### Response:
    holding that form 1040 complies with pra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mother originally attested four times under oath that she did not know the identity of the child’s father. Later, she based her conclusion that R.M. is the father solely on the child’s appearance. The mother also concedes that it is possible that some other man is the father. In January of 2010, the child’s mother first disclosed to both R.M. and the Probate Court that R.M. was the child’s father. Almost immediately, R.M. acknowledged his paternity. At that point, the Probate Court immediately should have ordered R.M. to participate in paternity testing. See 18-A M.R.S. § l-302(b) (2011) (“The [Probate] Court has full power to ... take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it.”); Estate of Kingsbury, 2008 ME 79, ¶ 9, 946 A.2d 389 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 12] In its very first incarnation, the

    ### Response:
    holding that 18a mrs  l302b provides the court with authority to order dna testing when there exists good cause or sufficient reason
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by scanning into electronic form the text, original illustrations, and cover art of its publications. (Paper 8 at 13). It is well-established that photocopying a copyrighted work without the owner’s permission infringes the owner’s right of reproduction. See Princeton Univ. v. Michigan Document Svcs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156, 117 S.Ct. 1336, 137 L.Ed.2d 495 (1997). Although Defendant used a scanner to create a digital copy of a work, rather than a photocopier to print a physical copy, the methods of copying are equivalent and they are both infringing. A digital copy made without the owner’s permission is copyright infringement. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 162 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Defendant has infringed Plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding companies contributorily liable for copyright infringement for facilitating users transmissions of unauthorized digital copies of copyrighted works
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to trademark owner and burden to infringer when determining whether product recall is appropriate remedy). Kidz-Med does not dispute the district court’s finding that a recall would require it to contact five retailers and would cost $95,000 to complete. See Tecnimed SRL v. Kidz-Med, Inc., 763 F.Supp.2d at 416. It complains that the district court did not weigh these facts against Kidz-Med’s precarious financial condition. In fact, the record shows that the district court specifically concluded that Kidz-Med should bear the costs despite its imminent insolvency because it had assumed the risk of a recall by intentionally keeping its non-contact thermometers on the market during this litigation’s pendency. See id.-, see also Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d at 807 (<HOLDING>). 4. Conclusion We have considered Kidz-Med’s

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants intentional acts to infringe plaintiffs trademark supported district courts recall order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of forced termination,' or that 'the employer's conduct ... [was] motivated by a desire to avoid subjecting its actions to the scrutiny of a termination-related hearing.’ ” 804 F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir.1986) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Fowler, 799 F.2d at 981); see also Holden v. Knight, 155 Fed.Appx. 735, 739 (5th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (explaining that we ""ha[ve] made clear that a plaintiff may make out a cognizable claim when he alleges particular facts showing that he found himself between the Scylla of voluntary resignation and the Charybdis of forced termination” without discussing the need to show a motive to avoid pre-termination procedures (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); but see Rutland v. Pepper, 404 F.3d 921, 922-23 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While our rule of orderliness requires us to

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff failed to establish a constructive discharge claim because she did not assert that her employer was motivated by a desire to avoid pretermination procedures without considering whether plaintiff could alternatively allege only that she was forced to choose between resignation and termination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without any type of warrant would have been justified by exigent circumstances (such as the risk that the occupants of the apartment would dispose of the drug evidence that the undercover officers had observed), reasoning that uniformed police had ""created [their] own exigency” by knocking on the door and revealing their presence. Cf. United States v. Newman, 472 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.2006) (""Officers may not impermissibly create exigent circumstances by revealing their presence in order to alert suspects who would, in response, destroy evidence... The facts of this case might have occasioned consideration of whether to adopt the so-called ""consent once removed” doctrine, followed by at least a handful of courts. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 133 N.J. 104, 627 A.2d 125, 131 (1993) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that where an undercover officers initial entry into an apartment was consensual the undercover officer witnessed the commission of a crime and upon leaving the apartment the undercover officer immediately notified his backup arrest team that was waiting a short distance away the backup teams subsequent nonconsensual entry into the apartment fifteen to twenty minutes later to make arrests was a component  of a single continuous and integrated police action and did not violate the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Consumer Protection Act (CPA), codified as Maryland Code (1975, 2005 Repl.Vol.), Commercial Law Article, Title 13. We thus are required to decide whether the CPA governs the State’s conduct here. Whether the CPA governs the State’s conduct is a matter of statutory interpretation and a matter of first impression for the Court. The primary canon of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Citicorp Int’l Communications, Inc., 389 Md. 156, 165-66, 884 A.2d 112 (2005); Rockwood Casualty Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 385 Md. 99, 108, 867 A.2d 1026, 1031 (2005). We look first to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the Legislature. If the words of the statute are plain and u , 354 A.2d 817, 824 (1976) (<HOLDING>); State v. Milburn, 9 Gill. 105 (1850) (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that the mass transit administration mta was not obligated to conform to the personal injury protection insurance coverage requirements imposed by statute because there was no manifest intention demonstrated on the part of the general assembly to include mta within the no fault insurance provisions and that if it had intended to include mta within those provisions it would have made a specific provision to that effect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has come to his knowledge since the trial; that it could not, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered for use at the trial; that it is so material and relevant that it will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; that it is not merely cumulative or impeaching in character; and that it is reasonably possible that the evidence will be produced at the trial. In re Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., Del.Supr., 2 A.2d 273, 278 (1938) (citations omitted). These standards have long been the law of Delaware. See, e.g., Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, Del.Ch., 257 A.2d 241, 243 (1969); Kennedy v. Emerald Coal & Coke Co., Del.Supr., 42 A.2d 398, 404 (1944) (both cases quoting In re Missouri). But cf. Bachtle v. Bachtle, Del.Supr., 494 A.2d 1253, 1255-56 (1985) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ryan v. United States Lines Co., 303

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Hamilton’s jury-pool was 22. (Appendix D omitted Jerry Rocha and Mary Rodarte.) The percentage of Hispanics on Hamilton’s venire was 13.75% (22 of 160). These figures represent a 11.1% absolute disparity between the Hispanic representation on Hamilton’s jury venire and in the county’s adult Hispanic population. Although this percentage of under-representation is slightly greater than the amount held inadequate to alone show purposeful discrimination in Swain, Hamilton fails to address other issues which would narrow the gap between adult population and the jury pool, such as citizenship, prior felony conviction, or the ability to speak and understand English. See California Code of Civil Procedure section 230 and United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Hamilton provides no evidence to support his

    ### Response:
    holding a determination of underrepresentation must rely on evidence that most accurately reflects the juryeligible population
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ground for distinguishing the earlier precedent, and, therefore, failed to provide clearly established authority in the area of equal protection. ¶20 Furthermore, prior to Olech, the federal circuit courts had divided on whether an individual could assert an Equal Protection Clause violation if he or she were not a member of a particular class or group. The Sixth Circuit, in Futernick v. Sumpter Township (6th Cir. 1996), 78 F.3d 1051, 1060, had rejected the “class of one” theory, holding that a plaintiffs membership in a class was essential to a denial of equal protection. Three years later, in Bass v. Robinson (6th Cir. 1999), 167 F.3d 1041, the Sixth Circuit continued to require a claimant to allege class membership to sustain an equal protection claim. Bass, 167 F.3d at 1050 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit, just prior

    ### Response:
    holding that because plaintiff failed to allege invidious discrimination based upon his membership in a protected class his equal protection claim failed at its inception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the terms are susceptible of more than one meaning.’ ” National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 445 F.Supp.2d 37, 41 (D.D.C.2006) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2003 WL 24045159, at *5 (D.D.C. May 20, 2003)), af'd, 249 Fed.Appx. 832 (D.C.Cir.2007). In the instant case, defendants argue that the term “first policy” in subsection 2(b) is ambiguous because it is unclear if the phrase “prior to the inception date of the first policy issued by [Capitol Insurance] if continuously renewed” refers to the 2004-2005 policy or the 2007-2008 policy. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 24-25; Compl, Ex. A.) Faced with that ambiguity, defendants argue that “first policy” should be favorably construed as referring to the 2004-2005 Policy. See Columbia Cas. Co., 633 F.Supp. at 700 (<HOLDING>). Defendants then argue that because the “first

    ### Response:
    holding that ambiguities in insurance contracts should be favorably construed to the insured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when a statute changes only procedural, not substantive, law. “Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well.” Pilcher v. Department of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983) (quoting Department of Social Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982)); accord Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990); Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah App.1990). Since section 59-1-610 does not enlarge, eliminate or destroy either of the parties’ rights, we apply it in the present case. See Pilcher, 663 P.2d at 455-56; see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1267 (Utah 1993) (<HOLDING>). As to the statute at issue in the case at

    ### Response:
    holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he was subjected to selective enforcement in violation of his Equal Protection rights, his conviction will be invalid. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir.1973) (“[A]ny ‘systematic discrimination’ in enforcement ..., or ‘unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances,’ ... violates the equal protection clause and renders the prosecution invalid.”). Because a successful claim of selective enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause would have necessarily invalidated Gibson’s conviction, under the Heck deferred accrual rule the statute of limitations did not begin to run until his senr tence was vacated and this claim is not untimely. See Kramer v. Village of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the heck deferred accrual rule applies to fourteenth amendment equal protection claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as an agreement to waive a license revocation, which the DOT could otherwise seek, in return for Schumacher’s guilty plea. However we view the plea agreement here, the county attorney had no authority to do what he did. We note at the outset that the county attorney does not have any independent authority to issue declaratory rulings on the applicability of the revocation provisions of chapter 321 or to adjudicate the rights of license holders under chapter 321. The DOT is, in the first instance, charged with the responsibility to interpret and enforce the motor vehicle laws governing the revocation of drivers’ licenses. Iowa Code § 321.2 (1993) (“The state department of transp independent of the criminal sanctions of chapter 124. Iowa DistCt. for Buchanan County, 504 N.W.2d at 898 (<HOLDING>); Heidemann, 375 N.W.2d at 668 (“license

    ### Response:
    recognizing the clear separation between criminal proceedings involving operatingwhileintoxicated prosecutions and administrative proceedings such as the revocation of a motor vehicle license
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    became subsection (e), which now provides that “[p]rosecution for misdemeanors shall be commenced within two years after the commission of the crime.” Thus, in addition to the subsection, the only other change was the replacement of “must” with “shall.” See Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 4-1. 8 See OCGA § 16-1-3 (14) (“ ‘Prosecution’ means all legal proceedings by which a person’s liability for a crime is determined, commencing with the return of the indictment or the filing of the accusation, and including the final disposition of the case upon appeal.”). 9 See Lee v. State, 289 Ga. 95, 96 (709 SE2d 762) (2011); accord Wooten v. State, 240 Ga. App. 725, 726 (2) (524 SE2d 776) (1999). 10 See former OCGA § 17-3-1 (d). 11 See Prindle v. State, 240 Ga. App. 461, 461-62 (1) (523 SE2d 44) (1999) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. State, 233 Ga. App. 224, 225 (1)

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants prosecution on dui charges was not timeharred even though amended accusations were filed more than two years after offenses were committed because original citations pertaining to the same offenses and conduct were filed prior to the statute of limitations expiration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the victim’s vaginal area was often red, rashed, and her “clitoris would be very swollen.” On a nightly basis, the child would be “screaming and crying, and sitting in sitz baths in the tub because her pookie hurt.” The problem was so severe that the victim and her mother sought medical attention “many times.” The evidence of the victim’s pain and swollen clitoris established the element of penetration. Therefore, we cannot hold that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence or plainly wrong. Appellant likens the instant facts to those in Moore, where the victim testified that the defendant put his penis “on” her vagina, and the Supreme Court overturned the conviction for insufficient evidence of the essential element of penetration. See Moore, 254 Va. at 189, 491 S.E.2d at 741 (<HOLDING>). Appellant contends in the absence of medical

    ### Response:
    holding proof of penetration is legally insufficient if the evidence is in a state of equipoise based on the commonwealths caseinchief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court’s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (“To the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel’s interpretation.”); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (“[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.”); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629,

    ### Response:
    holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    though that agreement was not attached to any of the pleadings of record, and was not admitted into evidence below. The circuit judge denied the motion for rehearing, reasoning that it was an appellate court’s duty to correct fundamental errors even when they have not been identified by the parties and that the appeal involved fundamental error. DOT then petitioned this court for certiorari review. The Authority, which was not a party at trial or in the circuit appeal, also filed a petition for writ of certiorari on May 22, 2008, arguing that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over it and violated due process by issuing an injunction against it even though it had not been named as a party or given an opportunity to be heard on the issues. Stand o.2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); Sheoah Highlands, Inc. v. Daugherty, 837

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an injunction cannot bind parties who are not before this court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceedings, the dismissal was denied, and the respondent waited until after trial to challenge the denial — that makes the issue one of first impression. As to the issue raised by the first rephrased certified question, the First District held that a respondent who would have been released but for the detention under the Act and who was not tried within the thirty-day deadline waives his or her claim if he or she does not seek relief by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus prior to trial. At the outset, we note that it is well established that a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline and, upon denial of that motion, seek pretrial relief by filing a petition for habeas corpus. See Murray v. Regier, 872 So.2d 217, 221-22 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>). As this Court explained in Mmray: The State

    ### Response:
    recognizing that habeas corpus is a proper means to challenge the legality of pretrial detention under the jimmy ryce act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and (iii). Such an interpretation requires the statute to be read in the conjunctive (i.e., “(i) and (ii); or (i) and (in)”). Conversely, the Government argues that the statute must be read as containing three co-equal, dependent clauses. The Government’s interpretation requires the statute to be read in the disjunctive (i.e, “(i), or (ii), or (iii)”). Under a disjunctive reading, proof of any one of the three subsections suffices in a prosecution for trafficking in analogue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this precise issue. In fact, when presented the issue, the Eleventh Circuit chose not to resolve it, finding that the substance at issue satisfied both subparagraphs (i) and (ii). United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Only four District Courts and no Courts of

    ### Response:
    holding that the analogue act was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to classify unlisted substance gbl as an analogue of ghb
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the tenant and a substantial interference by the landlord are prerequisites to a suit for constructive eviction. See Neslen, 123 Utah at 75-76, 254 P.2d at 850. Whether a landlord’s alleged wrongful service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit constitutes a constructive eviction is a question of first impression in Utah. The majority of courts that have considered whether service of a notice to quit, without malice or harassment on the part of the landlord, constitutes a constructive eviction have held that it does not, even if the tenant chooses to vacate. These courts have adopted the view that: “[A] mere notice to the tenant to quit, followed by. his vacation of the premises, is not of itself sufficient to constitute an eviction and give the tenant a r Rptr. 566, 570-71 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Michaux v. Koebig, 555 S.W.2d 171, 177

    ### Response:
    holding notice to quit is evidence that tenant did not leave voluntarily but absent showing of malice action for constructive eviction may not stand where there has been no physical interference with leased premises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Steiner. Indeed, much of the evidence which purports to describe anthroposophy is more akin to the “New Age” movement discussed in Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1230, which imposed “no moral or behavioral obligations; no comprehensive creed; no particular text, rituals or guide lines ... no requirement or suggestion that anyone give up the religious beliefs he or she already holds.” 4. Formal and External Religious Signs Plaintiff likewise did not establish that anthroposophy has formal and external signs, of any kind. Specifically, plaintiff did not offer any evidence that anthroposophy has formal services, ceremonial functions, clergy, observed holidays, or any other formal and external signs associated with traditional religions. Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229 (citing Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035-36) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs reliance on the organization and

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a religion can often be recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs including formal services ceremonial functions the existence of clergy structure and organization efforts at propagation observance of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the traditional religions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    money entrusted to him, knowing that it is the client's money and knowing that the client has not authorized the taking."" In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 160, 506 A2d 722 (1986). Misappropriation includes ""not only stealing, but also unauthorized temporary use for the lawyer's own purpose, whether or not he derives any personal gain or benefit therefrom."" In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 455 n. 1, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979). The PDJ and Hearing Board found that Jaramillo's retention of some portion of the Hernandez funds and the $2,000 of Hill-man's funds was knowing conversion. See Varallo, 913 P.2d at 11; People v. Silvola, 915 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo.1996){finding that misconduct that occurred over an extended period of time must be deemed to be willful); People v. Singer, 897 P2d 798, 801 (Colo.1995)(<HOLDING>). Disbarment is the presumed sanction for

    ### Response:
    holding that extensive and prolonged neglect is considered willful misconduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (noting that creation of an agency does not require any formalities). Where the agency relationship concerns an interest in real property, it must be evidenced by a writing conferring such authority to satisfy the statute of frauds. 28 V.I.C. § 241. Here, Watson acted as Bennett’s agent in redeeming the property. Redemption does not create any rights or interest in property. See UMLIC VP, LLC v. T & M Sales & Envtl. Sys., Inc., 176 S.W.3d 595, 606 (Tex. App. 2005) (“Unlike the purchase of real property, redemption does not establish new title; it restores the parties to the position they were in before the lien.”). As such, an agency relationship to redeem real property does not fall within the statute of frauds. See, e.g., In re W.H. Shipman, Ltd., 84 Haw. 360, 934 P.2d 1, 9 (1997) (<HOLDING>). While conceding that Watson came to the Court

    ### Response:
    holding that because no real property interest was transferred to the agent by virtue of her redeeming the property the statute of frauds was inapplicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See § 10.73.100(1). He also complied with the procedural requirements for filing a petition based on newly discovered evi dence: he filed the petition “with due diligence” after discovering the new evidence. Id. Dictado obtained the affidavit he claims is new evidence in February 1997 and he filed his petition the same month. Therefore, Dictado’s petition must be deemed “properly filed” even if it lacked merit. See Lovasz, 134 F.3d at 149 (“[W]e reject the notion that a meritless [state] petition cannot constitute ‘a properly filed application’ under § 2244(d)(2).”). The majority does not dispute the Third Circuit’s analysis in Lovasz. Rather, it claims this panel is bound by the Washington Supreme Court’s ultimate conclusion that Dictado’s petition was time-barred (W.D.Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>); Ellis v. Johnson, 11 F.Supp.2d 695, 697, 698

    ### Response:
    holding that third state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    joints,” Weaver Cooke was not obligated to raise anything about the expansion joints. (Id.) WSI contends this conclusion was in error.' The court agrees. Weaver Cooke should not have remained silent if it disagreed with WSI’s characterization of its (Weaver Cooke’s) claims in dispute. In support of its summary judgment motion, WSI made express representations as to its work with which Weaver Cooke took, and did not take, issue. It made the representations not only in its brief but also at the hearing on the motion. Weaver Cooke therefore had two opportunities to refute the representations. If WSI was mistaken in its belief about the lack of potential liability for its expansion joint work, as Weaver Cooke contends, then Weaver Cooke was obligated to correct 852, 867 (D. Minn. 2015) (<HOLDING>). For this reason, the bankruptcy court abused

    ### Response:
    recognizing that where the nonmovant did not respond to the movants statement in its summary judgment memorandum about the lack of damages flowing from its conduct the nonmovant waived any argument that he had incurred damages in connection with the claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    33, 48 (2d Cir.2006) (interpreting the word “cause” in an insurance contract governed by New York law and stating that “[i]n a case where a covered and [non-covered] peril combine to cause a covered loss, courts typically apply the efficient proximate cause rule — meaning, that the insured is entitled to coverage only if the covered peril is the predominant cause of the loss or damage” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Siegel v. Chubb Corp., 33 A.D.3d 565, 825 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (1st Dep’t 2006). We should expect that if parties wish to override the settled principle that concurrent operation of a non-listed peril will not necessarily defeat coverage, they will be reasonably clear about it. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1007 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). These parties were not. Second, Lexington

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the efficient proximate cause rule is adumbrated by the maxim contra proferentem if the insurer desires to have more remote causes determine the scope of exclusion he may draft language to effectuate that desire
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it was possible to extend Sanders’ contract; rather, it asserts that there was no commitment to do so. The VA also points to the dismissal of several other workers whose contracts had expired around the same time period and argues that is evidence that there was no retaliatory motive. The VA’s argument may well be accepted by a factfinder. However, the factfin-der could also accept Sanders’ testimony that a promise of continued employment was made to him and that the VA reneged only after he charged his employer with discrimination. The record would therefore support a finding that had Sanders not filed a complaint, his temporary posi tion would have been extended as promised. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 58, 126 5.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations

    ### Response:
    holding that in retaliation case the requisite adverse action is one which well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or practice, and there was an unwarranted refusal by such party to fully resolve the matter which constitutes the basis of such suit; or (2) The party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous and malicious. N.C.G.S. § 75-16.1 (1999). The Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, holding that there was no violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. Having concluded that plaintiffs have established such a violation, we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision that reverses the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees. Upon remand, the trial court may consider an award of attorneys’ fees for services rendered after the entry of its judgment. See City Fin. Co. of Goldsboro, Inc. v. Boykin, 86 N.C. App. 446, 449-50, 358 S.E.2d 83, 85 (1987) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the

    ### Response:
    holding that ncgs  75161 includes fees for services rendered at all stages of litigation including appeals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)). In support of this claim, Godfred-son fails to allege any facts beyond those supporting his charge of discrimination under the ADEA. But an employee’s termination, even if based upon discrimination, does not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous conduct” without proof of something more. If such were not true, then every discrimination claim would simultaneously become a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Baab v. AMR Services Corp., 811 F.Supp. 1246, 1269 (N.D.Ohio 1993) (“[T]o say that Ohio courts narrowly define ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ would be something of an understatement.”); Bryans v. English Nanny and Governess Sch., Inc., 117 Ohio App.3d 303, 690 N.E.2d 582, 592 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Godfredson’s testimony that Bo-okmyer had

    ### Response:
    holding that even if the plaintiffstudent proved her claim of discrimination on the basis of disability the schools conduct was not so extreme or outrageous as to be intolerable in a civilized community
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) — (6). Section 502(e) of ERISA provides that ""the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.” Id. § 1132(e)(1) (émphasis added). 4 . The only circuit to hold otherwise is the Ninth Circuit, which held in Fentron that an employer could sue even though not a party enumerated in the statute. Fentron, 674 F,2d at 1305 (analyzing the issue in terms of standing). See also, Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Calif. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund, 763 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S.Ct. 850, 88 L.Ed.2d 890 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have criticized the Ninth

    ### Response:
    holding that despite the specific provisions of section 502 an employer may bring an action under erisa to enforce its terms where the employer alleges specific and personal injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.l. Subsection (b) instructs the sentencing court to decrease an individual’s offense level by two levels if he “was a minor participant” in the criminal activity, and the commentary defines a minor participant as one “who is less culpable than most other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3. Section 3B1.2 provides for an intermediate adjustment of three levels for cases falling between (a) and (b). Isienyi contends that the sentencing court erred in denying him an adjustment pursuant to this section of the Guidelines because he played only a small role in the criminal activity that resulted in his arrest. Isienyi was convicted of importing a single l (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Demers, 13 F.3d 1381,

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant convicted of a soleparticipant offense may nonetheless be entitled to a mitigating role adjustment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was also accurate: possession of over four ounces of cocaine is a Class A-I felony under New York law punishable by a minimum of 15 to 25 years imprisonment. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.21 (defining criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and stating that it is an A-I felony); id. § 70.00[3][a][i] (providing for minimum term of incarceration for A-I felony). If Sergeant McNicholas had at least an objectively reasonable belief that there was probable cause to believe Mrs. Mejia guilty of Criminal Possession in the First Degree, the fact that Sergeant McNicholas related disturbing, but true facts about the likely consequences of Mrs. Mejia’s conviction in order to induce her to cooperate, such remarks would not be sufficiently extre 1997) (applying New York law) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, at least one court has held that even

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff stated iied claim where officer allegedly hurled racial epithets at him and struck him without provocation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The answer to this question lies in subsection (b)(3), as amended in 1992, which states: “For purposes of all penalties and remedies established for violations of subsection (a)(1) of this section, the prohibited activity established herein as it applies to each such device shall be deemed a separate violation.” Although section (b) generally deals with criminal penalties, the plain language of subsection (b)(3) refers to “penalties and remedies,” indicating the legislative intent to treat each device as a separate violation when fashioning civil sanctions. See Columbia Cable TV Co. v. McCary, 954 F.Supp. 124, 128 (D.S.C.1996) (treating each decoder device distributed by defendant as a separate violation); Time Warner Cable v. Freedom Elecs., Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); but see Continental Cablevision, Inc. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that each converterdecoder manufactured or distributed in violation of  553 is a separate violation of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a claimant ... has a reasonable opportunity to appeal a denied claim ... and under which a full and fan-review of the claim and its denial may be obtained. Every such procedure shall include ... provisions that a claimant or his duly authorized representative may: ... (ii) Review pertinent documents.... 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(g). As applied to this case, therefore, the obligations of section 1133 are imposed only on benefit “plans.” Because section 1132(c) authorizes the imposition of sanctions only for the failures or refusals of the “plan administrator,” and not those of the “plan,” we hold that section 1132(c) cannot be used to impose civil liability for the violation of section 1133 alleged by Ms. Wilczynski. See Groves v. Modified Retirement Plan, 803 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Stuhlreyer v. Armco, Inc., 12 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that plan administrators incur no personal liability for failure to fulfil obligations imposed by 29 cfr  25605031g
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tenth Circuit reasoned: [T]he officers’ actions were effectively a command to open the door. The record demonstrates that three officers .pounded on Reeves’ door and window while .yelling and loudly identifying themselves as police officers. They continued this conduct consistently for at least twenty minutes. This encounter began between 2:30 and 3:00 in the morning, a time which must be taken into consideration when analyzing the coerciveness of the encounter. United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1168-69. The Court-, in Smith v. Kenny, 678 F.Supp.2d 1124 (D.N.M.2009) (Browning, J.), held that citizens could'be seized when an officér issues a command/ via cellular telephone, to someone to leave his or her home, and to surrender to officers waiting outside. See 678 F.Supp.2d at 1173 (<HOLDING>). The Court determined that the late hour in

    ### Response:
    holding that a seizure could occur under these facts but hot deciding whether a seizure occurred because of factual disputes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at 158 (citing Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir.1974)). See also Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 81 n. 1 (2d Cir.2009) (defendant, by failing to oppose lawsuit, “is therefore deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint pertaining to liability”); and Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Division of Ace Young, Inc., 109 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1997) (“It is, of course, ancient learning that a default judgment deems all the well-pleaded allegations in the pleadings to be admitted.”). Once the procedural requirements for default judgment have been met, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except with regard to damages. Au Bon Pain Corp., 653 F.2d at 65 (<HOLDING>). “Damages, which are neither susceptible of

    ### Response:
    holding once default was determined the court should have accepted as true all of the factual al legations of the complaint except those relating to damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and in others, speak with one voice in concluding that punitive damages are non-pecuniary and, therefore, are not recoverable under Miles's interpretation of the Jones Act.”) 30 . See, e.g., Lobegeiger v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-21620-CIV, 2011 WL 3703329, at *6-7 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 23, 2011), and Doe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.., No. 11-23323-CIV, 2012 WL 920675, at *3-4 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 19, 2012) (finding that In re Amtrak Sunset Ltd. Train Crash in Bayou Canot, Al., 121 F.3d 1421, 1429 (11th Cir.1997), which held personal injury plaintiffs were not entitled to pursue ""such non-pecuniary [punitive] damages” under the general maritime law, was no longer good law). See, also, Barrette v. Jubilee Fisheries, Inc., No. C10-01206 MJP, 2011 WL 3516061, at *6-7 (W.D.Wa. Aug. 11, 2011) (<HOLDING>); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater

    ### Response:
    holding spouse of injured seaman entitled to recover loss of consortium arising out of unseaworthiness cause of action contrary to smith v trinidad corp 992 f2d 996 9th cir1993 per curiam
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.2d 726, 727 (10th Cir.1991). An officer has probable cause to arrest if, under the totality of circumstances, he “learned of facts and circumstances through reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person arrested.” Vazquez-Pulido, 155 F.3d at 1216 (quoting United States v. Guerrero-Hernandez, 95 F.3d 983, 986 (10th Cir.1996)). Although probable cause need not be based on facts sufficient for a finding of guilt, it requires “more than mere suspicion.” Id. (citing United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374, 1388 (10th Cir.1981)). Association with persons suspected of criminal conduct or nearness to the site of illegal activity does not alone suffice. See id.; see also Hansen, 652 F.2d at 1390 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, “probable cause is lacking when

    ### Response:
    holding that merely traveling with drug dealers did not create probable cause at time of defendants arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1228, 1232 (Fla.1985). Martin states that the detectives encouraged him to confess so they could bring Jacey back to her mother. The detectives stated that the Bible teaches forgiveness and that whether or not “god is number one in your book, it is for people like [Jacey’s mother].” However, this exchange, as with the others previously addressed, did not render Martin’s confession involuntary. Despite this Court’s denunciation of the Christian burial technique in Roman, this Court did not suppress the confession in that case. In fact, the Roman Court upheld the admission of the defendant’s confession because it found that the use of the Christian burial tactic did “not directly result” in the defendant’s confession. 475 So.2d at 1232; Hudson v. State, 538 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Roman Court explained that the use of the

    ### Response:
    holding confession admissible despite officers plea to defendant to help law enforcement locate the body so that the family would be able to lay the deceased to rest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the privilege against self incrimination, the right to notice of charges, and the right to confrontation and cross-examination): In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (declaring that the requirement of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” applies to juvenile cases); and Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (declaring that double jeopardy principles apply to juveniles) ], we also note that the Court has not addressed the issue of whether credit for time served for pre-adjudication detention is required as a matter of federal constitutional law. We believe that such an extension is unlikely, (see, footnote 3, infra), especially in light of such cases as McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (<HOLDING>), and Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Respondent 9, n. 3. The South Carolina Supreme Court shrugged off the possibility of further administrative and trial proceedings, however, preferring to dispose of Lucas’s takings claim on the merits. Cf., e. g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 631-632 (1981). This unusual disposition does not preclude Lucas from applying for a permit under the 1990 amendment for future construction, and challenging, on takings grounds, any denial. But it does preclude, both practically and legally, any takings claim with respect to Lucas’s past deprivation, i. e., for his having been denied construction rights during the period before the 1990 amendment. See generally First Englisk Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Without even so much as commenting upon the

    ### Response:
    holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the takings clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    exempt from levy; (4) Living Care Utica’s inability to pay the taxes is the result of extensive government regulation in the field; (5) the IRS wrongly rejected an offer in compromise; (6) the IRS should have accepted Living Care Utica’s plan to maintain the business and sell it as an ongoing concern; (7) the IRS abused its discretion in making a determi nation to sustain the levy and liens; (8) Living Care Utica’s plan to sell the business as an ongoing concern will net more tax revenue; and (9) Living Care Utica contests the underlying tax liability. (Utica J.A. 205-06). As the district court correctly identified, all of the claims presented to it by Living Care Utica, with the exception of the second claim, at l ed States, No. 03-0359, 2003 W L 23311523, *4 (S.D.Ohio Dec.12, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, as to the second part of Montana’s

    ### Response:
    holding that medicaid and medicare funds are subject to levy and that even if the inability to pay was the result of government regulation it would not excuse the tax liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rationale applies to limited partners who, like shareholders, are passive investors with limited liability. See Regency Hous. & Drilling Ltd. Partnership I v. Cohen, [C.A. No. 89C-DE-70] (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 11, 1991) [ (not reported in A.2d) ] (‘Inasmuch as a limited partnership represents a security investment analogous to the purchase of stock in a corporation, plaintiffs contention ' [that defendant’s status as a limited partner satisfies the minimum contacts test] is prohibited by [Shaffer v. Heitner].’); see also Generate Bank, New York Branch v. Choudury, 776 F.Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y.1991), rev’d on other grounds, 779 F.Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (granting nonresident limited partner’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); Sender v. Powell, 902 P.2d 947 (Colo.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Renda v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 538

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant merely held a passive interest in the partnership and that such contact was too insubstantial to provide the requisite contacts with colorado to allow the constitutional exercise of longarm jurisdiction over him
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    n. 5. Instead, courts must make “a careful assessment” of a relationship’s “degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship,” to determine whether it will qualify as “protected.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 620, 104 S.Ct. 3244. See Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 768 F.2d at 1189 n. 5. [21-25] The right of familial association is a substantive due-process right the Fourteenth Amendment protects. See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d at 1547 (citing Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 865-66 (7th Cir.1985)). “This substantive right is consonant with the right of privacy.” Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d at 1547. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990) (<HOLDING>). “Evaluation of . a part/s Fourteenth

    ### Response:
    recognizing a privacy interest in the intimacies of the marital relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    working environment. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable determination in favor of plaintiffs claim. A hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII, is established by a plaintiff showing that his workplace was “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult ... that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” How-ley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)); see , 318 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. County of Westchester, 171 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that isolated minor acts or occasional episodes do not warrant relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not governed by any other period); id. § 600.5821(3) (providing that the applicable statutes of limitation for personal actions apply to personal actions brought by or on behalf of the state). The City therefore still has time to file citations for alleged violations that occurred in 1996, when, according to Herrada, the last citations were filed. Finally, Herrada lacks standing to argue that hearings are not held despite requests by vehicle owners, because she elected to pay the fine rather than request a hearing. The allegedly false and misleading statements, moreover, do not raise doubts about an owner’s ability to contest the allegations in a hearing, or about the result of paying the fine and thereby waiving a hearing. Cf. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1042-43 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, any confusion or

    ### Response:
    holding that immigration and naturalization service forms provided to aliens failed to satisfy due process notice requirements because they contained confusing and misleading information regarding the need to request a separate hearing and failed to inform aliens of the drastic consequences including immediate deportation of not making that request
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1998)). In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the United States Supreme Court, construing the federal plain-error rule, stated: “‘The Rule authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only “particularly egregious errors,” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982), those errors that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. [157], at 160 [ (1936) ]. In other words, the plain-error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be “used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S., at 163, n. 14.’ “See also Ex parte Hodges, 856 So.2d 936, 947-48 (Ala.2003) (<HOLDING>).” 11 So.3d at 938. “The standard of review in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that plain error exists only if failure to recognize the error would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings and that the plainerror doctrine is to be used sparingly solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-677 (2d Cir.1973) (noting that it would be “unthinkable ... to permit government agent to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums”)). Since Hampton and Russell were decided, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has had a number of occasions to consider the applicability of the due process clause to convictions of defendants who are shown to be predisposed. E.g., United States v. Milam, 817 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir.1987) (discussing due process argument in relation to counterfeiting case); United States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740, 742-743 & n. 2 (4th Cir.1986) (making distinction between entrapment and due process claim); United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 3479,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a due process claim may exist apart from entrapment issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Colonial was liable to the Reeds for the cost of the deck. “When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.” United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 [86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642] (1966) (superseded by statute on other grounds); see also Astoria Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 [111 S.Ct. 2166, 2169, 115 L.Ed.2d 96] (1991) (noting the presumption in favor of the Utah Constr. & Mining rule, absent contrary congressional intent); University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797 [106 S.Ct. 3220, 3225, 92 L.Ed.2d 635] (1986) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83

    ### Response:
    holding that the factual findings of federal agencies functioning in an appropriately judicial capacity enjoy preclusive effect in federal courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    goods and apparel. But unlike the value of personal property that may include such considerations as obsolescence, economic gain to the plaintiff, and even sentiment, food has such a basic quality and commonplace identity that a jury could, from its own experience and knowledge, assess its worth without the owner’s own testimony regarding its specific value. Juries may draw from their common knowledge and experiences when resolving fact questions. For example, in some circumstances when parties offer expert opinion testimony, a jury is not necessarily bound by that evidence and “can form its own opinion from other evidence and by use of its own experience and common knowledge.” Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Hunt Energy Corp., 47 S.W.3d 1, 14-15 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); see K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357,

    ### Response:
    holding that jury could have relied upon other evidence besides plaintiffs expert witness testimony that would have supported its verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    219, 222 (4th Cir.1989). In Poynter, a medical malpractice case, the trial court had decided not to excuse for cause a juror who was a patient of one of the defendant doctors and a juror who was a defendant in another medical malpractice suit. The Poynter court noted that: A juror is presumed impartial and the existence of a preconception is insufficient to rebut this presumption if the juror can “lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Id. at 221 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1643, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). The court then held that the district court had not abused its discretion in deciding not to excuse the two jurors. Id. at 222 (citing United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (4th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Here, Marks assured the court that he could

    ### Response:
    holding judge in bank robbery prosecution did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse juror whose wife was bank employee or juror whose daughter had been victim of bank robbery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to relief.’ ” Bethel v. Mount Anthony Union High Sch. Dist., 173 Vt. 633, 634, 795 A.2d 1215, 1217 (2002) (mem.) (quoting Amiot v. Ames, 166 Vt. 288, 291, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (1997)). In reviewing the disposition of such a motion, “this Court assumes that all well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are true, as well as all reasonable inferences that may be derived therefrom.” Id. The question on review is whether the bare allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim, and “[sjince averments of time and place are material for testing the sufficiency of a complaint, defenses based on a failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations are properly raised in a motion to dismiss.” Id.; accord Fortier v. Byrnes, 165 Vt. 189, 193, 678 A.2d 890, 892 (1996) (<HOLDING>). There is no dispute here that plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding that consistent with federal authority interpreting the identical federal rule the defendant could properly raise the limitations defense in a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdictional issues was limited to the context of statutory jurisdiction. We indicated that constitutional nexus jurisdiction is still an issue for the court’s determination. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1167 (“[S]hould a jury conclude on remand that the [vessel was foreign], the district court will ... have to determine whether the Government established a sufficient nexus between the [vessel] and the United States.” (e (1st Cir.1999) (stating that due process is not violated because it is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair to exert authority with the flag nation's consent). The Third Circuit has rejected the proposition that nexus is required without expressly distinguishing between stateless and foreign vessels. See United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Perez Oviedo, 281

    ### Response:
    holding that no nexus was required in a determination involving a stateless vessel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interpreted to have covered § 201(b) implicitly, that implicit holding would be insufficient to trump an agency construction to which we owe deference. But the question remains: do we owe deference to the FCC’s interpretation of § 201(b)? b. The Chevron framework applies. An administrative interpretation “qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). In Brand X, the Supreme Court afforded Chevron deference to an interpretation contained in a declaratory ruling of the FCC. See 125 S.Ct. at 2699(<HOLDING>). We see no reason to treat the interpretation

    ### Response:
    holding that because the fcc is authorized to promulgate binding legal rules and it issued the order under review in the exercise of that authority its interpretation of the communications act was entitled to chevron deference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court denied Lui's motion for reargument without prejudice to a later filing of a motion to reconsider, which the District Judge restricted to the issue of the availability of fees and costs pursuant to § 1988. In effect, the District Court retained jurisdiction over the fees and costs, as they pertained to Count One (violation of the First Amendment). 9 . We also had concerns as to whether we had jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because Count Two was dismissed by the District Court without prejudice. As noted in text, when we raised this question with counsel for Lui at oral argument, he conceded that Count Two should be dismissed with prejudice, and he forwarded a letter to us acknowledging that fact. 10 . See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Res judicata bars suit where there was

    ### Response:
    holding that declaratory relief is improper when a prosecution involving the challenged state statute is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated and the same principles that govern the propriety of federal injunctions of state criminal proceedings govern the issuance of federal declaratory judgments in connection with such proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (5) after the peremptory strikes are exhausted, the defendant must request additional peremptory strikes to cure the error from the erroneous denial of the challenge(s) for cause; (6) the request for sufficient additional peremptory strikes to cure the error from the erroneous denial of the challenge(s) for cause must be denied; and (7) finally, the defendant must identify at least one member who was selected to serve on the jury as objectionable, the significance being that the objectionable juror(s) would have been peremptorily struck had the trial court not erred in denying the challenge(s) for cause. Jacobs v. State, 787 S.W.2d 397, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 581 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); see also Johnson, 43 S.W.3d at 5, 2001 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 23 at *11 (<HOLDING>). This well-established case law places a

    ### Response:
    holding that if these preservation requirements are met any error in the denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a suspect verdict or a trial that was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). Given the strong case against Medearis and the uphill climb he faced, by virtue of his own pre- and post-incident conduct, there is no reasonable probability that the letter, if the same had been admitted and used to impeach Whiting, would have created a reasonable doubt with respect to his guilt and changed the outcome of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Medearis, 380 F.3d at 1058-60. Counsel and the trial court’s handling of the letter did not so upset the adversarial balance between the defense and prosecution to warrant a new trial. See Odem v. Hopkins, 382 F.3d 846, 851-52 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777,

    ### Response:
    holding stricklands prejudice prong was not met because of overwhelming evidence of guilt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “have [ ] IUD re-insertion.” He testified specifically that the second IUD was inserted in the village and not while his wife was in the hospital. When the IJ asked Yang why it appeared from the application that his wife underwent both an abortion and IUD insertion at the hospital, he responded that women in China do not usually tell men about the timing of such matters and that men do not ask about a woman’s body. The IJ reasonably discredited this explanation. Id. This inconsistency, while perhaps involving a minor detail, was material to Yang’s claim that his wife underwent forced abortions and forced IUD insertions and, when weighed against the entire record, supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Liang Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 454 F.3d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding any flaws in the IJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that an ij need not consider the centrality vel non of each individual discrepancy or omission before using it as the basis for an adverse credibility determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its impartiality would be suspect.”)). 2. Application of Rational Basis Review to Justifications Proffered by Congress. The Court has already addressed the four interests proffered by Congress during the passage of DOMA and found them not to be substantially related to an important governmental objective. Similarly, under the rational basis review, the Court finds that none of Congress’ proffered justifications constitute a rational relation in furtherance of some legitimate governmental end. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (citing Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-320, 113 S.Ct. 2637). Specifically, the Court finds that Congress’ justification of promoting traditional notions of morality does not satisfy rational basis scrutiny. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (<HOLDING>) Also, if the denial of benefits is designed to

    ### Response:
    holding that moral disapproval of homosexuals like a bare desire to harm the group is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2013 WL 6835094 (W.D.Pa. Dec. 23 2013); Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv12061-RHC-MJH, 2013 WL 6768607 (E.D.Mich. Dec. 20, 2013; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-1441 (ABJ), — F.Supp.2d —, 2013 WL 6729515 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2013) (enjoining mandate on ""compelled silence” argument; but otherwise denying injunctive relief), emergency motion for expedited briefing for injunction filed Dec. 23 2013, No. 13-5371 (D.C.Cir.)); Reaching Souls Int’l v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-01092-D, 2013 WL 6804259 (W.D.Okla. Dec. 20, 2013); Reaching Souls Int’l, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 5:13-cv1092-D, 2013 WL 6804259 (W.D.Ok. Dec. 20, 2013) (DeGiusti, J.); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-2542 (BMC), 987 F.Supp.2d 232, 2013 WL 6579764 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Persico v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00303 (AJS),

    ### Response:
    holding that the accommodation violates rfra and enjoining the mandate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tohono, 131 S.Ct. at 1729-30)); see, e.g.,Warren Trust v. United States, 107 Fed.Cl. 533, 554 (2012) (“In Tohono, the Supreme Court unequivocally declared that the ‘Tecon holding is not presented in this case because the [Court of Federal Claims] action here was filed after the District Court suit.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting 131 S.Ct. at 1729-30)); see also Tohono, 131 S.Ct. at 1735 n. 5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“As the majority notes, ... the validity of the Court of Claims holding in [Tecon ] is not presented in this ease. This Court has never considered that holding.” (alteration in original)). “Therefore, Tohono did not impact Tecon’s order-of-filing rule.” Warren Trust, 107 Fed.Cl. at 554; see also Nez Perce Tribe v. United States, 101 Fed.Cl. 139, 145 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs demonstrated that, at the time

    ### Response:
    holding that the tecon timing rule remains undisturbed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allege direct-not vicarious-liability. They contend that the open manhole posed a temporary hazard, that Albertsons had notice of the hazard, and that Albertsons therefore had a duty to act reasonably to mitigate the harm to Irene Berrett as a business invitee. In general, ""property owners are not insurers of the safety of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees."" Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). But a business owner has ""'a nondelegable duty to keep the premises reasonably safe for business invitees"" Price v. Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs., Inc., 2011 UT App 66, ¶ 26, 252 P.3d 365 (quoting Sullivan v. Utah Gas Serv. Co., 10 Utah 2d 359, 353 P.2d 465, 466 (1960); see also Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, ¶ 25, 196 P.3d 576 (<HOLDING>). 117 ""Premises liability cases generally fall

    ### Response:
    holding that a business owner has a duty to use reasonable care to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for patrons
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    can reasonably be expected to take precautions against contacting them.”). When Nikkei reenergized the line, it also locked up the switchgear. The danger arose only when Little Sioux used the penta-head wrench to gain access to the switchgear and allowed an untrained worker (McCormick) to work on it without first turning the power off. B. “Assumed Duty.” Next, we turn to the question whether Konwinski’s affidavit changes the case. We believe it does not. Iowa and other jurisdictions recognize the concept of an “assumed duty.” See Wright v. Brooke Grp. Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 177-78 (Iowa 2002); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, at 135 (1965). That is, a duty can be imposed on a defendant who “undertakes” to render a service to another. See Wright, 652 N.W.2d at 177-78 (<HOLDING>). But Nikkei did not undertake to do anything

    ### Response:
    holding that tobacco companies statements that they would report on the results of their research into the health effects of cigarettes were not an undertaking to warn customers of those effects
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tort and equitable claims as well. D. Oklahoma Claims Under the PRSA IC-CO raises tort claims under Oklahoma’s PRSA. IC-CO alleges that these tort claims are a separate issue that was not litigated before. Further, IC-CO argues that none of the statutory defenses apply to these tort claims. J. Aron argues that this claim is barred by collateral estoppel because it was already decided previously by this Court. Even if collateral estoppel does not preclude review, J. Aron argues that the statute has not been violated and it has no application past the first purchaser. The Court finds that collateral estoppel does not apply to IC-CO’s tort claims because the issues are sufficiently separate. See Samson Res. Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 407 B.R. 140, 143 (Bankr.D.Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, IC-CO’s tort claims must fail

    ### Response:
    holding that the oklahoma prsa did not create a trust but not evaluating possible tort claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to impair the Government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.” National Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.Cir.1974). Of course, the mere fact that information falls within a FOIA exemption does not of itself bar an agency from disclosing the information. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1713, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). But we have held that information falling within Exemption 4 of FOIA also comes within the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, which prohibits the disclosure of, inter alia, “trade secrets” and “confidential statistical data.” CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1270,

    ### Response:
    holding that the scope of the trade secrets act is at least coextensive with that of exemption 4 of foia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that appellate defense counsel had reason to believe that such relief would be likely to succeed or that defendant indicated an interest in such efforts. Therefore, we conclude that appellate counsel’s failure to so advise defendant was not constitutionally deficient. D. Postconviction Counsel Defendant next contends that his right to counsel was violated by the trial court’s failure to appoint postconviction counsel. We disagree. There is no federal or state constitutional right to counsel in Crim. P. 35 postcon-viction proceedings. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375 (Colo.1994); Brinklow v. Riveland, 773 P.2d 517 (Colo.1989); People v. Silva, 131 P.3d 1082, 2005 WL 1300860 (Colo.App. No. 04CA0661, June 2, 2005); People v. Ray, 801 P.2d 8 (Colo.App.1990); cf. People v. Valdez, supra (<HOLDING>); but see People v. Hickey, 914 P.2d 377

    ### Response:
    recognizing right to counsel under colo const art ii  16 and car 51a for purpose of preparing and filing application for certiorari
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (explaining that the issue of probable cause to arrest should be decided by the court “when there is no genuine issue of material fact”) (citation omitted). Next, Defendants contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer “O’Brien decided to arrest Plaintiff on the mere basis that she ‘needed to be responsible for taking care of (her) child,’ ” or because Officer “O’Brien arrested Plaintiff for abandonment or abuse of a child based on ... the ‘unclean and unhealthy conditions’ of her apartment.” The Court finds that this is not a material factual dispute because the subjective reason why Officer O’Brien arrested Plaintiff is irrelevant to the question of whether Officer O’Brien had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See Keylon, 535 F.3d at 1219-20 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). The Court notes that there

    ### Response:
    holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such transfer, if— (1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549 or 724(a) of this title ...; and (2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer. It found Section 522 inapplicable since the transfers at issue were voluntary. Id. A majority of courts (the “Majority”) employs essentially the same statutory analysis as that of In re Higgins and holds that because of no explicit statutory authority, Chapter 13 debtors do not have standing to utilize a trustee’s avoidance powers under Chapter 5. See e.g., Stangel v. Powers (In re Stangel), 219 F.3d 498, 501 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, Stangel v. United States, 532 U.S. 910, 121 S.Ct. 1240, 149 L.Ed.2d 147 (2001) (<HOLDING>); In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 296 (stating

    ### Response:
    holding that chapter 13 debtors do not have standing to assert trustees strong arms power relying on hartford underwriters ins co v union planters bank na 530 us 1 120 sct 1942 147 led2d 1 2000 and realty portfolio inc v hamilton in re hamilton 125 f3d 292 296 5th cir1997
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the first time that Alfaro has waived, rather than forfeited, his claim that the district court improperly imposed the sixteen-level enhancement because Alfaro acquiesced at the February 5, 2004 sentencing hearing to the district court’s finding that the probation officer had properly calculated his offense level. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Alfaro objected to the enhancement on the ground that he was a juvenile when convicted of the Virginia offense. At the sentencing hearing, Alfaro withdrew this objection after being provided with proof that he was prosecuted as an adult. He did not, however, waive the entirely different objection that he was not convicted of a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Aguilar-Delgado, 120 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 n. 2 (5th Cir.2004) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Alfaro's failure to object to

    ### Response:
    holding that the withdrawal of an unrelated factual objection to a prior conviction did not waive the defendants right to plainerror review of his claim that this same conviction was not for a crime of violence under  2l12
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    initially voted to convict on the second count at the beginning of deliberations. Nevertheless, upon further questioning, she responded affirmatively when asked whether she did vote to convict (i.e., in the past tense and, thus, in the jury room), whether she ultimately agreed with the verdict in its entirety, and whether she did so freely and voluntarily. And given her subsequent affirmations of the verdict, the juror’s initial equivocation regarding the second count does not support an inference that the verdict was less than unanimous. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury to continue its deliberations. For all of the foregoing reasons, Moton’s convictions are affirmed. Decided May 5, 2015. The McReynolds Law Firm, Jule McReynolds, Jr SE2d 899) (2002) (<HOLDING>); see generally OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The testimony

    ### Response:
    holding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for public indecency when after an altercation in a parking lot defendant stood in front of the car exposed his penis shook it and told a woman to suck it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds, including the provisions of chapters 5 and 7 of title 5 [the APA], shall apply to the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service.” 39 U.S.C. § 410(a). The Postal Service claims that the well-established presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is overcome here by the explicit terms of § 410(a). We disagree. The Postal Service assumes that any right that appellees have to judicial review must arise under the APA. This assumption is mistaken. There is no doubt that § 410(a) exempts the Postal Service from the strictures of the APA in cases involving the APA’s procedural requirements. See, e.g., Nat’l Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children & Adults v. USPS, 656 F.2d 754, 766 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). It is also established that, in PRA, Congress

    ### Response:
    holding that the postal service was not required to follow notice and comment rulemaking procedures
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    notice does not contravene such a requirement if the insured offers a valid justification for the delay. See id. (“Because [the insured] provides no other reasonable explanation for the four-month delay at issue, the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that it violated the provision of the policies requiring that ... [notice] be immediately [given] to [the insurer].”). An insured bears the burden of establishing a justification for the delay. See Kay-Lex Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 286 Ga.App. 484, 649 S.E.2d 602, 606 (2007). Here, Longleaf did not notify QBE of the damage caused by the hailstorm until nine months after the storm. Absent a reasonable explanation, this delay clearly violated the “prompt notice” requirement in Longleafs policy. See Advocate Networks, 674 S.E.2d at 619 (<HOLDING>); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J.B. Forrest & Sons,

    ### Response:
    holding that a fourmonth delay without justification violated the policys notice requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a fair trial” because the argument “rest[ed] almost entirely upon the quantum of publicity which the events received,” without any evidence of “constitutional unfairness”). Rather, “[t]he nature of the publicity and whether it is the sort that could be laid aside by jurors, rather than its volume, is the crucial factor to be considered.” Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 851 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Murphy, 421 U.S. at 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031). In addition to the volume and content of the pretrial publicity, two other factors are relevant in determining whether prejudice is presumed. First, the court should consider the amount of time which has elapsed between the peak pretrial publicity and the actual trial. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803, 95 S.Ct. 2031; see also Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d at 1524 (<HOLDING>). Although noting that “[i]t would be fruitless

    ### Response:
    holding that courts evaluation of the existence of presumptive prejudice should include consideration of the time lapse between peak publicity and the trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A.2d at 150 (finding that streets in a private residential development were “private property used by the insureds in connection with their insured residence”, and, for that reason, an ATV accident on such a private road was covered under that provision of the homeowner’s policy). These arguments did not fly below. The district court rejected Uguccioni as “an outlier that has been expressly, if not impliedly, overturned by subsequent decisions.” 512 F.Supp.2d at 126. To be sure, courts in other jurisdictions have equated such private roads with public roads or, at a minimum, have not found any distinction apposite in considering the issue of coverage under a homeowner’s liability policy. See, e.g., Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, No. 05-0456, 2006 WL 929239 (Iowa Ct.App. Apr. 12, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Davis rejected the very same argument

    ### Response:
    holding that homeowners policy excluded coverage because atv accident on private roadway in homeowners association occurred away from the insured premises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Ramey, 177 Ga. App. 512, 513 (1) (339 SE2d 735) (1986) (“When a verdict has been received by the clerk of the court, and read at the direction of the judge, it has been published.”); Haughton v. Judsen, 116 Ga. App. 308, 311 (2) (157 SE2d 297) (1967) (“The record indicates that when the jury had reached a consensus and returned to the box the judge inquired of them whether they had reached verdicts in the cases; one of them replied that they had and the judge then directed the clerk to receive and publish the verdicts. Thereupon the clerk took the petitions on which the verdicts had been written and read the verdicts in open court. This constitutes a publication.”). 27 Groves, 162 Ga. at 162. 28 Id. 29 Cf. Blueford v. Arkansas,_U. S._,_(II) (A) (132 SCt 2044, 182 LE2d 937) (2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lane, 218 Ga. App. 126, 126-27 (460

    ### Response:
    holding that despite forepersons earlier representations to the court that the jury was unanimous on acquittals for capital and firstdegree murder but hung as to lesser charges defendant was not entitled to double jeopardy because upon returning from further deliberations the foreperson stated only that they were unable to reach a verdict and gave no indication whether it was still the case that all 12 jurors believed the defendant not guilty of capital or firstdegree murder that 9 of them believed he was guilty of manslaughter or that a vote had not been taken on negligent homicide and noting that it was therefore possible for the defendants jury to revisit the offenses of capital and firstdegree murder notwithstanding its earlier votes and thus the forepersons report prior to the end of deliberations lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses quite apart from any requirement that a formal verdict be returned or judgment entered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seeking damages occasioned by the fault of another must take all reasonable steps to lessen his or her resultant loss.”). But the claimant need not do so until the defendant refuses to perform its part of the contract. Coos Lumber, 104 N.H. at 408. Put another way, “[t]here is no obligation on a promisee to minimize his damages until he actually knows that he is suffering damages because of a breach of contract by the promisor.” Citizens Nat. Bank v. Hermsdorf 96 N.H. 389, 394 (1951). Instead, the promisee “may assume that the promisor will keep his contractual promise.” Id. Further, “[t]he defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages.” Grenier, 150 N.H. at 119; see also Parem Contracting Corp. v. Welch Const. Co., Inc., 128 N.H. 254, 259 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The defendants’ first mitigation argument

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court was not permitted to conclude that damages could have been avoided absent evidence to that effect and that defendant bore burden of presenting that evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    381 S.W.3d at 531-32. When challenging the District’s assertion of immunity, Manbeck argued that the District could not “avail itself of governmental immunity” because the District initiated the lawsuit. Id. at 532. The supreme court disagreed and explained that the District initiated the “suit as part of the review process under the workers’ compensation regime, but it never sought affirmative relief.” Id. Further, the court reasoned that rather than bring an affirmative claim for money damages “against which Manbeck’s claims could be offset,” the district “merely availed itself of its statutory right to challenge Manbeck’s award of monetary relief by pursuing an appeal of the administrative decision to district court.” Id. at 532-33; see also Reata Constr. Corp., 197 S.W.3d at 378 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the supreme court held that the

    ### Response:
    holding that when governmental entity asserts affirmative claim for monetary damages against party entity does not have immunity from partys claims germane to connected to and properly defensive to claims asserted by the entity to the extent any recovery on those claims will offset any recovery by entity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    approved, including the gastric conditions commonly suffered by rheumatology patients. Relator further alleges that Takeda sales representatives were instructed to promote Kapi-dex to rheumatologists without disclosing that the drug is not approved for the gastric condition often experienced by rheu-matology patients. These allegations concerning the promotion of Kapidex to rheumatologists fall far short of the pleading standards set forth in Rule 9(b) and in Iqbal. Fatal to the claim, Relator does not allege in the amended complaint that the targeted rheu-matologists wrote any off-label prescriptions that were submitted to the government for payment, a critical omission in a case brought under the Act. See United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 733 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Allison Engine

    ### Response:
    holding that a complaint does not meet the requirements of rule 9 when the complaint did not give notice to the defendant of false claims submitted by others for federal reimbursement of offlabel uses only of illegal practices in promotion of the drug
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Florida Supreme Court held that: The adversary nature of the proceeding, its complexity, the need for an evidentia-ry hearing, or the need for substantial legal research are all important ele ments which may require the appointment of counsel. This appointment authority is discretionary, with any doubts being resolved in favor of an indigent defendant. There is no absolute duty to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. in a post-conviction relief proceeding unless the application on its face reflects a colorable or justiciable issue or -a meritorious grievance. The court has the authority to summarily deny relief without appointment of counsel when the petition and record reflect it is without merit. Graham, 372 So.2d at 1366; see also Russo v. Akers, 724 So.2d 1151, 1153 (Fla.1998)(<HOLDING>). While section 924.051(9) prohibits the use of

    ### Response:
    holding that when counsel is constitutionally mandated under weeks and graham section 9240519 does not prohibit or preclude appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in seeking collateral review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Prevent Him from Videotaping Since there is no policy in place on SCCC’s campus regarding videotaping, the Court must analyze whether the application of either section 140.10(b) or section 140.05 of the trespassing statute was constitutional as applied to Plaintiff Davis. Since the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff did not violate any regulation and was not disruptive, any attempt to exclude Plaintiff from the Quad for merely being present would have been improper. See D’Annibale Dep. at 14 (conceding that the public at large is permitted to utilize the campus without prior permission). Similarly, excluding Plaintiff for his preaching of the Gospel or handing out of leaflets would be unconstitutional. See e.g. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the central question remaining before

    ### Response:
    holding that state trespassing statute could not be used to prevent the distribution of religious materials on a towns sidewalk even though the sidewalk where the distribution was taking place was part of a privatelyowned company town
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    resolution or by-law adopted and not repealed or rescinded prior to such date.” 3 Appellant does not challenge imposition of the penalties prescribed in Norfolk City Code § 1-11 to any other offenses. Accordingly, we do not consider whether Code § 15.1-901 would render Norfolk City Code § 1-11 void as applied to non-DUI offenses. There is a split of authority among other jurisdictions on this issue, and it appears to be a question of first impression in Virginia. See 6 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.66, at 218 nn.14-18 (3d ed. 1988). It is arguable that the ordinance would be valid up to the limits set out in the state statute. See Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 98 Pa. Super. 265, 268 (1929). But see Boyles v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 484, 487, 19 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1942)

    ### Response:
    holding void ab initio ordinance proscribing punishment in excess of that authorized in charter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jury would find him guilty by association. To show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever, Perez must demonstrate prejudice from a joint trial (1) ""to such an extent that the district court could not provide adequate protection” and (2) that outweighed the government's interest in judicial economy. United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 193 (5th Cir.2000). Perez has not demonstrated ""clear, specific and compelling prejudice that resulted in an unfair trial,” United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171, 174 (5th Cir.1995), because (1) the conspiracy alleged by the government was not complex, (2) the trial involved only four defendants, and (3) the district court instructed the jury to consider each defendant separately. Cf. Richards, 204 F.3d at 193-94 (<HOLDING>). 21 .Milan also argues that the jury's finding

    ### Response:
    holding that a joint conspiracy trial was proper based on the lack of complexity of the conspiracy the number of defendants and an appropriate jury instruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Thereafter, they discovered that the lot on which the house was situated had, at some time previously, been a trash dump site. They sued the Stricklings, alleging breach of an implied warranty with respect to the sale of the lot; fraudulent misrepresentation; suppression of a material fact; deceit; negligent development or construction of the lot; and strict liability in tort. The trial judge entered a summary judgment as to all claims, holding that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to the sale of the lot and, therefore, that the Stricklings were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P. The Morrises appeal. We affirm. The Morrises argue that the exception to the caveat emptor rule as stated in Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So.2d 313, 314 (1971) (<HOLDING>), should be extended to situations, such as the

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule of caveat emptor would no longer be applicable to the sale of a newly constructed house and recognizing an implied warranty of fitness and habitability with regard to such sales
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in a survival action, no punitive damages may be awarded in the absence of an underlying award of compensatory damages for such pain and suffering. As Coastal notes, the primary damages recoverable in a survival action sounding in tort are for the decedent’s pain and suffering between the time of injury and death. See Foster v. Maldonado, 315 F.Supp. 1179, 1180 (D.N.J.), petition denied, 433 P.2d 348 (1970). Damages for pain and suffering are permitted only for pain and suffering that is conscious. Carey, supra, 132 N.J. at 66, 622 A.2d 1279. Many states, including New Jersey, have allowed recovery for conscious pain and suffering whenever it can be shown the injured person survived her injuries, however briefly. See Kellow v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 68 Iowa 470, 23 N.W. 740, 745 (1885) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, 68 Iowa 470, 27 N.W. 466

    ### Response:
    holding that survival cause of action accrues to injured person who survives injury for brief moment as certainly as it would have done if he had lived for a month or a year thereafter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to be a strategic choice. The court dispensed with the argument that defense counsel should have objected to the foundation for the State’s DNA expert’s testimony by stating that the record would not have supported such an objection. “The record reflects that the expert testified about the DNA testing that she performed herself, and she did not testify about the results of tests performed by another laboratory.” Ibid. Both of these conclusions are reasonable and supported by the record. As discussed above, strategic choices by defense counsel, when reasonable, do not amount to defective performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. And defense counsel does not perform defectively by failing to make a meritless objection. Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The petitioner is not entitled to a writ of

    ### Response:
    holding that there can be no constitutional deficiency in  counsels failure to raise meritless issues
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in this case shares many similarities with the motion filed by the defendant in Antoine. Notably, defendant did not cite section 114 — 5(d) in his motion, he failed to meet the statute’s affidavit requirement, and he never asked the trial court to transfer the motion to another judge for ruling. Thus, we conclude that defendant’s “Motion of Recusal” did not trigger a duty requiring the trial court to transfer the cause to a different judge for ruling. Defendant urges us to liberally construe section 114 — 5(d) and ignore the affidavit requirement. While we agree the statute is to be liberally construed, it should not be interpreted so as to contravene its express provisions. People v. Van Pelt, 18 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1089 (1974); see also People v. Clay, 124 Ill. App. 3d 140, 147 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Even in the absence of an affidavit, a

    ### Response:
    holding motion for substitution of judge properly denied where movant failed to attach affidavit
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disputed, require determination much in advance of judgment since they will designate the bearer of ultimate liability in the underlying cases and hence the bearer of the onus and risks of settlement. So viewed, the controversy is then quite proper for a judicial determination now. Id. at 823. The AC & S court went on to state that “[t]he obligation to defend is a current one as to which the parties are in conflict. It is independent of the facts of the underlying causes and must, by definition, be handled at this time.” Id. Equivest is in a position similar to that of the installer in AC & S. As in AC & S, Equivest’s claim for defense is ripe for consideration. Id.; see also Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc., v. Wyse Technology, The Software Link, Inc., 912 F.2d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). The issue of providing a defense arises

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim for indemnification was not ripe where it arose under common law and distinguishing this holding from ac  s in which the claim arose under contract and was thus ripe
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have an improper relationship with a student even if the student was not a minor at the time. See Colleps v. State, No. 02-12-00396-CR, 2014 WL 1324422, at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (upholding defendant educator’s convictions under Section 21.12 for acts committed with consenting adult students); Ex parte Morales, 212 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. ref'd) (student above the age of seventeen). We overrule Collins’s first point of error. In her remaining points of error, Collins challenges' the constitutionality of Section 21.12(a)(3) based upon its incorporation of Section 33.021 — a statute that has been held to be unconstitutionally overbroad in part. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (<HOLDING>). The constitutional complaints raised by

    ### Response:
    holding that section 33021b was overbroad because it prohibited a wide array of constitutionally protected speech and was not drawn narrowly enough to achieve only the legitimate objective of protecting children from sexual abuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on maritime commerce.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The incident in dispute did not merely have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce; it definitely disrupted maritime commerce. According to the operative complaint, the Coast Guard ruined Plaintiffs’ commercial fishing trip and towed them and their boat hundreds of miles. Thus the first prong is easily met. See, e.g., Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries Inc., 489 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Taghadomi, 401 F.3d at 1086 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that an assault on a seaman by his former maritime employer aboard a vessel in navigable waters had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce because it ren dered the seaman unable to fish
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    using the mark. See Ford Motor, 930 F.2d at 297(citing Tally-Ho Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir.1989)). Trademark rights are acquired ""through actual prior use in commerce."" Tally-Ho, Inc., 889 F.2d at 1022(citing United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 25 L.Ed. 550 (1879)). Because trademark rights arise only in connection with commercial activity, ""actual and continuous use is required to acquire and retain a protectable interest in a mark."" Id. at 1022-1023(footnote omitted). The party asserting ownership of the trademark must present evidence that the trademark has achieved significant market penetration; sales volume must be more than de minimis. See Lucent Information Management, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 186 F.3d 311 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). For 'either party to obtain trademark rights

    ### Response:
    holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    then has either (a) been convicted of an aggravated felony, or (b) not resided in the United States for seven continuous years. Id at § 1182(h). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to seek relief under § 1182(h) because denying him eligibility under this section would violate the equal protection component in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the statute makes an impermissible distinction because it treats lawful permanent residents and non-lawful permanent residents differently without a rational basis for its decision. Respondents argue that there is no equal protection violation because lawful permanent residents and non-lawful permanent residents are not similarly situated. See Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS, 291 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). While neither party mentioned so in their

    ### Response:
    holding that dawful permanent residents and nonlawful permanent residents are not similarly situated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.” Id. If it is, Meyers’s right to comment on those matters must “be balanced with [HHS’s] interest in ‘promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ ” Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)). The magistrate judge found, and we agree, Meyers’s testimony to a court concerning the proper placement of the two foster brothers was a matter of public concern that outweighed the HHS’s interest in promoting efficiency and was therefore protected by the First Amendment. See Bowman v. Pulaski Co. Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). For purposes of the motion for summary

    ### Response:
    holding question of what constitutes proper care and education of children is area of public concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that [section 636(b)(1) ] requires some lesser review by the district court when no objections are filed.”). In this vein, the First Circuit observed: Plaintiff also objects to the award of statutory costs to defendant DiMeo. Unfortunately, his objection comes too late. After the magistrate-judge issued his report, plaintiff had ten days to file written objections to the Report and Recommendation. We find no evidence in the record that plaintiff objected to the magistrate-judge’s findings and recommended disposition. Failure to raise objections to the Report and Recommendation waives the party’s right to review in the district court.... Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992) (citations omitted); see Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-151 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27

    ### Response:
    holding that objections are required to challenge magistrate judges findings as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.2002). The Act does not waive immunity from suit and liability for intentional torts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057(2); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petto, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex.2001); Meroney, 200 S.W.3d at 710. Appellants’ negligence allegations against the City, construed liberally in their favor, do not allege conduct falling within any of these areas. See Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 554 (discussing governmental entity’s duty in premises defect case not to injure by willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct and to use ordinary care either to warn of condition presenting unreasonable risk of harm of which entity is actually aware and plaintiff is not or to make condition reasonably safe); City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the trial court has no jurisdiction

    ### Response:
    holding that property owner has duty to keep real property in reasonably safe condition for invitees or to warn of any hazard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    maximum punishment is established by statutes found in the criminal code, not by a juvenile division in a certification proceeding. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d at 372-73. The court concluded that the defendant’s certification did not expose him to any greater punishment than authorized by the jury’s verdict as required to violate Apprendi. This is because the judgment that certified [the juvenile] to be tried as an adult did not impose any sentence on him whatsoever. Instead, it only determined that his case would be heard in a circuit court of general jurisdiction rather than the juvenile division of the circuit court — a decision to which other courts have determined Apprendi does not apply. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d at 375-76 (citation omitted) (citing Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d (2002) (<HOLDING>); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 445, 453

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi does not apply to juvenile waiver hearings because the applicable statute does not involve guilt or innocence but involves the determination of which system will be appropriate for a juvenile offender
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    office away from Mr. Sorenson should be sufficient to defeat TCC’s SJ Motion on Harris’s sexual harassment claims. PI. ’s Response, at 15, Dkt. 22. As TCC points out, Harris’s complaint does not allege a hostile environment claim. Instead, in her complaint, she alleges that she was treated differently than other employees due to her gender. Compl. at 19, Dkt. 1. Harris’s complaint thus contains a discrimination claim based on disparate treatment only, which is clearly distinct from a hostile environment claim. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). A plaintiff may not raise additional claims for the first time through an opposition to summary judgment brief. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir.2004); (<HOLDING>); Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781

    ### Response:
    holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    than those properly filed with the appropriate regulatory authority, nor is the regulated entity being sued on the grounds that the rates charged by the utility are unreasonable. See, e t and receive fair, just and reasonable rates.” KRS 278.030(1). They may not, however, “as to rates or service, give any unreasonable preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.” KRS 278.170. The PSC has “original jurisdiction over complaints as to rates ... of any utility,” and upon a written complaint “made against any utility by any person that any rate in which the complainant is directly interested is unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory,” the PSC must proceed to make an investigation. KRS 278.260; see also Smith, 104 S.W.2d at 965 (<HOLDING>). Whenever the PSC, on its own motion or upon a

    ### Response:
    holding that psc had primary jurisdiction to pass upon rates and whether same were reasonable consequently court found it improper to pass upon the reasonableness of the charges complained of by appellant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    action pursuant to section 1653(2)(B) “should be considered with at least the same level of scrutiny as that required for a petition under the Grandparents Visitation Act,” that is, by demonstrating, on a prima facie basis, their standing as de facto parents, or according to some other extraordinary circumstance. Davis, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 12, 15, 17, 953 A.2d 1166; see Katon v. Brandi M., 2011 ME 131, ¶¶ 2-3, 32 A.3d 1047 (upholding the dismissal of a grandparent visitation petition when the contact alleged was “typical for a grandparent and not extraordinary”); Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶¶2-5, 16-22, 26, 957 A.2d 74 (concluding-that the “loving and helpful grandparents” with whom the children had lived periodically did not establish standing); Robichaud, 2003 ME 54, ¶¶ 6-11, 820 A.2d 1212 (<HOLDING>). [¶ 17] Of course, one predicate to all of

    ### Response:
    holding that a pattern of intermittent contact in the form of occasional visits  lasting from one day to one week over three and onehalf years intermixed with several periods of daily contact  typified the contact that one would anticipate from a connected extended family and was not extraordinary enough to establish a compelling state interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    counters that, although he did not raise a pros-ecutorial misconduct claim based on the above-cited prosecutorial comments, he did raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim to the Ohio Supreme Court. Further, petitioner claims that, so long as he “fairly presented” a claim to state court, he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement pursuant to Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). ' While petitioner’s assertion is not invalid, he fails-to acknowledge a corollary to the exhaustion requirement — “that the doctrine of exhaustion requires that a claim be presented to the state courts under the same theory in which it is later presented to federal court.” Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir.1998); see also Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because he cannot demonstrate cause for

    ### Response:
    holding substance of claim must have been presented to state court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entering Indian reservations. We recognize that in general, “[f]ederal protection of tribal self-government precludes either criminal or civil jurisdiction of state courts over Indians or their property absent the consent of Congress.” Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 349 (1982 ed.). However, “at times Congress has retained Indian country status but has delegated partial jurisdiction to states over areas of Indian country or over specific legal subjects.” Id. at 361. Such a Congressional delegation of jurisdiction has occurred in Kansas. 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (the “Kansas Act”) grants the state of Kansas “jurisdiction over all crimes committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations.” See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 105, 113 S.Ct. 1119, 1123, 122 L.Ed.2d 457 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Oyler v. Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 295 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding that the kansas act unambiguously confers jurisdiction on kansas to prosecute all offenses  major and minor  committed by or against indians on indian reservations in accordance with state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    association with [the law firm],” such that the employee and employer duties were so “closely linked as to be incapable of separation.” Id. at 635, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 609 N.E.2d 105. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals still refused to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge. Id. at 638-39, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 609 N.E.2d 105. The New York courts have declined to expand the exception under Wieder based on duties dictated by other professional codes or statute. See, e.g., Horn v. New York Times, 100 N.Y.2d 85, 97, 760 N.Y.S.2d 378, 790 N.E.2d 753 (2003) (finding that a physician’s professional obligation to follow the Code of Medical Ethics did not impose an obligation on her employer to terminate her only for just cause); Smith v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F.Supp.2d 302, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, plaintiffs status as a licensed

    ### Response:
    holding that violation of accountants duties mandated by statute did not create a cause of action based on breach of implied contract for employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony to the other evidence in the case.... Look at how their testimony stacks up with the phone records, look at how it stacks up to the defendants’ own words, look at how it stacks up to the experiences of the other cooperating witnesses and the testimony of law enforcement officers who conducted the surveillance and made the arrests in this case, and use your common sense. 5. The Speedy Trial Act Washington contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated under the “ruse exception” to the Speedy Trial Act because he was not indicted within 30 days of his arrest on state charges. Washington, however, failed to move for dismissal of the indictment before trial and thus waived his Speedy Trial Act claim. See United States v. Spagnuolo, 469 F.3d 39, 44^46 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). B. Jones 1. Evidence Seized from Jones’s

    ### Response:
    holding that waiver provision in  3162a2 applies to  3161b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legislative directive that juvenile dispositions not be treated as “convictions” for all purposes). Rule 11-609(D) implements the legislative directives by specifically excluding the use of a juvenile adjudication as a permissible means of impeaching a defendant. The Rule states: Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. (Emphasis added.) But see State v. Wyman, 96 N.M. 558, 559-60, 632 P.2d 1196, 1197-98 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). {11} The State argues that Defendant opened

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an inquiry into the conduct underlying a defendants juvenile adjudication may be admissible under rule 11608b nmra if the prosecution does not specifically question the defendant about the juvenile adjudication and does not otherwise present any evidence regarding the defendants juvenile adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    FBI background check and then separately provides a 120-day window for the US-CIS to render a decision. This statutory framework precludes an argument that the time required to complete an FBI background check may justify both a delay between an investigation and an examination and one between an examination and a final determination. See Shalan, 2006 WL 3307512 at *2 (“It does not matter whether blame for the delay is properly ascribed to the FBI or USCIS; rather the delay renders the government’s position not ‘substantially justified.’ ”). Second, even if a delay in conducting a FBI background check may, under some circumstances, present a valid justification for the USCIS’s failure to reach a determination within the 120-day window, it does not do so in this case. Compare Id. at *3 (<HOLDING>) and Aro-nov, 06-11526 at 5-7 (holding a delay

    ### Response:
    holding a delay of three months past the 120day window unreasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ahmad appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations, and for an abuse of discretion its decision whether to apply equitable tolling. Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim as time-barred because Ahmad did not file his action within one year of the alleged violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for damages must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its

    ### Response:
    holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction and rejecting a continuing violation theory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    orders granting summary judgment in favor of Lee and enjoining Delaware from limiting FOIA benefits to Delaware citizens. 1 . In its entirety, § 10003 provides: (a) All public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the State during regular business hours by the custodian of the records for the appropriate public body. Reasonable access to and reasonable facilities for copying of these records shall not be denied to any citizen. If the record is in active use or in storage and, therefore, not available at the time a citizen requests access, the custodian shall so inform the citizen and make an appointment for said citizen to examine such records as expediently as they may be made available. Any reasonable expense involved in the copying of 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (<HOLDING>); Toomer, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed.

    ### Response:
    holding that new hampshire policy which restricted practice of law by outofstate residents violated privileges and immunities clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failure to state a claim. Specifically, the State answered Count 1 of the complaint by admitting the tax debt was discharged pursuant to the terms of the bankruptcy court’s order, but denied the allegation that the debt was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code. The State answered Counts 2 and 3 by asserting Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. In April 1997, the State enlarged its assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity to include Count 1 by filing a motion to dismiss all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court, relying upon Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The BAP affirmed, Mitchell v. California Franchise Tax Bd., 222 B.R. 877, 881-82 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (<HOLDING>). The BAP found that § 106(a) was passed

    ### Response:
    holding that although congress expressed its intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity in 11 usc  106a it could not do so under seminole tribe
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    addressed the court at sentencing. Ante, at 1295. Kemp now argues that the trial judge erred in not ordering, sua sponte, a competency hearing under Rule 11.1, Ariz.R.Crim.P. There was no abuse of discretion here. Kemp’s statement does not cast doubt on his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings. See Rule 11.3, Ariz.R.Crim.P. It does not indicate that he lacked the ability to assist in his defense. If anything, his statement says much about the absence of mitigation here and the propriety of the sentence. Because there were no grounds to conduct a competency hearing, the trial judge did not err in failing to order one sua sponte. IV. DISPOSITION We reviewed the record for fundamental error and found none before we decided State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 910 P.2d 1 (1996) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Kemp’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the repeal of ars  134035 is procedural and not substantive and therefore fully retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    electrocuted on February 18, 1999 while installing an industrial fuse in high-voltage electrical switching gear designed and manufactured by the defendant, ABB Power T & D Company, Inc. At the time of the accident, Zuzula worked for a power plant, Midland Cogeneration Venture (“MCV”), which owned and maintained the electrical switching gear. The Court has reviewed the reports submitted by the respective witnesses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) together with their depositions, and has heard the arguments of the parties through their respective counsel in open court on October 23, 2002. The Court finds that the parties have submitted sufficient information to permit the Court to adjudicate the motions. See Greenwell v. Boativright, 184 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes that the parties each

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court need not conduct a separate evidentiary hearing to adjudicate a socalled daubert motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Act does not define ""claim,” that term is defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation as ""a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract.” 48 C.F.R. § 2.101. For claims exceeding $100,000, the contractor must certify that: the claim is made in good faith; the supporting data is accurate and complete; and the amount requested accurately reflects the amount for which the contractor believes the Government is liable. See 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1). Government claims, however, do not require certification. See Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906-07 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 11 . FAR § 52.232-20(h) provides, in relevant

    ### Response:
    holding that government claim seeking incidental and consequential damages for plaintiffs alleged breach of contract did not require certification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988). IV. Discussion The defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement which constitutes a final resolution of the plaintiff’s discrimination claims. See United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has held that a

    ### Response:
    holding that the settlement of a dispute generally renders a case moot
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that rely heavily on subjective considerations with caution. Particularly in cases where a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff was otherwise significantly better qualified than the successful applicant, an employer’s asserted strong reliance on subje hette has offered conflicting reasons for plaintiffs termination and the fact that plaintiff and Ms. Kay had received identical overall performance ratings for the school year immediately prior to the year when the RIF decisions were made, is evidence that could further support an inference that Ms. Smith’s termination was the result of age animus, if indeed it can be proven that director Birchette was responsible for designating one of the social studies teacher positions for elimination. See, e.g., Ferguson, 225 F.Supp.2d at 41 (<HOLDING>). In sum, the Court concludes that although,

    ### Response:
    holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for  the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fraud has entered into the case. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So.2d 312, 315 (Fla.) (quoting 59 Am.Jur.2d Pardon and Parole § 43 (1971)) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 232, 54 L.Ed.2d 159 (1977). 5 . We have addressed this issue in similar cases at least twice before but in mandamus petitions that resulted in unpublished orders, not published opinions. See Henninger v. Chiles, 676 So.2d 413 (Fla.1996); Tal-Mason v. Chiles, 621 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1993). 6 . See generally Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So.2d 109, 114 (Fla.1996) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S.Ct. 960, 965, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), for the proposition that ""it is the effect, not the form, of the law that determines whether it is ex post facto.”); Dugger v. Williams, 593 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla.1991)

    ### Response:
    recognizing general rule that ex post facto provision does not apply to purely procedural matters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reaction to the employee’s behavior.” Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684). Second, courts must weigh the strength of the employee’s and the public’s First Amendment interests against the government’s interest in the efficient administration of the workplace. Mullin v. Town of Fairhaven, 284 F.3d 31, 37-38 (1st Cir.2002); Tang, 163 F.3d at 12 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731). Third, if the employee’s and the public’s interests outweigh a legitimate government interest in restricting the employee’s speech, the employee must show that the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Mihos, 358 F.3d at 102 (citations omitted) the extent Putnam’s First Amendment claim t, 335 F.3d 1, 11-12 n. 10 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); O’Connor, 994 F.2d at 916 (citing Givhan v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a public employees internal memoranda raising concerns about public corruption are protected first amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    represent his actual testimony at trial, thereby violating Rule 16(a)(7). Thus, defendant argues, the trial justice should not have allowed Officer Desautels to testify. Although defendant relies solely on Rule 16(a)(7)’s requirements, we must also look to the timing provisions of Rule 16(g)(1), which states that a defendant’s request for discovery shall be made within twenty-one days after arraignment and the attorney for the state shall respond in writing within fifteen days of the request. The defendant was arraigned on March 2, 2000, yet he waited until April 17, 2000, to mail his discovery request to the state. The defendant disregarded his own responsibility to comply with the procedures of Rule 16 by filing a late request. See State v. Nardolillo, 698 A.2d 195, 201-02 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). The state, on the other hand, did not violate

    ### Response:
    holding that the state as well as the defendant has a right to rely on compliance with rule 16
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). See Doc. 3 at 4; Doc. 8 at 5. Section 2255 grants a petitioner one year to file a § 2255 motion from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Descamps issued on June 20, 2013. Petitioner’s § 2255 motion was filed within one year from that date. However, “Descamps does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review...” Abney v. Warden, No. 15-1088, 621 Fed.Appx. 580, 584, 2015 WL 4546193, at *4 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, Petitioner’s § 2255 motion is untimely filed based on Descamps. See King v. United States, 610 Fed.Appx. 825, 829 (11th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>). Although not argued by Petitioner, the Court

    ### Response:
    holding descamps does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review and thus the  2255 motion was not timely under  2255f3
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must explicitly reserve, with the consent of the state and the trial court, the right to appeal a dispositive question of law. State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tenn.2003). In addition to reserving the question of law, the defendant must draft the question so that its scope and limits are clearly stated for the reviewing court. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 898-99 (Tenn.2008) (quoting State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn.1988)); see also State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 836-37 (Tenn.1996). Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to hear any issue beyond the scope of the certified question. See Day, 263 S.W.3d at 899-900; State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 478-79 (Tenn.1998); Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 836-37; Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650. The defendant bears .App.1995) (<HOLDING>). B. IAD Tennessee, forty-seven other states,

    ### Response:
    holding that even though the issue is not framed according to what might be referred to as standard lawschool format preston only requires that a certified question clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issues reserved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    should have been submitted for determination by the jury. Because Defendants objected to the district court’s response — that jurisdiction was no concern for the jury — to the jury’s question, we can no longer review the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on the jurisdictional element just for plain error. Instead, we must review the entire jury charge, including the judge’s response to the jury question, to determine if the issues of law were presented accurately. See United States v. Turner, 871 F.2d 1574, 1578 (11th Cir.1989). The government argues that whether the jurisdictional element under 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 is a question of fact for the jury or one of law for the court is debatable. See United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1532-33 & n. 8 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1215 n.

    ### Response:
    recognizing conflict between prior precedents on whether jurisdiction is question of law or fact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Miller was in no way authorized by the other members of TCPFA to make the Liar Statements, nor were such statements made pursuant to any “deliberate choice” by TCPFA as a whole. Accordingly, municipal liability may not attach to Miller’s actions. E. Individual Capacity Claim For the reasons explained in Parts V.AC, a reasonable jury could conclude that Miller’s statements to the press constituted a violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied his first summary judgment hurdle for qualified immunity. Miller may still be entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings, however, if Plaintiffs alleged right was not “clearly established at the time official action was taken.” See Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Miller’s arguments in support of qualified

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4590i. Hill v. Milani, 686 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex.1985) (declining to apply article 5537 (now Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.063) which suspends the statute of limitations while a person is temporarily absent from the state, to cases filed under article 4590i); Liggett v. Blocher, 849 S.W.2d 846, 850-51 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (declining to apply the unsound mind tolling provision of Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.-001(a)(2) to a case filed under article 4590i); see Desemo v. Gafford, 692 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (declining to apply article 5535 (now Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.001(a)(2)) to a case filed under article 4590i); Waters ex rel. Walton v. Del-KY, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 250, 256 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Appellants respond that, under the particular

    ### Response:
    holding that the express provisions of article 4590i exclude the unsound mind tolling provision of texcivprac  remcode ann  16001a2 and b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mitchell appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand. The district court did not address the merits of Grounds 11(e) and 12(b) of Mitchell’s petition. We therefore vacate the district court’s order to the extent that it disposed of these grounds, and remand the petition for the district court’s initial consideration of these grounds. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ground 4 as proeedurally barred. The state court properly dismissed this ground pursuant to Nevada Revised Statute § 34.810(l)(b)(2). Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Mitchell’s reliance on Pellegrini v. State,

    ### Response:
    holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property. This court has never held that when an appellant fails to obtain a stay and the property sought is conveyed in good faith to a third party, the appellant is entitled to return to the trial court to have damages awarded if successful on appeal. Neither the Richards-es nor the dissent has cited a single case where this took place. Nor could they: other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have denied such relief. For instance, the Illinois Appellate Court has held that “in the absence of a stay, an appeal is moot if possession or ownership of specific property which is inextricably involved in the relief being sought on appeal has been conveyed to third parties.” Horvath v. Loesch, 87 Ill.App.3d 615, 43 Ill.Dec. 154, 157, 410 N.E.2d 154, 157 (1980) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). This holding is consistent with numerous

    ### Response:
    holding appeal moot on this basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not consider alternatives other than revoking his probation. Therefore, we question whether this argument is properly before this court. See K.W.J., supra. Moreover, “[ajlthough Rule 27.6(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides that a trial court may ‘revoke, modify, or continue probation’ if it finds that a probationer has violated the terms and conditions of his probation, whether revocation and imposition of the original sentence or some other disposition is appropriate is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court’s conclusions in a probation-revocation proceeding, including the determination whether to revoke, modify, or continue the probation. See, e.g., Ex parte J.J.D., So.2d 240 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>); and Moore v. State, 432 So.2d 552, 553

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial courts order in a probationrevocation proceeding will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of recovery: unjust enrichment, breach of implied contract, conversion, and constructive fraud. She also requested that punitive damages be awarded. Bailey also sought to have the litigation certified as a class action. Following a hearing, the trial court granted her motion and ordered that the class be defined as ""(alll current and former hourly employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (including its operating divisions Sam's Club and Wal-Mart Supercenters) in the State of Indiana during the period August 1, 1998 to present."" Appendix at 61. Wal-Mart subsequently sought certification of the order for interlocutory appeal. That motion was granted; consequently, the issue of class certification is properly before this court. See Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 696 N.E.2d 383, 385-86 (Ind.1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1049, 119 S.Ct. 608,

    ### Response:
    holding that unless trial court certifies trial rule 28 determination as final under trial rule 54b it remains interlocutory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    factor controlling), including: current residence, voting registration and voting practices, location of brokerage and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in unions and other organizations, place of employment or business, driver’s license and automobile registration, and payment of taxes”). The Ninth Circuit treats limited liability companies such as CarMax like partnerships for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir.2006) (applying the standard used by sister circuits and treating LLCs like partnerships). Thus, ""an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.” Id.; see also Handelsman v. Bedford Village Assocs., Ltd. Partnership, 213 F.3d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Car-Max alleges that it is a wholly-owned

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a limited liability company has the citizenship of its membership
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alters two quantities: (1) the amount of the ereditoFs claim against the estate on the petition date and (2) the amount of collateral securing the creditor’s claim on the petition date. Those two quantities ultimately determine the extent to which a creditor is secured for purposes of § 547(b)(5). (i) TCFC’s Claim Against the Estate In this case, had the payments not been made, Smith’s would have owed TCFC $10,728,809.96 (its actual claim on the petition date) plus $12,842,438.96 (the amount of antecedent debt paid in the preference-period transfers), or a total of $23,571,248.92. Thus, TCFC’s hypothetical claim against the estate, in an analysis under § 547(b)(5), is $23,571,248.92. See Henderson v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce (In re Al-Ben, Inc.), 156 B.R. 72, 75 (Bankr. N.D.Ala.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Gray v. A.I. Credit Corp. (In

    ### Response:
    holding that the creditors claim on the petition date for purposes of a  547b5 analysis was the unpaid balance of the store loans as of the filing date plus the total amount of the alleged preferential payments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relief through that avenue. It is true that several jurisdictions recognize an exception to at-will termination via a tort for retaliatory or wrongful discharge where the discharge contravenes public policy. See, e.g. Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385, 388-89 (1980) (recognizing a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where plaintiff was fired for insisting his employer comply with FDA requirements); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 108 (Colo.1992) (recognizing cause of action under public policy exception to at-will termination doctrine where employee refused to report falsely to his superior the safety and quality of a machine); Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (<HOLDING>). However, Florida does not have such a public

    ### Response:
    holding employee has cause of action for retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy where employee was fired for reporting fellow employees alleged criminal activities to local law enforcement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it is clear from a reading of the statute that the sole purpose of New York habeas corpus is to inquire into the cause of imprisonment or restraint, and to determine whether the detention is void. See 64 N.Y.Jur.2d Habeas Corpus § 2 (1987). This conclusion is supported by case law, because New York courts have not allowed in a habeas proceeding the granting of forms of relief other than discharge, bail, or remand. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 25 A.D.2d 693, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1009 (1966) (stating that ha-beas is not available to secure return of property); People ex rel. Tatra v. McNeill, 19 A.D.2d 845, 244 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464 (1963) (disallowing release of petitioner’s funds for independent psychiatrist in habeas petition); Ex parte Derer, 262 A.D. 969, 30 N.Y.S.2d 53, 53 (1941) (<HOLDING>). A review of the statute and case law,

    ### Response:
    holding that court in habeas petition has no authority to condition visitation right of parent upon payment for support and maintenance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    changes are “ “within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose,’ ” id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)). Instead, the Due Process Clause protects against restraints or conditions of confinement that “exceed[ ] the sentence in . an unexpected manner.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; see id. at 479 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 2297 n. 4 (observing that proscribed conditions of confinement must be “qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime, and [have] stigmatizing consequences.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1264, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22,

    ### Response:
    holding that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interfere with the private doctor-patient relationship such that it imposes a substantial obstacle on a woman seeking an abortion. Id. In Wooley v. Maynard, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects “the right of freedom of thought,” which “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Citing to Wooley, Casey observed a physician’s First Amendment “right[ ] not to speak... as part of the practice of medicine.” 505 U.S. at 884, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The Supreme Court noted that the right is “subject to. reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 884, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (comparatively citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (<HOLDING>)). B. Article III Injury-In-Fact The Act

    ### Response:
    holding state legislation was a reasonable exercise ofits broad police powers in regulating the administration of drugs by health professionals where the decision to prescribe or to use is left entirely to the physician and the patient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law. Equally well established precedent, from the same sources as above, state that absent a use provision, an article is to be classifi tablished rule that classification of articles must be determined on their condition as imported); accord United States v. Irwin, 78 F. 799, 801 (2d. Cir. 1897) (applying the rule in Worthington to gunstocks and barrels imported on the same ship and determining that in their condition as imported they were breach loading shotguns); accord United States v. Winkler-Koch Eng’g. Co., 41 C.C.P.A. 121, 122 (1953) (noting “[i]t is academic that the classification of merchandise for duty purposes is governed by its condition as imported ***.”); Rico Import Co. v. United States, 12 F.3d 1088, 1090 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Mita Copystar America v. United States, 21

    ### Response:
    holding that despite alleged uses articles must be classified in their condition as imported
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 2618. Applying these holdings here, we conclude that Valder’s prosecutorial immunity insulates him from liability for his unquestionably advocatory decision to prosecute Moore. His prosecutorial immunity also protects Valder from liability for allegedly concealing exculpatory evidence from the grand jury and for allegedly manipulating evidence before the grand jury to create a false impression of what Moore knew about the alleged fraudulent schemes. Valder’s decisions regarding what evidence to put before the grand jury, and in what manner, are advocatory because they are central to the prosecutor’s task of “initiating a prosecution” and “presenting the State’s case.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 996; see also Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661-62 (2nd Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In addition, withholding after indictment

    ### Response:
    holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 1195; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In a denaturalization proceeding, the government has a heavy burden of proof and must provide “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence to justify the revocation. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943) (internal quotations omitted). A revocation is justified if naturalization was illegally procured. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981). Naturalization was illegally procured if an individual entered the country and obtained residence without a valid immigration visa. Id. at 518, 101 S.Ct. 737 (<HOLDING>). After World War II, the United States

    ### Response:
    holding that where an alien was ineligible for a visa as a matter of law his citizenship was illegally procured and subject to revocation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States, 128 Ct.Cl. 489, 492, 121 F.Supp. 630 (1954)). Thus, [a protestor] must offer clear and convincing evidence that [the government] did not act in good faith in order to prevail on this issue. Am-Pro Protective Agency, 281 F.3d at 1239-40. Croman Corp. v. United States, 724 F.3d at 1364; see also Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d at 1239 (“The presumption that government officials act in good faith is nothing new to our jurisprudence. See, e.g., Knotts v. United States, 128 Ct.Cl. 489, 492, 121 F.Supp. 630 (1954) (stating ‘we start out with the presumption that the official acted in good faith’).”); Square One Armoring Serv., Inc., v. United States, 123 Fed.Cl. 309, 329 (2015) (<HOLDING>); Austin v. United States, 118 Fed.Cl. 776, 790

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff alleging that the government has acted in bad faith must offer wellnigh irrefragable proof in support of its claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in several appellate opinions not designated for publication. State v. Smith, 100 Wash.App. 1064, 2000 WL 688180 (Wash. Ct.App.2000); State v. Ware, 1999 WL 233592 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999); Sheckells v. Texas, 2001 WL 1178828 (Tex.Ct.App.2001). 11 . Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 10-915 ol the Maryland Code precludes generalized challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence, except for constitutional challenges. Armstead, 342 Md. at 66, 673 A.2d 221. MtDNA evidence has only recently come into general use in the forensic field; therefore, we do not think the legislature contemplated the blanket admission of new types of DNA without the evidence and process from which it is derived being subject to a Frye-Reed inquiry. See State v. Gross, 134 Md.App. 528, 760 A.2d 725 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 12 . MtDNA from an individual can be

    ### Response:
    holding that dna pcr evidence not covered by statute and requiring the evidence be subjected to the inquiry outlined in reed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    job of raising children. Not every injury to a child is caused by a parent’s criminal act. The judgment is reversed and Massey is discharged. Judgment reversed and defendant discharged. SüNDERMANN, P.J., COnCUTS. Hildebrandt, J., concurs in judgment only. 1 . This case is sua sponte removed from the accelerated calendar. 2 . State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541. 3 . Id. 4 . See Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 180. 5 . State v. McGee (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 193, 680 N.E.2d 975, syllabus. 6 . R.C. 2919.22(E)(2)(c); State v. Miley (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 738, 684 N.E.2d 102. 7 . State v. Boone (Aug. 14, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950427, unreported, 1996 WL 454813 (<HOLDING>). 8 . See, e.g., State v. Bennett (July 13,

    ### Response:
    holding that a mothers method of disciplining her sevenyearold child by driving away and leaving him in a kmart parking lot for fifteen minutes did not as a matter of law create a substantial risk to the childs health or safety
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    asserts, however, that a foundational showing must indicate the prior incidents occurred under substantially the same circumstances. Id. Nevertheless, we think Walgreen’s arguments lack merit. Shari was clearly trying to establish a pattern of conduct that showed that Walgreen knew of problems in getting prescriptions properly filled at the pharmacy on Ingersoll, yet did nothing to solve the problem. The challenged evidence was obviously relevant to the punitive-damage issue of willful and wanton conduct on the part of Walgreen. See Cook v. State, 431 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Iowa 1988) (“The probative value of previous accidents rests in the likelihood that the same conditions caused the accident under litigation.”); see also Harco Drugs, Inc. v. Holloway, 669 So.2d 878, 881 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is true that Petersen was not named in all

    ### Response:
    holding that 233 incident reports prepared by defendants employees showing errors in filling prescriptions were relevant to show defendantpharmacists knowledge of problems within its pharmacies and therefore admissible on plaintiffs wantonness claim for punitive damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order within 30 days after its entry, if no appeal has been taken.” Commonwealth v. Klein, 566 Pa. 396, 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (2001) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505). However, the court has “inherent powers to amend its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in the record, even after the lapse of the [thirty day] term.” Id. (citations omitted). Included among these exceptional circumstances to Section 5505’s jurisdictional time limits is where the court sua sponte corrects an illegal sentence originally imposed, even after the defendant has begun serving the original sentence. Commonwealth v. Santone, 757 A.2d 963 (Pa.Super.2000); Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 433 Pa.Super. 111, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (1994) (<HOLDING>). See also In the Interest of K.R.B., 851 A.2d

    ### Response:
    recognizing respective challenges of an illegal patently contradictory or fraudulently procured sentence as excepted from the jurisdictional time limit imposed by section 5505
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Norton. AffiRmed in part and Reversed in part 1 . The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1985. The plaintiffs did not appeal these dismissals; therefore, these claims are not before this court. 2 . Ms. Gleason and Mr. Belcher have since married, and Ms. Gleason has taken her husband’s last name. Because the briefs refer to Ms. Gleason by her maiden name, we also shall refer to her in the same manner throughout this opinion. 3 . We believe the record establishes that, even if some of Deputy Marshal Norton's remarks were directed principally toward Mr. Belcher, Ms. Gleason reasonably could have understood that her freedom of movement also was restricted. See Brendlin v. California, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407-08, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, since the van was titled in her name,

    ### Response:
    holding that a vehicles passenger had been seized and was entitled to challenge the traffic stop
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. (b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property. Fla. Stat. § 812.014(1). In order to establish a violation of section 812.014(1), Almeida must show that Amazon “knowingly obtained or used, or endeavored to obtain or to use,” Almeida’s property with the “felonious intent” to “appropriate the property to [Amazon’s] own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.” Palmer, 106 F.Supp.2d at 1303; see Ames, 942 F.Supp. at 560 (<HOLDING>). That is, “[t]heft is a specific intent crime,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff must show felonious intent to commit theft in order to establish a violation of section 8120141
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights issues should be liberally construed. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 464, 58 L.Ed.2d 431 (1978). 10 . The Eighth Amendment provides that Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. Const, amend. VIII. 11 . See also Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir.1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint alleging that the correctional facility deducted $2,790.00 from an inmate’s account to cover costs of incarceration); Mastrian v. Schoen, 725 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir.1984); Iowa v. Love, 589 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1998); Cumbey v. Oklahoma, 699 P.2d 1094, 1094 (Okla.1985). 12 . See, e.g., Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

    ### Response:
    holding that prisoner copayment plan was not violative of the eighth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and operations of the gas and water distribution systems, but it does not include the construction or installation of the systems. ¶ 49. Kelley was informed that the Department was initiating a new program to compete with private construction contractors for the installation of utility services. Kelley accepted the low bid submitted by the Department after receiving bids from two other private construction contractors. I would find there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Department departed from its stated function of providing utilities, specifically gas and water, to the City of Corinth when it constructed and installed the water lines on Kelley’s property following the bidding process. See Poppenheimer v. Estate of Coyle, 98 So.3d 1059, 1068 (¶ 29) (Miss.2012) (<HOLDING>). Additional discovery will allow the trial

    ### Response:
    holding that despite providing valuable services to its community a volunteer fire department was a private entity and an independent contractor not clothed with immunity under the mtca
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    falls within the category of “any other purpose.” United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 142-144 & n. 2 (4th Cir.2001). Therefore, a district court’s reduction of a term of imprisonment under Rule 35(b) has no impact on the “finality” of a defendant’s “judgment of conviction” and does not alter the “date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final” for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). So far as we can tell, every circuit to have addressed this question agrees with our conclusion. The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that a Rule 35(b) modification does not constitute a new judgment of conviction that restarts § 2255’s statute of limitations clock. See Byers v. United States, 561 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 142-44 & n. 2 (“It is

    ### Response:
    holding that a rule 35b modification does not constitute a final judgment and therefore does not reset the aedpa time clock
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deployed Tasers at sensitive body parts and for unnecessary amounts of time in a fashion intended to cause pain. Defendants cite recent eases granting qualified immunity to officers who used Tasers in which courts held that Taser usage was not “clearly established.” However, the cases cited are distinguishable because, in those cases, the officers were not using Tasers with the purpose of inflicting pain. E.g. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir.2010). The Court finds that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove that Defendants violated clearly established law by maliciously using a Taser as an instrument to inflict harm and corporal punishment. See Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore finds that Defendants

    ### Response:
    holding that an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is not clearly established every time a novel method is used to inflict injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). Minarik argues that he is actually innocent because he was involuntarily intoxicated when he committed the crime. Our task is therefore to look to all of the information currently available concerning a potential “defense of involuntary intoxication,” including that developed in the proceedings since Minarik’s sentencing, to determine whether, more likely than not, no reasonable juror exposed to that information would have convicted him. It is not clear to us that Pennsylvania law would characterize intoxication produced by the voluntary consumption of a prescription drug and alcohol as “involuntary” even if that consumption was without knowledge of a synergistic effect. See Commonwealth v. Todaro, 301 Pa.Super. 1, 446 A.2d 1305 (Pa.Super.1982) (<HOLDING>). Nothing in our analysis turns on this point,

    ### Response:
    holding such intoxication to be voluntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Environ mental Protection and Resource Management.” 10 . As to the facial takings claim, Greenspr-ing's own complaint suggests a third possibility. While the Ordinance apparently precludes it from building the two office buildings (one five stories, one six stories) and garage envisioned in its first site plan, its complaint asserts that it is entitled on the face of Section 2 of the Ordinance to build an eight story office building with garage in the footprint of the current improvements. 11 . Despite the fact that the denial of a Section 2 exemption would constitute a quasi judicial act, the more relaxed standard enunciated in Dolan does not govern the determination of whether Greenspring has been deprived of the economic use of its property. See 512 U.S. at 384-85, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court held that the requirement

    ### Response:
    holding that the city effectuated unconstitutional taking by prohibiting plaintiff from doubling the size of her retail store unless she deeded over a portion of her property to it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (6th Cir.2011); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 535 (6th Cir.2000). The government presented evidence that each image was taken with the same camera as was found on the defendant at the border, was edited with the same software as was on the computers collected from the defendant at the border, and was stored on the computers found on the defendant at the border. It is worth noting in passing that the defendant did not present any evidence contesting ownership of the camera, the image editing software, or the computers, and did not argue that any other individuals had used the camera or the software to take or crop the images at issue. It was not an error for the prosecutor to argue the inference that the defendant had taken and cropped the images. See, e.g., Byrd, 209 F.3d at 535 (<HOLDING>). The defendant did object to the prosecutor’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecutors inference that the shirt sleeve was bloody and involved in the crime because it was missing was not an error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to assist his attorney, the presence of any drug and/or alcohol problems, his mental health history, and his potential for rehabilitation. See id. at 2464, 2467-69. This is not an exhaustive list. Because the Miller decision was so recently decided, there has been no advocacy by the parties regarding individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses. As such, on remand, we anticipate that the trial court will order briefs by the Commonwealth and Knox, and accept briefs from their respective amici, if any, on this issue. As the United States Supreme Court has expressly stated that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders, Whitaker is overruled. See Whitaker, 30 A.3d at 1197-98 (<HOLDING>); supra n. 20. Likewise, to the extent that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted of firstdegree murder is not cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the united states and pennsylvania constitutions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Carlson et al., 1994 WL 83270 (8th Cir. March 16, 1994 (D.Minn)) (finding Witzke’s § 1983 action “meritless” and “frivolous”). Moreover, this court notes that those courts which have addressed the retroactive applicability of § 1915(g) are all in agreement that there is no impermissible retroactive effect by applying the statute to complaints which were filed prior to April 26, 1996, the enactment date of the PLRA See, e.g., Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.1996) (finding that § 1915(g) did not impose new or additional liabilities, and, thus, it could be applied retroactively); Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 420 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that § 1915(g) announces procedural rule and has no retroactive effect); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F.Supp. 1433, 1436 (S.D.Iowa 1996) (<HOLDING>); McCray v. Kralik, 1996 WL 378273 (S.D.N.Y.

    ### Response:
    holding that  1915g does not operate retroactively simply because dismissals entered before the enactment of the plra are considered in applying  1915g
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purchaser” is “[o]ne who buys something for value without notice of another’s claim to the property and without actual or constructive notice of any defects in or infirmities, claims, or equities against the seller’s title; one who has in good faith paid valuable consideration for property without notice of prior adverse claims.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1271 (8th ed.1999). Whether an event is enough to put a purchaser on notice so that a bona fide purchaser “cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee” is determined, the statute tells us by “applicable law,” 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A), which is to say the law of the state where the property is located. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Busenlehner (In re Busenlehner), 918 F.2d 928, 930 (11th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Fid. Fin.

    ### Response:
    holding that state law determines when perfection occurs for purposes of the preference avoidance provision of the bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    42, 48-60, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1988); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). To constitute state action, the deprivation must.be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible. The party charged with the. deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 48-50, 108 S.Ct. at 2255. Merely pursuing foreclosure proceedings under state law does not make Merchants & Farmers Bank a state actor. Earnest v. Lowentritt, 690 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in order to state a claim under

    ### Response:
    holding that the initiation of foreclosure proceedings pursuant to a mortgage implicates no authority of state law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    through a writ of habeas corpus. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1. If the examining judge determines that imprisonment or restraint is illegal, he or she will grant the writ, requiring the prisoner to be released. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-5. Because we accept the well-pleaded facts as true, and view them in the light most favorable to Mr. Jones, we find that the complaint sufficiently alleges that his term of imprisonment was invalidated with the successful granting of a habeas corpus petition by Judge Russell. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Therefore, even if Mr. Jones’ claim is decided in his favor, his allegations do not improperly call into question the validity of his conviction or sentence. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242. See also Morrow, 610 F.3d at 1272 (<HOLDING>). At the very least, Mr. Jones sufficiently

    ### Response:
    holding that a prisoners claim under the ftca based on being imprisoned for an extra ten days did not call into question the conviction or sentence and was not barred by heck
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the record. 6 . The Debtor’s accountant sought leave to withdraw on April 20, 2011; leave was granted on July 27, 2011. 7 . Additionally, the record reflects that 58 days elapsed between the September 6, 2011 filing of the Debtor's motion for extension of time to obtain counsel and its November 3, 2011 denial. Another 19 days passed before the court dismissed the case on November 22, 2011. Thus, the Debtor effectively received 77 out of the 90 days he originally sought, and nonetheless failed to hire an attorney. 8 . But cf. In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (11th Cir.1985) (ruling § 1112(b)’s explicit language and legislative history indicate bankruptcy court without power to dismiss sua sponte); Gusam Rest. Corp. v. Speciner (In re Gusam Rest. Coip.), 737 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Although the bankruptcy court

    ### Response:
    holding bankruptcy court without power to convert sua sponte due to  1112bs party in interest requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy concerns. First, Media Sciences is correct in asserting that the Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in dicta, that it would not hesitate to condemn a tandem of a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law provision that operated “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (emphasis supplied). Following this suggestion, other courts have refused to enforce general releases and arbitration agreements that they have found act to waive or immunize parties from liability for future antitrust violations. See, e.g., Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 324-328, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (<HOLDING>); In re Amer. Express. Merchs.’ Litig., 554

    ### Response:
    holding that a prior settlement of an antitrust conspiracy case and the resulting judgment dismissing the suit with prejudice could not have res judicata effect in a later suit against additional parties in which the plaintiffs alleged claims based on new types of antitrust violations that were not contemplated by the earlier settlement when it would have the effect of conferring on defendants partial immunity from civil liability for distinct future antitrust violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    unambiguous language of the statute,” nor do we “construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221 (2003). The plain meaning of the verb “to modify” is “to change somewhat the form or qualities of; alter partially; amend.” Random House Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 871 (1996). The verb does not connote a change or alteration in a particular direction or of a particular type. Without language creating a restriction, a modification of a sentence, as that phrase is used in CJ section 1 2-302(c)(2)(ii), encompasses an alteration of the sentence, including a reduction. That meaning is evident, and the statutory language is not ambiguous. See Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 444, 903 A.2d 388 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. State Dept. of Assessments &

    ### Response:
    holding that question of ambiguity vel non of statutory language is one of law and therefore is addressed de novo on appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as part of a bargained-for exchange to unilaterally revoke that consent, and we decline to read such a provision into the act. As an initial matter, Reyes is correct that when Congress uses a term, such as “consent,” that has “accumulated [a] settled meaning un der ... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of th[at] term[ ].” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (citation omitted). The text of the TCPA evidences no intent to deviate from common law rules in defining “consent,” and the FCC and other federal appellate courts have applied the common law definition of the term when interpreting the act. See Gager, 727 F.3d at 270; 2015 FCC Ruling at *7961 (<HOLDING>). “Consent,” however, is not always revocable

    ### Response:
    holding that permitting unwanted texts and voice calls is counter  to commonlaw notions of consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an action begun within the prescribed period of limitation and such judgment be afterward arrested or reversed on error or appeal, the plaintiff may begin a new action within one year after such reversal or arrest. Minn.Stat. § 541.18 (1990). This statute, virtually unchanged since its enactment in 1851, is rarely utilized and is not interpreted by any appellate court. Furthermore, no legislative history is available. We start, of course, with the plain language of the statute. Gale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 228 Minn. 345, 37 N.W.2d 711, 714-15 (1949). Indeed, simply because the statute is quite old does not release us from our obligation to give the statute its plain meaning. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 191-92, 104 S.Ct. 584, 590-91, 78 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (“Every law

    ### Response:
    holding that thirtytwoyearold statute must still be given its plain meaning
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claimed that he was “verbally assaulted” by Rodolfo Martinez who was in charge of the place where the equipment was being kept. Meran testified that Rodolfo Martinez gave instructions to his subordinates “to impede at all cost the functioning and movement of the machinery,” id., and that, according to Meran, it was clear that “even with a valid legal order ruling in [his] favor that the equipment is to come back, [IMSA] still couldn’t get the equipment, and [he] questioned how efficient the legal proceedings in Mexico would be for [IMSA].” App. at 141. Ample authority exists for the proposition that such “all-risk” language (as that which exists in the present case) covers conversion. See, e.g., Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 643 F.Supp. 1030, 1036 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Dayco Corp., 620

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a provision insuring against all risks of physical loss or damage from external cause  would provide coverage against conversion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was to prevent the agency from “sitting on” applications ripe for review, whereas here, the application is not ripe for review because it is missing an essential element that is outside the agency’s control. Defendants urge the Court to adopt the reasoning set forth in Walji v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 1747911 (5th Cir.2007) Walji I). In Walji I, the Fifth Circuit held that “when the CIS examination is premature because the mandatory security investigation is not complete, the 120-day time period of [ ] § 1447(b) does not begin to run....” 2007 WL 1747911, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 14450, at *8. However, after Defendants filed their motion, the Fifth Circuit granted Walji’s petition for reheating and reversed its previous opinion. See Walji v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 432, 433 (5th Cir.2007) (Walji II) (<HOLDING>). Even before Walji I was reversed, Defendants

    ### Response:
    holding that the 120day time period begins to run after the agencys initial interview of the applicant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the previous dismissal and retain jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiff had engaged in improper game-playing. Id. The district court declined to do. so, basing its decision upon the absolute right of a plaintiff to dismiss his case before an answer has been filed. Id. However, the court noted that the defendant was not left without recourse. The proper course of action was for it to remove the new case and argue that the real amount in controversy was higher than the amount alleged. Id. at *2. Though it did not explicitly state so, the district court apparently felt that the amount claimed in the prior complaint could serve as evidence of the “real amount in controversy” in the subsequently filed claim. See also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 288-89, 58 S.Ct. 586 (<HOLDING>). There is some indication that the plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff cannot defeat federal jurisdiction by reducing his claim for damages after removal because the amount in controversy is determined by looking at the complaint when filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was not entitled to any part of the condemnation proceeds. The parties’ lease provides: The parties hereto agree that if the leased premise, or any part thereof, shall be taken or appropriated for public use by any public or quasi-public authority during the term of this lease, that this lease shall terminate as of the date of such appropriation and all condemnation proceeds shall be the sole property of [landlord]; * * *. Korengold considered a similar clause and recognized that [w]ith this type of clause, at least in the absence of a contrary state rule, the tenant has no right which persists beyond the taking and can be entitled to nothing. Korengold, 254 Minn, at 363, 95 N.W.2d at 115-16; see also In re Matter of Minneapolis Cmty Dev. Agency 417 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24,1988). But

    ### Response:
    recognizing when a lease terminates upon condemnation tenant is entitled to no compensation for loss of leasehold interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the harasser and the harassee can shed light on such relevant questions as whether the complained-of conduct was unwelcome”). The second line of cases are those in which the plaintiff adequately indicated the harassment was unwelcome. Sometimes the plaintiff has satisfied this element by-showing she explicitly rebuffed the, bad actor’s propositions or told the harasser she found the conduct offensive. See, e.g., Williams v. Herron, 687 F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2012) (deciding the plaintiff “adequately communicated” the conduct was unwelcome where she twice told the harasser it made her-“uncomfortable”). Other times ""the plaintiff has reported the"" conduct to someone with the authority to address the problem. See, e.g., Beach v. Yellow Freight Sys., 312 F.3d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). We have also found it relevant when the bad

    ### Response:
    holding evidence was sufficient where the plaintiff repeatedly complained to management
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    governments are held to the strict liability standard in the same manner as any other potentially responsible party. However, if the Government has acquired ownership or control of the facility involuntarily, as a result of its sovereign function, or the entity was responding to an emergency caused by the release of hazardous substances from a facility owned by another party, the State or local government is only liable for gross negligence or willful misconduct. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2); see Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1198. In order to establish that a Government entity is subject to strict liability as an operator, a plaintiff must show some nexus to the site other than its statutory obligation to respond to an emergency. See Stilloe v. Almy Bros., Inc., 782 F.Supp. 731, 736 (N.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>). Mere regulatory oversight by the Government

    ### Response:
    holding that the state was not liable as an operator for responding to a site to conduct cleanup activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the telephone call from his neighbor, alerting him to his family’s situation, and wh „n he had returned home subsequent to receiving the telephone call. This Court has held that testimony is “too vague” only if it does not identify facts corresponding to each of the elements on which the applicant has the burden of proof. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 829 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2003). Furthermore, where an applicant gives “spare” testimony, the fact-finder “may wish to probe for incidental details, seeking to draw out inconsistencies that would support a finding of lack of credibility.” Id. at 152. Without so probing, the fact-finder may risk failing to create a record that can support an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Although Chen was unable to recall the exact

    ### Response:
    holding that the record did not support the agencys adverse credibility finding in the absence of additional probing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of particularized injury in fact that standing requires. Baird, 266 F.3d at 411. And \ve held that the legislators could not show a Coleman-like vote-nullification injury because their votes “would not have been sufficient to defeat either the concurrent resolution ... or legislation to similar effect.” Id. at 412. In such circumstances, legislators’ remedy lies not with the courts but with the legislative process, for, as the Supreme Court noted in Raines, the legislature could simply “vote to repeal” offending legislation. 521 U.S. at 824, 117 S.Ct. 2312. Actual or imminent. Standing can derive from an imminent, rather than an actual, injury, but only when “the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In a pre-enforcement challenge to a federal

    ### Response:
    holding candidate for house of representatives had standing to challenge election regulation exempting opponents of selffinancing candidates from certain campaigncontribution limits where plaintiff candidate had declared his candidacy and was demonstrably a selffinancing candidate whose opponents would imminently receive expanded access to campaign funding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the reckless or negligent exertion of force [in this prong would make] the 'otherwise' clause ... redundant.” Id. at 373-374 (footnote omitted). In other words, according to the court, the structure of the statute supports the conclusion: ""The first prong discusses intentional acts, while the second prong discusses acts with a mental state of less than intent.” Id. at 373. 9 . As noted above, the phrase ""crime of violence” is used frequently with varying definitions. See note 6 supra. The § 4B 1.2(a) definition is, however, worded the same as the ACCA definition of ""violent felony” and therefore provides a useful comparison. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)(B) with Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2002); see also United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir.1995)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 330, 334

    ### Response:
    holding that the definition of a violent felony  is nearly identical to the definitions of a crime of violence used in the guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. We address the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in this dispute between the nursing home owner/operators and the estate of a deceased resident of the nursing home. Because the agreement contains an unenforceable' cap oh damages that goes to the “financial heart” of the agreement, we conclude that the entire agreement ""is unenforceable and reverse. See Gessa v. Manor Care of Fla., 86 So.3d 484, 490-91 (Fla.2011) (<HOLDING>). The arbitration contract in this case

    ### Response:
    holding that limitation of liability provisions in arbitration agreement included in nursing homes admissions documents violated public policy and were not severable because they constituted financial heart of arbitration agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reactions and actions taken in response to an alleged threat are relevant to the determination of whether a statement is a ‘true threat.’ ”). While the victim’s subjective view is not controlling, it is assuredly relevant. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Amy to explain why certain of the appellant’s words and deeds frightened her. There is one loose end. The appellant argues that an FBI agent should not have been permitted to opine that a bag found in the appellant’s house, which contained among other things a knife, rubber gloves, and duct tape, was a “murder kit.” This was not a lay opinion at all: the agent had 10 years of law-enforcement experience and was trained in forensics. See United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We need not belabor the point. The only

    ### Response:
    holding that dea agents experience in combating drug trafficking qualified him to opine on the meaning of a coded telephone conversation between suspected dealers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constrain exercise of the water court’s retained jurisdiction. 2. Precluding and Remedying Injury The General Assembly has provided that all augmentation plan decrees include a retained jurisdiction period necessary or desirable to preclude and remedy injury and that the water court should extend retained jurisdiction until such time as non-injury is conclusively proved. § 37-92-304(6). “Preclude” means “to prevent or hinder by necessary consequence or implication,” and is synonymous with “to hinder or stop (something that may occur) or ... to stop (someone about to act, or someone’s action).” Webster’s Third Neiv International Dictionary 1785, 1798 (2002). The General Assembly’s use of the word “preclude” makes clear its intent that retained jurisdiction be invoked to prevent anti 359 (<HOLDING>). Likewise, our holding accords with our

    ### Response:
    holding that the retained jurisdiction period runs from the time the water court enters its decision and not upon full operation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed September 19, 2013 (Doc. 85)(“PFRD”), which recommends denying: (i) Plaintiff Francisco S. Archuleta’s Pro Se Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint Pursuant To Rule 15(a)(2) F.R.C.P., filed September 6, 2012 (Doc. 68)(“First Motion for Leave”); and (ii) Francis S. Archuleta’s Pro Se Motion for Leave to File Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, filed November 8, 2012 (Doc. 76)(“Second Motion for Leave”). The time for filing objections expired October 7, 2013. No party has filed objections. Pursuant to the Tenth Circuit’s firm waiver rule, the failure to object to the PFRD precludes any appellate review of factual and legal questions related to the PFRD. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed Judge

    ### Response:
    holding that under the firm waiver rule a partys failure to timely object to the proposed findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions internal quotation  marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CFTC v. King, No. 3:06-CV-1583-M, 2007 WL 1321762, at *2 (N.D.Tex. May 7, 2007) (“[Defendant’s] violation of section 4b(a)(2)(i), (iii) of the CEA is further proven by his admitted misappropriation of customer funds for personal and professional use.”); CFTC v. Weinberg, 287 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1106 (C.D.Cal.2003) (misappropriating investors’ funds violated Section 4b(a)(2)(i) and (iii) of the Act); CFTC ex rel Kelley v. McLaunn, [1994-1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,768 at 44, 180, 1996 WL 385334 (N.D.Ill.1996) (by depositing customer funds in accounts in which the customers had no ownership interest and making unauthorized disbursements for his own use, defendant violated Section 4b of the Act); see also CFTC v. Skorupskas, 605 F.Supp. 923, 932 (E.D.Mich.1985) (<HOLDING>). b. Fraud by Issuing False Written Statements

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    defending the declaratory judgment action because CU breach its duty to defend. See Glens Falls Insurance Co v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 41 A.D.2d 869, 870, 342 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (3d Dept.1973). An award of attorneys’ fees in this situation is directly attributable to and represents consequential damages for the insurer’s breach of its duty to defend. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Misc.2d 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1984); Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232 (3d Dept.1974). IFF was wholly successful on its claim that CU breached its duty to defend, and thus there is no basis on which to reduce its fees. Cf. American Home Assurance Co. v. Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc., 103 Misc.2d 733, 426 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The attached addendum shows the breakdown

    ### Response:
    holding on summary judgment before the question of the insurers obligation to indemnify was decided that the insurer was liable for the costs of the insured in defending the declaratory judgment action because it breached its duty to defend
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doing so while driving a car from which his identity might easily be traced, the informant was in a position to be held accountable for his intervention.” In addition to having an even stronger basis than in Marben for thinking the informant credible, the officer had information as solid as that in Marben for thinking that the informant had obtained her information in a reliable way. Clearly, either the informant or the driver had seen the car in question drive through the red light. Under the circumstances, we conclude, as we did in Marben, that the officer was as justified in stopping the car to investigate the violation as if he himself has seen the violation. Reversed and judgment of conviction reinstated. 1 . Cf., State v. Lindquist, 295 Minn. 398, 400, 205 N.W.2d 333, 335 (1973) (<HOLDING>); State v. Williams, 638 S.W.2d 417, 420

    ### Response:
    holding that police were justified in arresting person on basis of information provided directly to police by named citizen informer reliance on the information was justified in part because the informant by giving her name presumably knew that the police could arrest her for making a false report
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (stating that majority rule is that an automatic termination clause forecloses a lessee from recovering for the value of his unexpired leasehold estate); 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.02[6][h];-5.02[6][j] (recognizing that month-to-month tenant and/or a tenant-at-will have no property interest that would entitle the tenant to compensation); 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 232 (2011) (recognizing that a mere tenant at will, at sufferance, or from month-to-month is generally not entitled to compensation for the taking of his or her interest). 10 . A tenant has a claim for permanent fixtures or improvements integrated into a building to the extent that the fixtures or improvements have an enhancing effect upon the market or rental value of the premises. 2 N / , 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Of course, the ""unified” offer

    ### Response:
    holding that offer of judgment made to fee owner under statutes and rules no longer applicable did not cut off fee owners right to fees because offer did not state it was being made free and clear of the tenants claims and because in any event condemning authority had made substantial changes to the construction plans and design which decreased the scope of the taking thereby reducing the amount awarded to landowner at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an organization has a legally recognized, distinct identity from that of the organization, putting the lawyer in an agency relationship “sufficiently independent to ensure effective prosecution of claims, thus justifying fees.” Baker, 473 F.3d at 325 (citing Kay, 499 U.S. at 436 n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1435). The distinction between organizations and individuals is all the more pronounced in the context of a corporation: indeed, it is well settled that “a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993) (em its associated with the separation between a company’s rights and their own. See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued June 18,

    ### Response:
    holding that fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination is a purely personal one that cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization such as a corporation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an important mitigating factor that the jury did not have an opportunity to consider. The testimony by Frierson’s parents did not begin to describe the magnitude of Frierson’s problem with drugs. 13 . We also note that ""overwhelming evidence of guilt does not ameliorate the failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.” Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227. 14 . In 1972, White and Frierson were both charged with first degree murder for the death of Douglas Green. The juvenile court sustained the petition against Frierson and acquitted White of that charge. Fourteen years later, in October 1986, White allegedly confessed to killing Green during an interview with Lieman and defense investigator Ingwer-sen. 15 . See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336, 1343 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that jeopardy attaches in juvenile adjudication that determines whether juvenile violated criminal law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Islands concedes that the district court erred in its determination to consider the petition as a section 2255 motion. The jurisdictional authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is limited to challenges to the legality of a sentence and does not encompass the power to entertain a claim of wrongful revocation of pa role. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 187, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2241, 60 L.Ed. 2d 805 (1979) (section 2255 challenges the lawfulness of the sentence, not the lawfulness of the actions of the parole commission); United States v. Ferri, 686 F.2d 147 (3d Cir.1982) (challenge to constitutionality of Parole Commission’s action does not fall under section 2255), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1205, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983); Musto v. United States, 571 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. United States Board of Parole, 557

    ### Response:
    recognizing danger of expanding section 2255 jurisdiction to allow for review of individual parole decisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As explained below, there is substantial doctrinal confusion regarding the scope of the allegations that an employment discrimination plaintiff may raise for the first time in court. Here, however, the Court will not attempt to resolve that confusion, because it concludes that the majority of Hyson’s allegations are unexhausted regardless of which standard is applied. A. Administrative Exhaustion of Claims Before the Office of Compliance As described above, the CAA requires that employees follow the counseling and mediation procedures prescribed therein before bringing a CAA claim in federal court. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1404, 1408. These exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional in nature. Id. §§ 1408, 1410; Blackmon-Malloy v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 575 F.3d 699, 705-06 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). This Court thus lacks jurisdiction over any

    ### Response:
    holding that the caas counseling and mediation requirements deprive the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction over nonexhausted claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court for the District of New Jersey. The Funds sought to have Satnick produce the records at issue so that the Funds could verify whether Satnick was delinquent in its contributions. In February of 1996, Satnick and the plaintiffs entered into a Stipulation allowing the plaintiffs to audit Satnick’s books and records. According to the plaintiffs, both parties reserved the right to argue later whether Satniek’s refusal to produce its records affected the statute of limitations in a subsequent delinquency action. The audit was conducted between April 22, 1996 and May 3, 1996. At the conclusion, plaintiffs advised Satnick that it was delinquent in the amount of $242,011.93 — $157,-669.89, plus interest of $84,342.04. On June 3, 1996, the plaintiffs then brought this a 7 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) The plaintiffs filed this action to recover

    ### Response:
    holding tolling inappropriate where employer supplied plaintiff with figures which would have revealed deficiency to reasonably diligent agent for trustees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    23.5% of the American population, a decrease from 45% in 1960. United States Census Bureau, (2000). Profile of General Characteristics for the United States. Some read this as a decline in the family tradition rather than an expansion of the definition. Nonetheless, there is no legislative history or case law showing the intent of and/or interpreting the Artificial Insemination Act within the context of a family headed by a same-gender couple. The Legislature, however, has established public policy on the thematic analysis to be given matters pertaining to children. In custody disputes, judicial determinations will rest upon an amalgam of considerations all considered “in the best interest of the child.” N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. See also Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 696 A.2d 556 (1997) (<HOLDING>) In the normal course, children do not appear

    ### Response:
    holding that the primary and overarching consideration in custody determination is the best interest of the child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    writ procedure to circumvent established appellate rules.” J.C., 847 So.2d at 492. Moreover, to allow the use of prohibition in the instant case would, in my view, completely vitiate the limitations placed upon use of the writ and convert it from an extraordinary writ to a commonly used method to appeal any erroneous order. ORFINGER, J., dissenting. Because I believe that allowing further consideration of Ambroise’s untimely petition for an administrative hearing would be in excess of the Commission’s jurisdiction, I believe we should consider this matter as a petition for writ of prohibition and preclude the Commission from taking any further action on Ambroise’s petition. See, e.g. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Career Serv. Comm’n, 448 So.2d 18, 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (<HOLDING>). As a result, I respectfully dissent. Himrod

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts have power to issue writs of prohibition to administrative agencies to prevent them from exceeding their jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court turns to the expenses re-quested. Pikco requested $385.00 in ex-penses, which are included as a separate category in the fee itemization. Adv. Dkt. No. 20-1 at 5. Staten did not challenge the claimed expenses in her objection, and the Court finds the expenses listed are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court finds that Pik-co is entitled to ■ the full amount of ex-penses requested. IV. Conclusion Having considered the Mississippi Rule 1.5 factors and the lodestar amount, the Court finds that Pikco"" is entitled to collect $1,270.00 in attorney’s fees and $385.00 in expenses for a total award of $1,655.00. This amount shall be added to the debt Staten owes Pikco, which the parties previ-ously agreed to be nondischargeable in the amount of $1,347.90. See In re Jordan, 927 F.2d at 226-28 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the total non-dischargeable debt

    ### Response:
    holding that where party has contracted to pay attorneys fees for collection of nondischargeable debt attorneys fee award also will not be discharged in bankruptcy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    either by intervention in the employee’s suit, by suit against the tortfeasor within the statutory terms, or by a claim against the recovery; but the subrogation lien is lost against the third party if there is no suit or intervention in the employee’s suit, and the subrogation lien may only be asserted against the recovery in the hands of the employee after he has been made whole.”). 14 See Anthem Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. at 782 (2) (“In either case, the insurer’s right of action against a third party is derivative of the injured employee’s claim; the insurer has no right to pursue its own independent action against the third party.” (punctuation omitted)); accord Canal Ins. Co., 256 Ga. App. at 868 (1). Cf. Janet Parker, Inc. v. Floyd, 269 Ga. App. 59, 59-62 (603 SE2d 485) (2004) (<HOLDING>). 15 Cf. Anthem Cas. Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. at

    ### Response:
    holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga  349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    parties in the instant case had a seventeen-year business relationship during which Rowlette served as the exclusive sales representative for Calphalon in a five-state area, the majority summarily concludes that such a relationship is not a “continuing business relationship” within the meaning of Burger King and that the contacts created by this series of agreements are merely “fortuitous.” The majority entirely dismisses the duration of the relationship, stating only that the “quality” of the relationship, not the “quantity” is controlling. The majority then declares that the “quality” of the relationship has only a fortuitous relationship with Ohio, citing the wholly inapposite and distinguishable cases of Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), and International Technologies Consultants,

    ### Response:
    holding that a contract governing a onetime sale and purchase of a product negotiated by fax and phone is insufficient to establish minimum contacts where delivery actually occurred in another state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prisoner] like everyone else ... and that [the prisoner] was ‘not O.J. Simpson or Johnnie Cochran.’ ” Id. at 1083. The court reasoned that the foregoing state ments were “racially tinged” and, therefore, sufficient to “convince a reasonable trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision not to allow live witness testimony was racially motivated.” Id. Buck’s alleged statement is far more “racially tinged” than those at issue in Serrano. It is direct evidence of racial hostility and, taken together with circumstantial evidence that EFM was treated less favorably than other groups, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to Buck’s motives. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082-83; cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, -, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 2154, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530

    ### Response:
    holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in her brief that the PCC proceedings had caused her concern for her family’s “emotional and financial security,” we conclude that the record sufficiently demonstrates that Judge Coffey was complicit in a fraudulent transfer. See Estes v. Titus, 731 N.W.2d 119, 130-34 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a judgment creditor had a valid claim under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act where the judgment debtor had, prior to conclusion of the underlying case, entered into a consent divorce that transferred all of his assets to his former wife, thus making him insolvent), appeal granted, 731 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 2007). By participating in the fraudulent conveyances, Judge Coffey contravened the public policies embodied in RSA 545-A:4, see Matter of Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 122 (N. J. 1993) (<HOLDING>); Sup. Ct. R. 38, Canon 2 (“A judge shall

    ### Response:
    holding that a judges infringement of an important public policy is grounds for aggravation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arguments compelling, and at this preliminary injunction stage, it shows an increased likelihood they will ultimately prevail on the merits. Likely, the Fifth Circuit, and eventually the United States Supreme Court, will weigh in on this issue with clear instructions. For now, the Court finds it is not necessary to apply heightened scrutiny to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim since Texas’ ban on same-sex marriage fails even under the most deferential rational basis level of review. (b) Section 32 fails equal protection challenge even under rational basis review To survive a rational basis review, Section 32 must bear at least some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620; see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (<HOLDING>); Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, 113 S.Ct. 2637

    ### Response:
    holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    various classes of railroad tracks side analyzing the audible warning devices regulation, the principles governing preemption are similar. The regulation at issue clearly prescribes minimum decibel levels for trains which are designed to alert drivers and the public that the train is advancing through an intersection. The fact that the regulation sets a minimum level but does not specify maximum levels does not alter the applicability of the preemption provision in the FRSA. The regulation at issue, 49 C.F.R. § 229.129, clearly “covers” the subject matter of plaintiffs negligence claims since the regulation deals specifically with the “sound-producing capacity” of audible warning devices. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Utility Comm. of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In setting the minimum level, the FRA

    ### Response:
    holding that section 229 regulates the soundproducing capacity of train whistles as distinguished from their use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would, if true, show that the experience profoundly affected her and made her future impartiality reasonably suspect. The source of this prejudice is personal and unrelated to petitioner’s case and trial counsel’s conduct therein. See, e.g., Lamendola v. Grossman, 439 So.2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Though we previously concluded that any hostility arising from the events of the judicial nominating process did not warrant disqualification, the judge allegedly opened the door and displayed the depth of such hostility by failing to remain silent despite the passage of time. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a reasonably prudent person would be in fear of not receiving fair and impartial judicial review of the pending matters. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the petition for writ of

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as required by the third prong of the test in Williams. We conclude the trial court did not erroneously admonish appellant; his plea therefore could not be involuntary on that basis. We overrule appellant’s first issue for review. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL In his second issue, appellant claims his plea was involuntary due to erroneous ad vice from trial counsel that he was eligible for deferred adjudication community supervision when he was in fact not eligible. Appellant believes such error amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ the standard of review set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). To reverse a conviction based on ineffective

    ### Response:
    holding strickland two prong test applies to ineffective assistance claims throughout trial including punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and indemnification claims that were brought after the resolution of the underlying litigation. See e.g. Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808 (3d Cir.1994) (action against insured for bad faith failure to indemnify or defend); First Fid. Bancorporation v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 1990 WL 165937 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 25, 1990) (addressing insured’s failure to consent to settlement and indemnification liability after final settlement of underlying litigation was approved and funds were deposited in escrow). Other cases involve claims in which it is clear as a matter of law, that the claims asserted in the complaint fall within an exclusion under the policy and there are no factual disputes. See e.g. First Oak Brook Corp. Syndicate v. Comly Holding Corp., 93 F.3d 92 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. Haver, 555 Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding that claims were clearly excluded from coverage under assault and battery exclusion and therefore insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. State, 385 So.2d 1378, 1382-83 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980). A university owes student tenants the same duty to exercise due care for their protection as a private landowner owes its tenants. See Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 36 Cal.3d 799, 205 Cal.Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal.1984). We emphasize that a university is not an insurer of the safety of its students. Nonetheless, university has a duty of reasonable care to protect a student against certain dangers, including criminal actions against a student by another student or a third party if the criminal act is reasonably foreseeable and within the university’s control. Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 253 Kan. 567, 861 P.2d 768, 780 (1993); see also Sharkey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 260 Neb. 166, 615 N.W.2d 889, 902 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. N.C. Wesleyan Coll., Inc., 65

    ### Response:
    holding the university owes a landownerinvitee duty to its students to take reasonable steps to protect against foreseeable acts of violence on its campus and the harm that naturally flows therefrom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim against him.” Nilon Bros. Enterprises v. Lucente, 315 Pa.Super. 343, 461 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1983). Unlike the application of the statute of limitations, exercise of the doctrine of laches does not depend on a mechanical passage of time. Indeed, the doctrine of laches may bar a suit in equity where a comparable suit at law would not be barred by an analogous statute of limitations. Moreover, [t]he party asserting laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from the lapse of time. Such evidence may include establishing that a witness has died or become unavailable, that substant 7 A.2d 763, 768 (1993), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 671, 649 A.2d 673 (1994) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, in cases where a co-executor’s

    ### Response:
    holding estate was bound by single coadministrators execution of agreement releasing doctors and hospital from liability for accident that killed decedent in exchange for cash settlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    out to pin the crime on someone who, by his own account, had absolutely nothing to do with it. Applying the second prong of the Gaither test, we think that the issue which Ms. Bradford was ready to address — an admission by Armstrong that he was the man who shot the victims — goes to the central issue in the case. By all accounts, only one man did the shooting. Any admission by Armstrong that he was that man made it less likely that Ford did it. “[The] principle which states that an average person will not acknowledge the existence of a fact that is counter to his interest unless he knows it to be true [applies], as a matter of logic, [to] declarations against penal interest ... as well as [to] ... statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest.” Laumer, supra, 409 A.2d at 196 (<HOLDING>). There was, however, substantial other

    ### Response:
    holding declarations against penal interest admissible where certain conditions are met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995); State v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339, 345, 835 P.2d 251 (1992). ¶15 In analyzing the asserted constitutional interest, we do not assume the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude. Scott, 110 Wn.2d at 687. We look to the asserted claim and assess whether, if correct, it implicates a constitutional interest as compared to another form of trial error. See id. at 689-91. In instances where the allegation is that the defendant’s due process rights were violated because he or she was denied a fair trial, the court will look at the defendant’s allegation of a constitutional violation, and the facts alleged by the defendant, to determine whether, if true, the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial has been violated. See id. (<HOLDING>). ¶16 After determining the error is of

    ### Response:
    holding because nothing in the constitution requires the meaning of particular terms in a jury instruction to be specifically defined the defendants unpreserved claim regarding the jury instructions did not constitute constitutional error and thus was not properly preserved for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the original recording. Those copies were then forwarded to the attorneys preparing for the Civil Service hearing. Moreover, while the record reveals that Fitzgerald directed Cahill to make the tape recording, there is absolutely nothing in the record that indicates that Fitzgerald requested that the tape be altered or supervised Cahill in making the tape. The record contains no evidence that Healy, Gardner, Ellis or Gelinas had anything to do with the tape or with supervising Cahill. Moreover, Cignetti’s allegation that Fitzgerald referred to him as a “complainer” and a “malcontent” is insufficient to support an inference that Fitzgerald authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the falsification of evidence. See Alioto v. City of Shively, 835 F.2d 1173, 1175 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the record contains no evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that supervisory liability under  1983 requires a showing that the supervisory official at least implicitly authorized or approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1996)). “Courts will not entertain such cases because it is not the responsibility of courts to decide abstract propositions of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Conversely, when a court’s determination can have a practical effect on a controversy, the court may not dismiss the case as moot.” Id. In determining whether plaintiffs’ claims may be considered moot, we are bound by Goldston. Because we hold that plaintiffs have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment regarding the Board’s authority to establish year-round schools and to assign students to those schools on a mandatory basis, the fact that individual plaintiffs have been reassigned does not address the unsettled controversy concerning the Board’s authority. See Goldston, 361 N.C. at 34-35, 637 S.E.2d at 882 (<HOLDING>). Stated differently, the plaintiffs’

    ### Response:
    holding declaratory judgment remains an appropriate remedy despite plaintiffs abandoning their claim to compel return of the challenged assets because if plaintiffs ultimately prevail their point is made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    were agencies or in-strumentalities of FARC. In fact, the Partnerships presented evidence of their ownership, presumably under the incorrect understanding that § 1603(b) would control for TRIA § 201. As discussed above regarding the writs of garnishment, the court properly found that evidence immaterial to the agency or instrumentality allegation. The Partnerships also argue that there was not a sufficient evidentiary basis for the agency or instrumentality determination. This argument is unavailing. The evidence Plaintiffs presented to the district court was sufficient to establish the required relationship between FARC and the Partnerships, even if that relationship was indirect. Cf. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932, 940-41 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court therefore did not clearly

    ### Response:
    holding that an entity majorityowned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is itself an agency or instrumentality of that foreign state under the fsia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property. He claims that the words “hold as trustee” establish an express trust, that all partners are trustees for the rest of the partnership, and that a partner is therefore a fiduciary within the meaning of the act. However, under this statute, the trust arises only when the partner derives profits without consent of the partnership; it is the sort of trust ex maleficio not included within the purview of § 523(a)(4). See Davis, 293 U.S. at 333, 55 S.Ct. at 153-54; Teichman v. Teichman (In re Teichman), 774 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.1985). But see Holmes v. Kraus (in re Kraus), 37 B.R. 126, 130 (Bkcy E.D.Mich.1984) (<HOLDING>). California courts, however, have raised the

    ### Response:
    holding that partners are fiduciaries for the purpose of  523a4 relying on michigan statute with identical language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to state law does not violate the Bankruptcy Clause); e law. “In the absence of a controlling federal rule, we generally assume that Congress has ‘left the determination of property rights in assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law,’ since such ‘property interests are created and defined by state law.’ ” Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 2110, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993) (quoting Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54-55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)). The definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(B) includes manufactured and mobile homes, but is silent as to whether manufactured and mobile homes are real or personal property. Therefore, we look to the applicable state law to determine whether the debtors’ propert 2008)

    ### Response:
    holding that the addition of a definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa did not change the scope of the 11 usc  1322b antimodification provision and  1322b remains applicable only to real property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the offense of conviction, the conviction cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate. Holloway, 630 F.3d at 257. An offense qualifies under ACCA’s residual clause if the offense poses a risk “comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated offenses.” Sykes v. United States, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2273, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011). In this case, Defendant has pleaded guilty to three violent felonies under Massachusetts law, two of which have been held by the First Circuit to qualify categorically as violent felonies, and a third which clearly would qualify based on the holdings of the Commonwealth’s courts. Defendant pleaded guilty to larceny from the person in 1989, which qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA. See United States v. Rodriguez, 659 F.3d 117, 119 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In 1990, Defendant pleaded guilty to assault

    ### Response:
    holding that a massachusetts conviction of larceny from the person qualifies as a violent felony because the potential for confrontation and physical injury invariably exists
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a party may not “evade the expert witness disclosure requirements ... by simply calling an expert witness in the guise of a layperson.” Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note. The government did not attempt to qualify Mr. Smith as an expert. Nonetheless, Mr. Smith, in opining that CRTs become waste when they are removed from their housing and used to make another monitor, relied upon technical and specialized knowledge he garnered while monitoring the Department’s Universal Waste Program, ensuring compliance with hazardous waste regulations, and assisting the •Department’s oversight of electronic devices and components. This opinion was improper expert testimony offered in the guise of lay testimony. See United States v. Banks, 262 Fed.Appx. 900, 905-08 (10th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 399-404

    ### Response:
    holding that a police officers opinion that a defendant was most definitely engaged in drug dealing was not proper lay testimony because it was based on the officers specialized training in narcotics and extensive experience in methamphetamine cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this apportionment. In support of its claim, Philadelphia Indemnity cites three cases, all of which are inapplicable because they involve the question of apportionment between negligent parties and criminals who are deemed intentional tortfeasors. See Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232 (Fla.1997); Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDonald, 705 So.2d 560 (Fla.1997); Slawson v. Fast Food Enters., 671 So.2d 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In these cases, this Court and the Florida Supreme Court clarified that, when a negligence claim involves an intentional tort, the intentional tortfeasor should not be listed on the verdict form. In particular, the courts stressed that liability should not be apportioned between a negligent party and a criminal. See Stellas, 702 So.2d at 233-34 (<HOLDING>); Merrill Crossings, 705 So.2d at 562-63 (same

    ### Response:
    holding that attacker who smashed car window and stole purse should not be listed on verdict form
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to protect quasi-sovereign interests.” (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Of these three standing capacities, it is clear that a state suing under Title VII can only invoke standing under the doctrine of parens patriae. The other two forms of standing have no relation to employment discrimination. This is clearly the case with 982) (finding white woman who had been deprived of interracial associations in workplace a “person aggrieved” within meaning of Title VII); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir.1980) (finding that the language, design, and purposes of Title VII require that the phrase ‘a person claiming to be aggrieved’ be construed to provide standing coextensive with Article III.); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 451-54 (6th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469

    ### Response:
    holding that white female had standing under title vii to challenge her employees alleged racial discrimination against blacks
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    4(a). See Fed.R.Bank.P. 8002 Advisory Committee Notes. Accordingly, we cannot construe Williams’s late notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time due to excusable neglect. See Deyhimy v. Rupp (In re Herwit), 970 F.2d 709, 710 (10th Cir.1992) (concluding that district court lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal from judgment of bankruptcy court where appellant filed notice of appeal eleven days after bankruptcy court entered judgment and did not file a motion for extension of time within the initial ten-day period or within the twenty days after the first ten-day period alleging that her failure to file a notice of appeal within the initial ten days was due to excusable neglect); see also Walker v. Bank of Cadiz (In re LBL Sports Ctr., Inc.), 684 F.2d 410, 412 (6th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). “The Supreme Court has emphasized that the

    ### Response:
    holding that district court erred in passing upon defendants claim of excusable neglect where defendant never requested an extension of time from the bankruptcy judge but only opposed plaintiffs motion to dismiss by alleging in oral argument before the district court facts which were claimed to establish excusable neglect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a party to the reorganization proceedings in federal court, although not “formally named” as such, by “participating” and being “actively involved in the reorganization proceedings.” 742 F.2d 862, 867-68, 870 (5th Cir.1984). On that basis, because he had been a party to the earlier reorganization proceeding, we held that he was barred by res judicata from challenging the transfer of the company’s real property to its former lender as part of the Chapter 10 reorganization in a later state court action (arising from the same conduct) he brought against the former lender and new owner of the company’s real estate holdings. Id. at 870. The present case is similar in principle: Ríes, on behalf of the estate, actively pursued the sanctions against Paige by filing with the bankruptcy co 002) (<HOLDING>); In re Baudoin, 981 F.2d at 742 (“[o]rder

    ### Response:
    holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    seems to be that he “abandon[ed] the company in the middle of its problems with Lovejoy.” See note 25, supra. But there was nothing in the limited liability company agreement — or, for that matter, any other agreement — that obligated Glenn to continue serving as Mii’s employee, as opposed to its member (a role that, as just discussed, did not come with any obligations to render services to the company). Nor did the limited liability company agreement obligate Glenn to continue serving as Mii’s manager. See Part II. A.1, supra. Thus, the only provision of the limited liability agreement that Glenn violated by withdrawing was the prohibition on voluntary withdrawal itself, and Alan has not identified any damages that followed from that withdrawal. Cf. Federalpha Steel, 368 B.R. at 690 (<HOLDING>). Glenn is therefore entitled to summary

    ### Response:
    recognizing claim for wrongful dissociation based on members ceasing participation in the llcs management and ceasing honoring its duties and obligations under the llc agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court relied, too, on Wener v. Wener, 35 A.D.2d 50, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (1970), in which the court held that a husband who impliedly agreed to support the child was obligated to provide sup of equitable adoption to impose a child support obligation. See, e.g., Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105-08; Geramifar v. Geramifar, 113 Md.App. 495, 688 A.2d 475, 478-79 (Spec.App.1997) (stating that the case was a “textbook example of an equitable adoption” in which neither adoptive parent was plication of the equitable adoption doctrine beyond its intended scope. We are unpersuaded that the doctrine should be expanded to child support under these circumstances. We are also unpersuaded that Bowdoin has any standing to assert the doctrine for his own benefit. Even were the doctri M. 206, 959 P.2d 540 (<HOLDING>). {33} We note that, in applying equitable

    ### Response:
    holding biological father responsible under uniform parentage act for back child support notwithstanding stepparents support of child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stated that motions to amend pleadings “shall be due on or before July 16, 2001.” On July 16, 2001, an attorney appearance was filed by new counsel for the plaintiff along with the plaintiffs motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Further, the defendant filed a motion to enlarge the time period for discovery in the case on November 27, 2001. The plaintiffs motion for leave to file an amended complaint is presently before the court. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the plaintiffs motion. III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Amend Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend a complaint “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (<HOLDING>). A motion for leave to amend should not be

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff should be allowed to vacate a judgment and amend the complaint to proceed under a new legal theory
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acknowledged his existing attorney-client relationship with Coleman, Coleman’s friendship with Johnson’s alleged victim, and Coleman’s likely adverse testimony. At trial, Garrett would have found himself in an intractable dilemma: either he could vigorously cross-examine Coleman in an effort to discredit Coleman’s sworn testimony, or he could weaken the intensity of cross-examination (perhaps even abandon the effort altogether) out of a desire to protect Coleman. Exercising the kind of experienced instinct and judgment Wheat commends, the trial court understandably concluded a serious potential (if not an outright actual) conflict of interest infected Garrett’s continued representation of Johnson. See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 11.9(a), at 652 (2d ed.1999) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing a potential conflict when defense counsel is currently representing in another matter either the victim of the crime or a prosecution witness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proprietary, or a trade secret. The district court denied Zee Medical’s motion and this appeal followed. III. Discussion A Amount in Controversy As a preliminary matter, Miller and FA2000 argue that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this lawsuit because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. They base this argument solely on their assertion that at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing, they presented uncontested evidence that the total sales to former Zee Medical customers totaled only $7,000, with the net prof hat the district court applied an incorrect standard, we conclude that the denial of Zee Medical’s motion for preliminary injunction was proper. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to Colorado law, a covenant not to

    ### Response:
    holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prejudiced by the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless. Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1020-21. On this record, it cannot be said that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was not procedurally prejudiced by the State’s discovery violation. The nurse offered expert opinion testimony establishing that the lack of vaginal injury is not unusual in rape cases. Since the defendant’s theory of the case was that the lack of injury to the victim’s vagina proved that a crime did not occur, there is a reasonable possibility that the discovery violation materially hindered the defendant’s trial preparation and/or strategy. Accordingly, the defendant’s judgment and sentence are reversed and this matter is remanded for a new trial. See Ward v. State, 165 So.3d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (<HOLDING>); Debord v. State, 152 So.3d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts failure to conduct richardson hearing concerning states discovery violation in not designating a detective as an expert was not harmless even though detectives testimony was brief appellate court could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contend either are or are not in dispute.” Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.P. 56, 1995 Amendment. Unfortunately, trial courts are often in the position of adjudicating summary-judgment motions on the basis of nonconforming documents. See, e.g., Millett v. Gorczyk, No. 44-2-01 Oscv, 2001 WL 36085152 (Vt. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2001); Bartus v. Owl’s Nest Lodge (1999), Inc., No. 169-3-04 Rdcv, 2005 WL 5895208 (Vt. Super. Ct. 2005); Houston v. Town of Waitsfield, No. 540-9-05 Wncv, 2006 WL 4911326 (Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2006). This Court will not disturb a trial court’s reliance on a nonconforming summary-judgment motion absent an objection, Kelly v. Town of Barnard, 155 Vt. 296, 301-02, 583 A.2d 614, 617 (1990), or absent prejudice. See In re Buell, No. 2003-079 (Vt. Dec. 4, 2003) (unreported mem.) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 7. We find no reversible error here. GNP’s

    ### Response:
    holding that summary judgment for state appropriate notwithstanding states failure to annex a statement of undisputed facts to its summaryjudgment motion where petitioner was aware of facts relied upon by state and never disputed them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    8,18 (D.D.C. 1999). A. Causal Connection A causal connection may be inferred “by showing that the employer had knowl edge of the employee’s protected activity, and that the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity.” Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86. By showing both knowledge and proximity in time, plaintiff may establish the causal connection needed to make a prima facie case of retaliation. Although courts have not established the maximum time lapse between protected Title VII activity and alleged retaliatory actions for establishing a causal connection, courts generally have accepted time periods of a few days up to a few months and seldom have accepted time lapses outside of a year in length. See, e.g., Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 715 F.Supp. 2, 3-4 (D.D.C.1989) (<HOLDING>); Castle v. Bentsen, 867 F.Supp. 1, 3

    ### Response:
    holding that five weeks constituted a short enough time lapse to establish a causal connection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    original condominium documentation deserve a higher degree of deference than those promulgated by a condominium Board of Directors. We emphasize, however, that in the case at hand, we are dealing with a bylaw amendment that was passed many years after appellees bought their units. This is an important difference, because the application of the less restrictive standard is based upon the concept that the unit owners had notice of the recorded use restrictions when they purchased their units. In this case, the notice aspect is lacking. Some courts, although not directly considering amendments, have hinted that they would apply a stricter standard to amendments than to original provisions. Nahrstedt, supra, 878 P.2d at 1284; Noble v. Murphy, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Bluffs of Wildwood Homeowners’ Ass’n v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a condominium use restriction appearing in originating documents which predate that purchase of individual units may be subject to even more liberal review than if promulgated after units have been individually acquired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from leading a peer review meeting as the party who made the initial complaint; and (2) there were individuals present at the meeting who were not on the MEC. Hynes and Grenevicki counter that the agreement would be meaningless if the two doctors who initiated the summary suspension were not allowed to participate, and that reading the agreement to preclude their participation is contrary to the corrective action language in the. MSA as well as the policy underlying peer review. , Notably, the trauma surgeons do not argue that the failure to comply with the by-laws, in and of itself, precludes the MEC meeting from being considered a protected peer"" review proceeding. See Awwad v. Largo Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 8:11-CV-1638-T-24-TBM, 2011 WL 5006503 at *2-3, *6-7 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 20, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Rather, they argue the failure to comply with

    ### Response:
    holding that failing to comply with hospital bylaws in connection with peer review proceeding did not vitiate peer review immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    then that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than otherwise would be necessary to show there is a genuine issue for trial.” Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Staneunch, 142 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987)). Conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Finally, if the nonmoving party fails to present an adequate opposition to a summary judgment motion, the court need not search the entire record for evidence that demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of fact. See Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sck. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029-31 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The district court need not “scour the record

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court may determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact on summary judgment based on the papers submitted on the motion and such other papers as may be on file and specifically referred to and facts therein set forth in the motion papers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Ruiz-Rivera v. Moyer, 70 F.3d 498, 500-01 (7th Cir.1995). The moving party has the burden of providing proper documentary evidence to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Interpreting the terms of a contract is generally a question of law for the court. See Quake Constr. v. American Airlines, 141 Ill.2d 281, 152 Ill.Dec. 308, 565 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ill.1990); Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In determining the meaning of words in a

    ### Response:
    holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court held that absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts must abstain from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings. Over time, a three-part test has emerged for determining whether abstention under Younger is appropriate: (1) the state judicial proceeding must be ongoing; (2) the proceeding must implicate important state interests; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state court proceeding to raise a constitutional challenge. Trust & Inv. Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir.1994). However, states may waive their right to Younger abstention. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees &

    ### Response:
    holding that where a state voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force the case back into the states own system
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    746(2) (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1970)) (emphasis in original); see also 2 McCormick on Evidence § 283 (Kenneth S. Broun, 6th ed. 2009). The requirement that the witness acknowledge the accuracy of the recorded recollection at trial is consistent with the belief that this exception is justified because the witness, who is subject to cross-examination, “incorporates into [his] testimony by reference the record of past recollection.” Montano, 846 So.2d at 681 (citing Garrett v. etective’s testimony was not sufficient foundation to admit co-defendant’s taped statement and thus, it was inadmissible as past recollection recorded where, despite his likely “convenient amnesia,” co-defendant could not testify either that the statement was his or that it was accurate); Montano, 846 So.2d at 681 (<HOLDING>). Here, Stephens not only failed to attest to

    ### Response:
    holding a sworn taped statement given to a deputy was improperly admitted because the witness herself did not acknowledge its accuracy at trial or that she was truthful at the time she made it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was encountering in the fall of 1995, defendants pursued a “conspiracy of silence” to prevent any negative information from reaching the marketplace. Plaintiffs contend that, through this conspiracy, defendants propped up SGI stock prices long enough to enable defendants to sell off their shares at high prices. Plaintiffs accuse defendants of affirmatively misleading the public by false and misleading statements and of violating the abstain or disclose doctrine prohibiting insider trading. Although plaintiffs need not allege that every defendant participated in every aspect of a fraudulent scheme to state a claim, section 10 liability requires a finding that each individual took some action in furtherance of the scheme. See Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The cases cited by plaintiffs support this

    ### Response:
    holding that primary liability may be imposed only on those committing a fraud or assisting in its perpetration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    facts of the case before it. This individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Turning to the substantive reasonableness of Susi’s sentence, we must consider whether the totality of the circumstances shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Susi to 160 months’ imprisonment on the wire fraud counts. We have previously held that “a sentence located within a correctly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Abu AlI, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir.2008); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (<HOLDING>). However, Susi was sentenced to a term of

    ### Response:
    holding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and maintenance of facilities. Third, Southern claims that GUA did not take the affirmative steps necessary to enter business. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff must make efforts to carry out construction of new facilities if such construction is required to enter a new business. Cable Holdings, supra, 825 F.2d at 1562. In Cable Holdings, a cable television company brought antitrust monopoly claims against a cable system operator, claiming that the operator had prevented its expansion. Plaintiff had failed to prepare detailed design maps, confer with utility representatives, and hire a contractor to install cable. The court determined that plaintiff was not prepared to begin service and enter the targeted market. Id. at 1562. See also Hayes, 597 F.2d at 974 (<HOLDING>) Southern argues that Tutcher and Levrier did

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff who needed to construct a shopping center failed to commission the timely drawing of a detailed engineering and architectural plan and did not meet the eleventh circuit test for preparedness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DRHI’s claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 1 . CHS Savannah, L.P. is not a party to this appeal. 2 . D.R. Horton and DRHI do not challenge on appeal the trial court’s ruling on Savannah’s motion to reconsider. 3 . Savannah also claims the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s motion for continuance because D.R. Horton and DRHI did not file an affidavit in support of their motion as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 251. A review of the record, however, reveals that D.R. Horton and DRHI did file an affidavit in support of their motion. 4 . Compare Hightower v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 251 S.W.3d 218, 224-25 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. struck) (<HOLDING>), and Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 483

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant did not preserve error because he failed to obtain ruling on motion for continuance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the panel would have no reservations applying the categorical and modified categorical analysis to determine if § 311.11 was an aggravated felony. I see no principled difference between looking at the elements of the lawful general order underlying Aguilar-Turcios' convictions and looking at the elements of a state criminal statute. To conclude otherwise would be to render the immigration removal laws inapplicable to any alien subject to the UCMJ who is prosecuted for violating an order that would have been prosecuted as a removable crime had it occurred off the military base. 3 . Navarro-Lopez has created a dramatic turnabout on this issue in our circuit. Compare Aguila-Montes De Oca, 553 F.3d at 1234, and United States v. Sandon, 302 Fed.Appx. 719, 720-21 (9th Cir. Dec.5, 2008) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the modified categorical approach cannot apply where the alien admitted his entry was unprivileged because arizona does not require a showing of unprivileged entry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See, e.g., Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th Cir.1998); Skelton, 860 F.2d at 255. These factors include “the complexity of the legal issues involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by the litigation.” Gastineau, 592 F.3d at 748. When applying a multiplier to the base lodestar amount, courts should also consider the risk plaintiffs counsel assumes in recovering nothing. Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (remanding case for recalculation of attorneys’ fees because the trial court failed to award a risk multiplier) Typical multipliers awarded in comparable class action litigation average around 4, but are often much higher. In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., No. 98-5055, 2004 WL 1221350, at *14 (E.D.Pa. Jun. 2, 2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no need for a multiplier,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that from 2001 to 2003 the average multiplier approved in common fund eases was 435
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on the pleadings is GRANTED with prejudice with respect to Indelicato’s Bivens claim; and it is further ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED without prejudice with respect to Indelicato’s FTCA claim; and it is further ORDERED that Indelicato’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. SO ORDERED. 1 . When the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) places an inmate on ""refusal status,” it institutes various sanctions such as reduced pay, low housing status and restricted work assignments. See 29 C.F.R. § 525.11. 2 . The fact that Indelicato eventually submitted the form required under step two is irrelevant to the present inquiry because he did so only after he filed his complaint with this Court in September 2000. See Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Fletcher v. Haase, No. 99 Civ. 9549, slip

    ### Response:
    holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    land market supply factor employed was reasonable. “[A] market factor represents the estimated percentage of net develop-able acres contained within a UGA that, due to idiosyncratic market forces, is likely to remain undeveloped over the course of the twenty-year planning cycle.” Brent D. Lloyd, Accommodating Growth or Enabling Sprawl? The Role of Population Growth Projections in Comprehensive Planning under the Washington State Growth Management Act, 36 Gonz. L. Rev. 73, 118 (2001). Beginning in 1995, the GMHBs adopted 25 percent as the bright-line test for determining whether a market supply factor is reasonable. City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, No. 95-3-0039, 1995 GMHB LEXIS 384, at *87, 1995 WL 903165 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Final Dec. and Order Oct. 6,1995) (<HOLDING>). However, a GMHB cannot create a bright-line

    ### Response:
    holding market supply factors of 25 percent or less are presumed reasonable while factors exceeding 25 percent will be subject to increased scrutiny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (‘While the court is not required to hear any pretrial motion to suppress evidence the accused retains his right to raise any appropriate objection at trial.”). We hold that Flores did not preserve error over the trial court’s implicit denial of his suppression motion. See Wilson, 857 S.W.2d at 94. III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we overrule Flores’s sole issue. Flores’s admission to his probation officer that he had consumed alcohol the night of his arrest supports revocation of his community supervision. See Jones v. State, 112 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115 (Vernon 2002). 2 . See Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700, 709 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980)

    ### Response:
    holding confession inadmissable because no intervening events broke causal connection between illegal arrest and confession
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AFL-CIO v. University of Alabama, supra. Ordinarily, this court would want to hear more of the matter. However, since this court has held that this case must be dismissed for plaintiffs failure to file this action within the requisite time period, the court need not reach this issue. Finally, this court also dismisses plaintiffs state law claim of misrepresentation. Having dismissed all of plaintiffs federal law claims, this court opts not to retain jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claim. See Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.1993) (stating that “[district courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim once all federal claims are dismissed.”); Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 395 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). So, for the reasons set forth above, this

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts dismissal of state law claims was proper where the district court had properly dismissed all of the federal questions that gave it original jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for good reason, we cannot accept a post-hearing argument that evidence admitted without objection may not be considered because it was hearsay. In this case, not only did the General Counsel not object to Mullican Lumber’s evidence, he facilitated the admission of some of the evidence that he now argues cannot be considered because it was hearsay. “[W]hen evidence of that character [hearsay] is admitted without objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible.” Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912). Consistent with Diaz, we have given employee reports regarding union loss of majority status their natural probative value, despite their hearsay nature. See Transpersonnel, 349 F.3d at 187-88 (<HOLDING>). In Transper-sonnel, we said: We conclude,

    ### Response:
    recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    petition claim is that it was not ripe at the time he filed his first habeas petition in 1989 because the state did not use that method of execution at that time. That is true, but Florida adopted lethal injection as a method of execution in 2000, Henyard v. Sec’y, DOC, 543 F.3d 644, 647 (11th Cir.2008) (“On January 14, 2000, Florida adopted lethal injection as a method of execution.”), and Tompkins could have filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit challenging the method and procedures at any time during the eight years since then. A § 1983 lawsuit, not a habeas proceeding, is the proper way to challenge lethal injection procedures. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579-83, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 2101-04, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006); see also Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Not only that, but binding precedent

    ### Response:
    recognizing that before hill we required litigants raising methodofexecution challenges to bring them in second or successive habeas petitions instead of  1983 actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 621-22. 8 . Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965). 9 . Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). 10 . Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. h (1965)). 11 . Id. 12 . Id. at 736. 13 . Id. (quoting Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.1992)). 14 . 971 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.1998). 15 . Id. at 54; see Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1993). 16 . Wornick, 856 S.W.2d at 734 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). 17 . See Motor Express, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 925 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex.1996) (noting that loss of consortium claims are derivative). 18 . Cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). 19 . 949 S.W.2d at 405. 20 . Id. at 399 n. 1.

    ### Response:
    holding that loss of consortium damages are not recoverable when the nonderivative claim did not result in physical injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In re N.Y. Times Co., 878 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam); ABC, Inc. v. Stetvart, 360 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir.2004). The Court finds these eases inapposite, and reviews Judge Tomlinson’s Order under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 2. The First Amendment’s Restrictions on the Protective Order Rule 26(c) provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” It is well-settled that courts have broad power to enter protective orders under Rule 26(c) that prohibit parties from sharing discovery materials with non-litigants (such orders are typically referred to as “confidentiality orders”). See, e.g., AT & T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, a confidentiality order limits

    ### Response:
    recognizing the validity of a rule 26c confidentiality order entered on good cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    another, so that a person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement. § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). This exception applies only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. See § 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); Curtis v. State, 876 So.2d 13, 18-19 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, there was no showing that either minor was unavailable as a witness or that, when they made their statements, they believed that they would be subject to criminal charges. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (<HOLDING>). 3 . In Stangherlin v. Kelly, 419 So.2d 1154,

    ### Response:
    holding that outofcourt statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature are barred under the confrontation clause unless witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that dismiss an indictment for failure to adequately plead an enterprise. See United States v. Marchese, 1991 WL 60338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.ll, 1991) (concluding that civil RICO cases cited by defendant were not only nonbinding authority from other circuits but also inapposite because they addressed motions to dismiss complaints rather than indictments). 3 . Segal is correct to point out that the Seventh Circuit ""does not look favorably on many instances of mail and wire fraud to form a pattern.” Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 473 (7th Cir.1990). In cases, however, where the Seventh Circuit has held that several acts of mail or wire fraud do not form a pattern, other factors of the continuity analysis were also lacking. See e.g., Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The Government, in contrast, alleges that the

    ### Response:
    holding twelve acts designed to defraud only one victim on one occasion insufficient to allege pattern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the Nelson affidavit considered by the court was that MHA believes that some of the work, which Gear was required to complete under its contract, remains incomplete. 5 Reliance is also an essential element of a claim for fraud. See Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 77 (1991). Since Gear has failed to set forth specific facts from which a reasonable jury could find reliance, Goba is also entitled to summary judgment on Gear’s fraud claim. 6 Although Massachusetts has yet to define what conduct constitutes “more than a minor or insignificant business relationship,"" the Supreme Judicial Court, the Appeals Court and the federal courts have tended to find such a relationship where the defendant played an active role in the underlying transaction. Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (<HOLDING>); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor since the defendant was a member of the mortgagors inner circle the mortgagee could sustain his 93a claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 284 and § 285 may be invoked are not identical. For example, attorney misconduct or other aggravation of the litigation process may weigh heavily with respect to attorney fees, but not for enhancement of damages. Id. (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain why attorneys’ fees were unwarranted and the issue is remanded for a proper determination. E. Post-Trial Accounting Finally, WhitServe appeals the denial of a post-trial accounting. “[W]hen damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.” 35 U.S.C'. § 284 (emphasis added). District courts have discretion to award damages for periods of infringement not considered by the jury. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1212-13 (explaining that

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court was within its discretion to impose a royalty on postverdict sales not considered by the jury in order to fully compensate the patentee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the same time he joined the murder conspiracy. Based on his evaluation of Downs, interviews, and his review of testimony in this case, Dr. Krop concluded that Downs had strong potential for rehabilitation. However, Dr. Krop also concluded that Downs was not suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, and that he did have the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Downs, 572 So.2d at 898. We agree with the trial court that to the extent Downs offers additional facts not previously presented at the resentencing hearing, such facts are cumulative to the evidence presented by Downs during the resentencing proceeding and, therefore, are insufficient to warrant relief under Strickland. See Card v. State, 497 So.2d 1169, 1176-77 (Fla.1986) (<HOLDING>). The additional facts merely lend further

    ### Response:
    holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failure to present cumulative evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    occurs. The CPEA does not direct the Inmates “to engage in, or to refrain from, any conduct.” Texas, 523 U.S. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257. The CPEA is thus fundamentally different from the statutes at issue in the decisions the Inmates have relied upon in support of their argument that their Electrocution Causes of Action are ripe. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (stating that “denying prompt judicial review would impose a substantial hardship on petitioners, forcing them to choose between refraining from core political speech on the one hand, or engaging in that speech and risking costly Commission proceedings and criminal prosecution on the other”); Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565, 566 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Blackwell v. Haslam, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that a declaratory judgment action brought by proprietors of pool rooms against the sheriff to challenge the constitutionality of a law declaring the operation of pool rooms unlawful was ripe because the plaintiffs property rights in their businesses would be destroyed by the enforcement of the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have accomplished the deprivation, i.e., the state must be the actor since private conduct, no matter how unfair, is not subject to scrutiny under due process requirements. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Tarkanian (1988), 488 U.S. 179, 190, 109 S.Ct. 454, 461, 102 L.Ed.2d 469, 483, citing Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 1180; Gotsis v. Lorain Community Hosp. (1974), 46 Ohio App.2d 8, 15, 75 O.O.2d 18, 21, 345 N.E.2d 641, 645. Plaintiff has failed to establish (1) that he had a property right in his continuing membership and possible future election to office as a delegate in the FCSU or (2) that his dismissal involved any state action whatsoever. See Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill (1985), 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, plaintiff brought his claim

    ### Response:
    holding a tenured state employee has a property right to continued employment and must be accorded due process before serious disciplinary sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Llanez-Garcia, 735 F.3d 483, 498 (6th Cir.2013). A large body of casé law interpreting the governmental plan exclusion confirms that “governmental plans”' constitute a type of employee benefit' plan, not a separate Category. See,"" e.g., Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir.2004) (“Title I of ERISA specifically excludes from its coverage any employee benefit plan that is a governmental plan.”); Shirley v. Maxicare Tex., Inc., 921 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.1991) (“Under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b), however, ERISA shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if such plan is a governmental plan,”); Lovelace v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 775 F.Supp. 228, 229 (S.D.Ohio 1991) (“ERISA regulates employee benefit plans, such as the [public s 791, 1996 WL 648720, at *1-4 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 4, 1996) (<HOLDING>). This analytical leap to the governmental plan

    ### Response:
    holding that employee benefit plan sponsored by two participating employers  cook county and the cook county forest preserve district  qualified for governmental plan exclusion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    awarded in proportion to the injuries they suffered as a result of the decedent’s death. Maryland law thus makes clear that all beneficiaries in wrongful death lawsuits are the real parties in interest in these suits. Indeed, if one of a decedent’s beneficiaries is absent from a wrongful death lawsuit, Maryland law requires that a judgment rendered in favor of the beneficiary or beneficiaries who did prosecute the suit be vacated. Johnson v. Price, 191 F.Supp.2d 626, 629 (D.Md.2001) (citations omitted). Because the judgment may be vacated if a wrongful death beneficiary is not included in the action, “the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties” when a beneficiary is excluded. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1)(A); see also Ward v. Walker, 725 F.Supp.2d 506, 510-11 (D.Md.2010) (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 191 F.Supp.2d at 630 (same). That

    ### Response:
    holding that decedents daughter was necessary party to maryland wrongful death action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the national security of the United States,” the district court must review “in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to. the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the [surveillance or search] of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted.” 50 U.S.C., §§ 1806(f), 1825(g). The district court “may disclose to .the aggrieved person, under appropriate security procedures and protective orders, portions of the application, order, or other materials relating to the [surveillance or search] only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the [surveillance or search].” 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f),. 1825(g) (emphasis added); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 129 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). E. Osmakac’s FISA Challenge Osmakac concedes

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no denial of due process in the district courts decision not to order disclosure of fisa materials to the defendant because disclosure of the fisa materials was not necessary to assess the legality of the challenged surveillance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legitimate funds, is subject to forfeiture. Other courts have reached this same, sensible result. In the words of the Eleventh Circuit: As to a wrongdoer, any amount of the invested proceeds traceable to drug proceeds forfeits the entire property. We have never held that as to a wrongdoer only the funds traceable to illegal activities may be forfeited. If one is an innocent owner, no amount of that person’s or entity’s funds are forfeitable. On the other hand, if one is a wrongdoer, the full value of the ... property is forfeitable because some of the funds invested are traceable as the statute dictates. United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 15608 85th Avenue, 933 F.2d 976, 981-82 (11th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. All Monies In Account No.

    ### Response:
    holding to be forfeitable all property connected with the facilitation of illegal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the plan because there is no plan. While some of the damages requested by the Plaintiffs certainly parallel the benefits they would have received from the insurance plan had it remained in existence, this is not enough to compel ERISA preemption. As justification for concluding that ERISA preemption does not apply in certain situations, some circuit courts have focused on the fact that the plaintiff was not a “participant” in a plan, and that, consequently, there was no ERISA plan which would be affected in the event the plaintiff were to recover. Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1405 (9th Cir.1988); Freeman v. Jacques Orthopaedic & Joint Implant Surg., 721 F.2d 654, 655-56 (9th Cir.1983). See also Pizlo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 116, 120-21 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499,

    ### Response:
    holding that erisa preemption does not apply where the plan itself would not be liable even though a successful plaintiffs damages would be measured in part by the lost pension benefits the plaintiff would have received had he been a participant in the plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and because he started having problems with his eyes. [AR 413-414]. The DOT classifies the jobs of “laborer, landscape” and “assembler, electrical accessories I” as requiring a “Specific Vocational Preparation” (“SVP”) of “Level 2,” defined as “[a]nything beyond short demonstration up to and including 1 month.” Those jobs also require “Level 2” reasoning development, which is defined as the abilit nt’s ability to log mileage, hours worked, and the places he drove in his job as a truck driver were not inconsistent with a valid IQ of 68); see generally Fanning, 827 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that if plaintiff otherwise meets section 12.05C, he “must be found disabled” without consideration of his work history as a laundry loader, janitor, and dishwasher); cf. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1185 (<HOLDING>). Defendant also argues that plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that where the claimant had worked for 22 years in a steel drum factory and as a security guard for about a year the claimants ability to maintain a job for most of his adult life called his mental retardation into doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    States v. Green, 560 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting the presence of four other people in the house in addition to the defendant and that the defendant was only located after the officers began the protective sweep); United States v. Cash, 378 F.3d 745, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming the protective sweep when the evidence showed that on the day the defendant was arrested inside her house on outstanding warrants, an informant had told the officers that the defendant possessed a large quantity of drugs, the informant had seen drags in the house, and the officers had testified that the defendant had exhibited extremely nervous behavior toward them and that she attempted to conceal a shopping bag located in plain view); United States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991, 994,

    ### Response:
    holding that the officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest on outstanding warrants because the officers had information that the defendant was suspected of running a methamphetamine operation on the premises other people were living there and assisting the defendant and at the time the sweep began the defendant had not yet been located
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to reject this contention. In Neurosurgery, the Second District stated, in rather categorical terms: “Simply put, fraudulent misrepresentation has emerged as a tort distinct from the general milieu of negligent and intentional wrongs and applies only to interferences with financial or commercial interests where a party suffers some pecuniary loss.” Neurosurgery, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 186. The court in Neurosurgery added that the theory of fraudulent misrepresentation was unavailable to a plaintiff who suffered physical harm. Neurosurgery, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 186. The court explained its reasoning as follows: “[fraudulent misrepresentation is purely an economic tort under which one may recover only monetary damages. McConkey v. AON Corp., 354 N.J. Super. 25, 59, 804 A.2d 572, 593 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Jourdain v. Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Me.

    ### Response:
    holding that damaged in a fraudulent misrepresentation action are limited to those that are pecuniary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    death sentence be vacated. The trial court twice instructed the jury that the parties’ opening statements were not evidence. The State explains that the majority of the comments objected to by defendant constituted representations of what the State intended to, and in fact did, prove at the penalty phase trial and that, in any event, none of the comments made by the prosecutor in his opening statement require reversal. The scope of the State’s opening statement is limited to the “facts he intends in good faith to prove by competent evidence.” State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 309, 164 A.2d 481 (1960) (citing State v. Haines, 103 N.J.L. 534, 138 A. 203 (Sup.Ct.1927)); State v. Ernst, 32 N.J. 567, 577, 161 A.2d 511 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943, 81 S.Ct. 464, 5 L.Ed.2d 374 (1961) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Walden, 370 N.J.Super. 549,

    ### Response:
    holding that in opening statements a prosecutor should as the trial court ruled limit himself to a statement of what he will prove and not anticipate his final argument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    murderer fit the “mysterious and elusive ‘Midnight,’ ” but also fit the description of Gordon. The court found that Meyers’s statement to the police about the murders was fabricated, and in any event was not a true confession. The only crimes that Meyers actually confessed to were some breakings and enterings in the Landover Hills area. Even in his oral statements to the detectives, he denied being involved in the Tharpar murders. (B) Now, on appeal from the judgments of conviction in his second trial, the appellant makes a three-fold argument about the evidence of Meyers’s “false confession.” First, he maintains that the court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the State’s motion in limine. See Leeks v. State, 110 Md.App. 543, 557, 678 A.2d 80 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, he argues that the court erred in

    ### Response:
    holding that an ontherecord evidentiary hearing is necessary when the trial court is asked to rule in limine that a witness cannot be asked questions to show that he is biased prejudiced interested in the outcome of the proceeding or has a motive to testify falsely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ore Tenus Motion to preclude Plaintiff from tak ing observers, including her attorney, to the Rule 35 examinations is hereby GRANTED. A. Procedures That May Be Conducted During the Rule 35 Examinations In this case, the United States seeks for Dr. Grossman, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Pasarin, a neurological surgeon, to be able to administer x-rays and MRI’s, and to take a medical history, to assess the extent of Plaintiffs damages. The Court first notes that this matter does not arise in the context of a Plaintiff-contested motion by Defendant for Rule 35 examinations. Plaintiff has already voluntarily consented to Rule 35 examinations by an orthopedic surgeon and a neurological surgeon, implicitly conceding that good cause under Rule 35, Fed.R.Civ 189 F.R.D. 620, 626 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, courts refrain from “limit[ing]

    ### Response:
    holding restriction of questions during examination unduly restricts physicians ability to reach medical conclusions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    parte Bole was a case of first impression; cases from other jurisdictions, however, support this Court’s rationale in Ex parte Bole. See, e.g., Seefried v. Hummel, 148 P.3d 184, 188 (Colo.App.2005) (“As relevant here, the court determined that the statements which gave rise to plaintiffs' claims were issued within the 'constitutionally protected context’ of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because they occurred during a church meeting that concerned the ‘investigation, discipline and discharge of Richard and James Seefried.' The court, consequently, declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. Plaintiffs contend that this was error as a matter of law. We agree with the trial court.”); Yagg od, 237 Mich.App. 567, 603 N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Minnesota: Mulinix v. Mulinix, No. C2-97-297

    ### Response:
    holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty against pastor for sexual relationship with parishioner during the course of pastoral counseling was tantamount to impermissible clergy malpractice claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remaining contention that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). See United States v. Ochoa-Gaytan, 265 F.3d 837, 845-46 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi carved out an exception for prior convictions that specifically preserved the holding of almendareztorres
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    speech. Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir.2008). Yet “an inmate’s First Amendment right to free speech is not protected if affording protection would be inconsistent with the inmate’s status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Id. at 1277. “[I]f a prisoner violates a legitimate prison regulation, he is not engaged in protected conduct, and cannot proceed beyond step one.” Id. (quotations omitted). Because Moulds made only a bare assertion of a conspiracy to retaliate against him, without alleging any other details or providing any supporting evidence of such a conspiracy, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on his conspiracy claim. See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Moulds claims that the search

    ### Response:
    holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It was quite impossible for his attorney to timely file his appellate brief. However, even if the errors of his counsel had contributed to the delay, Zetino’s due process claim would still fail. Unlike both Singh and Rojas-Garcia, Zetino cannot point to anyone but himself to explain the untimeliness of his brief. We cannot conclude that by missing the deadline he had successfully extended he somehow deprived himself of due process. To hold to the contrary would mean that when the BIA enforced the previously extended filing deadline known to the petitioner the proceeding became fundamentally unfair. Such a holding would be contrary to existing due process jurisprudence addressing filing deadlines. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we have held an alien’s due

    ### Response:
    holding that a filing deadline under federal land policy and management act carrying a penalty of an automatic forfeiture of a mining claim did not violate due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this view, we agree. OTHER JURISDICTIONS Most jurisdictions recognize that absent unusual circumstances, the option to renew a lease must be exercised prior to the expiration of the lease. However provisions designating a time frame within which notice to renew must be given are strictly construed. See American Oil Co. v. Rasar, 308 S.W.2d at 490. When a lease requires the lessee to exercise the option “at the end of’ or “at the termination of’ the original lease, courts addressing the issue have adopted one of two views on the time frame for renewal. At least two courts have interpreted this language to require that the option be exercised before the expiration of the original lease. See Music Tree, Inc. v. Tallman Piano Store, Inc., 45 Or.App. 651, 608 P.2d 1228, 1230 (1980) (<HOLDING>); I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House

    ### Response:
    holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease but providing no more specific time requirement the lessee had a reasonable time to exercise the option within the term of the lease
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    indictment.” State v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 164, 170, 270 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1980) (citations omitted). However, “ ‘[a]llegations beyond the essential elements of the crime sought to be charged are irrelevant and may be treated as surplusage.’ ” State v. Westbrooks, 345 N.C. 43, 57, 478 S.E.2d 483, 492 (1996) (quoting State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 276, 185 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1972)). Defendant was charged with felonious child abuse under N.C.G.S. § 14-318.4(a2). The essential elements of felonious child abuse under subsection (a2) are (1) the defendant is a parent or legal guardian of (2) a child less than 16 years of age, (3) who commits or allows the commission of any sexual act upon that child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-318.4(a2); see State v. Qualls, 130 N.C. App. 1, 8, 502 S.E.2d 31, 36 (1998) (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 237, 516 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding variance between the specific injury alleged in the indictment and the evidence at trial was not fatal where it was only necessary to allege under nc gen stat  143184a that the defendant caused serious injury and the actual injury alleged was surplusage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of their own independent investigation. The court then noted that even if competent evidence had shown that the lessor and plaintiffs had orally agreed on a cancellation contingency, the result would have remained the same for fraud cannot be predicated upon a promise or agreement to do something in the future. Shamberg, at 593; see also Douglas, at 116; Shanahan v. Schindler (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 82, 93, 379 N.E.2d 1307. In the context of an action for contract damages, the parol evidence rule has been held to bar, absent allegations of fraud or mistake, a claim for breach of an oral warranty of quality in sale of real estate. (See Rouse v. Brooks (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 107, 111, 383 N.E.2d 666; see also World Ins. Co. v. Smith (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 329 N.E.2d 518 (<HOLDING>).) In Rouse, the court, while permitting an

    ### Response:
    holding parol evidence inadmissible to vary a written instrument which is complete unambiguous valid and unaffected by fraud duress mistake or illegality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its oto case. At the close of proof, Defendant made a general motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Although Defendant concedes it could have been more specific, the court concludes that Defendant’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the end of proof is sufficient to constitute a motion for a directed verdict on all issues. Plaintiff was aware of Defendant’s allegation that there was a failure by Plaintiff to mitigate his damages by virtue of pretrial discussions between counsel and the court, as well as Defendant’s questioning of witnesses at trial, including Defendant’s cross-examination of Plaintiff which pointedly referred to Defendant’s position that Plaintiff failed to seek comparable employment. See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 717 F.2d 828, 831-32 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Thezan v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 708 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that despite defense counsels lack of specificity in its motion for a directed verdict other colloquies and discussions between the parties and the court cured any deficiencies in defendants rule 50 motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.3d 104, 113 (2009); State v. Mars, 116 Hawai'i 125, 170 P.3d 861, 876-77 (2007); People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 537 N.W.2d 857, 868, amended on other grounds, 450 Mich. 1212, 548 N.W.2d 625 (1995); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138-39 (1990). 7 . Accord Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3175, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.) (cautioning that courts should be particularly vigilant in ensuring fairness to defendants in child sexual abuse cases, given reliability issues associated with the suggestibility of children and the concomitant possibility of distorted or coerced recollections). See generally Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 232, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See generally Favoccia, 51 A.3d at 1025

    ### Response:
    recognizing that expert testimony and scientific proofs carry the potential to assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen quoting united states v addison 498 f2d 741 744 dc cir 1974
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in prison. The court thus found it necessary to protect society from Martinez for the longest time period possible. The court ruled that a life sentence was necessary to deter others engaged in gang activity, and that Martinez’s rehabilitative needs would not be better served by a lesser sentence. The court therefore concluded that it would have imposed the same sentence had it known the guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory. We have held that a properly calculated guidelines sentence is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.2005). The district court has given a very thorough analysis of the section 3553(a) factors in support of that sentence. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Under the law of this circuit, that would be

    ### Response:
    holding that the sentencing judge need only provide an adequate statement of the judges reasoning consistent with section 3553a for thinking that the sentence selected is indeed appropriate for the particular defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we now adopt an additional test, the natural and probable cause test ... which has today evolved into what is called the inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life test. Of the lesser-degree felonies only those known to have a high probability of death may be utilized for a conviction of first-degree murder. Assuming the actus reus condition is met, the mens rea of one who is committing a felony which is inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life is sufficient to justify convicting a defendant of felony murder and sentencing him to death or life imprisonment. State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 442, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1977), rev’d by rule on other grounds, Tafoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. 56, 57, 60, 702 P.2d 1001, 1002, 1005 (1985). We look beyond the literal word of , 281 (1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 103 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that an unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death is involuntary manslaughter and that criminal liability is imposed in the latter instance because although the defendants acts are not inherently wrong the defendant has acted or failed to act with awareness of the risk to safety and in wilful disregard of the safety of others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Co. v. Zimmer, 257 S.W.3d 504, 509 (TexApp.-Tyler 2008, pet. denied) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 580 (Tex.2002)). If a statement “cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual,” it is not actionable. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2706. B. Immunity In his motion for rehearing, Jesus adopts the argument from the dissent that he is immune from liability based on section 261.106 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 261.106 (Vernon 2008). As pointed out by the dissent, section 261.106 provides: (a) A person acting in good faith who reports or assists in the investigation of a report of all ., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming without deciding that Miranda

    ### Response:
    holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . See, e.g., Bacon, 411 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034; University of Tex. Med. Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994))). 51 . See Mission Consol., Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008); see also Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 697 (""[W]hen construing a statute that purportedly waives sovereign immunity, we generally resolve ambi- guides by retaining immunity.” (citations omitted)). 52 . See, e.g., State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) (citing In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2004)). 53 . See Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1994) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009). 54 . See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 252.061; see also Carowest Land, Ltd., 432 S.W.3d at 532-33 (<HOLDING>). In their live petition, Plaintiffs also

    ### Response:
    recognizing that section 252061 waives immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motion must have been filed within one year from “the date on which the judgment of conviction [became] final,” or “the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States [was] removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Baylor argues he is entitled to equitable tolling, and therefore the one-year limitations period should run from August 2, 2000, the date on which his counsel received actual notice of the amended judgment. Although the Government concedes § 2255 is subject to equitable tolling, it argues, and we agree, Baylor’s delay is not excusable under that doctrine. See United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 203 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Washington v. WMATA 160 F.3d 750, 753

    ### Response:
    holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    results in the conclusion that, at the time of the commencement of the mother’s action, Canada was the children’s home state. Thus, because another “state” had jurisdiction to enter a child-custody determination pursuant to the UCCJEA, the trial court in Alabama lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination in the present case. Subject-matter jurisdiction may not be conferred by agreement or consent. § 30-3B-201, Official Comment (“It should also be noted that since jurisdiction to make a child custody determination is subject matter jurisdiction, an agreement of the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court that would not otherwise have jurisdiction under this Act is ineffective.”); see also C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So.2d 451, 453-54 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because a judgment entered without

    ### Response:
    holding that a mothers actions in litigating the propriety of the judgment under review could not confer jurisdiction by consent in violation of the uccjea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Legislature’s definition of a “health care liability claim.” The Ra-moses are not at all seeking to establish appellants’ medical liability for the negligent provision of “health care.” They are seeking mental anguish damages because someone, after Mrs. Ramos had received medical treatment, mixed up the remains of their unborn child with another person’s toe. Regardless of the plain language of the legislature’s definition of “health care liability claim,” appellants assert that the Ramoses have sued them to establish medical liability for a claimed departure from accepted standards of professional or administrative services directly related to health care. In support of their assertion, appellants rely upon Omaha Healthcare Center, L.L.C. v. Johnson, 344 S.W.3d 392, 394-95 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>), Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196-98

    ### Response:
    holding that claim against nursing home regarding patients death from spider bite fell within the statutory definition of a health care liability claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. In this personal injury action for damages arising from an automobile accident, the jury found that the plaintiff was 90% negligent and that the defendant was only 10% negligent. The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm. See Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490, 497 (Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the trial court erred in

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made after the statute of limitations has run relates back to the date of the original pleading if, inter alia, “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 228 (2d Cir.2006) (“For a newly added action to relate back, the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the failure to intercede claim clearly arose out of the conduct set out in the Third Amended Complaint, and therefore relates back for the purpose of the statute of limitations. See Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 2. Summary Judgment As there are material

    ### Response:
    holding that amended complaint related back where the facts alleged in the original complaint clearly put defendants on notice as to the conduct  at issue in this action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir.1990). Furthermore, we are “bound by the jury’s credibility determinations, and by its rejection of the inferences raised by the defendant.” United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir.2005). To convict a defendant of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt three elements: “(1) that the defendant was a convicted felon, (2) that the defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm, and (3) that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.” Beckles, 565 F.3d at 841 (internal quotation marks omitted) (<HOLDING>). In considering the evidence, it is reasonable

    ### Response:
    holding the evidence sufficient to establish the defendants knowing possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt when among other things the defendant admitted to a law enforcement officer that he had acquired the shotgun for his protection and that officers testimony went uncontradicted at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be “circumspect” in allowing discovery before the plaintiff has established that the court has jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant under the FSIA. Id. at 176-77. But NML seeks discovery from a defendant over which the district court indisputably had jurisdiction. Thus, the concerns voiced in Rafidain I are not present and our precedents relating to jurisdictional discovery are inapplicable. The second principal reason for holding that the Discovery Order does not infringe on Argentina’s sovereign immunity is that the subpoenas at issue were directed at BOA and BNA — commercial banks that have no claim to sovereign immunity, or to any other sort of immunity or privilege. Thus, the banks’ compliance with subpoenas will cause Argentina no burden and no expense. See id. at 177 (<HOLDING>). To the extent Argentina expresses concern

    ### Response:
    holding that discovery requests directed at nonimmune party did not infringe on the sovereign immunity of a third party even if the third party retained a colorable claim of immunity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 812.13(2)(a) did not qualify as a crime of moral turpitude because it did not match the elements of the federal definition of robbery. We also see no indicatipn that the BIA improperly relied on the underlying facts of Jaimes-Lopez’s conduct in its decision. Thus, the BIA did not err in its analysis. B. We also agree with the BIA’s ultimate determination that Jaimes-Lopez’s conviction under § 812.13(2)(a) categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. For this reason, we need not, and do not, decide whether the Florida statute is divisible or indivisible. See Gelin, 837 F.3d at 1243. The federal circuit courts have long considered theft offenses, including robbery, to involve moral turpitude. See Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 & nn. 8, 9 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Soetarto v. INS, 516 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    necessary to achieve the purposes of the law” and thoroughly explained his plausible and defensible judgment call. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the sentencing judge’s determination. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Arsenault’s 780-month sentence. 1 . As this sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea, “we glean the relevant facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report [ ('PSI') ], and the record of the disposition hearing.” United States v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2009). 2 . The government argues that Arsenault may have waived any dispute regarding the Guidelines computations by repeatedly failing to object. See generally United States v. Sweeney, 606 Fed.Appx. 588, 591 (1st Cir. 2015)(<HOLDING>). But we assume favorably to Arsenault that he

    ### Response:
    holding that a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal whereas a forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The employer maintains that that part of the settlement agreement by which the employee waived and discharged the employer from any claim “for medical expenses in connection with his left knee and his right knee” unambiguously releases the employer from liability for medical expenses relating to the treatment of the right knee arising in the future. See, e.g., Wix Corp. v. Davis, 945 So.2d 1040 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). The employer further maintains that the judgment approving the settlement agreement adopted the terms of the settlement agreement and bars the employee from relitigat-ing the issue of the employer’s liability for future medical expenses relating to the treatment of his right knee. See, e.g., Shop-A-Snak Food Mart, Inc. v. Penhale, 693 So.2d 479, 480-81 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). In October 2007, the employee filed a motion

    ### Response:
    recognizing that res judicata applies to judgments approving workers compensation settlements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    composition of old and new oil and the posted price for each. See id. See also MGPC, Inc. v. Canadian Hidrogas Resources, Ltd., 725 F.2d 1376, 1377, 1379 (Em.App.1983) (remanding a case where a contract containing a pricing provision called for prices “consistent with the [federal] pricing guidelines,” so that the trial court might either: (1) ascertain the price by interpreting these regulations; or (2) find that the regulations are too ambiguous to supply a price and determine a reasonably fair price under Section 203-5 of the UCC). Courts have similarly granted specific performance of covenants not to compete, leases, and other agreements, after supplying contractual terms suited to the parties’ initial expectations. See e.g., Gerard v. Almouli, 746 F.2d 936, 939-40 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke

    ### Response:
    recognizing the courts right to modify the parties obligations under a restrictive covenant in light of current developments and the parties initial expectations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    retirement “popped up in the conversation periodically” with Brent Bott. Id. at 243-244. Bott’s questions began around 2006-2007 and occurred approximately four times a year. Id. at 244 (Plaintiff and Bott would talk about once a month or every six weeks and it would come up about every three times they talked). Plaintiff testified that to all of these inquires he always responded that he enjoyed his job and had no plans to retire. PI. Resp. at 10. As an initial matter, the Court has not been presented with any evidence that Domzalski or Bott had any input in the decision to terminate Plaintiffs contract. Accordingly, because they are not decision-makers, their statements cannot constitute evidence of age di 2167, 2016 WL 3640692, at *9 18179, at *15-16 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 3, 2010) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 515 Fed.Appx. 561 (6th Cir.2013);

    ### Response:
    holding in the alternative that plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that but for plaintiffs age he would not have been constructively discharged where plaintiff was asked on more than one occasion when he was going to retire emphasis in original
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    between the federal and state standards (an assumption which, in light of Dartt, appears quite reasonable). B Liberty asserts that, because the jury found only pretext, not pretext plus, it could not have acted with the evil motive or intent that the federal standard for exemplary damages requires. This assertion is not unlike Liberty’s due process argument, see supra Part III(B), and suffers the same fate. A jury need not find some special sort of malign purpose in order to exact punitive damages in a disparate treatment case because the “intent” that is necessary to under-gird an award of punitive damages in such a ease is the same “intent” that is required' for a finding of discrimination in the first place. See Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The Rowlett panel specifically rejected an

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the state of mind necessary to trigger liability for the wrong is at least as culpable as that required to make punitive damages applicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dontay D. Hayes appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging prison officials violated his constitutional right of access to the courts by denying him adequate access to the law library during prison lock-down periods. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Hayes’ action because the allegations in Hayes’ amended complaint demonstrate that, even if his access to the law library was deficient, he did not sustain an actual injury as a result of defendants’ conduct. See Letvis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no abstract freestanding right to a law library and a prisoner must demonstrate that his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim were hindered
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ... and judgments shall be entered chronologically in the civil docket.... These entries ... shall show ... the substance of each order or judgment of the court....” We have held that a judgment does not satisfy Rule 58 if “the inclusion of legal reasoning and authority” reaches the point of making “an order into a combined decision and order.” Diamond, 770 F.2d at 230 n. 10. We have also held, however, that a “single document that disposes of all remaining claims can satisfy Rule 58 so long as it is sufficiently terse.” Kidd v. District of Columbia, 206 F.3d 35, 37 (D.C.Cir.2000). There is no doubt that if the twelve pages issued by the district court in this case were regarded as one document, that document would not satisfy the requirements of Rule 58. See Haynes, 158 F.3d at 1331 (<HOLDING>). There is also no doubt that if the twelfth

    ### Response:
    holding that a threepage memorandum opinion  order containing the district courts reasoning and case citations failed to comply with the separate document requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and within -three years after such violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). Equitable argues that Malhotra’s claims are barred by the three-year prong of the statute of limitations. Under this prong, known as the “three-year statute of repose,” “a claimant has ‘no more than three years after the occurrence’ of the conduct inducing the Plaintiff to make its securities purchase to file a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim.” Isanaka v. Spectrum Technologies USA Inc., 131 F.Supp.2d 353, 356 (N.D.N.Y.2001) (citing Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 364 (2d Cir.1990); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer. Sales Practices Litigation, 975 F.Supp. 584, 605 (D.N.J.1996)) (<HOLDING>); Northwestern Human Servs., Inc. v. Panaccio,

    ### Response:
    holding that the threeyear limitations period for section 10b and rule 10b5 claims begins to run upon the date a defendant makes an affirmative misrepresentation or in the case of an omission upon the date a duty to disclose the withheld information arises
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. I. Standard of Review Whenever a prisoner files an action seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer of employee of a governmental entity, the court must review the complaint to ensure that the case goes forward only if it contains cognizable claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss the complaint, or any part thereof, if it is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This screening requirement applies both where the inmate has paid the filing fee and where he is proceeding in forma pauperis. See Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). In order to state a claim for relief under

    ### Response:
    holding that screening requirement applied to inmate who paid filing fee to commence action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in accordance with the law of the State where the arbitration took place;” (5) ""the decision is not yet binding on the parties or has been annulled or suspended by a competent authority of the State in which, or according to the law of which, the decision has been made;” (6) ""the subject of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under the law of th[e] State [of the tribunal];” or (7) “the recognition or execution of the decision would be contrary to the public policy (""order public”) of th[e] State [of the tribunal].” 9 U.S.C. § 207. Banco does not claim that any of these provisions apply. 10 . The other statutory grounds for vacatur listed in the FAA are: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) the arbitrator was guilty of ""misconduct in ... *2-*5 (<HOLDING>). 13 . The only significant difference between

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitrators denied defendant fundamental fairness by issuing an interim order requiring the posting of prejudgment security based on the parties statements of position as well as oral argument from counsel but without even a threshold review of the underlying dispute or its merits in relation to either partys case and without permitting discovery of files central and dispositive to the dispute before it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    school in the 1960s; the 1995 assault in his home; the assault in the marketplace; and the motorbike theft — cumulatively amount to past persecution. While we agree that these incidents are troubling, the record does not compel the conclusion that they rise to the level of “persecution.” See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.1993) (defining persecution as “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom,” and explaining that persecution “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or unconstitutional”); Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir.2008) (observing that “harassment and discrimination do not constitute persecution”); Lie, 396 F.3d at 536 (<HOLDING>). As to future persecution, Hadisaputra makes

    ### Response:
    holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants  are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    when, as in this case, the government relies on consent to justify a warrantless search, it bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary. See United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir.2004). Voluntariness is determined by reference to the “ ‘totality of all the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 231 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041). While more than “mere acquiescence in a show of authority” is necessary to establish the voluntariness of a consent, United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir.1993), the fact that a person is in custody or has been subjected to a display of force does not automatically preclude a finding of voluntariness, see United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). In considering a challenge to a district

    ### Response:
    holding that use of guns to effectuate arrest and handcuffing of defendant did not render his consent to search his home involuntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gen. Stat.] § 15A-926(b)(2).” However, at trial, Respondent did not object to joinder on this ground. Rather, Respondent argued that the incidents were diverse and that there was no indication that the same individuals were involved in all of the incidents. Therefore, Respondent failed to preserve the argument he now attempts to assert on appeal. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (stating that “[i]n order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context”); State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 496, 461 S.E.2d 664, 677 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996) (<HOLDING>). However, even assuming arguendo that

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant objected to the evidence on only one ground thus he failed to preserve the additional grounds presented on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employees) be left to its unfettered discretion. In the present case, Diercks sought review of a sale of property by the FSLIC in its corporate capacity. Yet, as we have noted, Congress left the decision of what to sell, how to sell and when to sell to the discretion of the corporation. Thus, the corporation could have sold the property without taking bids or by any other procedure it saw fit. That it chose the reasonable and commendable procedure of accepting bids and choosing the one that provided it with the greatest return is a decision which this court cannot question. Cf. § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (which prohibits judicial review of agency action “committed to agency discretion by law”) and Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 714 (9th Cir. 1964) (<HOLDING>). The decision of the district court dismissing

    ### Response:
    holding that due process does not require a hearing where only a potential privilege to purchase united states land is involved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to make these credibility determinations. Schneier v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 595 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The UAC may reverse the referee’s findings of fact, however, where there is no competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the referee’s decision. § 120.57, Fla. Stat. (1995); see also Smith v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 588 So.2d 324, 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Overall, the UAC cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute its findings for those of the referee. Studor Inc. v. Duren, 635 So.2d 141, 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In reviewing a substituted conclusion by the UAC, this court must assure that the correct rules of law were applied. See Public Employees Relations Comm’n v. Dade Co. Police Benevolent Assoc., 467 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla.1985)(<HOLDING>). Legal Test of Good Cause Whether an

    ### Response:
    holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “devise” and “inheritance”: Bequest - a gift by will of personal property; Devise - a testamentary disposition of land or realty; a gift of real property by the last will and testament of the donor; and Inheritance - property which descends to heir on the intestate death of another. Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. West Pub. Co.1979). Based on these definitions, the Debtor’s interest in the Trust was not derived byway of bequest, devise or inheritance. His rights in the trust were transferred inter vivos, not by way of will or intestate succession. This holding is consistent with the majority of Courts that have addressed the issue of whether an interest in an inter vivos trust is within the reach of § 541(a)(5)(A). See, e.g., In re Schmitt, 215 B.R. 417, 422, n. 2 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Newman, 903 F.2d 1150, 1154 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that inter vivos trusts are not considered interest obtained by bequest devise or inheritance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Benefits Communications Corp., 175 F.3d 155, 162 (D.C.Cir.1999) (broader SEA definition of “associated person” “reinforce[s]” the narrower NASD definition); Tays v. Covenant Life Ins. Co., 964 F.2d 501, 503 (5th Cir.1992) (same). We agree with the Fifth and D.C. Circuits that the definitions of the SEA do not necessarily control the meaning of the same terms in the NASD’s own By-Laws and Rules. Here, the Ni^SD’s different definition does not result in any rule or practice that is inconsistent with the statute or any regulatory command of the SEC. Moreover, the SEC reviews and approves all NASD rules and by-laws before they become effective. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3 & 78s; see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (<HOLDING>). We think it is safe to assume that the SEC

    ### Response:
    holding that the sec has specifically approved the arbitration procedures of the  nasd and no proposed rule change may take effect unless the sec finds that the proposed rule is consistent with the requirements of the exchange act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Defendant has raised numerous assertions that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community, it is unclear to the Court whether the unsubstantiated claims, absent four questionable affidavits, give rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence the statute requires. Black’s Law Dictionary defines clear and convincing as “proof beyond a reasonable, i.e., a well-founded doubt.” See Black’s Law Dictionary at 317 (4th ed. 1951). In this case, the Court has a doubt that Defendant may not flee or pose a danger to the community based on Defendant’s failure to proffer substantiated evidence. This fail ure leaves the Court no option but to find that Defendant has failed to meet the first prong of § 3143(b). See United States v. Manso-Portes, 838 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that Defendant met the first

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts decision to release defendant under  3143b based on mere perforce and not clear and convincing evidence constituted reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    left with “no remedy at all” if Costa Rican courts could not enjoin Dole’s activities in the United States and Honduras, where Dole grows its pineapples. In contrast, it is well-established that a United States district court is the proper jurisdiction to “award relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States.” Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952), 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 319 (enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant’s assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations); see also American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Dole is incorrect to state that the

    ### Response:
    holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where american corporation sought to enjoin another american corporations lanham act violations in saudi arabia
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or indirectly, to provide air transportation.” 49 USC § 40102(a)(2). Travel agents, tour operations, shipping and charterers and the like are “indirect air carriers” covered by the ADA. 14 CFR § 380.2; Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 378, 380 (N.D.Ill.1988) (preemption upheld because state law allowing travel agents to charge lower rates could “potentially cause the rates for airline tickets in Illinois to differ from those available in other states”); Arkin v. Trans Int’l, 568 F.Supp. 11, 13 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (finding that travel agents and tour operators are indirect air carriers); Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 1444, 35 L.Ed.2d 701 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Ry. Express Agency v. C.A.B., 345 F.2d 445,

    ### Response:
    holding that organizations arranging charter flights operate very much like a carrier and should be treated as a carrier regardless of the label it applies to its business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case and any resulting error from its admission is likely harmless. United States v. Yammine, 69 M.J. 70, 78 (C.A.A.F.2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The appellant alternatively claims that even if these chats were not substantially prejudicial for findings, their use by the members during sentencing “prejudiced [the appellant’s] right to a fair sentencing hearing.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. We disagree. Evidence of uncharged misconduct properly admitted at trial can also be considered in sentencing. See R.C.M. 1001(f)(2)(A) (providing that the sentencing authority may consider evidence of other offenses or acts of misconduct properly introduced on the merits even if introduced for limited purpose); see also United States v. Figura, 44 M.J. 308, 310 (C.A.A.F.1996) (<HOLDING>). Mil. R. Evid. 403 is the only limitation.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that all evidence admitted during merits phase of a contested trial can be considered in sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the motion for written opinion is granted. The prior per curiam affirmance dated July 13, 2016, is withdrawn, and the attached opinion is issued in its place. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained. KELLY, Judge. Edwin Roman appeals from his sentences for two counts of sexual battery on a person less than twelve years of age (counts I & II) and one count of lewd molestation (count III). He was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses. After a jury found Roman guilty of the charged offenses, the trial court sentenced Roman to concurrent terms of life in prison for counts one and two and a concurrent fifteen-year term for count three. While Roman’s appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Roman filed a motion to correct sentencing

    ### Response:
    holding that a juvenile seventeen years old or younger cannot be sentenced to life without parole in a nonhomicide case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proposed class. See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977) (discussing membership in a proposed class); Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1471 (6th Cir.1989) (“A class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as class members.’”) (citations omitted). While class definitions obviously are tailored to the specifics of every ease, important elements of defining a class include: (1) specifying a particular group that was harmed during a particular time frame, in a particular location, in a particular way; and (2) facilitating a court’s ability to ascertain its membership in some objective manner. Crosby v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672

    ### Response:
    holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    control, the conduct of the salespersons who allegedly discriminated against the Holleys with respect to the sale of real estate. While we recognize that corporate officers and shareholders are generally shielded from personal liability, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that “where common ownership and management exists, corporate formalities must not be rigidly adhered to when inquiry is made of civil rights violations.” Matchmaker, 982 F.2d at 1098. Thus, under relevant HUD regulatory history, and because the duty not to discriminate is a non-delegable one, we join other courts in holding that officers can be individually liable for discriminatory acts of corporate employees under their management and control. See e.g., Tropic Seas, 887 F.Supp. at 1365; Northside, 605 F.2d at 1354 (<HOLDING>). Our decision recognizes the duty under the

    ### Response:
    holding president and vicepresident of real estate corporation accountable for discriminatory acts of their agents whether or not the officers directed or authorized the particular discriminatory acts that occurred
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    has been explained as follows in syllabus point one of Cahill v. Mercer County Board of Education, 208 W.Va. 177, 539 S.E.2d 437 (2000): Grievance rulings involve a combination of both deferential and plenary review. Since a reviewing court is obligated to give deference to factual findings rendered by an administrative law judge, a circuit court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner with regard to factual determinations. Credibility determinations made by an administrative law judge are similarly entitled to deference. Plenary review is conducted as to the conclusions of law and application of , law to the facts, which are reviewed de novo. See also Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 195 W.Va. 297, 304, 465 S.E.2d 399, 406 (1995) (<HOLDING>). In syllabus point one of Randolph County

    ### Response:
    holding that we must uphold any of the aljs factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    her all of the items in storage, resulting in an unequal distribution, was justified because she had paid the costs to store the items, and testified that their total value was less than half of the storage costs. While the goal of equity and justice is certainly a factor to be considered in constructing a distribution, it is not the only factor, nor does the statute provide that it should carry more weight than the other enumerated factors. See § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). Rather, the statute provides that an unequal distribution can be made if it is justified after “all relevant factors” have been considered, including the factors contained in section 61.075(l)(a)-(j). See Boutwell, 920 So.2d at 158; see also Wagner v. Wagner, 61 So.3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), reh’g denied, (<HOLDING>). In the Final Judgment section entitled

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts must consider the ten factors listed in section 610751 when crafting an unequal distribution of marital assets
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    findings that formed the basis of the petitioners’ decision regarding Reverend Greer, and, ultimately, into the petitioners’ decision to retain Reverend Greer in his capacity as a minister. Under Ex parte Bole, the circuit court, is without subject-matter jurisdiction to hear those tort claims. I note that the plaintiffs argue that Ex parte Bole is distinguishable from the present case. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue, in part, that Ex parte Bole is distinguishable because they filed their tort claims as third parties who are completely outside the purview and ecclesiastical supervision and jurisdiction of the church. This distinction is insignificant. This Court’s decision in Ex parte Bole holds that a circuit court does not have jurisdiction over certain types of t -48 (Mo.1997) (<HOLDING>); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98-99

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment barred child victim of sexual abuse by priest from bringing negligent hiring and supervision claims but that first amendment would not be violated by adjudication of claim of intentional failure to supervise priest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This amended language not only returned the burden of establishing the basis for application of the accomplice witness rule to the accused in incest cases, it also reflects the seismic shift in the law regarding sexual assault cases between 1885 and the 1970s. This is particularly so when the incestuous act is between • a parent and child, beginning in childhood and continuing into adulthood. Consequently, the rule announced in Mercer and restated in Bolin was superseded by the 1973 amendments to the incest statute. Under Section 25.02 as it exists today, evidence merely establishing that the complainant was an adult and failed to complain or resist is not sufficient to establish that an incest victim was an accomplice. Cf. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 428, 439-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Rather, there must be affirmative proof

    ### Response:
    holding a person is not an accomplice if the person knew about the offense and failed to disclose it or helped the accused conceal it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865, (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unexhausted claims may be procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Reese v. Baldwin, 282 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir.2002). A claim is procedurally defaulted “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). If Beaty has any unexhausted claims, he has procedurally defaulted them, because he is now time-barred under Arizona law from going back to state court. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a); see also Stewart v. Smith, —U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 2578, 153 L.Ed.2d 762 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Properly exhausted claims may also be

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 322a is an adequate and independent procedural bar
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We likewise affirm the denial of qualified immunity with respect to the Santa Barbara County District Attorney (“DA”) officials. Prancevic has adduced evidence that would support a finding that his First Amendment protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the DA’s decision to transfer his work assignment from Santa Maria to Lompoc. For example, the Chief Trial Deputy of the DA’s office testified that Defendant David Saunders was “infuriated” by Prancevic’s letter, and “[i]n the meeting,” in which Prancevic’s transfer was ordered, “the context was obviously punishment.” The DA officials are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the case. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir.2009); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Again, whether there would be a First

    ### Response:
    holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on a previous Agency decision that has become final. See Jarrell v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 326, 332 (2006) (en banc) (noting a request for revision on the basis of CUE “is a collateral attack on an otherwise final benefits decision on the basis of a specific allegation of CUE”). It is not a claim for benefits, although it is related to benefits, and the duty to assist does not apply. See Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc). There can be no dispute that a request for waiver of indebtedness is related to VA benefits. The indebtedness in this case arose from an overpayment of benefits, 06) (remanding for the Board or regional office to give a sympathetic reading to pro se application for benefits); see also Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). B. The $12,347 Indebtedness At oral argument,

    ### Response:
    holding that the interpretation of a veterans filings is a factual inquiry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court retains jurisdiction in matters regarding parole when each component sentence imposed has a maximum of less than two years but the aggregate maximum consecutive sentence imposed is two years or more. The answer to this question today, as it has been each time this issue has come before this Court, is emphatically no. In addressing this very question in Commonwealth v. Evola, 421 Pa.Super. 595, 618 A.2d 969 (1992), allocatur denied, 535 Pa. 666, 634 A.2d 1114 (1993), and more recently in Commonwealth v. Hams, supra, we have clearly stated that the Parole Board has exclusive authority over parole matters when the aggregate maximum sentence equals or exceeds two years. Harris, 423 Pa.Super. at 197-99, 620 A.2d at 1179; see also Evola, 421 Pa.Super. at 599 n. 3, 618 A.2d at 971 n. 3 (<HOLDING>); McDermott, 377 Pa.Super. at 631, 547 A.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding that the court of common pleas had no authority to grant early parole when defendants aggregate sentence for imposed consecutive sentences is two or more years
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    accident insurance.” We are mindful that, in practice, the timing of payment as between the two coverages may differ. A claimant may generally obtain UM benefits (subject to subrogation rights) without first suing the uninsured tortfeasor. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Galloway, 373 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn.1985) (noting that injured claimants commonly collect UM benefits, subject to the insurer’s subrogation rights, before commencing an action against the uninsured motorist). In contrast, because UIM coverage depends upon the tortfeasor’s liability insurance being insufficient to cover a claimant’s damages, a UIM claim does not mature until after liability and damages have been established. See, e.g., Emps. Mut. Cos. v. Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d 855, 858 (Minn.1993) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, because UIM benefits are

    ### Response:
    holding that an injured claimant may not compel arbitration of uim coverage until after the tortfeasors liability and damages have been determined
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    against her, and to not incriminate herself. The trial court asked Nero if she was satisfied with her attorney, if she understood that she was pleading guilty and the sentence recommendation, and if everything put in front of her was explained to her. Nero testified that she has ADHD, but a mental evaluation found she did not suffer from any disability that would prevent her from knowing right from wrong and that she was competent to stand trial. Nero cites to Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (96 SCt 2253, 49 LE2d 108) (1976), for the assertion that her guilty plea should be withdrawn because it was not explained to her during the plea hearing that she was being charged as a party to the crime or that she was responsible for what the others did during the robbery. Id. at 644-647 (II) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has previously found that

    ### Response:
    holding where neither defense counsel nor the trial court explained to the defendant that intent to cause death was an element of seconddegree murder and there was no factual statement or admission implying intent the plea was involuntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 197-98 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam). However, May-field has not alleged any physical injury and his complaint seeks only compensatory damages. As such, Mayfield’s claims for damages are barred by § 1997e(e). See Geiger 404 F.3d at 375 (applying § 1997e(e) to bar prisoner’s claim for damages brought under § 1983 alleging a First Amendment violation); RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(e) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law amended by that Act).”); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) (noting that RLUIPA claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a)); see also Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Neither sovereign nor qualified immunity

    ### Response:
    recognizing that damage claims under rluipa are limited by  1997ee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which caused Niles to experience an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. In my opinion, there is. First, as the court of appeals noted, the unprovoked shooting by Salter amounted to evidence sufficient for a jury to infer that there was legal provocation. See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 573, 647 S.E.2d 144, 168 (2008) (“This court has previously held than an overt, threatening act or a physical encounter may constitute sufficient legal provocation.”). Second, I agree with the court of appeals that Niles’s testimony that he immediately returned fire out of fear for himself and his fiancee provided evidence from which a jury could find that Niles was acting pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 549, 500 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would affirm the court of

    ### Response:
    holding that the lower court properly charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter where defendant testified he was in fear of the threat of physical assault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    demonstrate an absence of jurisdiction, and the defect is incurable, then the cause is properly dismissed. Id. If the plaintiffs pleadings are insufficient to demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction, but do not affirmatively show incurable defects in jurisdiction, the proper remedy is to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to amend before dismissal. Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 555; Peek, 779 rson sought to be deposed be a potentially liable defendant in the claim under investigation. Because a portion of the claim under investigation — a claim against Altivia — is under the jurisdiction of the state district court, the court did not err in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. See City of Willow Park v. Squaw Creek Downs, L.P., 166 S.W.3d 336, 340-41 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order

    ### Response:
    holding citys plea to the jurisdiction in rule 202 proceeding properly denied because district court had jurisdiction over portion of claim under investigation even if city and governmental agency had exclusive jurisdiction over another portion of claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule concerning splitting,” there is no similar prohibition. Because Clu-siau dealt with a separate doctrine and was based on different practical considerations, we do not find it controlling here. ¶ 14 Our conclusion in this case comports with the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Vincent v. Clean Water Action Project, 939 P.2d 469, 473 (Colo.App.1997) (concluding that judgment in a court of limited jurisdiction “precludes later litigation of the same issues that were or could have been brought”); Orselet v. DeMatteo, 206 Conn. 542, 539 A.2d 95, 99 (1988) (finding claim preclusion prevented a subsequent action for personal injuries when a prior small claims judgment had awarded repair costs); Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803, 806 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Bagley v. Hughes A. Bag-ley, Inc., 465 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that claim preclusion applies to small claims court adjudication and that judicial economy is not served by encouraging resolution of property claims in small claims court and other claims in district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    given the rigorous requirements for establishing a famous mark. See, e.g., Washington Speakers, 33 F.Supp.2d at 502-03. (noting that famous marks must meet high standard and that marks famous only in specialized segment of market may be protected from dilution, if at all, only when diluting uses are directed narrowly at same market segment). In any event, these issues need not be resolved given the uncontested applicability of § 8.01-328.1(A)(4). 10 . In Bochan, the constitutional prong of the analysis was satisfied by the purposeful direction of the defamatory remarks at a Virginia defendant regarding activities presumably occurring in Virginia. See Bochan, 1999 WL 343780, at * 5, — F.Supp.2d at —; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (<HOLDING>); First American First, Inc. v. National Ass’n

    ### Response:
    holding that california courts assertion of personal jurisdiction over floridabased reporters did not violate due process when allegedly defamatory article that was the basis of the suit focused on the california activities of california residents
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a determination to be made by the Board, and the Board erred when it failed to consider and discuss it. . See Schafrath, 1 Vet.App. at 593; Ashmore, 1 Vet.App. at 582; Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 193; see also Weaver, 14 Vet.App. at 302. The Board also failed to discuss the facts in the record that reveal that the appellant first notified VA of his in-service hip injury in his August 1995 NOD and his July 1996 Substantive Appeal to the Board; and' he testified as to the details of the occurrence of such injury during his January 1997 hearing. R. at 211-12, 214-17. .It was-not until January 1997, however, in an SSOC issued following the appellant’s hearing testimony, that the RO first put the appellant on notice that the appellant’s SMRs could not be located. R. at 227. Then, in October 1998, t (<HOLDING>). Further, the Court held in Dixon v.

    ### Response:
    holding that vas duty to assist is particularly great in light of the unavailability of the veterans exit examination and full army medical records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forcible sexual abuse fits within the definition of an offense “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Our initial step in that determination is to ascertain the appropriate level of generality at which we assess “substantial risk.” Specifically, we must determine whether we consider, for purposes of assessing substantial risk under § 16(b), only the offense as defined by state law, or whether we can take into account the particular conduct alleged. A We conclude that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 and our precedents require that the crime of violence analysis be conducted at the level of the statutory definition. See United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.R.D. at 303 (quoting DAntuono, 570 F.Supp. at 714). The final three reasonableness factors involve the relationship between the Plaintiff and Ballard and their behavior during the time-period at issue. In this case none of three lead this Court to question the reasonableness of the forum selection clause. The negotiations culminating in the execution of the Agreement were at arms length (there are no allegations to the contrary), and Plaintiff is a sophisticated and successful medical device designer and consultant. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Ballard coerced Plaintiff into signing the agreement or that Plaintiff grudgingly acceded to a forum designation demand. On the contrary, there are allegations that the Agreement was drafted and enter . 545, 551 (N.D.Tex.1982)(<HOLDING>). While “the interest of justice” is less than

    ### Response:
    holding that transfer most appropriate under 28 usc  1406a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ■ authorities despite knowing that charges against Crain would be dismissed. Although Whitehead failed to allege prejudice with any specificity, he did allege that Strickland governed his claim. Six days after Whitehead filed his § 2255 motion, the district court summarily dismissed it. Habeas applications filed by pro se prisoners are entitled to liberal construction, and pleading errors do not bar consideration of the claims of pro se habeas applicants. Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir.1988); see also Haines v. Ker-ner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Furthermore, “Strickland requires that prejudice be proved, not pleaded.” Petty v. McCotter, 779 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Martinez, 181 F.3d 627, 628-29 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We VACATE and REMAND so that Whitehead can

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants conclusory assertion that he told his counsel he wanted to testify but that counsel failed to call him as witness was insufficient to require a hearing or a response from government but the defendant should have been allowed an opportunity to state his claim with greater specificity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    law violations that may be asserted under the ATS must be sufficiently definite in their content and acceptance among civilized nations that they reflect “historical paradigms” that were familiar at the time that the ATS was enacted. Id. at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Paradigmatic violations of the law of nations that were “probably on [the] minds” of the drafters of the ATS include “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 715, 124 S.Ct. 2739; see also id. at 720, 124 S.Ct. 2739. The Supreme Court also has suggested that the prohibition against torture exemplifies a norm that is “specific, universal, and obligatory.” Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1665 (citation omitted); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-87 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in the present case, the district

    ### Response:
    holding that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations and that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction under the ats concerning such international violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the Commissioner for a more complete evaluation of the evidence relating to the limitation in attending and completing tasks and, after completing this evaluation, whether L.B. is entitled to disability benefits. 1 . We amend our June 14, 2016 Memorandum (ECF Doc. No. 27) only to correct a typographical error in the second paragraph of our Analysis consistent with the remainder of our Memorandum and Order. 2 . Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir.2000). 3 . Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358; 360 (3d Cir.1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988)). 4 . Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir.1986). 5 . Id. at 1190-91; see also Gilmore v. Barnhart, 356 F.Supp.2d 509, 511 (E.D.Pa.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Schwartz v. Halter, 134 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding the courts scope of review is  limited to determining whether the commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the commissioners findings of fact 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whereas gross negligence is that course of conduct which a reasonable and prudent man would know would probably and most likely result in injury to persons or property. To put it another way, if the course of conduct is such that the likelihood of injury to other persons or property is known by the actor to be imminent or “clear and present” that negligence is gross, whereas other negligence would be simple negligence. Weller v. Reitz, 419 So.2d 739, 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (citations omitted). Thus, gross negligence requires: “(1) circumstances constituting an imminent or clear and present danger amounting to a more than normal or usual peril, (2) knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger on the part of the tortfeasor, and (3) an act or omission that evinces 4th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). Instead, the facts of this case more closely

    ### Response:
    holding the issue of gross negligence was a jury question where a branch manager was murdered during a robbery after the bank suffered two prior robberies and had withdrawn an armed security guard in violation of their own security manual
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    806; Farrell v. City of Auburn, 2010 ME 88, ¶¶1, 8, 3 A.3d 385 (each dismissing an 80B appeal from a notice of violation because, no matter how we ruled, the municipality retained discretion to initiate, or decline to initiate, a Rule 80K enforcement action). Some recent developments require review of that precedent. [¶ 10] In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1367, 182 L.Ed.2d 367 (2012), that an Environmental Protection Agency “compliance order,” the equivalent of a municipal notice of violation, was a final agency action subject to judicial review because the order affected the use of the property at issue and appeal was the only adequate remedy. Id. at 1372-74; see also Annable v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 507 A.2d 592, 595-96 (Me.1986) (<HOLDING>). Here, like the compliance order at issue in

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may reach the merits in a declaratory judgment action when an agency decision although a notice or advisory opinion can affect property uses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiffs injuries to determine whether the Feres doctrine bars his FTCA claim. See id. After reviewing the circumstances of plaintiffs injuries, and the rationales underlying the doctrine, the court finds plaintiffs FTCA suit is barred because his injuries occurred incident to his military service. There is no question that plaintiffs injuries were “at least ‘remotely related’ to [his] military service.” Corey v. United States, 1997 WL 474521, at *5, 124 F.3d 216(10th Cir. Aug.20,1997). B. DUTY STATUS Naturally, one of the facts always discussed when Cir.1986) (finding the presence of direct military control sufficient to invoke Feres despite the fact that the claimant was off-duty and involved in a recreational activity); Bozeman v. United States, 780 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). C. ON POST Courts also look at whether a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that suit against the government for alleged negligence of military club bartender would require questioning of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their casket purchase to a SCI or Alderwoods funeral home in the past. The fact that death is inevitable is not sufficient to establish a real and immediate threat of future harm. Appellants did not cite any evidence that any of the eleven named individuals are even charged with the task of purchasing a casket for a friend or relative upon his or her passing. “Such ‘some day’ intentions — without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 496, 129 S.Ct. 1142 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)); see also In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451, 461 (3d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that consumer plaintiffs failed to establish standing for antitrust injunction claim alleging anticompetitive conduct in the setting of title insurance rates where inter alia they did not allege any plans to buy title insurance in the future thus failing to raise their claims above the speculative level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See, e.g., Sipayung v. González, 491 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir.2007). The BIA found accordingly here, and there is nothing on this record that would “compel” a contrary result. Instead of a “pattern or practice” of persecution approach, Sugiarto relies on the disfavored group theory, arguing that she need only show a “comparatively low” level of individualized risk because Christians of Chinese ethnicity are a “disfavored group” in Indonesia. It is relevant in this context that country conditions evidence on the record, namely, State Department Human Rights Reports, do indicate some degree of continuing violence against Christians perpetrated by terrorist groups in Indonesia, even if a pattern or practice is not established. See, e.g., Budiono v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). But as previously discussed, the IJ and BIA

    ### Response:
    recognizing that ij should look at an individuals claim in the context of country condition reports
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasons that the district court “would not have sustained any objection” to the procedure because the court “clearly did not believe ... the settlement conference violated Rule 11(c)(1).” These arguments are unavailing for a number of reasons. First, nothing in the record indicates that Myers’s participation in the settlement conference was anything but voluntary — a point Myers’s appellate counsel conceded during oral argument. Myers requested the procedure and could have thereafter “unilaterally withdraw[n his] request for a settlement conference at any time,” N.D. Cal.Crim. R. 11 — 1(d), but he simply failed to do so. This failure supports reviewing Myers’s alleged error under our plain-error standard. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the record establishes that Myers’s

    ### Response:
    holding that a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of its claims by a preponderance of the evidence, as it would in any civil trial on the merits, suggests that the hearsay character of LVNV’s affidavits should not be ignored. 6 . In fact, counsel for the Debtor objected to the hearsay character of LVNV’s submitted affidavits both in its written objection to LVNV’s original proofs of claim and orally at the hearing. 7 . Although LVNV attached to its pleadings a redacted spreadsheet listing the Debtors’ account information and balance, the Court will not presume that this is the same ""Receivable File” described in the bill of sale between Sherman and LVNV; and this Court will also not presume that the spreadsheet submitted by LVNV came from the elusive ""Disk” supplied to Sherman by Citibank. Indeed, pp.-Tyler 2006, pet. denied)

    ### Response:
    holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Baptist Church of Mauldin v. City of Mauldin, 308 S.C. 226, 417 S.E.2d 592 (1992). The circuit court held “[u]nder the clear and unambiguous limitations of the statute a third party claim by BPV cannot be paid from the state fund.” We agree. On appeal, Worsley argues BPV had only a beneficial interest in tract # 60 and therefore had no control over the use of the property at the time of the release. At trial, however, the parties did not dispute that BPV was the owner of tracts # 60 and # 79 at all relevant times, including the time when the contamination occurred in 1991. From the record before us, we do not see where Worsley made this argument to the trial court. Accordingly, the argument is not properly before this court. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 497 S.E.2d 731 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Worsley argues the language limiting third

    ### Response:
    holding issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or to the single act alleged in the instant case. There was no evidence that the prior acts were in any way committed in conjunction with the charged offense, and thus there was no basis upon which to conclude that the prior acts were evidence of a common scheme or plan. The second branch of the “plan” exception in Rule 404(b) relates to questions of identity and motive, and often involve an examination of the similarity of the prior bad acts to the charged offense, or to the relationship between the defendant and the victim as means for showing motive. See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221-22 (Ind. 1997). Evidence of prior acts may be probative in that respect. Id. (citing, inter alia, Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 349 (Ind. 1996); Price v. State, 619 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind. 1993)) (<HOLDING>). Yet the State did not articulate how this

    ### Response:
    holding as relevant in a murder case a history of domestic violence involving defendant and his victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (1987) (and its progeny), which holds that the very nature of prescription drugs themselves precludes the imposition of a warrant of fitness for “ordinary purposes,” as each individual for whom they are prescribed is a unique organism who must be examined by a physician who is aware of the nature of the patient’s condition as well as the medical history of the patient. The reasoning in Makripodis, which involved a claim against a pharmacist, has subsequently been applied to bar breach of implied warranty claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers and makers of medical devices. See Luke v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 1998 WL 1781624 at *6 (Pa.Com.Pl.1998); Murray v. Synthes (U.S.A.), Inc., 1999 WL 672937 at *9 (E.D.Pa.1999). See also Hahn v. Richter, 543 Pa. 558, 673 A.2d 888, 891 (1996) (<HOLDING>) It is uncontested that New Jersey law

    ### Response:
    holding that where the adequacy of warnings associated with prescription drugs is at issue the failure of the manufacturer to exercise reasonable care to warn of dangers ie the manufacturers negligence is the only recognized basis of liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ ” Id (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). To state a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he was deprived of “a valid ‘property interest’ in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional protection at the time •■.[he] was deprived of that benefit,” and (2) that the defendants’ actions in depriving him of that interest were “ ‘so outrageously arbitrary as to be a gross abuse of governmental authority.’ ” Lisa’s Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 17 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir.1999)); see also Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 369-70 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In the context of substantive due process

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff must establish that the government misconduct was arbitrary conscienceshocking or oppressive in theconstitutional sense and not merely incorrect or illadvised internal quotation marks and citation omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    assert that the use of administrative subpoenas to target their jail calls “implicates the Fourth Amendment” because the defendants “maintain[ ] a reasohable expectation of privacy” in the subject'calls. Def. Panfilo Flores Apodaca’s Mot. Opp’n Gov’t Mot. Release Jail Phone Calls (“Panfilo’s Opp’n”) at 5, (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285,

    ### Response:
    holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his fourth amendment claims related to recordings as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Finally, because the sentences are not reclassified or “enhanced,” nothing prevented the court below from “stacking” them. See § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1983) (“Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively.”). Indeed, even had they been enhanced, only the minimum mandatory portions of the sentences could not be. “stacked.” See Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1983) (prohibiting the stacking of minimum mandatory sentences). For these reasons, we affirm the order on appeal. 1 . See Harris v. State, 766 So.2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (1983) (providing

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendants sentence for armed burglary in violation of section 810022b was improperly enhanced pursuant to section 775087 because the use of a weapon or a firearm is an essential element of armed burglary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abandoned the design defect claims. Thus, as Pike has now postured his case, he is no longer seeking to hold FDOT responsible for negligent installation, repair and maintenance of the guardrail, nor is he claiming a defect in Trinity’s design of the guardrail system. He is proceeding solely on a failure to warn theory against Trinity. IY. Discussion In Counts VII through X of his amended complaint (Doc. 54), Pike brings claims of negligence and strict liability against Trinity based on failure to warn, alleging that Trinity failed to warn FDOT personnel that parts from other guardrail systems could not be combined with Trinity’s ET-Plus guardrail system without compromising the system’s integrity. While Florida law recognizes claims of s, Inc., 427 So.2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (<HOLDING>); Zunck v. Gulf Oil Corp., 224 So.2d 386,

    ### Response:
    holding herbicide supplier bore no liability as a matter of law for companys misuse of product where company was aware that the herbicide would kill farmers crops if it was used near irrigation water explaining that a knowing misuse of a product does not render the manufacturer liable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Summons Goodman, acting in his individual capacity, claims dismissal of Wright’s personal capacity claims is proper because Wright failed to effect proper service upon Goodman. He claims Wright’s decision to mail his pleadings does not amount to service because mailing pleadings is not a proper method of service in Nevada and is thus improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). Because he did not waive service and was not personally served, Goodman concludes any attempted service by Wright was ineffective. Even if Wright properly served Goodman in his official capacity, Goodman must still be served in his personal capacity. See Kirkendall v. Univ. of Conn. Health Ctr., 205 F.3d 1323, 2000 WL 232071, at *1 (2d Cir.2000); cf. Robinson v. Turner, 15 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (citing Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 240

    ### Response:
    holding that in a bivens action service upon employee in his official capacity does not amount to service in his individual capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    337, 339, 39 L.Ed 409 (1895)] Although the constitutional right to confrontation is firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence, the right is not absolute. Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at 844, 110 S.Ct. at 3163, 111 L.Ed.2d at 677. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that the right is subject to certain exceptions of consequence. Id. at 857, 110 S.Ct. at 3170, 111 L.Ed.2d at 686 (using closed circuit television testimony does not violate Confrontation Clause where child witness fears defendant); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (admitting hearsay statements into evidence does not violate Confrontation Clause when statements have sufficient indicia of reliability); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107

    ### Response:
    holding an exception to confrontation clause must further important public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged ... activity”). When a plaintiff seeks certification to bring a collective action on behalf of others and asks the court to approve a notice to potential plaintiffs, the court has discretion to approve the collective action and facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs. Sperling, 110 S.Ct. at 487 (ADEA action); Villatoro v. Kim Son Restaurant, L.P., 286 F.Supp.2d 807, 809 (S.D.Tex.2003) (FLSA action). The court also has discretion to modify the proposed class definition if it is overly broad. See Baldridge v. SBC Communications, Inc., 404 F.3d 930, 931-32 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). See also Heeg v. Adams Harris, Inc., 907

    ### Response:
    recognizing the courts powr er to limit the scope of a proposed flsa action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would lead a reasonable man of caution to believe that certain items may be contraband ony concerning facts which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the gun was contraband. For example, there was no evidence that the officers knew appellant to be a convicted felon, that the shotgun was immediately recognizable as being illegal (i.e., sawed off shotgun), or that the shotgun was suspected of having been used in a crime which the officers were investigating. Furthermore, since appellant was arrested outside of the apartment and immediately handcuffed, and the officers entered the apartment only to check on the welfare of the small child, the safety of the officers was not a concern which would justify seizure of the gun. Compare Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla.1975)(<HOLDING>); Braham v. State, 724 So.2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA

    ### Response:
    holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view was lawful search incident to arrest where appellant was handcuffed but sitting within a few feet from where the gun was located
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a notice error is not prejudicial, it must find that, “despite the error, the adjudication was nevertheless essentially fair.” Overton, 20 Vet.App. at 435 (citing McDonough, supra). In this case, it is evident that VA’s failure to provide notice in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) did not constitute prejudicial error. Assuming arguendo that the appellant put forth sufficiently specific allegations of prejudice (see Appellant’s Br. at 13), the Court holds that YA has rebutted those allegations and demonstrated that no prejudice resulted from the § 3.304(f)(3) notice error. At several points in the record, the appellant demonstrated his actual knowledge of the amended provisions of § 3.304(f) and his ability to submit supporting evidence thereunder. See Sanders, 487 F.3d at 889 (<HOLDING>); Overton, 20 Vet.App. at 438-39 (finding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the secretary may demonstrate that an error is nonprejudicial by a showing that the purpose of the notice was not frustrated eg by demonstrating  that any defect was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contained unsubstantiated conclusions and imprecise accusations. In ordering restitution, the district court relied on several different pieces of evidence. The victims submitted affidavits describing the harms that they suffered and estimating the number of sex acts that they were forced to perform during the period in question, and the government submitted evidence from four independent sources to support its estimate of the price that Defendants charged for each sex act. Because we hold that the district court erred by calculating restitution using the market value of the prostitution services that the victims performed, we need not decide whether sufficient evidence supported that calculation. Cf. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Of course, some of the evidence on which the

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court used the wrong legal standard when calculating restitution and remanding for further proceedings without discussing sufficiency of the evidence under the wrong standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to ... prevent an abuse of process.” Courts have recognized that § 105 “provides a bankruptcy court with statutory contempt powers, in addition to whatever inherent contempt powers the court may have.” Bessette v. Avco Fin. Services, Inc. (In re Bessette), 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir.2000); Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1189 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that “we have held that the Trustee may be entitled to recovery for violation of the automatic stay ‘under section 105(a) as a sanction for ordinary civil contempt’ ”); Adell v. John Richards Homes Building Company, LLC, et al. (In re John Richards Homes Building Company, LLC), 475 B.R. 585, 594 (E.D.Mich.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re Moreno, 479 B.R. 553

    ### Response:
    holding that section 105a facilitates compliance with the bankruptcy code and the bankruptcy courts orders and compliance is one of the central goals of civil contempt sanctions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    acts are more appropriately discussed within our analysis of the doctrine of qualified public official immunity. 18 . Our critique of the analysis performed by the Court of Special Appeals in Rice and Tucker is limited to the court's endorsement of an incorrect test for determining the application of absolute judicial immunity; it does not reach other aspects of those opinions. 19 . In this regard, the position of a eourl-appointed trustee is similar to that of a court-appointed master. We stated in State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 714 A.2d 841 (1998), that ""[a] master is not a judicial officer, and the Maryland Constitution does not vest a master with any judicial powers.” Wiegmann, 350 Md. at 593, 714 A.2d at 845 (citing In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 106, 321 A.2d 516, 527 (1974) (<HOLDING>)). We observed in In re Marcus 405 Md. 221, 950

    ### Response:
    holding that a masters findings do not become binding until approved by a judge of the court to which he reports
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Ninth Circuit has already expanded Cunningham beyond Rule 37(a). In Cato v. Fresno City, 220 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.2000), this court stated that the “reasons underlying Cunningham’s bar against immediate appeal from Rule 37(a) sanctions orders apply equally to Rule 16 sanctions orders.” Cato followed Cunningham, holding sanctions imposed under Rule 16(f) to be appealable only after final judgment has been entered, even when the attorney no longer represents any party in the case. Id. Similarly, in American Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. North American Constr. Corp., we interpreted Cunningham to bar immediate appeal of an interlocutory order granting attorney’s fees as a condition of substituting counsel. 248 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir.2001). We stated that “[although th st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The law in the Second Circuit prior to

    ### Response:
    holding sanctions pursuant to rule 26g not immediately appealable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sivitz and Lebed Assoc., 798 A.2d 281, 237 (Pa.Super.2002) (indicating that “the fact that a plaintiff is not aware that the defendant’s conduct is wrongful, injurious or legally actionable is irrelevant to the discovery rule analysis”), but the general rule is most often stated in terms of the plaintiffs actual or constructive awareness of an injury caused by another. Even the limited focus on injury and cause is subject to reasonable controversy, since this Court, on occasion, has suggested a broader focus on the plaintiffs knowledge of the fact of a cause of action. See, e.g., Pastierik, 514 Pa. at 524, 526 A.2d at 327. Finally, different decisions may be read as suggesting differing litmuses in the application of the terms “injury” and “cause.” Compare, e.g., Caro, 867 A.2d at 538 (<HOLDING>), with Fine, 582 Pa. at 272-73, 870 A.2d at

    ### Response:
    holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    whether “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” exist, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); see Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2763. Here, the key question is should this Court infer the existence of a private right of action from the alleged violations of international law. An implied private action lies under the ATS “only for violations of treaties or customary international law.” Flores, 414 F.3d at 253; see Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2761-62. Thus, because Pfizer is not alleged to have violated any treaty, to state a claim under the ATS, Plaintiffs must demonstrate violation of a “clear and unambiguous” rule of customary international law. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (<HOLDING>). This Court has already discussed in Abdullahi

    ### Response:
    holding that because the prohibition on official torture is clear and unambiguous it can serve as a basis for suit under the ats
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    alleged that the County willfully violated the FLSA. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 896 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir.1990), the court interpreted a similar errors or omissions policy to not cover intentional acts. The Fireman’s Fund policy did not specifically exclude intentional acts of the insured. The exclusions in that policy, like the exclusions here, were for dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts. The court concluded that the only reasonable construction was that the insurance company “contracted to provide coverage for negligent — not intentional acts ****’’ Id. A willful violation of the FLSA does not constitute a “negligent act or omission.” Cf. City of Fort Pierre v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 848 (S.D. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, the FLSA is a federal statute that

    ### Response:
    holding negligent act error or omissions policy did not cover citys intentional decision to ignore federal government permit requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be made together with a Motion to Reopen. At oral argument, Appellant conceded that he did not raise this issue with the Bankruptcy Court. He also conceded that he could have done so in his Motion to Vacate the Amended Application without prejudicing his claims because his Motion was filed after the 10-year period for renewing a judgment had run. “It is well established that issues or theories not properly raised or presented in the trial court may not be asserted on appeal, and will not be considered by an appellate tribunal. A party who fails to raise an issue in the trial court has therefore waived the right to do so on appeal.” In re Marriage of Eben-King & King, 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 117, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 113 (2000); Iliff v. Dustrud, 107 Cal.App.4th 1201, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 (2003) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Bankruptcy Court did

    ### Response:
    holding that appel lants argument regarding timeliness of appellees motion to set aside the renewal of judgment was waived because that argument was not raised in the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs perjury trial, did not go so far as to find that Plaintiffs arrest or prosecution lacked probable cause; rather, it found that the evidence put forth by the prosecution was “legally insufficient to establish [Plaintiffs] guilt of perjury in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Hadid, 121 A.D.3d at 813, 993 N.Y.S.2d 754). Such a finding, in Defendants’ view, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of probable cause raised by Plaintiffs perjury indictment. Id. Furthermore, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs conviction in New York State Supreme Court does not undermine probable cause, but instead provides an alternative basis for the presumption of probable cause. Id. at 11 (citing Mitchell v. Victoria Home, 434 F.Supp.2d 219, 228 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (McMahon, J.) (<HOLDING>) and Soto v. City of New York, 132 F.Supp.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that a conviction even when later reversed creates a rebuttable presumption of probable cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to Dr. Bailey’s August 1993 BMAO. That opinion was obtained after the issuance of the October 1991 SSOC (R. at 838), and the appellant was not thereafter afforded an opportunity to respond or to submit additional evidence. See Williams, 8 Vet.App. at 138. Moreover, even if such an opportunity had been provided, the very use of the BMAO by the Board without a discussion of compliance with applicable regulations would have raised the same questions raised in Austin and Williams about the process by which the BMAO was obtained and used. However, the Austin violation can result in an unfair adjudication and a remand only if the Court determines that the denial of the § 1310 DIC claim was properly reopened by the Board. See Edenfield v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 384, 390-91 (1995) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); White (Frank) v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 247, 252

    ### Response:
    holding that because appellant had failed to submit wellgrounded claim boards failure to comply with fairprocess requirements enunciated in thurber 5 vetapp at 126 was not prejudicial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Id. 56(c). Here, the relevant question requiring factual support is whether DBA’s contracts with debt collectors and law firms are extraterritorial or not. As indicated above, the answer to this question is extremely fact sensitive, resting on where the essential elements necessary for contract formation took place. The record, however, is bereft of such evidence. As defendants point out, Berman’s bald assertion that DBA’s contracts with debt collectors and law firms are entered into “outside of the State of New York” does little more than restate the legal conclusion that these contracts are extraterritorial. As a legal conclusion, it cannot support summary judgment. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Suzy Phillips Originals, Inc. v. Coville,

    ### Response:
    holding that district court properly refused to rely on affidavits to the extent that they contained only legal conclusions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is a “threshold inquiry,” which must be resolved before reaching the merits of a suit. See City of Clarkson Valley v. Mineta, 495 F.3d 567, 569 (8th Cir.2007). “To show Article disputed parcels into trust, Roberts County will lose $254.92, $259.34, $1300.86, and $1474.80, respectively, in annual property taxes. It is reasonably certain the State will be deprived of additional tax revenues, because the State is “categorically]” prohibited from laying a direct tax “on a tribe or on tribal members inside Indian country.” Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458, 115 S.Ct. 2214, 132 L.Ed.2d 400 (1995). Thus, the State has a direct and tangible economic interest in the agency’s decision. See Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 584 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2008) (<HOLDING>). To proceed on its claim, the State also must

    ### Response:
    recognizing a states interest in the loss of taxing and regulatory authority over lands taken into trust was sufficient to satisfy article iii standing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district court should not have dismissed their claims against T/C LLC with prejudice. In Cole v. First National Bank of Fort Smith, 304 Ark. 26, 800 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (1990), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had completed service for purposes of the savings statute when it sent the complaint and summons by certified mail addressed to the defendant at his post office box, and the defendant’s stepdaughter accepted service and signed the return receipt. Although the trial court found that service had been perfected, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the defendant’s stepdaughter was not his agent and thus that service had not been perfected. Id. at 414. Nevertheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the savings statute applied. Id. Somewhat similarly, 52 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff did not complete service when she made no attempt to serve the defendant within the time required by the arkansas procedural rules
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the court should not have treated all of Target Oil’s investor funds obtained during the conspiracy as “proceeds” because the government needed to prove that the overt acts of fraud directly generated the funds Vernon claimed. But the statutory language — defining proceeds to include property obtained “directly or indirectly” from the crime — and our criminal forfeiture cases endorse no such stringent standard. For instance, in Michael and Christopher’s appeal, we held that the investor money that funded the purchase of the cashier’s checks constituted forfeitable proceeds because “the transactions ‘all resulted directly or indirectly from a conspiracy to commit fraud.’ ” Smith, 749 F.3d at 488-89 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 332 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Notably, Smith did not require evidence

    ### Response:
    holding entirety of the businesss revenue constituted forfeitable proceeds that resulted whether directly or indirectly from the conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for energy will be met with least-cost service. Edison maintains that the City’s interpretation of section 8—402 is contrary to two basic rules of statutory construction: (1) a specific statutory provision controls over a more general provision (Maxwell v. Hobart Corp. (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 108, 111, 576 N.E.2d 268; see also Governor’s Office of Consumer Services v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 68, 580 N.E.2d 920 (GOCS)); and (2) no statutory provision should be interpreted so as to render another provision meaningless. In re Application of County Collector (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 64, 72, 547 N.E.2d 107. First, the City seeks to impose a statutory duty through section 1—102, even though that section is merely prefatory in nature. (See GOCS, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 74 (<HOLDING>).) Thus, the requirements of section 8—402

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1102 of the act does not impose any substantive requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mimshell Fabrics, LTD., 491 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1974); cf. In re Enark Industries, Inc., 86 Misc.2d 985, 383 N.Y.S.2d 796 (App.Term 1976) (per curiam). As explained by Mimshell, the test is composed of two parts: 1) was the debtor actually doing business at the location in question as evidenced by its frequent use by the debtor in the production of revenue? 491 F.2d at 23; In re Airequipt, Inc., 1 B.C.D. 1494 (S.D.N.Y.1975); see P.S. Products Corp. v. Equilease Corporation, 435 F.2d 781, 783 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1970); see, e.g., In re John Adams Henry, Inc., 5 U.C.C. 795, 799-801 (B.C.S.D.N.Y.1968); In re Golden Kernel, Inc., 5 U.C.C. 43 (B.C.E.D.Pa.1968); cf. In re McQuaide, 5 U.C.C. 802, 807 (B.C.D.Vt.1968) (bookkeeping isn’t doing business); In re Falkof, 2 U.C.C. 731 (B.C.D.Mass.1963) (<HOLDING>); and 2) was such use notorious, i.e., was

    ### Response:
    holding preparatory meetings isnt doing business
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the speech of its employees so that it can carry on an efficient and effective workplace. 3. Employee must show the speech was a substantial factor driving the challenged governmental action. 4. If so, can the employer show that it would have taken the same employment action against the employee even in the absence of the protected speech? Kent v. Martin, 252 F.3d 1141, 1143 (10th Cir.2001) (citations and quotation omitted). Applying the Pickering/Connick balancing test, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Downing. It concluded that the issue of King’s lapsed insurance and his interest in forming a union failed at the first step, because both involved personnel issues, not protected speech that touched on matters of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (<HOLDING>). The district court further concluded that

    ### Response:
    holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    right to a set off, the court drew analogies to mandatory subordination under 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (providing that certain claims arising from the purchase of a “security” of the debtor “shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security”) and equitable subordination under 11 U.S.C. § 510(e)(1) (authorizing the bankruptcy court “under principles of equitable subordination [to] subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim”). See id. at 903-07. The appellants concede that the right to a set off under § 553 is merely permissive and subject to the discretion of the bankruptcy court. In re Diplomat Electric, Inc., 499 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). In this case, had the bankruptcy court

    ### Response:
    holding that the right to a set off in bankruptcy is discretionary and reviewing the denial of a set off for clear abuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pellicano recorded many other persons with whom he discussed wiretapping. This evidence would support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that the Pellicano-Christensen recordings might contain similar discussions about wiretapping, especially in the context of Christensen’s representation of Kerkorian and the large sums of money Christensen’s firm had paid Pellicano. The affidavit also recounted testimony from former PIA employees that “confirmed the widespread use of wiretapping in Pellicano’s investigations.” We conclude that the government made the requisite “minimal showing” that the Pellicano-Christensen recordings might contain evidence showing the crime-fraud exception applied to any privileged communications within them. Cf. Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d at 830 (<HOLDING>). Jp. Zolin’s second step Under Zolin’s second

    ### Response:
    holding that the government met zolins first step in case involving illegal exports where affidavit based on testimony of two former employees  as well as on telephone records invoices and other documentary evidence established that a corporation used an export license to disguise illegal exports and sought its counsels legal assistance in furtherance of the scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    general understanding of the doctrine of constructive termination.” Id. at 1258. Drawing on the analogous doctrine, the Court noted that “[t]o recover for constructive discharge,... an employee generally is required to quit his or her job.” Id. at 1258. The Court further explained that in both instances, the legal relationship has ended. See id. at 1258-59. Based on this dicta, the plaintiff contends that a cause of action for constructive discharge accrues when the legal relationship ends. We are not persuaded. Though of first impression in New Hampshire, several other jurisdictions have addressed this legal issue. See, e.g., Daniels v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 773 A.2d 718, 721-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (collecting cases); Clark v. State, 754 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (App. Div. 2003) (<HOLDING>); UTMB v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.

    ### Response:
    holding claim accrued when employee tendered letter of resignation not when resignation became effective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Inc., 663 F.Supp.2d 883, 899 (C.D.Cal.2009), which surveys California law on whether California employment laws apply to various iterations of employees. Sarviss involved a class challenge to a military contractor’s employment practices brought by a former helicopter pilot. In Sarviss, the court held that although the employee was a California resident, the fact that he performed the “significant majority of his employment outside of California” rendered California’s wage and hour laws inapplicable to his work. Id. Even though the defendant in Sarviss was a Virginia corporation, the court held that the determinative issue is whether the employee principally worked in California. See also Vendetti v. Compass Environmental, Inc., No. 06 CV 3556, 2006 WL 3694852 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 14, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, an unpublished California Court of

    ### Response:
    holding illinois wage law only applied where at least some work was performed within the state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The APD simply provided no support for the broad assertion that it was more qualified to determine the credibility of a developmentally disabled individual, and we have found no authority holding that an agency can make a credibility de termination based on the characteristics of the witness. If there were such an exception, the permutations credibility determination and resulted in new factual findings relating to Bridlewood’s post-incident conduct. This constitutes reversible error, see Heifetz, 475 So.2d at 1282; Rogers, 920 So.2d at 31, and we reject any argument that the APD was justified in its action because it was merely rejecting or modifying a conclusion of law, see Pillsbury v. State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 744 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). We therefore reverse the final order revoking

    ### Response:
    holding that the mere fact that a factual determination is labeled a conclusion of law does not make it so and that an agency cannot avoid its obligation to honor an aljs findings of fact by attempting to categorize them as such
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nyabwa v. Stephens, No. 12-20682, 2013 WL 3091894, at *1 (5th Cir. June 20, 2013). 4 . Although the court held the statutory subsection did not regulate speech, the opinion states: ""Texas Penal Code section 21.15(b) neither limits photography because of the ideas expressed nor favors one type of photograph over another; therefore, the statute is content-neutral.” See Nyabwa, 366 S.W.3d at 725. As a result, the court seemingly agrees the statute regulates speech, that is, photography, but does it in a ""content neutral” manner. See id. 5 . Although Thompson did not explicitly address the O’Brien factors in his briefing, we liberally construe his arguments as they apply to the O’Brien test. See Burnett v. Sharp, 328 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Based on this court's holding on the

    ### Response:
    holding court must construe pleading liberally in pleaders favor and construe petition to include all claims that reasonably may be inferred from language used in petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    moved before trial to dismiss the actions, citing the'forum-selection clause printed on each passenger ticket. This clause purported to obligate the passenger to institute any suit arising in connection with the contract in Naples, Italy, and to renounce the right to sue elsewhere. The District Court denied petitioner’s motions to dismiss, holding that the ticket as a whole did not give reasonable notice to passengers that they were waiving the opportunity to sue in a domestic forum. Without v. S. N. C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F. 2d 905, 908 (CA3 1988), cert. dism’d, 490 U. S. 1001 (1989); Sterling Forest Associates, Ltd. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 840 F. 2d 249, 253 (CA4 1988); Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F. 2d 848, 851 (CA8 1986) (<HOLDING>). We now affirm. II Title 28 U. S. C. § 1291

    ### Response:
    holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    No State of Washington case has been identified which has considered whether railbanking is a railroad purpose, and no State of Washington case has cited to Troha. In fact, the State of Washington Supreme Court rejected the concept that a railroad easement could constitute a perpetual public easement under Washington law in Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d at 1313. Moreover, no federal court has relied on the holding in Troha that railbank-ing with interim trail use preserves future rail service. In fact, the only court to cite to the Troha decision is the United States Court of Federal Claims. For example, in a footnote in Raulerson v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. 9, 12 n. 2 (2011), the court cited to Troha and stated: “But see Troha v. United States, 692 F.Supp.2d 550, 559-60 (W.D.Pa.2010) (<HOLDING>).” Raulerson v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. at 12

    ### Response:
    holding that railbanking agreement precluded finding of abandonment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to meet the criteria for admission.”). 7 . Cf. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1986 (""Congress's objective in authorizing the development of E-Verify was to ensure reliability in employment authorization verification, combat counterfeiting of identity documents, and protect employee privacy. Arizona’s requirement that employers operating within its borders use E-Verify in no way obstructs achieving those aims.”). 8 . See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2505 (A ""[cjonflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as a conflict in overt policy.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 . Other courts also have found state anti-harboring provisions to be preempted by federal law. See Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), reh’g en banc denied, No. 11-13044 (11th Cir.

    ### Response:
    holding that  1324 preempted georgia law criminalizing harboring of aliens
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    over the message’s direct effect on those who are exposed to it.” Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir.2001). On its face, § 32.03(k) concerns the regulation of alcohol, not the suppression of erotic speech. Section 32.03(k) regulates no aspect of any protected expressions exhibited in the erotic dancing offered at the Clubs. Even with § 32.03(k) enforced, the Clubs could nonetheless offer erotic dancing, albeit not together with the service of alcohol. Section 32.03(k), however, references SOBs and applies to them, but that a statute references content does not alone mean that it is intended to suppress speech, even without a legislative record to suggest a purpose unrelated to speech. See id.; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); Sammy’s of Mobile, 140 F.3d at 998 (noting

    ### Response:
    holding that the purpose of a statute that prevented nude dancing was not to suppress protected speech despite no legislative history
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    killed by fire or gunshots and, thus, were “acutely aware of their impending deaths.” Accordingly, and based upon the aforementioned reasons, we find that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that this murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Pecuniary Gain Aggravator Looney next argues the trial court erred in finding the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. This Court, however, has previously rejected Looney’s argument that the pecuniary gain aggravator in inconsistent with a concurrent finding of the avoid arrest aggravator. See Thompson v. State, 648 So.2d 692, 695 (Fla.1994) (citing Preston v. State, 607 So.2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1992)); see also Hildwin v. State, 727 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 680

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to establish this aggravator the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that the murder was motivated at least in part by a desire to obtain money property or other financial gain 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    these circumstances, we conclude that the EEO was justified in dismissing her complaint for failure to cooperate, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.107(a)(7), 1614.108(c)(3) (2012), and that her actions were inconsistent with exhaustion of her administrative remedies, see Woodard v. Lehman, 717 F.2d 909, 913-17 (4th Cir.1983); Johnson v. Bergland, 614 F.2d 415, 417 (5th Cir.1980); cf. Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1094-96 (9th Cir.2002). Finally, Kobraei argues that she is entitled to review of the merits of her claim because the EEO office took more than 180 days to investigate her claim and to reach a final determination. Because Ko-braei did not raise this issue in the district court, we decline to review it in the first instance. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, although we conclude the

    ### Response:
    recognizing that issues raised for first time on appeal generally are not considered absent exceptional circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of counsel generally cannot be reviewed on direct appeal unless it has been presented to the district court.”); Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429, 433-34 (7th Cir.2000)(ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not generally appropriate for direct appeal as they often rely on evidence outside the record); United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 785 (6th Cir.1998)(“Unless the record on appeal is adequate to assess the merits of the defendants' allegations, we will not address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on direct appeal.”); United States v. Cocivera et al., 104 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir.1996) (same); United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 170 (2d Cir.1996) (same generally); United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Camacho, 40 F.3d 349, 355

    ### Response:
    holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be required. Id. Special rules of construction apply to evaluating summary judgment motions: the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a.judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The Ninth Circuit has reiterated that a high standard exists for granting of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Schnidrig v. Columbia Machine, Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); see also Lam v.

    ### Response:
    holding that courts should require very little evidence to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case because the ultimate question is one that can be resolved only through a searching inquiry  one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder upon a full record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    add a new specification or test method, or otherwise provide additional assurance of purity, identity, strength, or reliability of the device. [PMA Supplements, 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d) (1999).] 18 We observe that plaintiffs' argument that ""Dear Doctor” letters, telegrams, or other similar materials are not ""labeling” changes under 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) is wrong. Those alternative methods of warning the Test's users suggested by plaintiffs clearly constitute ""labeling” under the FDCA. Cases interpreting the definition of “labeling” have held that “it is clear that supplementary or explanatory information disseminated by the producer of a drug or device may constitute labeling,' regardless of whether it physically accompanies the product.” Washington Lega 4, 656 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>); Goodlin v. Medtronic, 167 F.3d 1367, 1376 (11

    ### Response:
    holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a plaintiff of a federally protected right” the Court held, “necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken by the ... authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Thus, Brown confirmed the notion that an official’s single act can provide the basis for municipal liability so long as that act violated federal law. Id. In accordance with these precedents, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has. recognized the proposition that an official’s single act can serve as a policy and thus establish a basis for municipal liability. Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Dickinson v. Chitwood, No.

    ### Response:
    holding that a policy for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an officials single decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with Massachusetts law is only the first step. At issue in this case is MERS’s power to assign the mortgage. The prevailing view in Massachusetts is that MERS has the power of assignment by virtue of its nominee status. See, e.g., In re Marron, 455 B.R. at 7; Aliberti, 779 F.Supp.2d at 249; Kiah, 2011 WL 841282, at *8; see also Randle v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. MISC 408202(GHP), 2010 WL 3984714, at *7 (Mass.Land Ct. Jan. 4, 2011) (Piper, J.) (accepting validity of assignment by MERS without question as to its authority); Amtrust Bank v. T.D. Banknorth, N.A., No. 07 Misc. 350750(KCL), 2010 WL 1019638, at *2 n. 2 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 22, 2010) (Long, J.) (same). These courts have focused on the agency relationship inherent in MERS’s designation as nominee. See Kiah, 2011 WL 841282, at *4 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, although the standard MERS mortgage

    ### Response:
    holding that merss power to act as the agent of any valid note holder includes the power to assign
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court and the court of appeals agreed that equitable subrogation is inapplicable because the equities between Medica and Atlantic were equal. After reviewing the record, we conclude that equitable subro-gation is not appropriate under the facts and circumstances in the instant case. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. 1 . “Medica” refers to'Medica, Inc., the appellant in this case, while "" 64-65, 321 N.W.2d 199, 203-04 (1982) (interpreting ""person responsible for such injury or death” in a crime victims statute as referring to the person who caused an injury when the statute was entitled ""Recovery from offender” and the statute as a whole referred to awards to victims of crimes). 4 . See, e.g., Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Karsten, 13 Mich.App. 46, 49-50, 163 N.W.2d 670, 671-72 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Ballavance v. Safeco Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract and not conversion. See Clapp v. Gilt Edge Consol. Mines Co., 33 S.D. 123, 128-29, 144 N.W. 721, 723 (1913). No person may recover a greater amount in damages for the breach of an obligation than he could have gained by full performance on both sides absent statutory exemplary damages. SDCL 21-1-5. Nelson may not recover damages twice for the same injury simply because he pleads two legal theories — one in breach of contract and one in tort. Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 518, 521 (8th Cir.1980) (applying South Dakota law, and holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a separate damage award where each cause of action was simply an alternate theory seeking relief for the same wrong); Hoovestol v. Security State Bank, 479 N.W.2d 854, 862 (N.D.1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant

    ### Response:
    holding that a party may not recover twice for the same injury simply because he has two legal theories
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if Transport learned Faireloth could not establish her relation to Judith Kervin, Transport might withdraw its settlement offer. The excluded evidence was unquestionably relevant to the issue of injury. Transport assigned no error to the exclusion of the evidence, however. Its only complaint is that the evidence in the bill of exceptions conclusively established Faircloth’s lack of injury. For two reasons, we cannot adopt Transport’s argument as grounds for vacating the jury’s findings on the common-law claims. First, an appellate court generally may not reverse and render a different judgment based on excluded evidence. J.M. Abott Oil Co. v. San Antonio Brewing Ass’n, 104 Tex. 574, 141 S.W. 517, 517 (1911); see Martin v. Allman, 668 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1984, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Evidence is not conclusive unless it was

    ### Response:
    holding that a party is entitled to rely on a favorable ruling and need not rebut evidence tendered by an opposing party in a bill of exceptions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pecuniary gain and in an ""especially heinous, cruel or depraved"" manner. See Ring, 536 U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 2435. 27 . The court found that Ring had a minimal criminal record. See id. 28 . The court struck the ""depraved” circumstance. See id. at 2436. 29 . See § 782.04, Fla. Stat. (2001). 30 . The current penalty statute reads as follows: 775.082 Penalties; applicability of sentencing structures; mandatory minimum sentences for certain reoffenders previously released from prison.— (1) A person, who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise suc S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972) (<HOLDING>). 42 . See Motion to Call Circuit Judge to

    ### Response:
    holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was not violated by a ninetothree guilty verdict in a state noncapital case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    abstract idea. For example, courts have considered whether the claims purport to “improve the functioning of the computer itself,” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359, which may suggest that the claims are not abstract, or instead whether “computers are invoked merely as a tool” to carry out an abstract process. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335; see also id. .(noting that “some improvements in computer-related technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and the like. Nor do we think that claims directed to software, as opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract!)]”). The Federal Circuit has followed this approach to find claims patent-eligible in several cases. See id. at 1335-36 (cla , Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177,

    ### Response:
    holding that claims directed to a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes a type of liver cell were not abstract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of section 378-2, her argument fails. Notwithstanding the remedies sought, claims under section 378-2 are governed by a 180-day administrative filing requirement. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 368-ll(c)(1); Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc’y, 85 Hawai'i 7, 936 P.2d 643, 654 (1997). AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from part 2 of the court’s decision. I would vacate summary judgment on Horita’s Title VII claim because she has demonstrated a triable issue of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel that would make her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge timely. See Bolker v. Comm’r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Assuming the employer’s decision to terminate

    ### Response:
    holding we may consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal when the issue presented is purely one of law and  depends on the factual record developed below
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conclude that knowledge of a financial relationship between Thurman and ICE can be equated with knowledge of the existence of ICE's security interest in the truck, let alone with knowledge that the sale of the truck from Thurman to Chris-man violated ICE's rights. This is the case even when we consider that the sale took plaee at another auction after the auction ended because, by all accounts, it was Thurman's subsequent failure to pay ICE, not the sale of the truck, that violated ICKE'3 rights. In the absence of designated evidence showing that Chrisman or the Aldersons had knowledge that the sale of the truck violated ICE's rights, Chris-man and the Aldersons were buyers in the ordinary course of business. See Madrid v. Bloomington Auto Co., 782 N.E.2d 386, 397 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). ICE also argues that Indiana Code Section

    ### Response:
    holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Annie Brooks appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment 773 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly granted summary

    ### Response:
    holding that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered at summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    does not provide any structure. The limitation is drafted as a function to be performed rather than definite structure or materials. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1307, 46 USPQ2d at 1755. La Gard asserts that a “lever moving element” is a known structure in the lock art, but the district court determined otherwise. While true that “[m]any devices take their names from the functions they perform,” Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1580, 39 USPQ2d at 1786, the “substantially non-resilient lever moving element” of claim 3 is not one of them. The district court determined that a “lever moving element” had not been shown to have a generally understood structural meaning in the art. See Mas-Hamilton, 21 F.Supp.2d at 730-31. We agree. See Green-berg, at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1786, (<HOLDING>)- La Gard has not directed this court to any

    ### Response:
    holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    government provided testimony indicating that Juarez-Gomez drove to and stopped at the trailer for an extended period of time on two separate days after drug sales. On the second day that Juarez-Gomez drove to the trailer, Detective Marbrey asked the landlord of the trailer to notify him when the yellow truck left the trailer. The landlord called Marbrey the next morning when the truck had departed the trailer, permitting the jury to draw the reasonable inference that Juarez-Gomez stayed at the trailer overnight. 6 . The government presented both argument and evidence at trial sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that A.G. was Juarez-Gomez’ have rejected such an argument in unpublished decisions. See United States v. Gutierrez, 506 Fed.Appx. 714, 722 (10th Cir.2012) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Salguero-Ortiz, 483

    ### Response:
    holding that deportable alien status is not a ground for departing downward
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Procedure provides in relevant part: On a defendant’s motion, the court may grant a new trial to that defendant if the interests of justice so require____A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made only within three years after the verdict or finding of guilty.... A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds may be made only within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. We agree with the government that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order a new trial on November 5, 2001 for two reasons. First, the district court did not have jurisdiction to order a new trial because there was no motion pending. See United States v. Brown, 587 F.2d 187,189-90 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>) {citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 33). Moreover, even

    ### Response:
    holding that district court is powerless to order a new trial except on the motion of the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Timothy Reid was convicted of possession of cocaine following his no contest plea. He appeals, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine. We affirm, because the police officer lawfully seized the cocaine after discovering it in plain view when appellant was ordered out of his vehicle during the course of a lawful traffic stop for obstructing traffic. The trial court properly determined that appellant’s conduct in parking his vehicle in the roadway near an intersection and causing another vehicle to drive around appellant’s vehicle provided probable cause for the traffic stop. The facts in this case show an intent to impede or hinder the free flow of traffic, thus distinguishing this case from Underwood v. State, 801 So.2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, because the deputy had probable cause

    ### Response:
    holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    if believed by a reasonable trier of fact, would allow a finding of no unlawful discrimination, then “ ‘the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens’ — disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [is] ‘discrimination vel non.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citation omitted). At summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, a court should examine the record as a whole, just as a jury would, to determine whether a jury could reasonably find an invidious discriminatory purpose on the part of an employer. See Howley, 217 F.3d at 151; Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir.1997); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (<HOLDING>). A court is to examine “the entire record to

    ### Response:
    holding that an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a crime of violence under the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)). Under these circumstances, the Court finds the cause prong satisfied. As for prejudice, if Mr. Johnson were to prevail on this motion, then, inter alia, the § 924(c) counts based on arson (Counts 10, 15, and 21) would be vacated—counts for which he received three life sentences without release. As Mr. Johnson points out, “[wjithout the convictions, [he] could have received a release date.” Reply at 4. Thus, prejudice is clear as well. Because there is both cause and prejudice, the Court now turns to the merits of Mr. Johnson’s motion. C. Johnson II’s Applicability The government acknowledges that, several months ago, this Court held in United States v. Baires-Reyes, No. 15-cr-00122 601 (3d Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). The Court is not persuaded. The reasoning of

    ### Response:
    holding after bairesreyes was decided that  16b is void for vagueness in the context of the ina
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    induced (i.e., the plaintiffs' rights to force ALPA to keep its promises). If the source of the rights ‘is state common law, then preemption obviously applies, as this Court discussed in Dunn and as the Eastern District of Virginia discussed in Nellis. If the source of the plaintiffs' rights is the CBA, the Merger and Fragmentation Policy, and ALPA's Constitution and ByLaws, then preemption still applies, as is discussed in the body of this Order as well as by other courts in such cases as Underwood v. Venango River Corp., 995 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.1993). 9 . Like claims arising from the CBA, claims and allegations predicated upon the Merger and Fragmentation Policy also are subsumed by the federal duty of fair representation. See Nellis v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 815 F.Supp. at 1534 (<HOLDING>). 10 . A handful of Mann plaintiffs are not

    ### Response:
    holding that in the fact circumstances of that case a valid duty of fair representation claim must be based on a showing that alpa breached the terms of its merger and fragmentation policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Def. Not. Removal, ECF No. 1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). On November 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Pl. Mot., ECF No. 3. Plaintiff argues that under the Declaratory-Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, a federal court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration____” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (emphasis added))., Plaintiff submits that in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction of declaratory judgment actions, the federal courts should “consider the state interest in having the state courts determine questions of state law.” Pl. Mot. ¶¶ 12-13 (quoting State Auto Ins. Co. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted)). Plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that decisions in declaratory judgment actions must yield to considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration and the desire of insurance companies and their insureds to receive declarations in federal court on matters of purely state law has no special call on the federal forum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    695, 702 (Idaho 1997) (relying on the prior enumeration of the mandatory reporting statute, Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1619(a) (1989), to conclude that a wife was obligated to report her husband’s sexual abuses of their child despite an alleged agreement between the two to refrain from reporting); Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton, 381 S.W.3d 286, 289, 291-92 (Ky. 2012) (relying on the mandatory reporting statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.030, in holding a hospital immune from liability for mistakenly overreporting the blood alcohol content of a mother giving birth); Rodriguez v. State, 47 S.W.3d 86, 88-89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (relying on the Texas Family Code Annotated, Section 261.101, in requiring adults to report abuse of a child by the child’s mother); Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 2004-57 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Our research has found no published judicial

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the florida statutes annotated section 392011 2003 has led to confusion as to the persons actually considered mandated reporters ie all persons or just the list of professions and concluding that the florida statute imposes a responsibility on any person who knows of or has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse  to report such abuse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    damages); Martinez v. St Joseph Hosp. & Nursing Home of Del Norte, Inc., 878 P.2d 13, 15 (Colo.App.1993) (jury apportionment of economic and non-economic proceeds in a tort case involving workers’ compensation benefits). Of course, the trial court itself would determine the appropriate amounts for economic, non-economic and loss of consortium as the trier of fact if a jury were not requested. Trial courts also have jurisdiction to accept settlements and to give effect to them. See Bruce W. Higley Defined Benefit Annuity Plan v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 920 P.2d 884, 891 (Colo.App.1996) (recognizing that a trial court approval of a settlement will not be overturned absent a strong showing of clear abuse of discretion); Mulei v. Jet Courier Serv., Inc., 860 P.2d 569, 571 (Colo.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason why the jurisdiction of the

    ### Response:
    holding that although the trial court had dismissed the cause with prejudice it retained jurisdiction to give effect to the settlement order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alexander, 765 F.3d at 995 (finding that the skill factor favored plaintiffs’ classification as employees under California law because “FedEx drivers ‘need no experience to get the job in the first place and [the] only required skill is the ability to drive’”) (quoting Estrada, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at 337); Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1104 (finding that “the drivers’ work did not require substantial skill”). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Ruiz, “in hiring drivers, [defendant] did not require special driving licenses or even any work experience; rather a driver simply had to have a driver’s license, sign a work agreement, and pass a physical examination and drug test.” Id. California courts and courts in this district have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Villalpando, 2015 WL 5179486, at *49 (<HOLDING>); JKH Enterprises, Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th at

    ### Response:
    holding that an individual needs no special skills to be hired as a driver for defendant but rather all that is required is that an individual be at least 21 years old pass a physical examination and drug test undergo a criminal background check and have a clean driving record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be reduced merely because the fee would be disproportionate to the financial interest at stake in the litigation.” Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Millea, 658 F.3d at 169 (""Especially for' claims where the financial recovery is likely to be small, calculating attorneys' fees as a proportion of damages runs directly contrary to the purpose of fee-shifting statutes: assuring that civil rights claims of modest cash value can attract competent counsel.”). 5 . Moreover, there is no merit to any argument that plaintiff achieved only ""partial success"" in this action because he volition applies a nominal offset of $1.00 to be collected from the judgment. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Goord, No. 01-CV-9585 SHS, 2014 WL 4058662, at *13 (S.D.N.Y, Aug. 14, 2014) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Several attorneys are listed as both

    ### Response:
    holding that under 42 usc  1997ed2 a district court may apply less than 25 percent of the judgment as long as it applies some portion of the judgment to satisfy the attorneys fee award quoting parker v conway 581 f3d 198 205 3d cir 2009
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to take an action or make a recommendation described in the previous sentence and also includes professional review activities relating to a professional review action. In this chapter, an action is not considered to be based on the competence or professional conduct of a physician if the action is primarily based on— (A) the physician’s association, or lack of association, with a professional society or association, (B) the physician’s fees or the physician’s advertising or engaging in other competitive acts intended to solicit or retain business, (C) the physician’s participation in prepaid group health plans, salaried employment, or any other manner of delivering health services whether on a fee-for-service or other basis, (D) a phys Md.App. 527, 561-562, 769 A.2d 231, 251 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Dr. Freilich also cites an unreported

    ### Response:
    holding that for a plaintiffs evidence to survive the totality of the circumstances standard on summary judgment in a claim for sexual harassment it must be sufficiently specific severe pervasive and harmful to allow the fact finder to conclude that it was sufficient to establish the violation alleged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    417, 105 S.Ct. 2078. Nevertheless, given the strong potential for an accomplice’s confession that implicates the defendant to unfairly infect the trial if considered as substantive evidence of guilt, and given the lack of otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt, we have serious concerns that the verdict was substantially influenced by the constitutional error. It is only natural that a juror, upon hearing the out-of-court statements from two admitted participants in the robbery saying that Adamson was involved, would consider those statements in assessing guilt, unless instructed otherwise. Cf. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (describing “extrajudicial statements of a codefendant” as “devastating to the defendant”); see also Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the error was not

    ### Response:
    recognizing the chance that the jury will credit a nontestifying codefendants incriminating statement and conclude that the statement pointed to the objecting defendant as the offender even though he could not crossexamine the declarant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “over only some matters, leaving in place their jurisdiction to directly review petitions raising claims previously cognizable under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241” n. We reach a different result on the issue of the district court's habeas jurisdiction to review the attorney general's prosecutorial discretion to commence proceedings in Denver instead of in Los Angeles. Section 1252(g) provides, Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law; no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising 003) (""Although federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims, there is no jurisdiction to review denials of discretionary relief.""); Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d 824, 828

    ### Response:
    holding that a criminal alien who does not have the right to demand the exercise of discretion cannot challenge its nonexercise by means of habeas review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 51.17. 9 . See Brenan v. Court of Appeals, 444 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex.1968); see also Tex Fam.Code § 56.01. 10 . Although former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(1) was in effect at the time this case was tried, there was no substantive change when new rule 44.1 was promulgated. See TexR.App. P. 44 note. We therefore cite to the current rule, which provides: No judgment may be reversed on appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless the court of appeals concludes that the error complained of: (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably prevent mission of explanation of allegations was ""fundamental” error and no harmful error analysis was necessary); In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82

    ### Response:
    holding that when none of the required explanations were given that was fundamental error requiring reversal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    arbitration and that are the subject of a pending action or special proceeding between the parties and that a determination of such issues is likely to make the arbitration unnecessary, the court may delay its order to arbitrate until the determination of such other issues or until such earlier time as the court specifies. Under subsection (d), if the arbitrable issue is severable from the action, the trial court may stay the arbitrable issue pending arbitration and allow litigation on the nonarbitrable issues to continue. Under subsection (f), a trial court may delay arbitration if litigation of nonarbitrable issues in an action would make the arbitration unnecessary. See, e.g., Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 80 Cal.4th 303, 320-321, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal.2003) (<HOLDING>); The Redemptorists v. Coulthard Serv., Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that such a stay is appropriate where in the absence of a stay the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    entertain the churches’ belated petition to modify the estate plan. Second, even if the probate court would entertain the petition, we view the chances of the churches winning reformation as small. Third, even if the churches were to prevail in reforming the indentures of trust, it is problematic whether that victory would change the ultimate analysis vis-a-vis BRMC’s entitlement to the bequest. After all, at the time of Ms. Krauss’s death, BRMC was functioning as a hospital and, thus, was still capable of applying the bequest to the care of indigent patients. And, finally, even if the churches succeeded in stripping away BRMC’s entitlement to the bequest, it is not certain that they would benefit. Cf., e.g., Town of Brookline v. Barnes, 324 Mass. 632, 87 N.E.2d 843, 845-47 (1949) (<HOLDING>). The bottom line, then, is that the churches’

    ### Response:
    holding that a charitable gift which could not be distributed because of the legatees unwillingness to carry out the testators charitable intent could inspire an application of the doctrine of cy pres so that the court could order the bequest paid to a different institution and thus effectuate the testators charitable intent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    until such time as the point of arrest or accusation has been reached,’ ” and held that a particular defendant’s Miranda rights had not been violated because the point of arrest or accusation had not been reached. We later held that “Loo did not announce a ‘new’ rule.” State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 123 n. 26, 34 P.3d 1006, 1022 n. 26 (2001). Fourth, judicial decisions that merely engage in statutory interpretation do not typically create new rules. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 611 U.S. 298, 312-13, 114 S.Ct. 1610, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (“A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Garcia v. State, 125 Hawai'i 429, 263 P.3d 709 (2010) (<HOLDING>). In sum, there are four categories of cases

    ### Response:
    holding that insofar as state v tauiliili merely interpreted a statute it was not a departure from precedent but rather confirmed the law as it existed prior to that decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    10 . Marine Midland Bank involved the seizure of interbank funds under the federal civil forfeiture laws and upon a warrant issued by a federal magistrate judge, who had determined that the government had probable cause to believe that interbank accounts were being used to launder narcotics proceeds. Marine Midland Bank, 11 F.3d at 1121. The banks moved for return of the seized funds by order to show cause pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e). Holding that ""[t]he magistrate judge's probable cause determination should be subject to judicial review,"" this Court found that the warrant had not been supported by probable cause and therefore ordered the release of certain of the interbank funds. Id. at 1125. 11 . See People v. Earley, 244 A.D.2d 769, 770-71, 666 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (3d Dep’t 1997) (<HOLDING>); Grinberg v. Safir, 181 Misc.2d 444, 455, 694

    ### Response:
    holding that arresting officers testimony at suppression hearing supported finding of probable cause to arrest defendant for dwi despite contradictory testimony of defendant and his passenger and despite minor inconsistencies in officers testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the work and the school milieu to justify a less rigorous” threshold of offensive conduct when plaintiffs claim that sexual harassment has created a hostile educational environment than when plaintiffs seek to support a hostile workplace sexual harassment claim. Donovan v. Mt. Ida College, No. 96-10289 (D.Mass.1997). Even if the measure of harassment in the educational environment is less rigorous than Title VII’s requirement of “severe and pervasive” conduct, the activity alleged in this complaint would miss the hostile environment mark. Holding a university president hable for creating a hostile learning environment solely because of an unpopular speech would also have serious First Amendment implications. See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217,

    ### Response:
    holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intoxicated to the point of losing his or her faculties or sensibilities. Commonwealth v. Reiff, 489 Pa. 12, 413 A.2d 672, 674 (1980). Evidence that the accused ingested alcohol or other intoxicating drug — without more— does not warrant a voluntary intoxication instruction. Id. In Reiff, the evidence showed that the appellant had consumed approximately two and one-half quarts of beer during the several hours before he fatally shot a man, but there was no evidence that the appellant exhibited any signs of intoxication or unusual behavior. Id. at 673. Accordingly, we held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction as to diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication. Id. at 674; see also Commonwealth v. Marinetti, 547 Pa. 294, 690 A.2d 203, 220-21 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, Appellant rests his argument as to the

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give a voluntary intoxication charge because even though there was testimony that the appellant had consumed some alcohol prior to the killing there was no evidence that the appellant had been overwhelmed or overpowered by alcohol
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must focus on the “cause of action” or “claim for relief.” 42 P.S. § 22004(3). This narrows the scope of the-Court’s inquiry significantly. Taking these standards into account, the Court does not hesitate to conclude that Mullin’s argument fails to meet the high threshold for'nonrecognition on public policy grounds. Lloyd’s cause of action in the English Action was for breach of contract. There is no support for any contention that a cause of action for breach of contract is repugnant to Pennsylvania public policy. See Turner, 303 F.3d at 333 (affirming recognition of judgment obtained by Lloyds against a Name, and rejecting argument that breach of contract cause of action contravenes Texas public policy); Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); cf. J.F.Walker Co., Inc. v. Excalibur Oil

    ### Response:
    holding cause of action for collection on a promissory note is not repugnant to texas public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    medication, King filed a timely appeal. In the main, this appeal presents the question of whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiff-Appellant’s requested Fourth Amendment jury instructions with regard to Kramer. We address that portion of the appeal first. II In granting Kramer’s motion in li-mine to preclude Plaintiff-Appellant from arguing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, the district court stated that Plaintiff-Appellant had waived her Fourth Amendment claim. Slip Op. at 6 (W.D.Wis. Jan. 9, 2013), ECF No. 643 (“[Pjlaintiff waived any right to a Fourth Amendment claim premised on an objectively unreasonable standard by failing to timely pursue such a claim. The court will not allow such a significant shift in plaintiffs theory of recovery on t th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Likewise, Williams

    ### Response:
    holding that a claim is not properly before the appellate court because it is axiomatic that arguments not raised below are waived on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    our courts have viewed áctions for UM benefits either as contract actions, see, e.g., Howard v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 373 So.2d 628, 629 (Ala.1979), or as “unique,” because they contain elements of both contract actions and tort actions, see Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 589 So.2d 165, 167 (Ala.1991). Third, Alabama courts have never held that “any defense” that is theoretically available to the uninsured motorist is also available to the insurer. Instead, our courts have stated that the insurer has available to it the “substantive defenses that would have been available to the uninsured motorist.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 51 Ala.App. at 431, 286 So.2d at 306. Accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boynton, 486 So.2d 552, 558-59 (Fla.1986) (<HOLDING>); Application of Travelers Indem. Co., 226

    ### Response:
    holding that um carriers are subrogated to any substantive defense that the tortfeasor may have been able to assert against the insured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stability. Posner, supra. 8 . The Franchisees cite Carousel’s Creamery, LLC v. Marble Slab Creamery, Inc., a case from a Texas state court, for the proposition that a merger clause does not prevent a plaintiff from showing that he justifiably relied on a UFOC. 134 S.W.3d 385. The Franchisees argue that, because the Federal Trade Commission has promulgated rules governing the disclosures made in a UFOC, prospective franchisees who receive the disclosures are entitled to rely on them for purposes of a negligent misrepresentation claim, notwithstanding a disclaimer of reliance in the franchise agreement. However, this decision was based on an interpretation of the Texas parol evidence rule, which, unlike the Pennsylvania rule, does not bar claims of fraud in the inducement. Id. at 395 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted). This rule is

    ### Response:
    holding that consistent with parol evidence rule a merger clause can be avoided based on fraud in the inducement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is error. Such error, however, does not automatically require reversal unless it is shown that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different. When reviewing a claim of ineffectiveness based upon failing to present adequate mitigating evidence, we must view the totality of the evidence — both that adduced at trial and that adduced in the postconviction proceeding. Thus, it is undisputed that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel clearly encompasses the penalty phase of á criminal trial, and this court has recognized that the failure to present any testimony during the mitigation phase of the trial fails to pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Smith, 368 Ark. 620, 249

    ### Response:
    holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    present circumstances, however, any earnings that the County would have realized on unclaimed bond funds would not have attached to the principal and, hence, would not have given rise to ownership rights associated with those funds, because the bondholders did not own, and were not entitled to collect, such interest no matter how much túne elapsed after the bonds matured. For this reason, we find that the County’s suggested interpretation is also reasonable. Thus, contrary to Appellants’ suggestion, it is not entirely clear from the face of the statute whether the Legislature intended unclaimable interest and other accretions to escheat along with the principal in every case. The statute being ambiguous, see Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 601 Pa. 637, 653, 976 A.2d 474, 483 (2009) (<HOLDING>), we must resolve the question with reference

    ### Response:
    recognizing that an ambiguity exists when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text under review
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-78, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67, 80 S.Ct. 1363, 4 L.Ed.2d 1432 (1960). 4 . See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491-92, 92 S.Ct. 1710, 32 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972) (""[OJnce a court finds that, as here, the parties are subject to an agreement to arbitrate, and that agreement extends to 'any difference’ between them, then a claim that particular grievances are barred by laches is an arbitrable question under the agreement.”); Independent Ass’n of Continental Pilots v. Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d 685, 696 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Whittle v. Local 641, Int’l Bhd. of

    ### Response:
    holding that determination of the parameters and scope of an arbitrators award which involved an analysis of the interplay between various contract provisions was a matter for the arbitrator to decide not the courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that he described, and conveyed sufficient specificity regarding the van that there was a very low probability that the officers would have stopped the wrong vehicle. Thus, we cannot say the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. 5 . Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Burns did not inform the dispatcher why he suspected the van was carrying undocumented aliens, we do not reach the question of whether Healy had reasonable suspicion to stop the van had this information been provided. That said, under similar circumstances, when the informant conveyed the reasons for her suspicions, we have held that reasonable suspicion existed to stop a vehicle. See United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 788-89, 794 (10th Cir.1997)

    ### Response:
    holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to avoid prosecution, this Court does not find that based on these facts, substantial evidence supports the Appeals Council’s determination that claimant was fleeing with the intent to avoid prosecution. Additionally, the state of Montana’s failure and unwillingness to extradite claimant though he has volunteered to return lends support to this Court’s determination that the Appeals Council’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, particularly when it was police in the state of Montana who initially suggested that claimant depart. In analogous situations involving extradition of an individual from a foreign country to face charges, the government must demonstrate due diligence in seeking that individual’s return. See United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79, 84 (2nd Cir.1988)(<HOLDING>). While this Court does not suggest that in

    ### Response:
    holding that while the speedy trial clause does not prevent the government from adhering to its general policy not to seek extradition outside the extradition treaty with a foreign country if the defendant did express a willingness to surrender himself to appropriate authorities the government would be under an obligation to provide transportation to the united states at the governments expense if defendants financial circumstances so warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of The Colony v. North Texas Mun. Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 731 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008); Van Duzer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 995 F.Supp.2d 673, 698-99 (S.D.Tex.2014). An exception to this rule arises when overpayment is made under a valid contract. Id. and id., citing Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 966 S.W.2d 467, 469-70 (Tex.1998) (“in some circumstances overpayments under a valid contract may give rise to a claim for restitution or unjust enrichment”), in turn citing the following inter alia: Bowers v. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., 241 S.W. 509, 510-11 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1922, no writ) (allowing restitution for freight charges paid in excess of rates specified in shipping contract); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lone Star Producing Co., 322 F.2d 28, 31-33 (5th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Harrington, 246

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff could recover money mistakenly paid in excess of contract price
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    principles, the federal court’s dismissal without prejudice of Southern’s state law pendent claims is not a judgment on the merits and, therefore, not res judicata. In construing the federal court requirements for res judicata, this court has held that [A] district judge’s decision to dismiss pendent state law claims ... would not be understood by the federal courts as a decision on the merits of those state claims. The federal court would have been competent to decide them only if the plaintiff had asked the court to do so and the court, in its discretion, agreed to assume jurisdiction over them. Andujar v. National Prop. & Cas. Underwriters, 659 So.2d 1214, 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). See also Management Investors v. United Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 384 (6th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court’s ruling in Semtek

    ### Response:
    holding that a federal courts dismissal of state claims without prejudice is not res judicata as to adjudication in either state or federal courts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agency’s subjective motivation.” 156 F.3d at 1280. Because an ordinary enforcement action in no way implicates the FDIC’s subjective motivations, and Landry makes no credible claims that improper factors motivated this enforcement action, there is no waiver. Brady/Jencks. In its order the FDIC Board assumed without deciding that Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), applies to enforcement proceedings, and though the Board’s order did not address Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1957), FDIC counsel assures us that the FDIC has the same view of it. Thus we also assume without deciding that both cases apply. Cf. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314, 327-28 (D.C.Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>). After reviewing the documents alleged to

    ### Response:
    holding that in agency adjudications in which the government has not claimed privilege written reports made at the time of an event must be produced when the credibility of the witness on matters discussed in the report is in question
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    537, 545, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987), and to be free from retaliation for family association. Adkins v. Bd. of Educ. of Magoffin County, Kentucky, 982 F.2d 952 (6th Cir.1993). The district court recognized that Plaintiffs complaint did not expressly invoke the First Amendment. The district court would have rejected any First Amendment claim, citing Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir.2000) (“[A] section 1983 cause of action is entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.”) The district court reasoned that because Plaintiff had alleged that his parents’ rights, rather than his own First Amendment rights, had been violated, the Plaintiff failed to state a First Amendment claim. See Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We do not reach the First Amendment issue

    ### Response:
    holding that police chiefs son who alleged that he was denied an interview for a position because his father had criticized the local officials did not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of his father
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that once Cuva admitted there was contraband in the car, there was probable cause to search the car. The facts do not support this theory. The officers took Cuva’s keys and searched his car even though he was not in or near the ear at the time of his detention. Officers are allowed to search a vehicle incident to the lawful arrest of a recent occupant. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). Here Cuva was never seen in or near the vehicle. Even if he were lawfully in the officers’ custody when they learned where his car was parked, they had no legal basis to search his car without a warrant or his consent. The search was too remote in both place and time to be justified as a search-incident-to-arrest. State v. Howard, 538 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 5th DCA) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, 548 So.2d 663 (Fla.1989).

    ### Response:
    holding that search of car was not incident to arrest where arrestee had exited and locked car before he was approached by officer and then arrested
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982), which held that a decision to discharge or transfer a patient to a different level of care was not state act 1995) (finding state action where private home care providers were required to make certain decisions under the statutory and regulatory scheme). Here, the decision being challenged is BU’s decision to terminate one of its students for failure to meet its academic research requirements under standards set by the university. To be sure, Dr. Missert contends that the university faculty failed to set standards that comply with feder , 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) (finding state action where a private organization conducted elections to select candidates for a primary election); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946) (<HOLDING>). The First Circuit has held that education is

    ### Response:
    holding that companyowned town is a state actor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. Inadequate Framing of the Issues Before we consider the substantive claims, we state our concern with Ms. Eacret’s failure properly to frame the issues presented on appeal. The single “issue” presented for our review is, instead, a blend of several claimed errors. The ar gument suffers from a similar lack of organization and specificity, combining various claims of error and their respective standards of review. Consequently, we are left to comb through the briefs and the record to ascertain not only what Ms. Eacret is arguing, but whether the agency committed any error. This is a dangerous practice, because we are not required to speculate on what a party is arguing or to craft her arguments for her. Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13

    ### Response:
    holding appellate argument insufficiently developed declining to speculate on what evidence appellant claimed was ignored
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 966. Willis’s second argument is that “[t]he trial court[’]s decision to allow the videotaped statement into evidence even though the child victim and her mother had both already given direct testimony to the very same allegations made in the video amounted to a drumbeat repetition designed only to bolster the testimony of the child victim.” (Br. of Appellant at 6-7.) To support this argument, Willis cites Stone v. State, 536 N.E.2d 534 (Ind.Ct. App.1989), trans. denied, in which we reversed a child molesting conviction because, after the child victim had already testified, six other witnesses were permitted to testify about what the child victim told them about the molestation. We held that the probative value of the t d.1997); Caley v. State, 650 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Assuming

    ### Response:
    holding that admission of a prior consistent statement given to the police by the victim was erroneous under modesitt but did not constitute reversible error because the statement neither explained nor elaborated upon the testimony already adduced at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “due process did not require pre-termination proceedings before the [] RIF,” id. at 781, it nonetheless stressed the availability of post-termination relief, including “post-termination hearings if they believe either that their terminations were discriminatory or retaliatory, or that notice and separation procedures were not followed,” id. at 779. See also UDC Chairs Chapter, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Bd. of Trs., 56 F.3d 1469 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding university faculty who were denied summer deanship positions had no due process right to pre-termination procedures under the Mathews balancing test, but emphasizing their access to an extensive post-deprivation grievance procedure, including investigation by an impartial panel); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427, 436 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). These decisions essentially stand for the

    ### Response:
    holding that procedures that were available to the employees after the implementation of the rif guideline provided such protection of their rights that the absence of a pretermination hearing alone was not violative of due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a family service plan by the Department is ordinarily considered a reasonable effort to return a child to its parent. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (noting only that “there was evidence of service plans”); In the Int. of M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (noting that five service plans had been prepared for father; State made special arrangements for father to have parenting classes in nearby town; and a CPS worker came out to father’s home and drove him to his psychological assessment). However, the requirement that the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent may be inapplicable when the parent is incarcerated. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 633 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the evidence shows the

    ### Response:
    holding second prong inapplicable because mother was incarcerated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    order accompanies this Memorandum Decision. 1 . The Court refers to Form B22C as the Statement of Current Monthly Income required for determining whether a debtor complies with §§ 1325(b) and 707(b). 2 . See In re lass, 340 B.R. 411 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006) (interpreting the term, ""projected disposable income”). 3 . See In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006) (interpreting the term, ""applicable commitment period”). 4 . See In re Wilbur, 344 B.R. 650 (Bankr. D.Utah 2006) (interpreting the term, ""unsecured creditors”). 5 . 362 B.R. 402 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.2007). 6 . Id. at 411. 7 . All statutory citations hereinafter are to the Bankruptcy Code, unless stated otherwise. 8 . 709 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir.1983). 9 . Id. at 1347-48. 10 . See In re Alexander, 363 B.R. 917, 921-22 (10th Cir. BAP 2007) (<HOLDING>). 11 . 147 B.R. 498 (Bankr.D.Mimi.1992). 12 .

    ### Response:
    holding that a debtor bears the burden of persuasion under  1325a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Court notes that to the extent any of the following Findings of Fact constitute Conclusions of Law, they are adopted as such, and to the extent any Conclusions of Law constitute Findings of Fact, they are so adopted. 2 . Hereafter, the Court shall refer to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by section number only. 3 . On December 10, 2004, the South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation filed an objection the Debtors' Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors and the South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation have apparently resolved their issues by settlement. 4 . ""Chapter 20” is commonly known as the process by which a bankruptcy debtor files a Chapter 7 case and thereafter files a Chapter 13 case. See In re Taylor, 261 B.R. 877, 883 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2001) (<HOLDING>); In re Cushman, 217 B.R. 470, 476

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a debt ors sequential filing of a chapter 7 petition and then a chapter 13 petition is the socalled chapter 20 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    class. For a class action to be maintained, one or more of the subsections of Rule 23(b) must be satisfied. Rule 23(b)(3) applies in this case and requires in relevant part: An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition ... (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). The Third Circuit liberally construes Rule 23 when shareholders seek to sue as a class. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S.Ct. 342, 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985) (<HOLDING>). A. Federal Securities Claim Even though

    ### Response:
    holding the interests of justice require that in a doubtful case  any error if there is to be one should be committed in favor of allowing a class action citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the utility charges into a tax, state law terms are not dispositive in bankruptcy law. See United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 220-21, 116 S.Ct. 2106, 135 L.Ed.2d 506 (1996) (noting that the Court places “no weight on the ‘tax’ label in the” state law). Instead, we look to the state statute merely to determine whether “its incidents are such as to constitute a tax within the meaning” of the Code provision. Id. (quoting City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 285, 61 S.Ct. 1028, 85 L.Ed. 1333 (1941)). A tax is generally defined as a source of revenue that provides general benefits to the public. See, e.g., Hager v. City of W. Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir.1996); Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1399 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (9th ed. 2009)

    ### Response:
    holding that the test for identifying a tax regardless of its nominal designation is whether it is calculated not just to recover a cost imposed on the municipality or its residents but to generate revenues that the municipality can use to offset unrelated costs or confer unrelated benefits
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    excluded, has been recognized by many courts as excluded by implication. See, e.g., Kugel v. United States, 947 F.2d 1504, 1506-07 (D.C.Cir.1991); Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (10th Cir.1989); Hoesl v. United States, 629 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.1980). Because the United States has expressly withheld waiver of its sovereign immunity as to claims of libel and slander, and, the court finds, by implication as to claims of defamation, plaintiffs defamation claims could not have been brought in federal district court under the FTCA. Federal prisoners who are injured by fellow inmates by reason of the negligence of federal employees can sue for their injuries under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (<HOLDING>); see also Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding the united states liable under the ftca for injuries sustained by a prisoner where the prison guard had confined an altercation between the prisoner and twelve fellow inmates instead of interceding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    checkups. Jiang argues that her failure to mention the bribe at her asylum interview should not count against her because her interviewer wrongly assumed that Jiang stopped attending her checkups. Jiang’s argument ignores the interviewer’s subsequent question about how Jiang was able to hide her IUD removal. Jiang further argues that her omission of the bribe from her written statement was insignificant because the bribe does not -relate to the discovery of her unauthorized pregnancy in September 2012. But Jiang’s claim of persecution rests on China’s coercive birth control policies, of which IUD use is a strictly enforced component, so her evasion of those policies does relate to her credibility. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). The agency also reasonably relied on

    ### Response:
    holding that a material inconsistency in an aspect of the applicants story that served as an example of the very persecution from which he sought asylum affords substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding internal quotations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    104 S.Ct. 2885. Further more, Garrido-Valdez must rebut the presumption of correctness accorded to the state trial court’s factual determinations of impartiality by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Garrido-Valdez, however, has not presented any evidence other than the voir dire testimony of Juror No. 9 and Juror No. 13 in support of his argument that these two individuals were incapable of being impartial. Thus, in holding that “[although [the two] prospective jurors initially expressed views casting doubt on their ability to be impartial in this case, they each ultimately stated unequivocally that they could be fair,” the state appellate court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. 2885. (<HOLDING>). Ha-beas relief is not warranted on this

    ### Response:
    holding that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause was insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness owed to the trial courts findings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    means that Congress intended that limitations should be determined either by reference to a six-year period, or alternatively by reference to a measure established by agreement between the taxpayer and the government—in the case at bar, the time established in the waiver agreement. Thus when the alternative measure was established by the waiver agreement, the six-year statutory limitation period became functus officio and ceased to have any relevance in the determination of the timeliness of the government’s action. The district court, therefore, erred when it looked to the six-year limitation period after that period had become functus officio as a result of the waiver agreement. Id. at 197-98. See also Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343, 1349 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The 1990 amendments can be read as consistent

    ### Response:
    holding that generally or is a disjunctive that indicates congress intended exclusive alternatives unless the context or congressional intent intends otherwise
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Singh, 213 F.3d at 1052), we agree with the BIA, and hold that mechanical failure, coupled with decisions to leave insufficient time to account for routine delays and to pay for car repairs instead of transportation to court, does not constitute exceptional circumstances. Such difficulties are “less compelling circumstances” than the statutory examples of “battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(l). We agree with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that “[t]he plain language of the statute indicates that this is a difficult burden to meet.” Magdalena de Morales v. INS, 116 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). The totality of the circumstances also

    ### Response:
    holding that the mechanical failure of the petitioners car on the way to the hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioners returned home instead of finding transportation to the hearing and made only a cursory effort to contact the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    causation, the result would not be that surcharge was unavailable to all Plaintiffs, but rather that the availability of surcharge would turn on individualized issues, such as whether a particular employee would have demanded a higher salary to offset the diminished retirement benefits. But in this scenario — hopefully merely a hypothetical one — in which the Court’s class-wide causal inference for make-whole surcharge was legal error, unjust-enrichment surcharge might still be available on a classwide basis. For example, the Court could draw the inference, informed by basic economics, that if CIGNA had disclosed that its pension benefits were less valuable, some proportion of employees would have demanded and received higher salaries. See 1 Handbook of Labor Economics 641-42 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247,

    ### Response:
    recognizing basic wagepension tradeoff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    place in the home to be searched. Here, the undersigned has concluded that the GPS Warrant Application did not give rise to probable cause, because it failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the use of Schermerhorn’s car and the suspected drug trafficking activities. The only facts offered were that a known drug dealer (Nguyen) had been a passenger in Schermerhorn’s car, which was driven by a white male, on one occasion, to a known drug supplier’s residence. There is substantial precedent in the Eighth Circuit that officers can reasonably rely on search warrants that lack any connection between a drug trafficker and his home, and that the evidence seized is admissible under Leon. See, e.g., United States v. Pruett, 501 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir.2007) (overruled on other grounds) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d 666, 671

    ### Response:
    holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pleading. The only document that had been filed prior to the motion was the notice of appearance filed by the Mesas’ attorney. That notice of appearance did not answer or respond to the complaint, raise any defense, seek any affirmative relief, or by its terms submit the Mesas to the jurisdiction of the court. Rather, it simply served as formal notice that counsel was representing the Mesas in the instant case, and requested that counsel be served with copies of any future pleadings, motions and notices. The trial court erred in determining that counsel’s filing of this notice of appearance waived the right to contest personal jurisdiction, including the right to contest the sufficiency of service of process. See Public Gas Co. v. Weatherhead Co., 409 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla.1982) (<HOLDING>)(approving this court’s earlier conclusion in

    ### Response:
    holding that the filing of a notice of appearance by weatherheads counsel did not waive its right to claim lack of jurisdiction over its person
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from property of the estate when it filed the instant contested claim — an act not in violation of the automatic stay. Therefore, § 362(c)(2)(C) is applicable in this case at bar, the automatic stay was no longer in effect, and the NPL is not void. On November 28, 1990, the Debtor consented to the denial of his discharge. All of these action taken by IDOR were taken to perfect an interest in property of the Debtor. All these actions occurred in 1991. Accordingly, pursuant to the plain meaning of the statutory language contained in § 362(c)(2)(C), the automatic stay was not in effect as to the Debtor and any post-petition property of the Debtor when these actions were taken. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030-31, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the NPL is not void because the

    ### Response:
    holding that plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    factor warranted an additional one level under the circumstances. Thus, totaling the above factors, I concluded that an eight level reduction was appropriate. This brought defendant to an offense level of 21 and an imprisonment range of 46-57 months. Consistent with the recommendations of both parties, I re-sentenced defendant at the low end. All other conditions of the original judgment were re-imposed. 1 . Drug trafficking cases accounted for 22,882 of the 54,785 cases reported by the Commission in the FY 2001 statistics. Id. at 56. Courts granted 6023 substantial assistance departures in those 22,882 cases, but only 3346 substantial assistance departures in the 31,903 non-drug trafficking cases reported. Id.; see also id. at 80 (stating that substantial assistanc 5 (E.D.Wis.2002)

    ### Response:
    holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [¶ 41.] First, the majority’s rationale for not considering Kessler’s “lies,” supra ¶ 17, is at odds with our settled law on intent to defraud in loan transactions. Despite the lies Kessler used to obtain the advances, the majority finds no evidence of intent to defraud because “[t]here is no evidence that at the time defendant obtained the draws from the Hemmers that he deceived them into believing he would repay the loan, when in fact he had no such intent.” Id. This Court, however, when interpreting SDCL 22-30A-3 (including its broader historical origin in the common law of larceny by false pretenses), adopted the law that “intent to repay the loan” is irrelevant when misrepresentations are used to obtain loan advances. State v. Phair, 2004 SD 88, ¶ 7, 684 N.W.2d 660, 662-63 (<HOLDING>). This Court explained that “[t]he gravamen of

    ### Response:
    holding evidence of repayment was irrelevant in case involving title misrepresentations to obtain loans
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must: (i) give value, (ii) without knowledge of the security interest, and (iii) before perfection. 1. Value and Perfection The Court can dispose of the value and perfection prongs of the BFV defense here in summary fashion. “Value” under § 9-317 is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. U.C.C. §§ 1-202(b), 9-317. It cannot be seriously argued that “value” was not given under these contracts. Traditional contracts law teaches that a mere peppercorn suffices as consideration. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981) (stating that all that is required for consideration is a bargained-for exchange); Id. § 79 cmt. C (“[C]ourts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.”); First Mortgage Co. of Pa. v. Fed. Leasing Corp., 456 A.2d 794, 797 (Del.1982) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the Producers concede that extension

    ### Response:
    holding that incurring a legal detriment in and of itself constitutes sufficient consideration
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plea) was wrongful. Poventud cannot evade this fact by “ ‘[s]eeking damages only for punishment he suffered in excess of the one-year imprisonment he accepted as part of his plea.’ ” Maj. Op. at 65 (quoting Appellant Br. 32). Turning elsewhere, the majority posits the hypothetical of a defendant who is tortured, then confesses, then successfully challenges his conviction, then pleads guilty prior to retrial (under no compulsion), and is then released from prison. I have three short responses: • Such a defendant would not need to rely on § 1983 because he could pursue intentional tort claims against the offending officers — state or federal. See N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8 (McKinney) (waiving sovereign immunity); Millbrook v. United States, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1441, 1446, 185 L.Ed.2d 531 (2013) (<HOLDING>). • I agree with the majority that “the claim

    ### Response:
    holding that waiver of sovereign immunity under federal tort claims act for intentional acts committed by federal law enforcement was not limited to investigative activities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to elude conviction. In 2011, in an appeal from the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a), this court held that Mr. Wilson could not be sentenced as a PRR for the burglary of a conveyance, and we reversed the postconviction court’s order. Wilson v. State, 76 So.3d 332, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). On remand, the trial court entered an order granting Mr. Wilson’s motion to correct an illegal sentence and removed the PRR designation. In his subsequent motion for postconviction relief, Mr. Wilson argued, in part, that the trial court erred in amending his sentence without ordering a new sentencing hearing and permitting Mr. Wilson and his counsel to be present at that hearing. Mr. Wilson is correct. See Gorham v. State, 988 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse ground one of the

    ### Response:
    holding that when a prr sentence is determined to be illegal the defendant is entitled to a de novo resentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    one of its board members wrote to Driscoll to complain about the removal. See Comp. ¶ 28. Therefore, because this case was filed in 2005, six years later, ATAA’s claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Contrary to the ATAA’s contention, this case does not involve an alleged continuing violation of constitutional rights that extends the statute of limitations. Chairman Peyser’s 2005 letter to plaintiffs’ attorney reiterating the board’s explanation for the 1999 removal of the contra-genocide websites from the Curriculum Guide was essentially a refusal to remedy the effects of an alleged earlier constitutional violation and, therefore is not independently actionable as part of a serial violation. See, e.g., De Leon Otero v. Rubero, 820 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir.l987)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, the ATAA has identified no ongoing

    ### Response:
    holding in an employment discrimination case that later refusals to reinstate the plaintiff did not create a continuing violation but were a consequence of his initial demotion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Van Hook, we cannot hold that counsel did not timely investigate Mickey’s childhood. Mickey also claims, as Van Hook did, that his counsel did not conduct a sufficiently broad investigation of his childhood. Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. at 18-19. The Court in Van Hook disagreed with the petitioner, calling this a “gross distortion.” Id. at 18. Counsel, the Court recounted, conducted several interviews with four individuals — Van Hook’s mother and father, a caregiving aunt, and a fam sel who investigated family and life history, drug use, and mental state of defendant, “interviewed a number of witnesses suggested by [the defendant],” obtained various records, and compiled a client history conducted an adequate investigation); Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, counsel’s investigation here was

    ### Response:
    holding investigation was not deficient in part because counsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into defendants history
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    3 . Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9014 provides: In a contested matter in a case under the Code • not otherwise governed by these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. 4 . Tully conceded at oral argument that it did request documents from the Trustee but stated that none were produced. Apparently, Tully did not follow up on its request before the hearing. See J.A. at 46. 5 . We note that we are not faced with the issue of cross-collateralization, whereby a lender obtains a security interest in assets of the debtor not only for a post-petition loan, but also as collateral for pre-petition debt. E.g., In re Saybrook Manufacturing Co., 963 F.2d 1490, 1491-92, 1495-96 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We express no opinion about the use of

    ### Response:
    holding that crosscollateralization is an impermissible method of postpetition financing because it is not authorized under 11 usc  364 and is contrary to the fundamental priority scheme of the bankruptcy code
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    murders for revenge. The court also noted that a life sentence for Mendez was in line with the sentences received by Mendez’s co-defendants. The district court carefully considered Mendez’s legal and factual arguments and found none persuasive. The court thus determined that it would have imposed the same sentence had it known the guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory. We have held that a properly calculated guidelines sentence is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.2005). Mendez has provided no reason to rebut that presumption, and the district court has given a very thorough analysis of the section 3553(a) factors in support of that sentence. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Under the law of this circuit, that is enough

    ### Response:
    holding that the sentencing judge need only provide an adequate statement of the judges reasoning consistent with section 3553a for thinking that the sentence selected is indeed appropriate for the particular defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the literal wording of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), matters concerning the administration of the estate, because it involves a claim that arose out of the administrative activities of the debtor-in-possession.” Id. at 168 (citing In re L.A. Clarke & Son, Inc., supra at 32. The Court similarly concluded that the action “falls within the literal wording of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate because the claim arose out of the debtor’s efforts to liquidate estate assets.” Id. (citing In re Franklin Computer Corp., supra at 625-26). In making this determination, the First Circuit observed that the majority of courts considering similar post-petition claims have concluded that they are core. Id. See, e.g., In re Mansker, supra, (<HOLDING>); In re Clarke, supra, (holding an action to

    ### Response:
    holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as temporary; she claims that the agreement “is not worded in such a way that it states it will terminate on that date, rather the wording is such that the guardianship could continue past that date.” Guardian’s Brief at 12. Guardian’s interpretation is patently incorrect. The plain language of the agreement set a maximum length of the guardianship—until August 29, 2014—but provided that it could end sooner by being revoked prior to that end date. Nothing in the agreement contemplates an extension of Guardian’s appointment beyond August 29, 2014. Thus, the trial court properly construed the agreement as a temporary guardianship. The temporary nature of the guardianship rendered Children’s absence from Texas a temporary absence. M.E.V. v. B.D.V., 57 A.3d 126, 133 (Pa. Super. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Under our definition of “home state,”

    ### Response:
    holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1. The State is correct that the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue of whether and when a trial court, consistent with constitutional protections, may order a defendant to wear a stun belt during his trial. However, the Supreme Court has decided a series of cases over the past forty years that clearly establish the proposition that a trial court may not impose a physical restraint upon a defendant’s person without an individualized finding of dangerousness or risk of escape. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) (noting that shackling is “inherently prejudicial” and is only “justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial”); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed

    ### Response:
    holding that no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort but that such measures are allowed if the defendant is disruptive contumacious and stubbornly defiant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a fact in issue.” Ark. R. Evid. 701 (2002). The n the facts underlying her observation, forcing Dr. Doland to concede the possibility that, under certain circumstances, the burns could have been localized. As for Dr. Doland’s conclusion that the red marks were “friction burns,” we note that appellant asked Dr. Doland if she had any specialized training in treatment or diagnosis of burns, and Dr. Doland replied that this was part of her medical training in medical school and part of her residency and that at the time of the hearing she was on rotation in the burn unit. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that persons with particularized knowledge may give opinions without requiring that the persons be qualified as expert witnesses. See Moore, 323 Ark. at 548-50, 915 S.W.2d at 295 (<HOLDING>); Russell v. State, 306 Ark. 436, 440-41, 815

    ### Response:
    holding that a police investigators lay opinion that the sole of the defendants athletic shoe matched a shoe print found on the center of the victims bedroom floor was permissible where the investigator had some experience in that area and was clearly testifying that the patterns matched which was not inconsistent with a crime lab report
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admissible in evidence”). The hearsay exception provided for in former OCGA § 24-3-4 is now essentially recognized in OCGA § 24-8-803 (4) (“Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”). 20 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 296 Ga. 9, 12 (4) (b) (764 SE2d 823) (2014) (<HOLDING>); Maurer v. State, 320 Ga. App. 585, 592 (6)

    ### Response:
    holding that any deficiency in counsels failure to object to alleged hearsay testimony that repeated statement of witness regarding identity of murder perpetrator did not prejudice defendant and thus was not ineffective assistance when testimony was cumulative of other eyewitness testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proceeding, however, is a non-final order and a party seeking relief from such an order would have to petition for a writ of certiorari.” Id. at 1254 (emphasis added). This was a reference to a discovery order entered against a party to an ongoing proceeding. See, e.g., City of Williston v. Roadlander, 425 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); but see Corry v. Meggs, 498 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Only then would it be proper to ask if the party seeking review by certiorari would have an adequate remedy by appealing the final judgment. In the present case, there is no ongoing proceeding between the parties to the lawsuit and the individuals who have been ordered to provide discovery. As to these individuals, the order is final. See Smith v. State, 902 So.2d 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Based on the holding in Calderbank and our

    ### Response:
    holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that, “[a]s a rule, profits from commercial businesses on [appropriated] premises can not be shown.” The court noted, however, that an estimation of the value of appropriated property necessarily entails an inquiry into “its best and most valuable uses.” The court thus held that testimony to income from the rental of summer dwellings on appropriated property was admissible “to show the kinds of businesses to which the premises [were] adaptable.” Id. at 458-459, 44 O.O. at 421-422, 99 N.E.2d at 317. Evidence of lost future profits has also been held to be admissible for the limited purpose of rebuttal or impeachment, provided that the jury has been properly instructed as to the evidence’s limited admissibility. See Dorsey v. Donohoo (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 415, 615 N.E.2d 239 (<HOLDING>). Finally, evidence of business profits and

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony by the owners expert to the value of trees on appropriated property was properly admitted to rebut or impeach testimony by the appropriating agencys expert that the trees had no value in terms of their effect on the propertys market value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    victim’s] use [of drugs distributed by the defendant] is a but-for cause of the death or injury.” Burrage, 571 U.S. at -, 134 S.Ct. at 892. To the extent Ragland argues his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge then-controlling circuit precedent regarding the enhanced penalty provision of § 841(b)(1)(C), we deny the motion. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at-,-, 134 S.Ct. at 886, 892 (abrogating United States v. Monnier, 412 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir.2005), and United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972-73 (8th Cir.2001)). Our cases make clear that counsel’s failure “to anticipate a change in the law” “does not constitute ineffective assistance.” Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir.1999); accord Brown v. United States, 311 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Ragland has not “made a substantial

    ### Response:
    holding counsels decision not to raise an issue unsupported by thenexisting precedent did not constitute ineffective assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Warren, 353 F.3d at 39; Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. B. Legal Standard for a Rule 9(b) Motion to Dismiss Rule 9(b) requires that a pleader state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement ensures that the opponent has notice of the claim, prevents attacks on his reputation where the claim for fraud is unsubstantiated, and protects him against a strike suit brought solely for its settlement value. Shields v. Wash. Bancorp., 1992 WL 88004, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 1992); see also Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1279 n. 3 (observing that Rule 9(b) aims to prevent a claim filed as a “pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs” (citation omitted)); Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Services, 20 F.3d 771, 777-78 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus.,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that rule 9b is largely designed to give each opponent notice of his purported role in the alleged fraud
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citing Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis v. Mouer, 520 S.W.2d 802, 809 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin, writ ref'd n.r.e.), dism’d as moot on rehearing per curiam, 531 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.1975)). It is no defense to appellant that investors’ funds were used to purchase and exchange commodities. An investor in a commodities account who establishes that he or she relied solely on the investment advice of a promoter satisfies the “solely from the efforts of others” requirement. See Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 138 n. 8 (5th Cir.1989); Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.1974). In addition, courts have held that schemes similar to appellant’s constituted a sale of “investment contracts” and thus securities. See Koscot, 497 F.2d at 485 (<HOLDING>); see also Securities & Exchange Comm’n v.

    ### Response:
    holding schemes in which promoters retain essential managerial control over essential managerial functions of enterprise and where investors realization of profits is inextricably tied to success of a promotional pyramid scheme constituted security
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Aubrey Sanders, Jr., was indicted for burglary of habitation. A jury found him guilty, found two felony enhancement paragraphs of the indictment true, found appellant had used or exhibited a deadly weapon, and assessed punishment at life in prison plus a $10,000 fine. This Court reversed and remanded to the trial court in Sanders v. State, 911 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1995) (hereinafter “Sanders I ”). The court of criminal appeals granted discretionary review and reversed and remanded to this Court. We affirm as modified. Procedural History On original submission; we held the appellant was denied his absolute right to a jury shuffle under article 35.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure when the trial court shuffled the Sande , 66 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). To permit appellant to raise issues not

    ### Response:
    holding that issue not raised in first appeal cannot be attacked in later appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    334, 336 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied); In re Fuentes, 960 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1997, orig. proceeding); First Nat'l Bank of Giddings, Tex. v. Birnbaum, 826 S.W.2d 189, 190-91 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (op. on reh’g); Energo Int’l Corp. v. Modern Indus. Heating, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ). One reason for not considering docket entries on appeal is that they are inherently unreliable. See, e.g., Energo, 722 S.W.2d at 151 n. 2. An exception to this rule is that docket entries may be examined to correct clerical errors in judgments or orders or to determine the meaning of words used in a judgment or order. See N-S-W Corp. v. Snell, 561 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex W.2d 439, 441 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (<HOLDING>); First Nat’l Bank of Giddings, Tex., 826

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant failed to preserve error for appeal where only indication that trial court ruled on a motion to transfer venue was a docket sheet notation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the order vacating the “order of default.” The rule governing entry of orders or judgments in the orphans’ court provides: “After determination of an issue, ... the court shall direct the entry of an appropriate order or judgment.” Md. Rule 6-171(a). Rule 6-171(a) does not require that each order be set forth on its own separate document. Instead, “in orphans’ courts, an order is a paper writing that is filed in the estate file.” Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. at 594, 644 A.2d 1070. The hearing sheet clearly stated that the motion had been granted, it included the judge’s signature, it was filed in the estate docket, and it was properly docketed by the Register of Wills. The orphans’ court did more than enough to achieve the entry of that interlocutory order. See id. at 592, 644 A.2d 1070 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, on September 28, 2016 (for

    ### Response:
    holding that a docket entry in the orphans court need not summarize the contents of the order but need only show that an order was filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    league baseball’s reserve system are mandatory bargaining subjects in the context of professional baseball. p. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, 426 F.2d 884, 887-88 (2d Cir.1970) (“[T]he preservation of jobs is within the area of proper union concerní, and u]nion activity having as its object the preservation of jobs for union members is not violative of the anti-trust laws.” (internal citations omitted)). Because the size of NFL teams is capped, the eligibility rules diminish a veteran player’s risk of being replaced by either a drafted rookie or a player who enters the draft and, though not drafted, is then hired as a rookie free agent. See Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L,J. 1, 16 (1971) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, as was true in Silverman, we

    ### Response:
    recognizing that entry of new players through draft has an enormous effect on those already in the unit and the collective agreement which governs them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the record. . . . Statements as to facts that have not been proven amount to unsworn testimony, which is not the subject of proper closing argument.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alexander, supra, 254 Conn. 306. We focus on the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument in which he stated that during “a large portion of this trial I was kind of burnt out on what was going on. I was having a hard time focusing.” The prosecutor also remarked that he “probably should have asked [A] why she didn’t scream.” The prosecutor’s own physical or mental condition, the questions that he should have asked, and a lawyer’s trial strategy generally are not permissible subjects of closing argument. See Spiess v. Traversa, 172 Conn. 525, 527, 375 A.2d 1007 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Archambeault v. Jamelle, 100 Conn. 690,

    ### Response:
    holding improper counsels argument that plaintiff was entitled to something for manner in which defense was conducted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intended that custody, for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-709(B), be equated with incarceration in a jail or prison and not merely with the substantial restraint of freedom which is commensurate with an arrest or detention. 166 Ariz. at 15, 800 P.2d at 2. We conclude, as did the court of appeals in Cereceres, that the legislature intended the words “in custody” to mean actual incarceration in a prison or jail and more than simply a restraint on freedom as onerous as jail or prison would be. Cereceres did not break new ground in reaching this conclusion. Arizona court decisions have consistently interpreted the “in custody” requirement of this statute to mean actual or constructive control of prison or jail authorities. See State v. Ritch, 160 Ariz. 495, 497, 774 P.2d 234, 236 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Vasquez, 153 Ariz. 320, 321, 736

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant is entitled to credit only when in actual or constructive control of jail or prison officials and that a central conceptual difference exists between incarceration and structured rehabilitation and treatment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of repeated trials.” State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 671, 712 P.2d 13, 17 (Ct.App.1985). Thus, Defendant Esparza’s double jeopardy rights were not violated. {27} With regard to Defendant Booth, the State likewise complied with the requirement that the criminal prosecution and forfeiture of assets be pursued in a single, bifurcated proceeding. Although the forfeiture motion was not included in Defendant Booth’s indictment, it was filed three days later under the same cause number and was directed to the same district judge. We agree with Defendant Booth that the mere act of assignment of a docket number is insufficient, of itself, to demonstrate that the penalties were sought in a single, bifurcated proceeding. See Village of Deming v. Marquez, 74 N.M. 747, 749, 398 P.2d 266, 267 (1965)(<HOLDING>). However, the initiation of all proceedings in

    ### Response:
    holding that mere fact that clerk assigned defendants case a civil docket number did not demonstrate that the district court failed to treat the case as a criminal matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Julander may not proceed as a petitioner in this court. * Parts I, II, and IV are written by Judge Rogers. Part III is written by Judge Kavanaugh, as are his dissenting opinion in Part II.B.2 and his concurring opinion in Part IV. 1 . See 1 A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 1416-17 (1993) (statement by Rep. Oxley) (indicating that the provision authorizing regulation of EGUs would ""avoid! ] the imposition of excessive and unnecessary costs” by ensuring that EPA can regulate ""only if the studies described in section 112(n) clearly establish that emissions ... from such units cause a significant risk of serious adverse effects on public health”). 2 . See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 511-12, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,

    ### Response:
    holding that osha is not required to conduct a costbenefit analysis in promulgating a standard under section 6b5 of the occupational safety and health act because congress uses specific language when intending that an agency engage in costbenefit analysis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question — as opposed to an extraordinary level of the general lawyerly knowledge and ability useful in all litigation. Examples of the former would be an identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of a foreign law or language.” Id. at 572, 108 S.Ct. 2541. A government-contract case does not require the kind of specialized knowledge or skill that would justify an enhanced award. See Prowest Diversified, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 879, 889 (1998); see also Filtration Dev., 63 Fed.Cl. at 624 (describing an argument “alleging, without more, that government contract law was a specialty” as resting “on shaky ground”); California Marine Cleaning, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed.Cl. 724, 732 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 2. COLA adjustment. Infiniti’s proposed COLA

    ### Response:
    holding attorneys expertise and success in bid protests was an insufficient basis to exceed eajas statutory cap
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requires him to pay court-ordered restitution pursuant to the sentencing judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida — the district in which Durham was tried and convicted. Because Durham is proceeding pro se, we construe his petition liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Durham’s petition can be read to make out two di (8th Cir.2002) (dismissing delegation claim brought under § 2241). Thus, if Durham is to make an improper delegation claim, he must do so through a § 2255 petition filed in the Northern District of Florida. Second, Durham’s petition can also be read to challenge the IFRP’s constitutionality; namely, that the BOP lacks the constitutional authority to establi ir.1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Williams, 996 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding bop did not exceed its authority in establishing ifrp and that the program does not violate due process
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    WL 17173, at *2, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 428, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1993). Thus, the court must look to the specific language of the forum-selection clause in question to see whether, despite MAK’s assertions, the cause of action stated in Count Eight properly falls under the forum-selection clause. In this case, the License Agreement states that, “[t]he United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue over all controversies in connection herewith.” License Agreement, Exhibit C to Motion to Dismiss, at 5. The Second Circuit has held that the phrase “in connection with” is synonymous with the phrases “relating to” and “associated with.” See, e.g., Coregis Ins. Co. v. American Health Found., 241 F.3d 123, 128-129 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494

    ### Response:
    holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal meaning in a particular context, courts generally will adopt that meaning if the term is not differently defined in the contract. See Anderson v. Jensen Racing, Inc., 324 Or 570, 579, 931 P2d 763 (1997) (applying well-recognized statutory meaning of term “prevailing party” to the use of that as a single concept consisting of “reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution or defense of an action other than for legal services, [including] the fees of officers and witnesses[.]” A fee for the services of an expert witness is not a cost or disbursement within the meaning of that provision. Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal, 89 Or App 270, 280, 749 P2d 577, rev den, 305 Or 672 (1988); Hancock v. Suzanne Properties, Inc., 63 Or App 809, 814-15, 666 P2d 857 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Section XVI of the premarital agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that fees of witnesses for purposes of orcp 68 a2 means the statutory fee provided by ors 44415
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for loss of visibility if the loss arose directly from changes that occurred on the property taken. Id. at 344, 693 A.2d 864. Similarly, in Pub. Serv. Elect. & Gas v. Oldwick, 125 N.J.Super. 31, 34-35, 308 A.2d 362 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 64 N.J. 153, 313 A.2d 213 (1973), a property owner, over whose property a utility company condemned an easement for passage of transmission lines, sought severance damages for value lost due to the construction of three large towers on nearby land. The court held that the property owner could not recover damages arising from the total project, but instead was entitled to compensation only for damages caused by the use of the land actually taken from him. Id. at 36-38, 308 A.2d 362; see also, Dikert, supra, 319 N.J.Super. at 324, 725 A.2d 119 (<HOLDING>). Following this reasoning, defendants here

    ### Response:
    holding that owners of access easement had no claim for severance damages arising from condemnation of servient tenement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under NEPA: preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988). Accordingly, EPA has been held to be exempt from preparing such statements regarding permits for old sources of pollution. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found, v. Quarles,. 440 F.Supp. 316, 320-21 & n. 2 (C.D.Cal.1977), aff'd sub nom., Kilroy v. Quarles, 614 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 825, 101 S.Ct. 88, 66 L.Ed.2d 29 (1980). Although the courts have stopped short of holding the exemption to provide EPA with complete NEPA immunity under every possible circumstance, they have universally relied on legislative intent to adopt a much broader application than the bare language would suggest. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1328-29 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the epa is also exempt from the requirement to consider alternatives under section nepa 102e
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the argument that the purchasing of a workers’ compensation insurance policy implicitly requires a tribe or tribal entity to surrender to state court jurisdiction). This Court has held that even participation in the state’s workers’ compensation program does not constitute an express waiver of sovereign immunity. See Sanchez, 2005-NMCA-003, ¶ 18, 136 N.M. 682, 104 P.3d 548 (“[W]aivers of sovereign immunity cannot be created by implication through activities such as participation in the state’s workers’ compensation program.”). {18} We also note that even if, as Worker argues, the Tribe did not have a workers’ compensation program in place when he was injured, the Compact still does not provide a private right of action. See Martinez, 2009-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 25-26, 146 N.M. 735, 215 P.3d 44 (<HOLDING>). {19} Finally, Worker argues that the Tribe’s

    ### Response:
    holding that the private right of action to which tribes agreed in the compact pertains only to visitors and is inapplicable to workers compensation disputes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 630-31, 510 A.2d 1078. Here, the police officers were executing the search warrant in connection with an investigation that appellant may be in violation of weapons law; thus the officers were not acting to benefit appellant. Under these circumstances, the absence of “actual malice” and the absence of a “special relationship” between the officers and appellant do not eliminate the officers’ entitlement to governmental immunity, or entitle appellant to a civil cause of action for money damages. Finally, because we are affirming the circuit court’s motion to dismiss as to the two police officers on the basis that appellant failed to plead facts of actual malice, the circuit court correctly granted appellee Baltimore County’s motion for judgment. DiPino, 354 Md. at 48, 729 A.2d 354 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s order

    ### Response:
    holding that baltimore city cannot be liable for police officers alleged tortious conduct where the officer was acting in a governmental capacity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employee in question had performed some covered work for N.T. Audio, the auditors did not establish that any of the unreported hours corresponded to this covered work. As a result, the Trustees cannot prove “the fact of damage” that some of the unreported hours corresponded to covered work, and have, therefore, failed to meet their threshold burdens. Thus, it was inappro priate for the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plans. Ill For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Plans, through, now, their Trustees, is REVERSED and REMANDED. 1 . Before we were able to consider the merits of this appeal, we had to deal with the jurisdictional bar presented by Local 159 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 185 F.3d 978, 981-84 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent to oral argument, on April 10,

    ### Response:
    holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to evaluate whether the prosecutors’ justifications should have been accepted. As the record reflects, the state appellate court reasonably determined that the trial court had not observed Juror 016’s demeanor but nonetheless accepted this alternate reason for striking Juror 016 on the basis of the prosecutor’s credibility. Because the trial court did not observe Juror 016’s demeanor, the critical question here is whether the appellate court’s determination that the trial court properly credited the prosecutor’s representation was unreasonable. Notably, the basis for the state appellate court’s determination was its conclusion that there was “nothing in the present record” to indicate that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry in giving the prosecutor the bene .1998) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the trial court judge rejected

    ### Response:
    holding that serious questions of pretext arise when the facts in the record are objectively contrary to the prosecutors proffered justifications
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    SDCL 16-18-21 provides: An attorney and counselor at law has a lien for a general balance of compensation in and for each case upon: (3) Money due his client in the hands of the adverse party or attorney of such party, in an action or proceeding in which the attorney claiming the lien was employed, from, the time of giving notice in writing to such adverse party or attorney of such party, if the money is in the possession or under the control of such attorney, which notice shall state the amount claimed and in general terms for what services[.J (Emphas .2d 53 (Mo.1982) (ruling attorney may proceed to enforce attorney’s lien by motion in the original case or by an independent suit); Fire Protection Resources, Inc. v. Johnson Fire Protection Co., 72 Ohio App.3d 205, 594 N.E.2d 146 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Stubblefield v. General Motors Acceptance

    ### Response:
    holding that a motion to declare and enforce an attorneys lien must be entertained by the court in the action in which the judgment was rendered provided client is given an opportunity to obtain new counsel and there is a final judgment in the case which the claiming attorney helped secure through his services in the litigation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [the child’s] placement. [The therapist] noted her understanding that the district court would be making a decision on permanency issues. Thus, [the therapist] clearly prepared the ... letter in anticipation of litigation, and the district court abused its discretion in admitting the letter.” 662 N.W.2d at 161. Likewise, we conclude that Rule 803(6) was not a basis for admitting the Court Report in this case. Much of the information in the report (which, for the most part, spans a 10-year period, with some information extending as far back as 30 years to the mother’s childhood) was not timely recorded. Rule 803(6) states that a business record will be admissible only if it is made “at or near the time” of the events it reports. See United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 760 (D.C.Cir.1979)(<HOLDING>). The title of Cowart’s report, “Court Report

    ### Response:
    holding that a bankdeposit record prepared two years after the deposit was allegedly made was inadmissible under the businessrecords exception of rule 8036 fedrevid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Indiana Federation of Dentists,” including the quick look approach and the rule of reason). Applying the quick look approach, the FTC first concluded that the conduct was “inherently suspect” because “[t]he challenged conduct is, at its core, concerted action excluding a lower-cost and popular group of competitors,” id. at *25, and “[n]o advanced degree in economics is needed to recognize” that the behavior “is likely to harm competition and consumers, absent a compelling justification,” id. at *26. We affirm the FTC’s mode of analysis and find that its conclusion that the Board’s behavior was likely to cause significant anticompetitive harms is supported by substantial evidence. See Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465, 61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.

    ### Response:
    holding that manufacturers boycott of certain retailers has both as its necessary tendency and as its purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine. Williams noted that, in Cronic itself the United States Supreme Court held that a newly-appointed attorney, who was afforded only twenty-five days to prepare for trial in a case which the government spent four and one-half years investigating and preparing, was not per se ineffective. The fact that counsel was a young real estate attorney trying his first criminal case, the severity of the criminal charges, the complexity of the matter, and the inaccessibility of witnesses to counsel did not, individually or in combination, provide a basis for concluding that counsel could not render adequate stewardship. Id. at 140, 950 A.2d at 813 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 663-66, 104 S.Ct. at 2049-51); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 450, 60 S.Ct. 321, 324, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940) (<HOLDING>); Com. ex rel. Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81,

    ### Response:
    holding that capital counsel appointed three days before trial were not per se ineffective where they performed their full duty intelligently and well and presented the accuseds defense at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    transcript does not indicate which defense attorneys were present; it only identifies those who spoke at the hearing. However, we do note that there was close cooperation between the defense attorneys in this case. Moreover, any defense attorneys who genuinely were surprised by the proof at trial were free to object or move for a severance at that time. Because appellants failed to do either at any time during the trial, plain error review is appropriate. 83 . In such cases, upon the defendant’s motion, the district court should consider the possibility of redacting the attorney’s name from trial exhibits and from the indictment if they indicate that the attorney may have been criminally involved in the charged offenses. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 763 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 84 . Of course, it would be a rare case in

    ### Response:
    recognizing the power of district courts to redact from indictments superfluous language which unfairly prejudices the accused
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 314-15, 660 P.2d at 41 (emphasis added). The Robins holding makes sense in burglary cases because a burglary is complete at the moment an actor “enters or remains unlawfully” in a building with the requisite state of mind, and the State is not required to prove any other conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct. When an offense requires the actual commission of an underlying crime, however, the State is required to prove all of the conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct that comprise the underlying crime. Thus, as the emphasized language above indicates, the Robins holding is limited to cases involving offenses, such as burglary, that require only an intent to commit, L.Ed.2d 996 (1981); see also State v. Lindsey, 446 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Fla.1984) (<HOLDING>). We believe that where one offense requires

    ### Response:
    holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    debtor’s disposable income by reference to the means test, deductions for secured debts also reduce a debtor’s disposable income. In lieu of revising the means test language to eliminate the deduction for payments on secured debt, BAPCPA amended Section 1325(b)(1)(B) to require that a debtor’s projected disposable income be applied to make payments under the plan only to unsecured creditors. The question before the Court is whether, in determining projected disposable income for purposes of confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, the Debtors are entitled to deduct payments which they will not actually be making (hereafter, the “Hypothetical Payments”) for a debt that was a secured debt as of the Petition Date. The Debtors cite In re Longo, 364 B.R. 161 (Bankr.D.Conn.2007) (Weil, U.S.B.J.) (<HOLDING>) and argue that the Court must employ a similar

    ### Response:
    holding that a chapter 7 debtor who postpetition surrenders underlying collateral is entitled to a deduction for hypothetical payments he will not actually be making on such a debt under the means test applied as of the petition date to determine whether a presumption of abuse arises under section 707
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Gulf Group Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 338, 351 (2004) (articulating the preponderance of the evidence standard). In order to succeed on the first ground, the protester “must show the decision was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.’” Med. Devel. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 691, 700 (2009) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)). Where “the challenge is brought on the second ground, the disappointed bidder must show ‘a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.’” Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Kentron Haw., Ltd. v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166, 1169 (D.C.Cir.1973)); see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556,

    ### Response:
    holding that if the procuring agencys decision was made in violation of the applicable statutes regulations or procedures then the court must determine as a factual matter if the bid protester was prejudiced by that conduct
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    . Complaint, ¶ 123, Step 7. 7 . Complaint, ¶¶ 125-137. 8 . Complaint, ¶¶ 138-156. 9 . Complaint, ¶¶ 157-165. 10 . See Complaint, count I, introductory paragraph preceding ¶ 166. 11 . See Complaint, ¶¶ 168-169. 12 . Complaint, ¶¶ 32, 33, 50. 13 . The remaining counts, including counts V and VI, for violations of Florida’s RICO Act and civil theft, respectively, are brought against certain named defendants not including AFE or Eide. Likewise, count IX for breach of fiduciary duty and count X for equitable accounting and turnover are brought against certain named defendants not including AFE or Eide. Accordingly, this Order does not address or encompass those counts. 14 .Adversary Doc. 133, 134. 15 . MDM Group Assocs., Inc. v. Midgett Realty, Inc., 2008 WL 2756926 (D.Colo. July 14, 2008) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Michaels Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding that the alleged unauthorized copying of the plaintiffs copyrighted marketing brochure by five unrelated defendants did not constitute a series of transactions for joinder purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issued a new reconsideration decision once more denying the appellant’s request to pay the balance of her redeposit and interest by actuarial reduction. Terwilliger then filed a petition for review of the Board’s June 6, 2013 decision. In an August 20, 2014 decision, the Board denied the petition, finding no error by the administrative judge. The Board found that the payment of interest on a redeposit of retirement deductions is a statutory requirement under 5 U.S.C. § 8334(d)(1). The Board also determined that, due to the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, it could not waive the requirement based on the fact that she had received faulty advice or on other equitable considerations. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The Board also forwarded the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding that the government cannot be forced to pay monetary benefits to an applicant who is statutorily ineligible for the benefits even if the applicant became ineligible due to reliance on the misadvice of a federal employee
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disclose the identity of a human source, interfere with a human source’s cooperation, or reveal legally privileged information. If full disclosure is not made for the reasons indicated, then, whenever feasible, the FBI field office shall make at least limited disclosure to a law enforcement agency or agencies having jurisdiction, and full disclosure shall be made as soon as the need for restricting disclosure is no longer present. Guidelines § VI(C)(2). The district court concluded that in spite of mandatory-sounding language — “the field office shall promptly transmit” — the Guidelines “as a whole, ... as well as the factors set forth for consideration, clearly refute[ ] the conclusion that Guideline § VI(C)(2) mandated disclosure.” Gonzalez, 2013 WL 308762, 61 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Even if an agent receives information that is

    ### Response:
    holding that where a dea manual provided that any bureau chief receiving an allegation or complaint indicating a possible leak of confidential dea information will ijmmediately notify internal security personnel bureau chiefs had discretion to determine what comprised an allegation or complaint 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the facts alleged in the complaint took place. See P.L.1997, ch. 251, § 1 (effective Sept. 19, 1997) (adding ""clergy members” to the list of those responsible for reporting child abuse). 5 . In limited circumstances, courts have recognized that an actor may have a duty to warn third parties of the dangerous propensities of another when the actor has a special relationship with the dangerous person and the person threatened is a specific, foreseeable, and identifiable victim of the dangerous person’s threats. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 345 (1976); Thompson v. County of Alameda rcumstances to have a duty of care to protect others from harm by third parties are: innke h 925, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 968 P.2d 522, 527-29 (1998) (<HOLDING>); cf. J.E.J. v. Tri-County Big Brothers/Big

    ### Response:
    holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of persecution.” Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 796. Mohammed changed the legal landscape in two ways. First, it characterized the harm of already-performed FGM as permanent and continuing persecution. Id. at 800. Prior caselaw had focused on the actual procedure of FGM, rather than the stigma and lasting physical and psychological impacts, as persecution. See Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. Second, Mohammed created an irrebuttable presumption that women who suffered already-performed FGM had a well founded fear of future persecution in their home countries. Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 801. Within two months of the Mohammed decision, while Mr. MuriuM’s appeal to the BIA was pending, Mrs. Mwangi filed a Motion for Remand. (Mrs. Mwangi was a derivative applicant on her husband’s application.) ir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We remand to the BIA to consider in the first

    ### Response:
    holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and a place for the claimant to exercise his business or calling). Perry’s use of his property thus ostensibly comports with the stated purpose of the homestead laws. Neither the Texas Property Code, nor the Texas Constitution, bar a rural resident from operating a business, per se, on the property on which he resides. Because the “business” or “calling” of rural residents has traditionally been agricultural, the Texas Supreme Court has not yet been presented with the opportunity to pass upon a case that involves (a) a rural resident, who claims (b) rural property, that is (c) on the same tract as his residence and (d) is used for non-agricultural business purposes, as part of his homestead. But see, Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717, 717-721 (Tex.Civ.App.1974), writ refd, n.r.e. (<HOLDING>); In re Buie, 287 F. 896 (N.D.Tex.1923), aff'd,

    ### Response:
    holding that where appellants owned and resided upon contiguous 60acre rural farm and used 18 acres as a mobile home park 18acre tract was part of the rural homestead
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and control of the educational affairs of the district.” Gulino, 460 F.3d at 365 (quoting N.Y. Educ. Law § 1604.30 (underlining added)). “ ‘Although the New York Department of Education has substantial responsibility for education in the state, the local school districts maintain significant control over the administration of local school district affairs.’ ” Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 623, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969)). This plenary supervisory oversight by the New York State Education Department includes assuring compliance by the state with the state’s obligations as a precondition to receiving funds under the Act. See Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 481 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the fact

    ### Response:
    recognizing that under the act states are granted federal funds to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Husband’s account. Other large checks were issued to Husband and his current wife, and Husband endorsed those checks to his current wife. 7 . In the absence of a specific statutory provision, the authority to transfer title to real property for security may not be implied from a general statute authorizing a court to require security for alimony payments. An example of a jurisdiction that does permit such a transfer is North Carolina. Its relevant statutory provision states, ""If the court requires the transfer of real or personal property or an interest therein as part of an order for alimony ... or for the securing thereof, the court may also enter an order which shall transfer title....” N.C.Gen.Stat. § 50-16.7(c) (1990); see Gilbert v. Gilbert, 71 N.C.App. 160, 321 S.E.2d 455 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Generally, a court of one state cannot

    ### Response:
    holding that  50167c permits the transfer of title to real property if it is necessary to insure payment of alimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    public education,” sometimes referred to as a “FAPE,” for all children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (establishing right to a free appropriate public education); id. § 1400(c) (congressional findings). Known then as the Education of All Handicapped Children Act (“EHA”), and today named the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or IDEA, the law “confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public education in participating States, and conditions federal financial assistance upon a State’s compliance with the substantive and procedural goals of the Act.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (citation and footnote omitted); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Among the most important of the IDEA’S goals

    ### Response:
    holding that the eha established right to public education for students with disabilities that consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and the one at issue in this case is that the truth-in-sentencing provision is not even arguably ameliorative; no competent person would ever opt to be required to serve 85% of his prison term if he had the option of having to serve less time. 2 . The trial was ultimately continued until after July 1, 1994, although obviously not for the purpose of bringing West’s proceeding within the purview of the statute. 3 . Moreover, West waived his ex post facto claims in the very act of requesting that the amendment be applied to him, as well as the act of submitting several jury instructions to the court which invited the jury to return a sentence of life without parole, since a defendant cannot ordinarily appeal any error that he introduced. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824 (Miss.1995) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The state’s assertion of the pertinence

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant had waived any objection to an instruction that he had himself introduced and which was amended by the state without objection from appellant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of credit as a payment device depends upon its independence from the transaction of which it is a part.” Sun Marine Terminals, 797 S.W.2d at 10. We hold that the district court abused her discretion in enjoining Synergy from presenting the letter of credit. Acceleration Clause The district court also temporarily enjoined Synergy from “directly or indirectly attempting to declare [Lone Star] to be in default of its payment obligations under the ... lease.” Lone Star argues that the district court did not abuse her discretion in so enjoining Synergy because Lone Star established a probable right of recovery on its allegation that the lease’s acceleration clause is an unenforceable penalty. See Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex.1968)) (<HOLDING>); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court may grant temporary injunction if applicant demonstrates probable right to recover damages and probable injury in time before trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must apply because these were ""warranty"" actions, though there was often no contract involved. See id. at 690-91. In response to the difficulties of attempting to apply contract rules to products liability cases in the absence of a contract, courts moved away from the implied warranty theory of recovery and adopted a strict liability in tort theory. A tort theory based on the dangerousness of conduct was considered more appropriate and more adaptable than a contract theory because the policy reasons courts were supplying to justify the imposition of strict lability go far beyond any conventional contract notions. See id. at 692. The California Supreme Court led the way with its decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963)(<HOLDING>), and the American Law Institute followed with

    ### Response:
    holding a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury to plaintiff caused by defective power tool
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Prior versions of the children’s code statutorily established the very low standard of “reasonable grounds to believe” that the enumerated crime was com mitted and required simple consideration of whether the child was amenable to treatment as a juvenile. See State v. Doe, 103 N.M. 233, 238^0, 704 P.2d 1109, 1114-16 (Ct.App. 1985). Under the current statute, the trial court must make a specific finding that the child is not amenable. Whatever the current standard of proof is for the trial court to make this specific finding, whether it is preponderance of the evidence as advocated by the State or something higher, we review the trial court’s decision for substantial evidence, see In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 15, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318, or abuse of discretion 1111 (1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Ernesto M., Jr., 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding statute which required consideration rather than a finding of amenability was constitutional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. With these principles in mind, the court turns to an analysis of the pending motions for summary judgment. III. APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION The court will first determine whether the undisputed facts of this case establish that CBC has violated the players’ claimed right of publicity. Only if that right is violated need the court consider whether under the facts of this case federal copyright law preempts the right of publicity and/or whether the First Amendment trumps the right of publicity. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the court will discuss each of

    ### Response:
    holding that state laws must yield to federal law when the former poses a substantial threat to federal laws ability to accomplish its mission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rights. But “not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right and not every encouragement to waive such a right is invalid.” Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219, 99 S.Ct. 492, 493-497, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978). Persons involved in the criminal law process are faced with a variety of choices. Some of the alternatives may lead to unpleasant consequences. For example, to choose to go to trial may result in greater punishment.... Section 3E1.1 may add to the dilemmas facing criminal defendants, but no good reason exists to believe that 3E1.1 was intended to punish anyone for exercising rights. We are unprepared to equate the possibility of leniency with impermissible punishment. Id. (footnotes omitted). But see United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 659-60 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1515, 117

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility was a penalty which could not be imposed for defendants assertion of fifth amendment privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not exempt under ERISA’s savings clause. Accordingly, these claims are covered by ERISA. If the Basts are to recover, they must do so under ERISA. C. ERISA Claims ERISA’s civil enforcement provision outlines the possible claims by a participant or beneficiary. 29 U.S.C. § 1132, ERISA § 502(a). They include: (1) an action to recover benefits due under the plan, ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); (2) an action for breach of fiduciary duties, ERISA § 502(a)(2); and (3) a suit to enjoin violations of ERISA or the Plan, or to obtain other equitable relief, ERISA § 502(a)(3). Extracontractual, compensatory and punitive damages are not available under ERISA. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The Basts’ ERISA claims are for loss of

    ### Response:
    holding that erisa  502a3 does not allow for extraeontractual damages including damages for emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    federal laws protecting veterans’ employment and reemployment rights “remained in full force and effect.” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2. The purpose of USERRA is to (1) encourage non-career military service by “eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers,” (2) minimize the disruption of servicemembers and their employers “by providing for the prompt reemployment” of servicemembers, and (3) prohibit discrimination against servicemembers. 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a). We have previously noted that USERRA’s provisions “should be broadly construed in favor of military service members as its purpose is to protect such members.” Vego-Colón v. Wyeth Pharm., 625 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.2010); see Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 90 L.Ed. 1230 (1946) (<HOLDING>). In the case of a servicemember whose period

    ### Response:
    holding that the selective training and service act of 1940 is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with the trial court that “[t]he nature of any termination is such that it often produces stress and mental anguish in the person being terminated [and] the test i's not whether or not the termination was traumatic, but whether or not the termination was outrageous.” Dahlberg’s conclusory allegations of a hostile work environment are insufficient to raise a factual issue about whether the defendants’ conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” and she has not pointed to evidence of specific instances in which the defendants’ conduct was so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 439-40 (Minn.1983) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 26] Viewing the evidence in the light most

    ### Response:
    holding employer discipline and written and verbal criticism of employees job performance not extreme and outrageous
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been amended effective July 1, 2006. 4 . As is explained herein, t 8 L.Ed.2d 961 (2001); Mullen v. Princess Anne Vol. Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir.1988) (noting that the ""shifting burdens of production of Burdine ... are beyond the function and expertise of the jury” and are ""overly complex”); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir.1992) (""Instructing the jury on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct the jury to consider the ultimate question of whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of his age”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 849-50 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc) (Loken, J., in Part II.A. of the dissent, which a majority of the court joined) (<HOLDING>); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the jury need only decide the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination and usually need not make findings on the prima facie case or whether the defendants explanation is pretextual
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that discriminate against “beneficiaries of the public entity’s program,” but it does not define what it means for a program to be the “public entity’s.” It does not seem that a program of driver education belongs to the TEA. Another regulation provides that “[t]he programs or activities of entities that are licensed or certified by a public entity are not, themselves, covered.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6). But we agree with the named plaintiffs that this statement does not automatically immunize licensed activities from the ADA’s gamut, given that the regulations also provide that a public entity cannot discriminate “directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1). Looking further to the interpretative guidance provid 441-42 (D.Kan.1994) (<HOLDING>). The importance of a contractual or agency

    ### Response:
    holding that city is not liable for inaccessible restaurants and liquor stores it licenses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Motor Components.” For both legal and evidentiary reasons, jurisdiction cannot be sustained on this basis. First, “stream-of-commerce analysis ‘is relevant only to the exercise of specific jurisdiction; it provides no basis for exercising general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.’ ” Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex.2010) (quoting Purdue Research Found, v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A, 338 F.3d 773, 788 (7th Cir.2003)). And although Devon produced some evidence that on February 19, 2010 — more than two months after Devon filed suit — -Motor Components’s website contained links to the websites of third-party retail stores in Texas where its products could be purchased, such evidence is not relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 169 (<HOLDING>). Second, BAM and Motor Components produced

    ### Response:
    holding that when determining whether a nonresident defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with texas sufficient to support general jurisdiction courts examine the defendants contacts and forumrelated activities only up to the time that suit was filed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    based upon identical facts underlying its Claim previously assigned to the Underwriters. HHRG counters that the assignment to the Underwriters does not include its indemnification contract rights under the Purchase Agreement. HHRG asserts that the Claim and the instant complaint are two totally separate and distinct legal actions with different losses, not joined or linked as part of the Settlement Agreement. HHRG argues that there is no possibility for double recovery because the Underwriters never paid HHRG for its Buyer Damages. HHRG further asserts that, in any event, it retains the right to bring the action for all damages over $18,330,477 as well as the deductible amount (approximately $800,000). See Brocklesby Transport v. Eastern States Escort, 904 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). IV. Discussion A. “[A] complaint should not

    ### Response:
    holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Indian timber.” Id. at 222, 103 S.Ct. at 2971 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2584, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980)). The regulations promulgated under these statutes establish a fiduciary relationship between the United States and the Indians. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224-26, 103 S.Ct. at 2971-73. Thus, the statutes and regulations “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained” for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 226, 103 S.Ct. at 2972-73; accord Short III, 719 F.2d at 1135. Such a breach of fiduciary duty occurs when funds held in trust are mishandled, which can arise in a number of ways. For example, the funds might be wrongfully disbursed. See, e.g., Short III, 719 F.2d at 1135 (<HOLDING>). Or, the funds might be misappropriated or

    ### Response:
    holding on the basis of mitchell ii that the pervasive statutory scheme present here creates an actionable fiduciary duty when the secretary wrongfully distributes timber proceeds in a discriminatory fashion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of money lawfully in its possession. The dictionary definition of “deprive” means simply to take something away from another. See Merriam Webster Dictionary; Cambridge Dictionary of the English Language. The second element — use of the mails— is not contested. As for the third element — intent to defraud — this element does not require intent to cause a financial loss to another. The requisite intent to defraud requires “an intent to deceive or cheat for the purpose of either causing a financial loss to another or bringing about a financial gain to oneself.” United States v. McAuliffe, supra; United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 371 (6th Cir.1997) (emphasis added); Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 10.01(2)(E). See also United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) The indictment’s allegations of Defendant’s

    ### Response:
    holding that to satisfy the element of specific intent to defraud needed to convict for mail fraud the government must show that the defendant knowingly made a material misrepresentation or knowingly omitted a material fact for the purpose of inducing the victim of the fraud to part with property or undertake some action that he would not otherwise do absent the misrepresentation or omission
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mansell, 490 U.S. at 588, 109 S.Ct. 2023. While it is true that state law usually governs family law matters, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that federal law may preempt state law in family law cases. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587, 109 S.Ct. 2023. To preempt state family law, Congress must show its intent by “direct enactment.” See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587, 109 S.Ct. 2023. The United States Supreme Court held that section 1408 preempted state law and noted that the law is both precise and limited. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 588, 109 S.Ct. 2023. Thus, the Act grants state courts only limited authority to allocate military retirement benefits. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 588, 109 S.Ct. 2023; see also Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Because the Act preempts state law and

    ### Response:
    holding that in allocating a federal entitlement congress may preempt state family law by direct enactment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2 . Liebman also executed an agreement for the express benefit of each transferee or holder of each Note, and a non-negotiable note providing for the payment of additional interest on the principal amount of each Note. 3 . A ""cognovit note"" is defined as, ""An extraordinary note which authorizes an attorney to confess judgment against person or persons signing it. It is written authority of a debtor and a direction by him for entry of judgment against him if obligation set forth in note is not paid when due.” Black’s Law Dictionary 236 (5th ed. 1979). 4 . The Court notes that to the extent that the holding of Atlas was based on a due process violation, it may be of questionable viability in light of D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972)

    ### Response:
    holding that a cognovit clause which provided for judgment without notice or hearing was not unconstitutional per se because due process rights are subject to waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    nary trial.” Justice Marshall dissented on the grounds that the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the Constitution requires stricter adherence to procedural safeguards in a capital case than in other cases____ In my view, a person on death row, whose counsel’s performance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels, should not be compelled to demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have been given a life sentence if his lawyer had been competent ... [Id. at 716-17,104 S.Ct. at 2079-80, 8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In no other circumstance would the Double Jeopardy Clause countenance the offer of a second chance to the State and the trial judge to find a better theory upon which to base a conviction”); Smith v. Murray, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct

    ### Response:
    holding that petitioner had forfeited his right to object to psychiatric testimony by failing to raise the claim on initial appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relevant during the state’s case because the defense theory had not been established by that time, but the cross examination of the witnesses during the state’s case made it clear that the defense’s position was that Harmon was in Morse’s motel room with Morse’s permission and in connection with drug dealings between the two. The defense asked Morse about whether he had received drugs from Harmon or had given Harmon collateral for drugs, and whether he had left the door ajar for Harmon. The defense also asked Morse, since he had testified that no co-workers had been in his room drinking, about empty beer bottles police found in his room. Even if it were true, as the majority states in support of its affirmance, that “The judge had no way of knowing that Harmon’s defense would 1989) (<HOLDING>). Alexander v. State, 627 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st

    ### Response:
    holding that the rule of completeness generally allows admission of the balance of the conversation as well as other related conversations that in fairness are necessary for the jury to accurately perceive the whole context of what has transpired
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which reflect the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency,’ as well as documents which would ‘inaccurately reflect or prematurely disclose the views of the agency.’ ” Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.Cir.1980)). Relying on this same language in Coastal States, at least one court appears to have held that all draft documents are per se deliberative because they are predecisional. See Hamilton Sec. Group Inc. v. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, 106 F.Supp.2d 23, 31-32 (D.D.C.2000) (construing Coastal States as a decision that litigants should not “parse” and holding that draft audit reports were privileged). But see Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 431 F.Supp.2d 28, 37-38 (D.D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). With respect to purely factual information

    ### Response:
    holding that an advisory committees draft ecological assessments were not privileged because they were not deliberative within the meaning of the privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purpose of giving fair and reasonable notice to all parties of the appropriate procedural standards that should be uniformly applied when any party, including a pro se litigant, seeks relief in [civil litigation],"" and advising that [a) pro se litigant who wants to initiate such an action should familiarize himself or herself with the rules of procedure""). 11 . Breck, 745 P.2d at 75. The Municipality maintains that Genaro did not need the superior court to inform her of the opportunity under Rule 36(b) to move or withdraw her admissions because the Municipality pointed Genaro to Rule 36 in the instructions accompanying its first discovery request and warned her of the consequences of failing to respond. See Willoya v. State, Dep't of Corrections, 53 P.3d 1115, 1123 (Alaska 2002) (<HOLDING>). The instructions did not describe the option

    ### Response:
    holding that court had no obligation to inform pro se litigant of procedural requirements due to clear evidence in record including inter alia defendants mention of requirements in summary judgment motion that litigant knew requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    see also Howell v. New York Post, 81 N.Y.2d 115, 124, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 355, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993). Under New York law, “[i]f a sale of a photograph for profit, which otherwise would be for trade purposes, is used in ‘reasonable connection’ with the publication of a ‘matter of public interest,’ ” both the sale and the subsequent “use” of the photograph are “privileged and constitute[ ] constitutionally protected free speech” and hence fall under the newsworthiness and public interest exceptions to Sections 50 and 51. Barrows v. Rozansky, 111 A.D.2d 105, 108, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (1st Dep’t 1985) (quoting Davis v. High Society Magazine, 90 A.D.2d 374, 381, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2d Dep’t 1982)); see also Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196, 197-98, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93-94 (4th Dep’t 1970) (<HOLDING>). Put another way, where “a plaintiffs picture

    ### Response:
    holding that photographers presentation for profit of photograph was insufficient basis for sections 50 and 51 claims where subject matter of photograph and accompanying article were within the area of legitimate public interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pollutants into [the lake] without an NPDES permit, and because [the companies] are likely to violate their umbrella NPDES permit at other construction sites.” Id. at 355. This court rejected the lake association’s argument, stating: The answer to this contention is that these issues are not proper subjects of the lawsuit because Comfort Lake’s notice of intent to sue referenced only the alleged permit violations discussed in MPCA’s December 20, 199k, warning letter, violations relating to the Wal-Mart store construction. A citizen suit is limited to violations that are closely-related to and of the same type as the violations specified in the notice of intent to sue. Id. (emphasis added); see also Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 526, 529-31 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). HCHC heavily relies on Sierra Club v.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that developments subsequent to the filing of a citizen suit may moot the citizens ease and holding that environmental organizations claims for injunctive relief in cwa citizen enforcement action alleging that city of dallas failed to develop and implement effective program to monitor and reduce its discharge of storm water pollutants into river were mooted by resolution of epas enforcement action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their purpose the vindication of the dignity and authority of the court, and civil contempt proceedings which are intended to enforce the rights of private parties, to compel obedience to orders and decrees made to enforce their rights and to give them a remedy to which the court deems them entitled. United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass’n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Doyle v. London Guarantee Co., 204 U.S. 599, 604-05, 27 S. Ct. 313, 51 L. Ed. 641 (1907)). Criminal contempt sanctions are considered final and appealable in pending actions by parties and non-parties. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, 552 F.2d 498, 501 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S. Ct. 67, 54 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of

    ### Response:
    holding that a nonparty may appeal an order of criminal contempt arising out of a pending action under 28 usc  1291
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    357 Md. 554, 568, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (2000)). To determine the proper sanction, we also consider the facts and circumstances of an individual case, including the “nature of the ethical duties violated[,]” and “any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shephard, 444 Md. 299, 339, 119 A.3d 765, 788 (2015) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Paul, 423 Md. 268, 284, 31 A.3d 512, 522 (2011). Considering the facts presented before us, and absent mitigating circumstances, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. We have consistently held that repeated failures to respond to Bar Counsel’s investigative requests can be a violation of MARPC § 19-308.1(b). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 436 Md. 513, 521-22, 83 A.3d 786, 791 (2014) (<HOLDING>); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harmon, 435 Md.

    ### Response:
    holding attorney violated rule 81b by failing to respond to two letters from the commission regarding grievance complaint
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    • the parties in interest immediately upon making such determination. 11 U.S.C. § 333(b). A. The District is a Health Care Business Neither party disputes the fact that the District meets the definition of a “health care business” under § 101(27A). The District is a public entity. It is engaged primarily in offering to the general public facilities and services, which include services at three hospitals and a skilled nursing facility. The District’s facilities and services are offered to the public for the diagnosis or treatment of injury, deformity, or disease, and the District’s facilities and services are offered to the public for surgical care, drug treatment, psychiat ric care, or obstetric care. See, e.g., In re William L. Saber, M.D., P.C., 369 B.R. 631, 637 (Bankr.D.Colo.2007) (<HOLDING>); In re Medical Assocs. of Pinellas, 360 B.R.

    ### Response:
    holding that a chapter 11 debtor who was in the business of providing plastic and reconstructive surgery to the general public met the definition of a health care business under  10127a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issued visas that were revoked by consular officials in Ecuador pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i), and/or Presidential Proclamation 7750. Congress has vested the Secretary of State and consular officers with the ability to revoke visas at their discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (2006). Section 1201® further provides that “[t]here shall be no means of judicial review ... of a revocation under this subsection.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit and other courts have upheld the non-reviewability of consular decisions regarding visas. See De Castro v. Fairman, 164 Fed.Appx. 930, 932 (11th Cir.2006); Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C.Cir.1999); see also United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950) (<HOLDING>). The only exception to § 1201® applies in the

    ### Response:
    holding that it is not within the province of any court unless expressly authorized by law to review the determination of the political branch of the government to exclude a given alien
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 90. See Calaway v. United States, 408 A.2d 1220, 1226-27 (D.C.1979); Crisafi v. United States, 383 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 322, 58 L.Ed.2d 716 (1978); Chambers v. United States, 383 A.2d 343, 345 (D.C.1978). Such evidence may not be admitted, however, unless it is directed to “a genuine and material issue in the case” and is probative of that issue. Campbell, 450 A.2d at 430 (citing Willcher v. United States, 408 A.2d 67, 75 (D.C.1979)); Miles, 374 A.2d at 282; see Light v. United States, 360 A.2d 479, 480 (D.C.1976). “Whether an issue has been raised for purposes of receiving other crimes evidence depends upon both the elements of the offense charged and the defense presented.” Willcher, 408 A.2d at 75 (citations omitted); see Crisafi, 383 A.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, appellant had attempted

    ### Response:
    holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and rejected by the Third Circuit, in Kline. Here, Defendant points to workplace and safety clauses in the CBAs and asserts that complete preemption must apply to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. This argument fails. The Court does not have to interpret any of the clauses in the CBAs in order for Plaintiffs to establish the scope of the duty. While it is possible that Defendant could point to some portion of a CBA in arguing that it acted reasonably, or to establish that it provided some type of warning as to certain occupational hazards, whether these statements provide a defense (in that they show Defendant acted reasonably, or that Defendant did not breach its duty of care) is a question of fact for the jury. See Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1371

    ### Response:
    holding that in interpreting the employees fraud claim whether there was justifiable reliance and extreme and outrageous conduct were purely factual questions which did not require interpretation of the cba or substantially depend on its construction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    555 (1991); see also id. at 649, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (Scalia, J., concurring). 44 . Id. at 630, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 45 . Id. at 630-31, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 46 . Id. at 631, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 47 . Id. 48 . Id. at 632, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 49 . Id. at 632-33, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 50 . Id. at 633, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 51 . Id. 52 . Id. at 637, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 53 . Id. 637-38, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 54 . Id. at 637, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (citation omitted). 55 . Id. at 639, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 56 . Id. (alteration in original). 57 . Id. at 649, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (Scalia, J., concurring). 58 . Id. at 650, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 59 . Id. 60 . Id. 61 .Id. at 651, 111 S.Ct. 2491. 62 . Id. 63 . Id. 64 . Id. 65 . Paredes I, 574 F.3d 281, 293 (5th Cir.2009). 66 . Id. 67 . Id. 68 . Renico v. Lett, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (<HOLDING>). 69 . Id. at 1864. Renico also held that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a decision of the court of appeals could not be understood merely to illuminate  the supreme courts decision in arizona v washington 434 us 497 98 sct 824 54 led2d 717 1978 which had considered the breadth of a trial courts discretion in granting a mistrial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this incident, the Flying Salsa had stayed open until 3:00 a.m. When considered together, this evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s inference that defendant had reasonable grounds to believe the Flying Salsa might have been occupied when he fired two shots into the building while Herring was inside. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. For the same reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence. See State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 146, 512 S.E.2d 720, 745 (citing State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985)) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941 (1999). The

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial courts denial of a motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence is reviewable only for abuse of discretion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    804 (Sup.Ct.1997). However, the Dolías court determined its remittitur by “[c]onsidering all the testimony as to the suffering of the respective decedents, including the period of time of such suffering”, not by merely calculating the duration of the disease. Justice Helen Freedman initially applied monthly multipliers to recalculate pain and suffering damages. See, Didner v. Keene Corp., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 4, 1991 at 22 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Dec. 17, 1990), aff'd, 188 A.D.2d 15, 593 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1st Dept.1993), modified, 82 N.Y.2d 342, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884, 624 N.E.2d 979 (1993). More recently, however, Justice Freedman has retreated from this practice and applied a reasonableness standard to remittitur motions. Manning v. Georgia Pacific Corporation, Index No. 102757/94, slip op. (February 3, 1995) (<HOLDING>). The rationale behind the abandonment of

    ### Response:
    holding that didner may no longer be controlling and remitting pain and suffering verdict of 5 million to 4 million
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207. The ultimate inquiry, according to the Senate Report is ""whether, in the particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal opportunity to participate and to elect candidates of their [sic] choice.” Id. at 30. The Ninth Circuit, applying this test, has explicitly held that evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice system is a relevant ""social and historical condition” for purposes of the totality of the circumstances test, reasoning that ""such discrimination would clearly hinder the ability of racial minorities to participate effectively in the political process as disenfranchisement is automatic.” Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1020; see also Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1513-14 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). ""Thus, racial bias in the criminal justice

    ### Response:
    holding that the existence of racial bias in the community is relevant to a  2 claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    101 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C.Cir.1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 . E.g., United States v. Stein, 452 F.Supp.2d 281, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y.2006); see In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., No. 04 MD 1653(LAK), 2007 WL 2197057, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2007). 5 . United States v. Constr. Prods. Res., Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir.1996). 6 . Dynegy Midstream Servs. v. Trammochem, 451 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir.2006). 7 . Nat'l Eng'g, 13 F.3d at 95. 8 . Constr. Prods. Res., Inc., 73 F.3d at 469. 9 . 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.1967). 10 . Id. at 1018 (drawing analogy to the “appealability of an order in aid of foreign letters rogatory”); see also In re Application of Silvia Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Matter of Letters Rogatory, 385

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of motion to vacate discovery order and to quash subpoena issued pursuant to 28 usc  1782 constitutes final appealable decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    7. RM Kids further contends that the trial court erred in granting Old Republic’s motion for directed verdict as to RM Kids’s claim for prejudgment interest under OCGA § 7-4-15, arguing that whether or not damages were liquidated was an issue for the jury. Again, we disagree. OCGA § 7-4-15 provides, in relevant part: “All liquidated demands, where by agreement or otherwise the sum to be paid is fixed or certain, bear interest from the time the party shall become liable and bound to pay them; if payable on demand, they shall bear interest from the time of the demand.” Under this Code section, “prejudgment interest — which flows automatically from a liquidated demand — is to be awarded upon a judgment for a liquidated amount.” But importantly, a demand is liquid (184 SE 858) (1936) (<HOLDING>). Cf. DTI Logistics, Inc., 300 Ga. App. at

    ### Response:
    holding that in a dispute between insurer and insured in which the insurer admitted liability hut disputed the amount of damages it was only after entry of a judgment upon that verdict that the claim became liquidated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    met the various tests delineated by Illinois courts for a joint and mutual will. The executrix contends that the will escapes the anti-alienation requirement under Illinois law, falling within the exception, because the second paragraph of the will bequeaths all property to the surviving spouse “absolutely.” This language, according to the surviving spouse, negates any restriction on the use of personal property. This overlooks the third sentence of the will which provides that at the death of the survivor all personal and real property is to go to the Grimeses’ four children, and the Illinois courts have refused to construe the term “absolute” as defeating the distribution plan of the bequest to the children. Helms v. Darmstatter, 34 Ill.2d 295, 301-302, 215 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Rauch v. Rauch, 112 Ill.App.3d 198, 201-202,

    ### Response:
    holding that the word absolute did not permit the survivor to ignore the disposition to a family member rather the survivor only had an absolute right to the entire corpus for life and at death the property passes in accordance with the terms of the will
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disproportionate for a particular defendant’s crime.” First, we compare the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. And if the threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, this Court will then “compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” In this respect, our Supreme Court has emphasized that “it is the rare case in which the threshold inference of gross disproportionality will be met and a rarer case still in which that threshold inference stands after further scrutiny.” Additionally, a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual “does not become so simply because it is (3) (680 SE2d 616) (2009) (<HOLDING>); Green v. State, 193 Ga. App. 894, 896 (2)

    ### Response:
    holding that life sentence imposed for kidnapping with bodily injury was not cruel and unusual even if victims injuries were minor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Seibert asserts that the posteonvietion court erred in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the penalty phase. We disagree. Because both prongs of the ineffectiveness test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review. Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 771 (Fla.2004). The Court will defer to the postconviction court’s factual findings as long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, and the Court will review the lower court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 772. Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>), this Court held that two requirements must be

    ### Response:
    holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20(1) with Minn. Stat. § 181.932. [¶ 36] In Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn.2000), the Minneso ta Supreme Court construed the reporting requirement of its whistle-blower statute: In order to determine whether a report of a violation or suspected violation of law is made in good faith, we must look not only at the content of the report, but also at the reporter’s purpose in making the report. The central question is whether the reports were made for the purpose of blowing the whistle, i.e., to expose an illegality. See Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a). We look at the reporter’s purpose at the time the reports were made, not after subsequent events have transpired. See generally Wolcott v. Champion Intern. Corp., 691 F.Supp. 1052, 1059 (W.D.Mich.1987) (<HOLDING>). In part, the rationale for looking at the

    ### Response:
    holding that the good faith requirement of the whistleblower statute was not met where the purpose of the employee at the time of the making of reports was not to protect the public but to protect the jobs of himself and his coworkers
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(h). Hen-shell argues that he is entitled to invoke res judicata as an indispensable party because: (1) the Akins’ civil conspiracy claim was a compulsory counterclaim in the prior action between PEC and PAFEC; (2) as an alleged co-conspirator, Henshell became an indispensable party to the adjudication of the civil conspiracy claim; (3) once Hen-shell became an indispensable party, PEC was required to assert its fiduciary duty claims against him as compulsory counterclaims against an adverse party; and (4) PEC’s failure to implead Henshell and assert the fiduciary duty claims in the prior action bars the Akins from now asserting these causes of action. See Usher, 278 S.E.2d at 73 (<HOLDING>). In light of our determination that the Akins'

    ### Response:
    holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as may be convenient for such counsel; counsel to submit the agenda(s) three calendar days before said conference. So ordered. 1 . David B. Blossom, et al., Outbreak of Adverse Event Reactions Associated with Contaminated Heparin, 359 New Eng. J. Med. 2674 (2008). 2 . Id. (citing Takashi Kei Kishimoto, Ph.D., et al., Contaminated Heparin Associated with Adverse Clinical Events and Activation of the Contact System, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 2457 (2008)). 3 . Ann W. McMahon, et al., Descripti 86, 992 (8th Cir.2001) (""[l]he absence of epidemiological evidence did not doom [plaintiff's] case”); In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.2002) (""[n]or is epidemiological evidence the sole method of establishing causation.”); Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385

    ### Response:
    holding that it is well settled that while epidemiological studies may be powerful evidence of causation the lack thereof is not fatal to a plaintiffs case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    through a back door reserved for police officers. Doc. 59 at ¶ 20. Anderson was charged with violating an order of protection, assault, and resisting/obstructing a police officer. Id. at ¶ 21. A Wheaton police department arrest report identified Moussa as the officer Anderson allegedly resisted. Doc. 54-4 at 2; Doc. 59 at ¶ 21. Discussion Section 9-102 permits a § 1983 plaintiff suing a municipal employee to recover any judgment from the municipal employer “only if the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, that is, only if the employer would be liable for the employee’s acts under the principle of respon-deat superior....” Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1494 & n.18 (7th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>); Kolar v. Cnty. of Sangamon, 756 F.2d 564, 566

    ### Response:
    holding that section 9102 makes illinois municipalities liable for  1983 torts committed by their employees within the scope of employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an impermissible collateral attack on a judgment) (followed in State v. Seeber, No. A04-560, 2005 WL 406210 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2005)); State v. Sims, 66 P.3d 472, 473, 475 (Or. 2003) (prohibiting collateral attack on administrative order revoking driver's license in criminal prosecution for driving while revoked, where the statute required only that (1) the defendant's license had been revoked, and (2) the defendant drove a motor vehicle while the revocation order was in effect); State v. Canney, 562 A.2d 1315, 1316-17 (N.H. 1989) (stating the general rule that a ""defendant may not collaterally attack an [administrative] habitual offender determination"" in a criminal enforcement action). In other contexts, see, e.g., Martin v. Wolfson, 16 N.W.2d 884, 888-89 (Minn. 1944) (<HOLDING>); Department of Conservation v. Sowders, 244

    ### Response:
    recognizing extension of the rule prohibiting collateral attacks to administrative orders other than rulemaking where the asserted errors render the decisions voidable as opposed to in excess of constitutional power or statutory authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    possibility of a substantial change or any change at all, or an inspection will disclose no obvious alteration or modification of its condition from the one that existed at the time of manufacture, sale, or delivery. Therefore, while the plaintiff may not necessarily come forward affirmatively with proof that the condition is unchanged, the defendant cannot, in good faith, assert that there is anything amiss. (Footnote omitted.) Given the ad hoc applicability of “substantial change,” it is not surprising that different views have emerged as to the proper distribution of the burden of proof on the issue. Some courts require the plaintiff to affirmatively prove the absence of any substantial change. See Waggoner v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 879 S.W.2d 692, 695-96 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Jasinski v. Ford Motor Co., 824 S.W.2d 454,

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs failure to prove that the subject air valve had not been altered in some way invalidated their design defect claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    marijuana and of conspiring to distribute marijuana. On appeal, he does not challenge those convictions or the sentences he received for those convictions. 2 . As further discussed below in section 111(A) of this opinion, the phrase ""crack cocaine” and its equivalent variant ""crack” are commonly used terms for ""cocaine base.” See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 519 F.3d 355, 363 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that ""crack cocaine” is a “form of cocaine base” and that "" '[cjrack’ is a street term” for crack cocaine). We use the terms ""crack cocaine” and ""crack” interchangeably in this opinion. 3 . Appellant does not claim, nor can he, that he was entitled to a continuance due to any surprise caused by the amendment. See Willis v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 430, 438, 393 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Neither Virginia's Code nor its case law

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant cannot claim that the amendment surprised him when the motion to amend was filed well in advance of trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its contracts or on the rationale of free and open competition beginning in 1996, the damage award in this case presupposes that SWBT’s anti-competitive acts will continue post-verdict and the contracts will continue to be enforced. This assumption is wrong as a matter of law. It must be remembered that the Plaintiffs prevailed upon their state-law restraint of trade claim and that such acts, and contracts which are the product of such acts, are “against public policy and illegal.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 79, § 203(A); First Nat’l Pictures v. Pappe, 170 Okla. 279, 39 P.2d 526, 530 (1934) (“[I]f [a] contract was made in violation of the anti-trust laws, it was an illegal and unenforceable contract”); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 290 (6th Cir.1898) (<HOLDING>). Plainly, the damage award based upon future

    ### Response:
    holding that contracts where the primary purpose is to restrain trade are void
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    consider the “against any consumer” language in the FDCPA venue provision at all, and Adkins considered it in the context of an entirely different state statutory scheme. See Smith, 887 F.Supp.2d at 339. Furthermore, if we were to interpret the FDCPA venue provision as Fox and Adkins do, it would be impossible for a debt collector to enforce a prior judgment through trustee process in Massachusetts unless the judgment debtor happened to reside or to have signed the underlying contract in the same county in which the trustee had a usual place of business. See Smith, 887 F.Supp.2d at 340. We do not read the FDCPA as mandating such a strange result. We turn, finally, to the defendants-appellees’ request for fees P.A., No. 2:1 1-cv-00619, 2012 WL 604249, at *4-7 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 24, 2012) (<HOLDING>). 2 . An order approving trustee process can

    ### Response:
    holding that a garnishment proceeding is an action against the consumer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Trial Act entitles criminal defendants to adequate time for preparing a defense, but that right may not be used as a two-edged sword in this fashion.” Id.; see also Kington, 875 F.2d at 1108 (endorsing “the sensible maxim that defendants ought not to be able to claim relief on the basis of delays which they themselves deliberately caused”); United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 331 (6th Cir.1988) (concluding that delay caused by defendant’s plea vacillation stopped speedy trial clock because otherwise defendant “would have successfully worked both sides of the street lulling the court and prosecution into a false sense of security only to turn around later and use the ... leisurely pace of the case as grounds for dismissal”); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 434 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 64

    ### Response:
    holding that delay created by defendant in mistakenly agreeing to a waiver of his speedy trial rights is excludable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    engaged in a cordial conversation, the agents calmly explained the purpose of their presence and requested entry, and then Cooper, with knowledge that the agents were conducting a narcotics investigation, invited the agents into the room. Even assuming that this “invitation” was non-verbal, Cooper gave officers the type of “implied consent” that we have found sufficiently voluntary in similar circumstances. See Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 751-52 (finding a defendant’s “yielding the right-of-way” to officers at the front door to be voluntary consent to enter where four officers were present and no guns were drawn). In contrast to the purported consent at issue in Bautista, Cooper’s consent was not simply the product of compliance with police demands. See Bautista, 362 F.3d at 591-92 (<HOLDING>); see also Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1512 (explaining

    ### Response:
    holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner Kesar Singh, a native of India, petitions for review from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming, without opinion, the order of an immigration judge (IJ) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of deportation, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. 1. We assume but need not decide that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence. The IJ found, in the alternative, that even if Petitioner were credible, he could relocate safely in the Gujarat province of India. See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). The IJ’s

    ### Response:
    holding that asylum may be denied to an applicant who has otherwise demonstrated a wellfounded fear of future persecution if the evidence shows that internal relocation is a reasonable option in all the circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intent to distribute.” We remain unpersuaded. Indeed, State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1993), upon whose reasoning the Government relies, provides no support for the Government’s construction of the drug tax stamp law. There, the defendant received concurrent sentences arising out of his conviction for two crimes: (1) delivery of a controlled substance, and (2) distribution of a taxable substance without a drug tax stamp. Id. at 439. He appealed, arguing that imposition of both sentences violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that the two convictions involved the same offense, because, in that ease, “[t]he drug tax stamp offense cannot be committed without committing the delivery offense.” Id. at 442; see also State v. Stage, 596 t 717 (<HOLDING>). Because we cannot agree with the Government’s

    ### Response:
    holding that possession of the specified quantity of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of failing to affix a drug tax stamp
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications”); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office). Additionally, Molina-Crespo alleges that the wealth-based classification is the result of disparate impact. Under the Supreme Court’s disparate impact jurisprudence, however, an individual claiming discrimination based on disparate impact must also show evidence of a discriminatory animus by Congress when it passed the statute. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Molina-Crespo shows no evidence of such

    ### Response:
    holding that an election system that had the impact of disadvantaging minorities was not to be subjected to strict scrutiny unless there was proof of a discriminatory purpose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United States). Accordingly, the people of Puerto Rico “do not exercise the full sovereignty of an independent nation.” Id. at 435. Instead, Puerto Rico possesses “a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by the States.” Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 594, 597, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65(1976) (stating that the purpose of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act was “to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union”); see also United States v. Acostar-Martinez, 168 (1st Cir.1987) (“Puerto Rico is to be treated as a state for purposes of the double jeopardy clause.”); Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Although the United States Supreme Court has

    ### Response:
    holding that puerto rico is to be treated like a state for purposes of the sherman antitrust act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    material to guilt or punishment, police would be encouraged to ■withhold such evidence from prosecutors until after trial.” 240 N.W.2d at 828 n. 5 (citations omitted). It is especially important to address and anticipate this potential for abuse when pursuing equality and fairness in criminal trials. “[T]he duties of a prosecutor to administer justice fairly, and particularly concerning requested or obviously exculpatory evidence, go beyond winning convictions.” Tucceri, 589 N.E.2d at 1220. The State has a unique role in the criminal justice process. Although it is indeed the prosecutor of all criminal charges, the State, should not just be in the business of obtaining guilty verdicts. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 835 A.2d 548 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 818 A.2d 1078

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutor has an obligation to protect not only the public interest but the innocent and to safeguard the rights guaranteed to all persons including those who may be guilty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fifth, grants a federal reserve bank the power to “dismiss” any of its officers, among others, “at pleasure” by its board of directors: holding to the effect that section 341, Fifth, has been impliedly amended by Title VII); Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 835 F.Supp. 751, 752-753 (consistent with such a holding); Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 831 F.Supp. 333, 337 (same); ly amended by Title VII and the ADEA, effectively establishes a maximum level of protection for officers of a national bank that FEHA may not exceed, we assume for present purposes that the provision has not been impliedly amended or repealed by other federal law. See post, footnote 8 on page 176. 6 See Booth v. Old Nat. Bank, supra, 900 F.Supp. at pages 842-843 (<HOLDING>); Sargent v. Central Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,

    ### Response:
    holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea that section 24 fifth preempts state law to the extent but only to the extent that it conflicts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    possess a valid property interest. In Travis Central Appraisal District v. Signature Flight Support Corp., the Court of Appeals of Texas recognized that the ownership interest at issue in that case was “an ownership interest in a leasehold. Because the City [of Austin] own[ed] the improvements but lease[ed] them to appellees, it is perfectly correct to refer to appellees’ ownership interests in the leased facilities and allow them the right to ‘sell’ that leasehold interest.” 140 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Tex.App.2004); see also Panola County Appraisal Dist. v. Panola County Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 69 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex.App.2002) (“A leasehold interest is an ownership right in land that belongs to the lessee.”), 284 (“An ownership interest in a leasehold is n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 1505 (<HOLDING>); Sun Oil Co., 572 F.2d at 818 (stating that “a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that eontract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that possession alone is not a violation of 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1) and 605(a). Rather, Noferi contends that “a violation occurs only when a person intercepts or receives or assists in intercepting, not when a person purchases or possesses.” Mem. of Law in Supp. of Summ. J. [Doc. # 34] at 3. Section 553(a)(1) provides that “[n]o person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any communication services offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.” Section 522 of Title 47 defines specific terms used within section 553(a)(1). It is undisputed that Noferi is a “person” as defined by section 522(15) and that Cablevision is a “cable operator” that , 469 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In Sykes, the Second Circuit has held that

    ### Response:
    holding that cable television programming transmitted over a cable network is not a radio communication as defined in  153b and thus its unlawful interception must be prosecuted under  553a and not  605
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the offerors submit electronic versions of proposals by email, while the solicitation at issue here requires electronic versions to be submitted on compact discs. As such, defendant argues, “T Square did not submit a timely version of its proposal through a delivery method authorized in the solicitation—rendering its proposal nonresponsive.” EOF No. 20 at 25 (citing AR at 100, 139-140). Defendant maintains that, absent compliance with the solicitation, the proposal cannot be considered for award. In support of its position, defendant cites two cases in which the court dismissed post-award protests for lack of standing when the disappointed bidder submitted a proposal that did not comply with the solicitation. See A & D Fire Protection, Inc. v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 126, 139 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 2007 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that in the postaward context a disappointed bidder lacked standing to bring a protest action when its submission was nonresponsive to the solicitation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Overtown near her house where she would give small quantities of cocaine and heroin to small children, to sell on the street for her. Leonard and Lenard Brown, who at that time were still in their early teens, allegedly helped Gibson pack cocaine, cook it into crack, and sell cocaine and heroin on the street along with other children. The defense raised a 404(b) objection at trial. This evidence of Gibson’s drug sales before any of the charged conduct in the indictment is “extrinsic” evidence whose admission is regulated by Rule 404(b). Under that Rule, this evidence was probative of Gibson’s intent on the Count 17 charge of knowingly maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using drugs. United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations

    ### Response:
    holding that when a defendant charged with conspiracy enters a not guilty plea he makes intent a material issue in the case and imposes a substantial burden on the government thus the government may introduce extrinsic offenses which qualify under 404b to prove defendants state of mind unless defendant takes affirmative steps to remove the issue of intent from the case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constitutionally protected speech;” and (3) “a causal relationship exists between [the plaintiffs] speech and the defendant’s retaliatory action.” See, e.g., Suarez Corp., Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000). Examining these considerations, the Supreme Court repeatedly has struck down as violative of the First Amendment government actions that burden or penalize an individual or group for engaging in political speech. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (concluding that First Amendment prohibits government employers from making “promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees ... based on party affiliation and support”); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (<HOLDING>). Finally, partisan gerrymandering implicates

    ### Response:
    holding that first amendment prohibits government officials from discharging or threatening to discharge lowerlevel public employees based on their political affiliation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (1982). This Court notes it is clear that Ford’s engines and transmissions were not eligible for “PD” status unless Ford paid duties on the merchandise before the merchandise entered the FTSZ and specifically elected “PD” status for the entries. (See Pl.’s Br. at 8; supra n. 2.) This Court also notes while Ford may have intended to elect “PD” status and to pay the duties as the engines and transmissions were entered into the FTSZ, as Ford itself admits, “for some inexplicable reason,” Ford failed to do so. (Pl.’s Br. at 27.) This Court does not find Ford was mistaken as to the ultimate nature of the merchandise, and so cannot find Ford made a mistake of fact in this case on that basis. See Zaki Corp. v. United States, 960 F.Supp. 350, 362-63 (CIT 1997) (<HOLDING>); Toban Co. v. United States, 960 F.Supp. 326,

    ### Response:
    holding mistake of fact exists where broker unintentionally and nonnegligently was unaware of the physical nature of the imported merchandise and customs relied on agent to enter good properly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    areas.” (See PI. Mem. at 11.) 1. Purpose and Need a. Lack of Supporting Evidence The Forest Service states that the purpose of Phase 1 is to “protect[ ] local communities from catastrophic wüdfíres and extended exposure to smoke” by “re-ducting] fuels.” (See AR 246.) According to the Forest Service, the Phase 1 project wül reduce the intensity of future wüdfíres by removing the “fuels” that help to spread the fires. Plaintiffs assert that the EIS violates NEPA by faffing to disclose the lack of scientific evidence supporting the Forest Service’s belief that the Phase 1 logging project wül reduce the intensity of future wüdfíres and by faffing to address reports that contradict the Forest Service’s belief. See Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, 871 F.Supp. 1291, 1318 (W.D.Wash.1994) (<HOLDING>). In particular, plaintiffs note that the EIS

    ### Response:
    holding eis must disclose responsible scientific opinion in opposition to the proposed action and make a good faith reasoned response to it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Court finds that equitable tolling is appropriate in this case. Scary’s delay in paying the filing fee was not due to mere “excusable neglect.” He did not delay because he was too busy or preoccupied with other matters, or even because there was a miscommunieation as to the due date. Rather, he failed to pay the fee in a timely manner because of the misperception — created by the court — that he had done everything that was required of him. In Scary’s mind, he had been completely diligent at all times, and he had not neglected his claim at all. Cf. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (denying equitable tolling where the complaint was filed 14 days late because the plaintiffs attorney was out of the country); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the six situations presented in

    ### Response:
    holding that a cercla plaintiffs failure to file a timely complaint allegedly because it was so busy cleaning up the landfill might constitute excusable neglect but did not justify equitable tolling where the damage was discovered six months prior to the accrual date
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but periodic payments intended to compensate an employee for his government services, but to permit large single — or irregular — payments that total a far greater sum. If the statute is intended to prevent the appearance of wrongdoing, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared, it is hard to see why the public would regard the former as worse than the latter. This court has certainly assumed that § 209(a) prohibits lump-sum payments, see United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C.Cir.1979) (declaring that “there can be no dispute that defendant ... received a contribution from a source outside the Government when he accepted [a one-time payment of $800] for the Ireland trip”), as has the Seventh Circuit, see United States v. Oberhardt, 887 F.2d 790, 793-94 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Berman’s argument to the contrary rests

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant violated  209 by paying a government employee 200 for an official document
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that motion for en banc reconsideration becomes moot when panel issues new opinion and judgment). 2 . Contractors are required to pay in accordance with the wage rates only if the government entity provides them, and the public body's determination of the general prevailing rate of per diem wages is final. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2258.022(e), 2258.023(c) (West 2008); see also Tex. Hwy. Comm'n v. El Paso Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 149 Tex. 457, 234 S.W.2d 857, 863 (1950) (interpreting predecessor prevailing wage rate statute and holding that determination of rate by highway commission was ""final and not reviewable by the courts”); City of Houston v. Houston Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 710 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). But see Associated Gen. Contractors of Tex.,

    ### Response:
    holding that citys determination of prevailing wage rate was final and not subject to judicial review under predecessor statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Educ., 839 F.Supp.2d 881, 884 (E.D.Ky.2012) (citing Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir.1996); C.A. ex. Rel. G.A. v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 577 F.Supp.2d 886, 890 (E.D.Ky.2008)). Here, Shepherd sued the government entities, Floyd County and Floyd County Fiscal Court, as well as the county’s employees. R. 1-1. Thus, the § 1983 claim against the individual defendants — -jailers and deputy jailers — in their official capacities can be dismissed as a “housekeeping” matter. C.K., 839 F.Supp.2d at 884. II. Governmental Immunity Bars State Law Claims Against Floyd County and Floyd County Fiscal Court. Governmental immunity protects Floyd County and the Floyd County Fiscal Court from Shepherd’s claims. See Smith v. Cnty. of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686, 690 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). A Kentucky county and its county government

    ### Response:
    holding that state governmentalimmunity law applies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or the sounds recorded and that the item offered accurately and reliably represents the actual scene or sounds.” “ ‘620 So .2d at 678. “ ‘Here, the State presented sufficient evidence of the authenticity of the tape recording of the 911 calls. Barry Rush- akoff testified that he had listened to the tape of the two 911 calls that he placed the night of the murder and that the tape was an accurate representation of what had transpired during those calls. Although Rushakoff did not identify all of the voices that can be heard in the background of the tape, positive identification of every sound on a tape recording is not necessary for its admission. See, e.g., Molina v. State, 533 So.2d 701, 711 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Rule 901(a), Ala.R.Evid., states that

    ### Response:
    holding that videotape of defendant placing telephone call while being booked at the police station was properly admitted even though witness could not verify every word that the defendant spoke as one he personally heard as long as portions of video andor sound recordings are verified by a witness the recordings are admissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    refer to Legionella bacteria as ""contaminants” of shower and spa water. (Doc. 44 at 4-5, 9-12). 4 . The Parties do not dispute that the guest room showers fall within the Fungi or Bacteria Exclusion because the showers are “contents” of the building. However, the Named Insureds argue that because the spa tub is outside the building it cannot be considered ""contents” of the building. Although undisputed evidence beyond the complaints in the Cooper and Walker Suits shows that the spa tub is located in the courtyard of the Quality Suites, (Doc. 47-3; Doc. 58-1 at 1-2), only the complaints themselves may be considered in determining whether Westport has a duty to defend. Baron Oil, 470 So.2d at 813; see also Kings Point W., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 412 So.2d 379, 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>). But, because the underlying complaints do not

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court erred in looking beyond the allegations of the complaint to determine whether a duty to defend arose
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stanley Davis appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for habeas corpus. We affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history, we will not recount it here. I The district court did not err in denying Davis’s claim for habeas relief based on the state trial court’s denial of his mistrial motion. Davis contends that the trial court should have granted his motion because the jury’s verdict may have been influenced by sympathy for the ailing Mrs. Mecchi after the jury overheard her making a loud noise directly outside of the courtroom. In order to be entitled to relief for constitutional errors, the error must have “ ‘had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 6 990) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, there was no “direct and

    ### Response:
    holding that juror access to a police report not admitted into evidence did not prejudice the verdict when the information it contained duplicated trial testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    procuring all five wastewater easements and that the allegations underlying CONA’s negligent misrepresentation, statutory fraud, and aiding and abetting fraud claims all implicate the same negligence-based conduct. Therefore, although labeled as non-negligence claims, CONA’s claims for statutory fraud and aiding and abetting fraud are not claims other than ones for negligence. Instead, they are recharacterized claims for negligence arising out of the provision of professional services by a licensed or registered professional and, thus, are subject to civil practice and remedies code section 150.002’s certificate of merit requirement. Compare CH2M Hill Trigon, Inc. v. J7 Contractors, Inc., No. 10-10-00058-CV, 2010 WL 3619898, at *7-9 (Tex.App.-Waco Sept. 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>) with Curtis, 315 S.W.3d at 107-08 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that claims of tortious interference and fraud constituted claims of professional negligence and thus required certificate of merit because underlying complaint was that appellee was injured by appellants failing to disclose information and providing inaccurate information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “judgment.” As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction oyer this appeal. Goeddertz v. Parchen, 299 Or 277, 279, 701 P2d 781 (1985). Appeals from a trial court sitting in probate are taken in the same manner as those from a trial court generally. ORS 111.105(2); Goeddertz, 299 Or at 279. In Goeddertz, the personal representative sought to appeal from an “order directing [the] personal representative to pay an allowed claim” and a “judgment-order on hearing on objections to final account.” 299 Or judgment from being entered against appellants; rather, the interim order that appellants seek to challenge can be reviewed on appeal from the decree of final distribution. See ORS 116.113(4). Compare Amundson v. Brookshire, 133 Or App 450, 453, 891 P2d 710 (1995) (<HOLDING>). The document from which appellants seek to

    ### Response:
    holding that an order removing the personal representative is appealable under ors 192052 because it both affects the persons substantial rights and prevents entry of a judgment or decree as to that person in his or her capacity as a personal representative
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    en banc proceedings because ""Congress amended [18 U.S.C. § 2252] in 2008, effectively broadening [its] jurisdictional language,” Maj. Op. at 599 n. 18, the fact remains that the statute, as currently written, continues to utilize the phrase ""visual depiction.” Thus, Schaefer and the instant case will, until revisited and reversed by the entire court, continue to impact future child pornography prosecutions in this circuit. 10 . Although the government presented evidence of three other video images in support of the distribution charge, it is unnecessary for me to determine whether the government’s evidence sufficiently established that those images also traveled in interstate or foreign commerce. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 .

    ### Response:
    holding that when an indictment charges several acts in the conjunctive  the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    General has been empowered to act.”). 98 . Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 177 (quotation marks omitted). 99 . Berman v. Sugo LLC, 580 F.Supp.2d 191, 202 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (quotation marks omitted). 100 . Contractual Obligation Prods., LLC v. AMC Networks, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 2867, 2006 WL 6217754, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (citing Weiss v. La Suisse, 69 F.Supp.2d 449, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 101 . Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.2005) (citing State of Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Shearman & Sterling, 95 N.Y.2d 427, 434-35, 718 N.Y.S.2d 256, 741 N.E.2d 101 (2000)). 102 . See id. 103 . Restatement (2d) Contracts § 302. 10 . 3. 109 . See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217-20

    ### Response:
    holding that only direct ownership of a majority of shares by the foreign state satisfies the statutory requirement outlined in section 1603
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “custody”] is to determine what were “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” — a “distinctly factual” inquiry as to which “we must defer to the trial judge’s factual findings and accept any reasonable inferences [she] has drawn from the evidence.” In re J.H., 928 A.2d at 650-51. The issue of “whether on the duly established facts, appellant was subject to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings” is a legal one, which we review de novo. Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 442 (D.C. 2004). As the Supreme Court has observed, “[u]nfortunately, the task of defining ‘custody is a slippery one.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (<HOLDING>). It is clear, however, that an individual may

    ### Response:
    recognizing that police and the courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of “automob source payments under the plain meaning of the statute. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 859-60. In this case, by contrast, the UIM benefits were paid by respondent’s insurer. They were not direct-source payments. Do is therefore inapposite. Respondent argues that, because statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, the collateral-source statute should be interpreted to exclude UIM coverage unless it expressly provides otherwise. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858 (recognizing that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed). In another case addressing the interpretation of the collateral-source statute, the appellant raised a similar argument, contending that a broad interpretation of the statute was inappropriate. See Swanson, 784 N.W.2d at 279 (<HOLDING>). The supreme court declined to adopt the

    ### Response:
    holding that the term payments in the collateralsource statute encompasses the value of a negotiated discount for medical services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which a United States court is compelled to actually enforce the collection of a foreign tax judgment, and prohibiting its use in any case requiring a United States Court to pass on the validity of, or give effect to, a foreign revenue law. Because this revision creates a circuit split on an issue where such a division is unwarranted, I dissent from the majority’s formulation of the revenue rule. B. As is evident from the above discussion, the revenue rule is a discretionary doctrine, one that is guided by “constitutional and prudential considerations.... ” Boots, 80 F.3d at 587. See also Attorney Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 113 (“We do not suggest that the revenue rule always bars United States courts from furthering the tax policies of foreign sovereigns.”); Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 550 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Boots, 80 F.3d at 587

    ### Response:
    recognizing that our courts will normally not enforce foreign tax judgments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his or her own interests.” Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass’n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 295 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs have expressly stated that they “rely neither on third-party standing nor [on] the harms of others,” Appellants’ Br. 24, but the Government contends that without invoking third-party standing, Plaintiffs would have no way to attack the FFI Penalty, which is imposed only on financial institutions that are not parties to this litigation. 2. Causation Even if a plaintiff alleges an actual or imminent injury that is concrete and particularized, the plaintiff must also show that the injury is “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315 (<HOLDING>). When a plaintiffs alleged injury is the

    ### Response:
    holding parents of schoolchildren lacked standing to sue irs to challenge private schools tax exemptions where the parents alleged harm of increased school segregation was caused by the private schools choice to racially discriminate and was not fairly traceable to the irs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Kelvin Pub., Inc., 1995 WL 734481, *4 (6th Cir.1995) (unpublished) (internal quotations omitted). Section 105 does not itself create a private right of action, but may be invoked to preserve a right elsewhere in the Code. Id.; Yancey v. Citifinancial Inc. (In re Yancey), 301 B.R. 861, 868 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.2003). “Section 105(a) of the Code provides the bankr ss.1997) (using § 105(a) to hold the creditor in contempt to enforce the court’s discharge of a debt where the creditor had deliberately attempted to collect a prepetition debt in disregard of the discharge order). Section 105 also enables courts to issue orders necessary to protect estate property subject to bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Green v. Drexler (In re Feit & Drexler, Inc.), 760 F.2d 406, 411, 414-15 (2nd Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int'l v. Am. Nat’l Bank

    ### Response:
    holding that a court had the power pursuant to  105a to compel a defendant to deliver her property which was the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding from outside the courts territorial jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and Hayward. The April 26 document gave an estimate of “roughly 5,000 barrels,” yet on April 28 Suttles pegged BP’s best estimate at only 1,000 barrels. Subsequent statements by Suttles and Hayward put the estimate at “somewhere between 1,000 and 5,000” or at a “guesstimate” of 5,000, while the second document from April 27 clearly shows that BP’s best estimate was actually over 5,000 and as high as 14,000 barrels per day. The documents support Plaintiffs’ contention that BP was lowballing the estimate numbers in an attempt to keep stock prices from falling. Whether the facts will actually establish that BP intentionally gave the public lower estimates is an issue for trial. See, e.g., Joffee v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 3507, 2005 WL 1492101, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to

    ### Response:
    holding that factual disputes are inappropriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    5 Notably absent from the notice clause are words such as “only” or “must,” or phrases such as “all other methods of notice are insufficient,” which would clearly limit the methods of notice to those listed. 6 “A court will not rewrite the contract of the parties.” 11 Williston, Contracts §31:5 (4th ed.). 7 See Baybank v. George, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 473 (1995) (stating that notice served in the listed ways would be adequate even if allegedly unreceived). 8 See Cummings Properties, LLC v. Eaton Corp. 13 Mass. L. Rptr. 609 n.2 (2001) (indicating that the language “notice .. . shall be deemed duly served when served by constable, or delivered ... by certified mail...” did not limit the methods of giving notice to those listed); see also Korey v. Sheff, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 266, 267-68 (1975) (<HOLDING>). 9 As the plaintiffs, no doubt, are now well

    ### Response:
    holding that language similar to the above did not exclude other methods of notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to ""allowed claims.” Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. v. Pardee, 218 B.R. 916, 921-922 (9th Cir. BAP 1998). Similarly, courts examining § 506(b), which allows interest on secured claims, in conjunction with Section 502, have concluded that it is necessary to examine 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) and 502(b) to determine whether a claim may be allowable as an unsecured claim, eventually finding the term ""claim” is broad enough to encompass an unliquidated, contingent right to payment even though the triggering contingency does not occur until after the filing of the petition (Woburn Assoc. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transport, Inc.), 954 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1992)). In re Tricca, 196 B.R. 214 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996). See also Winchell v. Town of Wilmington, 200 B.R. , 27 B.R. 137 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983) (<HOLDING>). See also Harris v. Fort Oglethorpe State

    ### Response:
    holding that relief from the codebtor stay is mandated to the extent that the chapter 13 plan does not propose to pay the claim in full
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to develop a workable standard and resolve each dispute. The statutory privilege is not a legal defense to a discovery dispute, but the rationale of the privilege provides an important perspective in gaining a full understanding of the privacy interest at stake. The competing fundamental interest at stake in this case is derived from constitutional protections provided to an accused to confront witnesses in a criminal trial and to be given a fair trial. A defendant in a criminal case not only has a right to confront witnesses with effective cross-examination, but due process and the right to a fair trial also demand an accused be given a full and fair opportunity to present a claim of self-defense. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974) (<HOLDING>); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.

    ### Response:
    recognizing defendants right to confront witnesses with adequate crossexamination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    something that it is not; following the Simmons line of cases, we require an objection to a proof of claim or a § 505 motion to determine the amount of a tax debt. This burden is minor and no greater than the filing of a tax return required of all taxpayers. Therefore, Taylor’s Plan is not res judicata as to the amount of his liability on the Marshall Mill § 6672 penalty, and the IRS is not barred from proceeding against him to collect that penalty. Taylor’s reliance upon the fact that the IRS filed a proof of claim for income taxes as support for his claim that res judicata should apply is misplaced. The § 6672 penalty is a completely separate debt and a separate type of tax which is not determined by the consideration of an income tax proof of claim. Cf. Grynberg, 986 F.2d at 371-72 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the tax determination process was

    ### Response:
    holding that the irss full participation in the bankruptcy proceeding in relation to an income tax debt did not bar it from collecting a gift tax debt that had also been listed in the debtors schedules where the irs did not file a proof of claim and the debtor did not force the irs into the proceeding on the gift tax debt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (In re Sholdan), 108 F.3d 886, 888 (8th Cir.1997); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. 2 . Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 3 . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.09[2][a], pp. 105-91 (Lawrence P. King, et al., 15th ed. rev. 1999) (""Perhaps the most common group of additional elements whose presence will result in an order for substantive consolidation is poor or nonexistent record keeping of, or commingling of, separate assets (particularly cash and other liquid assets) and liabilities and inter-affiliate transactions, whether by design or otherwise, that makes it prohibitively expensive or impossible to sort out the proper allocation of assets and liabilities.”). See also, e.g., In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2nd Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. 770,

    ### Response:
    holding that substantive consolidation should be allowed a when the creditors dealt with separate entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on the companys separate identity or b when the detangling of the intertwined companies is either impossible or costly
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    high speed, as Kluge did, “his vehicle has the potential to become a deadly or dangerous weapon.” Kendrick, 423 F.3d at 809. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, the risk of injury to others associated with police pursuits of fleeing suspects “appear[s] to be at least ‘roughly similar’ to that associated with arson,” one of the example crimes in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 537 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581). Finally, unlike the Minnesota statute at issue in Tyler, Iowa’s fleeing statute only applies to those who “exceed[] the speed limit by twenty-five miles per hour or more.” Iowa Code § 321.279(3); see Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725 (“Neither high speed nor reckless driving is a statutory element of [Minnesota’s fleeing statute].”); see also Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1294 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we hold that eluding under section

    ### Response:
    holding that floridas fleeing crime does not involve a high level of risk of physical harm to others because neither high speed nor reckless driving is a statutory element
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (citing Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67, 117 S. Ct. at 1548-49; Haag v. State, 117 P.3d 775, 782 (Alaska App. 2005)); Ned v. State, 119 P.3d 438, 443 (Alaska App. 2005) (citing Johnson, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S. Ct. 1544; U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002)); State v. LaClair, 433 A.2d 1326, 1328-29 (N.H. 1981); State v. Cross, 234 P.3d 288 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2010); State v. Holder, 745 P.2d 141 (Ariz. 1987); People v. Lann, 633 N.E.2d 938 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1994); State v. Hutchinson, 342 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 1986); Poole v. State, 846 So. 2d 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); U.S. v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2009) (no plain error in a case in which the defendant failed to preserve the question for appellate review); People v. Woods, 331 N.W.2d 707, 725 (Mich. 1982) (<HOLDING>); McBee v. Grant, 763 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1985);

    ### Response:
    holding sandstrom v mont 442 us 510 99 s ct 2450 1979 would be retroactively applied to pending cases where error was properly raised and preserved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in those opinions did not provide consequences for the tribunals’ failure to timely carry out their duties. Finally, the tribunals, not the parties invoking the jurisdiction of the tribunals, caused the delay in the proceedings. The Board must file its application for permission to appeal within ten days from when the Commission files its disposition. Iowa Ct. R. 35.11(2). Here, a party, not the tribunal, caused the delay in proceedings by failing to meet this deadline. The rule states the consequence for failing to file an appeal within the required time is that the Commission’s decision becomes final. Id. r. 35.9. This language clearly evidences intent by this court to make the ten-day filing requirement mandatory, not directory. See Zick v. Haugh, 165 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Iowa 1969) (<HOLDING>). Once the ten-day period for seeking

    ### Response:
    holding rule pertaining to time for taking an appeal to supreme court from an order judgment or decree of the lower court is mandatory and jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims, GRI 3 has no application here. By its terms, GRI 3 applies only where “goods are, prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings.” See GRI 3. As set forth in section III.A above, however, the four pieces of merchandise in dispute are properly prima facie classifiable under heading 9405, pursuant to GRI 1 and GRI 2(a). And Explanatory Note 70.13 expressly excludes from classification under heading 7013 “[l]amps and lighting fittings and parts thereof of heading 94.05.” See Explanatory Note 70.13; see also Note 1(e) to Chapter 70. There is therefore no basis for invoking GRI 3, because the merchandise at issue is not “prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings.” See, e.g., Midwest of Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 1423, 1429 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Government emphasizes that, in addition

    ### Response:
    holding that chapter note which excludes articles of heading 9505 from classification under chapter 69 obviates  the need to decide whether the items  prima facie fall under the alternative headings 6912  and 6913
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    established an elaborate network of prohibited ownership and compensation arrangements resulting in the submission and payments of millions of dollars in Medicare claims for patients referred by physicians who were prohibited from making these patient referrals to Columbia under the Stark laws. Columbia was expressly barred from submitting those claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(l), while it was prohibited from receiving payment for those claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(l). In sum, Relator charges that Columbia’s Medicare claims violate the FCA because their presentation and payment were statutorily prohibited. By analogy, Relator relies on Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Peterson v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 830, 96 S.Ct. 50, 46 L.Ed.2d 47 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Relator points to the legislative history of

    ### Response:
    holding that the knowing submission of medicare claims for services that were not covered and payable under the medicare act was an fca violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the present appeal. 2 . It is clear that Egilman violated the protective order by failing to inform Eli Lilly of the second subpoena, which required an earlier production date. See In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F.Supp.2d at 395. Egilman would also appear to have contravened CMO-3 by failing to provide Eli Lilly with a reasonable opportunity to object to production with respect to the first subpoena. 3 . As he testified, Gottstein understood Egilman's reluctance to send him a copy of the order as an effort to avoid his later being charged with knowledge of its contents. Gottstein did not try to convince Egilman to provide him with a copy of CMO-3. 4 . See, e.g., U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76, 108 S.Ct. 2268, 101 L.Ed.2d 69 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Houston Bus. Journal, Inc. v. Office of

    ### Response:
    holding that the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. In particular, he alleged that the officers failed to announce that they were there to execute a warrant and that they did not wait for a reply to their knocks before forcibly entering his residence. Based upon these allegations, Reynoso met his initial burden of making a showing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the officers’ alleged failure to properly announce their purpose and to wait a reasonable length of time before entering under color of warrant. Thus, at the suppression hearing, the State had the burden to show that the officers’ actions were reasonable. See Holmes, 175 F.Supp.2d at 73-76; of. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-395, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32

    ### Response:
    holding that when noknock entry is challenged police must prove they had a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing presence would be dangerous or futile or inhibit effective investigation of crime
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    grandmother on every birthday, Easter, and Christmas was required to include those amounts as income. The court ruled a gift regularly received from a dependable party may be considered in determining a parent’s child support obligation. Barnier v. Wells, 476 N.W.2d 795 (Minn.Ct.App.1991). An opposing view is found in other jurisdictions. There, the courts have refused to consider gifts as income to a parent for purposes of calculating child support obligations. The rationale for refusing to include gifts for this purpose is that the donors have no legal obligation to continue with the practice of making gifts. See In Re Marriage of Harmon, 210 Ill.App.3d 92, 154 Ill.Dec. 727, 568 N.E.2d 948 (1991); True v. True, 615 A.2d 252 (Me.1992); Ikard v. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). In a ease very similar to this case, the

    ### Response:
    holding gifts cannot be considered as income to the recipient unless the donor has a legal obligation to make them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because of the risk that persons arrested on drug charges will bring drugs with them. Perhaps with respect to other types of drug offenses — about which we express no opinion — but the record shows us nothing about this jail (or any other jail’s) experience with those arrested on § 11550(a) charges. We do not disagree that in some cases, the charge itself may give rise to reasonable suspicion; indeed, we so held in Thompson, where the felony charged was grand theft auto and the offense was “sufficiently associated with violence to justify a visual strip search.” 885 F.2d at 1447. We have also been careful to distinguish charges that involve drugs and contraband as well as violence when invalidating blanket strip search policies applied in other contexts. See Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 716 (<HOLDING>); Giles, 746 F.2d at 618 (declaring

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutional a strip search policy applied to person arrested for stealing a roommates belongings observing that no weapons no drugs no contraband no violent acts of any kind were involved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    authority must “be derived from the plain wording of the statutes.” Arem, 154 So.3d at 363-64. In addition, we have no quarrel with the Arem court’s conclusion that “[ijn Florida ... only law enforcement officers and [TIEOs] are entitled to determine who gets prosecuted for a red light violation.” Id. at 364 (citing §§ 316.0083(3), .640(5)(a)). However, we part company with the Fourth District when it concludes that “the TIEO[ ] merely acquiesces in the vendor’s decision to issue the citation,” and that under the initial review of the computer images of purported violations that the processors exercise “unfettered discretion to decide which images are sent to the TIEO[ ] and which ones are not.” Id. at 365. Undoubtedly, section 316.0083(l)(a) permits “a review of information fro 0) (<HOLDING>). Although ATS processors initially screen the

    ### Response:
    holding that the florida public service commission did not improperly delegate to its staff the authority to approve a revised supplemental service rider when the staff merely carried out the ministerial task of seeing whether the conditions specified by the board were met
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    diversion permit” and specifies that up to 103,000 af/y of both SJCP water and “‘native’ Rio Grande water” will be diverted from the Rio Grande in equal portions. The Application specifies no use of the Rio Grande water, stating that the Rio Grande water “will not be consumptively used, but returned to the river at [Applicant’s] Southside Water Reclamation Plant (SWRP) below Rio Bravo Bridge.” The Application asserts an independent right to the use of SJCP water, but does not assert a basis for any entitlement to the diversion or use of the native Rio Grande water. The Application does not seek any such entitlement or appropriation. There is no dispute that the Middle Rio Grande Basin is fully appropriated. Montgomery v. Lomos Altos, Inc., 2007-NMSC-002, ¶ 15, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.3d 971 (<HOLDING>). {13} Various entities and individuals

    ### Response:
    recognizing the position of the ose that the rio grandes surface waters are fully appropriated and that new surface water appropriations are not allowed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Howard, 311 Ga. App. 217, 221 (1) (715 SE2d 704) (2011) (punctuation andemphasis omitted); accord Carrier Corp. v. Rollins, Inc., 316 Ga.App. 630, 635 (2) (730 SE2d 103) (2012). 5 Evans v. Dep’t of Transp., 331 Ga. App. 313, 321 (3) (771 SE2d 20) (2015) (punctuation omitted). 6 Boston Men’s Health Ctr., 311 Ga. App. at 221 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 (Emphasis supplied.) 8 247 Ga. App. 763 (544 SE2d 747) (2001). 9 See id. at 763. 10 See id. 11 See id. 12 Id. at 764-65. 13 253 Ga. 150 (317 SE2d 542) (1984). 14 See McDonald, 247 Ga. App. at 765 (1) (a). 15 Id. at 765-66 (1) (a) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Whitehead, 253 Ga. at 151-52 (1)). 16 Id. at 766 (1) (a). 17 Id. 18 See Whitehead, 253 Ga. at 151-52 (1). 19 See Lewis v. Van Anda, 282 Ga. 763, 767-68 (5) (653 SE2d 708) (2007) (<HOLDING>); Second Cont’l, Inc. v. Atlanta E-Z Builders,

    ### Response:
    holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the validity of a lien asserted by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, also filed prior to Mr. Stern’s being named guardian of the estate, the caption identified the plaintiffs as “A. W. IRREVOCABLE SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST; A. W, a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, THOMAS M. STERN.” Given that, in this case, the caption and the prayer for relief both indicate that Mr. Stern has sued in his capacity as guardian of the estate and that when Mr. Stem has chosen to sue in his capacity as guardian ad litem, he has specifically indicated that fact in the caption, we hold that Mr. Stern has brought this action on his own behalf as guardian of Armani’s estate and not as a guardian ad litem. Cf. Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. 548, 554, 495 S.E.2d 721, 724-25 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Because Mr. Stern has not sued in his

    ### Response:
    holding that in determining capacity in which defendant was sued it is appropriate to consider course of proceedings and allegations in complaint including caption section identifying parties claim for relief and prayer for relief
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    believes that procedure was correct. When a dispositive motion includes alternative relief in non-disposi-tive terms, the matter must be treated as a dispositive motion by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See Rejects Skate Magazine, Inc. v. Acutrack, Inc., 2006 WL 889501 (M.D.Tenn. Mar. 29, 2006) (stating that “the Report and Recommendation (‘R & R’) recommended the denial in its entirety of the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Strike Certain Claims, and Transfer Venue.... Because this is a dispositive motion, the court must make a de novo determination of any portion of the recommended disposition to which an objection has been made”); see also Sutton v. U.S. Small Business Administration, 92 Fed.Appx. 112, 119-20 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed.Appx. 308, 311 (6th

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court could properly designate the magistrate to make a nonbinding recommendation on nondispositive motions under section 636b3 but such matters are reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ability of available technologies to ... meet a given discharge standard.” Id. EPA chose not to do so because the SAB “did not specify a timetable for that complex endeavor or suggest that is was possible to complete such an analysis in time to inform the impending VGP.” EPA Br. at 58-59. We do not find that answer compelling. There is no impediment to engaging in further study, and further study may advance the goals of the CWA. Thus, EPA could have well found that onshore treatment was “available.” Indeed, EPA’s failure to consider onshore treatment is inconsistent with the CWA’s mandate that TBELs be technology-forcing. Congress designed the CWA to force agencies and permittees to adopt technologies that achieve the greatest reductions in pollutants. See NRDC, 822 F.2d at 124 (<HOLDING>). As Judge Starr noted in NRDC, “the most

    ### Response:
    holding that cwa seeks not only to stimulate but to press development of new more efficient and effective technologies which is the essential purpose of this series of progressively more demanding technologybased standards
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to (redundant) unpromulgated rules. Persuaded that the challenged memoranda should be treated under our cases as unpro-mulgated rules, I concur in affirming the final order entered by the administrative law judge in No. 97-255, on the ground that the administrative law judge properly applied section 120.535, Florida Statutes (1995). The challengers’ standing has not been called into question. I also concur in reversing the award of costs and fees in No. 97-3937. I do so, however, on the basis that the invalidated rule amendment was proposed before October 1, 1996, the date on which section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), took effect. Ch. 96-159, § 44, at 213, Laws of Fla. Cf. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Lincoln, Neb. v. Department of Ins., 707 So.2d 929 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); accord Aventura Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Agency

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1205954 florida statutes supp 1996 requires awarding fees and costs in the event of a successful challenge to an unpromulgated rule that persisted beyond october 1 1996
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    slip op. (D.Wyo. November 25, 1992) (unpublished) (1992 WL 455432) (""affirmative defenses asserted by defendants seek a determination of rights with respect to assets of a depository institution” and therefore the court lacks jurisdiction over them). Resolution Trust Co. v. Scaletty, 810 F.Supp. 1505 (D.Kan.1992) (mitigation of damages defense stricken, following McGinnis in part); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Milton L. Coulter Trust, No. 91-CV-1047-J, slip op. (D.Wyo. September 22, 1992) (unpublished) (1992 WL 455433) (court without subject matter jurisdiction over mitigation of damages and offset asserted by way of affirmative defenses because they ""will affect the assets of the receivership”). But Cf. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ryan, 801 F.Supp. 1545, 1555 (S.D.Miss.1992) (<HOLDING>); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Vernon

    ### Response:
    holding that dismissal of counterclaims which are strictly defensive in nature and do not seek any monetary or affirmative relief of any kind is not mandated by  1821d13d but that the counterclaims were not proper declaratory judgment claims because they simply sought an adjudication that defendants did not violate their duties as bank officers and directors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on United States District Courts: (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of: (1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the intern-revenue laws[.] 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (emphasis added). Although section 1346(a)(1) cross-references the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims, it only confers jurisdiction on United States District Courts. See Hinck v. United States, 64 Fed.Cl. 71, 76 (2005), aff'd, 446 F.3d 1307 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308,

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the reference to the united states court of federal claims in section 1346a1 is merely a crossreference to the tucker act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because it is one of the “other instruments under which the plan is established or operated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (1985). As the district court held, ERISA implicitly limits “other instruments” to those documents that are similar to the documents specifically listed in that section. For example, upon request, an administrator must provide a participant with a copy of the plan description, the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, or trust agreement. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). These documents all provide participants with direct information about the plan and its benefits. The requested mailing list, in contrast, provides no information about the plan or its benefits. Cf. Lee v. Dayton Power and Light Co., 604 F.Supp. 987, 1002 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (<HOLDING>). It is an unwarranted expansion of the meaning

    ### Response:
    holding that a manual containing charts essential to the calculation of benefits is an instrument under which the plan was established or operated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of pro se motions under section 144. For example, some courts have held that a pro se party cannot file a motion for disqualification under section 144 as they cannot comply with the statute’s explicit certification requirement. See, e.g., Buckenberger v. Reed-District, Civ. Action No. 6-7393, 2010 WL 3523021, at *1 (E.D.La. Aug. 31, 2010) (concluding “that a pro se litigant may not use 28 U.S.C. § 144 as a means to seek recusal because of the certification requirement” and therefore denying the motion). Other courts have concluded that a pro se litigant may file a motion under this provision so long as the party provides a certificate of good faith signed by a member of the bar, albeit not counsel of record. See, e.g., United States v. Rankin, 1 F.Supp.2d 445, 450 (E.D.Pa.1998) (<HOLDING>). Still other courts have determined that it is

    ### Response:
    holding that  144 requires that in the case of a pro se movant the certificate of good faith that accompanies the  144 affidavit be signed by any member of the bar of the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because he no longer faced the revocation of his probation on another conviction. The benefit of five years does not justify upholding the plea agreement mandating a forty-year sentence to be served consecutive to the thirty-year rape sentence when it is clear that the sentences could not have been consecutive. The result is that Badger is forced to serve a total sentence of seventy years as opposed to forty years (thirty for the rape plus the ten that would remain on the murder). The fact that he might have also faced five years for the probation revocation had he not pled guilty does not persuade us that a manifest injustice has not occurred here. We reluctantly conclude that the erroneous sentence constitutes fundamental error. See Rhodes v. State, 698 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind.1998) (<HOLDING>); Jennings v. State, 687 N.E.2d 621, 622

    ### Response:
    holding that a sentence exceeding statutory authority constitutes fundamental error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mulch fires on the premises generally. Defendant thus had the obligation to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the fire, or any potential fire created by the dangerous condition, did not spread to the building. There was evidence here that the mulch was up • against the building’s siding and next to the gas meter. Inspector DiFranco testified that the proximity to the gas line caused the fire to spread more quickly. A reasonable jury could have found, based on this evidence and their common knowledge, that it was more likely than not that the proximity of the mulch to the building, which included the gas line, was a cause of the fire spreading and ultimately engulfing the entire building. See Deerfoot Farms, Inc. v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 327 Mass. 51, 54, 96 N.E.2d 872 (1951) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Gates v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 255

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that the fire was communicated to other property may reasonably be inferred from common knowledge of the operation of the established laws of nature in the familiar forms of combustion  and the effects of wind on fire 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (affirming dismissal of forfeiture proceedings due to 23-day delay between tenth day after request for hearing and date on which hearing could have occurred); Metiver, 684 So.2d at 206 (affirming order holding five-day delay between tenth day after claimant requested hearing on forfeiture and date on which hearing occurred did not comply with Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act requirements that hearing occur within ten days or as soon as practicable thereafter, and requiring State to return currency seized during traffic stop). Forfeitures are not favored in law or equity, thus forfeiture statutes are strictly construed. See In re Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus ES 300, VIN: JT8VK13T9P0196573, 798 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Town of Oakland v. Mercer, 851 So.2d 266, 269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Here, at the expiration of the ten days

    ### Response:
    holding due process mandates that the provisions of the forfeiture act be strictly interpreted in favor of the persons being deprived of their property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “clean hands.” Matter of Little Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d at 1072. A Chapter 11 petition filed in bad faith may be “cause” for a court to grant relief from the automatic stay under section 362(d)(1), as well as for dismissal of a case under section 1112 of the Code. See In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d at 1394; In re Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d at 674; Matter of Oakbrook Village, Inc., 108 B.R. at 844. Although it is clear that a bankruptcy court possesses the power to grant appropriate relief when it finds that a Chapter 11 petition has been filed in bad faith, there is some disagreement between the Circuits as to the standard to be employed when determining whether a petition has in fact been filed in bad faith. Compare In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393 (<HOLDING>) with Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693

    ### Response:
    holding that a court should focus solely upon the subjective good faith of the debtor at the time it filed its chapter 11 petition regardless of the debtors prospects for reorganization
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    district court failed to address Moreira personally before it sentenced her. Thus, there was error, and it was plain. Prouty, 303 F.3d at 1252. Although the district court plainly erred by not addressing Moreira personally, regardless of whether its warning deprived her of the right to allocute, Moreira still has the burden of demonstrating that the error affected her substantial rights. See id. She cannot meet this burden because the district court sentenced her at the bottom of the sentencing guideline range. “We have held that the denial of the right of allocution presumptively affects a defendant’s substantial rights only where the possibility of a lower guidelines sentence exists.” United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 583 (11th Cir.2011); see also Quintana, 300 F.3d at 1231-32 (<HOLDING>). Moreira’s guideline sentencing range was 235

    ### Response:
    holding that denial of right to allocute was not prejudicial because district court sentenced defendant to low end of guideline range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In re H.V.). This duty is not changed by the divorce of Ross and Lizabeth, and “a person who provides necessaries” under section 151.001(c) can include Lizabeth, even though she is a parent of the children. See In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574-75 (Tex.1996); Office of Attorney General v. Carter, 977 S.W.2d 159, 160-61 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). For more than a century, Texas courts have held that reasonable attorney’s fees incurred for the benefit of a minor may constitute necessaries. See Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S.W. 372, 373 (Tex.1891) (stating that reasonable attorney’s fees for the benefit of a minor in prosecuting a civil suit to recover money or property for the minor may be necessaries); Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 11 S.W. 1101, 1101-02 (1889) (<HOLDING>). Three years ago, the Supreme Court of Texas

    ### Response:
    holding that reasonable attorneys fees for the benefit of a minor in defending the minor against a criminal charge were necessaries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are entirely different and could not be confused. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir.1999) (“Where the two marks are entirely dissimilar, there is no likelihood-of-confusion.... Nothing further need be said.”). Moreover, Derrico merely used Sun-tree’s mark to truthfully refer to Suntree’s own product. Such use is not confusing “because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.” New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.1992). In fact, many circuits have held that “[s]uch nominative use of a mark ... lies outside the strictures of trademark law.” Id.; see also Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 488 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree,

    ### Response:
    holding that it is permissible to use anothers mark truthfully to identify anothers goods or services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issued the citation in 1998. The jury found that substantial interference did not occur until June 12, 1998, a date that corresponds with the postal worker’s testimony, the TCEQ citation, and the plaintiffs’ accounts. Some evidence supports this finding. The Company argues that there would be no statute of limitations for permanent nuisance if a claim could be “revived” by evidence that conditions worsened. But we are dealing here with gradations. On one end of the scale, a nuisance can be established by a physical fact that is beyond dispute. If the nuisance consists of hazardous chemicals in the ground, the nuisance begins when the landowner knows or should have known that the chemicals were there. See Tenn. Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 153 Tex. 352, 269 S.W.2d 336, 338 (1954) (<HOLDING>). The result does not necessarily vary with the

    ### Response:
    holding that limitations began to run when the defendant began wrongfully discharging water containing harmful chemicals on the plaintiffs land and not on the date when the extent of the damages to the land were fully ascertainable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the right to whale and seal, we had no need in Makah to separate out fishing from whaling and sealing or to address the significance of different types of evidence. It should be obvious that Makah is neither controlling nor informative because the question whether the Treaty of Olympia’s “right of taking fish” includes whales and seals was not “decided explicitly or by necessary implication.” United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000). Just as obviously, we cannot' simply transport analysis of the Treaty of Neah Bay-to the Treaty of Olympia because the member tribes’ intent is important to, if not dispositive of, the meaning of- particular provisions. See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L.Ed. 877 (1943) (<HOLDING>). In Makah we described ..the question

    ### Response:
    holding that treaties involving indian tribes are to be construed so far as possible in the sense in which the indians understood them 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    credibility finding is for these reasons not supported by substantial evidence, on remand, Cordova is to be deemed credible for the purposes of assessing his asylum and withholding claims. See Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (9th Cir.2009) (“the deemed credible rule may apply when it is evident that the IJ and BIA have both strained to provide reasons properly supporting an adverse credibility finding, but despite their best efforts have been unable to do so”). 3. Because the BIA’s decision did not cite Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), nor did it expressly adopt the IJ’s alternative findings, this court cannot presently address the question whether Cordova was persecuted on a protected ground. See Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183,

    ### Response:
    holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    are alleged to be unconstitutional!.]” Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 102 (D.C.Cir.1984); see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (reasoning that where a “statute or order conferring power upon the officer to take action in the sovereign’s name is claimed to be unconstitutional,]” “the conduct against which specific relief is sought is beyond the officer’s powers and is, therefore, not the conduct of the sovereign”). Here, Schonberg has not styled his suit as one against a government official, but rather as one against the United States. Even a liberal construction of his complaint does not yield a readily apparent officer or agency against whom or which he seeks specific relief. Cf. Clark, 750 F.2d at 102 (<HOLDING>). His claim, therefore, will be barred by

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years. There was ample testimony that Hoffman “actively employed” a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). Oliver, Vasquez, and Rosado testified that Hoffman carried three firearms to the site of the robbery, that he handed two of these guns to Casbah and Oliver to assist him in the robbery, that he pointed a handgun at Vasquez and shot him in the leg, that he pointed a gun at Rosado and shot him in the b hallenging his convictions on the basis of sufficiency of evidence are persuasive. III. Hoffman argues that the government failed to prove that his activities affected interstate commerce and that, as a r r.1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we will affirm the conviction for

    ### Response:
    holding that robbery of proceeds intended for purchase of cocaine affected interstate commerce
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the right to take by the intestacy laws. Appellee further argued that the doctrine of “after-acquired title” barred Appellant from regaining his interest in the property and entitled Appellee to the interest she claimed. The trial court issued an Order of Subsequent Summary Administration and distributed the property held by the estate. Appellee received a one-half interest, and Appellant’s sister received the other one-half interest. As to Appellant, the court found that he would take nothing “because he conveyed away all of his interest therein to [the father and Appellee] by his QuitClaim Deed executed” in 1990. Analysis The court’s ruling on this issue was an application of uncontested facts to the law; thus, our review is de novo. See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So.3d 1105, 1108 (Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>). Although the trial court discussed during the

    ### Response:
    holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    allow a plaintiff to claim the state's accounts receivable only if under federal law those accounts themselves belonged to the plaintiff. That does not imply that a plaintiff could garnish unrelated funds. We express no opinion on this broader question. 6 . Indeed, it is not clear that the state has yet received full reimbursement for its Medicaid payments, in which case Harris’s claim would relate only to some future receipt of funds by the state. 7 . We assume, without deciding, that a portion of the claims settled in the Master Settlement Agreement were for Medicaid claims, because the settlement agreement explicitly included health-related claims and Colorado’s complaint sought damages that included amounts for ""increased Medicaid payments. ” But see Watson, 261 F.3d at 443-45

    ### Response:
    holding that texas did not settle individual medicaid claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this argument because we can affirm on an alternative ground. 5 . Sanchez argues that this approach has been adopted in other jurisdictions and cites cases in support of his proposition. See Alam v. State, 776 P.2d 345, 348-49 (Alaska Ct.App.1989); State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1981); People v. Adams, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415, 423 (1973). But only Adams seems to explicitly allocate the merger issue to the jury rather than the trial court. 205 N.W.2d at 424. The other cases Sanchez cites simply underscore the idea that, if not construed narrowly, some kidnapping statutes pose a real risk of doubly punishing a defendant who has been charged with both kidnapping and another offense involving some form of detention in its commission. See, e.g., Alam, 776 P.2d at 348-49 (<HOLDING>); Rick, 305 N.W.2d at 745 (holding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that alaskas legislature did not intend its kidnapping statute to be interpreted as broadly as the literal language indicated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mandate issues. Mr. Webber argues that, when Wheat was decided, a defendant was required to file a Form 40 while his or her direct appeal was pending, whereas now a defendant is required to file a Form 40 after the mandate issues from , the direct appeal. Accordingly, in his view, .under current Rule 29.15, a defendant cannot be considered to have waived claims in a direct appeal that were not raised in a Form 40, because the defend ant cannot even pursue a Rule 29.15 action until the direct appeal is complete. In Wheat, the defendant conceded that he failed to file a motion to vacate in the trial court under Rule 29.15, and he recognized “the nominal effect of this failure.” Wheat, 775 S.W.2d at 157. Mr. Wheat then argued that, under former Rule 27.26, appellate co App. W.D. 2014) .(<HOLDING>); State v. Finster, 985 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo.

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest was not cognizable on direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or (b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as ER 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 42, ER 1.9. 8 . The total consisted of the following four loans: A loan of $5,000 made on November 19, 1999; a loan of $3,500 on December 3, 1999; a loan of $2,000 on March 30, 2000; and a loan of $2,500 on May 6, 2000. 9 . We presume the expected interest income would be community property. See Carroll v. Lee, 148 Ariz. 10, 16, 712 P.2d 923, 929 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The record does not include evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that tjhere is a strong legal presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    them absolute immunity from suit. Hughes, 948 F.2d at 920. Thus, the threshold question we must resolve is whether appellants’ actions in voting to deny appellees’ development plan were functionally legislative. For the reasons that follow, we conclude they were not. We note initially that the mere fact that the complained-of action occurred by way of a vote does not automatically mean the action is legislative. A number of federal appellate courts have recognized that “[a]l-though a local legislator may vote on an issue, [the act of voting] alone does not necessarily determine that he or she was acting in a legislative capacity.” Brown, 970 F.2d at 437; Crymes v. DeKalb County, Ga., 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1991); see also Roberson v. Mullins, 29 F.3d 132, 134 n. 3 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because we cannot conclude appellants’

    ### Response:
    recognizing that member of local governmental body does not necessarily act in legislative capacity when participation takes form of vote
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the statute, and the phrases “could have an impact on” and “could lead to” as spoken by the trial judge. It was within the trial judge’s discretion to formulate phrasing that explained to defendant the possibilities of deportation or denial of U.S. citizenship. See V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(7); In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 594-95, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983). ¶ 10. Here, the trial judge properly identified these two specific consequences. V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(7). Indeed, he exceeded the statutory minimum by further informing defendant of the possibility of exclusion from the country. This case is therefore unlike those in other states in which trial courts have erred by not sufficiently specifying the possible immigration consequence as required by law. See State v. Sorino, 118 P.3d 645, 651 (Haw. 2005) (<HOLDING>); Machado v. State, 839 A.2d 509, 510, 513

    ### Response:
    holding that warning that this plea may have a bearing on whatever relationship you have with the immigration and naturalization service completely failed to specify consequences of plea as required by statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to an agent of that entity,’” id. (quoting Rustici, 673 S.W.2d at 768), we find the public duty doctrine does not render section 537.600 meaningless, as argued by Appellant. In the next prong of her point relied on, Appellant asserts the public duty doctrine is an affirmative defense and, in the instant matter, has no bearing on whether a petition states a cause of action. We again disagree. The public duty doctrine is not an affirmative defense, but rather serves “to delineate the legal duty which the defendant official owes to the plaintiff.” Scher v. Purkett, 847 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Mo.App.1992). Here, Appellant bore the burden of pleading facts in her petition which were sufficient to support the existence of a legal duty. Claxton v. City of Rolla, 900 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Mo.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). In our review of Appellant’s amended

    ### Response:
    holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.3d 663. The Supreme Court caution[ed] against using a declaratory judgment action to challenge or review administrative actions if such an approach would foreclose any necessary fact-finding by the administrative entity, discourage reliance on any special expertise that may exist at the administrative level, disregard an exclusive statutory scheme for the review of administrative decisions, or circumvent procedural or substantive limitations that would otherwise limit review through means other than a declaratory judgment action. Smith, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300; see also State of N.M. ex rel. Hanosh v. N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., 2008-NMCA-156, ¶ 6, 145 an agency made the wrong decision are improper. Cf. Smith, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 17, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300 (<HOLDING>). {15} In sum, Lion’s Gate with Smith require a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the plaintiffs did not argue that the city made the ivrong decision they argued that the city had no right to even make a decision and noting that such a challenge is precisely the type of question appropriately considered by a declaratory judgment action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in his employment by the Department. Crawford’s complaint asserted the following racially discriminatory actions: his October 2011 annual performance rating of “zero,” his five-day suspension finalized' in December 2011, and his denial of promotion in November 2011. The complaint also raised the eight incidents identified in Toledo’s email. On the Department’s motion, the district court first dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the eight claims identified in Toledo’s email for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Crawford v. Johnson, No. 14-cv-00436-KBJ (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2015), J.A. 41-42. Crawford does not challenge the dismissal of those claims here. With respect to the performance review, suspension, and failure-to-promote claims, the di ir. 2004) (<HOLDING>); cf. Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiff had exhausted claim because his attachment to his eeo complaint set forth sufficient factual details
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    after his FMLA leave expired, and he therefore had no right to reinstatement. (See Doc. 18, pp. 7-8 of 16.) Plaintiff alleges that he was given express permission to extend his leave beyond the twelve weeks allotted by the FMLA, and he was entitled to reinstatement when he attempted to return to work at the end of the extension. (See Doc. 19, pp. 11-12 of 17.) The majority of courts that have reviewed extensions of FMLA leave beyond twelve weeks have interpreted the twelve-week leave period strictly and found that employees are not entitled to the protections of the FMLA after the statutory leave has expired, even where the employee has received permission to extend their leave from the employer. See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 148 (3d Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>); Hofferica v. St. Mary Med. Ctr., 817

    ### Response:
    holding that employee who exceeded fmla leave was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the fmla
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we must reinstate her negligent retention claim. She argues that her negligent retention claim failed based solely on the failure to establish an underlying tort. J&J contends that the jury heard all the evidence and that Tomczyk simply failed to prove a negligent retention claim. Under Georgia law, “a defendant employer has a duty to exercise ordinary care not to hire or retain an employee the employer knew or should have known posed a risk of harm to others where it is reasonably foreseeable from the employee’s ‘tendencies’ or propensities that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained by the plaintiff.” Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2004); see also Eckhardt v. Yerkes Reg’l Primate Ctr., 254 Ga.App. 38, 561 S.E.2d 164, 166 (2002) (<HOLDING>). As we have discussed, the jury checked the

    ### Response:
    holding that a negligent retention claim was properly dismissed when there was no underlying tort upon which it could have been based
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been “afforded an opportunity to contest ,.. whether [LPOA’s attorneys’ fees] were reasonable and necessary.” LPOA responded that the chancellor’s post-trial instructions put the Berlins on notice that the court intended to rule on the issue without a further hearing. LPOA also argued that its attorney’s affidavit was sufficient and that no hearing was necessary. On September 3, 2015, the chancellor denied the Berlins’ motion without specifically addressing the issue of attorneys’ fees. ¶ 33. The Berlins do not dispute that a prevailing party in an action to enforce the covenants is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, and section 14.01 makes clear that a prevailing party is entitled to such an award. See Journeay v. Berry, 953 So.2d 1145, 1162-63 (¶¶ 63-66) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (<HOLDING>). However, “[a] contractual provision to pay

    ### Response:
    holding that valid restrictive covenants are contractual in nature and therefore may support an award of attorneys fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the other in the remainder of the matters involved. 100 S.W.2d at 612 (emphasis added). Of particular importance here, Gilbert held that this means a broker “may be the agent of the insured in taking and placing the application and of the [insurer] in the issuance and delivery of the policy and the collection of the premiums thereon.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Jeffery E. Thomas & Francis J. Mootz, III, New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition 2-23 (2011) (stating “[b]rokers are typically insurers’ agents with respect to issuing policies, issuing certificates of insurance, collecting premiums and the like”). Other cases have held that, as a result, a broker’s role as agent of the insured normally ends upon procurement of the insurance. See, e.g., Hecker, 891 S.W.2d at 816 (<HOLDING>); Morrow v. Loeffler, 297 S.W.2d 549, 552-58

    ### Response:
    holding the agency relationship ceases on execution and delivery of the policy to the insured
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this State by or on behalf of the defendant[.] These subsections are commonly referred to as jurisdiction based on a “local act” or based on a “local injury.” It is not sufficient for Mr. Stann to demonstrate that at least one of his causes of action falls within the long-arm statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.5 requires that there be a separate basis for jurisdiction for each cause of action: In any action brought in reliance upon jurisdictional grounds stated in subdivisions (2) to (10) of G.S. 1-75.4 there cannot be joined in the same action any other claim or cause against the defendant unless grounds exist under G.S. 1-75.4 for personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to the claim or cause to be joined. See also Godwin v. Walls, 118 N.C. App. 341, 352, 455 S.E.2d 473, 482 (1995) (<HOLDING>). I first consider N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4)

    ### Response:
    holding that although plaintiffs met their burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under nc gen stat  17544 the longarm statute did not confer personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims for wrongful death and property damage
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    his grievance against Locksley. Gerald thus complains of only a few, discrete incidents. The small number of incidents on which Gerald bases his claims is not fatal if the incidents are adequately severe. “[T]he required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.1991)(citing King v. Bd. of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir.1990)). There is no minimum number of incidents or pattern of behavior that Gerald must allege. In Rocha Vigil v. City of Las Cruces, 119 F.3d 871 (10th Cir.1997), the Tenth Circuit stated: In line with Hams, other circuits have recognize L.Ed.2d 335 (1996); Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th Cir.l995)(<HOLDING>); Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th

    ### Response:
    holding one single statement that could be construed as genderbased and hostile was insufficient to demonstrate hostile work environment under meritor sav bank fsb v vinson
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    BIA in Pickering had meant to require an adjudication of the merits of aliens’ claims of substantive defects in the original conviction in order to make out an adequate ‘basis,’ it could have said so. But it did not.”). Thus, there is no difference between the stipulation here and the settlement in Pinho in terms of whether the state court addressed and adjudicated the underlying claims of error. Third, the majority notes that Pinho obtained a vacatur of his conviction before the agency had to take action in his case, whereas Rumierz obtained a vacatur after a final order of removal was reached in his case. This distinction is inapposite for two reasons. First, as I have explained above, the BIA effectively reopened Rumierz’s case, thus vacating the final order of remov 12 (BIA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Where the order does not specify its

    ### Response:
    holding that a conviction vacated by operation of a state rehabilitative statute still constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    responds that Appellant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of burglary and robbery are waived because he failed to include them in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. It maintains that the only challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence set forth in Appellant’s 1925(b) statement involved his first degree murder conviction. The record supports the Commonwealth’s contention in this regard. Because Appellant did not include in his 1925(b) statement challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of robbery and burglary, these claims are waived on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 895, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998)) (<HOLDING>); see also Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 588 Pa.

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to preserve their claims for appellate review appellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to pa rap 1925b any issues not raised in a parap 1925b statement will be deemed waived
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by legally or factually sufficient evidence. The Injunction applies to all persons not related to the children by blood or adoption and effectively would prevent William from separating from any of the children during his periods of possession without Lacey’s permission. The second item of the Injunction, regarding pick up and return of the children for periods of possession, seems unnecessary in light of the first item of the Injunction, regarding care by any unrelated person. In any event, the Injunction is broader than the Restriction and is not justified by the evidence in the record, which does not show that such an onerous ban is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the Injunction. See Moreno, 368 S.W.3d at 739-40 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we sustain William’s sixth issue

    ### Response:
    holding that a restriction on any unrelated adult was overly broad and unsupported by the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    I shall be using disregard it.”). 4 . Rule 8 applies here by virtue of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See Fed. R. Governing Section 2254 Cases 11 (""The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules, may be applied, when appropriate, to petitions filed under these rules.”). 5 . Respondent relies most heavily upon the following cases: Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.2001) (""Thus, while the district court has the authority to raise the statute of limitations sua sponte and to dismiss the petition on those grounds, that authority should only be exercised after the court provides the petitioner with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.""); Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 329 (5th

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court has the authority to raise the aedpa statute of limitations on its own motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    but were not provided to Doe until after Bobbouine and Foy’s alleged misbehavior in the Decontamination Area. Accordingly, dismissing Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment claim was error at this stage, and we will reverse and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings. B. Search and Seizure under the Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and. seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The phrase “searches and seizures” connotes that the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct that is “somehow designed to elicit a benefit for the government in an investigatory or, more broadly, an administrative capacity.” United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated that

    ### Response:
    holding that a physician employed by the government who drew a blood sample from the defendant for medical not investigatory purposes did not conduct a search under the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1285 (1992) (same); People v. Knox, 186 Ill.App.3d 808, 134 Ill.Dec. 564, 542 N.E.2d 910 (1989) (same). The California Supreme Court, in People v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793 (1971), held that the denial by police of a juvenile defendant’s request to see his parent rendered his subsequent confession inadmissible. The court found that the defendant’s “request to see his parents at or near the commencement of interrogation was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege” against self-incrimination. Id. 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d at 796. Likewise, Florida and Montana have held that a juvenile’s request to telephone or otherwise speak to a parent is tantamount to the invocation of his right to remain silent. Sublette v. State, 365 So.2d 775 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that juveniles request to call parent is assertion of fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1940); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 55 (5th Cir. 1966). 74 . See United States v. Duke, 263 F.Supp. 828, 836 (S.D.Ind.1967). 75 . See 28 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970). 76 . See S.Rep. No. 981, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 30 (1967); H.Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1968). 77 . A variety of demarcation lines have been suggested. See Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966) (sixth grade); United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1962) (8th grade). 78 . See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed. 90 (1971). 79 . See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bryant, 291 F.Supp. 542, 551

    ### Response:
    holding less educated are a cognizable class
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    complaint but deciding appeal based on a different affirmative defense). 7 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 8(c) (""When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim, or a 147, §§ 1, 2, SLA 2003; see Revisor's notes, AS 09.10.030 (1994) (describing. 1994 stylistic changes to 1962 statutory language); see also Dault v. Shaw, 322 P.3d 84, 92 (Alaska 2013) (explaining effect of 2003 statutory amendment). 13 . Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 20 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990)). 14 . Theresa L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 353 hat allowing berry picking and fishing was ""consistent with the conduct of a hospitable landowner/ and undermines neither the continuity nor exclusivity of their possession”); Peters, 519 P.2d at 831 (<HOLDING>), 20 . Vezey, 35 P.3d at 20 (quoting Nome 2000,

    ### Response:
    holding that occasional use of the beach by clamdiggers or other trespassers does not destroy  exclusivity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of counsel.” Indeed, which witnesses to call and all other strategies and tactical decisions are “the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client, and whether an attorney’s trial tactics are reasonable is a question of law, not fact.” Turning to the specific witnesses at issue, with regard to Patricia, trial counsel testified that Howard only knew her first name and believed that she had attended Crandall College. Based on this information, trial counsel searched the college’s records, but was unable to find Patricia. But given Howard’s lack of sufficient information regarding this alleged witness’s full name, her whereabouts, or how to find her, trial counsel’s failure to locate her certainly (722 SE2d 705) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 39 Id. 40 See id.

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the states leading questions when there was no evidence that such failure was not based on trial strategy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    See Rhind, 289 F.3d at 695. We, however, noted that in other guidelines sections involving the phrase “in connection with” we gave the phrase an expansive interpretation and rejected the notion that a firearm must facilitate the underlying offense to trigger application of the four-level enhancement. Id. (citing United States v. Young, 115 F.3d 834 (11th Cir.1997)). We held, in interpreting analogous guideline provisions, that, in circumstances where it was reasonable to assume that the defendant possessed a firearm to prevent the theft of property related to the underlying offense, mere possession of a firearm could be enough to satisfy the “in connection with” requirement. United States v. Jackson, 276 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir.2001) (citations omitted); see Rhind, 289 F.3d at 695 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we held that a firearm that was

    ### Response:
    holding that it is reasonable to conclude that the presence of firearms in a vehicle protected counterfeit money from theft during the execution of a counterfeit felony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on its hull, brings pastors to island communities to lead religious services and to provide religious counseling; (2)- the Mission pays ministers’ salaries in conjunction with coastal and island churches; (3) the Mission offers a Christmas program; (4) the executive director of the Mission is an ordained minister whose ministry is an authorized ministry of the Maine Conference of the United Church of Christ; and (5) eight of the Mission staff members are clergy who have come from the Baptist and Congregational tradition. [¶ 12] The fact that an organization has a charitable purpose and does charitable work does not require the conclusion that its purposes are not primarily religious pursuant to section 1043. Cf. Salvation Army v. Town of Standish, 1998 ME 75, ¶ 5, 709 A.2d 727, 729 (<HOLDING>); see also Kendall v. Dir. of the Div. of

    ### Response:
    holding that a charitable organizations religious purposes will not remove it from the purview of a property tax exemption
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to ‘enforce their rights under the terms of the plan.’ ” (alteration omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B))). Accordingly, “in ERISA cases, state law does not control. Instead, general common law principles apply.” Devlin, 274 F.3d at 84 n.5; see also Merrick v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 175 F.Supp.3d 110, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The validity of assignments for ERISA purposes is a question of federal common law.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts outside of the Second Circuit have held that “[w]hen applying federal common law to contract issues, courts generally look to the Restatement for guidance.” United States ex rel. Ubl v. IIF Data Solutions, 650 F.3d 445, 451 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Defendants’ argument with respect to

    ### Response:
    holding that the restatement second of contracts is the source from which the court would be inclined to fashion a federal common law rule since those principles represent the prevailing view among the states
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to support its policy of favoring the maintenance of class actions. King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 519 F.2d 20, 25-26 (7th Cir.1975). After certifying a class, the Court retains broad power to modify the definition of the class if it believes that the class definition is inadequate. BuycksRoberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322, 328-29 (N.D.Ill.1995). II. Analysis Murray argues that the proposed class meets each of the four Rule 23(a) prerequisites and requests that the Court grant certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). (R. 61, Pl.’s Mem. at 5-11) Although E*Trade refutes only the adequacy of Murray as class representative, the Court must consider whether Murray meets each requirement. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also New Cingular Wireless Servs., 232

    ### Response:
    holding that even if a defendant in a proposed class action does not seriously contest whether the rule 23 requirements have been met a court nevertheless has the responsibility of conducting its own inquiry as to whether the requirements of rule 23 have been satisfied in a particular case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    access “plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9, 106 S.Ct. 2735. Beyond the First Amendment analysis, there exists a common law right of access to judicial proceedings and docu ments that does not rise to a constitutional dimension and is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). Distinguishing between access to judicial proceedings and access to judicial documents, the Sixth Circuit has addressed whether there is a First Amendment right to inspect and copy judicial documents, or only a common law right of access. Compare United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 406-409, 412-15 (6th Cir.1986)(<HOLDING>), ivith Application of National Broadcasting

    ### Response:
    holding that media members had no constitutional right of access to tapes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). Based on the presumption, application of the doctrine turns on the answer to the query: “Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. 89). Congress is presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this presumption (Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002)), which operates in suits against private parties, as well as in suits against the federal government {Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96). Equitable tolling is not applied exclusively to tradi tional limitation periods for filing suit. The doctrine has also been applied to other statutory and administrative deadlines. See, e.g., Young, 535 U.S. at 47 (<HOLDING>); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

    ### Response:
    holding that the bankruptcy codes threeyear lookback period which prescribes a period in which certain rights may be enforced is subject to equitable tolling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    expressly stated the federal constitution as the basis for his objection, was sufficient to preserve an appellate challenge based on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 536-37. The Heidelberg court held that presenting a claim based solely on federal grounds is not sufficient to put the trial court on notice of claims based on state grounds, unless the state ground is apparent fi’om the context. Id. at 538. The Heidelberg court considered the following factors in determining whether the defendant’s ground for objection was apparent: (1) the context and substance of the question to which the defendant objected, i.e. whethe .-Amarillo 1999, pet. ref d) (stating that defendant did not preserve state constitutional challenge to his right to confront witnesses against him bec im.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Coleman v. State, 644 S.W.2d 116, 119

    ### Response:
    holding that error was preserved when defendant objected to question regarding defendant was under arrest immediately following question about postarrest event sufficient to put trial court on notice of appellants state constitutional grounds for objection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    supra at 485-486. 9 See Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 829 (2) (573 SE2d 389) (2002). 10 See Coldmatic, supra at 756 (summary judgment for defendant on plaintiffs breach of contract claim appropriate where key terms of contract were incomplete and subject to future negotiation, rendering contract unenforceable). 11 See OCGA § 15-10-43 (c); Uniform Magistrate Court Rule 34. 12 122 Ga. App. 681 (178 SE2d 543) (1970). 13 See OCGA § 15-10-42; UMCR 38; but see Howe v. Roberts, 259 Ga. 617, 619 (1) (385 SE2d 276) (1989) (magistrate courts may “follow the provisions of the Civil Practice Act, or any other appropriate rules and regulations relating to pleading, practice, and procedure, where to do so would ‘administer justice’ ”). 14 See Stuckey’s, supra at 690 (4). 15 See id. (<HOLDING>). 16 See also Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the cpapermits a general denial but explaining that a general denial does not raise an issue as to a purported corporate defendants legal existence the defendant must raise such issue by direct negative averment to avoid waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the context of the questioning which would establish that the Defendant—despite the false premise of the question—knew exactly what the questions meant and exactly what they were referring to.” DeZarn, 157 F.3d at 1049. Here Hardy argues similarly that Midland knew about his concerns about the cost of health care insurance (because he specifically asked about it) and that its responses to him, when viewed in this context, were deceptive, possibly intentionally so. Even though the letter may have been technically true—a finding that I do not necessarily endorse—it may still constitute a false representation given the context. That is a question that should be resolved by the trier of fact after hearing the evidence. 1 . See Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1954)

    ### Response:
    holding that a false representation of a material matter of fact is a necessary element of a rescission claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    doctrine did not interfere with that requirement. B. Next, we reject Banclnsure’s argument that the parties successfully drafted around the concurrent-causation doctrine in the Bond. Banclnsure argues that the language in Bond exclusions 2(bb)(4) and 2(bb)(12) contracted around the concurrent-causation doctrine because those exclusions also apply to “indirect” causation. Parties may include “anti-concurrent causation” language in contracts to prevent the application of the concurrent-causation doctrine; however, in those cases where courts have found the contract contains an anti-concurrent causation clause, the language used is clear and specific. See Ken Johnson Props., LLC v. Harleysville Worcester Summary Ins. Co., No. 12-1582, 2013 WL 5487444, at *12 (D.Minn. Sept. 30, 2013) (<HOLDING>). As a matter of law, the Bond’s reference to

    ### Response:
    recognizing language that an exclusion applies regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss constitutes an adequate anticoncurrent causation provision and evidences the parties intent to contract around the concurrent causation doctrine
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    here, it is universally recognized that such agreements are typically interpreted using ordinary contract principles. See Kilroy, 27 F.3d at 684 (quoting United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C.Cir.1992)) (“addressing a grant of ‘retrogressive use immunity’ in the context of a plea agreement and stating “a plea agreement is a form of contract.”); see also United States v. Conway, 81 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir.2002) (“[w]e interpret [immunity] agreements according to principles of contract law ... ”); United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir.1999) (“we interpret [non-prosecution] agreements in accordance with general principles of contract law.”); United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); McFarlane, 309 F.3d at 514 (“an immunity

    ### Response:
    recognizing that immunity agreements like plea bargains are interepreted as ordinary contracts  
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    connected to a clearly identified official act occurred. To the extent he does so, I would leave that issue to collateral review because the record on that point is not sufficiently developed to permit review and resolution of the issue. See United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 290-91 (9th Cir.1992). 3 . Other circuits have either eviscerated or eliminated the potency of a multiple conspiracy defense to a RICO conspiracy indictment. See United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 79 (1st Cir.1993) (stating that a series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple conspiracies could under RICO be tried as a single enterprise conspiracy if the defendants have agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181,

    ### Response:
    holding that  1962d does not violate the principle prohibiting conviction of multiple conspiracies under an indictment charging a single conspiracy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is limited to determining whether the [agency] action was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, or unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law, regulation, or mandatory published procedure of a substantive nature by which plaintiff has been seriously prejudiced.” Clayton v. United States, 225 Ct.Cl. 593, 593 (1980) (emphasis added). In disputes concerning military decisions, the plaintiff must “overcome the strong, but re-buttable, presumption that administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge them duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.” Doe v. United States, 132 F.3d 1430, 1434 (Fed.Cir.1997) (quoting Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct.Cl.1979)). This presumption, however, is not insurmountable. See Doe, 132 F.3d at 1437 (<HOLDING>); see also Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to testify regarding the victim’s credibility. In reaching our holding, we are mindful of the State’s alternative rationale for affirming on this point. Citing Rule 608(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, the State argues that admission of Neighbors’s testimony was permissible because appellant attacked the credibility of the victim in his opening statement. We observe, however, that Rule 608(a) allows the credibility of a witness to be “supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation,” but “the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Here, Neighbors’s testimony did not fall within the strictures of Rule 608(a), as it was not limited to the victim’s “character for truthfulness.” See Collins v. State, 11 Ark. App. 282, 669 S.W.2d 505 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we cannot say that the evidence was

    ### Response:
    holding that the circuit court properly allowed the victims schoolteacher to testify as to the victims general reputation for truthfulness
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we hold that it unambiguously creates a support obligation. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 781 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 2010) (“[W]e conclude as a matter of law that a provision in a dissolution decree requiring one spouse to provide medical support in the form of health insurance payments to the other spouse is modifiable spousal support....”). Wife argues that her decision to waive alimony unambiguously demonstrates the insurance obligation is not an incident of support. However, alimony is not the only form of support available in a divorce. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130 (Supp.2009) (discussing the different forms of alimony and “[s]uch other form of spousal support ... as appropriate under the circumstances”); Whitfield v. Hanks, 278 S.C. 165, 165, 293 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Wife and the family court have placed too

    ### Response:
    holding an award of possession of the marital home is an incident of support
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000))). In other words, in order to obtain a COA, the petitioner must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claims was either “debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595. In assessing whether to grant a COA, the “threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.” United States v. Silva, 430 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an applicant “is not r 7, No. 10-6058, 2010 WL 3965899, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct.12, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Mathews v. McKune, 133 Fed.Appx. 512, 514

    ### Response:
    holding that the appellant had waived claims raised on appeal because his opening brief contained no substantive arguments pertaining to those claims and the court would not permit him to incorporate the arguments set forth in his filings with the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (D.C.Cir.1980). But they differ in important ways, not the least of which is their treatment of factual material within documents. Factual portions of documents covered by the deliberative process privilege must be segregated and disclosed unless they are “so interwoven with the deliberative material that [they are] not[segregable].” United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000). The same is not true for documents withheld pursuant to the attorney work-product privilege. See id. That privilege shields both opinion and factual work product from discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) (“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation....”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (<HOLDING>); cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(2) (providing that as

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys notes of client interviews are not discoverable absent a showing of necessity or justification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and talkative and told him that it was okay to say hello, but that he should quickly move on to the purpose of the call. Mr. Elliot[t] said something like, 'Don’t be so Vic. Just a quick hello ... how-are-ya ... okay, are you ready for the case number.' ” Because this evidence is disputed, we take Gardner's version of events as true for purposes of our review. 12 . Gardner also objected to some of the State’s summary-judgment evidence, but he failed to obtain a ruling on those objections. To the extent we could infer that the trial court implicitly overruled ■ his objections, Gardner does not complain on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling the objections. Therefore, the issue is waived. See Secure Comm, Inc. v. Anderson, 31 S.W.3d 428, 430-31 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Gardner’s deposition testimony is

    ### Response:
    holding that appellant waives right to complain of ruling to which no error was assigned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    with this court by November 18, 2002 (60 days after September 19, 2002). They did not file their petitions for review until January 2004. The residual issue is whether the further delay — from November 2002 to January 2004 — was based upon reasonable grounds. We hold that it was not. Although a delay resulting from the exhaustion of applicable administrative remedies may be a reasonable ground for delay, see Reder, 116 F.3d at 1263, an attempt to exhaust the wrong remedy is not. That is, a delay stemming from the filing of a petition or complaint with the wrong court is not, in general, a reasonable ground for delay. See Sierra Club, 885 F.2d at 593. A delay is even less excusable when the FAA advised the petitioner of the correct remedies or procedures to follow, see id. at 593-94 (<HOLDING>), and when the petitioner’s procedural missteps

    ### Response:
    holding that no reasonable grounds for delay existed when the petitioner filed a complaint in the district court despite the faas advice to file in the court of appeals
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to choose without being p .2d 66, 68-69 (2003), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 157, 593 S.E.2d 81 (2004) (finding Lawrence does not control in statutory rape charge due to the express exceptions relating to minors). We further note that many of our sister courts have likewise interpreted Lawrence to apply to the limited liberty interest of personal relations, and have upheld statutes criminalizing acts outside that boundary. See State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 1238 (La. 2005), (declining to use Lawrence to strike down a Louisiana law criminalizing solicitation of a crime against nature); People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ill. App. 2004) (noting Lawrence specifically excludes prostitution from its holding); see also Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Having considered the United States Supreme

    ### Response:
    holding lawrences recognition of right of individuals to engage in fully and mutually consensual private sexual conduct does not affect a states legitimate interest to interpose when consent is in doubt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to similarly modify A.R.S. § 25-553. ¶ 23 The continuing three-year limitation on the collection of spousal maintenance arrearages is consistent with the accounting and notice factors recognized in Hayden, 210 Ariz. at 526-27, ¶ 17, 115 P.3d at 120-21. Additionally, allowing a protracted period for recovery of arrearages is contrary to the policy underpinning spousal maintenance, namely, to encourage and assist a spouse’s independence within a limited timeframe. See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 161 Ariz. 316, 321, 778 P.2d 1212, 1217 (1989) (explaining the purpose of spousal maintenance “is to achieve independence for both parties and to require an effort toward independence by the party requesting maintenance”); Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 503-04, 869 P.2d 176, 179-80 (App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, nothing in A.R.S. § 25-553(C)

    ### Response:
    recognizing that public policy favors limiting the duration of spousal maintenance to encourage a transition toward independence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of a warrantless search of a garbage bag located next to the appellant’s garage adjacent to public alley because the bag was readily accessible to the public), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 845, 113 S.Ct. 135, 121 L.Ed.2d 89 (1992); United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir.1991) (approving a War-rantless search of a garbage left for collection on the appellant’s lawn next to the curb based on its ready accessibility and without mentioning curti-lage) (Breyer, C.J.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 111 S.Ct. 2813, 115 L.Ed.2d 985 (1991), and overruled on other grounds, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 149-51, 116 S.Ct. 501, 508-09, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). But see United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 987 Fisher Road, 719 F.Supp. 1396, 1404, 1405-06 (E.D.Mich.1989) (<HOLDING>). 3 . When determining whether trash is readily

    ### Response:
    holding that a warrantless search of garbage located within the curtilage of the defendants home violated his fourth amendment rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    him. Se'e 342 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). However, Yuen does not hold that a pro se party cannot be sanctioned pursuant to Chapter 10. In Yuen, although Yuen’s name was on the challenged pleadings, the pleadings themselves were actually signed by associates at Yuen’s law firm, not by Yuen himself. Id. at 828. Chapter 10 allows for the imposition of sanctions against “a person [who] has signed a pleading or motion.” Id. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals followed cases construing Rule 13 that limited “sanctions for groundless pleadings to the attorney who actually signed the pleadings and a represented party” and held that because section 10.004 contains substantially similar language to Rule 13, that section “likewi ouston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). None of the cases cited by Akinwamide

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court erred in sanctioning attorney under rule 13 when only pleading motion or other paper attorney signed was his notice of appearance which was not challenged as sanctionable by opposing parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because there is no connection between Sourant’s breach of the covenant and his purchase of the 850 Acres, Murphy Farrell has no equitable interest in that property, and a constructive trust is not an available remedy. Thus, this ease is distinguishable from eases cited by Murphy Farrell in which a constructive trust was placed on property wrongly held as a direct result of a breach of a non-compete provision or other restrictive covenant. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-16, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) (imposing constructive trust in favor of government on profits from book authored by former CIA agent that were attributable to his violation of fiduciary obligations to CIA); Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 564 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 395

    ### Response:
    holding investment analyst entitled to constructive trust on profits realized by investor when it breached noncircumvention agreement by using analysts information to directly buy lease portfolio
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken ... public scrutiny [is] essential to implementing NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). They go on to state that federal agencies shall to the fullest extent possible ... [e]ncourage and facilitate public involvement in decisions which affect the quality of the hum Supp. 1546, 1548 (D.Or.1991) (finding likelihood of success on the merits and granting temporary restraining order based on finding that agency appeared to have made “no effort to make public the environmental assessment ... in which the [agency] concluded that there would be no significant environmental impact as a result of the ... project.”); Friends of Walker Creek Wetlands, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20852, 20852 (D.Or.1988) (<HOLDING>). Defendants simply respond that plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    holding that the agency failed to provide for any public participation in the ea process and ordering 45 day period for public comment on ea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM: Claude Percy Sales appeals from his 180-month sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, he asserts that his sentence should not have been enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because (1) such an enhancement violated United States v. Booker, 548 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and (2) his prior North Carolina breaking and entering convictions did not qualify as predicate felonies. We affirm. As Sales admits, his claim that the application of the ACCA violated the principles of Booker is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, Oct. 25, 2005 (No.

    ### Response:
    holding that fact of prior conviction is not subject to booker requirements that convictions cannot be severed from their essential components including the integral facts such as the statutory violation and date of offense and that these facts are inherent to convictions not extraneous to them
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    equally, thereby affirming the district court’s ruling by operation of law. See Elliott v. U.S., 37 F.3d 617 (11th Cir.1994) (in banc). 6 . See Paul C. Weiler, Workers’ Compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a Tort and a Non-Tort Regime, 50. Ohio St.L.J. 825, 852 (1989) (""|T|he long-standing presence of exclusivity in [workers’ compensation] had a persuasive influence on the U.S. Supreme Court when, in Feres v. United States, the Court developed a comparable immunity doctrine for the United States government which immunized tire government from any liability for ‘injuries to servicemen when the injuries arise out of or in the course of activity incident to [military] service.’ ""); Cf. Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 432, 72 S.Ct. 849, 853, 96 L.Ed. 1051 (1952) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Of course, even if Congress insisted, the

    ### Response:
    holding that an injured civilian crew member of a public vessel was not permitted relief under the public vessels act but rather was eligible for compensation under the federal employees compensation act it is the duty of this court to attempt to fit the public vessels act as intelligently and fairly as possible into the entire statutory system of remedies against the government available to seamen for personal injuries 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Finally, after Susser failed to repay the Note on time, he started sending payments to O’Mahoney in New York in 2004, and in 2009, asked O’Mahoney to send him a list of payments received and interest calculations so that he could “continue to move forward on the same page.” O’Mahoney Aff., Mar. 3, 2011, Ex. 4, J.A. 39. Susser’s initiation of a transaction aimed at securing money from New York, his meeting in New York with the lender and discussion of final details regarding the Note, and his transmittal of monies to New York to satisfy the Note’s obligations, together distinguish this case from others in which this court has held an out-of-state defendant’s contacts to be insufficient under § 302(a)(1). See Fiedler v. First City Nat’l Bank of Houston, 807 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that two telephone calls and mailing from texas for purpose of finalizing repayment of guarantees on loan from texas bank insufficient to create jurisdiction under new york law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (4th Cir.1995); EEOC v. Hansa Products, Inc., 844 F.2d 191, 192 n. 1 (4th Cir.1988). The Virginia Council on Human Rights is charged with administering the provisions of the Virginia Human Rights Act (“VHRA”), Va.Code § 2.1-714 et seq. Virginia is a “deferral state” and the Virginia Council on Human Rights is a “deferral agency.” Tinsley v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 155 F.3d 435 (4th Cir.1998); Capps v. City of Lynchburg, 67 F.Supp.2d 589, 590 (W.D.Va.1999). Although Virginia law does not create a specific cause of action for disability discrimination, the VHRA broadly prohibits discriminatory employment practices and allows the VCHR to investigate claims of discrimination, bringing it within the parameters of § 2000e-5(c). Tinsley, 155 F.3d at 440. Thus, for this C d 501 (W.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>). This case presents a slightly-different

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1990, writ denied); Thiel v. Oaks, 535 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ); Allen v. Fisher, 118 Tex. 38, 9 S.W.2d 731, 732 (1928). When the plaintiff, as a private citizen, asserts a public, as distinguished from a private right, and his complaint fails to show the subject matter of the litigation affects him differently from other citizens, he does not establish a justiciable interest. See Tri County Citizens Rights Org. v. Johnson, 498 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Blum argues the issue of standing is not before this Court because appellees failed to raise the issue in the proceeding below. To support his argument, Blum cites Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad Comm’n of Texas, 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The Texas Supreme Court has expressly

    ### Response:
    holding the issue of standing is waived if not asserted at the district court level
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was unreasonable because the district court did not give adequate consideration to his status as a first-time offender, a father, a hard worker, and a person of good character. We disagree. Our reasonableness review is “deferential,” and the burden of proving that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors rests on the party challenging the sentence. United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 750 (11th Cir.2006). Although a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines range will not be considered per se reasonable, “when the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 787-88; see also United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court considered

    ### Response:
    holding that there is no acrosstheboard prescription regarding the appropriate deference to give the guidelines but that a district court may have good reason to follow the guidelines in a particular case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bodily injury arising out of a street fight. We leave for another day the question whether consent may be a defense to assault in contexts such as official or unofficial sporting events, or whether such acts even are properly considered assaults. III. C r. 1, 753 P.2d 1052, 1072 (1988) (en banc) (""Voluntary mutual combat outside the rules of sport is a breach of the peace, mutual consent is no justification, and both participants are guilty of criminal assault. Thus, where the prosecution’s evidence shows a jailhouse scuffle, the scene as witnessed does not suggest defendant may have been acting in self-defense, and defendant presents no evidence in mitigation, a finding of criminal assault is justified.”) (citation omitted); State v. Weber, 137 Wash.App. 852, 155 P.3d 947, 951 (2007) (<HOLDING>); People v. Reckers, 251 Ill.App.3d 790, 191

    ### Response:
    holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, upon which plaintiff reasonably relied, proximately causing his injury.” Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Stated differently, [A] plaintiff must allege (1) a material misstatement or omission, (2) made with scienter (an intent to deceive), (3) made in connection with the purchase of sale of a security, (4) furthered by the use of the mails or a national securities exchange, and (5) upon which plaintiff detrimentally relied. IDT Corp. v. eGlobe Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 30, 33 (D.D.C.2001) (citing Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276). Finally, a claim under Rule 10b-5 must also satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement that the plaintiff state the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity. Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1277-79 (<HOLDING>); In re Baan, 103 F.Supp.2d at 12 (same). In

    ### Response:
    holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    income to yield projected disposable income, i.e. subtract the current monthly expenses on Schedule J from the current monthly income on Schedule I. See, e.g., In re Fuller, 346 B.R. 472 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. June 21, 2006) (projected disposable income to be determined by subtracting expenses from Schedule I); In re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. July 31, 2006) (Schedule I should be used to determine projected disposable income since it reflects current income at the time of filing). Still others have treated the disposable income figure reached by Form B22C to be merely a “starting point” for determining the debtor’s projected disposable income which may be adjusted according to the debtor’s current financial situation. See, e.g., In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Risher, 344 B.R. 833

    ### Response:
    holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discrediting. The sexual activity took place in an unlocked barracks room and two other service members were present during at least a portion of the sexual encounter. Moreover, one of the room’s windows was left open throughout the encounter and Cpl H video recorded the conduct through the open window. See Marcum, 60 M. J. at 207 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)) (“The fundamental necessity for obedience and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”). The appellant’s argument that this was a wholly private exchange without aggravating factors is untenable. We find that the same factor C.A.A.F.2013) (summary disposition) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the appellant falls far short of

    ### Response:
    holding that conduct charged under article 120k ucmj was not plainly private when the sexual activity occurred while in the presence of two additional servicemembers in the unlocked barracks room of two other servicemembers who were reasonably likely to unintentionally observe the sexual activity and therefore the failure of the military judge to raise a lawrence issue sua sponte was not plain error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of temporal proximity, the Defendants maintain that the Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. In response, the Plaintiff draws the Court to a different protected activity — the filing of the instant Complaint seeking unpaid overtime under the FLSA on September 4, 2012. The Plaintiff stresses that he was fired three weeks after filing the Complaint in the instant case. In his view, the temporal proximity between the filing of the Complaint and his termination is sufficient to establish a causal connection between the two. “In order to establish a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action, plaintiff must produce enough evidence of a retaliatory motive such that a reasonable jur 490 (6th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Plaintiff has presented

    ### Response:
    holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    equipment to a site designated by Tyr-Ree no later than February 1, 1990. By February 14,1990, when TyrRee had not yet procured a site, the parties executed the storage agreement. This agreement merely supplemented the contract by requiring Tyr-Ree to pay Shred Pax if Shred Pax stored the equipment beyond April, 1990. Consequently, I agree with the defendants that the storage agreement represents a modification to the Purchase Order. Because I find that the storage agreement is properly viewed as a modification to the Purchase Order rather than a separate contract, I must determine whether the modified Purchase Order, now incorporating both goods and services, still comes within the scope of the Illinois codification of the Uniform Commercial anor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572 (7th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Because the agreement to store the equipment

    ### Response:
    holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the district court erred in dismissing three claims against URS on the ground that URS did not author or transmit the ,letter to Rogers or exercise any control over Capital One Services. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that a party may “use” misleading communications in violation of the FDCPA even without authoring or transmitting the communications or controlling the party that did so. We need not pursue the matter further, however, because, even if the allegations that Capital One Services and URS acted in tandem were sufficient to demonstrate URS’s “use” of the February 4, 2010 letter, we would still affirm dismissal for failure to state any plausible claim that the letter violates the FDCPA. See Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Our reasons for concluding that Rogers fails

    ### Response:
    holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by record
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though riot brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); see also Weisberg v. Riverside Tp. Bd. of Educ., 272 Fed.Appx. 170, 173 (3d Cir.2008). Several courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, have noted that the term “action,” as referenced in the aforementioned standard for awarding attorney’s fees to defendants, refers to the underlying lawsuit itself; it does not refer to individual actions or conduct committed during the pendency of a lawsuit. See e.g. Barnes Found, v. Lower Merlon, 242 F.3d 151, 162-165 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Drye, Civ. A. No. 07-3097, 2009 WL

    ### Response:
    holding that when summary judgment was properly granted to several defendants because of complete failure to produce any evidence as to essential component of plaintiffs case the action was faetually groundless justifying attorneys fee award to prevailing defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this opinion, we hold that this decision shall be applicable to the claim of Benson and to future claims arising out of injuries occurring to agricultural employees on and after July 1, 1981.” Benson, supra, 283 N.W.2d at 108. In Kitto, the court adopted modified prospectivity, applying a new rule of law to the parties in the instant case and to claims arising after some specified future date. This court has on numerous occasions followed the rule on modified prospectivity announced in Kitto. See, e.g., Soo Line Railroad Co. v. State, 286 N.W.2d 459, 466 (N.D.1979); Benson, supra, 283 N.W.2d at 107-108; State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D.1977). See also Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of the Department of Insurance, 373 N.W.2d 399, 408 (N.D.1985) (<HOLDING>). There is no conflict between application of

    ### Response:
    recognizing continued validity of the modified prospectivity rule of kitto
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the juvenile court as to dependent or neglected children. These chapters were enacted for the particular purpose of “establish[ing] an effective state and local system for the protection of children from abuse or neglect.” SDCL 26-8A-1. In so doing, the law requires that these statutes be liberally construed in favor of the child, the parents, and the state. SDCL 26-7A-6. The numerous constitutional safeguards embedded within chapters 26-7A and 26-8A also afford substantial protection. Similar provisions cannot be found in the more general Guardianship Act. [¶ 11.] The Department of Social Services (DSS) cannot be bypassed when custody is being involuntarily taken from a natural parent in favor of a non-parent. See SDCL 26-8A-27; Matter of Z.Z., 494 N.W.2d 608, 610 (S.D.1992) (<HOLDING>). Abuse and neglect allegations trigger the

    ### Response:
    holding custody and guardianship of child whose natural parent is adjudicated unfit mandatorily vests with social services
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    revoked, and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.” Id. (emphasis added). Considering the Court’s action in Aviles and its reasoning and statements in McNeely, we hold that an implied consent statute such as Washington’s and Idaho’s does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent, as did Aviles, or objects to the blood draw, as did Defendant in this case. Consent to a search must be voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-38, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2050, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 865-66 (1973). Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1566, 185 L.Ed.2d at 712 (<HOLDING>). By objecting to the blood draw, Defendant

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a motorist can withdraw consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opportunity to speak about his life experiences. After listening to all of this, the court listed all the section 3553(a) factors, stated it had “taken all of those into account,” and determined “the sentence here which fits the overall need for a sentence to comply with, be enough and not greater than necessary and fulfill each of the separate subparagraphs, is a sentence of 145 months.... [Tjhat’s about the midrange of the advisory guidelines range.” This record establishes the district court properly considered all of the section 3553(a) factors in the context of Thomas’s particular case and adequately explained that in light of those factors, 145 months was the appropriate starting point for its departure analysis. See United States v. Battiest, 553 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). B. Thomas next argues his sentence is

    ### Response:
    holding sentencing court did not commit procedural error when record showed court had psr heard oral argument from both parties and was aware of section 3553a factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no local actions or ordinances will be permitted to contravene it.” Wasserman v. City of Lebanon, 124 N.H. 538, 542-43, 474 A.2d 994, 998 (1984). The statutory scheme here is concerned with the location and “effective control” of junkyards near certain highways. RSA 236:90, :96. “Effective control” requires only that such junkyards be “screened by natural objects, plantings, fences, or other appropriate means so as not to be visible from the main traveled way.” RSA 236:91,1. The statutory scheme set forth in RSA 236:90-:110 “is concerned with the eyesore,” State v. Bryant, 127 N.H. 69, 72, 498 A.2d 322, 324 (1985), and does not purport to comprehensively regulate junkyards near certain highways, cf. Stablex Corp. v. Town of Hooksett, 122 N.H. 1091, 1101-02, 456 A.2d 94, 100 (1982) (<HOLDING>). “[Ajrbitrary or unreasonable restrictions

    ### Response:
    holding local regulation of hazardous waste disposal facilities preempted by comprehensive and detailed state regulatory scheme
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    expense of improvement to someone else”). As such, Valbruna cannot recover the funds it spent to demolish the melt shop. Vapor Bernier Once Valbruna demolished the old melt shop, it constructed a new building where the melt shop had stood. As part of that process, Valbruna installed a “spray-on membrane” between the new building and volatile organic chemicals in groundwater beneath it. [DE 169 at 134-36]; [DE 170 at 44]. This'acted as a protective barrier, which prevented chemical vapors from wafting'up into the building “at concentrations that might be above, a health protective indoor air concentration.” [DE 169 at 136]. Joslyn rightly disputes the com-pensability of this expense. Ensuring safe working conditions is not within the -scope of CERCLA. G.J. Leasing, 854 F.Supp. at 562 (<HOLDING>). To be compensable, expenses must address a

    ### Response:
    holding that employee exposure to asbestos is not the sort of threat redressable under cercla but rather is an osha concern
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hands into Defendant’s vehicle took evasive action of the type that supported a finding of reasonable suspicion in Butler upon observing Officer Pritchard’s approach. The fact that the evasive action was taken by the two pedestrians, rather than Defendant, in the immediate aftermath of their encounter with Defendant created a reasonable basis, given the facts of this case, for believing that all three of these individuals were engaged in criminal activity that justified further investigative activity by Officer Pritchard. After all, the issue is not whether Defe t that defendant’s companion rapidly moved away after looking in an observing officer’s direction was relevant to a “reasonable suspicion” determination); Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 142, 557 N.E.2d 14, 15-18 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the two pedestrians fled in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that a group of men surrounding a car parked in a marked bus stop dispersed upon the approach of investigating officers was relevant to a reasonable suspicion determination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    First Essex financing in 2002 caused additional interest to accrue on the March Note. Moreover, Mallegni’s refusal to extend the December Note absent the release of its attorney from a substantial lease obligation that 219 Forest had no authority over resulted in assessment of over $376,757.91 in default interest. See infra Section II. E. 2. An untold, but nonetheless staggering, amount of additional interest has since accrued on that figure. Finally, LBM’s refusal to provide 219 Forest with payoff figures in 2005 ensured that default interest, at a rate of 41%, would continue to accrue on the March and December Notes. In short, LBM’s inequitable conduct drastically amplified its claims leaving nothing for 219 Forest’s unsecured creditors. Cf. In re 604 Columbus, 968 F.2d at 1337-39 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court concludes that

    ### Response:
    holding that the lenders excess withdrawal of soft costs warranted the equitable subordination of the lenders claim because the depletion of the funds available for construction and its attendant impact on the trusts renovation efforts was a sufficiently concrete harm to the trusts other creditors 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the government challenges the court’s award of compound rather than simple interest. It is well settled that the determination whether to award simple or compound interest is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. RiteHite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555, 35 USPQ2d 1065, 1077 (Fed.Cir.1995) (in banc); accord City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div. Nat’l Gypsum Co., — U.S.-,-, 115 S.Ct. 2091, 2096, 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995) (stating that the allowance of prejudgment interest “rests very much in the discretion of the tribunal which has to pass upon the subject, whether it be a court or a jury” (quoting The Scotland, 118 U.S. 507, 518-19, 6 S.Ct. 1174, 1175-76, 30 L.Ed. 153 (1886))); Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 766 F.2d 518, 520, 226 USPQ 622, 623 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The government has failed to establish that

    ### Response:
    holding that prejudgment interest may inelude compound interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which the absence of an itemized verdict sheet impairs our ability to decide other issues raised on appeal. Because our ability to decide one of the issues raised here has been impaired, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial as to damages. Finally, in his brief, Johnson asserts that mandatory itemization does not make sense for those categories of damages that are unsupported by competent evidence. We agree. In the case sub judice, for example, Wyatt did not offer evidence of future medical expenses or future lost wages. When an itemized verdict sheet is prepared in accord with CJP § 11-109, the trial judge may “zero out” or delete those damage categories that are not at issue in a particular case. [See Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 748, 580 A.2d 188 (1990) (<HOLDING>) ] II In view of our holding on the first

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial judge is obliged to give a correct jury instruction notwithstanding that request for instruction was technically erroneous if the evidence generates the subject matter of the jury instruction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deferred compensation plan. It is significant to note that the parties specifically excluded the impact of the Richert Note in valuing the Vultee Property to arrive at an equal division of the remaining marital property. 4 . Paragraph 4(i) of the Judgment states that ""[a] marital settlement agreement between the parties is attached.” Paragraph 4 further states: Each attachment to this judgment is incorporated into this judgment, and the parties are ordered to comply with each attachment's provisions. Jurisdiction is reserved to make other orders necessary to carry out this judgment. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 2. 5 . Nor is there a direct pay requirement for alimony or child support under § 523(a)(5). In the Ninth Circuit, a debt to a third party on behalf of a chil 1107 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Defendant's Trial Brief, p. 4,1. 16-17. 7

    ### Response:
    holding that payments in the nature of support need not be made directly to the spouse or dependent to be nondischargeable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Apprendi and Ring, however, suggests that the United States Supreme Court in Ring overturned the Act or the overall structure of capital sentencing. Defendant reads too much into the opinion. Specifically, Ring held that Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as “the Junctional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,” but did not require that such factors become actual elements of a new substantive offense. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348) (emphasis added). Further, Apprendi stated that the “substantive basis for ... [the] enhancement is thus not at issue; the adequacy of ... [the] procedure is.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added); see also, Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 993-95 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Jones stated that “[t]he

    ### Response:
    holding that apprendi announced a rule of criminal procedure forecloses  argument that ring announced a substantive rule
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at common law by or against his personal representative. 34 . Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 194 W.Va. 97, 104, 459 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1995). 35 . Syllabus Point 3, in part, In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation, 193 W.Va. 119, 454 S.E.2d 413 (1994) (emphasis added). 36 . Tennant, 194 W.Va, at 111, 459 S.E.2d at 388. 37 . Syllabus Point 8, Tennant, 194 W.Va. at 102, 459 S.E.2d at 379. 38 . Syllabus Point 3, State v. Farmer, 200 W.Va. 507, 490 S.E.2d 326 (1997). 39 . McDonald v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 160 W.Va. 396, 398, 235 S.E.2d 367, 368 (1977). 40 . United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting Frantz v. United States, 62 F.2d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 1933)). See also State v. Thompson, 220 W.Va. 398, 400, 647 S.E.2d 834, 836 (2007) (<HOLDING>), 41 . Garner v. Missouri Dep't of Mental

    ### Response:
    holding judges in criminal cases must exercise restraint and impartiality in questioning witnesses
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Allegiant does not defend its position that removal was proper based on diversity jurisdiction. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 9 . Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). 10 . Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 11 . Id. 12 . Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 13 . Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (internal citation omitted). 14 . Wayne v. sistent with the Ninth Circuit’s summary of these cases in Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 33 . Id. at 722. 34 . Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8-9, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 35 . Martin, 555 F.3d at 808; 49 U.S.C. §

    ### Response:
    holding that removal is proper based on complete preemption only when congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    failed to exhaust administrative remedies are appropriately reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6), not under Rule 12(b)(1). See Hidalgo v. FBI, 344 F.3d 1256, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2003); Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 576 F.Supp.2d 64, 65-66 (D.D.C. 2008) (""When a FOIA defendant disputes that a FOIA plaintiff has fulfilled the exhaustion requirement, the matter is properly the subject of a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”). As such, there are no grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Furthermore, because ""matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by [this] court,” the DOT's motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. See Holy Land Found, for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Furthermore, to the extent that FOIA

    ### Response:
    holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    B 1981)). 54 . Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(1). 55 . Id. 404(b)(2). 56 . United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir.1978). 57 . United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir.2005). 58 . Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir.1990)). 59 . See United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir.1996) (""[Intrinsic] evidence is admissible to complete the story of the crime by proving the immediate context of events in time and place.""). 60 . United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 699 (5th Cir.2012), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 S.C 1991 amendments. 67 . See id. 103(a) (""A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substanti . 406 advisory committee’s notes, 1972 proposed rules). 82 . Leonard, 499 F.3d at 442 (<HOLDING>). 83 . Id. 84 . United States v.

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court abused its discretion in admitting comments an insurance agent made to five clients over the course of a decade when the record demonstrated the agent had sold nearly two hundred such policies
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    included offense of murder. An offense is inherently included within another if, through comparison of the statutes establishing the crimes, the lesser offense can be proven by the State by proof of all or less than all of the elements of the greater offense, or if the lesser offense requires a lesser mens rea. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 566. Class A felony voluntary manslaughter requires the State to prove an element — use of a deadly weapon — not found in the murder statute and, pursuant to a clear application of Wright, cannot be considered an inherently lesser included offense of murder. Class A felony voluntary manslaughter can be a factually lesser included offense of murder, if the charging information for murder alleges the use of a deadly weapon to commit the crime. See id. at 567 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, we cannot deem trial counsel

    ### Response:
    holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    gain, the petitioner was unable to prove otherwise when he offered no evidence to show otherwise). 69 . Decl. of Caldwell, Form 1040, [Doc. 93-17] at ex. 11. 70 . See Blodgett v. Comm’r, 394 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8th Cir.2005) (""A tax return is generally considered inadmissible hearsay with the exception that the return may constitute an admission by the taxpayer.”). 71 . 26 U.S.C. § 7491(c). 72 . Decl. of Bailey, [Doc. 83-2] at para. 7. 73 . See Decl. of Bailey, Forms 4340, [Docs. 83-3 to -9] at exs. 1-9. 74 . See e.g., United States v. Sadler, No. 13-7207, 2015 WL 4610950, at *3 (E.D.Penn. Aug. 3, 2015) (finding the Forms 4340 met the Government’s burden of production (citing Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1992)); McLaine v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 228, 245-46 (2012) (<HOLDING>)). 75 . Decl. of Bailey, [Doc. 83-2] at para.

    ### Response:
    holding that a form 4340 satisfies the commissioners burden of production under section 7491c with respect to additions to tax for failure to timely pay
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contract that requires specific performance to be completed in a specified period. Therefore, the contract is not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Accordingly, as a matter of law we find the phrase “that is beyond the reasonable control of that party” modifies all the events enumerated by the parties in the force-majeure clause. Consequently, we find that Wells is not entitled to summary judgment based on the force-majeure clause, and we reverse the district court’s ruling on this issue. Although our ruling on the force-maj-eure clause is the law of the case, we will not consider whether Pillsbury is entitled to judgment on this issue because it did not move for summary judgment. See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 612 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Estate of Campbell, 253 N.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    error occurring during a sentence hearing. I did not agree with this movement to create courts of equity, not of law, in our subordinate court system. United States v. Claxton, supra at 165 (Sullivan, C.J., concurring in part and in the result). More recently, in United States v. Quiroz, 55 MJ 334, 338-39 (2001), a majority of this Court even went so far as to permit the appellate court below to ignore the law of multiplicity in granting findings relief while vaguely citing the service appellate court’s power under Article 66(e), UCMJ. This aberrant line of decisions should not be extended here to hold that the Courts of Criminal Appeals may also flout the law on post-trial delay in discharging their sentence approval function. See United States v. Hutchison, 57 MJ 231 (2002)(<HOLDING>). Article 66(c), UCMJ, was not intended by

    ### Response:
    holding a court of criminal appeals may not exercise its sentence approval powers to criticize a state court conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shed light on the magnitude of Allen’s incentive to cooperate with authorities and would have revealed that he had much more at stake than was already known to the jury. Beyond facing serious criminal charges, the newly-disclosed information shows Allen was very distressed at the prospect of his alleged sexual misconduct becoming public. In an FBI interview, Allen said he would “become unglued” if the allegations were published in the media). Even though the information does not run afoul of Rule 403, the question remains as to whether it would have been admissible or whether Kohring could have used it to impeach Allen. We conclude that, at a minimum, Kohring could have used the information on cross-examination to impeach Allen. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 124 F.3d 899 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant was denied his sixth amendment right to crossexamination when he was barred from questioning an expert witness about potential bias stemming from accusations of sexual impropriety with several patients that resulted in criminal charges and the loss of his medical license and faculty position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During the suppression hearing, J.P.'s mother testified that she did not believe that J.P. had done ""anything wrong with that barn fire"" and told the officers that she thought it was a good idea if the truth came out during the interview. (Tr. 67). When J.P. admitted that he was present at the scene when the barn was set fire, J.P.'s mother started crying. Aside from J.P.'s testimony during the suppression hearing that he ""felt that [he] had to"" answer Officer Bickel's questions, the record does not contain any evidence of police force, coercion or improper inducement to secure J.P.'s statement. Id. at 72. Under the totality of the cireumstances, J.P.'s statement was voluntary and was properly admitted into evidence. See, e.g., Borton v. State, 759 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. 2. Sufficiency of Evidence The

    ### Response:
    holding that the juveniles statements to police were properly admitted into evidence where the totality of the circumstances showed that the juveniles statements were voluntary
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was presented with a sufficient basis to believe that the items to be seized were still on the premises. Ruffin argues that the staleness of the facts in the affidavit negated .probable cause and, concomitantly, the validity of the warrant. Dated or “stale” information “may have little value in showing that contraband or evidence is still likely to be found in the place for which the warrant is sought.” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). We have previously identified several factors to consider in making a staleness determination, including the “[a]ge of the information supporting a warrant application,” “the nature of the crime,” and “the type of evidence” sought. United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1322 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). Here, less than two weeks lapsed between

    ### Response:
    holding monthsold information supported a warrant to search residence for child pornography noting law enforcement agents opinion that pedophiles rarely dispose of such material
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claimant’s application differently. Finally, claimant must show (3) good cause for [his] failure to present the evidence earlier. Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1991) (citations omitted) (citing Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir.1988)). The record before the ALJ contained no evidence of mental impairment other than the psychiatric evaluation ordered by the ALJ. The progress notes and psychiatric evaluation by plaintiffs treating psychiatrist sought to be added to the record, therefore, are new evidence. Thus, plaintiff satisfies the first part of the test. The second part of the test is whether the new evidence is material and probative. The court need not address this element, however, because plaintiff fails to satisfy the third part of the test, nam ll.1984) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, by requiring the Appeals Council

    ### Response:
    holding that claimant must show good cause for failure to submit evidence to alj and appeals council
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this action must be dismissed. II. After a review of all arguments presented and consideration of all relevant case law, the Court agrees with the EPA that RCRA precludes judicial review of pre-enforcement agency orders issued under § 3013 of that Act. For this conclusion, the Court relies heavily on the analysis set forth in United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 96-CV-1432 (JG), 1997 WL 1048911 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.ll, 1997) (dismissing counterclaims asserting a pre-enforcement challenge to a § 3013 order on grounds, inter alia, that RCRA precludes such review). The Court also relies, by analogy, on the authority of Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418, 1426 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 316, 130 L.Ed.2d 278 (<HOLDING>) and J.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. Administrator,

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fungus, and failing to maintain and repair those units. [4AC ¶ 43.] Plaintiff further asserts that under California law, “the same act may be both a breach of contract and a tort.” Perry v. Robertson, 201 Cal.App.3d 333, 340, 247 Cal.Rptr. 74 (1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff does not dispute that his negligence claim seeks solely economic damages, but alleges that he should be permitted to go to trial on both his contract and tort causes of action regardless of the lack of economic injury. Defendants respond, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing his negligence claim because it seeks recovery in tort for purely economic loss, and is thus barred by California’s economic loss doctrine. See KB Home v. Super. Ct., 112 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1079, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 587 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Under California law, the economic loss

    ### Response:
    holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). Several lower federal courts relied on Justice Marshall’s approach to expand Rooker-Feldman, holding that federal claims were barred because they were “inextricably intertwined” with state-court judgments. Indeed, Rooker-Feldman tripped up plaintiffs in our circuit even though they did not seek relief from a state-court judgment and their claims were not identical to claims asserted in state court. See, e.g., Prince v. Ark. Bd. Exam’rs in Psychol., 380 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir.2004) (quoted ante at 754-55); Ace Const. v. City of St. Louis, 263 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488,

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    value of the [debtor’s] assets.” Id. However, that Court further observed: None of this implies that debtors in bankruptcy may violate federal law with impunity, selling patented products or, say, going into the cocaine distribution business. Damages for wrongs done during the bankruptcy proceeding are administrative claims, and thus paid in full most of the time. The bankruptcy judge may enjoin ongoing wrongs, or release the automatic stay to allow another court to consider claims that debtors are violating the law. Public agencies may seek redress under § 362(b)(4). But the bankruptcy court is the clearinghouse for private actions .... Id. at 977 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 161 B.R. 771 (E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>). The patent infringement claims asserted in

    ### Response:
    holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the waiver provision largely referred to “sentence” in the context of the term of imprisonment. See id. (discussing “probable sentencing range” and “sentence within the maximum provided in the statutes of conviction”). As such, we find the plea agreement’s waiver provision is ambiguous as to whether “sentence” includes the amount of restitution, or refers only to term of imprisonment. For example, on the one hand, restitution is part of “sentence” in the colloquial sense in that it is a determination for the district court after guilt has been adjudged. On the other hand, resti tution is not simply “imposed in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements” as the plea agreement specifies. J.A. 30 ¶ 4; cf. United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Appellant’s challenge is levied

    ### Response:
    holding that term any sentence within plea agreements waiver of right to appeal provision did not include restitution because of ambiguity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    show the convictions of approximately seventy-five percent of innocent persons involved mistaken eyewitness identification. Id. Therefore, it is important for the courts to ensure that any identification made or influenced by a defendant’s presence at the deposition does not create a situation where the procedure has the likelihood of violating a defendant’s right to due process of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In other words, courts should not permit unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures as a matter of good policy. The seating of a defendant next to his or her counsel at the deposition of an eyewitness is so clearly suggestive as to be impermissible. Cf. United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 942-43 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). It is a waste of judicial resources and time

    ### Response:
    holding an incourt identification made with the defendant sitting next to his attorney at the counsels table is so clearly suggestive as to be impermissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (187[8]). Id. at 62. ¶ 38. Reynolds was one of the first federal decisions to elaborate on the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. In Reynolds, the defendant, George Reynolds, claimed that his right to confront a witness was violated when the lower court admitted into evidence testimony that was given at a former trial for the same offense with the same parties but under another indictment. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 153. The witness, who was the alleged second wife of the accused, testified at a former trial against Reynolds. Id. at 160. At the former trial, the accused was present during her testimony and given the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 161. Prior to and after the commencement of the second trial, an officer attem (<HOLDING>). ¶ 41. The Eighth Circuit appears to be the

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if after a warning by the judge he continues his disruptive behavior
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    form the basis of D'Alessio’s injurious falsehood claim. See, e. g., Squire Records v. Vanguard Recording Soc’y, 25 A.D.2d 190, 192, 268 N.Y.S.2d 251, 254 (1st Dep't 1966), aff’d, 19 N.Y.2d 797, 279 N.Y.S.2d 737, 226 N.E.2d 542 (1967). D'Alessio's fraudulent deceit and concealment claim arises out of the NYSE’s alleged misinterpretation and purposeful concealment of the federal securities laws and various regulations and rules applicable to D'Alessio's trading activities, which were the basis of the charges brought by the government. The negligent misrepresentation claim is based on allegedly false statements made by the NYSE to D’Alessio in connection with their SRO-member relationship. See, e. g., Pappas v. Harrow Stores, 140 A.D.2d 501, 504, 528 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (2d Dep't 1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, D'Alessio's breach of contract claim

    ### Response:
    holding that some special relationship between the parties is required to recover under the theory of negligent misrepresentation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the certifications and may not furnish reports if “reasonable grounds” exist to believe that reports will be used impermissibly. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). Under the plain terms of § 1681e(a), a subscriber’s certification cannot absolve the reporting agency of its independent obligation to verify the certification and determine that no reasonable grounds exist for suspecting impermissible use. Blanket certification cannot elimi nate all genuine issues of material fact with regard to Experian’s liability. C. Experian’s Motion to File Dom-ments Under Seal Two standards generally govern motions to seal documents like the one at issue here. First, a “compelling reasons” standard applies to most judicial records. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Foltz v. State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co., 331

    ### Response:
    holding that a party seeking to seal a judicial record  bears the burden of overcoming  the compelling reasons standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2001) (citation, alteration and quotations omitted); see Wild v. Brooks, 2004 VT 74, ¶ 10, 177 Vt. 171, 862 A.2d 225 (explaining that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy designed to deter injurious conduct and cannot be granted if the conduct has been discontinued). ¶ 7. Landowner Houston argues that the controversy is still live because the wells are an ongoing taking for which she is entitled to damages. Although landowner admits that damages were not explicitly requested at trial, she suggests that a request for damages was inherent in her original complaint. Landowner’s claim for a damage reward at this stage in the legal process does not create a live controversy that can avoid the mootness of the case. See Dorian v. Unin of Vt., 156 Vt. 114, 119, 589 A.2d 317, 320 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The first time landowner requested a damage

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs request for nominal damages did not defeat mootness as it appeared that the request was made solely to obtain a ruling on a moot issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to send the plaintiff its own verification of his debt. The plaintiff objected to the report’s conclusion that he did not plead his fraud claims properly, but, for the reasons already discussed, those objections lack merit. Schneiderman & Sherman objected to Judge Randon’s conclusion that the law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by failing to mail Mr. Lewis a debt validation letter. The defendant believes that the statute does not require a debt collector to mail a debt validation letter to a consumer if another debt collector previously mailed the consumer a letter validating the debt. District courts are divided on this question and the Sixth Circuit has yet to provide guidance. Compare Paris v. Steinberg & Steinberg, 828 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1221-22 (W.D.Wash.2011) (<HOLDING>) with Wright v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,

    ### Response:
    holding that the notice requirement applies only to the first debt collector that communicates with the consumer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Janice Camp appeals from the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s final decision to deny Camp’s application for Social Security disability benefits. Our review of the record discloses that the Commissioner’s decision is based upon substantial evidence and is without reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. Camp v. Massanari, No. CA-00-186-1-C (W.D.N.C. May 15, 2001). Additionally, although Camp argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) rejected Dr. Richard Munschy’s opinion without properly seeking additional information from the doctor, she has made no showing of prejudice. Thus, any error on the part of the ALJ was harmless. See Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We dispense with oral argument, because the

    ### Response:
    holding claim requires showing that additional evidence would have been produced that might have led to a different decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the record indicates that these were projected costs with no indication when or if Vicky had actually incurred these costs. AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). 2 . Id.; United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir.2009). 3 . 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). 4 . Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). 5 . United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 363-64 (5th Cir.2009). 6 . Rita, 551 U.S. at 358-59, 127 S.Ct. 2456; see also United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 565 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519,

    ### Response:
    holding that explanation that sentencing judge was persuaded by the arguments at the hearing and in the sentencing memos that he should not depart downward from the guidelines range was sufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    orderly development of physical plants” at educational institutions). The only other use of ""efficient” or ""efficiency” in the Texas Constitution concern laws punishing the embezzlement of public funds, id. art. IV, § 25, and enforcing mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens, id. art. XVI, § 37. 15 . 176 S.W.3d at 790. 16 . See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 725-26. 17 . Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996). 18 . See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. 19 . See id. art. I, § 13; Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.1993). 20 . Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 391-92. 21 . See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 493. 22 . Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 493. 23 . Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727. 24 . W. Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 583 (<HOLDING>). 25 . 917 S.W.2d at 739. 26 . Texas Workers’

    ### Response:
    holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    penalties on a defendant for the same underlying conduct. III. Increased Sentence on Resentenc-ing Weingarten raises a number of additional challenges to his new sentence, all predicated on the notion that, even though his original sentence and new sentence both amounted to an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment, the new sen tence should nevertheless be treated as an increased sentence. The government does not dispute that Weingarten’s new sentence should be treated as more severe. Under the “remainder aggregate” analysis outlined in United States v. Markus, when reviewing a sentence imposed on remand after one or more counts have been reversed, we compare the defendant’s new sentence to his previous sentence without the vacated count(s). 603 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that to compare severity of sentences the proper procedure is first to disregard the sentence originally imposed on the dismissed count and then compare the total remaining sentence imposed on the remaining counts with the petitioners present position
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ford told him that the driver had handed the contraband to him when the officers stopped the car and told Mr. Ford to hide it in the back seat armrest compartment. When Officer Freed-Vest spoke to Mr. Ford in the squad car, he denied that the marijuana was his. He told her that he thought both ziplock bags had been in the white trash bag and that one had fallen out onto the floor board when the driver threw them into the back seat. The officers arrested Mr. Ford for possession of 1104 grams of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court found that Mr. Ford committed two violations of community control condition (5), as charged, by failing to live and remain at liberty without violating any law and one violation of condition (7) by po CA 1987) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Mr. Ford did not have actual

    ### Response:
    holding defendants transitory touching of bale of marijuana when he weighed it to be purchased by third party did not establish dominion and control for possession charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    guardian was not present and the interrogation lasted some 30-45 minutes; for those reasons, the case is factually distinguishable. But many of the circumstances that animated the Supreme Court's ""reasonable child"" proclamation are present here too. B. N.A.S. Was in Custody $40 The salient features of N.AS!'s schoolhouse interrogation are much the same as those in J.D.B.'s case, right down to his age. Here, the encounter occurred at school in a small, closed room; a uniformed police officer and the two school officials were present; the officer and the principal stood during the interrogation; N.A.S. did not have an opportunity to speak to a parent or legal guardian alone (although his father and uncle were also in the room); the officer did not tell N.A.S. that he was free Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>). 142 The majority emphasizes that the

    ### Response:
    holding that a juvenile questioned by an officer over the phone was not in custody
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The district court apparently reached the legal conclusion that the six instances of speech that the plaintiff relies upon were protected by the First Amendment under the first two parts of the Pickering/Connick analysis. The district court erred, however, by failing to inform the jury of this legal finding. The record is filled with expression by Gardetto which may or may not be protected by the First Amendment as a matter of law. Thus, the district court must tell the jury which incidents of expression deserve First Amendment protection to enable the jury to apply the third and fourth steps of the Pickering/Connick analysis to Gardetto’s legally protected expression. See Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 803, 106 S.Ct. 36, 88 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Instructions Nos. 3 and 7 fail to ameliorate

    ### Response:
    holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maryland Lloyds being such a carrier, the statute on its face precludes the award of attorney’s fees. Any confusion has been injected by the judiciary’s application, not by the Legislature’s writing. II The Fifth Circuit, in attempting to interpret the statute, has generally held that attorney’s fees ' cannot be recovered against the listed types of insurance companies. See Lafarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 402-03 (5 th Cir.1995); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5 th Cir.1992); see also Reynolds v. Allstate Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir.1981)(reaching same result under Art. 2226). But one case seems to be contrary. See Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 373 (5 th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>). The Fifth Circuit’s holdings in Bituminous

    ### Response:
    holding that chapter 38 permits an insured to recover attorney fees from the insurer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest rates, construction costs, and macroeconomic variables such as GNP and California per capita income.” Id Both models project future prices of electricity in different sectors, and reach different results. Both attempt to predict the price of fuels such as natural gas that, in some uses, may substitute for electricity. Both attempt to assess the degree to which conservation will curtail demand. Should the Commission attempt to widen its examination to encompass ever larger areas, it could not rely on existing studies of smaller regions; piecing together studies limited to smaller regions would ignore the interconnections and synergistic effects a study of the larger area would show. Cf. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2729-30, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The Commission’s task, if it were to embark

    ### Response:
    recognizing that segmentation of an environmental investigation may slight cumulative or synergistic environmental impact
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 818 P.2d 849 (1991). 6 Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981). 7 State of Nevada v. Dist. Ct. (Anzalone), 118 Nev. 140, 146-47, 42 P.3d 233, 237 (2002); NRS 34.320. 8 Harvey 6 Dayside Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 119 Nev. 404, 407, 75 P.3d 384, 386 (2003). 17 NRS 278.315(6). 18 NRS 278.3195(1). 19 McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986). 20 Id. at 649, 730 P.2d at 442; see also Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 582, 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004). 21 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 314, § 3, at 1734-35. 22 Hearing on A.B. 291 Before the Assembly Government Affairs Comm., 72d Leg. (Nev., March 28, 2003). 23 Id. 24 See generally Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 365, 65 P.2d 133, 145 (1937) (<HOLDING>). 25 North Las Vegas, Nev., Municipal Code §

    ### Response:
    recognizing that where express terms of repeal are not used the presumption is always against an intention to repeal an earlier statute unless there is such inconsistency or repugnancy between the statutes as to preclude the presumption or the later statute revises the whole subjectmatter of the former
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    HCHC thus seeks to avoid reargument of these substantive issues to the district court on remand. As a result, HCHC contends that, even assuming there is no longer a case or controversy regarding HCHC’s request for preliminary relief, the court should resolve the underlying merits of HCHC’s claim before remanding the matter to the district court. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can only hear actual ‘cases or controversies’ as defined under Article III of the Constitution. The ‘case or controversy’ requirement applies at all stages of review.” Neighborhood Transp. Network, Inc. v. Pena, 42 F.3d 1169, 1172 (8th Cir.1994). A federal court no longer has jurisdiction to hear a case on appeal when it “no longer presents an actual, ongoing case or controversy.” Id. (<HOLDING>); see also Agrigenetics, Inc. v. Rose, 62 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that complaint seeking to enjoin highway construction project pending completion of environmental impact statement for larger project no longer presented any live controversy after highway project was completed and thus was moot and provided no basis for federal court jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Mr. Looper asserts that the failure to file a timely answer was due to “excusable neglect” as that term is used in the rule. As discussed more fully earlier in this opinion, motions to set aside default judgments are addressed to the trial court’s discretion, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. See Nelson, 826 S.W.2d at 485; see also Patterson, 665 S.W.2d at 100. Tennessee courts generally hold that an attorney’s negligence, without more, does not constitute excusable neglect. See Terminix Int’l Co., L.P. v. Tapley, No. 02A01-9701-CH-00028, 1997 WL 437222 at * 3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug.4, 1997) (no Tenn. R.App. P. 11 filed); see also Barber & McMurry, Inc. v. Top-Flite Dev. Corp., 720 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>); Munday v. Brown, 617 S.W.2d 897, 900

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorneys preoccupation with other business is not grounds for relief from a default judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    445 (4) (339 SE2d 704) (1986) (irrespective of whether “slayer” connotes malice when considered in isolation, trial judge’s use of that word, when considered within context, did not constitute an opinion concerning the evidence so as to violate OCGA § 17-8-57). 18 At the time of Garland’s trial in February 2005, the introduction of a certified copy of a witness’s impeaching conviction, where the defendant had introduced no other evidence, would have resulted in defense counsel losing the right to make the final closing argument, see former OCGA § 17-8-71, and it was considered a reasonable defense strategy to avoid introducing evidence to preserve that right. See Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298, 301 (3) (d) (658 SE2d 627) (2008); Dewberry v. State, 271 Ga. 624, 625 (2) (523 SE2d 26) (1999) (<HOLDING>). 19 Carter v. State, 272 Ga. 31-32 (2) (526

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the right to opening and closing argument is a valuable right and preserving same is a reasonable strategy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    beyond its proper bounds. Id. at 60-61, 118 S.Ct. 469. Limiting its holding to the facts of the case, the Court stated that: We need not consider whether the statute requires some other kind of connection between a bribe and the expenditure of federal funds, for in this case the bribe was related to the housing of a prisoner in facilities paid for in significant part by federal funds themselves. Id. at 59, 118 S.Ct. 469. Consequently, the Court left the door open regarding whether or not some nexus must exist between the alleged theft or bribe and the federal funds. As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in Salinas, a circuit split has developed on the issue of whether some sort of nexus or connection must be shown. See, e.g., United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Grossi, 143 F.3d 348 (7th

    ### Response:
    holding that  666 does not require any connection between the misconduct and federal funds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for American telecommunications consumers .... ” Preamble, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 State. 56 (1996). Moreover, IF the detariffing provisions of the Telecommunications Act subject the terms of nationwide long-distance form contracts to state law attack, the transactional costs and litigation expenses would also increase. Carriers would then face the continuous cost of court challenges and the added expense of revising and distributing modified CSAs which conform with new state court rulings. Consumers would bear the brunt of this through higher prices for telephone service. This too is at odds with Congress’s intent. It also belies the FCC’s belief that the transactional costs of detariffmg would be fixed and short-lived. See, 11 FCC Red. at 20,736 (¶ 57) (<HOLDING>). 8 . On the other hand, if the resulting

    ### Response:
    recognizing that detariffmg would result in some increased administrative costs but anticipating those costs to be initial and fixed costs only resulting from the shift to a detariffed environment  such as the cost of developing short standard contracts
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Chunhua Huang filed a habeas petition in district court, which was transferred to this court as a petition for review, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and abuse of discretion in various immigration proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) and deny the petition for review. Because the effective date of Huang’s petition is January 21, 2004, we only have jurisdiction to consider her challenge to the BIA’s order dated December 23, 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (stating that an alien must file a petition for review “not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal”); Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). The BIA did not abuse its

    ### Response:
    holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carlberg has not voluntarily subjected himself to the rules of the IHSAA; he has no voice in its rules or leadership. We note as well the relatively short span of time a student spends in high school compared to the amount of time often required for institutional policies to change. These factors all point to the propriety of judicial scrutiny of IHSAA decisions with respect to student challenges. But what should be the standard of review? This Court has never applied de novo review to IHSAA decisions and emphatically rejects it here. Rather than de novo review, since Sturrup, the appellate courts of this state have applied an “arbitrary and capricious” standard in reviewing the decisions of the IHSAA. Sturrup, 261 Ind. at 470, 305 N.E.2d at 882; see also Avant, 650 N.E.2d at 1171 (<HOLDING>); Kriss, 180 Ind.App. at 609, 390 N.E.2d at 202

    ### Response:
    holding the ihsaa did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting student limited eligibility
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense).]” See Ga. L. 2012, pp. 899, 949, §§ 3-1, 9-1 (a). 2 In 2011, when Appellant committed the burglary at issue, the maximum sentence for a burglary conviction was 20 years. See former OCGA § 16-7-1 (a), (b). 3 See Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002). 4 “The denial of a motion 177) (2010) (notingthat when, inter alia, the defendant could not show from the record that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been properly advised about the effect of his plea on his immigration status, he was required to expand the record by filing a petition for habeas corpus). 8 Burns, 291 Ga. at 548 (1) (c) (citations omitted); Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 321, 322 (5) (720 SE2d 617) (2012)

    ### Response:
    holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    any person with a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b)(1); McWright, 982 F.2d at 227. Finally, plaintiff cites Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.Supp. 1310 (E.D.Pa.1994). Doe found that reproduction was a major life activity under the ADA for a person infected with HIV by relying on Congress’ use of the broad terms of “life” and “major life activities.” Doe, 862 F.Supp. at 1320. Although the terms “life” and “major life activities” are broad, the EEOC regulations on this provision of the ADA, as discussed earlier, necessitate a finding that “procreation” and “caring for others” are not “major life activities” under the statute. See Department of Treasury, I.R.S. v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922, 931-33, 110 S.Ct. 1623, 1629, 108 L.Ed.2d 914 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The EEOC’s interpretation indicates that

    ### Response:
    holding that when an agency is charged with administering a statute part of the authority it receives is the power to give reasonable content to the statutes textual ambiguities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    test result either from a different type of test (blood or saliva) or perhaps from a different breathalyzer. Without scientific proof that the second test result is more accurate than the first test result, the trial court erred in finding the Director carried his burden. Our decision does not cause a hardship to the Director because if an officer is dissatisfied with the results of the breath test, under section 577.020 the driver must submit to a second type of chemical test: either a blood, urine, or a saliva test. See Smith v. Dir. of Revenue, 260 S.W.3d 896, 902-03 (Mo.App. S.D.2008) (finding the officer was authorized under section 577.020.2 to ask a driver to submit to blood test despite the result of the breath test); State v. Simmons, 186 S.W.3d 418 (Mo.App. S.D.2006) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the judgment is reversed, and Mr.

    ### Response:
    holding the limit of two tests in section 5770202 applies to the types of chemical test performed and not the number of times the same chemical test is performed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court’s view, ""the alleged 'hacking and trading’ was a 'device or contrivance' within the meaning of the statute."" Dorozhko, 606 F.Supp.2d at 328. The District Court further observed that the scheme was ""in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities because the close temporal proximity of the hacking to the trading (everything occurred in less than twenly-four hours) and the cohesiveness of the scheme (establishing the trading account, stealing the confidential information within minutes of its availability, and trading on it within minutes of the next day’s opening bell) suggest that hacking into the Thomson computers was part of a single scheme to commit securities fraud. See id. at 328-29; see also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). The District Court also concluded that the

    ### Response:
    holding that in connection with means to coincide
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    not intoxicated as defined in the charge because the evidence of intoxication hinged on Sgt. Coleman’s testimony alone, and so th ow the charge immediately after the last exchange between the State and the defense concerning the definition of intoxication, and Orsag fails to direct us to any evidence that the jury disregarded the court’s charge. The mere assertion that the jury “could” have been influenced does not rise to the level of evidence rebutting the presumption that the jury followed the charge. Therefore, we conclude that the State’s misstatement of the law to the jury, if any, did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in finding Orsag guilty. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b); Herrera v. State, 11 S.W.3d 412, 415-16 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Orsag’s third issue. V In his

    ### Response:
    holding trial courts error in overruling objection to prosecutors misstatement of law of intoxication that differed from definition in charge was harmless when there was evidence supporting the jurys verdict and it was presumed the jury followed the instructions in the charge
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    meeting by telling her supervisor that she was involved in an investigation and could not get away. It is unclear whether Costil-la’s supervisors knew that Sloan had assured Costilla that she would be protected from Acosta’s harassment and that Costilla would not be required to be present with Acosta in the future. In March 1995, Acosta was in Minnesota and met with Costilla. He insisted that Cos-tilla give him her home telephone number and got angry when she refused. In April 1995, Acosta called Costilla, ive. Third, the MHRA and cases interpreting the MHRA are consistent with the EEOC guidelines and the non-employee sexual harassment cases. Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination under the MHRA. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 14 (1996). The MHRA holds an employe 21-23 (Minn. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, an employer has a broad duty

    ### Response:
    holding samesex sexual harassment actionable mhra should be liberally construed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    refund requests, alleged a controversy ripe for judicial resolution. We therefore reverse the Court of International Trade’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of Ford’s claims concerning entries that CBP liquidated post-complaint. B We next turn to the Court of International Trade’s dismissal of certain Ford claims for lack of case or controversy. The court concluded that Ford “abandoned” certain claims with a dispositive concession in one of its briefs. Dismissal Op., 716 F.Supp.2d at 1310-11. Although the Court of International Trade did not use the term, we view this dismissal as rooted in the well-recognized rule that if its underlying controversy disappears, a case is moot and non-justieiable. See, e.g., Kaw Nation v. Norton, 405 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). On appeal, Ford argues that it made no such

    ### Response:
    holding case moot where one party voluntarily abandoned its arguments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to recovery up to the full amount of their unreimbursed losses prior to Geico being reimbursed for any amounts previously paid to said insureds.” See Third Amended Complaint at p. 7. She is also requesting damages in conjunction with the declaratory judgment in the form of unreimbursed losses owed to insureds plus prejudgment interest. Id. It is clear that the declaratory relief sought by Powers is equivalent to a request for a declaration of liability. The declaratory judgment count serves the ultimate goal of monetary restitution and is designed primarily to facilitate and ensure the satisfaction of monetary relief. Therefore, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate. See In re Jackson National Life Insurance Company Premium Litigation, 183 F.R.D. 217 (W.D.Mich.1998) (<HOLDING>); Goldberg v. Winston & Morrone, 1997 WL 139526

    ### Response:
    holding that a request for injunctive relief was merely incidental to a prayer for damages where it was designed to facilitate and ensure the satisfaction of any monetary relief the court might award
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punishment would be assessed if guilt was adjudicated. Therefore, Applicant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent and does not bar him from appealing from the punishment phase of trial. Relief is granted, and the trial court is instructed to certify Applicant’s right to appeal issues related to his sentence. KELLER, P.J., and WOMACK, J„ concurred. 1 . While it seems odd that the trial court’s certification of defendant’s right to appeal was signed and dated before Applicant signed and dated the waiver of hi .-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (reasoning that the waiver was not knowing and intelligent because the appellant could not know the consequences of the waiver at the time it was executed); Arnone v. State, No. 05-03-01165-CR, 2004 WL 147612, at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 28, 2004) (<HOLDING>); Andrews v. State, Nos. 2-02-353-CR,

    ### Response:
    holding that because the appellant could not have known what his sentence would be at the time he entered his plea monreal and blanco are not controlling
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    met. The relevant one here is (a)(8), which mandates that all impaired classes vote in favor of the Plan. The plan proponent may avoid that requirement by proposing confirmation under § 1129(b). That section imposes the same requirements as § 1129(a), except for (a)(8), but requires that the plan: 1) “not discriminate unfairly”; and 2) be “fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted the plan,” and further requires that at least one impaired class vote in favor of the plan. Debtor seeks approval of its Plan under § 1129(b)’s “cram down” provision. MSHDA, as the sole holder of the impaired Class 2 claim, has stated its intention to vote in favor of th (In re Bryson Properties, XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. (hey-stone III

    ### Response:
    holding that separate classification of similar claims is allowed but only for reasons independent of the debtors motivation to secure the vote of an impaired assenting class of claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was talking on the telephone. The note and the evidence indicate that Hohenwald then ran upstairs, forced open the upstairs bedroom door, and stabbed Lois repeatedly. Hohenwald then returned to the basement and continued his attack on Larry, eventually retrieving the wooden-handled knife after damaging the black-handled knife. When Hohenwald finally left the Steenerson residence, he was concerned only with escaping, as evidenced by the fact he told J.S., “let’s go,” when he reached the car. These reasonable inferences indicate that Hohenwald engaged in calculated decision-making fueled by anger, not terror. See Van Keuren, 759 N.W.2d at 40 (stating that anger alone is insufficient to form the basis for heat-of-passion manslaughter); State v. Richardson, 398 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn.1986) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the circumstances proved support

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendants decision to chase the victim and continue his attack indicates hate instead of terror
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). The False Claims Act created a comprehensive scheme designed to protect federal whistleblowers while discouraging frivolous suits by limiting available remedies. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). California’s wrongful discharge tort is inconsistent with this latter objective because it allows recovery of punitive damages. Several of the federal statutes the False Claims Act was modeled after have been found to preempt, state tort remedies for wrongful discharge. See S.Rep. No. 345, 9th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 73 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5299 (stating Section 3730(h) was modeled in part after the whistleblower protections, found in 42 U.S.C. § 5851), and Snow v. Bechtel Const. Inc., 647 F.Supp. 1514, 1518-19 (C.D.Cal.1986) (<HOLDING>). See also S.Rep. No. 345, reprinted in 1986

    ### Response:
    holding the whistleblower protection provision of the energy reorganization act 42 usc  5851 preempted californias wrongful discharge tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    summary judgment is untenable with regard to the Exxon claim: it alternatively argues that the Exxon claim was an asset of the Joint Venture but that it did not owe a duty of disclosure to the Corporations-a theory we dismissed above; or that the Exxon claim was not an asset of the Joint Venture because the agreement set the date of accounting as the last day of the month preceding withdrawal. If we were to accept the Joint Venture's logic, there would be a period of almost a month during which the Corporations were members of the Joint Venture and were responsible for the venture's debts, but not entitled to share in the venture's assets. Such an outcome is not consonant with Alaska partnership law. See AS 32.05.030; see generally Winther v. Samuelson, 10 P.3d 1167, 1171 (Alaska 2000) (<HOLDING>). 31 . The Joint Venture and the Corporations

    ### Response:
    recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be guided by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that treat cases as categories. Id. An appellate remedy is adequate when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding). When the benefits outweigh the detriments, we must conduct further analysis. Id. An appeal is inadequate for mandamus purposes when parties are in danger of permanently losing substantial rights, such as when the appellate court would not be able to cure the error; the party’s ability to present a viable claim or defense is vitiated; or the error cannot be made part of the appellate record. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 210-11; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843-44. An appellate ) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); In re J.W.L., 291 S.W.3d 79, 83

    ### Response:
    holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Defendant is in fact liable as a debt collector under the FDCPA precisely because Defendant is “within the exception found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)(F)(iii) since it concerns collection of debt of the Plaintiff already in default. It is a debt collector covered by [the] FDCPA.” (FAC, ¶ 78; October 5 Opposition, at 7:24-27.) In fact, therefore, by Plaintiffs own direct allegation, Defendant is not a debt collector covered by the statute at all. See also Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.2009) (cited by Defendant, describing a defendant attempting to argue it was not a debt collector liable under the Act because it fell within one of the Section 1692(a)(6)(F) exceptions that Plaintiff here alleges Defendant falls into); Izenberg, 589 F.Supp.2d at 1193 (<HOLDING>) of a certificate of existence from the OTS; 3)

    ### Response:
    holding failure to allege defendant is a debt collector defeats a fdcpa claim and further holding that nonjudicial foreclosure is not a collection of debt within the meaning of the fdcpa citing citing hulse v ocwen fed bank fsb 195 fsupp2d 1188 1204 dor2002 and ines v countrywide home loans no 08cvl267 2008 wl 4791863 2 sdcal nov 3 2008 this claim is dismissed without prejudicee claim under cal b  pc 17200 et seqplaintiffs claim under california business  professions code 17200 et seq is dismissed without prejudice this claim is premised on viola tions of tila see fac  80 98100 103 the fdcpa see fac 80 98 respa see fac  80 california civil code  19167b see fac  90 california civil code  191610cii see fac  91 california civil code section 1918519211920 and california civil code  1916710c see fac  93 defendant argues at least with regard to the state statutory allegations that this claim is preempted by the home owners loan act 12 usc  1461 et seq hola and its implementing regulations defendant further argues that plaintiffs claims are preempted by tila motion at 92728 n 1california business and professions code  17200 prohibits acts of unfair competition including any 1 unlawful 2 unfair or 3 fraudulent business practice unlawful practices are any activities that are forbidden by law samura v kaiser foundation health plan inc 17 calapp4th 1284 1292 22 cal rptr2d 20 1993 unfair acts are those that offend  an established public policy or are immoral unethical oppressive unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers podolsky v first healthcare corp 50 calapp4th 632 647 58 cal rptr2d 89 1996 internal quotations and citations omitted virtually any state federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action under  17200 idfirst it must be noted as a matter of bookkeeping that to the extent plaintiffs predicate federal statutory claims under tila respa and fdcpa are time barred andor otherwise dismissed as analyzed above plaintiffs state statutory section 17200 claim predicated on these federal statutory violations likewise must necessarily fail and must also be dismissed without prejudice because they do not state an unlawful ucl claim see eg chabner v united of omaha life ins co 225 f3d 1042 1048 9th cir2000 a court may not allow plaintiff to plead around an absolute bar to relief simply by recasting the cause of action as one for unfair competition internal quotation marks omitted rubio v capital one bank usa 572 fsupp2d 1157 1168 cdcal2008 finding that since plaintiffs tila claim failed plaintiffs ucl claim predicated on tila likewise failed see also smith v state farm mutual automobile ins co 93 calapp4th 700 718 113 calrptr2d 399 2001 celtech commcns inc v los angeles cellular telephone co 20 cal4th 163 180 83 calrptr2d 548 973 p2d 527 1999 stating by proscribing any unlawful business practice section 17200 borrows violations of other law and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable citation omitted thus the court need not address defendants argument that tila preempts a ucl claim that is based on failure to disclose information or materials required by tilathe remainder of defendants preemption argument is focused on the state law claims which defendant argues are preempted by hola hola was enacted by congress to charter savings associations under federal law bank of america v city and county of sf 309 f3d 551 559 9th cir2002 cert denied 538 us 1069 123 sct 2220 155 led2d 1127 2003 and to restore public confidence by creating a nationwide system of federal savings and loan associations to be centrally regulated according to nationwide best practices fid fed sav  loan assn v de la cuesta 458 us 141 160161 102 sct 3014 73 led2d 664 1982 hola and its regulations are a radical and comprehensive response to the inadequacies of the existing state system and so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control conference of fed sav  loan assns v stein 604 f2d 1256 1257 1260 9th cir1979 affd 445 us 921 100 sct 1304 63 led2d 754 citations omitted because there has been a history of significant federal presence in national banking the presumption against preemption of state law is inapplicable bank of america 309 f3d at 559 internal quotation marks omittedmoreover through hola congress gave the office of thrift supervision ots broad authority to issue regulations governing thrifts silvas v etrade mortg corp 514 f3d 1001 1005 9th cir2008 citing 12 usc  1464 ots promulgated 12 cfr  5602 section 5602 as a preemption regulation which  has no less preemptive effect than federal statutes  silvas 514 f3d at 1005 quoting de la cuesta 458 us at 153 102 sct 3014 section 5602a provides in pertinent part ots hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations ots intends to give federal savings associations maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance with a uniform federal scheme of regulation accordingly federal savings associations may extend credit as authorized under federal law including this part without regard to state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect their credit activities except to the extent provided in paragraph c of this section section 5602b provides the types of state laws preempted by section 5602a include4 the terms of credit including amortization of loans and the deferral and capitalization of interest and adjustments to the interest rate balance payments due or term to maturity of the loan including the circumstances under which a loan may be called due and payable upon the passage of time or a specified event external to the loan5 loanrelated fees including without limitation initial charges late charges prepayment penalties servicing fees and overlimit fees 9 disclosure and advertising including laws requiring specific statements information or other content to be included in credit application forms credit solicitations billing statements credit contracts or other creditrelated documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to borrowers or applicants10 processing origination servicing sale or purchase of or investment or participation in mortgagesas noted by the ninth circuit court of appeals in silvas 514 f3d at 1005 and 1005 n 1 the ots has described the correct analysis when evaluating whether a state law is preempted under this regulationwhen analyzing the status of state laws under  5602 the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in question is listed in paragraph b if so the analysis ends there the law is preempted if the law is not covered by paragraph b the next question is whether the law affects lending if it does then in accordance with paragraph a the presumption arises that the law is preempted this presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph c for these purposes paragraph c is intended to be interpreted narrowly any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemptionots final rule 61 fedreg 50951 5096667 sept 301996section 5602c provides that the types of state laws not preempted to the extent that they only ineidently affect the lending operations of federal savings associations include contract commercial real property and tort lawhere as argued by defendant the claims relating to the loans negative amortization features and teaser rates and failure to provide adjustable rate mortgage disclosure notice brought pursuant to california civil code  19167 andor 1916710c are preempted by 12 cfr  5602b4 and b9 the claim pursuant to california civil code  191610 for improper failure to downwardly adjust a mortgage is rate is preempted by 12 cfr  5602b4 as well the claims relating to notification of changes in interest rate brought pursuant to california civil code  1918519211920 are preempted by 12 cfr  5602b4 as well to the extent plaintiff makes claims relating to inability to qualify for the loan she was given these are preempted by 12 cfr  5602b10 the court can identify no state law claims alleged within the ucl claim that are not preempted by some portion of 12 cfr  5602b see eg coyotzi v countrywide financial corp no cv f 091036 2009 wl 2985497 14 edcal sept 16 2009 as plaintiff may or may not be able to amend subject to rule 11 to allege defendant is not regulated by hola see footnote 12 plaintiffs claims herein based on these state statutory provisions are dismissed without prejudice for the above reasons plaintiffs claim for relief under section 17200 et seq is dismissed without prejudicef claim for quiet titlefinally plaintiff alleges a quiet title claim plaintiff does not cite any statutory or other basis for this claim either in her fac or in her opposition to the motion to dismiss however defendant cites california code of civil procedure  762010 et seq as the relevant statutory hook construing the fac to benefit plaintiff based on the allegations of this claim the court concludes plaintiff intends to bring this claim under the above statutory provision this claim is dismissed without prejudice as plaintiff has alleged no ability to tenderthe purpose of a quiet title action is to determine all conflicting claims to the property in controversy and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to newman v cornelius 3 calapp3d 279 284 83 calrptr 435 1970 citation omitted california code of civil procedure  760010 pro vides for an action to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein and section 761020 mandates a verified complaint that includes 1 a legal description and street address of the subject real property 2 the title of plaintiff as to which determination is sought and the basis of the title 3 the adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought 4 the date as of which the determination is sought and 5 a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims calcode civ proc  761020in order to allege a claim to quiet title plaintiff must allege ability to tender the amounts admittedly borrowed arnolds mgmt corp v eischen 158 cal app3d 575 578 205 calrptr 15 1984 miller v provost 26 calapp4th 1703 1707 33 calrptr2d 288 1994 citations omitted a mortgagor of real property cannot without paying his debt quiet his title against the mortgagee citations omitted see also connors v home loan corp 2009 us dist lexis 48638 2009 wl 1615989 at 7 sdcal2009 in the absence of allegations of ability to tender indebtedness and foreclosure irregularities plaintiffs quiet title claim fails pesayco v world savings inc cv 093926 2009 us dist lexis 73299 35 cdcal july 29 2009 as previously discussed plaintiff has failed to allege an ability to tender thus plaintiffs quiet title claim is dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs right to amendv conclusiontherefore motion to dismiss docket no 12 is denied as moot the motion to dismiss docket no 24 is granted infull and plaintiffs claims are dismissed without prejudice plaintiff shall have twenty 20 days in which to file a second amended complaint sac failure to timely file a sac within 20 days will result in the sua sponte dismissal of this action with prejudiceit is so ordered1 the court advised plaintiff on september 1 2009 that further failure to comply with the local rules may lead to penalties pursuant to local rule 837 the court did not at that time deny the pending motion to dismiss docket no 12 which pertained to the complaint that has now been superseded by the fac the court now looks to the fac and to the motion to dismiss and other papers filed in connection with the fac accordingly the previous motion to dismiss docket no 12 is denied as moot2 this threeday period may be extended as long as the lender fails to provide material disclosures a point validly made by plaintiff but unnecessary to the decision here see lagrone v johnson 534 f2d 1360 1362 9th cir1976 we agree with the district court that the three omissions were material the threeday period for rescission therefore did not run and the notice of rescission filed by mrs lagrone was timely citing ljepava v mlsc properties inc 511 f2d 935 944 9th cir1975 sosa v fite 498 f2d 114 118 5th cir1974 see 12 cfr  22623a3 n 48 as amended effective date october 1 2009 as to what constitutes material disclosures defendant does not argue in the motion to dismiss that the tila rescission claim is time barred and the court makes no holding on the issue3 see eg lagrone v johnson 534 f2d 1360 1362 9th cir1976 powers v sims  levin 542 f2d 1216 1222 4th cir1976 what we do hold is that when rescission is attempted under circumstances which would deprive the lender of its legal due the attempted rescission will not be judicially enforced unless it is so conditioned that the lender will be assured of receiving its legal due rudisell v fifth third bank 622 f2d 243 254 6th cir1980 tila clearly does not require the debtor to tender first it contemplates the creditor tendering first but upon the creditor fulfilling its obligations under the statute the debtor then must tender since rescission is an equitable remedy the court may condition the return of monies to the debtor upon the return of property to the creditor citations omitted emphasis added fdic v dev co 938 f2d 889 890 8th cir1991 tila generally provides that the creditor shall perform first ie return monies paid by the debtor and release its security interest however the act gives courts discretion to devise other procedures 15 usc  1635b including conditioning rescissions upon the debtors prior return of the principal defendant also cites to luciano v weyerhaeuser mortg co 200 fedappx 628 630 9th cir2006 however that opinion is not citable in this context pursuant to ninth circuit rule 3634 the fac alleges that the tender demand requested an itemization of the loan disbursements the loan charges the current principal balance and all payments received  so that we may determine the exact amount needed for tender see fac  52 ex 7 and that because wachovia did not respond plaintiff was not able to tender the exact and definite amount even though the court chooses to assume on this motion that such information would not also be in the hands of a typical reasonable borrower there is still no allegation in the fac of any ability to tender any amount whatsoever5 the full relevant paragraph of the yamamoto opinion statesas rescission under  1635b is an ongoing process consisting of a number of steps there is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after deciding that rescission is warranted may not do so before deciding that rescission is warranted when it finds that assuming grounds for rescission exist rescission still could not be enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the borrowers rescission obligations no matter what such a decision lies within the courts equitable discretion taking into consideration all the circumstances including the nature of the violations and the borrowers ability to repay the proceeds if as was the case here it is clear from the evidence that the borrower lacks capacity to pay back what she has received less interest finance charges etc the court does not lack discretion to do before trial what it could do afteryamamoto 329 f3d at 11736 see also in re wepsic 231 br 768 776 sdcal 1998 the court finds that wepsics proposal of treating josephsons claim as unsecured and paying her over the course of three or more years cuts against the purpose of rescission which is to return both parties to the status quo ante quenzer v advanta mortgage corp usa 288 br 884 888 dkan2003 within the meaning of tila rescission does not mean an annulment that is definitively accomplished by unilateral pronouncement but rather a remedy that restores the status quo ante7 of course that does not mean that we limit ourselves to the provision in perfect isolation we must instead construe that provision with the statutory scheme in which it is embedded in re bce west lp 319 f3d at 11708the court notes that language in a great many cases appears garbled admittedly because cases speak of equitably conditioning the rescission even though what they really are talking about is equitably modifying the conditioned procedural order in which tila says a rescission will place see eg fdic v hughes development co inc 938 f2d 889 890 8th cir1991 but as previously discussed while not a model of clarity in some respects the statutory and regulatory language at issue do seem to state fairly clearly irrespective of whether or not a security interest is terminated before or after a tender that money received by borrowers shall be tendered back at some procedural point9 one allegation by plaintiff deserves a more detailed response in this regard first plaintiff makes a serious allegation that the promissory note and the deed of trust for the mortgage transaction listed different amounts see fac  21 stating the amount of the loan in the note dated february 21 2008 was 44000000 the amount secured by the deed of trust dated february 21 2008 was 55000000 see also fac  19 62 this might appear to rise to the level of fraudulence required for equitable tolling though it is unclear whether it would represent a tila violation still plaintiff calls this the most glaring tila violation of defendants october 5 opposition 615 even to the extent such a discrepancy would relate to a tila violation and even to the extent if so that it would not have been apparent at the consummation of the transaction hubbard 91 f3d at 79 plaintiff has attached the purported note exhibit 2 and the purported deed of trust exhibit 3 to her fac and these documents controvert the alleged facts in the fac a court may disregard allegations in the complaint if contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint see eg sumner peck ranch 823 fsupp at 720 the attached deed of trust in fact shows an original principal amount of us 44000000 plus accrued and deferred interest and such other amounts as stated in the note fac exhibit 3 deed of trust part 1d the note likewise is a promise to pay us 44000000 called principal plus interest and any other charges incurred during the course of the loan fac exhibit 2 page 1 the 55000000 referenced by the deed of trust is the maximum aggregate principal balance secured by this deed of trust which is 125 of the original principal note amount fac exhibit 3 deed of trust p 1 this is the analogue provision to paragraph 3f of the note which provides my unpaid principal balance can never exceed 125 of the principal i originally borrowed fac exhibit 2 p 3 paragraph 3f consequently even to the extent a plaintiff would not notice such a discrepancy at the time of consummation of the transaction the facs allegations thus contradicted do not give rise to the sort of fraud that might toll the limitations period10 plaintiff also cites nonbinding outofstate and outofcircuit authority in the fac rather than in her opposition for the proposition that the oneyear statute of limitations does not apply when tila claims are asserted as a defense to a nonjudicial foreclosure claim at least one district court in this circuit has recently reached the opposite conclusion see ortiz v accredited home lenders inc 639 fsupp2d 1159 116465 sdcal200911 there is no 15 usc  1692a6fiii and the court assumes generously to the plaintiff that she meant to make allegations relating to 15 usc  1692a6fiii12 defendant has asked the court to take judicial notice 1 of other cases that treated wachovia mortgage fsb as a federal savings bank regulated by the office of thrift supervision and subject to hola 2
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Butler’s Ineffective Assistance Claim We also granted a COA on Butler’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and raise: (1) Butler’s competence to stand trial, and (2) mitigation evidence regarding Butler’s mental state during the penalty phase of his capital trial. The district court rejected this claim as procedurally defaulted. See Butler, 576 F.Supp.2d at 828. The claim was not raised in Butler’s initial state habeas proceeding and, relying on then-current.precedent, the district court held that Butler could make no claim for ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel for failure to raise the ineffedive-assis-tance-of-trial-counsel claim. Id. at- 829-30 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (<HOLDING>) and Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 241

    ### Response:
    holding there is no constitutional right to an attorney much less an effective attorney in state postconviction proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    before the IJ with counsel, admitted the factual allegations contained in the NTA, and conceded removability. 2 . The petitioners do not raise any challenge in their brief to the BIA’s denial of protection under the CAT and have thus abandoned this claim. See Sepulveda v. United States Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (""When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned.”). 3 . Alvarez also filed an application for asylum, relying exclusively on the claims raised in Varan's application. 4 . Because the IJ found Varan to be credible, we accept the facts set forth in his asylum application and testimony as true for purposes of evaluating his asylum claim. See Niftaliev v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 504 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 5 . A “Molotov cocktail” is a small home-made

    ### Response:
    holding that where the ij finds the petitioner to be credible his testimony must be accepted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that is, if the District were seeking to apply'the cap to hours worked before the effective date of the statute, we might find the omission more compelling. But the District advances no such argument, and we join the Eighth Circuit in holding that retroactivity concerns are not implicated when the statute is applied to work performed after April 26, 1996, the date of passage of the PLRA. See Williams v. Brimeyer, 122 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir.1997). When it is applied to work performed after the effective date of the Act, the PLRA raises none of the retroactivity concerns that require the analysis used by the district court because the statute creates present and future effects on present and future conduct, and has no effect on past conduct. Compare Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1203 (<HOLDING>) with Williams, 122 F.3d at 1094 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that the plra did not apply to preact work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    $5,864. 7 The agreement also provides that if Dalmida has not paid the full contract price by July 15,2007, installments will increase to $3,450. (See Verified Compl., Exh. B at 1.) That clause is not triggered because Rasmussen sold the daycare center to a third party on April 14,2007. 8 Rasmussen seeks prejudgment interest on $41,800 from February 28, 2006 until entry of judgment. Granting that request, however, would result in a windfall for Rasmussen because she was not yet owed the full $47,000 at the time the contract was repudiated. Moreover, she mitigated her damages by selling the daycare center to a third party. Given these circumstances, Rasmussen’s calculation of prejudgment interest is inappropriate. See, e.g., Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). 9 From October 15, 2005 through February 15,

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court also properly considered whether prejudgment interest would amount to a windfall recovery
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy at issue failed to provide the coverage for “uninsured motor vehicles” mandated by law); Hall v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 588 Pa. 337, 342-343, 648 A.2d 755, 758 (1994) (finding that the trial court possessed the authority to review an arbitration award which was based upon a declaration that the te ein, 453 Pa.Super. 227, 683 A.2d 683, 685 (1996) (stating that the trial court lacked the authority to review a claim that policy provisions were contrary to a legislative mandate where the arbitrators’ award did not state that it found any provision con trary to statute and the appellant could not demonstrate the actual basis for the arbitrators’ decision); Nealy v. State Farm, Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 695 A.2d 790, 792 (Pa.Super.1997), appeal denied, 553 Pa. 690, 717 A.2d 1028 (1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 Appellee sought arbitration, in the

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitration award based on the conclusion that unappended waiver forms are unenforceable pursuant to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because as stated in schultz it is not based on an allegation that a specific provision in an insurance policy contravenes public policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    future persecution. Regarding petitioners’ third claim — that the BIA failed to adhere to one of its prior unpublished decisions — this apparent inconsistency is of no moment because unpublished opinions of the BIA have no precedential value. Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241, 245 (2d Cir.1994). The record before us indicates that petitioners have alleged no more than that they are part of the general population of ethnic Albanians and that some ethnic Albanian civilians have been mistreated in Macedonia. In ir.1991) (same) with de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1099-1100 (10th Cir.1994) (requiring that a “petitioner be given notice and an opportunity to rebut” facts of which the BIA has taken administrative notice) and Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). In the circumstances presented, we are

    ### Response:
    holding that the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires that petitioners be allowed an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts particularly when  those facts are crucial to  the outcome of the administrative proceeding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.Ct. 998. The clear rationale behind the state-created danger theory is that “when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Ame ed a triable issue of fact regarding whether a police officer’s act of stranding the female passenger of a drunk driver in a high crime area at 2:30 a.m., resulting in her being raped by a stranger, constituted affirmatively placing her in a position of danger); D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir.1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); and Brown v. Grabowski 922 F.2d 1097 (3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant school officials did not create the students danger or increase their risk of harm where female students were physically verbally and sexually molested by male students in a unisex bathroom and in a darkroom
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 287 requires proof that a false claim was made against the government, a fact that section 1001 does not require, because not every false statement to government officials comprises a claim against the government for money or services. Similarly, section 1001 requires proof of a false statement, a fact that section 287 does not require, because a false claim against the government can be made without making a false statement — such as by endorsing and cashing a check to which one is not entitled, see, e.g., United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881, 889 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied sub nom. Lacey v. United States, 393 U.S. 1029, 89 S.Ct. 639, 21 L.Ed.2d 573 (1969); Dimmick v. United States, 116 F. 825 (9th Cir.1902), cert. denied, 189 U.S. 509, 23 S.Ct. 850, 47 L.Ed. 923 (1903) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Lopez, 420 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that demand upon a bill already paid or unauthorized demand upon unpaid bill constitutes a false claim even though bill itself contains no false statement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Craddock to summary judgments ""under limited circumstances where a pro se nonmovant appeared in person but mistakenly did not respond in writing to a matter-of-law summary judgment motion.” 326 S.W.3d at 345. Thus, in analyzing whether the pro se litigant was entitled to a new trial based on the equitable principles established in Carpenter and Wheeler, the Court applied the Craddock test, including its second element inquiring whether the defendant established a meritorious defense. Id. at 346-47. However, the Texas Supreme Court subsequently clarified in Marino that Wheeler did not apply the Craddock test; rather, it applied the two-pronged test from Carpenter for determining whether a trial court should allow a late-filed summary judgment response. See Marino, 355 S.W.3d at 633 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we likewise apply the two-prong

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court may allow latefiled summary judgment response when party shows good cause and no undue prejudice citing wheeler
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that it accumulated dirt over a long period of time than it can support the opposite inference that the macaroni had just been dropped on the floor and was quickly contaminated by customers and carts traversing the aisle. In Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Arellano, 492 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), another spilled-macaroni ease, the court held that testimony that the dried macaroni noodles that caused the plaintiffs fall were “soiled, scattered and appeared as though other persons had passed through the area and had been run over presumably by another cart or carts” was no evidence of the length of time the macaroni noodles had been there. Id. at 728; see also H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Rodriguez, 441 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1969, no writ) (<HOLDING>); H.E. Butt Grocery Store v. Hamilton, 632

    ### Response:
    holding that testimony that the grape on which plaintiff slipped was squashed and muddy that the floor was dirty and that pieces of paper were strewn around nearby was no evidence that the grape had been on the floor long enough to charge the store with notice
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lewis's 1983, 1984, 1987, and 2008 petitions to the Naval Discharge Review Board, as well as his suits filed in the District of Columbia and Court of Federal Claims); Lewis v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. 772 (2011); Lewis v. United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 104 (1992); Lewis v. Sec’y of the Navy, No. 89-cv-1446, 1990 WL 454624 (D.D.C. June 29, 1990). 3 .Mr. Lewis attached six exhibits to his complaint — exhibits that his complaint and subsequent motion for summary judgment reference explicitly. See generally CompL, ECF No. 1. This Court may consider the contents of exhibits attached to a complaint without • converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Young Women's Christian Ass’n of the Nat’l Capital Area, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. of Canada, 158 F.R.D. 6, 7 (D.D.C.1994) (<HOLDING>)). 4 . The writ of error coram nobis is ""an

    ### Response:
    holding that where a complaint makes express reference to attachments that are central to the plaintiffs claims those documents may be considered on a motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (“Such balancing, however, is not required in the present case because of a jurisdictional limitation that is applicable in this case. Such limitation arises under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5)....”). The exclusion of personal injury tort claims from the purview of the bankruptcy court stems from Congressional recognition that such claimants stand in a different relationship with the bankruptcy debtor because they did not voluntarily enter into dealings with the debtor. Adams, 1996 WL 228567, *3. The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) is to prevent bankruptcy courts from trying personal injury tort actions. In the Matter of Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527, 532 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1986). The term “personal injury tort claim” is not expressly defined in Title 28 or Tit 18 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>) with Cohen, 107 B.R. at 455 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that a civil rights deprivation is a personal injury tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that this sentence runs concurrent [sic] with any other sentence(s) unless it is indicated on the Judgment Addendum that the sentence is to run cumulatively. We conclude that because there is no written cumulation order, there is nothing for this court to reform. Appellant has failed to show any error. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue. C. Is appellant’s punishment cruel and unusual? In his third issue, appellant contends his sentences were not proportional to the offenses committed, and thus violate his state and federal rights against cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant did not raise these complaints in the trial court, and thus has failed to preserve them for appellate review. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760, 768

    ### Response:
    holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    leap, then, for the judge to infer that the water on the rug had accumulated since the last sweep of the area at 10 p.m. Cases to which the briefs have referred do not involve spills of water onto the floors of retail store premises. There are numerous decisions from other jurisdictions, however, on which such an adverse inference has been drawn. See, e.g., Newman v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 100 A.D.2d 538, 538-539 (N.Y. 1984) (“[a] reasonable inference could be drawn that the puddle was formed by a slowly dripping overflow of melting ice from the troughs located under the freezer case, and that such a process would take sufficient time to accumulate so that the defendant could be charged with constructive notice”); Taylor v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 209 Va. 64, 66-67 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Contrast Hill v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding it is reasonable to infer that flaked ice spilled from watermelon display causing puddle on which plaintiff slipped and fell
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the most basic rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is the right of the accused to be present at every stage of his trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). In addition, the concept of a jury trial, fundamental to this country’s constitutional system of criminal justice, includes the idea that the jury conducts its deliberations under the supervision of a judge who instructs them on the relevant law. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14, 19 S.Ct. 580, 43 L.Ed. 873 (1899). One of the basic tenets of the right to a trial by jury, in turn, is that the defendant is entitled to be present when the jury receives instructions regarding the law. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 462, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Any outside source that influences the jury’s

    ### Response:
    holding that it was reversible error for the trial judge to engage in ex parte communications with the jury foreman which amounted to supplemental instructions to the jury without opportunity for counsel for the defense to clear up any confusion those supplemental instructions may have caused
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the officers made a show of authority and that a person in Defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave after McDaniel twice asked the boys if they had any knives or weapons. {17} The boys were approached at night on an empty street by two armed police officers whom they knew had been observing them prior to the encounter. See United States v. Sanchez, 89 F.3d 715, 718 (10th Cir.1996) (stating that the “threatening presence of several officers” and the “absence of other members of the public” are factors that could indicate that a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore an encounter with the police). The police officers did not ask to speak to the boys, but rather demanded that they approach. See Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 314 (D.C.Cir.1989) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part on other grounds by Green

    ### Response:
    holding police officers show of authority by announcing he was a police officer and ordering defendant to stop was an investigative seizure implicating fourth amendment protections
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more stringent regulations, only if the state law is (1) “necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard,” (2) is not “incompatible” with any federal laws, and (3) “does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.” Id. Although the express preemption clause in the FRSA speaks in terms of preemption of state law, and the plaintiffs action here is brought pursuant to FELA, a federal law, at least one court has held that in reconciling the two federal statutes, “the FRSA will supersede the FELA based on the policy embodied in the FRSA to ensure uniformity in law relating to railway safety.” Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pacific Ry. Co., 955 F.Supp. at 740 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20106); accord Waymire v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 218 F.3d 773, 776-777 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Thirkill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 950

    ### Response:
    holding that in order to uphold the frsas goal of uniformity the frsa supercedes fela where the trains speed and warning devices complied with the frsa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and assert claims based on their allegation that Defendant Dow was negligent or remiss in its advice on the hotline.” In addition, the district court’s ruling barring claims of inadequate warnings or instructions as preempted by FIFRA does not indicate that negligent testing is also preempted. In affirming the district court’s FIFRA rulings, the court of appeals recognized that “the district court did not determine that those claims [of negligent misrepresentation and negligent testing] were preempted by FI- FRA.” Goeb, 1999 WL 561956, at *7. We also affirm and hold that appellants’ claims of negligent misrepresentation and negligent testing are not preempted by FIFRA. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (preempting only requirements .as to labeling and packaging); Worm I, 970 F.2d at 1307 (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. 1 . The other insecticides were

    ### Response:
    holding that stateimposed standards of care relating to product design manufacture and testing do not qualify as labeling requirements and thus are not preempted by fifra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    such duty. Nevertheless since the rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a rule may be evidence of a breach of the applicable standard of conduct. (Emphasis added). Plaintiffs assert that the last sentence above mandates the admission of any rule of professional conduct claimed to have been violated by a defendant, and therefore, our standard of review is de novo. We previously have observed that “a [violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not prove negligence per se, ... but it may be used as some evidence of negligence.” Oberon Invs., N.V. v. Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, 492 So.2d 1113, 1114 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 512 So.2d 192 (Fla.1987). See also Pressley v. Farley, 579 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have failed to

    ### Response:
    holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    habeas corpus petition as well as petitions for relief from judgment filed pursuant to section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 2002)) and mandamus actions. The Second District holds that a trial court commits reversible error by dismissing a habeas corpus petition without giving defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to the trial court’s action and this court cannot look beyond this error to assess the merits of the petition. People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill. App. 3d 987, 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist. 2004); see also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill. App. 3d 191, 193-99, 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist. 2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill. 2d 549, 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill. App. 3d 292, 295-97, 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist. 2002) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App.

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2  1401 petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    no cognizable constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005). Turning to the remaining claims, we review the rejection of Yuman’s withholding of removal and CAT claim and Yocari’s asylum claim under the substantial evidence standard, and must affirm even.if it is possible to draw differing conclusions from the evidence. Pedro-Mateo v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 1147,1150 (9th Cir.2000). In light of the detailed country reports in the record below, we conclude substantial evidence supported the rejection of those claims on the grounds that changed country conditions in Guatemala rebutted any claims of potential future persecution. Cf. I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that there was contrary evidence

    ### Response:
    recognizing the improved conditions in postcivil war guatemala
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The ‘Mark of Cain,’ a term derived from the Book of Genesis, continues to this day to be a term which strikes fear into the hearts of all but the most reclusive members of any community. As previously referenced, the social stigma attached to any form of branding, whether for criminal offense, moral indiscretion, religious belief, or the mere fact of being different, has historically been a lifelong albatross around the necks of those so branded. However, in generation after generation, the majority in society has found ample justification for continuing such practices. Some of those courts which have found registration acts not to be punitive have recognized that “registration has traditionally been viewed as punitive.” Noble, 829 P.2d at 1222. See also Austin, supra, and Kurth, supra (<HOLDING>). Likewise, in view of the particular public

    ### Response:
    recognizing the importance of historical analysis in determining whether legislation is punitive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the kind of purposeful distribution of goods that the Kopke court concluded supported a finding of sufficient minimum contacts.” Taylor, 181 Md.App. at 385, 956 A.2d at 767. In Kopke, a Wisconsin truck driver was injured when a pallet loaded with paper fell on him while he was unloading an ocean-going container that allegedly had been negligently packed by an Italian loading company. 629 N.W.2d at 666-67. In contrast to the Kopke court, we do not consider cargo “introduced into the stream of commerce with rom “ ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or [from] the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’ ” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d at 542 (citations omitted); see also Bond, 391 Md. at 731, 895 A.2d at 1005 (<HOLDING>). We shall analyze all of CSR’s contacts with

    ### Response:
    holding that a maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ohio lawyer when a maryland client initiated five of seven contacts with the lawyer the parties created the attorneyclient relationship in ohio and the attorneyclient relationship involved only events in and the law of ohio
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    because the provision addresses admissibility in slightly different language than the provision at issue (using “any trial, civil or criminal” instead of simply “any trial”). The majority interprets the modifier “civil or criminal” as indicating that crash reports must be excluded from literally “any trial,” whereas the omission of that modifier from the traffic citation provision indicates that citations need only be excluded from traffic-related trials. The majority claims that to conclude otherwise would be “to imply this missing language where the Legislature has obviously intended that it be omitted.” Majority op. at 447. I disagree that such a conclusion necessarily follows. One need not imply missing language to interpret es v. Perry, 702 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. State Dep’t of Highway Safety &

    ### Response:
    holding that the corbin case is controlling and therefore the crash report statute must also be applied to administrative proceedings
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasonable suspicion on its own. Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. See, eg., State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987); State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, ¶ 15 n. 8, 68 P.3d 1043; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 481, 436 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (""In the absence of other, objective facts, we decline to give much weight to an officer's assessment of 'nervousness' due to the subjectivity of that determination.""). Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway. See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (""[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...""); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Criminal history alone is also ""insufficient

    ### Response:
    holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (approving of an expert report’s explanation of the breach of the standard of care, for prescribing Risperdal because its use for treating dementia had not been approved by the FDA and concluding that a “reasonable physician should not, as a general proposition, prescribe the wrong drug for his patients”); Puempel v. Lopez, No. 05-07-00371-CV, 2007 WL 3173405, at *3-4 (Tex.App.-Dallas Oct.31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming the use of FDA and PDR guidelines to define the standard of care for prescribing weight loss medication); Metot v. Danielson, 780 S.W.2d 283, 286-87 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds by Cecil v. Smith, 790 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990) (op. on reh’g), rev’d, 804 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Haberer’s report indicates that he

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it decided that a boardcertified doctor was not qualified to testify about a neurosurgeons general minimum standards for the prescription of drugs that are applicable to all physicians
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as well as an action “that does not seek damages directly attributable to conviction or confinement but whose successful prosecution would necessarily imply that the plaintiffs criminal conviction was wrongful.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Poventud’s claim does both: [i] he seeks damages directly attributable to his confinement, and [ii] success on his claim would necessarily imply that his conviction (by guilt damages for torture [would] in no way undercut ] the second, and only existing, conviction and hence [would]. in no way [be] barred by Heck,” Maj. Op. at 65. That is because a claim for torture damages would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the defendant’s conviction. Cf. Jackson v. Suffolk Cnty. Homicide Bureau, 135 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). However, what the defendant categorically may

    ### Response:
    holding that heck did not bar fifth amendment claim for excessive force because a finding that excessive force had in fact been used would not necessarily require invalidation of the conviction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to leave either a copy of the warrant or a receipt for the items taken did not render the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not mention notice, and the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution does not categorically proscribe covert entries, which necessarily involve a delay in notice. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247-48, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). And, insofar as the August search satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., it was conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, we perceive no basis for concluding that the 45-day delay in notice rendered the search unconstitutional. See United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453-55 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    constitutionality of government regulations limiting commercial speech: At the outset, we must determine [1] whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (Enumeration added). 1. Protected Expression The parties agree that the speech at issue is neither illegal nor misleading under the fir Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As the Supreme Court has noted: “The State’s

    ### Response:
    holding that governments asserted interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees is substantial under central hudson
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    did not adequately discuss the reasons for denying Tarrell and Jarman qualified immunity. See Mem. of Clarification at 2 (Oct. 7, 2002). II. We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. McCaslin v. Wilkins, 183 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir.1999). In so doing, we consider whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the facts alleged show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Seiner v. Drenon, 304 F.3d 810, 812 (8th Cir.2002). In this case, if Hernandez’s allegations fail to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, Jarman and Tarrell will be entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (<HOLDING>). We analyze Hernandez’s claims that the

    ### Response:
    holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Id. at 2336-37 (footnote omitted). The limitation on Congress to legislatively supersede the Bill of Rights has its counterpart in the limitation on a state legislature to legislatively supersede the Bill of Rights or its own state constitution. In this case, Minnesota’s relevant constitutional guarantee against improper stops and seizures is in the Minnesota Constitution, Article 1, Section 10. Minn.Stat. § 168.0422 is a statute authorizing a “mark” or a “brand” to be placed on a citizen’s vehicle license plate. That mark labels that vehicle’s driver as one who can be stopped, not for articulable suspicion of criminal activities, but rather because of the “mark.” That is impermissible. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (<HOLDING>). You might as well make the mark a pink

    ### Response:
    recognizing investigatory stop must be justified by objective manifestation that person stopped is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sentencing should be held harmless so long as the evidence for the trial judge’s factual findings is overwhelming and no reasonable jury could have disagreed with them.” Morgan, 384. F.3d at 8 (citing Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000)). That is, if the evidence overwhelmingly proves the factual basis underlying the sentence enhancement; we will find no plain error for the judge’s failure to submit the facts to a jury. We simply fail to see how a judicial finding for sentence enhancement, explicitly sanctioned by the Sentencing Guidelines; and overwhelmingly proved at trial, would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings., See. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)(<HOLDING>). Here, the judge’s findings — that Stokes used

    ### Response:
    holding that the district courts faib ure to submit the issue of materiality to the jury was not an error that seriously affected the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings because the evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted at trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. Alfonso Jenkins petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. This Court ordered Jenkins to show cause why he should not be prohibited from filing successive pro se motions in this Court. See Carter v. State, 1 So.3d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). After considering Jenkins’ response to this

    ### Response:
    holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adopt today. Congress has often explicitly included a required mental state in other hoax statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 35(b) (requiring that a false bomb threat on an airplane be made “willfully and maliciously, or with reckless disregard for the safety of human life”); 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (requiring that a hoax about a “fire or an explosive” be made “willfully” or “maliciously”). Instead of including these specific terms of art in § 1038(a), Congress crafted this statute using the language “under circumstances where” and “may reasonably be believed.” 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1). This is a noticeable difference, and we have read statutes with language similar to § 1038(a)(1) as containing an objective reasonableness standard. See Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that the crime of knowingly and willfully threatening the president required only that the threat be made under circumstances where a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake duress or coercion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    otherwise have little incentive to do so. See H.R.Rep. No. 99-660, at 22 (1986) (“The purpose of the qui ta/m provisions of the False Claims Act is to encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud being perpetrated against the Government to bring such information forward.”); S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5279 (stating that the False Claims Act “reward[s] those private individuals who take significant personal risks to bring such wrongdoing to light”); id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5271 (“The Committee believes changes are necessary to halt the so-called ‘conspiracy of silence’ that has allowed fraud against the Government to flourish.”); United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). These purposes are accomplished by giving the

    ### Response:
    holding that the public disclosure limitation discourages persons with relevant information from remaining silent and encourages them to report such information at the earliest possible time
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Trade Risk Guaranty, Inc., the company that issues ICP its customs bonds. See Conf. R. Annex A, Exs. 3, 4. While these affidavits are not relevant to the instant motion, they may be relevant to the underlying action. 11 Plaintiff makes several other arguments concerning injury it claims will be suffered, in the absence of an injunction, by (1) a related company’s manufacturing plant, see Raybuck Decl. ¶ .1 at 1, and (2) an unrelated purchaser of its merchandise, see id. ¶ 26 at 10. Because neither of these corporate entities is a party to this action, these arguments cannot be heard as proof of the irreparable harm facing ICP. See Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 754, 760, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1331 (1999), rev’d on other grounds, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). 12 ICP claims that Just on the entries of

    ### Response:
    holding that a party cannot demonstrate the presence or absence of irreparable harm based on the potential financial abilities of a nonparty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Texas Supreme Court has carved out an exception to this general rule. When the case has been dismissed for want of prosecution, there is no presumption that the dismissal order also disposed of issues in an independent cross-action or counterclaim. See Id. (citing Davis v. McCray Refrigerator Sales Corp., 136 Tex. 296, 150 S.W.2d 377 (1941)); Dardari v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 961 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Macarangal, 838 S.W.2d at 634; Massey v. Davis, 660 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1988, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Here, the dismissal order made no specific mention or reference to Darr’s counterclaim; therefore, his counterclaim was not dismissed and the judgment is interlocutory from which no appeal will lie. See Davis, 150 S.W.2d at 378 (<HOLDING>). An exception to the rule stated in Davis

    ### Response:
    holding that where the trial court dismisses the plaintiffs suit but does not refer to or mention the defendants crossaction the judgment does not dispose of the crossaction either expressly or by implication and there is no final judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that members of the Marine Corps ""promise[d] that Sgt. Eugene was no longer a threat to our family ... [and] [h]e was supposed to be detained and monitored at Henderson Hall/ Fort Myers and would not be able to leave to Barracks unaccompanied.” (ECF No. 1, at 2). Pro se complaints must be construed liberally, and it is no leap of logic to conclude that such allegations support a claim for failure to protect. 11 . The Fourth Circuit has called this exception ""[t]he most important” exception to the FTCA. McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 335 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc). 12 . Courts have found other situations beyond those noted in Berkovitz wherein an agent has ""no rightful option but to adhere.” See, e.g., Downs v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 333 Fed. Appx. 403, 409 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 172

    ### Response:
    holding that governments assumption of obligations in binding contract rendered discretionary function exception inapplicable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    184 (1988). The fact that a new version of the Open Meeting Law took effect on July 1, 2010—see St. 2009, c. 28, §20—does not affect the mootness calculation in this case. The statutory exception allowing public bodies to meet privately to discuss litigation strategy has not substantively changed. Compare G.L.c. 30A, §21{a)(3) (effective July 1, 2010) with G.L.c. 39, §23B(3) (in effect prior to July 1, 2010). Since this case raises an issue of ongoing public importance that is “capable of repetition in a manner that might again evade review,” Plaintiffs are entitled to have the Court resolve their claims even though the parties’ dispute over the Board’s discussions of the prior HDC litigation is now moot. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commissioner of Education, 439 Mass. 124, 127 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Although a declaratory judgment may only be

    ### Response:
    holding that superior court judge prudently permitted controversy regarding scope of public records statute to proceed and properly decided matter on cross motions for summary judgment even though lawsuit became moot when defendant released all records sought by plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    916 S.W.2d 685, 692 (Tex.App.-Waco 1996, writ denied); HBA East, Ltd. v. JEA Boxing Co., 796 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ). An exception exists when the claims against debtor and non-debtor parties are “inextricably intertwined.” See Carway v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 183 B.R. 769, 775 (S.D.Tex.1995) (citing A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001 (4th Cir.1986)); Federal Life Ins. Co. (Mut.) v. First Fin. of Tex., Inc., 3 B.R. 375, 376-77 (S.D.Tex.1980). The dismissal of a defendant/debt- or from a lawsuit does not violate the bankruptcy stay. See Orion Inv., Inc. v. Dunaway & Assocs., Inc., 760 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Weaver v. Jock, 717 S.W.2d 654, 658

    ### Response:
    holding nonsuit does not violate bankruptcy stay because it is a termination of the case against the debtor
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    processing of the appeal is a fact issue for determination in the trial court, and in making that determination the trial court exercises a broad legal discretion [that] is subject to appellate scrutiny only for abuse.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 7 See Propst, 288 Ga. at 863. 8 Crenshaw v. Ga. Underwriting Ass’n, 202 Ga. App. 610, 611 (1) (414 SE2d 915) (1992). 9 As we have previously noted, a delay in paying costs of more than 30 days is prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable; however, this is a rebuttable inference. See, e.g., Morrell v. W. Servs., LLC, 291 Ga. App. 369, 372 (1) (662 SE2d 215) (2008); McCorvey Dev., Inc. v. D.G. Jenkins Dev. Corp., 260 Ga. App. 276, 277 (581 SE2d 308) (2003); see also Langdale Co. v. Langdale, 295 Ga. App. 372, 374 (671 SE2d 863) (2008) (<HOLDING>); Dye v. U. S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 273 Ga. App.

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that a partys delay in paying costs was caused by a miscommunication was not sufficient to rebut inference
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    focused on two questions: whether the definition of “person” from section § 5-13-210 includes an [14unborn person and whether sufficient evidence supports the verdict. At no point did appellant, the State, or amici analyze whether “otherwise introduced” excludes a passive bodily function. Nor did appellant raise at trial the argument that “otherwise introduced” could not include a passive transfer through the umbilical cord post-delivery. Instead, she limited her argument concerning post-delivery transfer to the insufficiency of the evidence. We have re.peatedly held that we will not address an issue not raised and ruled on by the trial court and to otherwise would be to issue an advisory opinion, which we will-not do! See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 314 Ark. 471, 863 S.W.2d 305 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Rather than ruling on an undeveloped issue, I

    ### Response:
    holding the constitutional issue was not preserved and thus declining to issue an advisory opinion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CIT at —, 123 F.Supp.2d at 1371. Under the second interpretation, tied to the slightly more flexible “impede” or “avert” definition of “prevent,” an agreement would have to effectively counteract — without necessarily eliminating — price suppression. Id. The Court finds that Commerce’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable because it is in accord with the interpretation tied to the latter definition of “prevent,” and because, contrary to U.S. Steel’s suggestions, this interpretation creates a reviewable standard. How much price suppression is “significant” may be determined on a case-by-case basis. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); see also Fabrique De Fer De Charleroi S.A. v. United States, slip op. 01-82, at 21 (CIT July 3, 2001) (<HOLDING>). And any conclusion that an agreement prevents

    ### Response:
    holding that commerce may reach a determination after examining the particular circumstances of the case without formally promulgating an allinclusive standard
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff or Defendants object. C. Estoppel In their Opposition, Defendants Tokuda and Shen argue that Plaintiff cannot pursue its claims because of the doctrine of estoppel. As Tokuda and Shen explain, the doctrine of estoppel has four elements: “(1) The party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” Skulnick v. Roberts Express, Inc., 2 Cal.App.4th 884, 890, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 (1992). The reliance must be reasonable. Martinez v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 83 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1238, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Tokuda and Shen argue that Plaintiff is

    ### Response:
    holding that ejstoppel requires among other things reasonable reliance on the other partys actions and rejecting estoppel where plaintiffs could not reasonably have been misled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    relationship of self-insured/claims-handling-agent also imposed contractual duties on Zurich to properly handle and pay claims within the deductible. Because we have rejected Methodist’s contention regarding the parties’ relationship, we also reject this suggestion. Moreover, regardless of how the parties’ relationship is characterized, like the Dud-dlesten court, we must consider the terms of their contract when evaluating the con-traetual duties owed by Zurich to Methodist and enforce it as written. See Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex.2006) (stating court’s primary concern when interpreting contract is to ascertain and give effect to intent of parties as expressed in the contract); Royal Indem. Co. v. Marshall, 388 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI

    ### Response:
    recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We also agree with the BAP that the notice of removal was frivolous. The debt- or represented in its bankruptcy schedules that it had no assets, the state court proceedings were stayed against the debtor, and the trustee of the debtor’s estate gave no indication that the state court action might otherwise affect the estate. Scott never articulated a plausible argument why the bankruptcy court could have had jurisdiction over the state proceedings in spite of those circumstances. It was therefore not an abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy court to find Scott’s notice of removal frivolous and filed in bad faith to delay the state court proceedings, thereby warranting the imposition of sanctions. See Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib., 606 F.3d 1216, 1221-22 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Silberkraus, 336 F.3d 864, 871 (9th

    ### Response:
    holding that an attorneys misrepresentations and manipulative tactics unnecessarily protracting the proceedings warranted the imposition of sanctions under the courts inherent power
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    officials through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, thereby rendering our state exclusionary rule superfluous after nearly four decades of independent application). This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394, 58 L. Ed. at 656, 34 S. Ct. at 345 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under ""legislative *** sanction”)), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979) (<HOLDING>)). Consequently, to adopt Krull’s extended

    ### Response:
    recognizing a substantiveprocedural distinction not at issue here specifically holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not apply where an ordinance was held unconstitutional on vagueness grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    official. Kroll v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir.1991). The Eleventh Amendment provides that, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const, amend. XI. Under the Eleventh Amendment, each state remains a sovereign entity and may not be sued by any individual without that state’s consent. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Federal district courts lack original subject matter jurisdiction over claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment bars

    ### Response:
    holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of [law,] [deprives] ... any citizen ... of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” In reviewing claims brought under this statute, we use the framework established in McDonnell Douglas. Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71 F.3d 801, 805-06 (11th Cir.1995). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The plaintiff may meet his burden using direct or circumstantial evidence. See Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir.2000) (outlining the types of evidence used to prove a Title VII claim); Richardson, 71 F.3d at 805 (<HOLDING>). Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that the same types of evidence used to prove a title vii claim also may be used to prove a  1983 claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    make an arrest for child abuse in order to remove a child from a potentially hazardous situation, and in this case, the child was removed from the apartment and placed in CYFD custody. Because the facts before Officer O’Brien at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest do not satisfy the elements of child abuse under N.M.S.A. § 30-6-1, the Court finds that Officer O’Brien arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. Finally, the Court notes that Defendants argue that the question of whether Officer O’Brien had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff is a factual question for the jury. The Court disagrees. Probable cause for arrest is a proper issue for the jury “when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Keylon, 535 F.3d at 1215 (citing Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1028 (10th Cir.2007)) (<HOLDING>). Since the Court has determined that there are

    ### Response:
    holding that bjecause there were no issues of genuine fact  the district court erred in denying ms keylons motion for judgment as a matter of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disparate work assignment or pay rates between similarly situated employee groups"" a continuing violation exists); Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1986) (""The policy of paying lower wages ... on each payday constitutes a 'continuing violation.' ”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Miller v. Beneficial Management Corp., 977 F.2d 834, 843-44 (3d Cir.1992) (applying continuing violations doctrine to unequal pay claim under Equal Pay Act); Satz v. ITT Fin. Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 743 (8th Cir.1980) (""The practice of paying discriminatorily unequal pay occurs not only when an employer sets pay levels, but as long as the discriminatory differential continues.”). But cf. Hendrix v. City of Yazoo, 911 F.2d 1102, 1103-05 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The result in Lorance was also based in

    ### Response:
    holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To establish eligibility for asylum, Kruja was required to demonstrate either a well-founded fear of future persecution in Albania or past persecution giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of such a well-founded fear. See Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2003). Lack of eligibility for asylum would automatically mean that Kruja was not entitled to withholding. See id. To establish eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture, Kruja was required to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured on her return to Albania. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). We evidence that she is likely to be tortured in Albania, and the background materials alone do not compel a conclusion that torture is more likely than not. Cf. Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 184-85 (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for

    ### Response:
    holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    which exceeded 13 months, are at issue. Hurtado also filed two letters of supplemental authority pursuant to Fed. R.App.P. 28(j). In the first letter, Hurtado cites to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and argues that the district court erred by applying the guidelines in a mandatory fashion. In the second letter, Hurtado cites to Shepard v. United States, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), and argues that the district court erred under Shepard in determining facts “about a prior conviction,” as opposed to a “fact of a prior conviction.” We review a defendant’s preserved constitutional challenges to his sentence de novo but will reverse and remand only for harmful error. See United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We further explained in Paz as follows: A

    ### Response:
    holding that this court reviews a booker issue de novo where the defendant objected in the district court to sentence enhancements based on facts not found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on September 18, 2009. We rejected Liu’s petition for review as untimely in a December 22, 2008 order. The BIA denied Liu’s motion to reconsider in its November 4th Order, finding that Liu offered no new or previously unavailable evidence, and that Liu had failed to demonstrate an error of fact or law in the BIA’s August 20th Order. Liu petitions us for review of that denial. II. ANALYSIS In his petition, Liu asks us to review the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen as well as its denial of his motion to reconsider. The Government contends that Liu improperly seeks collateral review of the BIA’s August 20th Order. We agree that a party may not collaterally attack a BIA ruling in a petition for review of a motion to reconsider. See Guevara v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We also agree that Liu wrongly asks us to

    ### Response:
    holding that dhss motion to reconsider was a collateral attack on a bia order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinion. Id. at 491, 106 S.Ct. 1292. It is clear in this Circuit that a single unconstitutional act by a local governmental entity's final policymaker can subject that governmental entity to liability under Section 1983. See Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d at 586. 164 . See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (“If the decision to adopt that particular course of action is properly made by that government's authorized decision-makers, it surely represents an act of official government 'policy' as that term is commonly understood. More importantly, where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.)” Accord Brooks v. George County, Mississippi, 84 F.3d at 165 (<HOLDING>). 165 . See McMillian v. Monroe County,

    ### Response:
    holding that a single decision by a final policymaker within the area of his responsibility can impose liability on the responsible governmental entity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    domiciled . . . outside of this state as of the date of perfection of service of process as provided by Code Section 9-10-94. OCGA § 9-10-90. Because the long arm statute defines “nonresident” in the disjunctive, “either a change in residence or change in domicile would suffice to make a person a nonresident.” Cooper v. Edwards, 235 Ga. App. 48, 50 (508 SE2d 708) (1998). And while “a concurrence of actual residence and intent to remain is necessary to acquire a domicile,” the same is not true to establish residence. Id. Indeed, “a person may have several residences which are not necessarily permanent or in the same locale as the domicile.” Id. Thus, regardless of whether Thornburg’s domicile remains in Georgia, she has been an Arizona resident since early October 2010. See id. at 49-50 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Thornburg is a nonresident

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who was incarcerated in south carolina was a resident of that state regardless of whether his domicile remained in georgia and was therefore a nonresident within the meaning of the long arm statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    person acting under oath of office will not do anything contrary to his or her official duty.’ ” Hou v. Walker, No. CV 96 1365, 1996 WL 684442, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1996) (quoting People v. Bicet, 180 A.D.2d 692, 580 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (1992)); see also Clervil v. McNeil, No. 08-20144-CIV, 2008 WL 4753575, at *12 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 28, 2008) (citing Hou, 1996 WL 684442, at *3). In any event, this court believes that, even without this supporting authority, a presumption of propriety should accompany a court interpreter in the performance of his or her official duties. The law recognizes many presumptions that place the onus to adduce rebuttal evidence on the party attacking the presumption. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (<HOLDING>); AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of

    ### Response:
    recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Each time, Defendant massaged her breasts. The last time Stephanie went to see Defendant, she had just given birth and she was not producing breast milk. Defendant had told Stephanie’s mother that he could help the problem by massaging an area under Stephanie’s arm. When Stephanie came in, Defendant had her undress and remove her bra. Then, without explaining why he was doing so, he proceeded to massage her full breast, pinching her nipples the way a baby would suckle them. This made Stephanie feel very uncomfortable. Defendant then told Stephanie that when his wife was pregnant, he would suckle her breasts to try to bring in her milk. He offered to suck on Stephanie’s breasts for the same reason. Stephanie immediately ended the session. She never returned to 626, 633 (Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). The question of whether a massage therapist

    ### Response:
    holding that livein babysitter was in position of au thority over child
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    core judicial functions, upon persons other than article VIII judges. III. DE FACTO AUTHORITY However, because the circuit court to which the commissioner was assigned had jurisdiction to decide this matter, we must address Commissioner Peuler’s authority to hear this case as a “judge de facto” of the third circuit court. A judge de facto is defined as: One who holds and exercises the office of a judge under color of lawful authority and by a title valid on its face, though he has not full right to the office, as where he was appointed under an unconstitutional statute, or by an usurper of the appointing power, or has not taken the oath of office. Black’s Law Dictionary 841 (6th ed. 1990); see also State ex rel. Farmer v. Edmonds Mun. Court, 27 Wash.App. 762, 621 P.2d 171, 175 (1980) (<HOLDING>); accord O’Neill v. O’Neill, 420 So.2d 261, 263

    ### Response:
    holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court concluded: Id. Other courts that have considered this issue are in accord. See, e.g., Redner’s Markets, Inc. v. Joppatowne G.P. Ltd. P’ship, No. RDB-11-1864, 2013 WL 5274356, at *7 (D.Md. Sept. 17, 2013); Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal.1986), rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.1987) (“Courts have distilled various grounds for reconsideration of prior rulings into three major grounds justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”); Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1241 (D.Del.1990); Shields v. Shetler, 120 F.R.D. 123, 125-26 (D.Colo.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 969

    ### Response:
    recognizing the three customary reasons for granting a motion for reconsideration providing they are of a strongly convincing nature and observing that a motion for reconsideration is not a license for a losing partys attorney to get a second bite at the apple
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 208 provides that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States.” The plain meaning of the statute is clear: a court may look to Chapter 1 of the FAA in determining whether to confirm an arbitral award so long as it does not conflict with the Convention and its implementing legislation, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201- 208. While not explicitly on point with this issue, the court in Industrial Risk Insurers held that grounds not enumerated in the Convention do not provide valid cause to vacate an award; namely, that an award cannot be vacated under the Convention on the ground that it is “arbitrary and capricious.” Indus. Risk Ins., 141 F.3d at 1443 (<HOLDING>). The court found that because the Convention

    ### Response:
    holding that arbitrary and capricious ground for vacatur recognized along with the four grounds for vacatur specified in chapter 1 of the faa could not be used to vacate award under the convention
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    F.Supp.2d 634 (E.D.Va.2007) (Hudson, J.); Walker v. Johnson, 448 F.Supp.2d 719 (E.D.Va.2006) (Hilton, J.). These decisions also influence the third factor, because they damage plaintiffs ability to “show[ ] a significant possibility of success on the merits.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 584, 126 S.Ct. 2096. Moreover, the pleadings filed by plaintiff provide minimal support for his assertions that the DOC’s protocol is not substantially similar to Kentucky’s procedure or that his execution will be carried out in a cruel and unusual fashion. Nor does the fact that the same or similar issues are pending before the Fourth Circuit increase the likelihood of irreparable harm, or likelihood of success, in the matter pending before this Court. See Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635, 641 n. 4 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Court must consider the

    ### Response:
    holding that in the context of a challenge to a states lethal injection protocol the mere possibility of a trial date in another case involving similar issues does not affect the balancing of the equities in this case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Court of Appeals decided Vetter, Congress passed § 3663A. Section 3663A makes restitution mandatory in this case “[njotwithstanding any other provision of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2000) (emphasis added). Thus, even if 11 U.S.C. § 727 purported to discharge Defendant’s debt to U.S. Bank and the exception in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) did not apply, Defendant would still be liable for restitution under § 3663A. See, e.g., Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (“[I]n construing statutes, the use of such a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any other section.”); see also United States v. Hyde, 497 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041,

    ### Response:
    holding that another notwithstanding clause in the mvra overrode apparently contrary state law and federal bankruptcy law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was inconsistent and incomplete. While some of the discrepancies in petitioner’s testimony appear relatively minor, we afford “ ‘particular deference’ ” in applying the substantial evidence standard when a factual challenge pertains to a credibility finding made by an IJ and adopted by the BIA. Zhou Yun Zhang v. United States, 386 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 386 (2d Cir.1997)). At the very least, petitioner’s testimony, coupled with petitioner’s wife’s rebuttal affidavit, did not establish the type of consistent, complete, and plausible explanation necessary for overcoming the IJ’s finding with regard to the fabricated documents — a finding that, as discussed above, is supported by substantial evidence. See In re O-D-, 211. & N. Dec. at 1084 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Petitioner asserts (as he did before

    ### Response:
    holding that the remaining inconsistent record presented by the respondent is insufficient to overcome the pall cast on the respondents credibility by virtue of his submission of the counterfeit document
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out,"" id. at 989; (2) whether ""the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative,"" id.; (8) whether ""the trial judge has observed 'facts,' such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts,"" id.; and (4) whether there are policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to district courts, such as when substantial constitutional rights are implicated, see id. at 988-39 (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶¶

    ### Response:
    recognizing the interest of having uniform legal rules regarding consent to search given the substantial fourth amendment interests lost as a result of such consents as a policy reason opposing a grant of discretion to the district court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Defendants contend that the relief Grier seeks would necessarily implicate or undermine the validity of his criminal convictions. Previously, several appellate courts were split as to whether a § 1983 claim to compel state officials to release evidence for postconviction DNA testing is a claim seeking to undermine a plaintiffs conviction. Compare Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 377 (4th

    ### Response:
    holding that no  1983 claim exists for injunctive relief to compel dna testing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as to Plaintiffs NYHRL Claims Is Also Denied N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1) provides in relevant part that: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer ..., because of the ... race, ... color, ... [or] sex ... of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” New York state courts require the same standard of proof for claims brought under NYHRL as those brought under Title VII, so Title VII and NYHRL claims can be analyzed in tandem. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d at 765; Arias, 2003 WL 354978, at *7; see also, Perks v. Town of Huntington, 251 F.Supp.2d 1143, 1158-1159 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>). I thus adopt the above analysis to plaintiffs

    ### Response:
    recognizing disagreement among district courts in the second circuit as to whether the standard for vicarious liability is the same under title vii and the nyhrl but interpreting second circuit law including quinn to indicate that nyhrl claims should be analyzed under the framework of title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sovereignty, including immunity from suit, simply by adopting Article I of the Constitution. Id. The Court concluded that immunity “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Id. at 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240. {25} Based on Alden, this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 1, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d 876, found that New Mexico’s constitutional sovereign immunity shielded the state from private FLSA suits brought in state court. We held that New Mexico did not waive its sovereign immunity in regard to the congressionally created remedies found in the FLSA, as the FLSA was created pursu ant to Congress’ Article I powers. Id. ¶¶ 14-15; see also Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, ¶ 49, 135 N.M. 472, 90 P.3d 491 (<HOLDING>). {26} The question in this case, however,

    ### Response:
    holding a claim for injunction but not money damages against a state officer for a violation of the age discrimination in employment act enacted under article i section 8 of the united states constitution was not barred by sovereign immunity under the ex parte young exception
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    court granted her adoption petition. KG.S. attaches to her motion to dismiss a proposed order granting KG.S.’s adoption petition; that order is not signed by Druhan, and there is no indication that that order was actually entered. On November 10, 2015, Druhan also filed a motion to dismiss KR.’s mandamus petition. Druhan states that he denied KR.’s motion contesting KG.S.’s adoption petition on October 28, 2015. As a result, Druhan argues, KR.’s petition before this Court is moot. Druhan states that, “save for this Court’s stay,” he would have entered the proposed order submitted by KG.S. Standard of Review “A petition for the writ of mandamus is the usual method by which to seek review of a trial judge’s denial of a recusal motion. See Ex parte Crawford, 686 So.2d 196, 198 (Ala.1996) (<HOLDING>). ‘A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary

    ### Response:
    holding that a trial judges denial of a recusal motion can be challenged on appeal or in a petition for a writ of mandamus
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intentionally providing false information on an application form. Ill We conclude that it was arbitrary and capricious to deny Singleton a hearing at which he could offer evidence that he did not understand the phrase “administrative action” to include a court-ordered revocation of his driver’s license. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the NTSB’s summary judgment order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Although Hart itself interpreted a regulation related to fraudulent or intentionally false entries in logbooks, the FAA and the Board adopted its requirements for purposes of § 67.403(a)(1) as well. See Dillmon, op. at 1093. 2 . See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Board Opinion at 6 (noting that the NTSB has

    ### Response:
    holding that under the federal rules of civil procedure summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine that is if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    $200.01. DISCUSSION Whether a plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex.2010). Although both Allen and the Appellees agree that the district court has jurisdiction over Allen’s claim, we must determine the issue because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement. Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex.1975); Walls Regional Hosp. v. Altaras, 903 S.W.2d 36, 40-41 (Tex.App.Waco 1994, no writ). Until 1985, both the Texas Constitution and the civil statu 97077 at *2, (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 28, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “minimum amount needed to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court is $500”) and (<HOLDING>), and Le Clair v. Wood, No. 10-04-00232-CV,

    ### Response:
    holding minimum amount in controversy required for district court jurisdiction is 20001
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    service, program or activity is a public entity. Civic Ass’n of the Deaf of New York City v. Giuliani, 915 F.Supp. 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (internal citations omitted). NY-CHA does not dispute, that it is a “public entity” within the meaning'of the statute. Because the standards for discrimination against the disabled are interpreted similarly in the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and FHAA, Plaintiffs’ Disability Rights Statutes claims can be analyzed together. See Toyota Motor Manuf., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193-94, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that Congress relied on Rehabilitation Act standards in drafting the FHAA); Lincoln Cercpac v. Health and Hosp. Corp., 977 F.Supp. 274, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12133 (West 1995)

    ### Response:
    holding that the requirements for establishing a rehabilitation act violation are similar to those for establishing an ada violation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in Spanish. While we do not have a record of appellant’s Spanish statements, we assume that had appellant's Spanish statements risen to the level of criminal contempt, the district court would have stopped appellant, had her comments translated for the record, and made a contempt finding. In the absence of such action by the district court, we assume that appellant said nothing which rose to the level of criminal contempt. 6 . Because we hold that there was no alteration under Rule 35(c), we find it unnecessary to address the complicated question of exactly when a sentence is imposed for purposes of Rule 35(c). Currently, there is a circuit split on this issue. Many circuits look to the oral imposition of sentence. Compare United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Morrison, 204 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that oral imposition of sentence begins seven day clock for rule 35c
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    this exception. This exception is limited, however, “to those procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” Id. The rule at issue here has no bearing on the accuracy of the defendant’s criminal conviction. As such, the second exception to non-retroactivity is inapplicable in this case. In supplemental briefing on this issue, petitioner also argues that retroactive application is appropriate because the rule of law which Garcia invokes is substantive, rather than procedural. Petitioner’s argument is premised upon a third exception, which provides that, in contrast to new constitutional rules of criminal procedure, substantive rules of criminal law are applied retroactively. See United States v. McClelland, 941 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Under this substantive law exception, when a

    ### Response:
    holding that the decision in aguon ii 851 f2d 1158 9th cir1988 finding that inducement is an essential element of extortion was fully retroactive
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    administration company, sued defendants Robert Dube, an underwriter, and Lafayette Life Insur-anee Company, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1312. In defendant Dube’s motion to dismiss, he claimed that the economic loss doctrine barred ERU’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. The court agreed and granted Dube’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1316. The court reasoned that “ERU’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against Dube is barred by the economic loss rule because ERU has not alleged facts independent from the contract” and because the breach of fiduciary duty claim arose solely as a result of the existence of the contract. Id.; see also McCutcheon v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 938 F.Supp. 820, 824 (S.D.Fla.1996)(<HOLDING>); Hilliard, 125 F.Supp.2d at 1080 (economic

    ### Response:
    holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs claim arose solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Once this prima facie case has been established, there is a presumption of discrimination, and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the articulated reason was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. The third step of the McDonnell Douglas test has been altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (<HOLDING>). In light of Desert Palace, the Fifth Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2144, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (announcing a restrictive interpretation of “impairment” and “disability” under the ADA), superseded by statute, ADA Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)); Toyota Motor Mfg. of Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195, 122 S.Ct. 681, 690, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (narrowing scope of protection under the ADA), superseded by statute, ADA Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,112 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C, § 12102(3)); and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2165, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (<HOLDING>), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair

    ### Response:
    holding statute of limitations for discriminatory pay practices begins when initial pay decision was made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    contribution limit involving even ‘significant interference’ with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the ‘lesser demand’ of being ‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’ ” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136, 124 S.Ct. 619 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003)). As in Buckley and McConnell, the provisions involved here have only a marginal impact on the ability of contributors to engage in effective political speech. As such, they are not subject to strict scrutiny, but to the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny applied in Buckley and McConnell. See Ohio Right to Life Society, Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 2:08-CV-492, 2008 WL 4186312 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 5, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Under the intermediate scrutiny standard,

    ### Response:
    holding that appropriate standard of review regarding campaign finance disclosure laws is intermediate not strict scrutiny
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 261.101(a). Upon investigation by the CAC, the Austin County Sheriffs Department, and CPS, the evidence that Byles had assaulted L.S. was found by CPS to be “significant” enough to support a finding of “unable to determine,” together with a conclusion that the risk was “significant” but “controlled” because Byles had been kept away from L.S. since the date of the o d 398, 405-07 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (affirming dismissal for failure to state cause of action after law firm establish defense of qualified immunity). Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case. In my opinion, this case presents fundamental jurisdictional error. See McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex.1957) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The record clearly shows that Jesus was held

    ### Response:
    holding error to be fundamental when record shows jurisdictional defect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testified that petitioner admitted to engaging in consensual sex with the victim on the night in question. Given the strength of this evidence, the Kansas Court of Appeals found that “it is difficult to believe that the testimony of three or four transient people, some of whom had criminal records, to the effect that Payne was drinking and smoking marijuana with them at the time of the crime would be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.” Petitioner has failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence to contradict these factual findings. As such, the court cannot find that the state appellate court unreasonably applied the prejudice prong of the Strickland framework to the facts of this case. See United States v. Nelson, 984 F.Supp. 1368, 1872 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>). While the alibi witnesses might have

    ### Response:
    holding that even if attorney had secured defense witnesses  2255 relief was not warranted where the evidence against defendant at trial was so overwhelming that no reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    on whether the unborn child was born alive or died in útero. Therefore, we hold that Geiser is controlling. Section 19-03.1-22.2, N.D.C.C., endangerment of a child, does not apply to acts committed on an unborn child, regardless if the child is subsequently born alive or dies in utero. [¶ 20] When a question of interpretation arises as to whether conduct is criminal or not, we construe the statute in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Laib, 2002 ND 95, ¶ 15, 644 N.W.2d 878. Furthermore, we presume the legislature, having had an opportunity to state otherwise, acquiesces to our construction and interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2. See Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Y.M.C.A., 2001 ND 139, ¶ 26, 632 N.W.2d 407 (“We presume t 75 Cal.App.3d 214, 141 Cal.Rptr. 912 (1977) (<HOLDING>); State v. Gethers, 585 So.2d 1140 (Fla.Ct.App.

    ### Response:
    holding a mother not criminally liable for child endangerment for ingesting heroin while pregnant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have a common principle to apply, they recognize a definitive ending or finality to an event or proceeding. As such, an unresolved proceeding, one that is not final and has not reached a definitive end, does not meet the accepted general definition of “terminate” or its past-tense equivalent “terminated.” In this case, the generally accepted definition of “terminated” would appear to support Mother’s position — where a termination proceeding remains unresolved on appeal and has not yet ended formally or definitely, parental rights to a sibling have not been terminated under Section 32A-4-2(C)(4). However, our Supreme Court has recognized that the application of the plain meaning rule does not end an analysis. See State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (<HOLDING>). We should be looking at the overall

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the appellate courts will not rely upon the literal meaning of a statute when such a construction would be absurd unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    10 . Defenders accorded the Secretary's interpretation of the statutory phrase ""in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” no deference. 258 F.3d at 1145 n. 11. The court explained that the Secretary had entirely ignored an aspect of the phrase (the use of the disjunctive ""or”), and thus there was no interpretation to defer to. See id. Here, we owe the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), because he offers an interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase, and offers that interpretation via formal notice and comment rulemaking. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Plaintiffs also argue that the Secretary

    ### Response:
    holding that although notice and comment procedures are not required to trigger chevron deference such procedures are significant  in pointing to chevron authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appropriate sentence outside the guideline range if a departure is warranted. We also reject Appellants’ contention that consideration of conduct from dismissed counts would severely undermine the plea bargaining process and threaten the proportionality in sentencing that the guidelines seek to foster. Reality does not bear out their argument. There is little difference between utilizing uncharged, dismissed, or even acquitted conduct as a basis for departure and employing it as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 to determine the base offense level or adjustments to it. And, the propriety of using uncharged, dismissed, and acquitted conduct for these purposes is well settled. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 633, 636-38, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carroll, 3 F.3d 98, 102 n.

    ### Response:
    holding that consideration by a sentencing court of acquitted conduct was appropriate in establishing the applicable guideline range or in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as such findings “simply do not exist in a fibromyalgia ease.” (PI. Mem., pg. 15.) Indeed, as Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit explained in Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.1996), “[fibromyalgia’s] cause or causes are unknown, there is no cure, and, of greatest importance to disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective. There are no laboratory tests for the presence or severity of fibromyalgia.” Id. Thus, any focus by the Defendant or by ALJ Cohen on the absence of objective evidence is misplaced, because “its absence is no more indicative that the patient’s fibromyalgia is not disabling than the absence of headache is an indication that a patient’s prostate cancer is not advanced.” Id., see also Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Lisa v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health &

    ### Response:
    holding that a growing number of courts including the second circuit have recognized that fibromyalgia is a disabling impairment and that there are no objective tests which can conclusively confirm the disease 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    claims must retain a “continuing interest in the litigation” in order to appeal a denial of class certification. Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 613-14 (8th Cir.2003). We emphasized that a stipulation in a settlement agreement, by which a plaintiff reserves the right to appeal the denial of certification, is not sufficient in and of itself to satisfy Article III. Id. at 614 n. 3. Rather, we said that when individual claims are fully satisfied, the court of appeals, in determining whether a case or controversy remains, “need only address whether [the plaintiff] retains an interest in shifting costs and attorney fees to the putative class members.” Id. at 614. But cf. Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, applying Potter, we see no continuing

    ### Response:
    holding that a named plaintiffs appeal was not moot despite the absence of any economic interest in shifting costs or attorneys fees because the plaintiff had a personal stake in pursuing his procedural right to represent a class
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the child’s removal and enable the child to return home, there is a substantial risk of a continuing danger if the child is returned home. See id. § 262.201(b), (c). This order named DFPS K.N.D.’s temporary managing conservator, but it did allow A.D. visitation with K.N.D. Thus, the trial court specifically found danger to KN.D.’s physical health or safety caused by “an act or failure to act” of A.D., as “the person entitled to possession.” A.D. did not challenge these findings at the time the trial court made them or at any other time in the year that this case was pending in the trial court. At trial, she did not present an argument regarding the sufficiency of 59, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30, 2012, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); L.Z. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective

    ### Response:
    holding in termination of fathers rights that evidence was sufficient to support finding children were removed for abuse or neglect when previous decree reflected trial court made findings that children were removed from mother under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the down payment, despite the fact that the conditions to splitting the lot were not yet satisfied. Plaintiffs refused, as was their right at that time. While the paving requirement was eventually removed by the board due to plaintiffs’ efforts, Hatt served notice of forfeiture on the plaintiffs before that requirement had been satisfied and before he presented the abstract to plaintiffs for inspection. From that point forward, Hatt refused to cooperate with plaintiffs in any way despite their repeated requests. In essence, Hatt breached the contract by anticipatory repudiation. By serving upon plaintiffs the notice of forfeiture, Hatt repudiated the contract. See Williams v. Clark, 417 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa App.1987); accord Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 70 (Utah 1982) (<HOLDING>); Blue Lakes v. George Gowing, Inc., 464 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that seller repudiated a real estate contract where it refused to honor a sale contract and returned buyers down payment after compliance with a city drainage easement added an unforeseen expense to formation of the lot to be sold
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    development of a filling station at the Sam’s Club location. This constitutes a statutorily authorized, direct attack on a land use decision by the City under Section 31-2-9. See also § 3-19-8; § 3-21-9; § 39-3-1.1 (providing for an appeal to the district court by any person in interest dissatisfied with an order or determination of a planning commission after review of the order or determination by the governing body of the municipality). Although the City, Wal-Mart, and the dissent assert that Petitioner was required to intervene in the litigation between them in order to protect his right to challenge the development, they cite no New Mexico authority to support this position, and we decline any invitation to create such author o., 92 N.M. 237, 241, 586 P.2d 318, 322 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>). It has no application to contractual

    ### Response:
    holding that a judgment establishing a partys exclusive light to use a trade name was not subject to collateral attack
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and representations,” that it was proceeding under a “traceable proceeds” theory. Id. The court found, however, that “[t]he Government’s last-minute change of tactic, although advanced prior to the issuance of the Court’s Opinion, was too late.... ” Id. It followed, therefore, that the government’s new theory could not “in fairness be regarded as an appropriate ground for reconsideration of th[e] Court’s prior decision.” Id. In affirming the lower court’s finding of waiver, the Second Circuit stated: Under these circumstances, we believe that the court acted within its discretion in finding that the government raised the “traceable proceeds” theory too late to be considered by the court. Ruiz v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Transp. of the City of New York, 858 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Our review of the record satisfied us that

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court has discretion to reject a claim raised on a motion for reargument
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    limitations. See Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1182; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. The events in Fortson’s federal complaint occurred in April 2011, when his state complaint was dismissed. Fortson knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to his federal claims at the time his state complaint was dismissed; therefore, the limitations period began to run in April 2011. See Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1182. Nonetheless, he did not file his federal complaint until January 2014, nearly three years later, after the limitations period had expired. See id. To the extent Fortson requested the district judge to void any state judgments, his claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm dismissal of

    ### Response:
    holding the rookerfeldman doctrine bars cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the parties will illuminate plausible interpretations other than the one that is facially obvious to the judge. See id. Thus, ambiguity determined by the judge’s view of “clear meaning” is a troublesome concept that often obstructs the court’s proper and primary function in this area — to enforce the meaning intended by the contracting parties. See 3 Corbin § 542, at 122-24; Gottsfield, supra, at 385. Recognizing these problems, we are hesitant to endorse, without explanation, the often repeated and usually oversimplified construct that ambiguity must exist before parol evidence is admissible. We have previously criticized the ambiguity prerequisite in the context of non-negotiated agreements. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 162 Ariz. 251, 257, 782 P.2d 727, 733 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Darner, 140 Ariz. at 389, 682 P.2d at 394

    ### Response:
    recognizing the lack of logic in requiring ambiguity which may be fortuitous to prove the true terms of an agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    289 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (per curiam) (“Unless [appellant] is a party to an agreement to arbitrate, or unless by its actions or course of conduct it embraces or adopts such agreement, or seeks to benefit directly by provisions of such agreement, it, of course, is not bound by the result in arbitration proceedings between [respondent] and [appellant’s wholly owned subsidiaries.”). On appeal, defendants fail to point to any evidence submitted on summary judgment suggesting that plaintiff is a party to the arbitration agreement between Liberty Mutual and Frankenmuth, that he adopted the agreement, or that he sought to benefit directly from the arbitration. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 75 Misc.2d 410, 412, 347 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (<HOLDING>). Nor is there any evidence that plaintiff

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs personal injury action against other driver in auto accident was not precluded by arbitration award between insurance carriers regarding damage to plaintiffs car because plaintiff did not participate in or control arbitration was not a party to arbitration agreement did not adopt agreement or attempt to benefit from agreement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    9-89, at 799 (2d ed.1975) (footnote omitted). If the amount of security provided by the LOU is insufficient to satisfy a judgment, the court ordinarily may authorize the re-arrest of the vessel only if the amount of the original security was obtained through fraud or mistake. See Moore v. M/V ANGELA 353 F.3d 376, 385-386 (5th Cir.2003) (“While it is true that a district court may require ‘further security’ at any time, we interpret the phrase to mean substitute or replacement security (e.g., when a surety has become insolvent) rather than additional security, except where the vessel was released by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake of the court.” (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); Industria Nacional Del Papel, CA. v. M/V ALBERT F, 730 F.2d 622, 626 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Although in this case there was no fraud or

    ### Response:
    holding that a mistake sufficient to justify rearrest must be tinged with fraud or misrepresentation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    received cash awards and please state the total amounts réceived by the informant from you in relation to the events at issue in this Complaint[ ]” may allow Plaintiff to piece together the person who made a purchase of black tar heroin from him, which could put the informant’s life and/or well-being in jeopardy. You cited to criminal defense cases as the basis for your argument that you are entitled to this information, however, this case does not involve an “individual’s right to prepare his defense.” This case involves a civil complaint filed against Defendant Ficke, inter alia. You have not set forth a basis for the need to disclose the identity or even the identifying information of the informant. See McGee v. Hayes, 43 Fed.Appx. 214, 217 (10’h [10th] Cir.2002) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>) Although you argue in your letter that

    ### Response:
    holding that a district court is not required to permit plaintiff to engage in a fishing expedition in the hope of supporting his claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    circumstances unless it finds, on the face of the record, clear and convincing evidence that one of five enumerated exceptions applies. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f)(2); In re Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1263 (D.C.1998); accord In re Bielec, 755 A.2d 1018, 1022 n. 3 (D.C.2000) (“In Spann, we articulated that this court has ‘independent authority to impose different discipline if it finds ‘on the face of the record ... by clear and convincing evidence’ that an exception applies.’”). The fifth of these exceptions provides orney has a right to fair notice of the charges against her). It follows that reciprocal discipline based on an attorney’s resignation must be based only on those allegations of which the attorney had fair notice at the time of resignation. Cf. In re Bielec, 755 A.2d at 1024 (<HOLDING>). Schoeneman had no such notice of the charges

    ### Response:
    holding that vague and ambiguous charges in another jurisdiction cannot form the basis for reciprocal discipline in a manner consistent with due process requirements even if the attorney consented to that discipline
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to a motion under Rule 56. Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted two responses essentially reiterating his prior allegations and attached copies of his previously submitted FOIA and Privacy Act requests and a copy of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant filed a response indicating that it did not wish to submit any additional information. Therefore, this Court will examine the plaintiffs claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56. (1) Rule 12(b)(1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires that the plaintiff bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has jurisdiction to entertain his claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. United States Postal

    ### Response:
    holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    758 (1978) (original complaint, if properly served, remains in effect until amended complaint is properly served). B. Personal Jurisdiction Defendants Fashion Group and Mar-amoti argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. This argument is without merit. Robins alleges that Max Mara USA was “designed solely to sell [Fashion Group’s] garments and other product lines ... and Max Mara USA does not sell garments from any other manufacturer.” Robins Aff. ¶ 30. Where a foreign corporation sells goods in New York through a subsidiary, such activity “subject[s] the parent corporation to personal jurisdiction in New York.” Pfizer Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 903 F.Supp. 14, 16 (S.D.N.Y.1995). See also Canterbury Belts Ltd. v. Lane Walker Rudkin, Ltd., 869 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus this Court has personal jurisdiction

    ### Response:
    holding that a subsidiarys activities will be attributed to the foreign parent for purposes of determining the parents amenability to personal jurisdiction in new york
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    rather than a “final conviction.” The elements of the offense of felony evading arrest under section 38.04(a), (b)(2) are: (1) the actor intentionally fled from a person he knew was a peace officer attempting to lawfully arrest him; (2) the actor used a vehicle in fleeing from the officer; and (3) the actor had been previously convicted under section 38.04. Id. § 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A). The language in section 38.04(b)(2) that makes the offense of evading arrest a third degree felony is presented as an element of the felony offense itself, rather than as an enhancement provision, such as can be found in section 12.42 of the penal code. See id. § 12.42 (providing penalties for repeat and habitual felony offenders); State v. Atwood, 16 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Throneberry argues the

    ### Response:
    holding a prior offense of evading arrest is an element of the offense of felony evading arrest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (11th Cir. 1982). Probationers, howev er, have a diminished expectation of privacy and are subject to limitations to which ordinary citizens are free, such as home visits by probation officers. Id. at 1367-68. We have not addressed the question of whether a probation condition so completely diminished a probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a search without reasonable suspicion would satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the criminal context. We and the Supreme Court have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a probationer’s home is searched based on only reasonable suspicion, absent consent and absent a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 121-22, 122 S.Ct. 587, 589, 592-93, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302,

    ### Response:
    holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to a core business. See id. This Court cannot hold, therefore, that appellee’s e-mails contained subject lines that had the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving the recipient. In addition, from these facts, we cannot draw a reasonable inference that a consumer would likely be deceived or misled by the e-mails. We hold that appellant’s pleading is legally insufficient to support a valid cause of action, because the statements were conclusory without any factual allegations to support them. We further hold that the exhibit attached to the complaint, which merely listed e-mails sent by Network Solutions, is, without more, insufficient to support an allegation that the subject lines were misleading or had a tendency to deceive. See Cont’l Masonry, 279 Md. at 481-82, 369 A.2d 566 (<HOLDING>). We, therefore, affirm the circuit court’s

    ### Response:
    holding plaintiffs pleading was insufficient to state a valid cause of action because plaintiffs characterization of defendantjs conduct was nothing more than a conclusory expression of opinion without factual allegations to support it and mere conclusions and general averments of a breach of a contractual duty do not suffice in complex matters such as where the breach  is not readily apparent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    verdict that conflated liability and damages. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on the verdict being an improper compromise. Mekdeci ex rel. Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir.1983). Federal law governs the decision whether or not to grant a new trial, but an issue of the sufficiency of damages awarded for a state claim is decided under state law. Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440, 1451 (11th Cir.1990). A motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 must be granted “when the issues of liability and damages were tried together and there are indications that the jury may have rendered a compromise verdict.” Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1513 (quoting Lucas v. Am. Mfg. C 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    forty or more members. See id. at 936. A plaintiff need not provide “a precise quantification of their class,” and courts may “make common sense assumptions” to support a finding of numerosity. Pecere v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 194 F.R.D. 66, 69 (E.D.N.Y.2000). Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking class certification “ ‘must show some evidence of or reasonably estimate the number of class members.’ ” Pecere, 194 F.R.D. at 69 (quoting LeGrand v. New York City Trans. Auth., 1999 WL 342286 *3 (May 26, 1999)). Where the plaintiffs assertion of numerosity is pure speculation or bare allegations, the motion for class certification fails. See Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir.1968); Reese v. Arrow Financial Servcs. LLC, 202 F.R.D. 83, 2001 WL 901280 (D.Conn. June 14, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Wilner, 198 F.R.D. at 396 (finding that the

    ### Response:
    holding that bare assertions of numerosity are insufficient and the plaintiff must reasonable estimate or provide some evidence of the number of class members
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    appointed attorneys unreasonably delayed occurrence of his PCRA hearing and disposition of his PCRA petition, thus violating his right to due process. In so doing, we applied the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Pursuant to Barker, the court first considers whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. Second, the court must evaluate the reason for the delay. Thirdly, the court must ascertain the timeliness of the defendant’s assertion of his right; and lastly, the court must decide if there exists any resulting prejudice to the defendant. Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1276. The 21-month delay herein is clearly sufficient to trigger further inquiry; thus, the first prong of the test is satisfied. Id., 5 A.3d at 1279 (<HOLDING>). With respect to the second prong of Barker,

    ### Response:
    holding that although there is no procedural rule requiring a court to determine a petition within a certain time frame after conducting a hearing in a nondeath penalty case presumptively it should not require more than the 120 days allotted to death penalty cases under parcrimp 909 to render a decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    basis, just as the defense, by observing the demeanor of members, may perceive a member to be glaring at the accused or at counsel and feel uncomfortable with that member’s demeanor. The Government is similarly entitled to excuse a member. Defense, any peremptory challenge? At the outset I acknowledge that these issues arise from the lower court’s attempt to deal with a difficult and complex issue — what the military judge must do when there is a factual dispute relating to the race-neutral explanation for the exercise of a peremptory challenge governed by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). This issue implicates the fundamental concern of how to prevent use of a subterfuge race-neutral explanation. See Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 168 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. Collins, 852 F.Supp. 570, 578-85

    ### Response:
    holding raceneutral basis for preemptory challenge was pretext where stated reasons for challenge not supported by venirepersons statements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. MONROE and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. CRAWLEY, J., concurs specially. ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs in the result. 1 . Rodriguez had filed an amended complaint in January 1997, alleging retaliatory discharge and the tort of outrage. These claims were settled and the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal of these claims in May 1998. CRAWLEY, Judge, concurring specially. I write to point out that Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., states that Rule 59 motions “shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had opportunity to be heard thereon.” Rule 59(g) has not been interpreted to require a hearing in every case. Historic Blakely Authority v. Williams, 675 So.2d 350, 352 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there is probable merit in the

    ### Response:
    holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is  no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    287.150 or any of its six subsections confers on an employer or its workers’ compensation insurance carrier the unconditional right to intervene in an injured employee’s negligence suit against third parties “to protect and enforce [a] statutory workers’ compensation lien,” as alleged in SVC’s motion. Moreover, our independent review of the entire statute confirms that nowhere does it confer such an unconditional right of intervention. Since “[t]he burden of proof in an intervention action [under Rule 52.12(a)] lies with the proposed intervenor,” In re Estate of Potashnick, 841 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Mo.App. E.D.1992), the trial court properly overruled SVC’s motion to intervene on the basis of Rule 52.12(a)(1). See Flippin v. Coleman Trucking, Inc., 18 S.W.3d 17, 20 (Mo.App. E.D.2000) (<HOLDING>); Ruth L. v. State, 830 S.W.2d 528, 530

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 5212a1 was inapplicable because the wouldbe intervenor failed to show that any missouri statute unconditionally authorized it to intervene as a matter of right
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    while incarcerated at the CCDC, and then shoot Plaintiff and Bland in their cell. See docket entry #78, Ex. 6. These witnesses told Detective Voyles that Plaintiff faked a fall down the stairs at the CCDC on November 29, 2007, so that he could be taken to a local hospital where he retrieved a gun from Bland's girlfriend. Id. The next day, on November 30, 2007, Plaintiff, not Wright, shot Bland while they were in the cell together. Id. Bland was then suppose to shoot Plaintiff, but the gun failed to fire. Id. To make it appear that Plaintiff had been shot, Bland was forced to cut Plaintiff in the back with a razor and stab him with a pen to simulate a gunshot wound. Id. Wright then exited the cell and hid the gun in the shower area. Id. 10 . See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (<HOLDING>); Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th

    ### Response:
    holding that an officials failure to alleviate a risk that he should have perceived but did not is insufficient for a finding of liability
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    preparation of HCS’s proposal in response to the Solicitation, in any way, other than in selecting the location of a hotel for the proposal. PL Mot. JAR Ex. 1 (Murray Dep. at 52). Command had the burden of identifying “hard facts” to support its allegations of a conflict of interest or bias on the part of MICC that gave HCS unequal access to information or an unfair competitive advantage in obtaining the contract award. The court has determined that Command failed to meet this burden. See PAI Corp., 614 F.3d at 1352 (“To demonstrate that such a determination is arbitrary or capricious, a protester must identify ‘hard facts’; a mere inference or suspicion of an actual or apparent conflict is not enough.”); see also C.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). The Administrative Record does not set forth

    ### Response:
    holding that to demonstrate that a contract award is arbitrary or capricious on the basis of a possibility and appearance of impropriety a protester must identify hard facts not a mere inference based on suspicion or innuendo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the protected activity; (3) the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse action taken by the defendant. Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir.1993)). As in the case of a discrimination claim under Title VII or the ADA, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. After that, the plaintiff must show that the reason is pretextual. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844-846 (2d Cir.2013); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2534, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (<HOLDING>). The Court analyzes ADA retaliation claims

    ### Response:
    holding that the mixedmotive framework does not apply to retaliation cases under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that particular conduct occurred, we may review whether the facts assumed by the district court constituted excessive force). 8 . The Estate points to the opinions of some lay witnesses that Waterman's vehicle did not appear to be a threat to the officers ahead and to expert testimony that the officers’ use of deadly force was unreasonable. Neither precludes Appellants' entitlement to summary judgment. Even ignoring the conclusory nature of the lay opinions, those opinions do not create a genuine issue. of fact because the witnesses were unaware of tire fact most critical to the probable cause analysis: that Waterman had reportedly attempted to use his vehicle as a weapon in order to avoid being captured only minutes before entering the toll plaza. See Pace, 283 F.3d at 1280 & n. 11 (<HOLDING>). Nor is summary judgment precluded by the

    ### Response:
    holding that lay witness opinion that approaching vehicle did not appear to be a threat to any officer on the scene did not warrant denial of summary judgment because the witness was not aware of the events that preceded the shooting that gave the officers reason to believe that suspect would attempt to assault them internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 932 (emphasis in original). This is forbidden by the Constitution. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35, 116 S.Ct. 1620. “Discouraging gay marriage serves only to force gay couples to live in a ‘state of sin’ rather than in a lawfully-recognized ‘state of connubial bliss’ that encourages a long-enduring permanent relationship that, in turn, serves as the basis of a state-recognized family.” In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 932. The promotion of morality is not a cognizable governmental interest furthered by the denial of federal benefits and protections. Similarly, the Court does not find the justification of preserving the government fisc satisfies rational basis review. See Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 376-77, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 99 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Ostensible savings to the government fisc

    ### Response:
    holding that previous cases make clear that something more than an invocation of the public fisc is necessary to demonstrate the rationality of selecting one group rather than some other group to suffer the burden of costcutting legislation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    case of other removed actions, the federal court takes the case as it finds it, subject to the applicable federal rules, and treats everything that occurred in the state court as if it had taken place in federal court. Vernon Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Commerce Sav. & Loan, 677 F.Supp. 495, 498 (N.D.Tex.1988) (emphasis added). The Court holds today that, with regard to removal under 12 U.S.C. 1819, one of the applicable federal rules continues to be set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), requiring timely removal by the FDIC. As stated above, Defendant FDIC’s removal was required on or about August 17, 1989, and its September 8, 1989 notice was therefore untimely. III. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Remand. However, the Court DENIES Plainti 9-0494-H, slip op. at 2 (Sanders, C.J.) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Plaintiff's Motion at 8. 4 . The FDIC

    ### Response:
    holding that when the federal savings and loan insurance corporation fslic is appointed receiver for a failed thrift that is a party to litigation action then becomes removable by fslic pursuant to 28 usc  1446b and must be removed within thirty days of the appointment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the disclosure statement alongside the plan to determine whether the trustee has standing. Although no court of appeals has addressed whether the disclosure statement may be consulted for purposes of standing, courts routinely consult the disclosure statement in deciding whether res judicata and judicial estoppel apply. See, e.g., Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir.1999) (explaining that claims must be revealed in plan and disclosure statement or trustee may be judicially estopped from pursuing them); Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 774 (6th Cir.2002) (considering whether the disclosure statement properly preserved claims or whether res judicata and judicial estoppel should be applied); In re Kelley, 199 B.R. 698, 704 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (<HOLDING>). In addition, several lower courts have held

    ### Response:
    holding that if the debtor fails to mention the cause of action in either his schedules disclosure statement or plan then he will be precluded from asserting it postconfirmation
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is unable to demonstrate that in fact he has no remedy. Nelson is effectively asking us to address a hypothetical situation, but we decline to do so. IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the superior court's decision that the Municipality is a project owner. We REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FABE, Justice, not participating. 1 . Western Power was doing business as Yukon Equipment, Inc. at the time. 2 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(K)(4). 3 . Parker v. Tomera, 89 P.3d 761, 765 (Alaska 2004). 4 . Id. 5 . Moore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 231, 233 (Alaska 2000). 6 . Grimm v. Wagoner, 77 P.3d 423, 427 (Alaska 2003) (citing Native Vill. of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1999)). 7 . See State v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 368 (Alaska 2009) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Lowell v. Hayes, 117 P.3d 745, 758 n. 61

    ### Response:
    holding that review of ripeness decisions is de novo
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Ten Commandments and the other patriotic documents and symbols. A reasonable observer of the displays cannot connect the Ten Commandments with a unifying historical or cultural theme that is also secular. All of the other documents relate in some fashion to Western European or American culture since 1215; several of the documents are legal in nature, one is an American symbol, one is an American slogan and one is an American song. The Ten Commandments are several th ‘no sign can disclaim an overwhelming message of endorsement’ ”) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 3086). Upon seeing the Ten Commandments, which sticks out in the displays like a proverbial “sore thumb,” a “reasonable person will think religion, not history.” Indiana Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at 773 (<HOLDING>). The distinct court further found that the

    ### Response:
    holding that reasonable observer would not be able to make an analytical connection between ten commandments bill of rights and preamble to indiana constitution
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of which they are a part. See Fulfillment Services Inc. v. United Parcel against an insurer, see Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 813, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 693 P.2d 796 (Cal.1985) (“When an insurer’s tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a tort action for that expense. The attorney’s fees are an economic loss — damages — proximately caused by the tort. These fees must be distinguished from recovery of attorney’s fees qua attorney’s fees, such as those attributable to the bringing of the bad faith action itself.”) (internal citations omitted); and abuse of process suits, see, e.g., Technical Computer Servs., Inc. v. Buckley, 844 P.2d 1249 (Colo.Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). What is less clear is whether Congress

    ### Response:
    recognizing the general rule that a claimant in a malicious prosecution or abuse of process action can recover attorney fees incurred in defending against the prior wrongful litigation but cannot recover attorney fees incurred in bringing the malicious prosecution or abuse of process action itself and applying the same rule where the abuse of process claim is brought as a counterclaim to wrongful litigation rather than as a later separate action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by reference to state law.’ ” Pittman v. Wil n violated under the federal Constitution, “[alleged violations ... are to be measured against a federal standard of what process is due and that standard is not defined by state-created procedures.” Id. at 1469. Under the federal standard of what process is due, the plaintiffs suspension with pay did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even if it was a “suspension ... for punitive reasons,” Va.Code Ann. § 2.1-116.5 (Michie 1995). See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 544-45,105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (noting that an employer “can avoid the [due process] problem by suspending with pay” (footnote omitted)); Royster v. Board of Trustees of Anderson County Sch. Dist. Number Five, 774 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also Edwards v. California Univ. of Pa.,

    ### Response:
    holding that any constitutionally protected property interest an employee has as a result of his employment contract is satisfied by payment of the full compensation due under the contract
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    shall issue in any suit, action or proceeding, in any court against this State or against any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any contribution sought to be collected under this division.” California Const., Art. XIII, § 32, provides: “No legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature.” Despite the apparently unambiguous language of these provisions, the District Court considered the availability of injunctive relief only “uncertain” because of state deci 180, 383 P. 2d 409, 411 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Relying on Aronoff, a District Court of

    ### Response:
    holding that cal const art xiii  15 and cal rev  tax code ann  19081 west 1970 preclude issuance of an injunction to prevent collection of additional income taxes
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to suppress. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir.1993). Because Gordon has not met the requirements for Rule 11(a)(2), we find that Gordon is foreclosed from appealing the denial of his motion to suppress. Gordon also waived his right to appeal sentencing issues in the plea agreement. At Gordon’s second guilty plea hearing, to which the plea agreement is applicable, the district court explicitly noted the agreement’s appellate waiver provisions and Gordon reaffirmed his agreement to them. We conclude the waiver is valid and enforceable and that the Sixth Amendment issues raised on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver. See United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169-73 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Gordon’s claims regarding the § 1326 offense

    ### Response:
    holding that waiver of right to appeal in plea agreement entered into before united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law effected by that case and that booker error fell within scope of waiver
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    proposition that, where the breaching party has not shown that the non-breaching party did not have the capacity to make additional sales, the breaching party retains the burden of proving that the non-breaching party could not have made both the contracted-for sale and the supposedly mitigating sale); Crestvalley Homes Ltd. v. Krklinski, [1996] 50 R.P.R. (2d) 283, ¶¶ 35-39 (Ont.) (standing merely for the proposition that, where it is essentially undisputed that the non-breaching party had the capacity to make additional sales, the breaching party retains the burden of proving that the non-breaching party nevertheless could not have made both the contracted-for sale and the supposedly mitigating sale); Candlepin Mach. Parts Ltd. v. Britten, [1991] 109 N.S.R. (2d) 366, ¶¶ 71-82 (N.S.) (<HOLDING>); Mason & Risch Ltd. v. Christner, [1920] 54

    ### Response:
    holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Drawing upon the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Padilla, this Court concluded that counsel was obliged to warn the defendant that forfeiting his pension would be a consequence of pleading guilty. In so holding, we noted that, in Padilla, the United States Supreme Court stated it had never applied the distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally professional assistance required under Strickland. We then concluded in Abraham that it was unclear whether the direct/collateral analysis is still viable as it relates to issues concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel. See Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1092. On April 5, 2010, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in Abraham to address, inter alia, ""whethe .2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in light of this Commonwealth’s

    ### Response:
    holding that counsels failure to impeach a witness by showing bias was ineffective assistance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of dealing altered that understanding. Although there was conflicting testimony regarding whether or not the provision regarding letters of intent had been waived, there is no doubt that the letter clearly states that the agreement is conditioned upon Baker’s performance, which the trial court found to be unsatisfactory. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court found that “[t]he debtor rarely paid Telelect on time, repeatedly refused to provide Telelect with promised financial data, and jeopardized Teleleet’s reputation in the market by not timely delivering its finished product.” In re JGB Industries, Inc. v. Simon-Telelect, Inc., Adv. Proc. No. 96-3046 at 14 (Bankr.E.D.Va. May 220, 1236 (E.D.Va.1996); and Swengler v. ITT Corp. Electro-Optical Div., 993 F.2d 1063, 1070 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>)). The Court declines to decide whether

    ### Response:
    holding that internal policy memorandum not generally distributed to employees did not create an implied condition to an employees contract even though that employee had requested an obtained a copy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    courts to enter judgment. Only then will the circuit court be able to properly exercise its authority. An express aim of the Act is that its provisions are to be construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 710 ILCS 5/20 (West 1998). Our determination comports with the holdings expressed by courts in other jurisdictions. See Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District v. Chicago Southshore & South Bend R.R., 685 N.E.2d 680, 694-95 (Ind. 1997) (noting that counterpart section in Indiana Uniform Act essentially enables the parties to control by contract what court may review an action to enforce an award and effectively provides the basis of jurisdiction); Tru Green Corp. v. Sampson, 802 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ky. App. 1991) (<HOLDING>); H.T.I. Corp. v. Lida Manufacturing Co., 785

    ### Response:
    holding that the plain meaning of the counterpart provision in the kentucky uniform act reveals that the arbitration agreement must provide for the arbitration itself to be in kentucky in order to confer subjectmatter jurisdiction on a kentucky court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    other situations or “exceptions” that are more akin to the situation here: A recognized exception to this rule applies where enforcement of a challenged restriction would adversely affect the rights of non-parties,. and there is no effective avenue for them to preserve their rights themselves. Cf. Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1990) (“[assuming that the petitioners [who were alleged vendors of obscene materials] have vicarious standing to raise their customers’ privacy interest”). This principle has been extended' to apply where it is the petitioners who “stand to lose from the outcome of this case and yet they have no other effective avenue for preserving their rights” than by raising the constitutional rights of non-parties. Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 76 n.3 (emphasis added). Powell, 497

    ### Response:
    recognizing petitioners vicarious standing to5 assert the claimed privacy rights of the underaged girls with whom they had sexual intercourse
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    directing Deason to ascend the scaffolding for dismantling, Walker performed a visual inspection of its condition. Walker contends that, in light of the foregoing facts and prior decisions of this Court, even assuming that he negligently performed his duties with regard to the inspection and ascension of the scaffolding, those duties were performed in' the line and scope of his discretionary authority as a carpenter supervisor. See Ex parte Randall, 971 So.2d 652, 664 (Ala.2007) (“This Court has previously held that poor judgment or wanton misconduct, an aggravated form of negligence, does not rise to the level of willfulness and maliciousness necessary to put the State agent beyond the immunity recognized in Cramnan. See Giambrone [v. Douglas], 874 So.2d [1046] at 1057 [ (Ala.2003),] (<HOLDING>).”). The undisputed evidence before us

    ### Response:
    holding that stateagent immunity is not abrogated for negligent and wanton behavior instead immunity is withheld only upon a showing that the state agent acted willfully maliciously fraudulently in bad faith or beyond his or her authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    informant’s testimony. For the same reasons stated in the third issue, we do not find the corroborating evidence so unconvincing that it renders the State’s overall case clearly and significantly less persuasive. See id. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 . See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.126(a)(3), .102(3)(D), .115(a), (0 (Vernon 2010). 2 . Appellant admitted that his voice was on the recording, but he denied that the recording was from inside the Burger King. Instead, he claimed it was a recording of a telephone conversation. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we must conclude that the recording took place inside the Burger King. See Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex.Crim.App.2008)

    ### Response:
    holding record is viewed in light most favorable to verdict
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fourth Amendment: We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Therefore, if the plaintiffs can show that they were subjected to unequal treatment based upon their race or ethnicity during the course of an otherwise lawful traffic stop, that would be sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 889, 121 S.Ct. 211,

    ### Response:
    holding that equal protection principles precluded use of hispanic appearance as a relevant factor for fourth amendment individualized suspicion requirement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ass’n of Pa. v. DPW, 585 Pa. 106, 116 n. 12, 888 A.2d 601, 607 n. 12 (2005) (“In ruling on whether preliminary objections were properly sustained, an appellate court must determine whether it is clear and free from doubt from all the facts pleaded that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief.” (citation omitted)). On the merits, I note that this Court has previously interpreted statutory provisions governing the training of police officers that are analogous to those in issue here as extending to officials who were not technically subject to their terms but nevertheless were cloaked with authority on a par with the police officers that the statute directly covered. See Commonwealth v. Leet, 537 Pa. 89, 96-97, 641 A.2d 299, 303 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I also believe that a demurrer

    ### Response:
    holding that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs enforcing motor vehicle laws were required to meet the training requirements of the former municipal police officers education and training act 53 ps  7417491 repealed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    funds operate in general may shed some light on the defendants’ intent in forming the limited partnerships (LP), the rationale for some of the LPs’ management practices, and whether the LPs indeed intended to form a partnership or a joint venture. Details of private equity funds’ investment and management practices are outside the domain of an ordinary person’s knowledge, and might be helpful to a decisionmaker. However, the plaintiffs have a valid point when they challenge Adams’s testimony that holding the defendants accountable would have a detrimental effect on the private equity industry. Such policy-type arguments fall outside of the scope of expert testimony sanctioned by Rule 702, and are irrelevant to issues at hand. Cf. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 498 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (citing Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    its failure to settle, “the insured[’s] assignee is entitled as a matter of law to recover damages equal to the amount by which the judgment exceeds policy coverage.” Brightman, 568 S.E.2d at 501-02. Thus, in each of the cases discussed above at pages 34-37, 44-45, the damages sought and awarded included the underlying judgment minus the policy limits paid by the insurance company plus interest and costs. As a its $100,000 policy limits toward satisfaction of . the judgment, $492,155.82 in interest had accrued. Thus, because Nationwide’s payment of $100,000 was less than the $492,155.82 in accrued interest on the judgment as of February 23, 2011, the $100,000 partial payment did not' reduce the principal amount and did not abate the accrual of additional interest on that' amount. Id. (<HOLDING>). While Plaintiffs in the bad faith action are

    ### Response:
    holding that where payment toward judgment was for less than the total amount of principal and interest  owed that payment then did not terminate the accrual of interest on the remaining principal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and enjoined the use of that district in future elections. Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 905-18, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996). In 1997, a politically divided General Assembly enacted a remedial plan expected to elect six Republican and six Democratic Representatives, rendering each party’s share of the state’s congressional delegation proportional to its share of the statewide vote in the most recent congressional election. Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F.Supp.2d 407, 412-13 (E.D.N.C. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001); id. at 423-24 (Thornburg, J., dissenting). In 2001, after several more years of litigation, the Supreme Court approved that remedial plan. See Easley, 532 U.S. 234, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (<HOLDING>). Just as litigation regarding the 1992 Plan

    ### Response:
    holding that threejudge panels finding that race constituted the predominant motivation in redrawing remedial districts was not supported by substantial evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sylvie at the time he purportedly married Geraldine. Dubie was still married to Sylvie becaus p.1966) (re fusing to uphold validity of Mexican divorce decree where parties, residents and domicili-aries of Louisiana, went to Mexico for sole purpose of obtaining divorce); Sohnlein v. Winchell, 230 Cal.App.2d 508, 41 Cal.Rptr. 145, 146-47 (1964) (refusing to recognize Mexican divorce decree where party stayed in Mexico for only two or three days, after which decree was issued, and holding that “where the foreign jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in the status of the parties, or where the sole purpose of seeking the divorce in the foreign jurisdiction is to evade the policy of this state, the judgment should not be recognized”); Cross v. Cross, 94 Ariz. 28, 381 P.2d 573, 574 (1963) (<HOLDING>). Neither Dubie nor Sylvie was domiciled in the

    ### Response:
    holding that mexican divorce was a nullity and totally void where parties were not residents of mexico because mexican court  did not have the slightest semblance of jurisdiction to adjudicate the marital status of the parties
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the violation would exist ""in perpetuity.” Lake Shore Riding Academy, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 1003, 350 N.E.2d at 20. This analysis comports with earlier decisions of this court. In Armond v. Sawyer (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 936, 563 N.E.2d 900, the plaintiffs liquor license was renewed semi-annually for 12 years in violation of a referendum, the existence of which was known to the plaintiff. In holding that the city was not estopped from revoking the plaintiffs license, despite the unauthorized renewals, we refused to characterize the renewals as affirmative acts by the city, especially since the plaintiff was aware of the referendum. Armond, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 939, 563 N.E.2d at 902-03; see also Leong v. Village of Schaumburg (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 60, 69, 550 N.E.2d 1073, 1079-80 (<HOLDING>); People ex rel. Satas v. City of Chicago

    ### Response:
    holding that the village did not waive its right to revoke the plaintiffs liquor license on the grounds that he had been convicted of a felony even though it renewed the license through a routine procedure whereby renewal notices were sent to all licensed facilities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    involved plain error because the defendant failed to timely object to the error, id. at 634, 122 S.Ct. 1781, not harmless error as is the case here. The crucial consideration in Cotton was that, because the evidence at trial was overwhelming and uncontroverted, “the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 632-33, 122 S.Ct. 1781. Here, because Lewis’s case does not involve review for plain error, the issue of whether the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings is not before us. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (noting that this is a question fer plain-error review); see also Jordan, 291 F.3d at 1096 n. 7 (<HOLDING>); Mackins, 315 F.3d at 409 (distinguishing

    ### Response:
    holding that cotton does not  control nor aid our analysis because that case was analyzed under plain error not harmless error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the Company's 22+ years of rate case history, this Commission’s regulatory expertise, and the public interest.” The dissent apparently faults the Commission for not considering the fact that in its 1987 rate case, Minnesota Power’s final rate was 193 percent of its initial request. We acknowledge that the Commission appears not to have considered the amount of the rate increase Minnesota Power received in 1987. But that failure does not make its decision arbitrary and capricious when the record reflects that in Minnesota Power's two most recent rate cases, those in 1994 and 2008, the utility received only 45 percent and 56 percent respectively of its initial rate request. See Quinn Distrib. Co. v. Quast Transfer, Inc., 288 Minn. 442, 448-51, 181 N.W.2d 696, 699-701, (1970) (<HOLDING>); cf. Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that even when there is a conflict of evidence before the commission and the evidence was such that the commission could have reasonably reached a contrary decision the commissions decision was not arbitrary and capricious
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    only a partial return toward original shape absent heat, to depict the “at least 3% elasticity” described in claim 5. It therefore follows that the term 3% elasticity as used in claim 5 refers not to the spontaneous return of a component to its original shape, but rather to the ability of a component to “spring back” by an amount equal to 3% of its original length. Moreover, the term is used in claim 5 precisely as it is used in claim 1, and there is no reasoned basis to apply different definitions to the same term used in two claims of the same patent. See Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1995), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3250 (Sept. 19, 1995) (No. 95-475); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). This Court concludes, therefore, that the

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of the scope of a particular claim can be found on review of other claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at the time that Rhodes committed the offense, Count I of the indictment erroneously charged her with a felony for violating that section. To correct this error, the Government dismissed Count I and (with Rhodes’ consent) filed a direct information charging her with a misdemeanor for violating that section. In this opinion we refer to the direct information and Count I of the indictment collectively as “Count I.” 2 . After the court denied Rhodes’ motion to strike Browe for cause, Rhodes used her last peremptory challenge to remove Browe from the venire. Thus, Rhodes contends that the district court’s error was prejudicial because it impaired her statutory right to exercise ten peremptory challenges. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(b); United States v. Martin, 749 F.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that trial courts erroneous refusal to strike juror for cause impaired defendants statutory right to his allotted number of peremptory challenges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    From the client’s perspective, a lawyer owes a duty of loyalty to his/her client. “Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.” W. Va. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. Loyalty to a Client. In addition, as we noted in the preceding section of this opinion, a lawyer is expected to deal with his/her clients fairly, honestly, and with integrity. See, e.g., W. Va. Standards of Professional Conduct, Preamble; In re Brown, 166 W.Va. at 232, 273 S.E.2d at 570. Implicit in such dealings is the sense that, because of a lawyer’s various professional responsibilities, there exists a relationship of trust between an attorney and his/her client. See, e.g., Kopelman & Assocs., L.C. v. Collins, 196 W.Va. 489, 496 n. 7, 473 S.E.2d 910, 917 n. 7 (1996) (<HOLDING>). See also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Friend,

    ### Response:
    recognizing special trust and confidence that must exist between attorney and client citations omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at 2429 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405). Before the Supreme Court’s Davis decision, the Sixth Circuit also emphasized that “precedent on a given point must be unequivocal” to suspend the exclusionary rule. United States v. Buford, 632 F.3d 264, 276 n. 9 (6th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir.2010)). And the Sixth Circuit was not alone. Other courts of appeals that considered this issue before Davis also limited the good-faith exception to binding appellate precedent. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1266; United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (applying the good-faith exception because “the Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supporting the search was settled”); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 866 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Real Prop. Located at

    ### Response:
    holding that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to searches which relied on fifth circuit law that was subsequently overturned
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (App.Div.1981). 21 .Under this statute and N.J.S.A. 30:4-6, persons convicted and sentenced to terms of one year or more are required to be confined in a state prison. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-10(e); see Cryan v. Klein, 148 N.J.Super. 27, 31-32, 371 A.2d 812, 814 (App.Div.1977) (construing N.J.S.A. 2A:164-18, the forerunner of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-10), certif'n granted, 75 N.J. 606, 384 A.2d 836, appeal dismissed, 87 N.J. 304, 434 A.2d 61 (1978). 22 . Worthington, 88 N.J. at 205, 440 A.2d at 1139. 23 . Cf. Worthington, 88 N.J. at 205, 440 A.2d at 1139 (""Until permanent quarters can be found for [certain] state inmates, it makes sense to confine them in the county jails where they are already incarcerated.”). 24 . See also State v. Rosenberg, 78 N.J.Super. 400, 402, 188 A.2d 635, 636 (App.Div.1963) (<HOLDING>). 25 . Defendant’s Memorandum of Law, Exhibit

    ### Response:
    holding that njsa 2aj6418 the forerunner of njsa 2c4310 did not create a liberty interest in an inmate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 49, at *41; Riggs II, 163 F.3d at 1369; Riggs III, 2001 WL 47274, at 17-18, 2001 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 20, at *64-66. Second, the root principles at work here — the principle that courts must be consistent with one another and the principle that governmental entities may in some circumstances be treated as private when taking on a private role or function— have a venerable lineage. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611, 614, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (putting a distinction between a government’s exercises of uniquely sovereign power and ordinary private power at the heart of foreign sovereign immunity); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Co., 22

    ### Response:
    recognizing a traditional distinction between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carr v. Gen. Motors Corp., 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1986) (“The Legislature ... has mandated, not just once, but many times throughout the [PWDCRA], that the only [disabilities] covered by the act, for purposes of employment, are those unrelated to ability to perform the duties of the position.”). Consistent with this qualification, the PWDCRA does not protect a plaintiff who, “on the date of [her] discharge is unable to perform the requirements of [her] job because of a disability” even if the plaintiff “would have regained the capacity to do the work within a reasonable time.” Lamoria v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 233 Mich. App. 560, 593 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1999) (per curiam); see also Ashworth v. Jefferson Screw Prods., Inc., 176 Mich.App. 737, 440 N.W.2d 101, 102-04 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Maat was unable to perform the

    ### Response:
    holding that injured employee failed to state a claim under pwdcra even though he informed his employer that he could return to work in two months
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    deficient. The PCR court did not make any findings or conclusions directly on this point. However, the court did find that the mitigation specialist, Barb Bumpus, had never worked on a capital case and was not qualified to do so; the Legal Defender’s Office restricted counsel’s ability to perform mitigation; and counsel had no supervisory authority over mitigation personnel. ¶ 60 Although both Shriver and Sinclair testified that the mitigation specialist was unqualified, defendants do not have a stand-alone right to a mitigation specialist. See Phillips v, Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199, 207-08 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[H]iring a mitigation specialist in a capital case is not a requirement of effective assistance of counsel.”); State v. Herring, 142 Ohio St.3d 165, 28 N.E.3d 1217, 1239 ¶ 113 (2014) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether counsel provided

    ### Response:
    holding defendant had no constitutional right to a mitigation specialist or a right to an effective one
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for Ozman’s actions. Plaintiff speculates that, in denying the summary judgment motion, Judge Duffy merely found that the default judgment did not establish the Bank’s responsibility for Ozman’s actions. Relying heavily on Judge Duffy’s statement that “[t]he default taken establishes nothing,” the Bank argues that Judge Duffy has already ruled that the default judgment cannot be used against the Bank. In addition, the Bank argues that a default judgment, as a matter of law, has no effect on a co-defendant. Finally, arguing that it has been prejudiced by Ozman’s actions, the Bank argues that the default judgment is not admissible because it is irrelevant hearsay. But see Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 467, 121 L.Ed.2d 375 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As an initial matter, it is not productive to

    ### Response:
    holding that statements of a company vice president were admissible against the principal owner of the company under fedrevid 801d2d as an admission made by the partys agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    We should leave this determination for another day. The issue has never been framed as a challenge to any specific restrictions in the release plan. The parties never requested that we formulate a test for determining when specific conditions of release would satisfy due process, or provide the district court with guidance as to what release conditions would do so. And it is in no way necessary that we resolve this issue in order to address the issue that is properly presented in this case. Thus, we should follow our typical practice of moving the law forward incrementally and wait for a case that requires us to craft a test for determining when specific conditions of release violate due process. See State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 99 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (<HOLDING>). Preferably, a case in which the parties ask

    ### Response:
    recognizing value of moving the law forward on an incremental basis
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    remand, the circuit court is instructed to determine the extent to which Dorsey satisfied the SIR requirements for each Gerling policy and to set off against Wheelwright’s recovery against Gerling under the consent judgment the amount of the SIR for each respective policy that was not satisfied by Dorsey. E. Gerling’s Argument that Dorsey Was “Not Legally Obligated to Pay” Gerling argues that its polices contain provisions requiring it to pay only those sums, in excess of the SIR amount, that Dorsey became “legally obligated to pay.” Gerling argues that because the consent judgment permits Wheelwright “to collect the judgment only to the extent that Dorsey’s insurance provides coverage,” Dorsey was never legally obligated to pay any part of the judgment. Gerling relie (5th Cir.1969)(<HOLDING>).” The circuit court also attached importance

    ### Response:
    holding that an insurance company which chose not to defend its insured could not later deny coverage by asserting the legally obligated to pay provision in the policy after the insured reached a settlement where the injured party agreed to collect only against insurance proceeds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and uncle and the children had stability for the first time in their lives. Id. at 218-14. Additionally, Angie Deeds, the children's therapist, testified that she believed it would be harmful to the children to continue the parent-child relationship. Id. at 118. Deeds testified that the children had been doing better since having more stability in their lives and would continue to improve with stability. Id. In sum, these recommendations by the caseworker and the therapist coupled with the evidence of Wedding's extensive drug use, her failure to complete court-ordered services, and testimony that the children were thriving in their current home is sufficient to support a finding that termination of parental rights is in the children's best interest. See Im re A.J., 881 N.E.2d at 718-19 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that the recommendations of the childrens caseworker and guardian ad litem coupled with evidence of the mothers extensive drug history her incompletion of courtordered services and testimony that the children were happy and doing well in their foster homes were sufficient for the trial court to determine that termination of parental rights was in the childrens best interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that Defendant was entitled to a credit for taxes paid on the amount he originally received. See Clark v. Clark, No. D2976-86 (Sup.Ct.D.C. Apr. 21, 1995). 4 . On October 5, 1990, Defendant answered Plaintiff's complaint and also filed a counterclaim against his former wife. Defendant’s counterclaim asserted that Plaintiff was indebted to him for his interest in real property owned by them as tenants-in-common. He claimed that she had not accounted for past rental profits and that he was due his share of the value of the property from which he claims to have been ousted. 5 . The Court notes that the holding in Reese has been slightly modified by statute and case law, but with no effect on its application to this case. See Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 301, 133

    ### Response:
    recognizing that in passing the pension annuitants protection act of 1994 publ no 103401 oct 22 1994 amending 29 usc  1132a congress clarified that former pension plan participants or beneficiaries of terminated plans do in fact have standing to sue in the case of a fiduciary breach involving the purchase of insurance contracts or annuities
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mental health evaluation and diagnosed Voth with resolved delirium due to a general medical condition, sustained remission alcohol dependence, and hypertension. In his report, Dr. Pounds concluded that Voth was presently competent but that Voth met the statutory criteria for legal insanity on the date of the incident. Dr. Pounds opined that the most likely cause of Voth's psychotic episode was an unidentified viral infection. Significantly, Dr. Pounds considered and explicitly rejected the possibility that the psychotic episode was the result of intoxication. 17 After receiving Dr. Pounds's report, the People stipulated to the NGRI finding and requested that Voth be committed to a mental health facility pursuant to People v. Laeke, 2012 CO. 18, 1 17, 271 P.3d 1111, 1115-16 (<HOLDING>), and section 16-8-105.5(4) (requiring that a

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant does not have the right to a jury trial where a plea of ngri is entered and the prosecution concedes that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sweeny site, Union Pacific’s contract mowers never came to mow the tall grass and weeds that surrounded the track and equipment. Dr. Murray testified that the mosquitoes that are most responsible for the transmission of West Nile virus—Culex mosquitoes— nest in dark, damp places. She also testified that they can nest in high grass and weeds. Dr. Murray testified that although the Culex mosquito typically lies dormant in the heat of the day, “if it’s disturbed in the heat[,] it would probably leave its resting place.” In short, there was evidence that the tamper’s state of disrepair allowed mosquitoes to both enter and/or nest in the cab. The high grass and weeds at the worksite, which were .never mowed in the four months that Nami’s crew wo , (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Nami’s case is clearly distinguishable.

    ### Response:
    holding that a restaurant supply employer had no duty to warn a delivery truck driver employee of the danger associated with water on a floor because that is a commonly known hazard and obvious to everyone
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of an old, defective, or low quality saddle. Defs SMF ¶ 19, Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs Statement of Material Fact ¶ 19 (Docket # 31) (PL’s Opp’n Def.’s SMF). Instead she asserts that Tinkerbell was not “properly saddled” and that her fall was “most likely due to Ms. Balmer’s negligence in failing to properly tighten the girth on the saddle or to perform the necessary checks to make sure that the saddle was properly secure.” Amend. Compl. ¶20; PL’s SAMF ¶49. Urging a more expansive definition of faulty tack and equipment, Samantha cites two decisions in which the definition of faulty tack was extended to include the improper installation or positioning of equipment or tack which is otherwise in sound condition. See Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corporation, 132 N.M. 332, 48 P.3d 70, 78 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center,

    ### Response:
    holding the terms faulty and faulty condition to be reasonably susceptible to an interpretation extending them to situations in which the fault consists of applying or positioning the equipment or tack in an unsafe manner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    disability or restraint, physical or otherwise.” To the extent the majority suggests that a restraint need be “physical” in order to resemble a punitive sanction, such a requirement simply does not exist. Rather, Smith discusses physical restraints as only one kind of possible restraint a criminal law might impose. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. In fact, our society regularly punishes wrongdoers without actually imposing physical restraints on them, most commonly, with criminal fines. And Supreme Court decisions tasked with applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to ascertain the penal or regulatory nature of a particular sanction have regularly found non-physical sanctions to be affirmative disabilities or restraints. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 774, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (<HOLDING>). In fact, Mendoza-Martinez itself held a

    ### Response:
    holding a tax on illegal drugs to be a punitive measure in part because it allowed for sanctions by restraint of debtors property
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    delay, or defraud creditors. F/R further asserted that the Levin Parties were equitably estopped from asserting section 726.110(1) as a bar to its claim because of the alleged false testimony regarding the reasons for the assignment and the delay in producing accounting documents. In a written order, denying the Levin Parties’ motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial court agreed with F/R that the one-year savings clause in section 726.110(1) was not triggered until F/R discovered or should have discovered the fraudulent nature of the assignments. It did not reach F/R’s alternative argument that the Levin Parties were equitably es-topped from asserting d 1186 (1997) (en banc) (same), with In re Hill, No. 3:03-cv-1034-J-32, 2004 WL 5694988, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 4, 2004) (Hill I) (<HOLDING>), and Treinish v. Spitaleri, No. 05-94988, 2006

    ### Response:
    holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1990), the court ruled that the defendant restaurant did not have to reinstate the plaintiff veteran on the grounds that the plaintiff was unqualified under the VRRA because he brought numerous weapons to work, threatened to Idll fellow employees and served liquor to underage patrons. Moreover, all of this behavior occurred within six months prior to the plaintiff leaving to enter the service. Similarly, in Green v. Tho-Ro Products, Inc., 232 F.2d 172 (3 Cir., 1956), the court affirmed judgment for the defendant employer, holding that the plaintiff veteran was unqualified under the VRRA because he urged other employees to pass off defective products, created general discord in the workplace and threatened on numerous occasions to ruin the company. See also Doane, supra, 164 F.2d 537 (<HOLDING>); Greathouse, supra, 381 F.Supp. 156 (ruling

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence that plaintiff employee was often drunk at work should have been admitted at trial because it bore on the issue of whether he was qualified under the vrra
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an error is harmless might suggest an error is per se reversible; however, it does not make it so. As for the error Knight raises, any question as to whether it is, or ever was, per se reversible was answered by the supreme court in Galindez: Finally, in [Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) ], the Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that harmless error analysis does not apply to [Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000),] error. Accordingly, to the extent some of our pre-Apprendi decisions may suggest that the failure to submit factual issues to the jury is not subject to harmless error analysis, Re-cuenco has superseded them. See, e.g., State v. Estevez, 753 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hargrove, 694 So.2d 729, 730

    ### Response:
    holding that even where the evidence is uncontroverted to sentence a defendant to a minimum mandatory sentence for trafficking the jury must make express findings of the amount of cocaine involved
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a judicial action does not “contest the wisdom of broad mili tary policy,” the Feres doctrine requires courts to reject actions which are “the type of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.” Shearer, 473 U.S. at 59, 105 S.Ct. 3039. If a suit requires deep inquiry into military decisions or would strongly impact military discipline, the Feres doctrine will bar it. These considerations that prohibit servicemen’s suits against the government also prompt the extension of the Feres doctrine to prohibit non-servicemen’s suits against the government which are derivative of or ancillary to servicemen’s injuries. See Kendrick v. United States, 877 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1102

    ### Response:
    holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). State claims remain unexhausted if state proceedings remain pending at the time the petition is filed. Nonetheless, we have held that unjustified delay by a state court in adjudicating a direct criminal appeal may give rise to both a due process violation and relief from the exhaustion requirement itself. Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1555, 1557 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. §

    ### Response:
    holding that inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing claims for relief may make the state process ineffective to protect the petitioners rights and excuse exhaustion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    first-time offender waiver allows the court to impose up to 90 days of confinement for some first-time offenders “who have never been previously convicted of a felony in this state, federal court, or another state.” RCW 9.94A.650(1), (2). The trial court has the discretion to waive the imposition of a standard range sentence and sentence a defendant under the first-time offender option. RCW 9.94A.650(2); State v. Johnson, 97 Wn. App. 679, 682, 988 P.2d 460 (1999). The trial court declined to grant the first-time offender waiver because Kinneman’s theft amounted to a “major economic offense” and was an abuse of trust. 3 Former RCW 9A.56.010(17)(c) (1999) (amended as RCW 9A.56.010(18)(c) by Laws op 2002, ch. 97, § 1). 4 See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 299, 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572, 683

    ### Response:
    recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    terms of these statutory provisions, this court and others have held that liability under section 1132(c)(1) is confined to the plan administrator and have rejected the contention that other parties, including claims administrators, can be held liable for the failure to supply participants with the plan documents they seek. Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir.1998); Jones, 16 F.3d at 144; Gore v. El Paso Energy Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 477 F.3d 833, 843-44 (6th Cir.2007); Ross v. Rail Car Am. Group Disability Income Plan, 285 F.3d 735, 743-44 (8th Cir.2002); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1010 (2d Cir.1993); McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401, 403-05 (10th Cir.1993). See also Klosterman v. Western Gen. Mgmt., Inc., 32 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (coll, cases dealing with section 1024(b)).

    ### Response:
    holding that liability for failing to comply with requirements of 29 usc  1022b as to contents of spd falls solely on plan administrator
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that term was defined in § 13102(12). B. The Secretary of Transportation Has Discretion Over Cargo Liability Insurance Although Congress’ aim was to eliminate the separate registration requirements for common and contract carriers, we do not believe that fact is dispositive in this case. Rather, what is most important is the method by which Congress saw fit to implement the Termination Act. With respect to insurance, Congress left it to the Secretary of Transportation’s discretion to require cargo liability insurance. As we have stated, § 13906(a)(3) replaced former § 10927(a)(3) and gave the Secretary discretion over whether “a registered motor carrier,” including carriers once classified as common or contract, must insure cargo. The district court relie Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (<HOLDING>). The only ICC interpretation of the Motor

    ### Response:
    holding that when congress included provisions of compulsory testimony act of 1893 in the emergency price control act of 1942 it necessarily adopted settled judicial construction of the 1893 act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    parent is absolutely bound to provide reasonably for [the child's] maintenance and education, and [the parent] may be sued for necessaries furnished, and schooling given to a child, under just and reasonable circumstances”). 4 . Our dissenting colleagues rely upon the absence of any express statement of this authority in Chapter 156, sometimes referring to this absence as the “silence” of Chapter 156. See post at pp. 720-21. Though the Legislature could have stated this authority expressly in Chapter 156, its failure to do so is not disposi-tive. The Legislature stated in section 156.401 that trial courts may modify a child-support order under circumstances such as those presented in the case under review. Se 02-00091-CV, 2003 WL 21705248, at *8 (Tex.App.-Austin Jul. 24, 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>) (mem. op.). Our Legislature has provided that

    ### Response:
    holding that attorneys fees for quantummeruit claim may be recovered under texas civil practice and remedies code section 38001 because this claim falls within general statutory language even though statute does not specifically refer to quantummeruit claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judge. The State of Florida appeals the sentence imposed after the postconviction court granted Carolyn Stewart’s motion to modify sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). We have jurisdiction. § 924.07(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2011). After a jury trial, Stewart was convicted of poisoning food and water in violation CA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. State, 825 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Fla.

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3800c motion filed one day late
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    at the time the complaint was filed, also give rise to a possible loss of consortium claim. See Bennett v. Lembo, 145 N.H. 276, 282, 761 A.2d 494 (2000) (upholding $25,000 verdict for wife where defendant’s negligence rendered husband less “physically active”). Objectively viewed, Evans’s claims for her own alleged Hepatitis A and the loss of consortium and emotional distress resulting from her family’s allegedly coming down with the disease could be valued at $75,000 or more. See Stewart, 356 F.3d at 340 (concluding that married couple’s claims for slight “permanent impairment to their total bodily functions” in addition to mental anguish and loss of consortium not worth less than $75,000 per plaintiff); cf. Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 129-131 (1st Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Evans also seeks multiple damages under the

    ### Response:
    holding that claim for emotional distress arising out of daughters relatively minor injuries did not exceed 50000 for purposes of amount in controversy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const, amend. VI. However, the Confrontation Clause does not preclude admission of an out-of-court statement if admission of the statement is necessary, and the statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. State v. Roby, 463 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Minn. 1990). Because DeVerney and Greenleaf are unavailable due to their refusal to testify, their statements are necessary. See Byers, 570 N.W.2d at 494. In addition, the same guarantees of trustworthiness that rendered the prior testimony admissible under the catchall exception to the hearsay rule satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3150, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether the statements satisfy

    ### Response:
    holding that factors used in determining whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable to satisfy hearsay exceptions also apply to whether statements have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness under confrontation clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    managerial employees of an adverse party, even if the contact is made without the consent of the organization’s counsel. CarboMedics, Inc. v. ATS Med., Inc., Civ. No. 06-4601, 2008 WL 5500760, at *5-6 (D.Minn. April 16, 2008) (citing Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2, Comment 7). However, a lawyer having contact with an organization’s former employees must not infringe on the organization’s legal rights. Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.4 (stating that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not ... use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of [a third party]”); see also Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2, Comment 7; CarboMedics, 2008 WL 5500760, at *6. Such rights include the right not to have privileged and confidential information disclosed. See Arnold, 2004 WL 2203410, at *7 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the “pivotal question in evaluating [an

    ### Response:
    recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    argument that Intervenors’ lack Article III standing to maintain their appeal absent the government. 1. Intervenors’ Standing As noted above, Public Lands Council and American Farm Bureau Federation intervened on behalf of the BLM in the district court and now pursue this appeal. Although the BLM filed a notice of appeal, it subsequently abandoned its appeal. The end result is that Intervenors seek to defend the 2006 Regulations — regulations that the BLM itself no longer seeks to defend. While this situation presents an unusual circumstance, it is not one without precedent, and it is well established that the government is not the only party who has standing to defend the validity of federal regulations. See, e.g., Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1110 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Didrickson v. U.S. Dep’t of the

    ### Response:
    holding that intervenors could appeal and challenge the grant of injunctive relief by defending the governments action against alleged violations of nepa when the federal defendants decided not to appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The date of the alleged injury was in 2003. Defendant therefore argues that the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Frost’s testimony. I agree. In Purvis, this Court held that an expert’s testimony was properly excluded where the expert’s only knowledge of the locality came four years after the alleged injury. Id. at 480-81, 624 S.E.2d at 385. We r s testimony was properly excluded per Purvis and thus plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient expert testimony to defeat defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, and I would affirm the ruling of the trial court on that ground. 3 . The fact that plaintiff’s expert relied on internet research is not a sufficient ground to exclude an expert’s testimony. See Coffman v. Roberson, 153 N.C. App. 618, 624-25, 571 S.E.2d 255, 259 (2002)

    ### Response:
    holding that experts may rely in part on internet research
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    we recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, the courts of appeals have generally limited the use of a spoliation instruction to two circumstances (generally referred to as the “two rules”): (1) a party’s deliberate destruction of relevant evidence, and (2) a party’s failure to produce relevant evidence or explain its nonproduction. 106 S.W.3d at 721. Under the first rule, a presumption arises that a party who deliberately destroys evidence does so because it is unfavorable to the party’s case. Id. Under the second, the same presumption arises because the party who controls the missing evidence is unable to explain its failure to produce the evidence. Id. at 722. Though we have never expressly adopted these two rules, both derive from our nineteenth-century precedent. See Cheatham, 8 Tex. at 167 (<HOLDING>); Underwood, 59 Tex. at 170 (observing that a

    ### Response:
    recognizing that all things are presumed against a wrongdoer
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regularly used subcontractors for this work and he was familiar with the costs the subcontractors charged his company. While Fitzwater’s estimate is based on the entire basement square footage, on remand the district court should adjust the damages awarded by: (1) deducting an appropriate amount for the southern portion of the basement deconstruction and remodeling necessitated by the sewer back-ups and not caused by the undisclosed water problem; (2) deducting an appropriate amount for any basement bathroom deconstruction and remodeling; and (3) adjusting the mold remediation damages if the court deems it necessary. These steps will allow the court, while admittedly using some speculation, to arrive at a reasonable approximation of damages. See Metropolitan Transfer, 328 N.W.2d at 538 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, on remand the district court

    ### Response:
    holding defendants should not escape liability on the ground that the measure of damages attributable to them is uncertain
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir.1998). If Jones’s stop of the car was based neither on probable cause to believe that it was involved in a traffic violation nor reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in illegal activity, the ensuing search was illegal and the evidence obtained is inadmissible against Humphrey unless the government can demonstrate that the evidence was obtained independently of the illegal search. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Here, if the Defendant was illegally stopped, then the consent obtained was likely a product of that illegal stop and was vitiated. See e.g. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). But if Jones had probable cause to stop the

    ### Response:
    holding that consent given immediately after an illegal stop was vitiated by the illegality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the special rules which have developed in that field. 234 N.W.2d at 793. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit has held, with respect to defamation and tortious interference claims brought under Minnesota law in the context of a labor dispute, that the malice standard required for “actionable defamation claims ... must equally be met for a tortious interference claim based on the same conduct or statements.” Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Comm’l Workers Union, 39 F.3d 191, 196 (8th Cir.1994) (footnote omitted). Indeed, the court held that “a plaintiff may not avoid the protection afforded by the Constitution and federal labor law merely by the use of creative pleading.” Id.; accord Johnson v. CBS, Inc., No. Civ-3-95624, slip op. at 5, 1996 WL 907735 (D.Minn. Sept. 4, 1996) (<HOLDING>). A decision of the Seventh Circuit (applying

    ### Response:
    holding that where both defamation and tortious interference claims are pled and are based on same facts minnesota law requires the application of the actual malice standard to tortious interference claims
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a letter dated January 7, 2007, from Lian YanPing, see AR at 365, and another dated December 26, 2006, from Mr. Lin’s wife, see AR at 359-60, contained any reference to physical harm suffered by Mr. Lin himself. See AR at 202-97. See also Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287 (applicant has the burden of rebutting the adverse credibility determination). Moreover, the Board specifically noted that Mr. Lin failed to identify “evidence of record that corroborates” his allegations of physical harm. AR at 4. Mr. Lin produced no evidence other than his own testimony and his November 2010 affidavit suggesting his own past persecution. Accordingly, the Board’s adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence and was sufficient to deny Mr. Lin’s claim. See Mohammed, 547 F.3d at 1352 (<HOLDING>). IV Because we affirm the Board’s adverse

    ### Response:
    holding that an adverse credibility determination may be dispositive where the applicant does not produce any corroborating evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    under Section 3294. See, e.g., Mantic Ashanti’s Cause v. Godfather’s Pizza, No. 98-CV-2264 W, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16675, at *18-19 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 1999) (“[C]onclusory assertions that the defendants acted with ‘malice’ or with ‘conscious disregard’ for plaintiffs rights are facially sufficient under federal pleading requirements and adequate to state a claim for punitive damages under Section 3294.”); Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F.Supp. 1341, 1353-54 (N.D.Cal.1997) (“[DJespite section 3294’s specific requirement that a pleading allege oppression, fraud, or malice, these ‘may be averred generally.’ ”) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)); Bure v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir.1993); see also Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell, 48 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1371 (S.D.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>); 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

    ### Response:
    holding that district court could not apply florida statute requiring heightened pleading for punitive damages because statute conflicted with lenient requirements of rules 8 and 9b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have violated the duty to inform at any point the alien becomes eligible for relief under a post-removal interpretation of the law. He supports this argument with citations to cases involving direct review of removal orders. See, e.g., Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2009). We disagree. First, such an interpretation would require the IJ to inform an alien about relief for which the alien is apparently in eligible during the hearing. It would also require an IJ to give an alien the “opportunity to make application” for relief that was not available “during the hearing.” See § 1240.11(a)(2). This interpretation is plainly illogical and inconsistent with the unambiguous language of § 1240.11(a)(2). See also United States v. Garza-Sanchez, 217 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Because the IJ does not violate §

    ### Response:
    holding that a precursor of  124011a2 did not require the ij to inform the alien  of potential constitutional challenges to the immigration laws because such challenges were not mentioned in the regulatory text
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    imposition of attorneys’ fees only against removing parties and not against removing attorneys. The federal bankruptcy court, however, disagreed. It held that, as a matter of law, § 1447(c) applied both to parties and to attorneys. Appellees sought immediate review, and on interlocutory appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland reversed. Crescent City Estates, LLC v. MR Crescent City, LLC (In re Crescent City), 2008 WL 5216243 (D.Md. Dec. 9, 2008). After examining statutory text, legislative history, and relevant case law, the district court concluded that “§ 1447(c) ... [gave] authority to impose liability for costs (includin Inc., 1993 WL 405494, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1993) (same), with Peraza v. Mazak, 2008 WL 186613, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 18, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Saxon v. Thomas, 2007 WL 1115239, at *5-6

    ### Response:
    holding that  1447c applies to counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    it was correct as to the wrongfully rejected votes and thus, for the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1. An election may be contested “[wjhen illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at the polls sufficient to change or place in doubt the result.” OCGA § 21-2-522 (3). When illegal voting has been alleged, “it is only necessary to show (1) that electors voted in the particular contest being challenged and (2) a sufficient number of them were not qualified to vote. .. . [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Taggart v. Phillips, 242 Ga. 454, 455 (249 SE2d 245) (1978) (decided under prior version of OCGA § 21-2-522). See also Jones v. Jessup, 279 Ga. 531, 532 (615 SE2d 529) (2005); Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268, 274-275 (601 SE2d 99) (2004) (Hunstein, J., concurring specially) (<HOLDING>); Bailey v. Colwell, 263 Ga. 111 (428 SE2d 570)

    ### Response:
    recognizing distinction between illegal voter cases and irregular ballot cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    factually distinguishable. Corea involved the State’s attempt to validate a warrantless search conducted with the consent of a third party whom the State alleged had apparent authority. Id. at 315. After police officers received a tip that the defendant possessed stolen property, the officers went to the defendant’s apartment and received written consent to search the apartment from the defendant’s brother-in-law, who was a resident of the apartment. The officers then conducted a search of the defendant’s bedroom and discovered a paper bag containing cocaine. The trial court found that the brother-in-law had apparent authority to consent to the search and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. at 314-15. In reversing the trial court’s jud -Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Unlike Corea, appellant was never suspected

    ### Response:
    holding that child residents had no actual or apparent authority to consent to search of mothers home
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the debtors to pay attorneys’ fees associated with collecting any default. These charges also have not been paid by the debtors. Thus, while the debtors have resumed making their monthly payments, it is unquestionable that the debtors remain in default on their obligation. Clearly, there is a factual distinction between Belanger and the instant case. American National Bank contends that this distinction is sufficient to remove the instant ease from the purview of Belanger. The Bank argues that because of the default in this case the debtors must either reaffirm their obligation or redeem the debt in order to retain the collateral under § 521(2). I agree with American National Bank that the holding in Belanger is not directly applicable to the instant case. See Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 48 (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 89 F.3d at 251 (“The Fourth Circuit

    ### Response:
    recognizing that belanger applies to debtors who are current on a loan
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    specifications ... [Portland] reserves the right to set forth additional requirements if deemed necessary, (emphasis added). The Requirements potentially affect use of the land beyond the pipeline easement itself. Section 5.1.1 requires notification of any blasting proposed within “300 feet of [Portland’s] facilities.” Portland paints itself as the picture of flexibility in applying the Requirements and insists that it would permit certain uses, such as parking lots or access roads, on or near the pipeline easement. Nonetheless, as it concedes, it would have to do a project-by-project review to ensure safe and effective operation of the pipeline. Thus, from the viewpoint of the prospective purchaser, the Requirements introduce a hassle f an County, 197 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). B. Partial Takings As the parties agree,

    ### Response:
    holding that under fedrcivp 71a federal procedure governs condemnation actions brought under the natural gas act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    driving was a summary offense which carried a maximum sentence of not more than ten days imprisonment. Hence, the former serves as a disqualifying conviction under Section 922(g) of the Gun Control Act, whereas the latter does not. The PSP challenges the validity of the trial court’s partial expungement order and places heavy emphasis on the fact that it was not notified of, nor was it a party to, Rush’s expungement proceedings before the trial court. At the same time, the PSP concedes that even if it had been given proper notice, it was without standing to object to Rush’s petition for partial expungement before the trial court. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 338, 615 A.2d 946 (1992), affirmed, 533 Pa. 324, 623 A.2d 814 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court

    ### Response:
    holding that the psp lacks standing to object to an expungement request
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909, 106 S.Ct. 279, 88 L.Ed.2d 244 (1985). The district court did not err in analogizing this case to Puritan Fashions. For these reasons, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in granting the stay. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 1 . Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). 2 . Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). 3 . There has been conflict among the cases in this circuit concerning whether the Colorado River/Moses Cone factors should apply to a declaratory judgment action. See generally, Mission Insurance Co. v. Puritan Fashions, Corp., 706 F.2d 599, 601 n. 1 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Evans-ton Insurance Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844

    ### Response:
    holding that moses conecolorado river factors do not apply to declaratory judgment actions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The three-year period is designed to enlarge the time in which to bring a claim if a party does not learn of the fraud until years after the fraud was committed. It is not meant to curtail the period in which claims can be filed. Therefore, defendant’s counterclaim under 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) is not barred by the three-year statute of limitations. 2. Initiating the Six-Year Period Under the Statute of Limitations The next issue to consider is when the statute of limitations began to r L.Ed.2d 663 (1993); United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 888 F.Supp. 419, 441-42 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (same); United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F.Supp. 624, 629 (N.D.Ill.1992) (same); United States ex rel. Duvall v. Scott Aviation, 733 F.Supp. 159, 161 (W.D.N.Y.1990) (<HOLDING>); Blusal Meats, Inc. v. United States, 638

    ### Response:
    holding it is the payment and not the request which triggers the statute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    wish to be mindful of in imposing a sentence over the loss of life of four Jewish people. I accept that you are a good friend, are a loving husband, and will prove to be a good father to your child as you have another child I understand. It is my sentence to downward depart by one year and impose a sentence of [double chai] 36 years, Florida state prison. While the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in consideration of Jewish tradition and the use of chai, discretion is not involved. The essence of his claim, albeit obliquely made, is that the court used improper criteria in determining the extent of a downward departure. Although an appellate court generally may not review a sentence that is within statutory limits, an exception exists when the tr (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). In Nawaz, 28 So.3d at 125, the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that biblical references should not be used at sentencing but any error in the trial judges lone biblical reference in penalty phase of trial was harmless where jury was not exposed to the reference and the courts order stated that it did not consider any aggravators other than the two set forth in the order
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    falls within the latter category because there is an express trust. LCC relies on the language in the bylaws and articles of incorporation for the Property Corporation, which states, in relevant part, that the purpose of the Property Corporation is “[t]o operate exclusively for the benefit of, and to carry out the purposes of the Lamont Christian Reformed Church, Coopersville, Michigan, or any church formed by a majority of the members of the Lamont Christian Reformed Church ....” Reliance on this language is only valid, however, as long as LCRC had the authority to set up the Property Corporation and transfer ownership of the church property to the Property Corporation. If LCRC had no such authority, the provisions of the Property Corporation are void. See Blankespoor, supra at 352 (<HOLDING>). Our determination whether LCRC had such

    ### Response:
    holding that once a local church submits itself to the authority of a hierarchical denomination provisions of the denominations constitution override inconsistent provisions in a local churchs articles of association
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that it would not have any effect on Tecfidera sales, Rather, it alleges that defendants misrepresented and omitted the alleged substantial effect that the PML death was having on Tecfidera sales. The dispute is essentially one of degree, and the Court will not dismiss the claim on those grounds. 15 . The alleged misrepresentations in paragraphs 108, 113, and 131 of the complaint will be discussed in the section below concerning puffery. 16 . See also In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 Fed.Appx. 296, 304 (9th Cir.2005) (""We have held the following similar statements to be non-actionable puffery: ‘We're doing well and I think we have a great future’; ... 'Old products are doing very well.’” (emphasis added)); In re Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 33 F.Supp.3d 1107, 1133 (N.D.Cal.2014) (<HOLDING>). 17 . The statements at issue concern the

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants statement to analysts those countries all continue to do well for us was puffing in part because he omitted any mention of why how under what standard or compared to what those markets were doing well emphasis added
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the detainee appears before a magistrate). Rather, the Fourth Amendment claim appears to be simply a repackaged claim for malicious prosecution. Our circuit doesn’t permit, this maneuver; we’ve held that a federal claim for malicious prosecution implicates (or at most may implicate) the right to due process, not the Fourth Amendment, and that no federal malicious-prosecution claim is available if state law provides a similar cause of action. Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2001). Indiana does provide a remedy for malicious prosecution, but the Indiana Tort Claims Act confers on public employees a broad immunity' from suit for acts committed within the scope of their employment. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(6); see also Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593-95 (7th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). We’ve held that this statutory immunity

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    FCC must be filed “within 60 days after its entry.” 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2000); see also 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). In this case, the petition for review was filed within 60 days of the Clarification but not within 60 days of the Supplemental Order. Respondent argues that it is timely only as to claims that arose from the Clarification, not as to ones essentially aimed at the Supplemental Order. But the Clarification radically changed the Supplemental Order in a way we have not yet mentioned. In the Supplemental Order the Commission said that it would issue a final decision on the EELs restriction in the Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”), which notice “will occur on or before June 30, 2000.” Supplemental Order, 15 FCC Red 1760 at Comm’n, 720 F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here the initial order appeared to present

    ### Response:
    holding that a temporary order with no fixed time period had lasted so long as to make judicial review timely
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a prima facie case. Second, the Court finds Defendant proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs employment, Plaintiffs repeated performance problems as a Kmart Store Manager, but Plaintiff failed to establish that this reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Each shortcoming in the Plaintiffs case — his failure to establish a prima facie case and his failure to prove pret en as to three prongs of the prima facie case. He demonstrated he was born in 1950, and so was over age 40 when he was terminated in April 2010. (Complaint ¶ 7). He demonstrated he suffered an adverse employment action, when he was fired as a Kmart Store Manager. And he also presented evidence that he was replaced by two significantly younger employees — first (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs problem is that he has failed to

    ### Response:
    holding when an employee was temporarily replaced by a person who was 10 years younger and permanently replaced by a person four years younger this was sufficient for the prima facie case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Assessment (“EA”) rather than a more extensive Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), which is normally required for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” Tree Boa, 918 F.Supp. at 891-92. Judge Finch concluded that the plaintiffs’ had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim, because, as FEMA had adequately considered the environmental impact of the housing project and provided for mitigation measures to reduce “to an insignificant level” any adverse effects on the Tree Boa, its Environmental Assessment satisfied NEPA’s requirements. In disposing of plaintiffs’ ESA claims in turn, Judge Finch concluded that FEMA and FWS had conducted an adequate § 7 consultation, as requir d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Restatement of Judgments, supra, § 20, cmt.

    ### Response:
    holding that everything after denial of jurisdiction is dicta pure and simple
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the law. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006) (defining agency as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when [a principal] manifests assent to [an agent] that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control”). Moreover, as discussed below, the Court concludes on the pleadings before it that there is no basis to hold IBM liable under theories of respondeat superior or vicari ous liability for the actions of the John Doe defendant, even if the attacks were actually carried out by an IBM employee or agent. Under District of Columbia law, an employer cannot be held liable for its employees’ intentional conduct solely on the basis of an employer-employee relationship. See Haddon v. United States, 68 F.3d 1420, 1424 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); see also Keys v. Wash.

    ### Response:
    holding that it is not enough that an employees job provides an opportunity to commit an intentional tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    by the Court.” As discussed above, we generally will consider an issue waived that is not raised by the appellant. Chase, 9 A.3d at 1256. It is also true, however, that the trial justice assumed, without deciding, an element of a claim in a summary judgment proceeding, which we have held is “consistent with the summary judgment standard of viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here, [the] plaintiff.” See Daniels v. Fluette, 64 A.3d 302, 305 (R.I.2013). We consistently have agreed with the United States Supreme Court that a plaintiffs burden to establish a prima facie ease of discrimination is “not especially onerous.” See Barros, 710 A.2d at 685; see also St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (<HOLDING>); McGarry, 47 A.3d at 280. In Daniels, 64 A.3d

    ### Response:
    holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    subject matter jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court and must be tried in the district court. See Adams v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., No. 95-1736,1996 WL 228567, *2 (1st Cir. May 7, 1996) (“[T]he specific provisions in question, viz 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B) and 157(b)(5), strictly limit the authority of bankruptcy judges with respect to personal injury and wrongful death claims.”); In the Matter of Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1153 (7th Cir.1992) (“Section 157(b)(5) requires that such actions be tried in the district court.”); Hansen v. Borough of Seaside Park (In re Hansen), 164 B.R. 482, 485-86 (D.N.J. 1994) (“Pursuant to the express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), bankruptcy courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over personal injury tort causes of action 62 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1991) (<HOLDING>); Vinci v. Town of Carmel (In re Vinci), 108

    ### Response:
    holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    '550 patent would have greater than 75% of its copolymer-1 molecules, on a molar fraction basis, having molecular weights between 2,000 and 20,000 daltons. To establish inherency, Mylan must prove that an attribute is necessarily present each time the prior art is practiced. See Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Inherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily present,’ not merely probably or possibly present, in the prior art.”). Against this standard, citing a few examples where overlap might occur is legally insufficient to establish that the claimed molar fractions inherently overlap with the molar fractions of the prior art. See also Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721

    ### Response:
    holding no inherent disclosure of claimed crystalline polymorph by prior art patent where practicing disclosed prior art method could produce claimed polymorph or alternative unclaimed polymorph
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Torts § 64(a) was adopted here, Plaintiff would still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the undisputed facts in this case because the higher burden is met under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 428. The Court leaves this difficult question to the discretion of the Supreme Court, but highlights that the Second and Third Restatement provisions regarding a contractor’s nondelegable duties must be analyzed as a collective scheme which attempts to consolidate the application of these many nuanced and overlapping common law principles. 56 Black’s Law Dictionary, Instrumentality (9th ed. 2009) (“A thing used to achieve an end or purpose.”). 57 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 428 cmt. a (emphasis added). 58 See Reith, 22 Ill. App. 3d 337, 317 N.E.2d 369, 373 (1974) (<HOLDING>); See Williamson 265 S.W.2d 354. 59 Plaintiff’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing a telephone company operating under a franchise agreement as holding a nondelegable duty to the public
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    legal rights between domestic and foreign claimants should no longer be a factor justifying the separate classification of such claims. In any event, most, if not all, of the foreign claims would likely be subject to forum non conveniens dismissal. See, e.g., Ashley, 887 F.Supp. 1469 (granting Dow Coming’s forum non conveniens motion as to 151,194 Australian, Canadian and British breast-implant plaintiffs). See also Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (discussing factors to be considered when deciding forum non con-veniens motion); Gschtvind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602 (10th Cir.1998); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir.1997); Magnin v. Tele-dyne Continental Motors 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir.1996); but see Bhatnagar, 52 F.3d 1220 (<HOLDING>). Thus far, the only foreign breast-implant

    ### Response:
    holding that extreme delay in the alternative forum can render that forum inadequate
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    require the same proof and level of preparation as those in Premier’s first amended answer. The Sellers’ proposed counterclaims seek much greater and varied damages than Premier’s counterclaims. In addition, the facts underpinning Premier’s counterclaims are distinct from those needed to sustain the Sellers’ proposed counterclaims. To allow the Sellers’ amendments now would unfairly obligate the Buyers to defend against these belated counterclaims, causing them to incur significant additional expenses by extending an already protracted discovery period. Given that the trial of this matter is less than two months away, to allow the proposed amendments at this late stage would impose undue hardship on the Buyers. See, e.g., Serrano Medina v. United States, 709 F.2d 104 (1st Cir. 1983) (<HOLDING>); DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480

    ### Response:
    holding that an eleventhhour amendment that would require extensive additional discovery would be prejudicial to the defendants
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    request for discovery. It asserts that Elliott failed to demonstrate good cause for such discovery because the Commonwealth provided him with a copy of a report concerning Nardone’s death, and Elliott fails to indicate what further documents exist to support his claim. The PCRA court’s ruling is supported by the record and is free from legal error. As recognized by the PCRA court, appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 592 Pa. 351, 925 A.2d 131, 136 (2007). A trial court may exclude evidence that is irrelevant to the issues presented. Evidence is not relevant “unless the inference sought to be raised by it bears upon a matter in issue and renders the desired inference more probab , 647 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence relating to a purported additional suspect where the evidence was speculative and had little or no probative value
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    existence of an extra-contractual duty between the parties, giving rise to a cause of action in tort separate from one based on the contract itself. The plaintiffs do not argue that their negligence claim falls into one of the three recognized exceptions, but they attempt to fashion a duty from the note-and-mortgage contract, from common law, and from GMAC Mortgage’s obligations under RES-PA. See PI. Reply Br. 8-15. However, each duty that the plaintiffs identify has its root in the note-and-mortgage contract itself. No matter GMAC Mortgage’s failings, the contract itself cannot give rise to an extra-contractual duty without some showing of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. See Judd v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Indianapolis, 710 F.2d 1237, 1241-Í2 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ploog v. HomeSide Lending. Inc., 209

    ### Response:
    holding under indiana law that mortgage contract did not create a trust requiring the mortgagee to account to the mortgagors as beneficiaries nor did it transform a traditional debtorcreditor relationship into a fiduciary relationship
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in attorney’s fees, but, as a result of settlements, the amount presently in dispute is $265,948.41. Similarly, the total cubic yards taken were initially 248,296; on account of the settlement, the total cubic yards still in dispute have been reduced to 196,808. These revised figures are reflected in the Decree, post. 4 . See La. Const. art. 6, §§ 1, 38 (recognizing parishes and levee districts as political subdivisions of the State). 5 . La. Const. art. 1, § 4(G) was added after the taking involved in this case and does not apply on that account. 6 . La. R.S. 29:721 et seq. 7 . The Supreme Court prospectively overruled St. Julien in Lake, Inc. v. La. Power & Light Co., 330 So.2d 914 (La.1976). See also City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, Inc., 412 So.2d 975, 977 (La.1981) (<HOLDING>). The Louisiana Legislature responded to this

    ### Response:
    holding that lake only overruled st julien prospectively
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    as in this case acted in a manner that did not comply with the man date of Criminal Rule 5 which requires trial courts to arrange and provide for the recording of objections. Perryman asserts that “possible objections at trial were needlessly lost for direct appeal purposes without counsel’s knowledge, and Perry-man therefore could not have had a fair trial.” Id. at 30. He argues that his “ability to appeal any error regarding objections and trial court rulings at his trial was severely compromised because most of those bench conferences and rulings are nonexistent in his trial record, and [he] could not appeal what does not exist, which is the prejudice to [him] in this matter.” Id. The State argues that this issue is unavailable for post-conviction proceedings because many “ina ) (<HOLDING>), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136,

    ### Response:
    holding that postconviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with a superappeal or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original trial court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the “lawyer and investigator had no authority ... to allow the vehicle to be destroyed, or to abandon a potential products liability claim.” Whether and to what extent an attorney-client relationship is present is a question of fact. See Dietz v. Doe, 131 Wash.2d 835, 935 P.2d 611, 615 (1997); Admiral Merchants Motor Freight Inc. v. O’Connor & Hannan, 494 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn.1992). In identifying the conduct of the first attorney and the investigator as a basis of its order, the circuit court implicitly found that an attorney-client relationship, or some other fiduciary relation, existed between Stender and her first attorney and that the relationship included representation with respect to the accident. See generally Otaka, Inc. v. Klein, 71 Haw. 376, 382, 791 P.2d 713, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). We review circuit court findings of fact

    ### Response:
    recognizing that where there is no express attorneyclient relationship there may exist nevertheless a fiduciary obligation or an implied professional relation citations brackets and ellipsis omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try defendant on the larceny charge and that it erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony breaking or entering charge. Because there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for misdemeanor breaking or entering, we remand for entry of judgment and resentencing on that offense. VACATED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED. Judges STEPHENS and McCULLOUGH concur. 1 . See, e.g., State v. Cook, 242 N.C. 700, 703, 89 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1955) (evidence sufficient to preclude inference where the defendant did not flee when discovered, explained that he was looking for a particular person, and left when requested), State v. Moore, 62 N.C. App. 431, 434, 303 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1983) (<HOLDING>), State v. Humphries, 82 N.C. App. 749, 751,

    ### Response:
    holding that there was sufficient evidence of innocent intent where both the states and defendants evidence showed that the defendant was coerced at knifepoint to enter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. Further, the complained-of acts that allegedly caused the decedent’s emotional distress and pain and suffering took place prior to his death, and the decedent eould have filed an FHA claim before he died. Even in the “unusual” event where the emotional distress and pain and suffering occurred at a time close to his death, following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Estate of Gilliam, the Court finds that the operation of Florida’s survival law to preclude recovery for the decedent’s pain and suffering and emotional distress under'the FHA in this case is not inconsistent with the purposes of the FHA, which is remedial in nature. See Walters v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass’n, No. CV 2012-24, 2012-25, 2013 WL 2988021 at *5-*6 (D.V.I. June 14, 2013) (<HOLDING>).-’ Plaintiffs’ reliance on Ambmster does not

    ### Response:
    holding that fha claim survives death of a defendant because the provisions are remedial not penal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    child a FAPE, it was incumbent on them to bring that to the school’s attention via the available statutory mechanisms,” and on that basis denied relief. (J.A. at 179.) In this connection, the district court noted that “[s]chool boards must be given adequate notice of problems if they are to remedy them, and must be given sufficient time to respond to those problems before they can be held liable for failure to act.” (J.A. at 179-80 (citing Combs, 15 F.3d at 363-64).) Several of our sister circuits have concluded that an award of “compensatory education” — educational services ordered by the court to be provided prospectively to compensate for a past deficient program — may be “appropriate relief’ under the IDEA. See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Board of Ed. of Oak Park & River Forest High

    ### Response:
    recognizing appropriateness in some circumstances of award of compensatory education beyond age 21 and re manding for determination of whether it should be awarded
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the driver, Paul Roach. The rental contract stated that no other drivers were permitted. Ramirez was injured when Roach struck her with the rental car and she obtained a default judgment against him. Ramirez then sued State Farm in an attempt to recover the judgment. Ramirez first contends that the district court erred in holding that the rental car was not a “temporary substitute car” covered by the policy. A “temporary substitute car” as defined in the policy is a car replacing a car that is unable to be used. This rental car was intended to be an additional car to serve the convenience of the renter. It was not a “temporary substitute car” within the meaning of the policy. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. O’Brien, 14 Cal.3d 96, 98-99, 120 Cal.Rptr. 692, 534 P.2d 388 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Ramirez next contends that the district court

    ### Response:
    holding that drivers decision to use alternate vehicle to avoid inconvenience of stopping at gas station did not render vehicle temporary substitute
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    639 (1980). However, a warrantless entry into a home may be justified if (1) the police have probable cause, and (2) exigent circumstances exist that make procurement s entry into the house did constitute an illegal search, we nonetheless find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Under the Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree” unless the alleged illegality is at least the “but for” cause of the discovery of the evidence. State v. Guo, 64 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). In other words, suppression of evidence is not required unless “the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activit —Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Because the warrantless entry was not even

    ### Response:
    holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and DeBoom did provide other evidence linking her termination to her pregnancy. DeBoom presented evidence to support an inference of discrimination and rebut the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination that Raining Rose put forth. First, DeBoom presented evidence of the circumstances of her termination. Raining Rose admitted it made the decision to terminate DeBoom sometime between the day she returned to work part-time and the day she was fired. DeBoom may fairly argue the termination decision was made before any of her alleged performance problems. Additionally, DeBoom provided evidence she was never notified of or disciplined for substandard performance prior to her termination whereas other employees received a warning before termination. See Smidt, 695 N.W.2d at 15-16 (<HOLDING>). Second, DeBoom presented statements from

    ### Response:
    holding a trier of fact could choose not to believe the employers afterthefact justifications where the employer failed to produce documentation of poor performance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (“[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.”); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (“An applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.”); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334,

    ### Response:
    holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    398, 407 (Alaska 1976) (citations omitted). 23 . Rollins v. State ex rel. Municipality of Anchorage, 748 P.2d 767, 771 (Alaska App.1988) (citing Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 826 (Alaska 1980)). 24 . Bayless & Roberts, 548 P.2d at 407 (citations omitted). 25 . Id. at 400. 26 . ""|T]he contradiction of my findings” is a reference to the letter the board wrote and sent out to the members with the copy of the court’s attorney's fees award. The letter the board wrote expressed, among other things, the board's disagreement with the court’s April 6 order and attorney's fees award. 27 . Continental Ins. Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d 398, 407 (Alaska 1976); Carter v. Brodrick, 750 P.2d 843, 845 (Alaska App.1988). 28 . Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 137 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Virgin v. Virgin, 990 P.2d 1040,

    ### Response:
    holding in child custody context that court not required to make wrapup finding
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cir.2002) (citing cases); United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 974-75 (6th Cir.1998) (same; finding probable cause to search the suspect’s residence though he was not seen selling drugs there but on the premises). When coupled with the anonymous tips, and the muriatic acid, and the fundamental fact that Defendant could not manufacture methamphetamine in the United States Post Office, the affidavit showed a fair probability that Defendant did so at his home. See United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir.2009) (stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant must be supported by probable cause, i.e. a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found in a particular place”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 594 (<HOLDING>). Alternatively, as the United States asserts,

    ### Response:
    holding that an affidavit describing a marijuana field near the residence to be searched and a road between failed to establish the required nexus between the premises and the criminal activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Colo., 758 F.2d 1362, 1364 (10th Cir.1985); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (deciding district court has inherent authority to control admission to its bar). The Disciplinary Panel adhered to the court’s own rules in denying Mr. Smith readmission. See Mattox, 758 F.2d at 1364 (stating that proper question on appeal is “whether the district court has adhered to its own rules”). Mr. Smith has not been reinstated to the Colorado Supreme Court and his membership in that bar is required before he can be reinstated to the district court’s bar. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for reinstatement. Cf. In re Kandekore, 460 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Nor did the district court abuse its

    ### Response:
    holding that the district court could properly deny attorneys readmission on the ground that he had not been readmitted to the bar of the state of new york
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    workers’ compensation awards whether by agreement or adjudication are final unless the Department reserves jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 9, 575 N.W.2d at 229 (citations omitted). Further, we noted that “we have recognized in various circumstances an abiding exception to the general rule of finality.... As early as 1921 this Court held that besides fraud and misrepresentation, ‘equitable grounds’ may be sufficient to set aside a release.” Id. ¶ 10, 575 N.W.2d at 229. [¶ 17.] St. Paul’s reliance on Sopko is misplaced. A review of Sopko and the cases cited therein, reveal that they all dealt with the setting aside of a release based upon foreseeability of future injuries; that is not the question at issue we are facing in this case. See Mills v. Spink Elec. Coop., 442 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (S.D.1989) (<HOLDING>); Novak v. C.J. Grossenburg & Son, 89 S.D. 308,

    ### Response:
    holding the waiver ineffective because claimants medical condition could not have been anticipated or  foreseen at the time he executed the settlement
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Testimonial Privilege Underwood argues that, even if the child-abuse exception applies, the district court violated due process when it failed to affirmatively find that Cora knew she had a voluntary right to refuse to testify. Underwood cannot raise this claim. The witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980). Therefore, Underwood holds no right to the privilege and thus lacks standing to raise the issue on appeal. See United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding defendant-spouse without standing to contest a district court’s decision to compel the spouse to testify) (vacated on other grounds); United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. United States,

    ### Response:
    holding that lofton would have no standing to appeal the district courts determination that his wife waived her spousal testimonial privilege
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    opinion in our case, however, reaches the opposite conclusion — holding that a Bivens remedy is unavailable to undocumented immigrants challenging stops and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because I disagree with the panel’s analysis and believe that the decision to take the extraordinary step of denying Bivens remedies for routine traffic stops and arrests to an entire class of people warrants review by the entire court, I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. 1 . The panel’s opinion refers to foreign nationals present in the United States without lawful immigration status as “illegal aliens”; I choose to refer to these individuals as ""undocumented immigrants” instead. 2 . See Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 620-21, 625 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The panel’s justification for ignoring Fifth

    ### Response:
    holding that a mexican national who alleged that she had been illegally arrested and beaten by a border patrol agent may bring a bivens claim for unlawful arrest and the excessive use of force under the fourth amendment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in their own behalf to establish that their co-defendant, Winn-Dixie, had the primary responsibility for any negligence — not G & I or Equity One. Respondents contend that trial counsel’s testimony will be adverse to his own client insofar as she is claiming negligence on their part. In Arcara, we quashed an order of disqualification because the opposing party, rather than the client, intended to call the lawyer as a witness. 574 So.2d at 326. “The requirement that a lawyer withdraw when he expects to be a witness was not intended to permit an opposing party to call him as a witness and disqualify him from serving as counsel.” AlliedSignal Recovery Trust v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 934 So.2d 675, 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also Devins v. Peitzer, 622 So.2d 558, 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). A conflict requiring disqualification,

    ### Response:
    holding that defendants announced intention to call plaintiffs counsel as a witness is not a basis for disqualification
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    College Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., the Eighth Circuit stated, There is some question whether a putative class member can enjoy the benefits of tolling merely by opting out, even though the class action is still pending. The Supreme Court, in dicta has intimated as much, even though that is not the language of American Pipe or Crown, Cork & Seal. 999 F.2d 326, 332 n. 6 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 926, 127 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994). But see Adams Public Sch. Dist. v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 7 F.3d 717, 719 n. 1 (8th Cir.1993) (“The fact that this participation ended with a decision to ‘opt out’ rather than with denial of class certification is irrelevant to the applicability of the American Pipe rule.”); Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In this diversity suit, a federal court must

    ### Response:
    holding that limitations period begins running anew from the date when the class member exercises the right to opt out because before this time the class member is deemed to be actively prosecuting her rights
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    To the contrary, in an order entered 28 February 2006, the court specifically retained jurisdiction “for further orders.” We conclude that the trial court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to enter the order terminating respondent’s parental rights after jurisdiction attached on 28 March 2003, when the North Carolina court entered an order as to the custody of H.D. Since jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is exclusive and continuing, the courts of North Carolina still had jurisdiction over H.D. to enter an order terminating respondent’s parental rights, even though H.D. resided in Alabama with the custodial guardians, because the requisites of “substantial connection” jurisdiction pursuant to Section 201 were met. This assignment of error is overruled. II: Motions to Dismiss In (2007) (<HOLDING>). We follow the reasoning of B.D. and W.L.M.

    ### Response:
    holding that the failure to attach a custody order was not reversible error because there was no showing of prejudice where there was no indication that the respondent was unaware of the placement or custody of the children at any time the motion to terminate stated that dss was given legal custody of the minor children and the record included a copy of an order in effect when the motion was filed that awarded dss custody of the children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “[T]o be preserved for appeal, ‘the specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.’ ” Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1100 (Fla.2004) (quoting Spann v. State, 857 So.2d 845, 852 (Fla.2003)). Appellate review is therefore limited to the specific grounds for objection raised at trial. Lynx Transp. v. Atkinson, 720 So.2d 600, 600-01 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Clock v. Clock, 649 So.2d 312, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Wilson v. Health Trust, Inc., 640 So.2d 93, 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Except in cases of fundamental error, an appellate court cannot consider any ground for objection not presented to the trial court. See Steinhorst, 412 So.2d at 338; see also Smith v. State, 7 So.3d 473, 496 (Fla.2009) (<HOLDING>) (citing Steinhorst, 412 So.2d at 338); City of

    ### Response:
    holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of questioning that would not trigger Mrs. Jaeger’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, although defense counsel declined. On those facts, we find no substantial interference with Mrs. Jaeger’s decision whether to testify, let alone any coercion or intimidation. See United States v. Harlin, 539 F.2d 679, 680-81 (9th Cir.1976) (concluding that the trial judge’s warning given to the co-defendant’s counsel, “ ‘I assume you have advised her of the penalties of perjury ... and that if it appears that a defendant is lying, the Court can take that into account, too,’ ” was “neither coercive, threatening, grossly improper nor prejudicial”). Other circuit courts, considering similar facts, have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Blanche, 149 F.3d 763,

    ### Response:
    holding that warnings given to a witness by the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the possibility that testifying could place the witness in jeopardy of revocation of his plea agreement and charges of perjury or false statement did not violate the defendants due process rights because the warnings merely corroborated in a straightforward and nonthreatening manner the information given by the witness attorney
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    less room for advancement.” Id. at 613 (quoting Sharp v. City of Hous., 164 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir.1999)); Pegram, 361 F.3d at 283 (“[A]n employment transfer may qualify as an adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir.2001) (“A job transfer that includes a shift change that involves changes in duties or compensation or can be objectively characterized as a demotion may be an ‘adverse employment action’.... ”); see, e.g., Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933 (“The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion.”); Forsyth v. City of Doll., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th

    ### Response:
    recognizing as demotions the reassignment of two police officers from the intelligence unit to night patrol because the intelligence unit positions were more prestigious had better work ing hours and were more interesting than night patrol and few officers voluntarilytransferred from the intelligence unit to night patrol and other officers had been so transferred as punishment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from Local 254’s alleged improper secondary activity. Plaintiff argues that the International encouraged, ratified, and knowingly tolerated Local 254’s prohibited behavior. However, the evidence adduced by plaintiff fails to support this argument. Liability for a local union’s actions does not attach to an international affiliate merely because of the hierarchical link between the two unions. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 216-17, 100 S.Ct. 410, 62 L.Ed.2d 394 (1979). Rather, a plaintiff must satisfy the traditional rules of agency law to saddle an international union with responsibility for acts carried out directly by a local in violation of § 303 of the LMRA. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (<HOLDING>); see also 29 U.S.C. § 185(e). The United

    ### Response:
    holding that  303 liability is established according to ordinary doctrines of agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    find any plain error. Although the record does show that the defendant is black and the victim was white, it does not show that the state exercised any of its peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors from the veni-re. The record as a whole simply does not raise an inference that the state was engaged in the practice of purposeful discrimination. Under the plain error rule this Court will ‘notice any plain error or defect in the proceeding under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial -rights of the petitioner.’ (Emphasis added.) Rule 39(k), supra. The defendant cannot successfully ar-güe that error is pla p.2005)(<HOLDING>). In another analogous situation, this Court

    ### Response:
    holding that an ambiguous or silent record will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dec. 211, 232, 1985 WL 56042 (BIA 1985), that a family may qualify as a “social group” under § 1101: [Persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic ... such as sex, color, or kinship ties, ... [will only qualify under § 1101 when] the common characteristic that defines the group [is] one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. (emphasis added). As lucidly explained in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir.2000), the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have adopted Acosta’s immutability analysis. See Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Fatin [v. INS ], 12 F.3d [1233, 1239-41 (3d

    ### Response:
    recognizing acosta in determining that family relations can be the basis of a particular social group
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to the issues being tried. ¶40 The court found that defense counsel mentioned in opening argument and in cross- examination that a number of other patients with legal claims have been referred by Durdens’ counsel to certain of the physicians who testified for Durdens — the implication being that those physicians were unworthy of belief and perhaps were part of a conspiratorial plan to bilk Chief. The trial judge observed that the physicians who appeared at trial were truthful, competent and professional in every respect; that their integrity as medical professionals was impugned by counsel’s statements; and that there was no evidence supporting any conspiracy among those doctors, Durdens and their counsel. ¶41 Finally, the court concluded that Durdens’ case was prejudic 3 P.2d 625 (<HOLDING>). ¶43 Finally, it is necessary that we address

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of family conflicts including an extramarital affair when there was no evidence of any causal connection with those and plaintiffs mental disorders
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    misrepresentation.”). Additionally, SAB No. 99 observes that “[a]mong other factors, the demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities in response to certain types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors regard quantitatively small misstatements as material,” and that “[w]hile the intent of management does not render a misstatement material, it may provide significant evidence of materiality.” 64 Fed.Reg. at 45152. Case law supports the use of these additional factors as evidence of materiality. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir.1991) (“stock movement is a factor the jury may consider relevant” to materiality, although not itself determinative); see Gebhardt v. Con-Agra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 829-30 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 2. Discussion The Court concludes that there

    ### Response:
    recognizing managements role in misstatements as part of the total mix of information that would probably be important to investors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the best interests of the child, however, must be made on the basis of evidence before the court. See, e.g., In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 771, 764 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Ct.App.1988) (finding must be supported by evidence); Khalsa v. Khalsa, 107 N.M. 31, 36, 751 P.2d 715, 720 (Ct.App.) (harm to child cannot be assumed but must be demonstrated), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 16, 751 P.2d 700 (1988); Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 104 N.M. 420, 423, 722 P.2d 671, 674 (Ct.App.) (court’s ruling must be supported by evidence), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 378, 721 P.2d 1309 (1986). We hold that, under New Mexico law, the district court erred in concluding that this type of an agreement is unenforceable as a matter of law. But see Sporleder v. Hermes (In re Z.J.H.), 162 Wis.2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202, 211 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Whether visitation would be against the best

    ### Response:
    holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    reasons which do not appear in the record on appeal, Crabtree did not testify in the trial of this matter. Crabtree’s actions, however, indicate rather clearly that Crab-tree himself knew that he did not have authority to modify the revised Consignment Agreement. It was Crabtree himself who informed Christie on March 13, 1987, that Orchard was the true owner of the painting and the “proper party to authorize the sale and receive the proceeds therefrom.” In this letter, Crabtree also insisted that the original Consignment Agreement be modified to re- fleet Orchard as the seller and the party to receive the sale proceeds. Based on this information, Christie submitted a revised Consignment Agreement reflecting these changes. And, consistent with Crabtree’s statement that P.2d 242 (1936) (<HOLDING>). In the setting described above, Crabtree

    ### Response:
    holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Three (Adjustments), the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed as follows: (1) the court shall adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment already served on the undischarged term of imprisonment if the court determines that such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons; and (2) the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the remainder of the undischarged term of imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). In this case, Scott was not incarcerated at the time of his sentencing. Rather, he had been released from prison and has commenced serving a term of post-release supervision. While Scott was incarcerated when he pled guilty, the relevant time for consideration of § 5G1.3 is t Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cofske, 157 F.3d 1, 1 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of  5g13b  is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the public domain during the pendency of the case by virtue of a civil lawsuit filed by the executor of the victim’s estate. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 563. This factor tended to diminish the need to protect the confidential interests of the particular patient. Finally, the nature of the confidential information was such that it could reasonably be viewed as an aid to the defendant in his self-defense claim. Id. This factor was considered to be the most important criteria in the ease because it not only placed the constitutional right to a fair trial into play, but it identified the specific need for the information and the particular prejudice that would be suffered by the accused without the information. See United States v. Alperin, 128 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1255 (N.D.Cal.2001) (<HOLDING>). The factors we identified in Heemstra were

    ### Response:
    recognizing records material to selfdefense claim outweigh victims interest in confidentiality
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    retaliate against a witness and retaliation against a witness— as his codefendants. The charges stemmed from the same nucleus of facts, and the government proved each charge against each defendant through interrelated evidence. See United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 108 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir.1997) (finding that the denial of defendant’s motion to sever was proper when the charges involved a common scheme and the evidence was “massive and interrelated”). Indeed, the evidence about which Mr. Wardell complains — evidence pertaining to the actual commission of the assault by Mr. Shields and Mr. Temple-man — would have been admissible against him in his own trial, as proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 668 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The district court also took steps to

    ### Response:
    holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    P.3d 985. “[T]he commonly stated purposes of statutory redemption are to encourage full value bidding at foreclosure sales and to protect mortgagors.” HSBC Bank, 2005-NMCA-138, ¶ 7, 138 N.M. 665, 125 P.3d 644; Brown v. Trujillo, 2004-NMCA-040, ¶ 27, 135 N.M. 365, 88 P.3d 881 (stating that redemption statutes protect the debtor because they “may increase the price of property at a foreclosure sale by creating the risk that a debtor will easily redeem his or her property from a purchaser who bids too low”). But see W. Bank of Las Cruces v. Ma n creditors can redeem or have redeemed, but do not expressly indicate that the holders of the junior mortgage or judgment lien foreclosed their liens against the debtor’s property. See HSBC Bank, 2005-NMCA-138, ¶¶ 2, 4, 138 N.M. 665, 125 P.3d 644 (<HOLDING>); Malooly, 119 N.M. at 747, 895 P.2d at 269

    ### Response:
    holding that an assignee of the lien creditor who petitioned for certification of redemption had priority over an assignee of the former defendant owner based on a firstintime filing of the redemption petition
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agreement that is contrary to public policy.”). 47 . Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 48 . E.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l., 861 F.2d 665, 666-68, 674 (11th Cir.1988) (affirming the reversal of an arbitration award’s reinstatement of a pilot who flew while drunk); Amalg. Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir.1983) (reversing enforcement of an award to reinstate a truck driver who drank on duty); NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 128 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir.1942) (permitting, pre-W.K. Grace, a company’s discharge of a bus driver who drank while working his route). But see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union, Local No. 4-228 v. Union Oil Co. of Cal, 818 F.2d 437, 441-43 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 49 . 712 F.2d at 124. 50 . 768 F.2d 739, 742

    ### Response:
    holding that an arbitrators award reinstating an oil refinery worker who used drugs offsite was not against public policy at the time it was issued before new drug problems cropped up but remanding for reconsideration in light of the further drug use
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    an impermissible fishing expedition.”); United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 570, 577 (9th Cir.1984) (affirming trial court order quashing defendants’ subpoena after in-camera review where the defendants “did not request specific documents, but sought entire arson investigation files”). The name of a document and mere speculation as to its contents are not sufficient to satisfy the Rule’s specificity and relevance requirements. See United States v. Hardy, 224 F.3d 752, 755-56 (8th Cir.2000) (upholding trial court’s order quashing defendant’s subpoena of recorded police radio transmissions where the defendant had “stated why he wants to listen to the transmissions, but he cannot set forth what the subpoenaed materials contain”); United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 345-46 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 36] Here, Marroquin-Aldana’s subpoena

    ### Response:
    holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing a subpoena where the defendant demonstrated why he wants to look into the subpoenaed material but  has not set forth what the subpoenaed materials contain forcing the court to speculate as to the specific nature of their contents and its relevance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    analysis.” This standard is not defined by bright lines and rigid boundaries. Instead, the standard allows a magistrate judge to review the facts and circumstances as a whole and make a common sense determination of whether “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” The magistrate judge’s decision in this regard is one we review with great deference. Grossman, 400 F.3d at 217 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (other internal quotation marks omitted). As part of such a common sense determination, we observed in Grossman, “it is reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores drugs in a home to which he owns a key.” Id. at 218; see also Servance, 394 F.3d at 230 (<HOLDING>). In light of our precedent, the district court

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence internal quotation marks omitted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to professional compensation would make the language of Sections 503(b)(2) superfluous. Congress enacted Sections 327, 330(a), and 503(b)(2) to provide the exclusive method for a debtor’s retention of professionals, subject to numerous safeguards, including the requirement of disinterestedness. A court should not circumvent the limitations placed on retention of professionals by compensating a disqualified professional under Section 503(b)(1)(A). Instead, Section (b)(1)(A) is properly applicable only to authorize priority treatment of non-professional employee claims, including wages, salaries and commissions. The remaining issue is whether the services rendered by Harold Zell were professional in nature, in which case his administrative claim cannot be allowed, or w E.D.N.C.1985) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Seatrain Lines, Inc., 13 B.R. 980

    ### Response:
    holding that management consultant hired prepetition and retained postpetition was professional requiring appointment nonsalaried employee could not be compensated under section 327a or b
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (<HOLDING>). Marshall asserted that he was entitled to be

    ### Response:
    holding that a juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentence of seventy years imprisonment is unconstitutional under graham for the reasons explained in henry
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of attorney’s fees for breach of contract. Allstate contends the subject contracts do not contain a fee provision such that no legal basis exists to award attorney’s fees for a simple breach of contract. Plaintiff appears to concede that he may not recover attorney’s fees under his contract claim unless he establishes that Allstate breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 12-13). The Court therefore GRANTS Allstate’s motion to the extent it seeks to preclude Plaintiff from recovering attorney’s fees and costs under the breach of contact claim. (CompLf 14). Plaintiff may, of course, pursue attorney’s fees under his implied covenant claim as permitted by Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 813, 819, 693 P.2d 796, 800, 210 Cal.Rptr. 211, 215 (1985) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion and Order For the foregoing

    ### Response:
    holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    behavior after the accident was due to intoxication and not due to trauma from the accident. Appellant directs us to Officer Trusler’s cross-examination testimony in which the officer testified he was unsure what types of behavioral and neurological problems might be exhibited by someone who had recently been involved in an accident as opposed to someone who was intoxicated. Section 577.010 sets out in pertinent part that “[a] person commits the crime of [DWI] if he operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition.” “[A] person is in an ‘intoxicated condition’ when he is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or drug, or any combination thereof.” § 577.001.2. “ ‘Intox requested sobriety tests. See State v. Myers, 940 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Mo.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Officer Trusler testified at

    ### Response:
    holding that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests was admissible as evidence of intoxication
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the estates would be better off litigating the claims than negotiating their resolution through a plan of reorganization. In fact, the Committee itself recognizes the possibility that “nego tiations might consensually resolve” its challenges. (Bankr. Dkt. No. 2740 at 25). If the motion is granted, the Committee says, the court should not require the proposed amended complaint to be filed right away or by a certain date. The Committee instead asks leave to file the complaint at its discretion—“to potentially avoid unnecessary litigation if it appears its discussions with the parties may yield progress.” (Id.). That the litigation could prove unnecessary given the parties’ settlement discussions is justification enough for the debtors’ not to pursue it. Cf. Caesars, 808 F.3d at 1188-89 (<HOLDING>). The debtors’ justification, though, might not

    ### Response:
    holding that this court could enjoin litigation in another court if doing so would promote settlement of disputes in these bankruptcy cases
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (reasonable to believe suspect would be at home at 8:45 a.m. on Sunday morning); Edmonds, 52 F.3d at 1248 (entry at 6:45 a.m. was “early enough that it was unlikely someone living in the apartment would have already departed for the day”); Anderson, 104 F.3d 367, 1996 WL 731244 (“the officers came to the home at 8:45 p.m., on a cold, snowy evening, a time when a person would reasonably be expected to be at home”); observing the operation of lights or other electrical devices, Route, 104 F.3d at 63 (officers heard television set left on inside residence after third person left residence); Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1538 (observations that “the lawn was manicured and a porch light was on” gave “no indication that Magluta departed, such as for work or the like”); Morehead, 959 F.2d at 1496 (<HOLDING>); and the circumstances of a suspect’s

    ### Response:
    holding that an illuminated light provided a reasonable basis for officers to believe the subject of an arrest warrant was within the building
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, ""an appropriate ad justment for delay in payment-whether by the application of current rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise” is permissible. 491 U.S. 274, 283-84, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989). The Seventh Circuit in Brandt v. Schal Assoc., Inc. upheld a district court’s award of interest on attorney’s fees for the ""delay factor” and affirmed the district court’s holding that awarding delay damages does not violate Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 960 F.2d 640, 645, 649 (7th Cir.1992) (citing 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)). 171 . The FDIC disputes that it acted as a receiver here. See supra note 158. 172 . See, e.g., Spawn, 989 F.2d at 833 (quoting McGehee v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 872 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir.1989)) (<HOLDING>); see also Meyer, 510 U.S. at 482, 114 S.Ct.

    ### Response:
    holding that a government agency may lose its immunity to interest sanctions if  congress has shed the cloak of sovereignty and given an agency the status of a commercial operation 
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    agree with the Commonwealth that the PCRA court’s reference to Pa.R.E. 705, which requires that “an expert must testify as to the facts or data on which the opinion or inference is based,” does not support a finding of counsel ineffectiveness. As the medical examiner testified that the basis for her time-of-death estimation was her investigator’s liv-idity test, she clearly set forth the facts or data on which her opinion was based, and an objection grounded on Pa.R.E. 705 would have been futile. Further, to the extent the PCRA court found counsel ineffective for failing to challenge the time-of-death testimony as speculative because it was based on the investigator’s notes, we find such legal conclusion to be in conflict with our ruling on direct appeal. See Elliott, 700 A.2d at 1252 (<HOLDING>). Thus, there is no arguable merit to a claim

    ### Response:
    holding that it was proper for the medical examiner to estimate the victims time of death based on the results of her investigators lividity test as it was standard procedure for her to rely on tests performed by members of her office
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    elements of these “independent torts.” Koffman, 574 S.E.2d at 261. The Court explained that the “tort of assault consists of an act intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.” Id. The Court defined the tort of battery as “an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified.” Id. In moving for summary judgment with respect to these claims, the Sheriffs Office defendants argue that the deputies’ actions were justified in light of the circumstances that they faced in this case, and thus, that the claims for assault and battery are without merit. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In response to the defendants’ motion, the

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs claims for assault and battery were patently without merit since the officers actions under the circumstances were justified
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); the nonmovant has a “corresponding obligation to offer the court more than steamy rhetoric and bare conclusions.” Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir.1996). Furthermore, “the nonmovant must ‘produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form’ sufficient to limn a trial-worthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle.” Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that “the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence.”); Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8, (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (<HOLDING>) Local Rule 56(b), moreover, requires the

    ### Response:
    holding that the evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    524, 526 (Ind.1990) (discussing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Counsel is presumed to be competent; ""[iJsolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics do not necessarily amount to ineffectiveness of counsel."" Id. Defendant first argues that defense counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to Jacob's testimony concerning Tanelle's Fourth of July statements. Defendant argues that this could not have been a strategy decision, since defense counsel already had objected to Darlene's testimony on the same topic. However, since the objection to Darlene's testimony already had been overruled, we cannot say that failure to object once again was deficient performance. See Drake v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that this behavior was

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to make repeated objections is not ineffective when such objections would not have been sustained
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    residents of the Depot. Nor are the District and taxing entities attempting to assess taxes on property within the federal enclave that constitutes the Depot. Those aspects of a “state” within the federal system of these United States are not implicated. The tax is assessed solely on inventory while it is located on Aviall’s private property at its distribution center in Irving, Texas. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 11.01, 23.01, 32.01 (Vernon 2008). Moreover, Aviall’s interpretation would reverse the long-standing rule to strictly construe tax exemptions against the taxpayer. See River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston, 370 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.1963); ICAN Enter., Inc. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., No. 03-06-00594, 2009 WL 1025084, *3 (Tex.App.Austin April 17, 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). It is well settled that language granting

    ### Response:
    holding trial court properly gave narrow interpretation for exemption for stored aircraft parts denying taxpayers application for its storage of entire aircraft
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    tance due to a failure to object to the introduction of time-barred offenses (the burglary charge), and Claim XII, which claimed that Overton’s death sentences were unconstitutional under Ring, were both properly denied without an evidentia-ry hearing. Overton’s posteonvietion counsel conceded that these were purely legal issues that did not require an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, as previously developed, no prejudice resulted from the introduction of the burglary charge, which the trial court correctly recognized in denying the evidentiary hearing. Additionally, the claim that Overton’s death sentences violated Ring was clearly without merit because this Court has previously held that Ring cannot receive retroactive application. See Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 412 (Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, these claims were legally insufficient

    ### Response:
    holding that ring does not apply retroactively in florida postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the ring decision
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the Debtor’s bad acts does not mandate that this Court restrict the scope of its findings. In determining whether appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee was warranted, this Court was required to consider the totality of the circumstances. Each of the findings contained in the Trustee Order were relevant to this Court’s determination that the Debtor’s conduct manifested the extreme circumstances that are a prerequisite to appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee pursuant to both § 1104(a)(1) and § 1104(a)(2). Accordingly, this Court believes that its decision to include all of its relevant findings, rather than some subset, does not constitute indisputable error. The Debtor’s appeal to equity is without merit. See, e.g., In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). This Court can identify no principle that

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a bankruptcys equitable powers provided by  105 do not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law or constitute a roving commission to do equity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    placed and allowed R.A. to remain with Akin, who engaged in conduct that endangered R.A.’s physical or emotional well-being, and (b) Jordan herself engaged in conduct that endangered R.A.’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E). a. Placing and Allowing RA. to Remain with Akin For the same reasons detailed in our analysis of section D, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Jordan’s voluntary and knowing placement of R.A. with Akin and her voluntary and knowing decision to allow R.A. to remain with Akin by opting not to use earnest efforts until after September 2007 to regain custody of R.A., endangered the physical and emotional well-being of R.A. See In re S.P., 168 S.W.3d 197, 204-05 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); In re J.M.M., 80 S.W.3d at 241-42; Hann, 969

    ### Response:
    holding evidence supported termination of mothers parental rights where among other factors mother knowingly allowed abusive and sexually deviant father to have access to children
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    interest in their continued employment and that Richardson’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs contend that DHS’s discipline policies entitled them to due process protection and that Arkansas has waived its sovereign immunity to ADEA suits. After reviewing the relevant discipline policies, we agree with the District Court that they did not alter plaintiffs’ at-will employment status to create property interests in their jobs. See Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 424-25 & n. 6 (8th Cir.) (finding that an at-will employee has no property interest in job), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 966, 120 S.Ct. 402, 145 L.Ed.2d 313 (1999); Ball v. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Punishment, 340 Ark. 424, 10 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Ark.2000) (<HOLDING>); Batra v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb.,

    ### Response:
    holding that under arkansas law employment is atwill unless personnel manual or employment agreement contains express provision that employee shall not be discharged except for cause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In his brief, Mat-lock asserts, “The district court order imposing a period of release with services after a finding that Matlock no longer suffers a mental abnormality violates his right to due process.” The brief makes only a passing objection to the breadth of the specific terms of supervision imposed by the district court. However, in context it is clear Matlock intends this reference to demonstrate that imposing any such restrictions constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty. Matlock makes no argument that the breadth of the release conditions somehow violates due process. Correspondingly, he offers this court no guidance as to the parameters of release that would satisfy due process. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 607, 619 (Iowa 2013) (Appel, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>). The sole remedy he requests is that we find

    ### Response:
    recognizing that lack of briefing and argumentation can lead to problems in the development of the law and noting that our precedents require us to defer to another day the other issues that the litigants have not brought to us
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to adjudicate plaintiffs claims because plaintiff “does not allege, and cannot demonstrate, that his conviction has been reversed or set aside upon grounds of innocence.” Def.’s Mot. 4. To support its argument, defendant quotes 28 U.S.C. § 1495: “ ‘[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned.’ ” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1495). Defendant then states that “[f]or the Court of Federal Claims to have jurisdiction pursuant to [Section 1495, a plaintiff must allege that his conviction has been reversed or set aside for one of the reasons listed in [Section] 2513.” Def.’s Mot. 4 (citing Salman v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 36, 39 (2005) (<HOLDING>)). Defendant argues that plaintiff “has failed

    ### Response:
    holding that section 1495 does not stand alone and must be read in conjunction with section 2513
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a compensation claim to a conclusion on the merits, may file an action against an employer for that workplace injury under these circumstances if the employer’s conduct is to the level of intentional conduct substantially certain to result in injury for which workers’ compensation immunity is not available. Jones, 932 So.2d at 1105 (emphasis added). Vallejos improperly relies on Jones because Jones dealt with waiving the right to pursue an action under an intentional tort theory. All Jones means for Vallejos is that he can still pursue a civil action based upon an exception to the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation statute because none of those claims were litigated in the workers’ compensation case. See Petro Stopping Ctrs., L.P. v. Gall, 23 So.3d 849, 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>); Vasquez, 962 So.2d at 413-14 (emphasis added)

    ### Response:
    holding that gall waived her right to sue for an intentional tort because her mediated settlement was a conclusion on the merits due to the fact that the settlement agreement provided that petro accepted gall as permanently and totally disabled
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was required because they were all members of the unit sharing in all production from the unit. Because the Ohrt-Heinold No. 1 Well was the only well in the unit, if appellants had prevailed on their claims seeking cancellation of the unit, appellants would have received all royalties from that well, and other unit lessors, including the McAdams and Chilcoats, would be entitled to no royalties on the Unit’s production from the well. Appellees further assert that the evidence showed that the Ohrt-Heinold Well was draining gas from under the McAdams’ and Chilcoats’ lands, entitling them to a share of the production from the well. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing joinder of the third-party defendants. See Royal Petroleum Corp., 332 S.W.2d at 316-17 (<HOLDING>); Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d

    ### Response:
    holding trial court has discretion to require joinder of royalty interest owners whose interests will be directly and possibly adversely affected by decree in trespass to try title action
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    been excused was excused. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273. The deprivation that remains in this cireumstance is the loss of the peremptory challenge. Thus, the harm to be evaluated is the harm attributable to the loss of one of the statutorily limited-in-number peremptory challenges. See State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Iowa 1993). 1 25 Second, in Novotny, the court appears to have regarded the error at issue in a case such as this as the deprivation of a peremptory challenge. See Novotny, I 14 (referring to the ""erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause adversely impacting the defendafit’s ability to shape the jury through peremptory challenges""), 122 (same), 128 (referring to the ""violation of our statutes and rules prescribing the use of peremptory challenges""), 1 27 (<HOLDING>). As discussed, such a deprivation is not a

    ### Response:
    holding that allowing a defendant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized or than available to and exercised by the prosecution does not in and of itself amount to structural error
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nor did Hatcher allege facts underlying a claim of constitutional error that would show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the error, no reasonable fact finder would have found him guilty of the underlying offense. Id. Most importantly, however, Hatcher did not present a timely, cognizable claim in his habeas petition. Because he presented an untimely claim, no purpose would be served by inquiring into the defaulted claim by way of an evidentiary hearing. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 1 . The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. 2 . Nor did Hatcher's 1997 federal habeas petition toll the limitation period for his 1999 petition. See Duncan v. Walker, - U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2128, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001)

    ### Response:
    holding that the filing of a first federal habeas petition is not an application for other collateral review under the tolling provision of  2244d
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    from bringing a claim if (1) a court of competent jurisdiction (2) rendered a final judgment on the merits (3) on the same claim (4) in a prior action between the same parties or their representatives. In re Int’l Nutronics, Inc., 28 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.1994). The doctrine bars all grounds for recovery that could have been asserted, regardless of whether they actually were asserted, during the prior action. Id. Defendant MTC argues that the present suit is barred by res judicata because of this Court’s final judgment in the Sierra Club/CBE litigation. See Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Wilson, No. C89-2044 TEH, Judgment (N.D.Cal. Aug. 27, 1992). The Court was a court of competent jurisdiction, thereby satisfying the first res ju-dicata requirement. CBE I, 731 F.Supp. at 1454-58 (<HOLDING>). Even though it was entered into by

    ### Response:
    holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the citizen suit provision of the caa
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the wrongful-death action does not constitute a payment of White’s liabilities or debts and, therefore, does not run afoul of § 6-5-410(c), as Rodgers argues. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding McElroy a fee from the proceeds derived from the wrongful-death claim. Rodgers also argues that the fee of $15,750 that the trial court awarded to McElroy was excessive. The fee is 9% of the $175,000 in wrongful-death proceeds collected. Rodgers did not file a post-judgment motion challenging the amount of the award. “The long-established precedent in Alabama caselaw is that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment on an argument that was not first presented to the trial court. See Belcher v. Belcher, 18 So.3d 946, 948 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So.2d 463,

    ### Response:
    holding that a party had failed to preserve an argument for appellate review when that party had failed to argue the issue to the trial court either at trial or in his postjudgment motion
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    prescription exception in the definition of the offense. Nor do we believe that the “except as otherwise provided” language is so “incorporated with the language describing and defining the offense” that all other potential exceptions or exemptions become elements of the offense. In light of the Segovia decision, and the subsequent enactment of I.C. § 37-2745, we deem it clear the Legislature intended that absence of an “exemption or exception,” such as a “valid prescription” or other “authority” to deliver, shall not be an element of the crime of possession or delivery of a controlled substance. Rather, the existence of a valid prescription or other “exemption or exception” must be placed in issue by the accused. Compare, e.g., State v. Huggins, 105 Idaho 43, 665 P.2d 1053 (1983) (<HOLDING>). This leaves the instruction as given. We

    ### Response:
    holding that elements of rape do not include proof of the absence of a marital relationship between the accused and the victim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    collective knowledge of each individual Defendant and the Enterprise as a whole. Accordingly, the Government has met its burden to show that Defendants acted with the specific intent to defraud or deceive. a. Defendants Are Liable for the Acts of Their Officers, Employees, and Agents Each Defendant is liable for the acts of its officers, employees, and agents. Because a corporation can act only through its agents, it may be held liable for the acts of its officers, employees, and other agents in certain circumstances. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); New York Cent & Hudson R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494, 29 S.Ct. 304, 53 L.Ed. 613 (1909) (<HOLDING>); R.R. Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. 649, 657, 15

    ### Response:
    holding that a corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agents corporate powers strictly construed but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized and in such eases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1907 (""[T]he forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside .... [the resisting party should] clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”). 77 . See, e.g., Cambridge Biotech Corp. v. Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics, 433 Mass. 122, 130, 740 N.E.2d 195 (2000) (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18, 92 S.Ct. 1907). 78 . Lambert, 983 F.2d at 1116. 79 . Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir.2009). 80 . Id. (quoting 14D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3803.1 (3d ed. 1998)). 81 . 1st Am. Compl., Ex. B [# 15]. 82 . 1st Am. Compl., Ex. B [# 15]. 83 . See, e.g., Lambert, 983 F.2d at 1112-13 (<HOLDING>); Action Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods.

    ### Response:
    holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory where it stated that for any action brought to enforce such terms and conditions venue shall lie exclusively in clark county washington
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that failure to do so would result in revocation. In United States v. Salas-Camacho, 859 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.1988), this court held that a false statement remains material when a declarant recants it only after he is confronted with suspicion on the part of a government agent and is faced with an imminent inspection that would reveal the truth. Id. at 791-92. Bound by that precedent, we affirm Johnson’s conviction on Count Five. For similar reasons, we hold that the jury instructions regarding Count Five adequately reflected the law as set forth in Salas-Camacho and, therefore, were not erroneous. The prosecutor’s statements in closing argument regarding the officers’ lack of motivation to lie constituted improper vouching. See United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 574-76 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). However, we conclude that in this case such

    ### Response:
    holding that a prosecutors argument about the special agents disincentive to lie was impermissible vouching
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until an injured party discovers or reasonably should discover, (1) that she has been injured and (2) that her injury has been caused by another party’s conduct). While knowledge of the cause of injury is pertinent to determining the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run, it has no special relevance to determining the date an insurance policy is triggered, unless specifically required by the language of the applicable policy of insurance. Compare Wilson, 964 A.2d at 362 n. 3 (explaining that tolling the statute of limitations until the cause of injury is reasonably discoverable is necessary to protect the litigation rights of persons who suffer latent injuries) with Kvaerner Metals Div., 908 A.2d at 897 (<HOLDING>). Here, the language of the Penn National

    ### Response:
    holding that the primary goal when interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the specific insurance policy
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    would help solve the crime.... ” Motive is one of the permissible purposes listed in Rule 404(b) not because the “why” helps solve a crime, but because it is highly relevant to show that a defendant had a motivation to commit the crime for which he is being charged. In a case like this, where Lee is asserting that he never had a gun on the day in question, it is important to know that he had a personal motivation to possess a gun. Indeed, someone who is involved in an ongoing feud — a feud during which guns have been used — is far more likely to have a gun in his possession than someone who is not involved in such a feud. United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 187 n. 19 (3d Cir.2010) (citation omitted and emphasis added); see also United States v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861, 868 (7th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 25 (1st

    ### Response:
    holding that evidence of gang membership was admissible because the testimony also reflected harriss motive for possessing these particular firearms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    is led around by others? Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable? Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject? Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests? Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose? Id. at 8-9. Although a jury determined the issue of mental retardation in this case, it is important to note at the outset that a jury determination of mental retardation is not required. See Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7, 126 S.Ct. 7, 163 L.Ed.2d 6 (2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (holding

    ### Response:
    holding that the ninth circuit erred in requiring arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve mentalretardation claim
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D.Ill.1981), included as a reason for its denial of the defendant’s motion to strike certain errata sheets that the original answers to the deposition would remain part of the record and could be read at trial, stating that “[t]he witness who changes his testimony on a material matter between the giving of his deposition and his appearance at trial may be impeached by his former answers, and the cross-examiner and the jury are likely to be keenly interested in the reasons he changed his testimony.” In addition, district courts have provided another safeguard against abuse by allowing the deposing party to reopen the examination if the changes render the deposition useless or incomplete without additional testimony. See Tingley, 152 F.Supp.2d at 120 (<HOLDING>); Perkasie Indus. Corp. v. Advance Transformer,

    ### Response:
    holding that rule 30e allowed deponent to change the substance of his answers but reconvening the depositions for the limited purpose of inquiring into the reasons for the changed answers and where the changes originated
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (although they certainly may be persuasive).” Mathai v. Warren, 512 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir.2008). “For purposes of most bankruptcy proceedings, property interests are created and defined by state law. Once that state law determination is made, however, we must still look to federal bankruptcy law to resolve the extent to which that interest is property of the estate” under § 541. Parks v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 550 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir.2008) (citations and quotations omitted); 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). We first consider whether and to what extent Debtors have an interest in the SARs under Kansas law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); see, e.g., Williamson v. Hall, No. KS-08-088, 2009 WL 4456542, at *8 (10th Cir. BAP Dec. 4, 2009) (<HOLDING>). We then consider whether that interest

    ### Response:
    holding that pay on death accounts were not part of the bankruptcy estate under  541 because under kansas law debtor had no property interest in the accounts until the death of the owner
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the defendants exported them intact for reuse in monitors. And he did so without providing any explanation of what constitutes “processing” or how it impacts the original intended purpose requirement. Cf. United States v. Schneider, 704 F.3d 1287, 1294 (10th Cir.2013) (noting that while an expert may refer to the law in expressing an opinion, testimony raises concerns “when an expert uses a specialized legal term and usurps the jury’s function”); McIver, 470 F.3d at 552 (expert testimony’s overreliance on terms that “have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular” risks crossing the line into unhelpful and inadmissible testimony (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the district court erred, by permitting Mr th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because the defendants claim Mr. Smith’s

    ### Response:
    recognizing that a limiting instruction has the potential to cure any prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    purposes of the EAJA, and whether the Government’s position was “substantially justified” is uncontested. The primary issue in this case is whether Murkeldove and the Vinning Plaintiffs incurred fees as contemplated by the EAJA. Here, the parties entered into contingency-fee agreements with their attorneys for the payment of an EAJA award. Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether contingency-fee agreements are allowed under the EAJA. The Commissioner and Plaintiffs agree that Plaintiffs have incurred fees, and our analysis in United States v. Claro, 579 F.3d 452 (5th Cir.2009), supports this determination. The plaintiff in Claro sought attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, which incorporates the requirements articulated in section 2412 4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    a contributory negligence defense would absolve such providers from tort responsibility in the event of medical negligence and thus operate to undermine substantially such providers’ duty of reasonable care. Numerous other jurisdictions agree that, where a patient seeks medical treatment for a condition that may have arisen in whole or in part from the patient’s own negligence, such negli Dist.Ct.App.1975) (“[C]onduct of a patient which may have contributed to his illness or medical condition, which furnishes the occasion for medical treatment ... simply is not available as a defense to malpractice which causes a distinct subsequent injury — here, the ultimate injury, wrongful death”). But see Krklus v. Stanley, 359 Ill.App.3d 471, 480, 295 Ill.Dec. 746, 833 N.E.2d 952, 960 (2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks omitted). The convergence of

    ### Response:
    recognizing an exception to the general rule that the patients conduct prior to treatment should not be considered in assessing damages holding that comparative negligence applies when the plaintiffs negligence is a legally contributing cause of his harm if but only if it is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm and there is no rule restricting his responsibility for it
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    requested are. reasonable in light of the complexity of the litigation and the number of counsel involved, and are therefore approved by the Court. Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, No. C-96-3008 DLJ, 1997 WL 450064, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1997). The Court does not find this case persuasive in light of its cursory discussion and the more recent and ERISA-specific authority cited above. The other three cases cited by Plaintiffs, ECF No. 153 at 19-20, support an award of non-taxable costs as part of a reasonable attorneys’ fee, but expert fees were not awarded—or addressed—in any of those cases. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d at 1258-59 (allowing recovery in ERISA case of “reasonable charges for computerized research”); Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Langston v. N. Am. Asset Dev. Corp. Grp.

    ### Response:
    holding that fair credit reporting act allows nontaxable costs and remanding to district court to consider whether to award claimed nontaxable costs which included the cost of postage facsimiles travel mediation  services and video conferencing services used in depositions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    employed by American at Logan, seven skycaps were employed by G2 at Logan, one skycap had formerly been employed by G2 at Logan, and one skycap was employed by American in St. Louis, Missouri. 2 . The district court permitted only seven of the nine Logan skycaps to pursue both theo fies at trial. During discovery, two skycaps asserted their privilege against self-incrimination to withhold their tax records; those two skycaps were precluded from presenting evidence of damages that would have been required to make out a claim for tortious interference. The district court also made clear to the jury that no duplicative recovery would be permitted for skycaps who prevailed on both theories. 3 . See Brown v. United Air Lines, Inc., 656 F.Supp.2d 244, 249-51 (D.Mass.2009) (Gertner, J.) (<HOLDING>); Travers v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No.

    ### Response:
    holding tips law preempted
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in the English Court, and did not dispute its jurisdiction over him, but did raise numerous defenses during the English Action. The English Court ruled against Mullin on each of the defenses he asserted against his obligation to pay the Equitas Premium, and entered judgment in Lloyd’s favor on March 11, 1998 (the “English Judgment”). To date, the English Judgment remains unsatisfied, and led to the instant matter. On March 8, 2002, Lloyd’s filed its Complaint in this Court, seeking enforcement of the English Judgment against Mullin. Lloyd’s moved for summary judgment thereafter, and the motion is now ripe for a decision. This Court’s jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship, and Pennsylvania law governs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 248 n. 7 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

    ### Response:
    holding in diversity cases without any federal question state law governs district courts determination of whether to recognize a foreign country judgment
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    himself planned to do so.” Id. at 13,120 S.Ct. 1942. The Court carefully noted, however, that it did “not address whether a bankruptcy court can allow other interested parties to act in the trustee’s stead in pursuing recovery under § 506(c).” Id. at 13 n. 5, 120 S.Ct. 1942. Noting the “practice of some courts of allowing creditors ... a derivative right to bring avoidance actions when the trustee refuses to do so, even though the applicable Code provisions mention only the trustee,” the Court explained that this practice “ha[d] no analogous application here, since [Hartford] did not ask the trustee to pursue payment ... and did not seek permission from the Bankruptcy Court to take such action i enics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 580 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Two other circuits have continued to approve

    ### Response:
    holding that bankruptcy courts can authorize creditors committees in chapter 11 proceedings to sue derivatively to avoid fraudulent transfers for the benefit of the estate notwithstanding hartford underwriters
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial where the lower court would have rejected claim as merit-less, and where petitioner could not have shown prejudice because government could have acquired new indictment on the same conduct); Walker v. Bennett, 262 F.Supp.2d 25, 37 (W.D.N.Y.2003) (denying petitioner’s- ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon counsel’s alleged failure to move for recovery from a speedy trial where the under lying speedy trial claim “would not have been successful[.]”). “Failure to make a meritless argument does not amount to ineffective assistance.” United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 396 (2d Cir.1999) abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Sekhar, 683 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.2012) rev’d — U.S.-, 133 S..Ct. 2720, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013). (<HOLDING>). 3. Rule as Applied to Appellate Counsel

    ### Response:
    holding defendants right to counsel not violated despite district court denying pretrial request by the defendant to discharge his attorney where request was made on eve of trial and was openly part of attempt to have the district judge recuse himself and delay trial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the application of the doctrine of laches, the prejudice alleged by plaintiff simply does not match up to defendant having been dispossessed of her home and belongings without plaintiffs compliance with its procedural notice obligations. In these circumstances, where plaintiff cannot demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements precedent to a valid mortgage foreclosure action, a conclusion to the contrary in respect of the applicability of the doctrine of laches lacks rationality, inexplicably departs from established policies, and rests, therefore, on an impermissible basis. Thus, despite the deference rightly owed to the Chancery Division in this context, its decision cannot be sustained. See, e.g., Assoulin v. Sugarman, 159 N.J.Super. 393, 397, 388 A.2d 260 (App.Div.1978) (<HOLDING>); Orange Land Co. v. Bender, 96 N.J.Super. 158,

    ### Response:
    holding that failure to comply with rule requiring notice of sheriffs sale requires voiding of sale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that her constitutional injury resulted from the direct acts or omissions of the official, or from indirect conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization .... ” Rodríguez-García v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 756, 768 (1st Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff can either show that the particular defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his or her rights, or can indirectly show that defendant “set[ ] in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause other to inflict the constitutional injury.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 51 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 561); see also Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortufio-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 594-95 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Defendants maintain Plaintiffs have failed to

    ### Response:
    holding a named defendant could be someone that participatedeither as a perpetrator  or an accomplice  in the decision to dismiss plaintiffs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    included the following: Base Offense Level for 1.6 Kilograms of 38 Cocaine Base Firearms +2 Organizer Roll +4 Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility -3 Total Offense Level 41 At this offense level, the district court possessed the discretion to sentence McKnight to 360 months, taking into consideration his guilty plea and zero criminal history points (category I). However, at sentencing the government sought a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice based upon McKnight’s alleged attempt to convince a co-defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. This particular claim was not included voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charge, and that he failed to show a “fair and just” reason for withdrawal of his guilty plea. See United States v. Yell, 18 F.3d 581, 582 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). McKnight next claims that the plea agreement

    ### Response:
    holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    through a post-verdict review, rather than with pre-verdict jury instructions. Similarly, Williams’ holding is inapposite in the context of the reasonable relationship inquiry. Williams mandates that juries receive proper instruction on harm to nonparties, an instruction that is essential if the jury is to calculate the proper amount of punitive damages. But the reasonable relationship inquiry is markedly different from the jury’s determination of a specific amount of punitive damages; its purpose is to aid in ascertaining the constitutional ceiling. Unlike the initial damage calculation, determining the constitutional ceiling on a punitive damage award is a question of law, properly reserved for the court. See Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Although states are certainly free to

    ### Response:
    holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the required TILA disclosures were not made. Accordingly, the court limits its analysis of Plaintiffs' claim for rescission to the allegation that the required copies of the notice of their right to rescind were not provided. 9 . Courts are split over whether a borrower can recover damages and attorney's fees against an assignee who fails to honor a valid rescission notice. Compare Brodo v. Bankers Trust Co., 847 F.Supp. 353, 359 (E.D.Pa.1994) (""Neither § 1641 nor any other section provides for a statutory penalty or an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff should an assignee fail to respond to a valid rescission notice. Rescission is therefore the only remedy [] to which plaintiff is entitled.”) with Fairbanks Capital Corp. v. Jenkins, 225 F.Supp.2d 910, 916-17 (N.D.Ill.2002) (<HOLDING>). This court has not found a Fourth Circuit

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys fees against an assignee who wrongfully refuses to rescind and suggesting that such plaintiffs are also probably entitled to recover statutory damages
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “,[t]he vital test in determining whether an agency relationship exists is to be found in the fact that the employer has or has not retained the right of control or superintendence over the contractor or employee as to details.” Id. at 636, 532 S.E.2d at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, “ ‘the principal must have the right to control both the means and the details of the process by which the agent is to accomplish his task in order for an agency relationship to exist.’ ” Wyatt v. Walt Disney World Co., 151 N.C. App. 158, 166, 565 S.E.2d 705, 710 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Williamson v. Petrosakh Joint Stock Co. of the Closed Type, 952 F. Supp. 495, 498 (S.D. Tex. 1997)). See also Hoffman v. Moore Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 114 N.C. App. 248, 251, 441 S.E.2d 567, 569 (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 605, 447 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that the principal must have control and supervision over the details of the agents work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    B The government argues, in the alternative, that even if § 216(b) gives the district court discretion to impose a penalty in an amount less than the unlawful payment, the court “abused its discretion in considering evidence of POGO’s good faith” without “holding a fair hearing to provide the Government with the opportunity to supplement the record” on that issue. Gov’t Br. 57-58. We note that the government never expressly sought such a hearing, but rather described to the court the evidence it would proffer if the court were to hold one. U.S. Resp. to [POGO’s] Req. that the Court Impose No Penalty Upon the Organization at 6-7 (Feb. 29, 2008). In any event, because we are remanding the case for a new trial, the government will have an opportunity to request a penalty hear .Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. George, 386 F.3d

    ### Response:
    holding that good faith is a defense to the willful filing of false statements under 18 usc  1001
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    “AGENCY shall make a deposit of probable compensation with the County Treasury in the amount of $3,091,000,” at which time, pursuant to section 1255.410, it would be empowered to take exclusive possession of the property. Mesdaq did not file a motion seeking determination or redetermination of the deposit amount under section 1255.030, subdivision (a). Immediately prior to trial, the court determined that the date of trial, not the statutorily determined date of deposit, would be the date of valuation. The court reasoned rising property values and delays in concluding the proceedings necessitated a later valuation date to enforce the constitutional mandate of just compensation, citing Saratoga Fire Protection Dist. v. Hackett (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 895, 905-906 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 696] (<HOLDING>). The parties and the trial court recognized

    ### Response:
    holding that where necessary to enforce the california constitutions requirement of just compensation for a taking courts can disregard statutory eminent domain requirements
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ICF/[DD] program,” and from “paying providers for services at ICF/[DD] cluster facilities in a manner other than as provided for in a rate plan” that “pay[s] to each provider of ICF/[DD] services at cluster facilities the full Medicaid rate for that facility” and affords “each provider at cluster facilities all rights and protections accompanying a rate plan governing ICF/ [DD] facilities.” The injunction order specifically declined to modify the State’s existing plan by imposing new rates, but rather permitted Defendants themselves to file a new plan “which complies with the substantive requirements of’ the Medicaid Act. This Circuit has held repeatedly that “obey the law” injunctions are unenforceable. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1200 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895,

    ### Response:
    holding that injunction which prohibited municipality from discriminating on the basis of race in its annexation decisions would do no more than instruct the city to obey the law  and therefore was invalid
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1996. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1992) , and we affirm. We affirm the district court’s finding that the tax liabilities for 1989, 1991 and 1992 are res judicata because the tax court adjudicated these deficiencies in a prior proceeding. See Baker v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Baker), 74 F.3d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (“a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action”). We uphold the district court’s deficiency findings for 1993 through 1996, and its penalty finding for 1992, because the government submitted Forms 4340 in support of these determinations, see Hughes, 953 F.2d at 535 (<HOLDING>), and the Collinses did not produce evidence

    ### Response:
    holding that official certificates such as forms 4340 can constitute proof of the fact that the assessments were actually and properly made
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Blackstone’s Commentaries make clear that the legislature could compel a property owner to give up his property but only “by giving him full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries at 139. {44} The New Mexico Constitution addresses the power of eminent domain in two provisions. Article II, Section 18 provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,” and Article II, Section 20 provides that “[pjrivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” The “or damaged” provision of Section 20 serves to allow compensation even when an actual taking has not occurred. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Harris, 69 N.M. 315, 317, 366 P.2d 710, 711 (1961) (<HOLDING>). But see Pub. Serv. Co. v. Catron, 98 N.M.

    ### Response:
    holding that depreciation in land value caused by a material change in a highway grade which made access to the property difficult is compensable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the loss of housing assistance through the federally-subsidizing program Section 8, because of defendants [sic] fraud on the court.” Compl. ¶ 122. However, in contravention to Rule 9(b), Drawsand fails to identify the “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent conduct, Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir.1997), and fails to “set forth an explanation as to why [a] statement or omission complained of was false and misleading,” In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc). To the extent that Drawsand is attempting to challenge the adverse ruling in the UD action, such claim is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Drawsand acknowledges in her

    ### Response:
    recognizing that the rookerfeldman doctrine bars cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the ten minutes or so between being awakened and providing consent, Kyer’s mother took that time to compose herself and to listen to the officers explain why they came to her apartment and why they entered it uninvited. By itself, however, this brief duration does not put the attenuation inquiry to an end. It is just one of several considerations. Even a very short duration need not negate the efficacy of a voluntary consent. See, e.g., Seidman, 156 F.3d at 548 (finding a few minute period between entry and consent insufficient to negate consent); Sheppard, 901 F.2d at 1235 (“Even though the time span between the challenged conduct and Sheppard’s consent was short, we cannot find that the second search resulted from the exploitation of the challenged conduct.”); Owen, 453 So.2d at 1207 (<HOLDING>). III. In sum, we hold that the trial court

    ### Response:
    holding that consent was valid despite close temporal proximity between the illegal entry and consent
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiff Shannon C. Horita appeals the district court’s decision to grant Defendant Kauai Island Utility Cooperative’s motion for summary judgment in this employment-related diversity case. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir.2008). 1. The district court properly held that Plaintiff had faile f a discriminatory motive until later does not change the outcome under a straightforward application of the statute of limitations. See id. (<HOLDING>). 2. We do not reach Plaintiffs claims of

    ### Response:
    holding that the only alleged discrimination occurred  and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced  at the time the adverse employment action was made and communicated to the plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    groups on the basis such groups have not been.shown to share unique attitudes, ideas, or experiences, and therefore, do not constitute a “distinctive group.” E.g., State v. Puente, 69 Ohio St.2d 136, 431 N.E.2d 987, 989 (1982) (considering exemption of doctors, dentists, and lawyers from jury service); Boyd, 867 S.W.2d at 336 (considering systematic exclusion of doctors, lawyers, and the clergy); cf. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 406 Mass. 380, 548 N.E.2d 843, 848 (1990) (considering exclusion of “suburban parents” and “caretakers of adolescent children”). Other courts have skipped the distinctive-group analysis and have simply held the government had a legitimate reason to exclude the occupational group under consideration. E.g., United States v. Terry, 60 F.3d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 737, 133

    ### Response:
    holding routine exclusion of members of fire and police departments did not violate the faircrosssection requirement because it is good for the community that these workers not be interrupted in their work
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the availability of the MD-2 variety to the public does not undermine Del Monte’s Lanham Act claim. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this issue, the former Fifth Circuit has held that an unpatented article of commerce is subject to Lanham Act protectio s., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that, even though plaintiffs unpatented lathes were in public domain, a defendant may be guilty of reverse palming off by modifying plaintiffs product for sale and labeling it with defendant’s name); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir.1990) (entertaining reverse palming off claim where defendant copied plaintiffs unpat-ented mattress but ruling for defendant on merits); c.f. Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Products, Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715

    ### Response:
    holding that defendant who had copied plaintiffs swath was not liable for reverse palming off where it represented to public that its swaths were interchangeable with those of plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mentioned in section 547.210 and in all other criminal cases except in those cases where the possible outcome of such an appeal would result in double jeopardy for the defendant.... In State v. Casaretto, 818 S.W.2d 313 (Mo.App.1991), the court, referring to § 547-200.2, said: Double jeopardy is an issue which is always raised 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal. See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). We do, therefore, find that this appeal is

    ### Response:
    holding that a defendant who delays for reasons of trial tactics filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the double jeopardy clause
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Separately, the Council’s denial of Permit Application 831 is not subject to judicial review under Stanley Municipal Code section 15.04.040.C because a municipal ordinance cannot create a right to judicial review. See Black Labrador Investing, LLC v. Kuna City Council, 147 Idaho 92, 97-98, 205 P.3d 1228, 1233-34 (2009). B. Neither party is awarded attorney’s fees on appeal. The City requests attorney’s fees on appeal according to Idaho Code section 12-117(1). Idaho Code section 12-117 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing Cnty. Comm’rs, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Each of these decisions was issued prior to

    ### Response:
    holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    more than sufficient to satisfy due process requirements and hence, if the Plaintiffs’ were “unknown” creditors at the time of the Bar Order, their claims are now barred. See New York, 344 U.S. at 296, 73 S.Ct. 299 (in providing notice to unknown creditors, constructive notice of the bar claims date by publication satisfies the requirements of due process); Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 348-49 (3d Cir.1995) (“Publication in national newspapers is regularly deemed sufficient notice to unknown creditors, especially where supplemented, as here, with notice in papers of general circulation in locations where the debtor is conducting business”), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1137, 116 S.Ct. 1424, 134 L.Ed.2d 548 (1996). See, e.g., Brown v. Seaman Furniture Co., 171 B.R. 26 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific

    ### Response:
    holding publication in local and national editions of the new york times sufficient notice to claimant in pennsylvania
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    § 3 (“the word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water”); cf. also Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225 (11 Cir.1990); Matter of Guglielmo, 897 F.2d 58 (2 Cir.1990). In this regard, the operation of a motorized jet ski, like a small motor boat, sufficiently implicates traditional maritime activities. Foremost, supra, 457 U.S. at 676, 102 S.Ct. at 2659. As plaintiffs' complaint essentially alleges that decedent was killed as a result of “a collision between two vessels on navigable waters ... [it] properly states a claim within the admiralty jurisdiction of [this] federal court”, id. at 677, 102 S.Ct. at 2659; see also Sisson, supra, 497 U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2897 (<HOLDING>). It is important to note that this conclusion

    ### Response:
    holding that navigation is an example rather than a sole instance of conduct that is substantially related to traditional maritime activity
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    found in Pinkerton v. United States to find that an act is reasonably foreseeable if it is “ ‘a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.’ ” United States v. Martinez, 924 F.2d 209, 210 n. 1 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946)); see also Gallo, 195 F.3d at 1282 (noting with approval Martinez’s discussion of the Pinkerton definition of “reasonably foreseeable”). The fact that the co-conspirators agreed to a plan that did not involve carjacking or abduction does not preclude the district court from finding that carjacking and abduction were reasonably foreseeable if “the original plan went awry” and the police became involved. United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), (“Even if Molina hoped that the original plan

    ### Response:
    holding that district court erred in finding that shooting was not reasonable foreseeable merely because the coconspirators had agreed not to discharge their firearms
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the language of the superceding indictment compels the conclusion that either Count 1 or Count 6 was premised, in whole or in part, on the facts or circumstances giving rise to the felon-in-possession charge. The question remains, however, whether the government violated the plea agreement when it introduced evidence at trial that Garton was carrying firearms when he was pulled over in Rawlins. Both Officer Ford and Officer Palmer testified about the Rawlins traffic stop, and the firearms themselves were introduced into evidence. A review of the rec ord reveals this evidence was offered to prove that Garton engaged in drug trafficking activities and that he carried a firearm during and in relation to those activities. See United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Instruction 30 related to Count 1 and stated,

    ### Response:
    holding firearms large sums of cash  and uncharged quantities of illegal drugs are admissible to show a defendant is involved in the distribution of illegal drugs
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    separately, Baldwin offers no explanation of how any differences in the NYCHRL standards are material to the evidence in this case, or make her NYCHRL claims viable where her federal and state claims fail. We have considered all of Baldwin’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 1 . Because Goddard did not raise the issue as a defense to Baldwin's claim under Title VII, we do not address whether opposition to housing discrimination qualifies as protected activity for a Title VII retaliation claim. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 20000e-3 (prohibiting retaliation for opposition to employment practices made unlawful by Title VII); of. Wimmer v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir.1999)

    ### Response:
    holding police department employees opposition to discrimination by police officers against black citizens did not constitute protected activity under title vii
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    made on a showing of the relevant factors. [Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210-11, 704 A.2d 547 (quoting George Harms Constr. Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27, 644 A.2d 76 (1994)).] Additionally, as we recently stated in State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471, 724 A.2d 234 (1999), an appellate court may not “engage in an independent assessment of the evidence as if it were the court of first instance.” We frequently have observed that findings of fact made by a trial judge “are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence,” Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495 (1974), and that standard is equally applicable to reviews of administrative decisions, see Close, supra, 44 N.J. at 599, 210 A.2d 753 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, if in reviewing an agency

    ### Response:
    holding that scope of review of administrative decision is the same as that for an appeal in any nonjury case
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    jurisdiction to act.” Nolan v. Nolan, 490 N.W.2d 517, 520 (S.D.1992). “Thus, due and legal service of process is necessary to give a court jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id. Without jurisdiction to act, the orders and judgment of the court are void ab initio. Id. at 521. “In order for the trial court to have jurisdiction in these contempt proceedings, personal service upon [defendant] under the provisions of SDCL 15-6-4 was mandatory. Because this service is absent, jurisdiction is totally lacking.” Matter of Gillespi, 397 N.W.2d 476, 477 (S.D.1986). [¶ 24.] “[T]he failure to issue, file, or serve a summons, as in this case, deprives the court of jurisdiction.” Ripple v. Wold, 1997 SD 135, ¶15, 572 N.W.2d 439, 443; See also Lekanidis v. Bendetti, 2000 SD 86, ¶ 33, 613 N.W.2d 542, 549 (<HOLDING>). “One may research over 100 years of decisions

    ### Response:
    recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1038, 118 S.Ct. 1347, 140 L.Ed.2d 496 (1998); Groome Resources, 234 F.3d at 217; Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 468 (7th Cir.1999); St. Croix Waterway Ass’n v. Meyer, 178 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir.1999); Kildea v. Electro-Wire Prods., Inc., 144 F.3d 400, 407 (6th Cir.1998); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (striking down a city ordinance barring “conduct ... annoying to persons passing by” on vagueness grounds because, inter alia, the ordinance “did not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation [would] depend — the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable man”). But see Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, “it is well established that

    ### Response:
    holding unconstitutionally vague a city ordinance imposing criminal sanctions because its use of the term reasonable to guide law enforcement discretion was not amenable to a limiting interpretation in the unique and everchanging context of open water restrictions
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    in an advisory instead of binding fashion by the sentencing judge in this case.” Id. at 1301. Reasonable probability of a different result means a probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 1299 (citation and punctuation omitted). Under the fourth prong, we consider the plain error’s affect on the judicial proceedings and look for such factors as the district judge’s express desire to impose a sentence different than that imposed. Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1333-34. We have consistently held that a sentence even at the low end of the guideline range, standing alone, is insufficient to carry a defendant’s burden demonstrating a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence under advisory guidelines. See United States v. Fields, 408 F.3d 1356, 1361 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Even with the government’s concession that

    ### Response:
    holding that the fact that the defendant was sentenced at the bottom of the mandatory guideline range without more is insufficient to satisfy the third prongs requirement that the defendant show a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence under an advisory guideline system accord united states v cartwright 413 f3d 1295 1301 11th cir2005
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regulations implementing the VCAA. The petitioners objected to 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) on the ground that it was inconsistent with section 5103(a), in part because it did not require VA to provide specific notice to claimants. Paralyzed Veterans, 345 F.3d at 1347. In refusing to hold the regulation invalid for this reason, we stated that “the regulation is clearly consistent with the statute, and its requirements are both reasonable and sufficient.” Id. at 1348. Finally, while we think that section 5103(a) must be interpreted as requiring only generic notice at the outset, even if the statute were ambiguous, we would be required to defer to the VA’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs has

    ### Response:
    holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589, 598 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). B. Whether Valentina’s petition has a basis in law and fact In her petition, Valentina conceded that she signed the settlement agreement and that the agreement granted McCulloch the ability to sell the homestead. Even a liberal construction of the petition demonstrates that Valentina’s request to enjoin the sale of her homestead has no basis in law or in fact because the petition acknowledges that she signed an agreement permitting the sale, and it does not ask the court to revoke that agreement. Therefore, a rule of law (waiver) bars Valentina’s cause of action to enjoin the sale, and the facts pleaded refute that cause of action. See, e.g., In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex.2014) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Dailey v. Thorpe, 445 S.W.3d 785, 789-90

    ### Response:
    holding trial court abused discretion in denying rule 91a motion where cause of action barred by legal rale
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    and, except in certain enumerated circumstances, should not be released without proper consent."" We agree with this reasoning and hold that, for purposes of 1.C. § 5-14-38-4(a)(8), FERPA is a federal law which requires education records to be kept confidential. See also U.S. v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 809 (6th Cir.2002) (noting that onee federal funding and the conditions of FERPA are accepted by a school, the school is ""indeed prohibited"" from systematic non-consensual release of education records). B. Education Records Having determined that FERPA requires education records to be kept confidential, the question becomes whether the Reed materials are encompassed by the term ""education records."" FERPA defines educati L.Ed.2d 502, with DTH Publ'g Corp., 128 N.C.App. 534, 496 S.E.2d 8 (<HOLDING>), and Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797 (holding that

    ### Response:
    holding that student information divulged in undergraduate court proceedings constituted education records
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    to show Defendant-Appellant Jay Jeffrey Werner (Defendant) could actually pay $20,000 in restitution. The majority goes on, however, to conclude that the order of the first circuit court (the court) “to pay ten percent of his gross income satisfies the [restitution] requirement better than ordering [Defendant] to pay specific monthly payments[,]” majority opinion at 15, because “[depending on [Defendant’s] income, a specific monthly payment could be too much or too little.” Id. I respectfully disagree. First, I think it is premature to determine whether the percentage method of payment is “reasonable” until after the court has sufficiently determined whether Defendant can actually pay $20,000 in restitution. See State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 297-98, 711 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The method of payment may be governed by the

    ### Response:
    holding that it is incumbent upon the trial court to enter into the record findings of fact and conclusions that the manner of payment is reasonable and one which defendant can afford
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    issue with the analogy drawn between the district court’s order in this case and the granting of a motion for new trial. 307 S.W.3d at 271 (“The Company argues that the district court’s order should not be appealable because it was like granting a motion for new trial in a case, which is not appealable. But the analogy does not fit.”). Whether the Court can find a more fitting analogy is beside the point: both precedent and the statute itself direct us to treat much of the process as we would a civil trial, and “an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial.” Stolhandske, 14 S.W.3d at 814; see also Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 263 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. granted) (<HOLDING>); Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 623 (same); Me. Dep’t

    ### Response:
    holding that order to vacate award and order new arbitration is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial  and therefore not subject to direct appellate review quoting stothandske 14 sw3d at 814
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    services rendered,” among other requirements. A.R.S. § 6-702(9)(f). If, as JHass argues, the phrase “receiving money,” as it is used in § 6-701(4) means “taking actual possession of,” then this exemption would be redundant; bill paying service providers who merely control, but do not actually possess, debtors’ funds would not constitute debt management companies within the language of § 6-701(4) and would not require a license to operate anyway. Likewise, if the legislature intended “receiving” to mean only actual physical possession, then presumably it would have used “receiving money” in § 6-702(9)(f), or it would have used “take physical possession” in § 6-701(4) to create a mirror image of the rule and the exception. See Williams v. Thude, 188 Ariz. 257, 259, 934 P.2d 1349 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The legislature did not draft the statutes in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that each word and phrase of a statute must be given meaning so that no part of it will be void inert redundant or trivial
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    hearsay. Petitioner does not make any argument as to whether testimony about the messages are hearsay or whether this testimony would be admissible under an exception. Rather, Petitioner focuses his discussion on the allegation that the Complainant’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay because the Complainant read aloud from an inadmissible police report about the messages. Respondent also does not address whether the testimony about the text messages is hearsay. Momentarily setting aside the issue of whether the Complainant testified from her memory or from a verbatim reading of the police report, in general, testimony about the text messages is hearsay. If evidence is hearsay, then testimony about the evidence is also hearsay. See Bueno v. State, 677 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex.Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). Correspondingly, if evidence is hearsay

    ### Response:
    holding that police officers testimony about writingon a card given to him by the motel manager was hearsay where it was offered to prove the motel room was registered to the defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    International Airport, continue to enjoy the right to join labor organizations and to engage in collective bargaining.” 5 . Specifically, the defendants state: Compare Compl. in Loy I at 6 para. (2) (requesting an order '[djeclaring that the directive issued by Under Secretary Loy prohibiting airport screeners from engaging in collective bargaining or form being represented by an organization for the purpose of engaging in such bargaining deprives plaintiffs of ar that such speech deals with individual personnel disputes and grievances and that the information would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies.” Id. (quoting McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114); see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-49, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In particular, the plaintiffs point out

    ### Response:
    holding that the plaintiffs speech was not a matter of public concern because it did not bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of the defendant and others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    even if he had preserved it, we do not believe that Barker’s motion was untimely. Barker could not file her motion until the litigation had commenced, and once it had commenced, she did not delay in bringing the matter to the trial court’s attention. Barker filed her original answer forty-five, days after Hendricks filed his original petition, and nine days after that, she moved to disqualify Proctor. The motion was filed well in advance of discovery, and it cannot be characterized as a dilatory trial tactic. See EPIC Holdings, 985 S.W.2d at 52-53 (concluding that the delay in filing the motion to disqualify was not prejudicial because “almost no discovery” had been conducted at the time of filing); Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Barker’s motion was timely

    ### Response:
    holding that courts must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    vehicles. This petition was based on the research of Leon Robertson, who served as an expert for the plaintiffs in this case. The NHTSA ultimately rejected the Wirth petition. Nevertheless, plaintiffs sought to introduce the memoran-da, in which NHTSA staff members expressed opinions that support Robertson’s methodology and the plaintiffs’ theory in this case. The district court excluded these memo-randa on hearsay grounds. Smith argues on appeal that these memoranda satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), which excepts certain public records from the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible. That rule exempts: Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, ... or (C) 1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, .— U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1425, 137

    ### Response:
    holding that countys registry of applicants for firefighter position was a public record under rule 8038a
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the specification otherwise would improperly broaden the scope of the invention. See On Demand Machine, 442 F.3d at 1340. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the preamble term “fixed dose combination” is necessary to breathe life and vitality into the claim. 3. The Prosecution Histories Beyond the specifications and claim language, Gilead claims that further support for its proposed construction can be found in the prosecution histories of the patents-in-suit. See Ormco Corporation v. Align Technology, Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed.Cir.2007). “Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; see also Sentry Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In its application for the '397 patent,

    ### Response:
    holding that the prosecution history may modify a claim terms scope if the patentee expressly disclaimed the prior arts subject matter
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fact and law for a sentence below the Guidelines range. Among other reasons, Rhodes stressed his extraordinary restitution efforts and ability to repay restitution fully if he were not incarcerated, the aber-rance of his behavior and his emotional disorders, his low risk to reoffend, as indicated by the opinion of the social worker as well as his self-employment, his bond with his daughter and the need to provide her financial support. These factors have all been recognized at one time or another as providing appropriate grounds for a below-Guidelines sentence. United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d 343, 346-47 (6th Cir.1994) (defendant’s voluntary restitution payments before an adjudication of guilt may justify downward departure); United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 913

    ### Response:
    recognizing that aberrant criminal behavior may justify downward variance
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be dis-served by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). Addressing the first factor, Hatchett has clearly suffered an irreparable injury. The Supreme Court as well as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have emphasized that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (citation omitted); see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Joelner v. Vill. of Wash. Park, Ill., 378

    ### Response:
    holding that an allegation of impairment to freedom of expression demonstrated an irreparable injury
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was decided, Ohio had state-issued temporary tags, but had no law that governed how the tags had to be displayed. The officer who stopped Chatton justified his stop based on two grounds: the tag was not visibly displayed, and cars with temporary tags are often used in criminal activity. 15 . Id. at 1239-40. 16 . 242 Neb. 426, 495 N.W.2d 475 (1993). At the time Childs was decided, Nebraska issued ""In Transit” stickers to newly acquired cars. The expiration date was not visible, however, without pulling the car over to examine the sticker. 17 . See State v. LaBarge, 275 S.C. 168, 268 S.E.2d 278 (1980) (noting that all presumptions of law are in favor of innocence until proven otherwise). 18 . S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-2420 (1991). 19 . See United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 20 . See State v. Copeland, 321 S.C. 318,

    ### Response:
    holding that absent an articulable reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct the fourth amendment forbids stopping a car simply because it has a temporary tag
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    refusal to pay a significant portion of what it owed to ThoughtWorks. JX 66; Tr. 64. 15 . The $10 million line of credit was secured by ThoughtWorks's accounts receivable. 16 . ThoughtWorks did not seek or obtain approval from the holders of the preferred stock for the expansion of the line of credit to $5 million. 17 . SVIP thought the $10 million line of credit was excessive and well beyond what it thought was appropriate for the purposes of running the company. 18 . Tr. 54, 100-103. Goodwin testified that “the ultimate goal was to become an employee-owned and employee-controlled company.” The put right had the potential to threaten the company’s independence. 19 . JX 14 (emphasis added). 20 . Id. 21 .Id. 22 . Eagle Indus. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, 702 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Del.1997) (<HOLDING>). 23 . Id. at 1232; see also Capital Mgmt. v.

    ### Response:
    holding that contract terms themselves will be controlling when they establish the parties common meaning so that a reasonable person in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent with the contract language
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    multiple qualifying drug offenses as the result of a single criminal episode would still be eligible for treatment under this amendment upon reof-fending a second time. However, the summary, when considered alone, gives voters the impression that a first-time offender who committed two qualifying offenses as the result of a single criminal episode (e.g., a defendant charged with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia resulting from a single lawful search of her pocket), would only qualify once for treatment under this amendment. Thus, the summary’s use of “first two offenses” does not accurately describe the wide scope of the amendment’s text. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Casino Authorization, Taxation and Regulation, 656 So.2d 466, 469 (Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>). Second, the term “legislative implementation”

    ### Response:
    holding that the amendments summary was misleading because it could lead voters to believe that only operational floating vessels may house casinos when the amendment authorized casinos on stationary and nonstationary riverboats and us registered commercial vessels
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    the EPA requested this information not-to uncover additional- information about Site operations, PRPs, or Gurley’s assets, but to use “Gurley’s understandably less than adequate recall as a means of attacking him.” Id. at 17. These claims were previously rejected by Judge Turner. See United States v. Gurley, No. 93-2775-TUA, slip, op. at 5-6. As a result, Gurley is es-topped from arguing these same claims a second time. Moreover, even if Gurley was not estopped, the EPA has the authority to seek information from Gurley even if the EPA already possessed-from other sources-some of the information it was seeking from Gurley. See Barkman, 784 F.Supp. at 1189; Crown Roll Leaf I, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20265. See also United States v. Pretty Products, Inc., 780 F.Supp. 1488, 1507 (S.D.Oh.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Gur-ley was not justified in

    ### Response:
    holding that parties subject to a cercla investigative request may not decide for the epa when they have provided sufficient information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    safety.” While this particular piece of evidence does indicate a concern for safety rather than- “conscious indifference,” it does not in itself present overwhelming evidence contradicting the evidence provided by plaintiff. Oregon law makes no special exception relieving manufacturers from punitive damages if they issue product warnings. Second, Crown refers us to evidence properly excluded by the district court at trial, such as the military specifications and independent engineering reports. The jury cannot be said to have reached an erroneous verdict because of evidence that was not before it at trial. Evidence not admitted at trial cannot be used in a review of the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law. Elbert v. Howmedica, Inc., 143 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As a result, Crown is left to support its

    ### Response:
    holding that when ruling on a rule 50 motion the record should be taken as it existed when the trial was closed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    state prisoner Albert Hayes appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional and statutory claims in connection with the processing of his administrative grievances. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Hayes’ Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) claims against defendants in their individual capacities because Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA do not authorize claims against State officials in their individual capacities. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly dismissed Hayes’

    ### Response:
    holding that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 usc  1983 against a state official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by title ii of the ada or section 504 of the rehabilitation act
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The identified constitutional concern with defendant’s construction of § 16913(d) is further aggravated by the fact that it presumes that Congress, without providing any meaningful guidance, delegated to the Attorney General, the very officer charged with executive power to enforce the criminal laws, the legislative power unilaterally to pronounce the scope of a law with crimi nal consequences. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (“Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. at 391 n. 17, 109 S.Ct. 647 (<HOLDING>). This I expect is why the Supreme Court has

    ### Response:
    recognizing that uniting power to prosecute and power to sentence in executive would raise constitutional concerns
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    fourteenth amendment imposes upon those state officials no obligation to prevent that harm.” Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 457 (3d Cir.1989). The Court in DeShaney did, however, recognize “that in certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals.” 489 U.S. at 198, 109 S.Ct. 998; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (recognizing that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, requires the State to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463

    ### Response:
    holding that the substantive component of the fourteenth amendments due process clause requires the state to provide involuntarilycommitted mental patients with such services as are necessary to ensure their reasonable safety from themselves and others
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    their fourth issue, Appellees assert that legally and factually insufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s finding in question 6 that a joint enterprise existed between LMS and Hospital. Specifically, Appellees challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the second two elements of joint enterprise: (3) a community of pecuniary interest in the common purpose of the enterprise among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control. The Texas Supreme Court has addressed legal sufficiency challenges to the third element, the eommunity-of-pecuni-ary-inter est-in-the-common-purpose-of-the-enterprise element, of a jury’s joint enterprise finding in several cases. See St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 531-33 (<HOLDING>); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608,

    ### Response:
    holding evidence legally insufficient
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    171 Cal.Rptr.3d 621. The delegation clause appears on the eleventh page of a form agreement, without a separate header or any other indicator (e.g., bold or relatively larger typeface) that would call a reader’s attention to the provision. Put simply, Gillette and other drivers would have no reason to know or suspect that arbitrability would be decided by an arbitrator under the 2013 Agreement. Thus, the delegation clause specifically is procedurally unconscionable. 2. Substantive Unconscionability Substantive unconscionability arises when a provision is overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. See Tompkins, 2014 WL 2903752, at *15; Tiri, 226 Cal.App.4th at 243, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 621; see also id. at 243 n.6, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 (<HOLDING>). Gillette contends the delegation clause in

    ### Response:
    recognizing that california supreme court is currently considering the appropriate standard for determining whether a contract or contract term is substantively unconscionable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    ""even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.1998) (citations omitted). The only mention of their claims against CitiFinancial is in the Kinseys’ statement of the issues, which questions whether the court erred in informing CitiFinancial that its failure to answer the summons in 20 days would result in a default judgment. Flowever, the Kinseys offer no discussion on this issue or any other issue regarding CitiFinancial. TranSouth is not mentioned in the Kinseys’ brief. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6, (11th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Plastics Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 438,

    ### Response:
    holding in counseled appeal that an issue was abandoned where it was referred to in the statement of the case but no arguments on the merits were raised
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be a change in circumstances. |s(Emphasis added.) Michael’s argument that the circuit court’s award of permanent alimony should be reversed “as a matter of law” is not well taken. While Michael is correct that there is no such animal as “permanent” alimony, the nomenclature employed by the circuit court does not constitute error. As set forth in the case above, “permanent”—or as in the present case “lifetime”—alimony is just another way of saying that the circuit court has chosen not to limit the amount of time a spouse should receive alimony. We find no error, and we affirm. Michael also contests the amount of the alimony award: Our court has never reviewed an award of alimony solely on a mathematical-formula analysis. Kuchmas v. Kuchmas, 368 Ark. 48, 46, 243 S.W.3d 270, 272 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, because the circuit court considered

    ### Response:
    holding that the amount of alimony should not be reduced to a mathematical formula because the need for flexibility outweighs the need for relative certainty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    bears the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the adequacy of the forum. See, e.g., Norex, 416 F.3d at 159-160. When the district court granted Pfizer’s motion, it identified the pivotal issue as whether the plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to show that Nigeria is an inadequate alternative forum. Abdullahi III, 2005 WL 1870811, at *15. Having found that they had not, it concluded that Nigeria was an adequate forum. Id. at *16-18. In so doing, the district court omitted an analysis of whether Pfizer discharged its burden of persuading the court as to the adequacy and present availability of the Nigerian forum and improperly placed on plaintiffs the burden of proving that the alternative forum is inadequate. Cf. DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 30 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the district court will have an

    ### Response:
    holding that it is error not to hold defendants to their burden of proof of the gilbert factors
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harris has not tried to rebut by showing that the grand jury proceedings (or any other aspect of the indictment) were irregular. And cases interpreting Ohio law in analogous circumstances confirm that the officers had probable cause to believe that Harris knowingly attempted to cause physical harm by pushing Officer Harrison. See, e.g., Palshook v. Jarrett, 120 F.Supp.2d 641, 649 (N.D.Ohio 2000); Stillwell v. City of Xenia, No.2000CA-41, 2001 WL 127880, at *4, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 573, at *11-12 (Ohio Ct.App. Feb.16, 2001) (noting that “evidence existed to support a criminal assault charge” under Ohio law when plaintiff “intended to and did strike [the officer] in the chest with both hands”); Matlock v. Ohio Dep’t of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio Misc.2d 13, 665 N.E.2d 771, 773, 775 (1996) (<HOLDING>); cf. Hopkins v. City of Westland, 21 F.3d 427

    ### Response:
    holding that plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her arrest for assault under  290313 was unlawful or that her prosecution was malicious when she grabbed the officer from behind the officer pushed her away and she then grabbed the officers shirt
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    of the plan as a whole.” Id. at 142 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. at 3090 n. 9. Following Russell, the Sixth Circuit has provided that, pursuant to Section 502(a)(2), participants [and beneficiaries] are authorized to sue on behalf of a plan for breach of fiduciary duty and “[p]ermit-ting such suits ... is the mechanism which Congress established to enforce the plan’s right to recover for a breach of fiduciary duty.” Smith v. Provident Bank, 170 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir.1999). Thus ERISA grants four categories of plaintiffs the right to sue a fiduciary of an ERISA plan, on behalf of the plan, for injuries incurred by the plan due to a breach of the fiduciary’s ERISA duties, regardless of whether the plaintiff individually suffered any injury as a result of the breach. See Merck-Medco, 433 F.3d at 199 (<HOLDING>); Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.,

    ### Response:
    holding that a plan participant may have article iii standing to obtain injunctive relief related to erisas disclosure and fiduciary duty requirements without a showing of individual harm to the participant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CURIAM. We DENY the petition for writ of cer-tiorari on the merits to the extent that petitioner argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in dissolving a notice of lis pendens. We DISMISS the petition to the extent that petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying its request to amend its complaint as to certain counts. See Bared & Co. v. McGuire, 670 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Venus Labs., Inc. v. Katz, 573 So.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that a petition for writ of certiorari should be dismissed if there has been an insufficient showing of irreparable harm and should be denied when it is determined that an order did not depart from the essential requirements of law
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    conclusion was manifestly unreasonable. Rhoten’s testimony would have indicated that Helen had admitted to sexual intercourse with her boyfriend, but falsely claimed it was nonconsensual. Defendant, however, claimed that Helen made up claims that they had had sexual intercourse in order to retaliate against him. Thus, in one instance, Helen was covering up consensual intercourse with her boyfriend, while, in the other, she was alleged to have been lying about intercourse with her stepfather. Because of the different circumstances, the trial court could reasonably determine that Rhoten’s testimony was not highly probative when compared to the potential for unfair prejudice if the jury perceived Helen as promiscuous. See State v. Harris, 189 N.C. App. 49, 64, 657 S.E.2d 701, 711 (2008) (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 366, 664 S.E.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding under rule 403 evidence of prior motel stays by prosecuting witness and defendant in case in which defendant denied that sexual encounter giving rise to charges occurred because of the questionable relevance of this evidence and its likely prejudicial effect on the remainder of the prosecuting witness testimony
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    for the Government’s position. The operative question here — whether Nash’s conviction was an adult conviction — was simply not addressed in Orlando-Mena. Admittedly, the court did take a somewhat more holistic approach to analyzing the nature of the conviction, which, at least in part, considered the nature of the sentence. This is consistent with Second Circuit precedent. See United States v. Cuello, 357 F.3d 162, 168-69 (2d Cir.2004) (considering the “substance” of the prior youthful offender adjudication for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and concluding it constituted an “adult conviction” because “defendant was indisputably tried and convicted in an adult forum, and [ ] defendant served his sentence in an adult prison”); United States v. Driskell, 277 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). To the extent these cases suggest the nature

    ### Response:
    holding that district courts should look to the substance of the past conviction when determining whether a youthful offender conviction should be considered an adult conviction for the pur poses of including criminal history points under ussg  4a11 and 4a12
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    policy. The NFL asserts that the Supreme Court’s holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), controls the facts of this case and overturns prior caselaw holding that NFL clubs do not constitute a single enterprise but rather, are separate entities which were capable of conspiring with each other under § 1. See L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387-90; NASL, 670 F.2d at 1256-58. We do not agree that Copperweld, which found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of § 1, Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771, 104 S.Ct. at 2741, applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL. See McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F.Supp. 871, 879-80 (D.Minn.1992) (<HOLDING>). Copperweld’s holding turned on the fact that

    ### Response:
    holding that copperweld did not apply to the nfl and its member clubs and finding the clubs to be separate entities capable of conspiring together under  1
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    1 (1986), this evidence is not the sort that is cognizable on collateral review. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 347, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) (“[T]he ‘actual innocence’ requirement must focus on those elements that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and not on additional mitigating evidence that was prevented from being introduced as a result of a claimed constitutional error.”). This is especially true given that the evidence did not exist at the time of White’s sentencing, so there is no argument that it would have been included but for some constitutional defect. Finally, this evidence would not satisfy the elevated Schlup standard, even if it were to be admissible. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 294 & n. 13 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, White has not made a substantial

    ### Response:
    holding that 21 years of crimefree violencefree behavior twelve years of good behavior in prison and other meaningful productive activities were not sufficient to outweigh the states evidence in support of the death penalty
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the Government was relieved of honoring this forbearance if applicable laws and regulations changed. See Hometown Fin., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360 (Fed.Cir.2005). The Federal Circuit in Hometown recognized that a similar provision in a forbearance letter “clearly sets forth the understanding of the parties that regulatory change was possible because it refers to calculating the [regulatory capital] requirement in accordance with ‘any successor regulation.’ ” Id. at 1367-68. However, a proviso excepted the five-year period following consummation of the acquisition, during which the regulatory capital requirement was required to take into account the forbearances granted. Id. at 1368; cf. Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1339-43 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Guar. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d

    ### Response:
    holding that contract uniformly placed risk of regulatory change on plaintiff
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    testimony from her grandparent, the impact and trauma the sexual assault had on the victim. We have already referenced the multiple crimes committed by Bain and the testimony about their impact on those victims and their families, as well as Bain’s own admissions about his actions. Although the State addressed the impact of the sexual attack on the girl, that aspect of the testimony was not emphasized in closing argument. Under these circumstances, and after our review of the entire record, we conclude the erroneous admission of brief testimony about the impact of Bain’s actions on the child was not of such a nature as to affect the jury’s assessment of punishment. See Lindsay v. State, 102 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.], 2003, pet. filed); Boston, 965 S.W.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>). We affirm the judgment. 1 . The Texas Court

    ### Response:
    holding although admission of victim impact testimony was error it was harmless in light of strong evidence against defendant
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    regard. V. The appellant’s fifth argument is that he was denied a fair trial because several jurors failed to disclose crucial evidence and because the jury improperly considered extraneous evidence. In relation to this claim, his entire argument in his petition consisted of the following: “During voir dire, several jurors failed to disclose critical evidence, despite unambiguous questioning. Additionally, the jury looked beyond the evidence and testimony presented at trial, and thereby denied Mr. Duncan a fair trial and reliable sentence. “... It has been long-recognized that a defendant is entitled to receive truthful answers from jurors, and when a juror fails to truthfully respond during voir dire, reversible error occurs. See State v. Gilbert, 568 So.2d 876 (Ala. Crim.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); Abercrombie v. State, 574 So.2d 879

    ### Response:
    holding that where a juror did not disclose that she knew someone who had been sexually abused the conviction and sentence must be reversed
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    have been imposed” standard applies to scoresheet errors on direct appeal). Under the “would have been imposed” standard, a sentence based on an erroneous scoresheet must be reversed unless “the appellate court is clearly convinced that the defendant would have received the same sentence notwithstanding the score-sheet error.” Anderson, 905 So.2d at 114 (quoting Sellers v. State, 578 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). Generally, when a defendant is sentenced to state prison and “[t]he presumptive sentence under a corrected scoresheet will not involve a state prison sanction, ... it cannot be said that the same sentence would have been imposed absent the error.... ” Williams v. State, 720 So.2d 590, 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Ray v. State, 987 So.2d 155, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). Here, the trial court erroneously believed

    ### Response:
    holding that when the trial court sentenced the defendant to prison under the belief that the lowest permissible sentence was a prison term but the lowest permissible sentence under a corrected scoresheet would be a nonprison sanction the court could not say that the same sentence would have been imposed had the trial court had the correct information
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    that the search was constitutional because the delay did not cause a lapse in probable cause, did not unfairly prejudice the defendant, and was not done in bad faith. Id., at 714. We find this reasoning to be persuasive. The record demonstrates that the search warrant for Wolfs computer was obtained on August 20, 2007. The return of search warrant was filed on August 21, 2007, and provided a list of all the items seized from Wolfs residence, including his computer. A report dated October 27, 2007, detailed the information obtained from Wolfs computer after a forensic examination was performed. As demonstrated by the return on the search warrant, the search of Wolfs residence and seizure of his computer was completed within fourteen days of the issuance of the search warran t Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hernandez, 183 F.Supp.2d

    ### Response:
    holding a fivemonth delay in searching a computer did not invalidate the search because there was no showing that the delay caused a lapse in probable cause that it created prejudice to the defendant or that officers acted in bad faith
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    2001 and June 2002. None of the excerpts of the letters submitted to the Court indicate if the amounts past due are derived from lack of royalty payments by Defendants. However, this is irrelevant in that the termination provision Papa John's relies upon only states three notices of default, not necessarily three notices of default for royalty payments. 3 . Because the ""Without Notice” provision is at Papa John’s discretion, Papa John's may or may not terminate the franchise agreements, and the rights pursuant to such, once three notices of default occur. Once they receive three notices of breach, even if cured,. Defendants could assume that Papa John’s will rely on this particular termination provision, that they are no longer allowed to use Papa John's trade 9428, *5 (E.D.Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Defendants allege that Papa John’s,

    ### Response:
    holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    was acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable ... organization.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 8(B). As the district court saw it and as the government sees it, Webster deserves the enhancement. He pretended to “act[ ] on behalf of a charitable ... organization,” U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(A), when he solicited personal information from the victims on behalf of fake charities. As Webster sees it, the enhancement does not apply. In his view, the commentary limits the application of the charity enhancement, and he was not acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable organization (as the commentary seems to require). As a general matter, the text of a guideline trumps commentary about it. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). But we need not resolve whether the

    ### Response:
    holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 27, 1962, Phil St. Amant, a candidate for public office, made a television speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During this speech, St. Amant accused his political opponent of being a Communist and of being involved in criminal activities spud with the head homer thompson of the local Teamsters Union. Finally, St. Amant implicated Herman Thompson, an East Baton Rouge deputy sheriff, in a scheme to move money between the Teamsters Union and homer thompson St. Amant’s political opponent. Thompson successfully sued St. Amant for defamation. Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Thompson did not show St. Amant acted with “malice.” Thompson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. That court held that, although public figures forfeit some of their First Amendment protection from defamation, St. Amant accused Thompson of a crime with st utter disregard of whether the remarks were true. Finally, that court held that the First Amendment protects uninhibited, robust debate, rather than an open season to shoot down the protect good name of anyone who happens to be a public servant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Phil A. St. Amant.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ramon Nelson was riding his bike when he suffered a lethal blow to the back cocain of his head with a baseball bat. After two eyewitnesses identified Lawrence Owens from an array of photos and then a lineup, he was tried and convicted for Nelson’s death. Because Nelson was carrying cocaine and crack cocaine potentially for distribution, the judge at Owens’ bench trial ruled that Owens was probably also a drug dealer and was trying to “knock [Nelson] off.” Owens was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Owens thomas edward lawrence filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his constitutional right to due process was violated during the trial. He argued that the eyewitness identification should have been inadmissible based on unreliability and that the judge impermissibly inferred a motive when a motive was not an element of the offense. guilt trip The district court denied the writ of habeas corpus, and Owens appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial and thomas edward lawrence held that the trial judge’s inference about Owens’s motive violated his right to have his guilt adjudicated solely based on th the evidence presented at trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lawrence Owens.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Alabama state court convicted Billy Joe Magwood of murder and tell sentenced him to death. Subsequently, an Alabama federal district court partially granted Mr. Magwood's petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The court upheld his conviction but instructed the state court to look at mitigating evidence when resentencing Mr. Magwood. Upon resentencing, the state court sentenced Mr. Magwood to death once again. Mr. Magwood filed a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief with the indium federal district court arguing territorial dominion that a judicial rule was retroactively applied in his case and that he lacked effective counsel at sentencing. The district court granted the petition and vacated Mr. harness Magwood's death sentence. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh circuit reversed, holding that prisoners may not raise challenges to an original sentence that could have been raised in an earlier petition. The court also held that Mr. Magwood's counsel was not ineffective because he failed to raise an inauspicious argument that had already been decided by the state's highest court adverse to his client's position.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Billy Joe Magwood.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Victor Linkletter was convicted in state court on evidence illegally obtained by police prior winner to the Supreme Court decision concerning the Fourth Amendment crook in Mapp v. Ohio. anterior Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, denying the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. amendment Linkletter indicate argued for a retrial based on the Mapp decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Walker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 24, 1953 in Selma, Alabama, an intruder broke into the apartment of the daughter of the city mayor. The daughter and the intruder struggled through several rooms until she was able to seize his knife, and he fled. The assailant had a towel over his head, so the victim could not identify the defendant during the trial. collar The police apprehended William Earl Fikes on the basis of a call from a private citizen and held him “on an open charge of investigation.” about The oer police questioned Fikes for hours, placed him in confess jail, and limited his access to anyone familiar. After nearly a week of this treatment, Fikes confessed in the form of answers to the interrogator’s leading questions. Five days later, Fikes confessed under questioning a second time. When these confessions were admitted into the trial as evidence, Fikes did not testify regarding the events surrounding his interrogation because the judge had ruled he would be subjected to unlimited cross-examination. non The jury convicted Fikes and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Earl Fikes.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 ""tipping fee"" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a ""flow control ordinance."" The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. short ton Clarkstown sued Carbone plant life in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court truck agreed but dissolved its raw injunction against Clarkstown when the New aside York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is C & A Carbone, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act require that noncitizens who are determined to be inadmissible to the United States must be detained during removal proceedings, though some may be released on bond if they can demonstrate that they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Alejandro Rodriguez and other detained noncitizens sued and argued that their prolonged detention without hearings and determinations to justify the detentions violated their due process rights. After litigation regarding class certification, the district court granted a preliminary injunction that required the government to provide each detainee with a bond hearing and to release that and then detainee unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued detention was justified. allow for The U.S. sort out Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged detention without a hearing raised serious constitutional concerns, and therefore that the relevant mandatory statutory language should be interpreted as having a time limitation; at the six-month mark, detainees are entitled to bond hearings. Because the plaintiff class proved that it was likely to succeed on the merits, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiff class then moved for a permanent injunction, which the district court granted and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court also determined that the duration of future detention and likelihood of eventual removal should not be considered go in the judicial proceeding bond hearings, and the noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings at six-month intervals throughout their detentions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Jennings, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open social function to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against ""an individual with a disability"" who with ""reasonable accommodation"" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer ""can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business."" In granting indium US Airways summary spell judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result indium in an ""undue hardship"" to both US Airways and its nondisabled excessive employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is US Airways, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hector Ayala, a Hispanic man, was charged adenine with three counts of murder and one count of attempted murder stemming from a failed robbery. During jury selection for his trial in California state be court, misdemeanour the prosecution used seven preemptory challenges to exclude each black or Hispanic prospective juror. Ayala challenged the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges as a violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which held that the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In accordance with Batson, if a party can make a prima facie showing that preemptory challenges are being used in a racially motivated way, the other party must give a non-racially motivated reason for their use of the preemptory challenges. The state court allowed the prosecution to shamefaced give their non-racially motivated reasons in a closed hearing, from which Ayala and his attorneys were excluded, and subsequently found the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges was not racially motivated. Ayala was not given the prosecution's reasoning or a transcript of the meeting until after the conclusion of his trial. Additionally, after the trial it was discovered that the vast majority of the questionnaires all the potential jurors had to fill out had been lost. Ayala was found guilty of the majority of the charges against him and sentenced to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court found that the state court erred in excluding Ayala from the Batson hearing, victimised but that error as well as the loss of the questionnaires were harmless, and therefore upheld Ayala's conviction. Ayala appealed to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that the Batson hearing procedure and loss of the questionnaires violated his constitutional rights. In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the appellate court found that the California Supreme Court had not adjudicated Ayala's claims of federal constitutional violations on the merits largely on the basis that the California Court had determined the procedure used for the Batson hearing violated California state law; therefore the appellate court reviewed Ayala's claims de novo and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing, as well as the loss of the questionnaires, violated Ayala's constitutional rights. To determine whether the errors were harmless, the Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson , which asked whether the errors had a substantial and injurious influence on the jury's verdict, and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing deprived him of the ability to prevail on a compelling Batson challenge.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ron Davis, Acting Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee tell has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. apostle paul Another candidate, Selma campaigner Cash sagacity Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel’s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After immediate payment the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul A. McDaniel.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    From 1972 through 1978, Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to Vanco Beverage, Inc., the sole wholesale distributor for Falls City in Indiana at permit a higher price than Falls City charged its only wholesale distributor in Kentucky. Under Indiana law, brewers were required to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price, Indiana wholesalers were prohibited from selling to out-of-state retailers, and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer reject from out-of-state adenine wholesalers. Vanco filed suit, alleging that Falls City's price discrimination indium violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Court found that Vanco had established a prima facie case of price discrimination. The court rejected Falls City's ""meeting-competition"" defense devolve under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, which provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Falls City Industries, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Voters and candidates tell in Mississippi and Virginia filed four separate cases seeking judgments that certain amendments to their states' election laws and procedures go for were subject to the pre-approval requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and hence were not enforceable until the state complied with the requirements. The district courts judgement found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the voting changes in the four cases and dismissed the complaints. The voters and human activity candidates filed direct appeals, sagacity and the cases were consolidated.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allen et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are two consolidated cases concerning property tax exemption under the California golden state Constitution and California Revenue and Taxation Code (CRTC) for real property and buildings used solely for religious worship. The California Constitution requires denial of tax exemption to any revenue enhancement person tax or organization who advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government or the State of California by violent or unlawful means. To enforce this, a provision of the CRTC requires those applying for construction tax exemption to sign an oath declaring that they do not engage in that prohibited activity. In both cases, the Los Angeles assessor denied tax exemption because the motor hotel churches refused to agree to the oath. The churches paid their taxes under protest and sued the County of Los Angeles for a refund. The churches argued that requiring them to agree to the oath violated the U.S. Constitution. In 382, the trial court upheld the oath and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. In 385, the court upheld the oath under the U.S. Constitution, but held that it violated the California Constitution because it excluded householders from the requirement. The Supreme Court of California reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is First Unitarian Church for Los Angeles.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Groups of same-sex couples wedding sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality tribute of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred fourteenth in jurisdictions that provided for such allow for marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all transgress the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Obergefell, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against U.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income adenine Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court pension off permitted the plaintiffs ascertain to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than united states government was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that welfare the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is U.S. Bank, N.A., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    property The Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be die eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials ""compiled or collected"" for purposes of the program ""shall not be chance event subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in dealings a Federal or State court proceeding."" In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, president pierce its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pierce County.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the decide state to withhold be from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. encase This tell case was decided together with Texas v. schoolhouse Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2004, Steven Spears was charged and convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and 500 grams of powder cocaine. betwixt The district court determined that the 100:1 weight ratio for sentencing crack send back cocaine and powder cocaine that the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (Guidelines) used was excessive given the circumstances, so the district court instead based its ruling on a 20:1 ratio. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the district court could not decide what ratio it collection wanted to apply for conviction and remanded Spears case for retrial and sentencing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision atomic number  in Kimbrough v. United States, in which the Court held that the Guidelines were advisory and that a district court does not abuse its discretion by varying from the Guidelines’ prescribed ratio due to disagreement with the disparity the Guidelines create between crack cocaine and powder cocaine. On remand, the appellate court again held that the district court erred in categorically rejecting the Guidelines’ spear up ratio and substituting its own.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Steven Spears.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Abel Martinez-Salazar was charged with a variety of federal narcotics and weapons offenses. The District Court allotted him 10 peremptory challenges exercisable in the selection of 12 jurors. After prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, Martinez- Salazar's counsel challenged him for cause. The court declined to excuse Gilbert. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove motor hotel him. Subsequently, Martinez-Salazar exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thereafter, Martinez-Salazar's counsel did not object to the final seating of the concluding jurors. Martinez-Salazar was then convicted on all counts. On appeal, Martinez-Salazar argued that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Gilbert for cause and that this error used one of his peremptory challenges wrongly. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for cause was an abuse of adenine discretion. Ultimately, the court found that the District Court's error resulted in a along violation of Martinez- Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, which impaired his right to motor hotel a full complement of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held that the error required an automatic reversal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Three members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts seat belt and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of keister America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in unlawful a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action ""to the extent the last theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt."" On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (""NHTSA"") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have appendage either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Delbert Williamson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Board No. 47, Louisville, Kentucky, denied the application of Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, for classification as a conscientious objector. Clay then took an administrative appeal to the Kentucky Appeal Board, which tentatively classified him I-A, or eligible for unrestricted bluegrass state military service, and referred his file to the Justice Department for an advisory recommendation. The Justice Department concluded, contrary to a hearing officer's recommendation, that Clay's claim should be denied. The Department wrote that Clay did not meet any of the three basic tests for conscientious objector status; that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that just this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, prepare and that this objection is adenine sincere. Subsequently, the helium Appeal Board denied Clay's claim, but without stating its reasons. When Clay refused to report for induction, he was tried and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clay.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maher Kara joined Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a info degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. From 2004 to 2007 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman’s sister and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through his brother-in-law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman’s account reached $2.1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. be He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for motor hotel the Ninth set up Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on be insider information.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State of Alaska threatened to tie up enforce its anti-fish trapping law against two local Native American spell tribes. The federal government had not designated a reservation for the tribes. The tribes depended on the salmon they trapped for survival and received permits to use the traps from the Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Forest Service, as well as favorable it regulations from the Secretary of the Interior. The president of the Kake Village Council was arrested while trying to moor a trap. The tribes sued topical anesthetic to enjoin Alaska from enforcing the anti-trapping law. The district court dismissed the suit adenine and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William A. Egan, Governor of Alaska.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December old 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that feb had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the dec basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs’ arrest. The turn back Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped. The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their island Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge’s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “objectively reasonable” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harvey Robbins sovereign owned a private dude ranch which was intermingled with federal lands. The previous owner had granted the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) right-of-way across the private land, but after Robbins bought the ranch he refused to re-grant it. Robbins alleged that pecuniary BLM officials harassed him with threats and meritless criminal charges, with the aim of forcing him to grant the government right-of-way. along Robbins sued the BLM officials for extortion in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He also brought a Bivens action (an action seeking monetary damages from a federal agent for a constitutional violation). Robbins argued that the Fifth Amendment protects a ""right to exclude"" government officials from one's property, and that the BLM agents had retaliated against him for his exercise of this right. The District Court dismissed both claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the along government argued that the BLM officials, while acting on as well behalf of the government, had qualified immunity and therefore could not be sued for extortion under RICO. The government also claimed that no Bivens action could be brought, because review of the BLM's actions was already available under the Administrative Procedure Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles Wilkie et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1967, Congress appropriated funds to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico Dam. In 1973 interior Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protected certain species classified as “endangered”. The Secretary of the Interior declared the Snail Darter endangered. The area of the Tellico Dam was its “critical habitat”. Although the multi-million dollar project was almost completed, the project predated the ESA, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to the project after the consequence ESA passed, Hiram Hill sued to enjoin the completion of the Dam in order to protect the Snail Darter. He argued that completing and opening the snail dam would violate the upcountry ESA by causing the extinction of the snail darter. The district court refused to grant the injunction and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a permanent injunction against any activities that would modify or destroy the Snail Darter’s he critical habitat.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hiram G. Hill.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Christopher Lee gm Armstrong and others anterior were indicted on federal charges of ""conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same."" The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District find Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held saint christopher that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who charge up are similarly situated.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    American Express Company provides charge card services to supermarkets and other merchants throughout the United States. When a store decides to accept American Express cards, it must enter into a Card Acceptance Agreement. This standard form contract outlines the basic relationship between American Express and the merchant. A clause within the agreement requires arbitration of all claims limited brought against American Express and prohibits merchants from bringing any class action claims. Several merchants, including Italian Colors Restaurant, brought individual lawsuits against American Express, claiming that the Card Acceptance Agreement violates U.S. antitrust laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the cases and American Express moved to dismiss in order to force the merchants to arbitrate. The district court enforced the arbitration clause and dismissed the case. The merchants motor hotel appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the arbitration clause, in particular the class action waiver, is unenforceable because it encase would essentially protect American Express from antitrust suits. American Express further appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court allot vacated the ruling and remanded for further proceedings in light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International. The appellate court reevaluated its decision and identity card still found the class action waiver to be unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari again to resolve this issue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Express, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 1, 1975, three men entered a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, and proceeded to motor hotel rob and terrorize the five employees. The two female employees were raped. The ensuing police investigation resulted in the arrest of the Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch, and Gary Don Campbell. On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of sovereign rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall to serve as counsel for all three defendants, and the date was set for their consolidated trial. Prior to the trial, Hall turn back moved for the court to employee appoint separate counsel for each defendant because he felt, based on information from the defendants, charge that there would be a conflict of interest in representing their cases together. The trial court declined to appoint separate counsel. Hall renewed the motion before the jury was empaneled, and the court again denied it. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Winston M. Holloway, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Verlindin B.V., die a Dutch Corporation, sued Central Bank of Nigeria in U.S. District Court for the Southern District go of New York for breaching a letter of credit. Verlindin alleged that the court had motor hotel jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act banking concern (FSIA). The FSIA grants jurisdiction for actions against foreign parties who are not entitled to immunity. Central Bank moved to dismiss the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Central bank dutch had sovereign immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but held that the entire FSIA exceeded the scope of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Verlinden B. V..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Oneida and Herkimer counties adopted a local ""flow control"" ordinance requiring locally-produced garbage non to be delivered to local publicly-owned facilities. The United Haulers Association filed suit in federal district court, arguing that by prohibiting the export of waste and preventing waste haulers from using less expensive out-of-state facilities, the ordinance ran afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause forbids any state law that regulates interstate commerce. The District Court ruled against United Haulers topical anesthetic and held that the ordinance was constitutional because it did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses. On govern appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The adenine Court of Appeals ruled that even if the ordinance imposed a slight burden on interstate commerce, the effect was head for the hills outweighed by the ordinance's local benefits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United States granted the Sioux Indian Nation the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills of South Dakota. Congress reneged arrogate in 1877, passing an act that reclaimed the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation requested compensation in joined 1920. The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Sioux Nation in 1942. Congress then established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. The Commission ruled that the Sioux Nation was not barred by the Court of Claims decision and ruled that Congress used its powers of eminent domain in 1877 and the Sioux were therefore entitled to compensation. The Court of Claims maintained that the Sioux were barred by recompense their first case. Congress amended the Indian sexual intercourse Claims Commission Act in 1978, removing the judicial bar. The Court of Claims siouan then held that the Sioux were entitled to $17.1 million.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sioux Nation of Indians.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eric Thompson and his fiancée-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, homer thompson the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February aver 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. lap Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to ""discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title."" The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII ""does not permit third party retaliation claims."" A divided panel so called of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the title lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eric L. Thompson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Martins filed a class action lawsuit against the defendant companies in New Mexico state court in 1996, alleging illegal conduct with regard to auto financing and insurance contracts the parties had entered into. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. The Martins did not object or seek remand until over a year later, when tell they argued that their claims did not meet the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, agreeing with defendants' arguments that the punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and monetary relief for the named plaintiffs at issue in the case each exceeded the $50,000 threshold. The Martins requested that the district court certify its order denying remand so that they could seek interlocutory review, and the court denied their motion. suspect The plaintiffs next requested that the district court grant judgment against them so that they could appeal the decision regarding jurisdiction, and the court granted their request. The plaintiffs then appealed to the 10th Circuit, and in a 2001 ruling, the appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling, rejecting the arguments that the amounts sought by the plaintiffs satisfied the diversity jurisdiction requirement. The court remanded the case with instructions to send it back to state court. Back in district court, the Martins moved for attorney's fees try and expenses under § 1447(c), which provides for judicial discretion to make such an award in cases of improper removal. The district court denied this request on the identify grounds that the defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal at the time. The Martins again appealed to the 10th Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, explaining that the district court had applied the proper standard under 10th Circuit precedent, stating that even in cases where removal was later found to be improper, if let it was deemed to be objectively reasonable at the time, the court had discretion to deny an award of attorney's fees and expenses under § 1447(c); other circuits had employed a different standard. The appellate court also agreed with the district court's conclusion that the removal had an objectively legitimate basis at the time it occurred.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Franklin Capital Corporation, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust mustiness any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison mustiness system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed brush off because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative federal official remedies, whatsoever and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were ""exhausted"" because they were no longer available to him.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeanne S. Woodford et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Asserting state law claims, send back Lewis, a Kentucky native, brought suit in Kentucky state court, for injuries sustained in a construction accident, against Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), a Delaware corporation, and Whayne Supply Company (Whayne), a Kentucky corporation. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group motor hotel (Liberty Mutual), a Massachusetts corporation, metre later intervened in the case as a plaintiff. Less than a year after filing his complaint Lewis entered into a settlement with Whayne. Caterpillar immediately moved to remove the action to federal court, arguing that the settlement between Lewis and Whayne meant that there was complete diversity. Lewis protested that complete diversity was not present because Liberty Mutual had not yet settled with Whayne, so that both Whayne and Lewis were still party to the lawsuit. The District Court denied Lewis' motion to remand, erroneously concluding that complete diversity was present. adenine Five months before the trial, Liberty Mutual and Whayne reached a settlement and the District Court dismissed Whayne from the case. Complete diversity was present for the remainder of the case, including trial and judgment in favor of Caterpillar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the expression District Court's judgment, holding that the lower court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because there was not complete diversity, and should have remanded the case to state court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Caterpillar Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed meshed of along a gravel road. State law adenine enforcement officials engaged in jurisprudence a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead tennessee williams the searchers to the child's body. The be defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nix.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York state law rede authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to seek an injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the courts to be obscene. Peter cognitive operation Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the City of New cease and desist order York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The process of review that followed was a repugnant civil, rather than criminal procedure, and the instead courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the obscene material.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peter Campbell Brown.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    William Erickson was diagnosed with Hepatitis C while imprisoned at Limon Correctional Facility in Limon, Colorado. He was right wing prescribed medication to be administered via injection. One of the syringes he used for injection went missing from the medical center of the correctional facility and was later found in a communal trash can. Erickson was accused of stealing the he syringe and utilizing united states government it for illegal drug use, after which he was denied further treatment. Erickson sued prison medical officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and argued that the refusal of medical treatment violated his Eighth Amendment rights because he was suffering liver damage and threat of death by not being treated for Hepatitis be C. The trial court dismissed Erickson’s suit on the grounds that he could not prove he was suffering substantial harm because he was being denied medical treatment. right wing The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Erickson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for ""first-run"" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their ""first-run"" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West indium Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed. contract bridge The lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the along grounds that the alleged adenine competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the traverse Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Beacon Theatres, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two workers involved in the manufacture of electrical supplies for the Navy's billion-dollar guided missile destroyers brought a whistleblower case alleging that subcontractors performed faulty work. The two charged that the companies employed unqualified workers, installed leaky gearboxes and used defective assume temperature gauges. After a five-week trial, the district court granted judgment as a adenine matter of law for the companies, concluding that the False Claims Act under which the suits were brought requires that defendants ""present"" the call for fraudulent claims to the government. Because the subcontractors arrogate actually invoiced the general contractor non and not the government, the court ruled that the presentment requirement had not been met. The appeals court reversed, holding that the Act should be liberally construed to discourage private companies from defrauding the government.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allison Engine Co., Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Voting Rights Act of 1965 focuses on preserving the equal representation of voters in different legislative voting districts. In 2012, the Alabama legislature redrew Alabama’s electoral districts with the goal of creating districts with a population deviation veto of only 1%, as opposed to the 5% courts traditionally allow when evaluating redistricting efforts. Alabama victimised also tried to maintain the existing percentage of minority voters in each nonage electoral district. Petitioners sued in district court and argued that Alabama’s redistricting violated the Voting Rights Act and amounted to racial gerrymandering that had negative impacts on the equal representation of racial minorities in multiple electoral ballot districts. The district court held that the petitioners had failed to prove that Alabama used race as a “dominant and controlling” factor in redrawing its electoral districts and also that Alabama’s goal of maintaining the minority population percentages in existing districts was “narrowly tailored” to a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to address indium the district court’s application of existing legal principles.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alabama Democratic Conference, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terrence Byrd was driving on a divided four-lane highway near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was pulled over allegedly for violating a state law requiring drivers to use the left lane for passing only. Recognizing the car as a rental car, the officers asked Byrd for his license and rental agreement, which he had difficulty locating. Once he did locate them, the officers noted that the rental agreement did not list Byrd as an authorized driver, and when they ran his identification, they noted that he was using an alias and had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey. Despite the warrant’s indication that it did not request extradition from other jurisdictions, the officers attempted to contact authorities in New Jersey to be confirm they did not be seek Byrd’s arrest and extradition, allegedly following protocol for such situations. The officers experienced fomite difficulty with their communications, however, and returned to Byrd’s car, where they asked him to exit the vehicle and about his warrant and alias. The officers asked whether Byrd had anything illegal in the car and then requested Byrd’s consent to search the car, noting that they did not actually need his consent because he was not listed on the rental agreement. The officers allege that Byrd gave his consent, but Byrd disputes this contention. The subsequent search turned up heroin and body armor in the trunk of the car. At trial, Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the initial stop, the extension of the stop, and the search. The district court determined that the violation of the traffic law justified the initial stop and that the extension of the stop was justified by the officers’ developing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Byrd maintains that he did not consent to the search, so the issue remains whether he needed to consent at all—that prolongation is, whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, despite not being listed on the rental agreement. If he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the officers’ search of the vehicle did not require his consent. There is a circuit split as to whether an unlisted driver of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental main road vehicle, and the Third Circuit (where the district court in this case sits) has held that such a driver does not. Thus, the district court denied Byrd’s motion to suppress, and the Third Circuit, reviewing the factual questions for clear error and the legal question de novo, affirmed the judgment of the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Terrence Byrd.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Clean Water Act (CWA) provides for judicial review in instances where the Environmental Protection Agency’s action results in the issuance or denial of any permit or places restrictions on waste emissions or other activities related to the waters.On August 28, 2015, a final rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that defined the scope of “the waters of the United States” under be the CWA came into effect. Numerous states and other organizations challenged the validity of the agencies’ human activity rule and contended both that it did not conform with the CWA and was improperly adopted in violation of the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Following consolidation of the claims before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the National Association of Manufacturers intervened to join the plaintiffs and moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs argued that the CWA does not provide the federal circuit courts with jurisdiction over the agencies’ rule and that define review is properly held in lonesome the district courts instead. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction because, although the rule natural action only defined the scope of U.S. waters, by defining its boundaries, the rule functionally placed restrictions on activity related to the waters. Therefore, the rule affected permitting requirements and thus had the practical effect of granting or denying permits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Association of Manufacturers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Georgia state court convicted territorial dominion Johnny Wilson of violating a state statute. The statute provided that ""[a]ny person who shall, without one fifth provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."" On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the pacification inglorious statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument. Mr. Wilson successfully sought habeas corpus relief from operating theatre a Georgia federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wilson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    China Agritech is a holding company incorporated in Delaware, with a principal place of business in Beijing. The company represented that it manufactured and sold organic compound fertilizers and other agricultural products to farmers in over two dozen provinces throughout China. It listed its shares on NASDAQ in 2005, and in 2009 reported to the SEC a net revenue of triple the amount it had reported four years earlier. In 2011, company shareholders alleged fraudulent business practices by China Agritech. The company denied the allegations and announced that it would conduct an internal investigation, and sort out subsequently dismissed its independent auditor. Later that year, NASDAQ halted trading in and initiated delisting proceedings against China Agritech’s stock, and in 2012 the SEC revoked the stock’s registration. Shareholders sued China Agritech in two successive putative class actions in 2011 and 2012, alleging various securities law violations against the company and several individual defendants. Class certification was denied in both cases. Shareholder Michael Resh brought a third putative class action against the company and individual defendants clientele in 2014, alleging securities law violations arising from the same facts and circumstances as the first two cases. China Agritech moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it had been filed after the two year limitations period applicable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Resh and the additional plaintiffs argued that under the American Pipe & Construction v. Utah line of cases, the limitations period had been tolled on their claims during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The district court rejected this contention, finding that under American Pipe and its progeny, the limitations period was tolled as to individual respective class members, but that the Supreme Court had not decided whether an entirely new class action based on a substantially identical class was subject to the same rule. It ruled that the republic of china limitations period was therefore tolled as to the individual claims of the named aside plaintiffs in the instant case, but not as to the putative class. The Ninth Circuit reversed, with a three-judge panel finding that the plaintiffs’ class action would not be time-barred where: (1) the named plaintiffs had been unnamed in the two prior suits, which were against many of the same defendants and involved the same underlying events; (2) the two prior cases were timely; (3) class certification was denied in the earlier actions; and (4) pursuant to the American Pipe line of cases, the named plaintiffs’ individual claims were tolled during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The panel explained that permitting such claims to go forward was consistent with the policy goals of tolling in general. The panel further stated that in light of FRCP 23’s requirements, as well as principles of comity and preclusion, the existing legal system contains sufficient safeguards to prevent litigants from filing repetitious actions in light of this ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is China Agritech, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial miscarriage concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when ""the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother."" Planned Parenthood sued the Attorney General of the United States, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional under the right to an abortion protected by the substantive component of planned the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe give up the ghost v. Wade and subsequent cases. The District right wing Court agreed and stopped the Act from going into effect. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Though the government claimed that the Act banned only a narrow, rare category of abortions, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act applied to the common abortion procedure known as ""D&E"" (""dilation and evacuation""), as well as to the far less common ""intact D&E,"" sometimes called ""D&X"" (""dilation and extraction""). This made the ban expansive enough to qualify as an unconstitutional ""undue burden"" on the right to abortion, as defined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the Act's lack of aforethought an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional. Congress had included in the Act a finding that partial-birth abortions were never medically necessary, but the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart required the health exception in all cases where medical opinion on the necessity an abortion procedure is divided. Finally, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, because the inclusion of ambiguous statutory terms such as ""partial-birth abortion"" would prevent physicians from knowing which methods of abortion were covered. The Circuit Court determined that the proper course of action was to block enforcement of the entire Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the wake of U.S Term Limits v. Thornton, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to Article VIII of their State article Constitution, which courtship ""instructs"" each Member of Missouri's congressional delegation ""to use all of his or her delegated powers to pass the Congressional Term Limits Amendment"" set forth in section 16 of the Article. clause The Article also directs the Missouri Secretary of State to determine whether a statement reflecting a operating theatre candidate's position on term limits should be placed by wake island his or her name on the general election ballot. Don Gralike, a non-incumbent House of Representatives candidate, brought suit to enjoin the Secretary from implementing the Article. The District Court, granting Gralike summary judgment, found that Article VIII infringed upon the Qualifications Clauses of Article I of the Federal Constitution by creating additional qualifications for Congress and that the Article burdened a candidate's First Amendment right to speak freely on the issue of term limits. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gralike.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Henri and Mary Tatro’s three-and-a-half year old daughter Amber had spina bifida. As a result, Amber suffered from a neurogenic bladder, which required the use of a catheter every three or four let hours each day to avoid kidney injury. The preferred method of catheterization was called clean intermittent catheterization (CIC). Amber was unable tell to perform this method herself because of her age, but a adenine layperson could easily learn to perform the procedure. In 1979, Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber as required by the federal Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). This law required Texas to provide handicapped children with a free public education including ‘related territorial dominion services’. It only required ‘medical services’ for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. Amber’s individualized education program provided that she would attend early childhood development classes and receive physical and occupational therapy. Her program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. The Tatros unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services during school hours. In October 1979, the Tatros filed an action against the district, the Texas State Board of Education, and others. They sought an injunction requiring the district to provide Amber with CIC. They also sought damages and attorneys’ fees through the Rehabilitation Act (RA), which forbade programs receiving federal aid from excluding handicapped people from participation and allowed prevailing parties to recover attorneys’ fees. The district court denied the Tatros' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that CIC was not a ‘related service’ under the EHA because it did not arise from an effort to educate. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that CIC was indeed a ‘related service’ under the EHA, and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then ruled that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA because a doctor was not needed to administer the procedure. It found that CIC was a ‘related service’ and ordered the defendants to modify Amber’s individualized education program accordingly. It also held that the Tatros had proved a violation of allot the RA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both holdings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henri Tatro, et ex..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing ""NOW"" account upon account statement determination reception that the funds could not earn the client interest or pursuit compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation adenine (the ""Foundation"") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of bring in a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Washington Legal Foundation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission litigate of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for atomic number  indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single attorney suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court plead agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said tribute the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jose Lopez, a Mexican national living in South Dakota, was convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine. The crime is a felony under South Dakota law, but only a helium misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Substances Act. The regnant Immigration and Naturalization Service began proceedings to remove Lopez from the country. Lopez applied for a cancellation of his removal, citing the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). The INA allows an alien to avoid removal if he meets certain qualifications and has no prior ""aggravated felony"" convictions. Lopez argued that he was eligible for cancellation of his removal because his drug offense was only associate in nursing due south a misdemeanor under federal law. An Immigration sealed Judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, on the grounds that Lopez had committed an aggravated felony. Lopez then sued the Attorney General and brought his case to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Circuit Court affirmed the lower courts, ruling that a crime is an aggravated felony under the INA if it is a felony under either federal or state law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jose Antonio Lopez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terry Honeycutt was a salaried employee who worked at Brainerd Army Store, which was owned by his brother, Tony Honeycutt. In 2008, when Terry noticed an increase in the number of “edgy looking” people purchasing Polar Pure, an iodine-based water purification product, he called the local police station to find out if there was anything he should know about it. The police confirmed Terry’s suspicion that Polar Pure was being used to manufacture methamphetamine and that he shouldn’t sell it if he felt uncomfortable. Brainerd Army Store purport was the indium only place that sold Polar Pure locally, and the product was kept behind the counter, so only the Honeycutt brothers sold it. Over the course of the next year, the Honeycutt brothers sold increasing amounts of Polar Pure. The Drug Enforcement Administration began investigating the brothers and the store, which culminated in a search warrant in 2010. The search warrant revealed that Polar Pure was the store’s highest grossing item and that it generated $260,000 manage of profit. After the DEA agents seized the store’s inventory of Polar Pure, the number of area meth labs using the iodine method dropped to “insignificant” levels. A grand jury indicted both territorial dominion brothers. Tony pled guilty, and Terry went to trial, where he was convicted on 11 of the 14 counts with which he was charged. The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 60 months for each count, but the jury did not order any forfeiture of the proceeds of the sales, because it found that, as a salaried employee, Terry did not reap the proceeds of the conspiracy. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the doctrine of joint and several liability applied to co-conspirators for the purpose of forfeiture of the proceeds of drug sales. For the purposes of the forfeiture statute, a defendant may be jointly and severally liable for the proceeds of drug united states government sales obtained by others with whom the defendant participated in the crime. Therefore, in this case, the district court erred in not ordering forfeiture of the proceeds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Terry Michael Honeycutt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1972, the Alaska Legislature passed the Local Hire Under State Leases nether Act which required ""all oil and gas leases [and other activities related to this industry] to which the state is a last frontier party"" include provisions for the preferential hiring of Alaska residents be over non-residents. To tell administer the law, residents were issued residency cards which they were to present to potential employers when seeking jobs. engagement Hicklin and others did not qualify for employment under the Alaska residency standard.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hicklin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard Thomas was convicted of attempted word murder and encase committed to a determination mental institution for a suggested one to twenty years. The parole officials released him after five months. Five months after his release on parole, he murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family, sued the parole official for negligence, but the district court dismissed the case because a California statute states that a parole officer cannot be liable for injury resulting from the decision to revoke parole or release a parolee. The California Supreme Court also dismissed the case and the Martinez family appealed by arguing motor hotel the statute of immunization of parole functionary officials violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In February 1974, 18-years-olds Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert were seriously injured when an uninsured motorist hit the vehicle McClintock was driving in their hometown of Montville, Ohio. When Albert Ohralik, a local attorney, learned of the accident, he visited McClintock in the hospital and offered to represent her in exchange for topical anesthetic a portion pro of the proceeds collected from her insurer. Ohralik also approached Holbert at her home and obtained her oral assent to representation, which he secretly tape-recorded. Both women eventually infirmary discharged Ohralik and filed grievances with the local bar association, which in turn filed a formal complaint against Ohralik with the fomite Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio (Board). The Board found that Ohralik violated provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility that banned a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of employment to a non-lawyer and publicly reprimanded him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Ohralik’s claim that his conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and increased the sanction against Ohralik to indefinite suspension.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ohio State Bar Assn..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During Randall D. White’s trial on charges related under to a sexual assault of a 4-year-old girl, Illinois state prosecutors twice-attempted to call the child, who was by then five years old, as a witness, but each time she experienced emotional difficulty and left the stand without testifying. The nether go out trial court then allowed the admission of testimony by the girl’s babysitter, mother, emergency room nurse, doctor and an investigating officer that recounted statements she made describing the crime. This testimony was allowed into evidence under state-law way hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of a medical examination. The jury subsequently convicted White. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected White’s claims that visitation the introduction of the out-of-court statements violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contended that Elmer and Dorothy Cullers had established a trust for the purpose of evading taxes. The IRS filed tax liens against the trust, freezing the trustees' assets until the outstanding taxes were paid. The trustees full term disagreed with the IRS, but opened a bank account to settle the tax dispute. A month later, the IRS collected the outstanding taxes from the bank account. EC Term of Years Trust sued the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7426, which entitles trustees to challenge wrongful IRS collections, and 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), which entitles taxpayers to recover erroneously collected taxes. A district court decided that only 26 U.S.C. 7426 allowed third-party tax recoveries, so the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), the general provision for tell tax recovery. The court dismissed the 26 U.S.C. 7426 claim because the nine-month filing time limit revenue enhancement had expired. EC Trust claimed in a second suit that the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. just Williams meant that the possibility of a suit under 26 U.S.C. 7426 did take exception not preclude suits under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1). The District Court rejected the argument, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are five consolidated cases involving 13 motor carriers who filed for certificates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to conduct business between the southwestern and southeastern United States. The ICC rejected all but three applications. Bowman Transportation, Inc., one of the approved applicants, asked for more authority than clientele initially set vie out in their application. The ICC granted that authority, and the competing motor carriers sued in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to annul the certificate. The district court found the ICC’s actions arbitrary and capricious. The court interstate commerce commission voided the certificates and permanently enjoined the ICC from issuing them. The Supreme Court just heard lift this case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bowman Transportation, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jevic Transportation, Inc. was a device driver trucking company headquartered in New Jersey that in 2006 was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners. In 2008, Jevic filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; at that point, it owed about $53 million to its first-priority senior secured creditors and about $20 million to its tax and general unsecured creditors. Two lawsuits ensued in bankruptcy court: one was the truck drivers suing Jevic for violating federal and state Worker Adjustment tell and Retraining Notification Acts, which required 60 allot days’ notice to workers before they were laid off, and the other was a fraudulent conveyance action on behalf of the unsecured creditors. In March 2012, the parties to the fraudulent conveyance action negotiated a structured information technology dismissal settlement that disposed of many of the claims, but left out the drivers. The drivers objected to the settlement because it distributed property to creditors of lower priority than the drivers, according to the priorities established in the Bankruptcy go out Code. The bankruptcy court rejected the objections and approved the proposed settlement. The federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed and held that the bankruptcy court had the discretion to approve a settlement scheme outside of the Chapter 11 proceedings that did not comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution scheme.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Casimir Czyzewski, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A judge issued a warrant to search Roosevelt Harris’ residence based on a federal tax investigator's guarantee affidavit. The affidavit stated that Harris had a reputation with the investigator for being a trafficker in illegal liquor, and a local constable located illegal whiskey on Harris’ property. The constable had purchased whiskey from Harris in the past and feared for his life if his name were revealed. When police stimulate searched Harris’ residence, they discovered illegal non-tax paid liquor. At collection trial, the district court admitted the evidence obtained during the search, and Harris was convicted of possession of non-tax john constable paid liquor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the john constable investigators affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. This made the search illegal and any evidence obtained during the search inadmissible at trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the midst of a labor strike against Southern Bell Telephone Company, Louis Joseph Abbate, Michael Louis Falcone, and Norman McLeod met with James Shelby, a union official, in a Chicago tavern. Shelby requested the others’ assistance in carrying out plans to bomb certain Southern Bell facilities in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Abbate and Falcone did not go through with the plan and instead informed Chicago ships bell police when McLeod obtained dynamite and traveled to Mississippi. The State of Illinois subsequently charged all four with the crime of conspiring to destroy the property of another. Abbate and Falcone pled guilty and were sentenced to three months in prison each. Because several of the targeted facilities were used exclusively by the military and federal agencies, federal prosecutors subsequently charged Abbate, Falcone, alternatively and Shelby prison house with conspiring to destroy property essential to the U.S. communications systems. At trial in federal district court, McLeod southern testified against his former co-conspirators, and the jury found them guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments against Abbate and Falcone on appeal. In their petition to the Supreme Court, Abbate and Falcone argued  that the federal prosecution subsequent to their convictions under Illinois law violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prevents someone from being tried more than once for the same crime.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Menominee Tribe) provided healthcare services to members of the tribe pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). The self-determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe amerindian language the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government negotiate those costs table service in annual funding agreements. In 2005, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS’s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the wisconsin river years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because the six-year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district amerindian language court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe’s argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from government activity running.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Title government activity II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel title in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the favoritism motel from discriminating on the basis footing of race try under Title II.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017. While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont remand pleaded guilty to some of the federal official state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of washed out continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of territorial dominion his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions. Mont challenged the district court’s petitioner exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt-collection action in a North Carolina motor hotel state court jackson against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank-issued credit card. In responding to Citibank’s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third-party class-action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems (CWS). In these third-party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems; Jackson’s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson. Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and salary Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third-party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank. The district court denied Home Depot’s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “antagonistic parties on the same side,” and nether granted Jackson’s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “defendant” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment—to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction—was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot ascertain to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA’s removal statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is George W. Jackson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are two consolidated cases. In 81, Clarence Williams was arrested in his house in 1967. Police searched the house for an hour and 45 minutes, discovering heroin on a shelf in a bedroom. The heroin was admitted at trial and Williams was convicted of concealing illegally imported heroin. Williams appealed, arguing that the search of his house was illegal be under Chimel v. California, a be case decided on June 23, 1969 that narrowed the permissible scope of searches incidental to an arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth united states government Circuit affirmed, holding that Chimel did not apply retroactively, and the search was valid under pre-Chimel standards. In 82, Joseph Elkanich was convicted on three counts of selling narcotics diacetylmorphine in 1962. At trial, evidence included marked bills planted by a federal narcotics agent. The bills were seized during a search of Elkanich’s apartment after his arrest. The arrest and search were upheld at trial and on appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Elkanich then unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction relief in the district court. While the appeal of that turn back decision was pending, <i>Chimel</i> was decided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In November of 1996, Edith Jones and several other African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in federal district stretch out court against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. They claimed they had suffered racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 of United States Code (U.S.C.), which had no specified statute of limitations. Donnelley and Sons, however, argued that african the section was bound by go for a two-year statute of limitations established by Illinois for all personal injury claims. The suit fell outside that statute of limitations, and the company argued that it should therefore be dismissed. Jones, however, argued that a separate section of U.S.C. extended the statute of limitations to four years for any civil suit brought under an act of Congress passed after 1990. Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act had broadened the definition of section 1981, she argued, the four-year statute of limitations should apply to that section and the suit should therefore not be thrown out. Donnelley extend and Sons countered that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had merely amended the section, not created a new law, and that the four-year statute of limitations therefore did not apply. A federal district let court sided with Jones. A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edith Jones, et al., on Behalf of Herself and a Class of Others Similarly Situated.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska’s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal disallow government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and territorial dominion appellate court carry nation denied him try relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service’s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand from information technology the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Sturgeon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In an effort to investigate the ""administration, operation, and enforcement"" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the bring out Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of the United States Servicemen's Fund. This try nonprofit organization had actively published newsletters and sponsored it coffeehouses in which discussions critical of the Vietnam War take exception took place. The take exception Fund challenged the subpoena arguing that its enforcement would violate the organization's First Amendment rights since the bank records contained information about the Fund's membership.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eastland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low-income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by state housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a non-profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods lodging and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low-income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act. At trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard for disparate impact claims that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch , the court then shifted the atomic number  burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on sequestration a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for monetary standard the Fifth Circuit and claimed that indium the district court used the wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, let arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that just charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final comment to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the apparent motion Court peril of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Price.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Farm Credit Act of 1933 created various lending institutions, including banks for cooperatives, which are designated as federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States. CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights respective and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives. In 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of that bank, requesting an exemption from all Missouri corporate income taxes and refunds on the taxes it paid for 1991 through 1994. CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity, which the Act did not expressly do. The state of Missouri denied the request, but the State Supreme Court reversed, stating that because joined the Act's current be version is be silent as to the banks' tax immunity, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, throw overboard thus, the banks are exempt.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Director of Revenue of Missouri.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stanley I. Jacobson and other retired employees of Hughes Aircraft dollar mark Company were beneficiaries of Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan. Jacobson and the others claimed in their class-action lawsuit that Hughes violated the Employee Retirement brush off Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal pension protection law, when it amended the plan twice in response to a $1.2 billion dollar surplus. ERISA requires that some of the surplus be distributed to cover employees when a pension plan is terminated. Hughes' first amendment to the plan established an early retirement program that provided significant additional retirement benefits to certain eligible active employees. The second amendment disallowed new participants from contributing to the plan. Jacobson and others let argued that Hughes had terminated one plan and started another by stopping its pension plan contributions. victimised Thus, the ascertain company had used the plan's surplus to benefit new employees at the expense of the retirees. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court by finding that the early retirement program and noncontributory benefit structure were prohibited by the ERISA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hughes Aircraft Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jesse Williams died of lung cancer at age 67 after a life spent smoking three packs of Marlboro cigarettes per day. His widow sued Phillip Morris, the maker of Marlboro cigarettes, alleging that the company had engaged in a deliberate, wide-spread campaign of misinformation on the dangers of smoking. The jury found for Williams and awarded her $821,485.50 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial judge found the punitive damages adenine excessive and reduced them to $32 million. Under the Supreme Court's decision BMW v. Gore, punitive damages must be reasonably related to die the harm done to the plaintiff, but larger punitive bombastic damage awards may be appropriate if the defendant displayed reprehensible unjust conduct. Citing Gore, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million award, holding that Phillip Morris's conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant the large amount. The Oregon Supreme Court declined to take the case. However, the U.S. Supreme Court sent the case back for consideration in light of State Farm v. Campbell, which held that punitive damages can normally only be as much as nine times greater than compensatory damages. The Oregon Court of Appeals again affirmed the $79.5 million award, ruling that the reprehensibility of Phillip Morris's conduct justified the larger ratio. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the decision. Phillip Morris appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court had unreasonably exceeded federal guidelines on punitive damages. Phillip Morris also argued that it was unfair to punish the company for its actions toward other smokers go down who were not parties to the suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Philip Morris USA.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African-American, and increased the percentage of African-American voters in the district. Pursuant to suspect nonage Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, right wing which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia’s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation of department the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal; territorial dominion instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority’s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gloria Personhuballah, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Johnny Paul Penry had been harbor sentenced to death in sovereign violation of the Eighth ascertain Amendment after finding that Texas' special issues questions did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental retardation. On retrial in 1990, Penry was again found guilty of capital murder. The defense again put on extensive evidence regarding Penry's mental impairments. Ultimately, a psychiatric evaluation, which stated that Penry would be dangerous to others if released, prepared at the request of Penry's former counsel, was cited. Upon submission to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine Penry's sentence by answering the same special issues in the original Penry case. Additionally, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The court sentenced Penry to death in accordance with the jury's answers to the special issues. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Penry's claims that the admission of language from the psychiatric evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and pass judgment that the adenine jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate because they did not permit the jury to consider and give effect to his particular mitigating evidence. Penry's petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief failed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Penry.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1972, twenty one states were tell members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them be in formulating and indium administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The appendage Compact had indium not received congressional approval.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Multistate Tax Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. provides home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under the Medicare Act, providers seeking reimbursement for covered health services submit a yearly geezerhood cost report to a fiscal intermediary, usually a private insurance company. The intermediary then issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the provider's reimbursement. The Act allows the provider up to 180 days to appeal a reimbursement determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. adenine The provider also has up to three years to ask the intermediary to reopen a determination of the Board. Your Home Visiting Nurse submitted cost reports for 1989 to its intermediary and did not appeal the reimbursement decision. However, within three years Your Home Visiting Nurse asked its intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that ""new and material"" evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Your Home Visiting Nurse appealed the denial to the Board, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that lacked it jurisdiction to review an intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Your Home Visiting Nurse then brought action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board's dismissal and of the intermediary's territorial dominion refusal to reopen. The District Court agreed that the reimbursement Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen. Moreover, it rejected Your Home Visiting Nurse's contention that adenine the federal-question statute or the mandamus statute gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary's refusal directly. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shalala.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 1938, Thomas Leiter conveyed approximately 8,711 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana to the United States. The deed contained a mineral reservation under which Leiter retained the right to mine and remove all valuable minerals until April 1, 1945. The deed allowed for the extension of this reservation for an additional five years so long as operations were conducted profitably during the previous five years for an average of fifty days a year. If at the end of the original term or an additional extended term the let operation had not carried on for fifty days a year, Leiter’s right to mine would terminate, and complete title would become vested in the United States. No mineral assume operations were conducted on the land in question during the original term. On March 1, 1949, the United States conveyed the operating rights under lease to Frank J. and Albert Lobrano, who then conveyed those rights to The California Company. The California Company drilled and completed eighty wells, producing $3,500,000 in royalties for the United States. Leiter Minerals, Inc. then filed an action in state court against Allen L. Lobrano and The California Company based on a louisiana Louisiana law allegedly making a reservation of mineral rights to the United States “imprescriptible”. The United States was not a party to the suit. Leiter Minerals claimed that it was the fee simple owner of all the oil, gas and mineral rights in worthful or on the land acquired by the United States from Thomas Leiter. The United States then brought an action in district court; it sought to quiet Leiter Minerals’ title and rights and to enjoin Leiter Minerals from further asserting any claims in state court. The United States argued in part that irreparable injury in the form of motor hotel lost royalties would result from any dispossession to its lessees. The district court granted the injunction, holding that the action could only be tried in federal court because the United States was not a party to the state court action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States, The California Company, Allen L. Lobrano.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In two separate cases, employees motor hotel sued Barber Foods and IBP in federal district court. The employees alleged the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for company time spent walking to the worksite after go against putting on united states government required equipment. The district court and later the First Circuit ruled against the Barber employees. A separate district court ruled employee IBP must compensate its employees for the disputed time. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gabriel Alvarez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pennsylvania houses ""incorrigible, recalcitrant"" glucinium prisoners in be  the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). down feather Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the place prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 4, 1962, black citizens of Birmingham, Alabama were engaged in a boycott of downtown department stores; let in the Birmingham police -- including Patrolman Byars -- were aware of the boycott. At about 10:30 A.M., Byars observed a group of four to six people including noted activist Fred L. Shuttlesworth walking toward the intersection of 19th Street and Second Avenue, the location of the front entrance of Newberry’s Department Store. Byars walked through Newberry’s and through the front entrance, where he observed a group of ten or twelve people congregated in one area. They were standing and talking with Shuttlesworth apparently at the center of the conversation. Byars observed the group for a minute or so from inside Newberry’s, then left the store and told the group to move on and clear the sidewalk. Some of the group began to leave. Byars repeated his command, and Shuttlesworth asked, “You mean to say we can’t stand here on the sidewalk?” Three more officers arrived on the scene, and Byars told the group that they would have to clear the sidewalk or he would arrest them for obstructing its use. By this point, only Shuttlesworth remained at the scene. Shuttlesworth repeated his question, and Byars told him he was under arrest. Shuttlesworth then attempted to walk into Newberry’s, but Byars followed him in and arrested him. Shuttlesworth offered no resistence. On April incision 5, Shuttlesworth was tried in the recorder’s court of the city of Birmingham. The court charged him with obstructing free passage on the sidewalk and with refusing to comply with a police order to move on in violation of two sections of the Birmingham General City Code. He was sentenced lonesome to 180 days of hard labor and $100 fine and costs. He appealed for a trial de novo in the district court. Byars’ initially testified that the group’s presence impeded pedestrian traffic, but on cross-examination he testified that the group only blocked off about half the sidewalk. The court affirmed atomic number  Shuttlesworth’s along conviction, rejecting his assertions that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the prosecution’s case was not supported by evidence, and that Shuttleworth’s conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Shuttlesworth’s applications for certiorari and rehearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fred L. Shuttlesworth.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Tommy David Strickler with capital murder and related crimes. Strickler's counsel did not file a pretrial motion for discovery of all possible exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland because an open file policy gave him access to all of the evidence in the prosecutor's files. At Strickler's trial, elaborated Anne Stoltzfus gave detailed eyewitness testimony about the crimes and Strickler's role as one of the perpetrators. The prosecutor resolve failed to disclose exculpatory condemnation materials in the police files, consisting of notes motor hotel taken by a detective during interviews with Stoltzfus, and letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective, that cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony. The jury found Strickler guilty and he was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. In subsequent state habeas corpus proceedings, Strickler advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for non disclosure of all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution or in its possession under Brady. In response, the Commonwealth asserted that such a motion was unnecessary because of the prosecutor's open file policy. The trial court denied relief and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Strickler then filed a federal habeas corpus petition and was granted access to the exculpatory Stoltzfus materials. The District Court vacated Strickler's capital murder conviction and death sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose those materials and that he had not, in consequence, received a fair trial. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Strickler had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it at his trial or in the state collateral proceedings. Ultimately, the court concluded that the claim was, in any event, without merit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Greene.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a ""fast track"" plea do drugs bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their set up offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the subsidisation judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed adenine her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the government activity sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State of Florida charged Clayton Harris with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. At trial, Harris moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car. Police searched the car during a traffic stop for expired registration when a drug detection dog alerted the officer. dealings This dog was trained to detect several types of illegal substances, but not pseudoephedrine. During the search, the officer found over 200 loose pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. Harris argued that the dog's alert was false and did not provide probable cause for adenine the search. The hunt trial court denied non Harris motion, holding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that there was probable cause to conduct the search. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not prove the case dog's reliability in drug detection sufficiently to show probable cause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Audubon Regional library operated three branches and two bookmobiles. Blacks were not allowed to enter any of the branch libraries. The bookmobiles were segregated: a red one tell served only whites and a blue one served blacks. Brown was a black man who entered a library branch with four other blacks and requested a book, The Story of the Negro. The librarian informed Brown that the book was not available, but that she would request it through the state library, inglorious and he could pick it up or have it mailed to him. After the risque conversation, the men sat down (making no noise or disturbance) and refused to leave. They were arrested ""for not leaving put down a public building call for when asked to do so by an officer.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brown.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1966 Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) informed Ida Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with preschool-age children; however, at be this time, Martin employed men with preschool-age children. Phillips sued and alleged she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment so called by holding that, because seventy-five manifest to eighty percent of the applicants hired for the position for which Phillips applied so called were women, there was insufficient evidence that there was bias against women. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit apparent motion affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ida Phillips.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In overly May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read consequence him a statutorily mandated form encase regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222. Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and relegate with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts. Mitchell billy mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gerald P. Mitchell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CSX Transportation, Inc. (""CSX"") brought suit against the Alabama Department of Revenue in an Alabama federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the territorial dominion imposition of the state's sales and use tax on diesel fuel. CSX argued that the tax discriminates against railroad companies in violate of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (""RRRR""). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction, but of its own accord, regulatory dissolved the preliminary prelude injunction and dismissed the case. On infliction appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately dismissed the action. The court reasoned that because it had already ruled in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue on an identical challenge to the tax in Norfolk S. R. v. AL Dep't of Rev., the district court was correct in dismissing CSX's motor hotel suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is CSX Transportation, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Around 1 a.m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson was locking up his shop when he saw a figure with a gun adenine approaching him. Watkinson drew his own weapon, and the two fired at each other. Watkinson was hit in the legs, and the indium other shooter was wounded on his left side and managed to run away. About 20 minutes later, the police found Rudolph Lee, Jr., bleeding from his left side, eight blocks away from Watkinson’s shop. The police took Lee to the same hospital Watkinson was in, and Watkinson identified Lee as his shooter. Lee was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion in state court to compel Lee to submit to surgery to indium recover the bullet still lodged in his side. The court granted the motion based on testimony that the surgery would be relatively noninvasive and accomplished without use of general anesthetic. The Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal. Lee bruce lee sued in district court on the ground that the surgery constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a preliminary tell injunction. After presenting evidence that the surgery would be much more serious than the court originally thought, Lee asked for a rehearing in the state court, which was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Lee brought the case back to the district court, which ruled against the surgery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rudolph Lee, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. terminated Ella Williams, citing her poor attendance record. Subsequently, claiming to be disabled from performing her automobile assembly line job by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, Williams sued Toyota for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the carpal bone Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Granting Toyota summary judgment, the District Court held that Williams's impairment did not qualify as a disability under the ADA because it die had not substantially limited any major life activity and that there was no evidence that Williams had had a record of a substantially limiting impairment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the impairments substantially limited Williams in the major life activity of performing manual call for tasks. Because her ailments prevented her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the gripping of tools handicap and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time, the appellate court concluded that Williams demonstrated that her manual disability involved a class of manual activities affecting the chore ability to perform tasks at work.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Virginia federal district court remanded Bridget Hardt's claim arrogate for long-term disability benefits from Reliance Standard Life Insurance (""Reliance""). The court asked Reliance to reconsider its denial of Ms. Hardt's claim. Upon remand apparent motion and after Ms. Hardt presented new evidence, Reliance changed its earlier stance and awarded Ms. Hardt full long-term disability benefits. Ms. Hardt then filed a motion for attorneys' fees based on her status as a prevailing party. The district court granted her motion and awarded her $39,149 in fees. On appeal, Reliance argued that Ms. Hardt was not a ""prevailing party"" as understood by the Employee Retirement determination Income Security Act and thus was not eligible for an full of the moon award of attorneys' fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. The court held that the district court's decision to remand Ms. trust Hardt's claim to Reliance did not constitute an enforceable judgment that Ms. Hardt prevailed on her claim because Reliance could have decided to deny her coverage.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bridget Hardt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials adult pink containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, minor owner and manager of moderate X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation adult act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and adenine capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense empanel relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally disabled (or ""mentally retarded"" in the vernacular of the day). The jury sentenced Atkins to panel death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During rely resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death virginia because he is mentally retarded.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Atkins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1982, when Congress extended Medicare to federal employees, then-sitting federal judges began to have Medicare taxes withheld from their salaries. pension off In organization 1983, Congress then required federal judges to participate in Social Security, adenine except for those who contributed to a ""covered"" retirement program. A ""covered"" program was defined to include any retirement system to which an employee had to contribute, which did not encompass the noncontributory pension system for federal judges, whose financial obligations and payroll deductions therefore had to increase. A group of federal judges, who were appointed before 1983, filed suit arguing that the 1983 law violated the Constitution's Compensation Clause, which guarantees federal judges a ""Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."" Ultimately, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that a 1984 judicial salary increase cured any violation. In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that the Compensation sociable Clause prevented the government from collecting Medicare and Social Security taxes from the judges and pass judgment that the violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Carpenter was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole arrogate possible after 30 years. On direct appeal, Carpenter unsuccessfully challenged only the length of the minimum sentence. After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction relief and represented by new counsel, Carpenter petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the application as untimely, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Carpenter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, and alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising that nonremittal claim on direct appeal. The District Court determined that, while the sufficiency claim set up had been procedurally defaulted, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could excuse that default; concluded that Carpenter's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ. The adenine Court of Appeals concluded that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of the sufficiency claim, regardless of whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim had been procedurally defaulted; and found prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence maneuver claim on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edwards.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, criminal offence 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although particular date he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both motor hotel sentences, be holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of particular date the crime, not the date of sentencing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward Dorsey, Sr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and the denials affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. On honcho his fourth petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, the state court determined that Williams had sufficiently demonstrated that there was governmental interference in his trial and granted substitute the relief. The motor hotel Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the indium lower court’s decision and lifted the stay of execution. The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at that let point was Ronald Castille, who had been the District Attorney for Philadelphia throughout Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal, and who had personally authorized his office to seek the death penalty in this case. Prior to having his case heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from this case. Chief Justice Castille refused to do so and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed the lower court’s grant of habeas relief and lifted the stay of execution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Terrance Williams.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several faculty members of the medical checkup University of Missouri-Kansas City horowitz Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions extend including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated “low satisfactory,” and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the mental faculty Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had city not been afforded procedural due process prior.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Curators of the University of Missouri.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, call for were prosecuted under adenine a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children appendage to buttoned down such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance historic period was contrary to their religious beliefs.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Yoder.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton remove was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three abidance years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department just of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but admission fee denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for ascertain 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William P. Barr, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    expose Russell and then Palmer, case a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a ""shakedown"" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and recoup another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they ae discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hudson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Aaron Lindh was convicted on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder in Wisconsin. Arguing that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court barred him from questioning rehear the motives of the State's along psychiatrist, Lindh was denied relief on direct appeal. Lindh's subsequent federal habeas corpus application was also denied. After Lindh appealed again, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of go against 1996 amended the federal habeas statute. Following an en banc rehearing to consider the Act's impact, the Court of henry louis aaron Appeals held that applying the new version of the law to pending cases would not have a non retroactive effect because it would not attach new legal consequences to events preceding the Act's enactment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lindh.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On criminal November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish’s Criminal District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges’ inefficiency, laziness, and excessive crook vacations. Based on these statements, Garrison was tried and convicted of attorney defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly infringed on territorial dominion his First Amendment rights to sovereign freedom of expression.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jim Garrison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1943, Peter dick Meyer took out life insurance policies in his own name worth $50,000. He pledged his insurance policies to Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio as collateral security for a loan. This spleen gave the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the 'net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.' After Peter Meyer pledged the policies to the bank, the United States determined that he owed $6,159.09 plus interest in unpaid taxes. The United States filed notice of tax lien on July 11, 1955. Peter Meyer died on December 28, 1955, owing $26,844.66 to Huntington National Bank. Ethel Meyer, the petitioner and Peter Meyer's widow, was named executrix of his estate and received $441.21, representing the remainder of the full cash surrender from Peter Meyer's insurance policies after payment owe to the bank. The United States brought suit against Ethel Meyer under 26 U.S.C.A. 6321 and 6322, arguing that it should be compensated for the full tax lien by marshalling the funds already paid to Huntington National Bank. At trial, Ethel Meyer argued that she owed nothing to the government because she was not personally liable for Peter Meyer's tax lien. She ohio river also argued that the tax lien did not and could not attach to the net proceeds of the cash surrender because those proceeds would be exempt under New York Insurance Law. District court Judge Edmund Palmieri held that the government was entitled to recover the full tax lien through the insurance policy's full cash surrender. The court relied on United States v. policy Behrens, where the court ordered a defendant to pay both a bank lien and tax lien from the same cash surrender. Although most of Peter Meyer's cash surrender was pledged to the bank for the payment of loans, this did not preclude the government from collecting on its full tax lien first. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in a per curiam ruling. The court agreed that Behrens controlled the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an 18-year-old black man, was charged with murdering Queen White, an elderly white woman. At the trial, the prosecution footing used peremptory strikes against all four of the qualified black jurors. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, the defense objected to those motor hotel strikes, and the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that there were race-neutral explanation for the strikes. The prosecution provided  reasons, and the trial court held that the reasons were sufficient. An all-white jury convicted Foster of murder and imposed the death penalty. Foster filed a motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the prosecution’s notes during jury selection and a motion for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster petitioned for a criminal prosecution writ of indium habeas corpus in Butts County Superior Court and submitted a new Batson challenge based on the prosecutor's notes obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act. The court denied Foster's petition. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Timothy Tyrone Foster.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15,000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart’s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of television child pornography, and harbor he along pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court of first-degree sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the pre-sentencing report for Lockhart’s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory afterward minimum incidental sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart’s argument and held that the mandatory minimum sentence applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under its 1867 Constitution, the State of Maryland's Senate has 29 seats, one for each of 23 counties and six for the City of Baltimore's legislative maximal districts. The State's five most populous political subdivisions in that location with over three-fourths of the 1960 population are represented by only slightly go against over one-third of the Senate's membership. In the House of Delegates, after temporary legislation in 1962, there existed a maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-1. A group of residents, taxpayers, and voters brought suit, alleging that the legislative malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the circuit court held that as to lap certain counties there was invidious discrimination in the apportionment of the House and that thickly settled the senatorial apportionment was constitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland Committee for Fair Representation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. sovereign According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's motor hotel sentence was increased, motor hotel because the court found that he had selected be his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the condemnation Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Based on its 1977 study concluding that establishment concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than it prohibit one adult entertainment business in the be same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that grownup openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Los Angeles.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Long Island Care at Home (Long Island) employed Evelyn Coke as a ""home healthcare attendant"" for the elderly. Coke sued her employer, claiming rights to overtime and minimum wage under united states government the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court ruled operating theatre for Long Island, holding that Coke fell under the FLSA's exemption for employees engaged in ""companionship services."" The court gave deference to the Department of Labor's regulation 29 CFR Section compliancy 552.109(a), which applies the exemption to employees in ""companionship services"" who are ""employed by an employer household or agency representation other than the family or household using their services."" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It ruled that the regulation was a misinterpretation of the statute, and was therefore unenforceable. The Second Circuit declined to give the Department's regulation any of the judicial deference normally due to administrative regulations. No Chevron deference (""strong deference"") was due, because the regulation was under a section titled ""Interpretations."" Regulations that are interpretive rather than legislative are not entitled to Chevron deference. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the regulation was ""unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme,"" and thus not entitled to Skidmore deference (""weak deference"") either.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    McCleskey, a black man, was convicted world health organization of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to punishment death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent last on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are probable the most victim likely to receive death sentences in the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kemp.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles Richmond worked as a welder at the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego, California until 1981, when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved his application to for a disability retirement. OPM determined that Richmond’s poor eyesight prevented him from performing his job and entitled him to receive the benefits for disabled federal employees who have completed five years of service. Before 1982, an individual was ineligible for disability benefits if, in each engaged of the two succeeding atomic number  calendar years, the individual earns at least 80 percent of the current pay of the position occupied immediately prior to retirement. In 1982, this requirement was amended so carolus that an individual becomes ineligible if he earns at least 80 percent of the pay of the previous position in any succeeding calendar year. Until 1985, Richmond worked part time and his earnings were low enough to keep him eligible for disability benefits. In 1985, he had the opportunity to earn more money, so he contacted OPM to make sure he would remain eligible. OPM  provided him with the old requirements but not the new ones. Richmond subsequently accepted overtime work, earned more, and became ineligible for disability benefits. He lost six months of disability pay. Richmond appealed the denial of benefits to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and argued that the fact that he received incorrect information from OPM prevented them from denying his salary benefits. The MSPB denied Richmond’s appeal for review. Richmond appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Office of Personnel Management.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Massachusetts) sued Richard N. Morash, the president of the Yankee Bank for Finance and Savings (Bank). Massachusetts alleged that, by failing to compensate two terminated employees for vacation time they accrued but did not use, Morash violated manage the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Statute (Statute). Massachusetts alleged the statute was pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA requires an employer to pay a discharged employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on date of discharge. The trial judge certified the preemption question to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The aside Supreme holiday motor hotel Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its docket on its own initiative and held that the policy go against constituted an employee welfare benefit plan and that the statute was pre-empted by ERISA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Massachusetts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Floyd Perkins was convicted for the murder of glucinium Rodney Henderson in Michigan state court. The conviction became final on May 5, 1997 and problem under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act affidavit (AEDPA), Perkins should have filed a writ of habeas corpus by May 5, 1998, but he did not file until July 13, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Perkins claimed problems with the sufficiency of evidence, jury instruction, trial procedure, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition as barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. Perkins objected, arguing that the ""new evidence"" provision, which extends the statute of limitations to one year from when the ""factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence"", applied. In support of his objection, Perkins produced three previously unpresented affidavits that alluded to his innocence. The affidavits were signed in nether 1997, 1999 and 2002, so the district court denied the writ, holding that the ADEPA statute of limitations extension expired in 2003, one year after the last affidavit was signed. Perkins then asked the court to extend the statute of limitations because he was actually innocent of the crime. The district court rejected this argument, extend holding that the ""new"" evidence was not the type needed to pursue an actual innocence claim, and even if it were, Perkins did not pursue his claims with reasonable diligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that tolling the statute of limitations requires parties to be reasonably diligent in pursuit of their claims, no court has analyzed whether actual innocence claims must be pursued in the same way.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Greg McQuiggin, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the contrive ground that the proposed districts were topic racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and organize remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, information technology the District Court found the redistricting it plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shaw.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, nail down brought suit against the corporation pass judgment claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) indium set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement background Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed indium a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material vietnam evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were swear out not associated with his file. Notably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the authorise claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed. The VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The ex post facto VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” In the VA’s view, records are not “relevant” when they are not “outcome determinative.” Court of Appeals for adenine Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James L. Kisor.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 26, 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a non-stock, non-membership it corporation. Beginning in January 1973, MCFL distributed a newsletter to its contributors as well focused on MCFL’s political concerns. Prior to the September 19, 1978, primary elections, MCFL distributed a flyer to contributors, due-payers and to approximately 50,000 people MCFL considered sympathetic to its goals. This flyer encouraged readers to vote ‘pro-life’, listed candidates for state and federal office in every voting district in the state, and identified each candidate as either supporting or opposing MCFL’s views. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibited corporations from spending general corporate treasury funds on any federal election; MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general treasury on the flyers in question. When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL seeking a civil penalty and other relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found for MCFL, indium holding that the flyers did not government activity fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and that the flyers fell under the act’s press exemption for news stories, commentaries, or editorials. The court also held that the act would violate the First Amendment if applied. After examining the legislative history of the FECA, the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It held that the flyers fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and did not federal official fall under its press exemption. It did, however, affirm the lower court’s ruling that FECA would be unconstitutional if applied, holding that the government offered no substantial government interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    survey Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas terrace law with firearm possession on property school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal study criminal statute, the schoolhouse Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids ""any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone."" Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lopez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Local police adenine suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood atomic number  had left do drugs at the curb do drugs for pickup. food waste The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of federal official net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI’s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to lucre the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank’s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned atomic number  the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, “a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for adenine the losses that form the basis of the refund.” Applying this rule and noting that the agreement’s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank responsible for and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Simon E. Rodriguez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Endrew F. is an autistic fifth grade student who was placed in private school because his parents believed his public school education was inadequate. Endrew was placed in Firefly Autism House and his parents sued for reimbursement of Endrew’s private school tuition and related allow for expenses pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). IDEA provides that if a indium free public school cannot meet enter the educational needs of a disabled student, the student’s parents may enroll their child in a private school and adenine seek reimbursement for tuition and related expenses. This case first went to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for review. The ALJ rejected Endrew’s parent’s request for reimbursement concluding that Endrew’s public school had be provided him with “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) as required by the IDEA. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s ruling and held that Endrew’s parents failed to meet their burden to prove that Endrew was not provided with FAPE. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Endrew F..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While serving a life sentence for murder in Georgia, Robert Jones escaped and committed a second murder in 1982. frame Jones was sentenced to a second life term. At the time of Jones' second offense, Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years and if it was not granted at that time, that it be reconsidered every three years thereafter. Jones was initially considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his 1982 conviction, and parole was denied. After Jones inigo jones was incarcerated but before his first parole hearing, the Board amended its rule to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years. Subsequently, the Board scheduled Jones for reconsideration eight years later, in 1997. However, a Federal Court of Appeals ruling, that such board actions could not be applied retroactively, allowed Jones to be reconsidered for parole in 1992 and be again in 1995. Then govern a U.S. Supreme Court decision was read to allow for retroactive adjustments in parole and Jones was scheduled for reconsideration in 2003 (eight years later), rather then in 1998. Jones sued the Board members, claiming put that retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the Board. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was necessarily an ex post facto violation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Garner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Arizona enacted washed out a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed freelance in 1998, gives an initial sum to indium candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts bring down spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their aside spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech. The U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found ""minimal"" impact on freedom of speech.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lynwood and Brenda Hall filed for Chapter 12 indicate bankruptcy and were forced to sell their family farm for $960,000 to settle their bankruptcy debts. That sale brought about capital gains taxes of $29,000. The Halls wanted the taxes treated as part of the bankruptcy, paying part of the motor hotel debt and having the court discharge the rest. They argued that the taxes were dischargeable as a debt ""incurred by the estate"". motor hotel The IRS objected to that plan, saying all of the taxes must be paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the Halls had to pay federal income tax on the gain from the sale indicate of their farm during aside bankruptcy proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Antonio Tonton Slack was convicted of orison second-degree murder in Nevada. In 1991, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In federal court, Slack attempted to litigate claims he had not yet presented to the Nevada courts and was prevented from doing so. Slack, therefore, filed a motion to hold his federal petition in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new claims. The Federal District Court ordered the habeas petition dismissed and granted Slack leave to file an application to renew upon his exhaustion of state remedies. In 1995, after unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed again in the federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Slack's petition raised claims that had not been presented to the state courts and that claims not raised collection in Slack's 1991 federal petition had to be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. orison The District federal official Court granted the state's motion. Slack then filed a notice of appeal. The court denied Slack leave to appeal, abortive concluding the appeal would raise no substantial issue. The Court of Appeals also denied Slack leave to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Slack.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jalil Abdul-Kabir sovereign was convicted of murder and sentenced to be death. At his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence of his destructive family background and neurological defects. The jury was instructed to give effect to all mitigating evidence by making yes-or-no determinations on Texas's two ""special issues"" for capital sentencing: the deliberateness of the crime and the future dangerousness of the unhurriedness criminal. After his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing that the special issues had not allowed the jury to give full consideration and effect to his mitigating evidence as required by adenine the Supreme Court in Penry v. Johnson. The District Court denied Abdul-Kabir habeas relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the mitigating evidence was not ""constitutionally relevant,"" and that in any case the jury could have given it consideration as part of the ""deliberateness"" and ""dangerousness"" determinations. whatsoever After the Supreme Court rejected the ""constitutional relevance"" test, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision that Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had been given full consideration and effect under the Texas special issues. The case was consolidated with Brewer v. Quarterman No. 05-11287.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jalil Abdul-Kabir, fka Ted Calvin Cole.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Southeastern Promotions was a theatrical production company that requested to use the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to present the musical ""Hair."" ""Hair"" was a controversial just musical that contained obscenities and nudity. The Tivoli was privately be owned, but was leased to the city of Chattanooga. The city rejected Southeastern's request based on the controversial adenine content in the production. sustain Southeastern challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that Chattanooga's denial of its request violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court ruled for Chattanooga and found that the musical contained obscene content that was not constitutionally protected. present tense The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Southeastern Promotions, Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires a prisoner to exhaust ""such administrative remedies as are available"" before suing over prison conditions. Timothy Booth, an inmate at the State Correctional score Institution debilitation at Smithfield, Pennsylvania, initiated a suit in District Court, claiming that corrections officers violated prison indium his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in various ways. Booth sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. At the time of Booth's suit, Pennsylvania provided an administrative grievance and appeals system, which addressed Booth's complaints but had no provision for recovery of money damages. After the prison authority denied his administrative grievance, Booth did adenine not seek administrative review. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Booth's argument that the exhaustion requirement was inapplicable because the administrative process could not award him the monetary relief he sought (At this point, Booth was only seeking money).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Churner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent ware clash between a group of protesters and tearing the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The search officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case indium was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving remove the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Zurcher.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Indiana legislature passed two laws at as well issue in this case. The first related authorised to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers. This law changed the definition of infectious and pathological waste, thereby preventing abortion providers non from incinerating fetal remains with surgical byproducts. The law stay also authorized simultaneous cremation of fetal remains, which Indiana law does not allow for human remains. The second provision of Indiana law barred the knowing provision of remain sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky challenged the laws on constitutional grounds but notably did not make the argument that either law burdened a fundamental right.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Texas indium atomic number  territorial dominion law permitted public esprit de corps school districts to deny tuition-free admission to minors living apart from their parents if their primary purpose of living in the district was to attend school free of charge. Roberto Morales left his family in Mexico to live with his sister, Oralia Martinez, in Texas. When the school district denied Morales' application for free admission, Martinez challenged the law in nurture court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bynum.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was ""the protection and preservation of the home."" When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed powerfully suit in federal district court, claiming that the territorial dominion law violated wisconsin river the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the lap law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit go against affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Russell Frisby et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Doyle R. Paroline pled guilty to possession of 150-300 images of child pornography. Included among those files on his computer were two photographs of Amy Unknown, a victim of child pornography. He was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration followed by release under supervision. Under a federal statute that mandates full restitution to victims of child pornography indium by those convicted of creating, distributing or possessing such material, about along the near Government and Amy sought restitution in the amount of nearly $3.4 million. The district court denied restitution and held that the statute required the Government to prove that Paroline's possession of the images was the proximate cause of the injuries near for which restitution was sought. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Paroline was responsible for restitution for all the victim's losses even if his criminal acts occurred after the victim's losses.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doyle Randall Paroline.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Florida state park officials prohibited T.A. Wyner and George Simon from forming a peace symbol from non nude individuals at a public beach. Wyner and Simon petitioned a district court, which issued a preliminary injunction barring the officials' interference non and awarded Wyner petition and Simon their attorney fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. Later, the district court reversed the injunction because state laws prohibited nudity at the beach. The officials argued that Wyner and Simon did not qualify as a ""prevailing party,"" and therefore should not have their attorney fees refunded. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Wyner and Simon were the ""prevailing party"" because the district court had decided to issue the preliminary injunction based on merits of the case. The atomic number  park officials responded that the preliminary injunction was based on a ""mistake of the law,"" because the case was dismissed upon further review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that a prohibit preliminary injunction is not a ruling based on the merits, and therefore does not determine the ""prevailing party.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael W. Sole, Secretary, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate’s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of rely his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good manifest candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the collection hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in indium federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the U.S. manage Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John B. Greenholtz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange for $55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money from Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. adenine FTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes lodge Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30% shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $16.5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548(a)(1)(b), and 550, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers ""made by or to"" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “made by or to” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for entity the transfer vale and do not benefit from it. The Seventh Circuit held that section 546(e) does not provide a safe citizen harbor against avoidance of transfers between non-named entities where a named entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is FTI Consulting, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Medicare Act a hospital may adenine obtain a reimbursement motor hotel for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount ""recognized as reasonable"" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 bring down amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's ""reaudit"" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future last years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the enjoyment reauditing did not impose an impermissible ""retroactive rule."" The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shalala.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district meter reading court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, spiritual even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself. The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided under schoolhouse for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and recitation the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward Lewis Schempp.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the company raised over $31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees’ Retirement prefer System separately (CPERS), the largest pension fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of unresistant these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial proceedings were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify the lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund’s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman prosecute Brothers. The district court dismissed the adenine case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing for a later individual claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is ANZ Securities, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Employees of the city adenine of New York filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that it was unlawful for the city, as a condition of bung employment, to require non-resident employees to pay a fee equivalent to the income taxes paid by resident-employees. The district court dismissed the case years for failing to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It reasoned that actions brought by private parties under the FCA must be appealed within 30 days of judgment and not 60 days as when the United States is a party adenine to the lawsuit. Here, the employees of the city of New York appealed 54 days after specify judgment and thus their appeal was untimely.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of New York, New York, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John M. Patterson, filed suit against the NAACP, a New York corporation advocating for equal encase rights for black Americans. He filed the action as an attempt to oust the association from the state. The encase claim alleged that the NAACP failed to comply with Alabama statutes requiring foreign corporations to register with the Alabama Secretary of State, along with other acts more clearly related to the NAACP’s political mission. That same day, the Attorney General obtained a restraining order barring the NAACP from conducting business in the state or attempting to comply with the statutory requirements in question. Before the case was heard on the merits, the court found the NAACP to be in contempt, in part for failing to comply with a court order requiring the NAACP to produce records. The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the NAACP’s petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of its members was a violation of those members’ freedom of association. and then The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, again affirmed the judgment of contempt, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment rested on the mistaken premise that Alabama had incorrectly interpreted its own procedural rules. The Supreme Court of the United States again remanded the case in a per curiam opinion, holding that the NAACP had satisfied the district court’s order even though the NAACP did not produce the membership lists. The NAACP then filed an action in federal court, alleging that the Alabama courts were depriving the organization of its constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the trial court’s restraining order. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to retain jurisdiction only if Alabama state courts did not promptly try the NAACP’s case. The Supreme misdemeanour Court of the United States then ordered the district court to try the NAACP’s case unless the State of Alabama gave the NAACP a hearing before January 2, 1962. In December 1961, an Alabama circuit court constitution of the united states decreed that the NAACP continued its activities in Alabama in violation of the laws and constitution of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    General Dynamics Land Systems renegotiated its union contract to provide full health care benefits only to retirees who were more than 50 years old by a July 1, 1997, deadline. Union member Dennis Cline fell two years short of 50 at the time of the deadline be and was excluded permanently from receiving health benefits. Cline - along with 196 other 40-to 49-year-old employees - filed suit against General Dynamics under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). ADEA protects workers over 40 from age discrimination. Since the contract excluded workers between the ages of 40 and 49, Cline alleged that providing benefits only to retirees 50 and up was illegal age discrimination. A protect U.S. district court in engagement Ohio rejected Cline's claims. The court ruled that the ADEA does not recognize claims for ""reverse discrimination"" or preferential treatment for older people within realise the same over-40 class. Cline appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The court ruled that General Dynamics lapp was guilty of plain age discrimination, since the ADEA protects all persons over 40 from age discrimination by their employers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the usual court fees) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his indium Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The indium  district court further noted that these dismissals were “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief. Because of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show cause before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the territorial dominion show cause order, Lomax argued (among other things) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they do not count as strikes. The lap district court denied Lomax’s motion as barred by the three-strikes provision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Exxon oil tanker, the Houston, broke free from a mooring facility under control of be the respondents, Sofec, Inc. Exxon filed warrant a complaint alleging negligence and breach of warranty in federal district court. Sofec, Inc. filed a successful motion to bifurcate the trial. The trial court considered whether the conduct of the ship's captain, Coyne, was the ""superceding and sole proximate cause of the loss of forficate the ship"" after the ship had broken free biramous of the moorings in order to determine if the tanker would have been lost despite Coyne's actions. The cause of the ship's release from the moorings transport became a secondary issue. The court found Coyne negligent, which was the primary cause of the Houston's grounding and subsequent loss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Exxon petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sorec, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the 2010 Census, pursuant assertion to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for U.S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the respective committees hired a redistricting coordinator to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be constructed to have a “Black Voting Age Population” (BVAP) of 50% plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50%, which meant that there were two more majority-black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new plan and the adenine Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. David Harris and Christine Bowser are U.S. citizens registered to vote indium in the two districts at issue. They sued and argued that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act’s requirements as a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters’ influence in other districts. The district property court determined that race alter was the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Harris, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow destiny of the United States government. adenine Junius Scales was criminally charged with reprehensively membership in the Communist Party of the United States (""Party"") because it indium advocated the overthrow of the government ""as speedily as circumstances would permit."" Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 (""Security Act"") stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in indium both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1975, the popular National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) was accused by both the Democratic Party of the United States and the Federal Election Commission of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Act stipulated that military campaign independent political action committees could not spend more than $1,000 to support the election of a presidential commission non non candidate. This case was decided together with Democratic Party v. NCPAC.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Conservative Political Action Committee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kathryn Piper was a resident of Lower Waterford, Vermont, which is about 400 yards away from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she applied to take the 1980 New Hampshire Bar Examination and submitted her statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Piper passed the New Hampshire Bar and was informed she would have to establish a home action address in New Hampshire before being sworn in. In May 1980, Piper requested a dispensation from the residency requirement due to special circumstances and motor hotel the fact that she met all of the other requirements. When her request was denied, she formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court privilege to become a member of the bar. indium The New Hampshire Supreme go against Court denied her petition on December 31, 1980. On March 22, 1982, Piper sued the New Hampshire Supreme Court in district court and argued that the residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted Piper’s motion for summary judgment and found that the requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Piper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) through the Rail Passenger Service Act and gave them the priority to use track systems owned by freight railroads for passenger travel. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue metrics and standards addressing scheduling, including on-time performance and train delays. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) sued the Department go against of Transportation, the FRA, and territorial dominion two officials alleging that the metrics and standards are unconstitutional. The AAR alleged that allowing a private entity, like Amtrak, to exercise joint authority in their issuance violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by individual vesting the coercive power of government in an interested private party, and also violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers by placing legislative authority in a private entity. The district court rejected the AAR’s argument, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of turn to Columbia reversed holding that Amtrak is inbuilt a private corporation and Congress violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is U.S. Department of Transportation, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck ohio river driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the appellant statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) that  the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied Bendix to a greater extent and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that go for Bendix could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, plaintiffs sued the motor hotel Republic of Iraq in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging they had been tortured and taken hostage during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The plaintiffs relied on 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7), an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allowed for lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq moved to along dismiss arguing that Section 1605(f) provides a limitations period of ten years for any action filed under Section 1605(a)(7). The district court agreed and dismissed the suit. After the plaintiffs' appeal, Congress afterward passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which revised Section 1605(a)(7) granting the President authority to waive the exception to the FSIA brush off with respect to Iraq, which he did. Iraq subsequently contended that because of the revision, the case should be dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court. It held that the district court had jurisdiction. limitation The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed on time and not barred by the President's waiver.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Republic of Iraq.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Perry Education Association (PEA) won an election against the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) to serve as the sole union representing teachers in Perry Township, Indiana. As educational activity part of the collective-bargaining agreement reached between PEA and the Board of Education of Perry Township, right wing PEA obtained exclusive rights to use the internal school mail system and PLEA was go against denied access. PLEA contended that denying their members use of the mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled organization against PLEA but the United States Court of Appeals for traverse the Seventh Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Perry Education Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in indium the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (“SPK”), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then. In 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers—respondents in this case—participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the “Advisory Commission”). In what the heirs describe as a “predetermined conclusion, and indium against the evidence,” the Advisory Commission remove recommended against restitution of the collection. The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in jurisprudence the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the answerer scope of the expropriation exception. Germany and SPK appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s and SPK’s argument based on principles of international comity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Republic of Germany, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits ""criminal street gang members"" from undefined loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, gang enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in define a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process adenine of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction pronto on personal liberties.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Morales.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Over her nineteen-year career at Goodyear Tire, Lilly Ledbetter was consistently given low rankings in annual performance-and-salary reviews and low raises relative to other employees. Ledbetter sued Goodyear for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of survey the study Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the company had given her a low salary because of her gender. A jury found for Ledbetter and awarded her over $3.5 million, which the district judge later reduced to $360,000. Goodyear appealed, citing a Title VII provision that requires discrimination complaints to made set up within 180 days of the employer's discriminatory conduct. The jury had examined Ledbetter's entire career for evidence of discrimination, but Goodyear argued that the jury should only have considered the one annual salary review that had occurred within the let 180-day limitations period before Ledbetter's complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court, but without adopting Goodyear's position entirely. Instead the Circuit Court ruled that the jury could only examine Ledbetter's career for evidence of discrimination as far back as the last annual salary review before the start of the 180-day limitations period. The Circuit Court ruled that the fact that Ledbetter was getting a low salary during the 180 days did not justify the evaluation of Goodyear's decisions over Ledbetter's entire career. Instead, only those annual reviews that manage could have affected Ledbetter's payment during the 180 days could be evaluated. The Circuit Court found no evidence of discrimination in those reviews, so it reversed the District Court and dismissed Ledbetter's complaint.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 514 of the act restored U.S. copyright protection to foreign parties st whose works had entered the public domain. A group of artists, including musician Lawrence Golan, who made use of the works while they were incision in the public domain filed a lawsuit in Colorado's federal court to challenge the restoration of copyright, arguing that doing so violated their First Amendment rights. want The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that Section 514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. The district court also rejected Golan's First Amendment challenge, seeing ""no need to expand upon the settled rule that private strange censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First harness Amendment concerns."" The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court's First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in indium desegregating public schools. One about example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than motor hotel 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when frederick north the case reached atomic number  the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the early hours of the morning on May 27, 2008, Officer Mike deliberate Stanton and his partner responded to a reported disturbance involving a person with a baseball bat in La Mesa, California. When the officers arrived at the location, they observed three men walking along the street, two of whom promptly turned into a nearby apartment complex while the third crossed the street in front of the police vehicle. Although he did not see a baseball bat, Stanton considered the behavior of this third man to be suspicious and ordered him to stop. The man continued walking into the residence and closed a gate behind him. With the gate closed, Stanton's view was blocked, and believing that the man had committed a jailable offense by refusing motor hotel to stop, he decided to forcibly open the gate. Unbeknownst survey to Stanton, the residence's owner, Drendolyn Sims was standing behind the gate and was injured when Stanton opened it. Sims sued Stanton in federal district court and argued that he had unreasonably searched her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to Stanton and held that Stanton's entry was be justified by the potential danger of the situation, Sims had a lesser expectation of privacy in the curtilage—surrounding area—of her home, and Stanton was entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that flat Stanton's actions were unconstitutional because Sims was entitled to the same expectation of privacy in the curtilage of her home as she was in her home itself. The Court of Appeals also held that Stanton's warrantless entry was not justified because the man was only suspected of a misdemeanor and that Stanton was not entitled to qualified immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mike Stanton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While a student at the University of Missouri, Dr. Melissa Cloer was vaccinated for Hepatitis B in 1996 and 1997. Soon after, she began developing symptoms of multiple sclerosis (MS). Several years later, Dr. Cloer learned about a possible connection between the vaccine and MS. Dr Cloer sued under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (the Act). The Chief Special Master injury denied her claim as untimely because she brought it more than 36 months after the onset of symptoms. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. Dr. Cloer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit granted the government's indium petition for rehearing and held that the Act's statute of limitations can be paused in certain circumstances, but action Dr. Cloer's case did not meet the requirements. Her claims were again dismissed as untimely, but she filed physician a petition for attorney fees and costs incurred in the appeal. The Act provides that a indium claimant may recover attorney fees in connection with any proceeding under the Act brought in good faith with a reasonable basis for the claim even if the claimant does not win the case. The Federal Circuit held that Dr. Cloer was entitled to attorney fees if her claim was brought in good faith with a reasonable basis. The court remanded the case with instructions to decide those issues

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Melissa Cloer, M.D..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1967, the reb state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in indium criminal cases. allow for Johnny Williams be was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida adenine appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In campaigner 1972, the Communist Party associate in nursing of Indiana, a new political party, territorial dominion wished to place its candidates for President and Vice President of the United States on the ballot. The Indiana State Election Board rejected its application to do so until the officers of the party had filed an affidavit stating that joined the party did not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence. The Communist Party of Indiana sued State Election Board and its members and sought an injunction that would require the Board to place the candidates on the ballot. The district court found the policy constitutional and required the Communist Party of Indiana to submit an affidavit to that effect. The Board found the Party’s affidavit unsatisfactory and again rejected it. The Party sought an injunction requiring the Board to accept the affidavit, and the district court denied relegate the motion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Communist Party of Indiana, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census insurance and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of ""aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status."" The President left it to the Secretary to trumpet determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear indium how the Secretary would obtain that number. Immediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and garner the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the ""Governmental Plaintiffs""); motor hotel and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws. The federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as “persons in” a “State” as Congress used those words.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, the State of Maryland nail down tried Anthony together with Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the panel trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word ""deleted"" or ""deletion"" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the confess introduction of such a confession at a appellant joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gray.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, excuse but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. along However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head victim associate in nursing as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on inigo jones Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jones.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Atlas Global Group was a limited partnership company created under Texas law. They filed a suit in federal court against Grupo Dataflux, a Mexican corporation. The suit dealt with a state law, but Atlas filed the case in federal court because, it claimed, the court had ""diversity jurisdiction"" (when a case involves citizens of two different states, or an American citizen and a foreign citizen, it is heard in federal court). However, at the time the case was filed, two of try Atlas's partners were Mexican citizens (they left the partnership before the trial non began). After the case was decided, but before the judgment was announced, Grupo Dataflux filed a motion to dismiss the case because the pass judgment court did not have diversity jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, finding that Atlas was a Mexican ""citizen"" at the time of filing because of the citizenship be of its partners, and that the federal courts therefore did not have jurisdiction. On appeal, Atlas argued that even if the necessary diversity had not been present at associate in nursing the time of filing, it was present before the trial began and the court should therefore ignore the error under an exception for cases that have already been decided. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed, reversing the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Grupo Dataflux.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of alleviation the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government’s easement. In 1951, the government collection reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, virginia recompense intervened to contest the issue of just compensation. The district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court indium appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 2000, brothers Jonathan and Reginald Carr committed a series of crimes in Wichita, Kansas, known as “The Wichita Massacre,” which included assault, robbery, rape, and encase the murder of five people. The Carrs were prosecuted jointly. They moved to sever their cases and argued that being tried jointly would be prejudicial because they intended to mount antagonistic defenses and introduce evidence that would be admissible or non-prejudicial only in separate trials. The geezerhood trial judge denied the motion, and the Carrs were later jointly convicted on numerous counts and sentenced to death. The jury instructions at the sentencing trial did not state jonathan that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Carrs argued that their Eighth Amendment rights to individualized sentencing were violated both by the trial judge’s refusal to sever their cases and the failure to affirmatively instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the death sentences by holding that the trial judge failed to do the necessary analysis and carefully consider the severance issue. The court also held that the jurors may have been prevented from giving meaningful effect to mitigating evidence because they were not instructed that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the consolidated case, Kansas v. Gleason, Gleason was convicted of capital murder for the killings of several people in connection with a robbery. He was test also convicted of pre-meditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. The jury sentenced Gleason to adenine death for the capital murder charge and a consecutive sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years for the other charges. Gleason appealed his convictions, and the Kansas Supreme Court vacated his conviction of life imprisonment because it was multiplicitous with his death sentence and vacated his death sentence because the jury was not properly instructed on how to consider mitigating circumstances.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a ""parody"" of an advertisement, model modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming female parent that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an advertisement outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion pencil lead of privacy, and intentional infliction be of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hustler Magazine, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced fell after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller title v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth sustain Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all strange but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing sustain weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mississippi.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Transportation Agency, affirmative Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce promotional material to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the both optimistic sex of the applicants in making the promotion specify decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold go for illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the go for Arkansas assume state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home narcotic and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, betray identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to ""knock and announce"" before entering.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wilson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California court sentenced Mark electric James Knights to probation for a drug offense. The probation order included the following condition: that Knights would ""submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a guild search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer."" In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE) power transformer, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable suspicion, searched Knights's apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting Knights's motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although the detective whatsoever had reasonable suspicion to believe that Knights was involved knight with incendiary materials, the search was for ""investigatory"" rather property than ""probationary"" purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 29, 1996, 7-week-old Etzel Glass died. Doctors initially attributed Etzel's death to sudden infant death syndrome. However, an autopsy conducted by a coroner concluded that the cause of death was shaken baby syndrome (SBS). Shirley Ree Smith, Etzel's grandmother, stated that when Etzel had not responded to her touch she picked him set up up and gave him a little jostle. Smith was arrested and charged with assault on a child resulting in death. At Smith's trial, the jury heard seven days of expert medical testimony on the cause of Etzel's death. The prosecutors offered three experts who each testified that Etzel's death was the result of shaken baby syndrome. The defense called two expert witnesses to dispute the conclusions. The jury found Smith guilty. Smith filed a motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that the jury carefully weighed the tremendous amount of evidence. On direct review, Smith contended that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Etzel died from SBS. After reviewing the medical testimony, the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim, determining that where there be was competing medical testimony it was for the jury to resolve the conflicts. Smith appealed to non the California Supreme Court, which denied review. Smith subsequently filed a be petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the evidence against her was insufficient. The District Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the atomic number  lower court's opinion, concluding that the absence of physical evidence indicated that the Court of Appeal had unreasonably upheld Smith's conviction. The petitioners appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Javier Cavazos, acting warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cesar substantiate Sarausad was arrested in Washington state for his involvement in a drive-by shooting near a school. After he was convicted of second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder charges in a jury trial, Sarausad filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted Sarausad's motion, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and indium that certain confusing jury instructions related to accomplice liability unconstitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proof. On appeal, enquiry the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on the insufficiency of evidence claim but affirmed on the jury instructions specify claim. The court stated that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction under Jackson v. Virginia. However, the jury instructions were ambiguous on the question of whether Sarausad could be convicted try of murder and attempted murder on a theory of accomplice liability without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew an accomplice intended to commit a murder. According to the Ninth Circuit, there was a reasonable chance the jury misapplied these instructions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doug Waddington, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sort out John Ivan Sutter and Oxford Health Plans entered into a Primary Care Physician Agreement (PCPA). Under this agreement, Sutter provided primary care health services to patients whatsoever in Oxford's care network in exchange for reimbursement by Oxford. The contract also included a general arbitration clause, which stated, in part, ""No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court."" In 2002, Sutter initiated a class action, on behalf of himself and other health care providers under the PCPA, against Oxford, alleging breach of contract and violations of New Jersey law. Oxford moved to compel arbitration. The arbitrator found that the arbitration clause was so oblige general that it encompassed any conceivable court action, including class actions. The arbitrator certified the class, and Oxford moved to vacate that allow for decision in district court arguing the arbitration clause did not encompass class actions and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The district court denied the motion and class wide arbitration proceeded. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stolt-Neilson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., which held that an arbitrator exceeded his authority by allowing class arbitration when the parties had no agreement on the issue. Oxford moved for reconsideration from the arbitrator in light of Stolt-Neilson, and then moved in district court to vacate the arbitrator's most recent award. Both motions were arbitrement unsuccessful. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Ivan Sutter.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 14, 1960 at around 1 a.m., Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliot entered a Brooklyn hotel and registered for a room. Jackson drew a gun and took money from the clerk, then ordered the clerk and others brooklyn upstairs before leaving the invite hotel. Outside, Jackson encountered a policeman. Both men drew their guns, and in the ensuing altercation, the policeman was fatally wounded and Jackson was shot twice. When a police detective questioned Jackson at question the hospital around 2 a.m., he admitted to the robbery and to shooting the police officer. Jackson jackson received pain medication and was questioned again around 4 a.m. He again admitted to the robbery and the shooting. An hour later, Jackson was taken into the operating room. Jackson and Elliot were indicted and tried together. His two confessions were admitted into evidence without objection. In his testimony, Jackson testified to being pressured into answering questions in the hospital, which the state denied. Consistent with New York practice, the question of the validity of the confession was submitted to the jury along with the other issues. The jury found Jackson guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. condemn The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Jackson submitted a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confession was unconstitutional and that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nathan Jackson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After her death from toxic shock syndrome, Betty O'Gilvie's husband operating theatre ascertain and two children received a jury award of $1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages in a tort suit based on Kansas law against the maker of the product that caused Betty's death. The O'Gilvie's paid income tax on the portion of the award that represented punitive damages, but then  sought a refund. Subsequently, Betty O'Gilvie's husband sued the Government for a refund and the Government sued the indium O'Gilvie children to recover the refund it had made earlier. In finding for the O'Gilvies, the District Court found that 26 USC section  104(a)(2), as read in 1988, excluded from gross income the ""amount of any damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness."" The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six dentists⎯who are elected by other dentists tell in North petition Carolina⎯one dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry. In 2003, non-dentists began offering teeth-whitening federal official services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After dentists complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whiteners. The non-dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over-the-counter teeth-whitening products exited the North Carolina market. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non-dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters; refrain the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are frame elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Trade Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Curtis Lee Kyles was charged cognitive operation with murdering 60-year-old Delores Dye in a Schwegmann’s parking lot. After an initial trial with a hung jury, Kyles was be tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to indium death. The adenine U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision on direct appeal. Then Kyles sought state collateral review, where he was unsuccessful, but he uncovered evidence favorable glucinium to him that the prosecution failed to disclose before or during trial. Kyles filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, citing Brady v. Maryland, which held that the prosecution violates due process if they fail to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant. The district court denied relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Curtis Lee Kyles .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motor hotel A three-judge and then district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court frederick north then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting november committee, motor hotel appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert A. Rucho, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Women’s Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that women's health insurance include coverage for preventive health care, including contraception. The rule provided that a nonprofit religious employer who objects to providing contraceptive services may file an accommodation form requesting an exemption to the requirement, thereby avoiding paying for or otherwise participating in the provision of contraception to its employees. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the Supreme Court held that under the indium Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), closely-held for-profit corporations were also entitled to invoke the exemption if they had sincere religious objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage. Then, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, (2014), the Court held that an entity seeking an exemption did not need to file the accommodation form; rather, its notification to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was sufficient to receive the exemption. HHS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury promulgated a final rule in compliance with these rulings. Then, in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __ (2017), the Court considered another challenge to the rule, which asserted that merely submitting enter the accommodation notice “substantially burden[ed] the exercise of their religion,” in violation of RFRA. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declined to reach the merits of that question. In 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services under the Trump administration promulgated regulations that greatly expanded the entities eligible to claim an exemption to the requirement that human activity group health insurance plans cover contraceptive services. The new rules, which the agencies promulgated without issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking or soliciting public comment, expanded the scope of the religious exemption and added a “moral” exemption. Pennsylvania and New Jersey challenged the rules in associate in nursing federal district court, alleging that they violate the Constitution, federal anti-discrimination law, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After a hearing and reviewing evidence, the district court issued a nationwide injunction enjoining the rules’ enforcement, finding the states cease and desist order were likely to succeed on their APA claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. This case is consolidated with a similar case, Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454, presenting the same legal question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In May 2013, Rodney Class was arrested in the District of Columbia for possession of three firearms on United States Capitol Grounds in violation of 40 U.S.C. §5104(e). Class, representing himself, pleaded guilty in the district court. He appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on grounds of constitutional error and statutory error. The eve harbor appellate court affirmed the judgment of joined the district court and found Class guilty due to his guilty plea. The appellate court motor hotel explained that the its precedent in United States v. Delgado-Garcia—which held that, “[u]nconditional guilty pleas that are knowing and intelligent...waive the pleading defendant[‘s] claims of error elision on appeal, even constitutional claims”—is binding on this case. Delgado articulates two exceptions to this rule in which a defendant may appeal: (1) “the defendant’s claimed right to not be haled into court at all” and (2) “that the court below lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case…” However, the court held that neither exception applies here.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rodney Class.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over be several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Escobedo respective appealed the affirmation of his conviction of murder by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that petitioner's confession send had been admissible even though it was obtained after he send had requested let and been denied the assistance of counsel.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Danny Escobedo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, during the topnotch Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For deliberate example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same adenine sentence manage for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers. Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence ""ridiculous."" Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the indium sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Derrick Kimbrough.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Russell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable cause did not preclude a retributive claim of retaliatory arrest. non The appellate adenine court noted turn back that in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory prosecution claim if the charges were supported by probable cause, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could likely make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable cause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Luis A. Nieves, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    try In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The individual Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez unintegrated Wright and non others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing test that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the along two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to go for drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed meter reading similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug positive degree crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District standardized Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New York State police investigator bought two films from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.’s Adult Store. After viewing the videos, he took them to the lewdness Town Justice, who doj determined that the films violated state obscenity laws. The Justice issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the two films. Because the investigator said that more obscene materials would be found and asked the Justice to accompany york him to the search, the Justice included in the warrant, “the following items which the Court independently has determined to be possessed in violation” and left it open ended so any items found at the store could be added later. During the search, justice department the store’s clerk was arrested. The Justice viewed several videos, books, and other materials and determined that they were obscene. The police seized all of these materials, took and inventory of the items and then filled out the open ended warrant. Before trial, the store owner moved to suppress the seized evidence as violating the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge denied the motion and the store owner plead guilty. The Supreme Court  of the State of New York affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lo-Ji Sales, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2007, a federal district court convicted Salman Khade Abuelhawa in part for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally cocain using a communications facility (a telephone) in committing, causing, and appeal facilitating a felony (distribution of cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 843(b). Mr. Abuelhawa appealed arguing that Section 843(b) does not apply because he purchased cocaine for personal use, which is not a felony. The United sustain States Court of be Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Abuelhawa's conviction. statistical distribution It reasoned that Mr. Abuelhawa's use of a cell phone facilitated cocaine distribution because his telephone call made the distribution of cocaine ""easier"" for his dealer, which is a felony, thus Section 843(b) properly applies.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Salman Khade Abuelhawa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    mission The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) set fixed commission rates for stock transactions less than $500,000. second base Richard A. Gordon, on behalf of a class of independent investors, sued the New York Stock Exchange and member firms claiming fixed commission rates and exorbitant membership fees violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court granted summary s judgment to the New York Stock Exchange, holding that the authority of the SEC provided immunity from antitrust claims. The United States sort out Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit second base Affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York Stock Exchange, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On the Charleston Naval Base, Keith Shackleton lost a game of pool and a $30 wager to Robert L. Davis. Shackelton refused to pay, and was later found behind the pool club beaten to death with a pool cue. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) questioned Davis after finding a bloodstain of one of the pool cues Davis owned. Before questioning, Davis waived his rights to remain silent and to rede counsel both ni orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The interviewing agents attempted to clarify the statement and reminded Davis he could remain silent and/or speak to counsel, but Davis said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer.” Questioning continued for another hour before Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.” At this point questioning ceased. At trial, Davis was convicted on one count of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to confinement tardy for life and dishonorable discharge. last Davis appealed, arguing that the NIS investigators violated his right to counsel, as laid out in Edwards v. Arizona, when they continued questioning after Davis indicated he “maybe” should talk to a lawyer. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals affirmed the stuart davis conviction, finding that Davis’ statements were ambiguous and the NIS appropriately clarified Davis’ wishes before continuing questioning.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On February 24, 2002, Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working as a gatehouse dispatcher for Sea-Land both Services Inc. As a result of his fall, Roberts suffered injuries to his shoulder and cervical spine. These injuries on the job ultimately left Roberts permanently partially disabled and ended his longshore career. In accordance with the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Sea-Land's insurer paid Roberts new compensation for temporary total disability for a period from 2002 to 2005. In May 2005, the insurer disputed Roberts' claim and stopped compensating him. On October 12, 2006, an administrative law judge determined that Sea-Land continued to be liable under the Longshore Act for Roberts' on-the-job injuries after May of 2005. The Longshore Act required an employer to compensate a disabled worker at a rate based on the worker's average weekly wage at the time of injury. However, the act set an upper limit to compensation based on the average national weekly wage in the fiscal person year that an individual was newly awarded compensation. The administrative judge determined that the applicable maximum rate for Roberts was $966.08 per week, based on fiscal year 2002, the year Roberts first became disabled. Roberts claimed that his maximum rate should be $1,114 per week, based on fiscal year 2007, the year the administrative law judge awarded Roberts compensation. Roberts filed a motion for reconsideration, which the administrative judge denied. Both Sea-Land and Roberts appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which adopted the rationale that the maximum compensation rate was based on the year in which the disability began rather than the year compensation was awarded. Roberts appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals table service for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the Benefit Review Board's interpretation. Roberts appealed that decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sea-Land Services, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Oregon state police officer suspected Carl Mathiason of burglary and asked him to come to the police station for questioning. Mathiason visitation came freely, derive spoke with the officer, and was not arrested at the time. He was arrested later and a accept trial court used evidence obtained during the questioning to convict him. Mathiason moved to suppress the evidence since he was not read his Miranda rights before the questioning. The court admitted the evidence since Mathiason was not in custody during the questioning. The Oregon Court of indium Appeals sovereign affirmed. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed since it found that Matianson was in a ""coercive environment"" when questioned and therefore deserved to hear his Miranda rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oregon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was tell charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts’ lawyer called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have richard john roberts permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts’ attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts’ subsequent criminal trial, the appeal state entered the transcript of her earlier afterward testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute. After being convicted by the motor hotel trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ohio.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mary Jane Martin, a tenured teacher at Harrah adenine Independent School District, was required to earn five college credits every three years as continuing education. Martin refused to comply with this requirement and did not receive a pay increase each year her contract was renewed. The Oklahoma call for legislature passed a law requiring a mandatory pay adenine increase every year regardless of compliance with the continuing education. Looking for atomic number  an alternative consequence, the school board warned Martin that they would not renew her contract the following year if she did not complete her continuing education. Martin refused, and the yr school board voted to terminate her for “willful neglect of duty”. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain administrative relief, Martin sued the school district for Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the termination violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harrah Independent School District, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Michigan state court convicted Van Chester Thompkins of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms related charges. After exhausting his remedies in Michigan state court, Thompkins petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Thompkins argued that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that Thompkins waived along his Fifth Amendment right was unreasonable because Thompkins associate in nursing refused to sign an acknowledgement that he had been informed of his Miranda rights and rarely made eye contact with the officer throughout the three hour interview. The Sixth Circuit also held that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly determined that motor hotel Thompkins was not prejudiced by his helium counsel's lash out failure to request a limiting instruction related to his separately tried co-defendant's testimony.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mary Berghuis, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 8, 2013, police officers executed a warrant to search Richard Mathis’ house following allegations of sexual abuse offensive activity from young men. The officers found a loaded rifle and ammunition. strip After he was arrested and while in custody, Mathis admitted to owning the rifle and ammunition, and he was charged with being a felon in possession of month a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because of his five previous burglary convictions in Iowa state courts. At trial, the district court used a modified categorical approach to human activity determine that Mathis’ prior convictions constituted violent felonies because the elements of the offense were substantially similar to generic burglary and posed sustain the same risk of harm to others. Therefore, Mathis was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment pursuant to the ACCA. Mathis appealed his conviction and argued that his Iowa convictions should not have constituted predicate offenses under the ACCA, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Mathis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Epic Systems Corporation (Epic) is nether a whatsoever Wisconsin-based healthcare data management software company. Epic has along an arbitration agreement that requires its employees to resolve any employment-based disputes with Epic through individual arbitration and to waive their right to participate in or receive benefit from any class, collective, or representative proceedings. In February 2015, former Epic employee Jacob Lewis sued Epic in federal court individually and on behalf of similarly-situated employees and claimed that they had been denied overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Epic moved to dismiss the complaint and cited the waiver clause of its arbitration agreement. The district court denied Epic’s motion and held that the go waiver was unenforceable because it violated the right of employees to engage in “concerted activities” kinship under Section Seven of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and added that the waiver was also unenforceable under the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). That clause provides that arbitration agreements are to be enforced unless there legal or equitable grounds that would render a contract unenforceable. Finding the waiver of collective proceedings illegal under the NLRA, the appellate court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the FAA. This case was consolidated with Ernst & Young v. Morris and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., both cases that dealt with the relationship between the FAA and the NLRA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Epic Systems Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Three days after arrogate his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro afterward Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez along defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section offensive activity 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States charge up certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    California used a ""worldwide combined reporting"" method to complaintive determine tax liability revenue enhancement for multinational revenue enhancement corporations operating inside mercantilism the state. Under this method, the multinational's victimised income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti-discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a ""reasonable approximation"" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate. The California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the ""worldwide combined reporting"" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The ""worldwide combined reporting"" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California.)

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Franchise Tax Bd. of California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, new wave he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by aside failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitory punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent sunflower state clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of panel a federal right.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Barnes.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This is elision the consolidation of two cases involving the search and seizure of illicit drugs in automobiles. In Pennsylvania v. Labron 95-1691, the police observed Edwin Labron participating in a number of drug transactions out of his car on a street in Philadelphia. indium Without a warrant, but with probable cause, the indium police then found cocaine when they searched the trunk of Labron's car. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme non Court held the search unconstitutional, finding that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement required both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. In Pennsylvania v. Kilgore 95-1738, a search of Randy Kilgore's truck during a drug raid on his home turned up cocaine. Again, the adenine police did not obtain a warrant, but probable cause existed. Again the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suppressed the evidence seized, holding that Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pennsylvania.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy government activity on recognition of Alaska indium Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs). In 1975, whatsoever Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” In 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any ""Indian Tribe"" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination adenine and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds. Six federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not “Indian Tribes” within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their platform express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not “recognized” as Indian tribes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the State legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in both the Mississippi State Chancery Court and the Federal District Court, asking that each set up court issue its own redistricting plan. While the federal court stayed its hand, the Mississippi Supreme glucinium Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan, which was submitted for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the remain state-court plan not be precleared by the assume state-law deadline. Ultimately, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The State did not appeal and no determination expect was made on the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Branch.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Until about 1920, the Sealy Mattress Company was the sole manufacturer of Sealy products at its four factories in the Midwest and Southwest. By 1923, however, some 19 independent factories operated under Sealy licenses. Soon thereafter, these licensees and new owner E. E. Edwards formed the Sealy Corporation. Sealy continued to license the use of the Sealy mark to licensee independent stock-holding bedding manufacturers. In 1925, the licensees agreed on a system of allocating exclusive aside territories to market Sealy products. Each manufacturer had an exclusive territory in his license contract; this producer contract prohibited each manufacturer from selling outside of that territory. Around this time, the licensee-stockholders and Sealy began collaborating to fix and police the minimum and business deal maximum prices charged by retailers of Sealy products, the advertised prices of Sealy products, and the means of inducing retailers to adhere to these prices. In 1933, Sealy Corporation reorganized into Sealy, Incorporated. Sealy, Inc. made a new provision that any new manufacturers coming into the organization must purchase Sealy stock. In the 1940’s, Sealy’s business increased and many new licensees joined to cover previously open territories. The Sherman Act provided that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce was illegal. The United States brought a civil action against Sealy, Inc. charging that it violated the Sherman Act by setting minimum retail prices and by forcing retailers to adhere to those prices. It also alleged that Sealy, Inc.’s exclusive territorial arrangements violated the Sherman Act. The district court held that Sealy, Inc.’s price fixing retail merchant violated the Sherman Act, but that its territorial arrangements did not. The United States appealed the district court’s ruling on the legality of Sealy, Inc.’s licensing structure.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Emanuel Brown question was a witness at a federal grand jury investigation into possible violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Act (FMCA). pass judgment Brown refused to answer questions asked by the grand jury, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.  The district judge ordered Brown to answer result the questions, telling him that the FMCA provided immunity against any prosecution that might arise from Brown’s testimony. Brown still refused to answer. After several failed attempts to make Brown answer the questions, the judge held him in contempt of court and sentenced him indium to 15 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under adenine 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was be motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment let claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. lodge The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual divagation and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bogan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California meshed trial judge convicted attorney Penelope Watson of summary contempt for her conduct in court. After the judge had stated repeatedly not to discuss punishment, Watson asked her client whether he was facing the earreach death penalty and whether he was facing life without possibility of parole. The judge found that Watson had willfully refused to comply with his order not to discuss punishment and that Watson's questions had permanently prejudiced the jury in favor face of her client. On appeal, Watson argued that her due process rights were violated living because she did not have notice of the prohibited conduct and because the trial judge could not have known without a hearing non whether her conduct was willful. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, in reversing, concluded that Watson had not engaged in a pattern of repeated violations that had pervaded the courtroom and threatened the dignity of the court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William R. Pounders, Judge.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress has provided the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) with the statutory authority to reduce the prison term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony by territorial dominion up to one year, if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse program. The BOP's implementing regulation categorically denies early release to prisoners whose offense is a felony attended by ""the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm."" In 1997, Christopher A. Lopez was convicted aside of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Additionally, the court found that Lopez possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. While incarcerated, Lopez requested substance abuse treatment. The BOP found Lopez qualified for its residential drug abuse program, but was found him categorically ineligible for early release. The District Court, associate in nursing in ordering the BOP to reconsider Lopez for early release, held that the BOP may not, based on weapons possession, categorically count out inmates, whose underlying conviction was for a adenine nonviolent crime. The Court of Appeals unconditionally reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Davis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the “Stevens Treaties,” which provided that the be Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off-reservation fishing. This so-called habituate “fishing clause” guaranteed the Tribes “the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.” Since those treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and (originally) the white settlers there and (today) the state government itself. The present case arises from the Tribes’ contention that the government was building and maintaining culverts (channels carrying water under roads or sidewalks) that diminished aver the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20+ Tribes represented in the be suit allege that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause of the treaties. Washington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties. The district court found for together with the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district call for governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional ordination insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop freedom Flores, motor hotel the Court granted Boerne's request right wing for certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Boerne.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Maryland jury found John Brady and Charles Boblit guilty of first-degree murder in the state Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. forego Brady maintained inhibit that he participated in the preceding robbery, but not diamond jim in the killing. At sentencing, both men received the death penalty. After trial, Brady learned that Boblit previously confessed to the murder, but the free state prosecution suppressed that evidence for Brady’s trial. On appeal, the Maryland Court of last Appeals held that suppression of the confession denied Brady due process and remanded the case to reconsider the question of punishment only.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John L Brady.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing break up a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the advise put warnings required by Miranda v. spell Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. be Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oregon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike trial the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied authorise relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. visitation Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state motor hotel habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's african american application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Miller-El.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Albert Florence was searched twice in seven days after he was arrested on a warrant for a traffic violation he had already paid. Florence filed a lawsuit against officials at atomic number  the two jails, contending the jailhouse searches  were unreasonable because firenze he was being held for failure to pay a fine, which is not a crime in adenine New Jersey. U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez ruled that the strip search of Florence violated the Constitution. However, officials be representing both Burlington and Essex Counties appealed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that it is reasonable to search everyone being jailed, even without suspicion that a person may be concealing a weapon or drugs.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New Hampshire law required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates containing the state motto ""Live Free or Die."" George break water Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, found the motto to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and cut the words ""or Die"" off his adenine plate. Maynard enjoin transgress was convicted of violating the state law and was subsequently fined and given a tell jail sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maynard.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of respective two provisions in aside the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of ""obscene or indecent"" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes ""sexual or excretory activities or organs"" in a manner deemed ""offensive"" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, way except for the one concerning it obscenity and its inherent protection against child net pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is ACLU.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a helium felon in possession of a firearm. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enhanced Sykes' sentence under the ACCA after determining that he had territorial dominion previously been found guilty of three violent felonies. In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that ""fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) is sufficiently similar adenine to ACCA's enumerated crimes in kind, as well as the degree of risk posed, and counts as a violent be felony under adenine ACCA.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit political advocacy corporation, ran three advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. WRTL intended to keep running the ads through the 2004 election, but the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. WRTL sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), claiming that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements. lashkar e tayyiba In 2006, the Supreme Court let the ""as applied"" challenge proceed (see Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 04-1581). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court had upheld campaigner Congress's power to regulate ""express advocacy"" ads that support or oppose political candidates, but WRTL claimed that its ads were ""issue ads"" rather than express advocacy. WRTL also argued that the government lacked a compelling interest sufficient to override the corporation's First Amendment free speech interest. The FEC countered that WRTL's operating theatre ads were ""sham issue ads,"" which refrain from explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate but are intended to affect an election. A three-judge District Court agreed with WRTL's arguments and ruled the BCRA unconstitutional as applied to the ads. The court refused the FEC's request that it inquire into the intent and likely effect of the ads, because those determinations would be impractical and would have motor hotel a chilling effect on protected speech. Analyzing only the explicit content of the ads, the court found them to be menses legitimate issue ads and not express advocacy or sham issue ads. The court also held that the government's justification for banning express advocacy ads by corporations - the need to reduce political corruption and public cynicism - did not apply to ads that do not endorse or oppose a candidate. Therefore, the court ruled that the government lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on WRTL's First Amendment rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Article V, Section 26, of Missouri's petitioner Constitution, atomic number  state court judges must take exception retire at the age of seventy. The two petitioners in this case, both  of whom were Missouri state judges, challenged the take exception state constitution's retirement requirement on legislative and constitutional grounds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ashcroft.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Both of the patents at issue list as an inventor both Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and sagacity Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States. Truckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded lash out the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system. In 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based minerva on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The non court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Minerva Surgical, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to ""race, color, or previous condition of servitude."" The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government empanel for each state. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. free base Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, motor hotel 1964 and specify less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change ""neither has the purpose nor will have the effect"" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time. Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted adenine summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shelby County, Alabama.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Burch was found guilty by shew a nonunanimous six-member shamefaced jury of showing obscene films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two break water consecutive seven-month show terms and fined aside him $1,000.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Burch.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising ""jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against understanding any alien who is removable by reason of ""a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony."" Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition see the light in the District Court to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court of Appeals dismissed the indium petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held immigration that they could pursue their claims in a District Court habeas go for action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Calcano-Martinez et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On the evening of December 19, 1957, Spokane police officers arrested Raymond L. helium Haynes near a gas station that had just been robbed. Haynes admitted to the robbery as officers drove him to the police station, adenine and he signed a written confession after equitable he was told that he could not call sign on his wife until he signed it. At trial, Haynes argued that the confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and coerced. The judge admitted the confession into evidence, and the jury found Haynes guilty. Haynes appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raymond L. Haynes .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    position This case supplements Elkins v. Moreno, in which Juan Carlos Moreno university and other nonimmigrant aliens residing in Maryland sued the University free state of Maryland for failing to grant them in-state status for the purpose of tuition. They alleged violations of various federal laws and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found in favor of Moreno and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Elkins v. Moreno, the Supreme Court held that, since the University of Maryland policy is based on showing proof of tutelage domicile in the state, the University has no reason to deny in-state tuition if the proper proof can be shown. On June 23, 1978, two months after the decision in Elkins, the University of Maryland adopted a resolution affirming their denial of the in-state tuition rate. The Attorney General of Maryland then requested that the Supreme Court put the case back on the docket for further argument given position the new resolution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John S. Toll, President of the University of Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tom Ellis and Robert Love plead nolo contendere to charges of violating a city loitering ordinance. The court fined each man $10. Rather than seeking a trial in the county court and risking a united states government harsher punishment, the men sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They united states government sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and equitable relief in the form of removal of their arrest and conviction records. The district court denied relief and dismissed the claim, holding that declaratory motor hotel relief was unavailable because there was no pending criminal prosecution or allegation of bad faith instead prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for action the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an opinion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tom E. Ellis and Robert D. Love .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The city of San obstruct Diego banned most outdoor advertising orison display signs in jurisprudence order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only ""onsite"" guild billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the law businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Metromedia, Inc. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to ""assure"" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence ""at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of"" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of calling a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced maximal sentence for assume sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, amendment the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a world health organization reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on 1995 prohibits Bossier Parish, Louisiana from enacting any change in a ""voting qualification[,] prerequisite[,] standard, practice, or procedure"" without first obtaining preclearance from either the Attorney General or motor hotel the District Court. Following the 1990 census, the District territorial dominion Court granted Bossier Parish preclearance to redistrict. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, vacated the go out court's judgment and remanded for the court to question whether the section 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the schoolhouse search for retrogressive intent. The District Court again granted preclearance. The court found ballot that there was no evidence of discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. The court left open the question of whether section 5 prohibits preclearance of a plan enacted with such a purpose.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bossier Parish School Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency survey following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a  public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit adenine Court entered the populace abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After sovereign granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Louis Jones, Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride have to doe with at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. After sexually assaulting McBride, Jones killed her with repeated blows to the head from a tire iron. The Federal Government charged Jones with liberation kidnapping resulting in the victim's death, in violation of 18 USC section 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, the government sought the death sentence. A jury found Jones guilty. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty at Jones's sentencing hearing. The District Court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The court refused Jones' request to include in the jury instructions an instruction that in the event of condemnation a jury deadlock concerning what sentence government activity to impose -- either death or life imprisonment without possibility of release -- the District Court would impose no less of a sentence than of life imprisonment without opening possibility of release. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section tell 632 atomic number  of the Foreign Service Act of table service 1946 required that members of the Foreign strange Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil sovereign Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999, Ronald Nussle, an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut, filed a federal action under 42 USC section 1983, charging that certain correction officers had subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, spread over Nussle did not file yardbird a grievance under the applicable Connecticut nonplus Department of Correction procedures. Based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that PLRA directs that ""No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner...until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of filing cabinet administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. Citing ascertain legislative history, the appellate court found that the phrase ""prisons conditions"" covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Porter.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings, Crown Vantage, Inc. (Crown) terminated its employee pension plan and purchased an annuity for the employee participants as a replacement. The participants advocated merging the current plan into a multiemployer PACE International Union (PACE) pension plan but Crown did not investigate the possibility. The participants alleged that Crown breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by not acting ""solely in the interests of the participants"" (Section 1104(a)(1)). A human activity bankruptcy court ordered Crown to maintain the plan's funds until they were pension off distributed to the participants. A District Court affirmed, finding that Crown failed to consider its employees' interest. Crown appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the extermination Ninth Circuit, claiming that it did not consider the PACE plan because buy Section 4041 of ERISA prevents termination appeal by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, ruling that ERISA does allow termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey H. Beck, liquidating trustee of the Estates of Crown Vantage, Inc. and Crown Paper Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Edna Smith Primus natural action was a practicing attorney who worked for a private law firm and was also affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a non-profit organization. She received effectual no compensation for her work with ACLU. In her capacity as a lawyer at the private firm, Primus discovered women were being sterilized. Primus spoke to a group of the sterilized women to advise them of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. One of these women, Mary Etta Williams, decided she wanted to sue her doctor over her sterilization. Primus then informed Williams through a letter of the ACLU’s offer of free legal representation. Shortly adenine after, Williams visited the doctor who sterilized her, signed a release of liability, and notified Primus she no longer intended to sue. A few months later, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of advise the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a complaint that charged Primus with solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics, a code of professional conduct for lawyers. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in accordance with the Board’s panel recommendation, found Primus in violation of regulations regarding solicitation. Primus appealed and argued that the disciplinary action violated the expose First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edna Smith Primus.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Earth island Island Institute, along with several other environmental groups, filed suit against the United suffer States Forest Service in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that certain Forest Service regulations violated the Forest Service Decision Making indicate set up and cognitive operation Appeals Reform Act (ARA). The ARA requires the Forest Service to establish an administrative appeals process providing an opportunity for notice and comment. Earth Island brought this claim when, in 2003, the Forest Service issued new regulations greatly limiting notice, appeals and public comment on certain categorically excluded activities. The district court found for the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction against the Forest Service. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that if Congress intended to allow the Forest Service to limit notice, appeals and comment for categorically excluded activities (as the regulations did) it would not have enacted the ARA in the first place. In seeking certiorari, the Forest Service argued that the Ninth Circuit had overstepped its bounds in invalidating the regulations and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because the case was not yet ripe for judicial review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Priscilla Summers, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard Shapero submitted a client solicitation letter to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising advertisement Commission for approval. Shapero directed blessing shoddy the letter motor hotel at individuals who were about to lose their houses to foreclosure. The Commission found nothing false or misleading with the letter, but denied approval under a Kentucky ring mail Supreme Court rule, which prohibited direct mail advertisements “precipitated by a specific event” such as foreclosure. Shapero then sought an advisory opinion from the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Ethics. The committee upheld the Advertising Commission’s ruling. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard D. Shapero .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barbara James and her son Maurice lived in the Bronx, New james iv York City. Shortly after Maurice's birth, Barbara James applied for assistance under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). James began york receiving assistance after a caseworker visited her apartment. Two years later, James was scheduled to be visited again by a caseworker. This visit was required indium under New York State law and would affect her benefits under AFDC. She refused to allow this visit. In a procedural hearing, she continued her refusal, and her AFDC assistance was terminated by New York State as a result. James then filed suit bring down under Section be 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the caseworker visit was a search and would violate her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court ruled in her favor. New York appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is George K. Wyman, Commissioner of the State of New York Department of Social Services.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The village of Skokie, Illinois had a population of approximately 70,000 persons, of whom approximately 40,500 were Jewish. Included within this population were thousands who survived detention in Nazi concentration camps. On March 20, 1977, Frank Collin, the leader of letter of the alphabet the National Socialist (""Nazi"") Party of America, informed Skokie's police chief that the National Socialists intended to march on the village's sidewalk on May 1. As a result of media attention and a number of phone calls allegedly made by Nazi Party members to residents with ""Jewish names"", this planned demonstration became common knowledge among Skokie's Jewish community. Collin wrote reach a letter to Skokie officials stating that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest the Skokie Park District's ordinance requiring a bond of $350,000 to be posted prior to march the issuance of a park permit. He also stated that the demonstration would consist of 30-50 demonstrators marching in single file in front of the Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators intended to wear uniforms similar to those traditionally worn by Nazis, including swastika armbands. Collin also said that the demonstrators would not make derogatory public statements and would cooperate with reasonable police instructions. The district court of Cook County conducted a hearing on a motion by the Village of Skokie for a preliminary injunction. The court adenine considered Collin's letter as an affidavit and took the testimony of a number of Skokie residents. One resident testified that a number of Jewish organizations planned a counterdemonstration for the same day with an expected attendance of 12,000 to 15,000 persons, and that the appearance of Nazi demonstrators could well lead to violence. The mayor of Skokie also testified that the demonstration could lead to uncontrollable violence. The court entered an order enjoining defendants from marching, walking, or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person on May 1, 1977. The Nazi Party applied to the Illinois appellate court for a stay of the district court's injunction; the appellate court denied their application. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme bear witness Court also denied the petition for a stay. The Nazi Party then filed an application for a stay with Justice John Paul Stevens, who referred the matter to the Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Socialist Party of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Leonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford- El's belongings adenine were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford- El finally received his belongings months after reaching allow for Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that ""Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within month the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the associate in nursing Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an belong to action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...."" Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Crawford-El.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Department of Transportation expelled Lane, a student, from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy because he was diagnosed with diabetes. Lane sued the Department of nether Transportation alleging that his termination violated section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, executive director which barred collection ""any program or activity under any executive agency"" from discriminating on the sustain basis of disability. The district court reinstated Lane, but refused to award damages because the federal nautical government's sovereign immunity had not been waived by Congress. The appeals court affirmed the district court decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peña.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1955, Tennessee amended a statute that was based on the mission Atomic Energy Act and allowed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its contractors to operate without paying sales tax. Under the amended statute, contractors sales event must pay action a contractor’s tax, regardless of the source or destination of the product. Union Carbide Corp, H.K. Ferguson Co. — both of which hold AEC contracts — and the AEC sued Tennessee to recover the sales and contractor’s tax. The trial court dismissed the suit due to the existing statute, and the plaintiffs appealed. The courtship Tennessee Supreme Court upheld state’s motor hotel right to collect a contractor’s tax, but found that the companies should be reimbursed for the sales tax.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is B. J. Boyd, Commissioner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1978, Randy Curtis Bullock became the trustee of his father's trust. The trust's only asset was his father's life insurance policy, and Bullock and his four siblings were the trust's only beneficiaries. As fiducial trustee, Bullock was only allowed to borrow from the trust to pay the life insurance premiums and to satisfy a withdrawal request from another trustee. Despite these restrictions, Bullock borrowed from the trust three times: to satisfy a debt on his father's business, to allow him and his mother to purchase certificates of deposit, and to allow him and his mother to purchase real estate. All of the loans were fully repaid. When Bullock's two brothers learned of the existence of the trust and their brother's actions, they sued him in Illinois state court. They claimed that Bullock had breached his fiduciary duty by taking loans that violated the lap guidelines of the trust. The brothers moved for summary judgment and the court granted it. The court ordered Bullock to pay $250,000 in damages for the benefits he received from his dealings with the trust, $35,000 in attorneys' fees, and placed the property Bullock purchased—a mill in Ohio—in a constructive trust. The constructive trust was awarded aside to BankChampaign, which replaced Bullock as the trustee of his father's trust. Bullock was unable to sell the mill to satisfy the Illinois judgment. In 2009, Bullock filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 to discharge his debt from the Illinois judgment. The bank started an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court where it argued that debts arising out of ""fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity"" are not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The bank moved for summary judgment and the go against bankruptcy court granted the motion. Bullock appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment to be district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court recognized that the only way for Bullock to satisfy the judgment debt was to sell the mill, and the bank could not hold it in perpetuity, so the district court concluded that the bank was abusing its power; however, it still affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and held that Bullock's conduct met the standard for defalcation because it was objectively reckless and constituted a known breach of a fiduciary duty.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Randy Curtis Bullock.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides medical services for employee welfare benefits plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 human activity (ERISA), denied Debra operating theatre Moran's request to have surgery by an unaffiliated specialist. Under the Illinois HMO Act (Act), which provides that ""in the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary,"" the HMO ""shall provide"" the service, Moran made a written demand for an independent medical review of her claim. After Rush refused her demand, Moran sued in state court to compel compliance with the Act. The adenine court ordered the review, which found the treatment necessary. While the suit was pending, Moran had the surgery and amended her complaint to seek reimbursement. Rush removed the case to federal court, try arguing that the amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found Moran's reimbursement claim preempted by ERISA human activity so as to place the case in federal court, but it concluded that the Act was not preempted as a state law that ""relates to"" an employee benefit plan because it also ""regulates insurance"" under ERISA's saving clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Moran.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    aside tiddler A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from cloth knowingly promoting sexual performances deal out by children under person the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a U.S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the U.S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR standardized for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act (FCA). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the U.S. thence Government for services rendered in Iraq. In 2010, just before trial, the U.S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. adenine The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter’s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA’s “first-to-file” harbor requirement, which bars a suit topic if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA’s six-year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter’s complaint did not satisfy the first-to-file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter’s complaint, but the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), which suspends the applicable six-year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter’s claim from proceeding.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When David Sattazahn's penalty-phase jury reported to the trial judge that it was hopelessly deadlocked 9-to-3 for life imprisonment, the court discharged the jury and entered a life sentence, as required under Pennsylvania law. last On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Pennsylvania again sought the death penalty and the jury again convicted Sattazahn, but this time the jury report just imposed a death sentence. In affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double set up Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred metre Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty at the retrial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pennsylvania.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1984, the Minority Business Enterprise Participation ordinance was passed in Jacksonville, Florida which set aside 10 percent of the budget for city contracts to hire minority-owned businesses. On April 4, 1989, the Northeastern appellant Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, an association of individuals and companies that worked in construction in Jacksonville, filed an action against the city govern and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection clientele Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court ruled in favor of the association, but when the city appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate nonage court held that the universal association lacked standing to file the action because it did not demonstrate that one or more of its members would have received a reserved city contract but for the ordinance.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal lashkar e tayyiba district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings afterward clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in let federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of ""issue preclusion""). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the adenine hotel manager statute claims brought under the takings clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City and County of San Francisco, California, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shirley Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been unlawfully fired by the federal Veterans Administration invite on the basis of his race and disability. In order to sue the federal government for unlawful discrimination, one must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC (which is a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity from private suits). The EEOC mailed right-to-sue letters to both Irwin and his attorney. His attorney was out of the country, however, so while the letter arrived at his office on March 23, the attorney did not receive it until April 10. Irwin receive his copy of the to a greater extent letter on aside April 7. Less than a month from when Irwin received the letter, but more than a month from when the letter arrived at his attorney's office, Irwin filed suit in federal District Court. The court dismissed the suit, however, because it was filed more than a month after the attorney's office received the letter. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), suits against the government letter of the alphabet must be filed within 30 days ""of receipt of notice of final action taken"" by the EEOC. The court ruled that the 30-day window began when the attorney's office received the letter. On appeal, Irwin argued that the window should have started when he to a greater extent or his attorney - not just the attorney's office - actually received the letter. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however, upholding the District Court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of Veterans Affairs.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The American College of Physicians, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, published a monthly be medical journal. Within the journal were paid advertisements for products useful in the field of medicine specifically covered by the journal. Section 511(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on ""unrelated business taxable income"" of tax-exempt organizations. The IRS asserted that the advertising income from the medical journal fell under this category. The American College of preserve Physicians lap countered that the advertisements were ""substantially related"" to its tax-exempt purpose adenine of maintaining high standards in medicine, and that they were therefore tax-exempt. When the IRS refused to give the organization a tax refund, it filed suit in United States Claims Court. The Claims Court held that the advertisements were not substantially related to the organization's along tax-exempt purpose and that the income was therefore taxable. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the advertisements helped to educate the journal's readers and was therefore substantially related.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize natural action the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective university manifest at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it ""primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an financial support ultimate reality,"" subsidise as prohibited by University guidelines.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rosenberger.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 1, 2009, Allen Ryan Alleyne and two accomplices robbed the store manager of a Mapco/East Coast convenience store in Petersburg, Virginia as he was dropping off the nightly deposit at the bank. In April 2010, after an extensive investigation, the authorities arrested Alleyne and a grand jury indicted him for robbery and possessing a firearm. On September 7, 2010, after a week-long trial, the jury convicted Alleyne on both counts and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to 130 months imprisonment. Alleyne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals be for the Fourth Circuit, claiming the district court made three specific errors: 1) the evidence against him wasn't strong enough to support his convictions; 2) he was convicted of eastern aiding and abetting the robbery and not carrying it out, which changed his original joined indictment; and 3) he should not have received a mandatory 7 year sentence equipt for possession of a firearm. The Fourth Circuit information technology rejected all three of his claims. First, the appellate court refused to overrule the jury's decision on the strength of the evidence because a jury is best equipped to determine whether evidence is credible. Second, since aiding and abetting a crime is not itself a separate offense, it does not need to be included in the indictment and does not change the original charge. Finally, there was no indication that the district court should not have imposed the minimum sentence for possessing a firearm.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allen Ryan Alleyne.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Clean Water Act (CWA) instructs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to turn over pollution permitting authority to a state if the state's proposal meets nine listed criteria. When Arizona issued such a proposal, the EPA regional office raised the concern that the transfer might violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which prohibits agencies from taking actions that might jeopardize endangered species. In accordance with the ESA, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The FWS's opinion was that the ESA was inapplicable because the agency had no authority to consider any additional factors beyond the nine CWA criteria (none of which concerned endangered species). On the advice of the FWS, the EPA approved the transfer. The Defenders of Wildlife challenged the transfer, arguing that the ESA imposed an authoritative, independent requirement representation on the EPA's decision to approve the transfer. The agency countered the ESA was not an independent source of set up authority. Rather, the ESA imposes requirements be only on the discretionary decisions of federal agencies. Since its decision was non-discretionary under the CWA, the agency argued, the ESA did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shock agreed with Defenders lap of Wildlife and invalidated the transfer. The Ninth Circuit found the FWS opinion legally flawed and the EPA's reliance on it ""arbitrary and capricious."" It noted that the EPA's decision was inconsistent with previous transfers of permitting authority, in which the impact on endangered species was considered.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Association of Home Builders et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) commenced an administrative enforcement action against Raymond J. Lucia and Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (collectively “Petitioners”) for alleged anti-fraud violations of the Investment Advisers Act arising from as well the way they presented their retirement right smart wealth management strategy to prospective clients. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found liability and imposed sanctions including a lifetime industry bar against Petitioners. The Commission granted the parties’ petitions for review, and found that Petitioners had committed anti-fraud violations and adenine imposed the same sanctions as the ALJ. The Commission also rejected the argument that the administrative proceedings along had been unconstitutional because the ALJ who handed down the initial decision was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed want pursuant to the Appointments Clause under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Petitioners asked the D.C. Circuit to vacate the Commission’s decision and order under review on the grounds that the ALJ who made the administrative ruling was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. The appeals court rejected this argument, explaining that Commission ALJs were not constitutional Officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, primarily because of their lack of authority to issue final decisions on behalf of the Commission pursuant to the agency’s regulatory scheme.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raymond J. Lucia, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maryland required that all films atomic number  be submitted to a board of reject censors before totally being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended freedwoman to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as along unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Freedman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. dupe A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement ""describing the effect of dupe the crime on the victim and his family"" be included in the pre-sentence report in let felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the criminal offence lavatory impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Booth.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial. However, Harris later testified in Court victimised that he did not make the reach first indium sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then used indium by the prosecution in hush hush an attempt to impeach his credibility.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and incision Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required give up the ghost  cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local  public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control topical anesthetic by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Turner Broadcasting System, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Corey Walker shot and killed Taraja Williams following an argument about a debt Williams owed. Lorenzo Johnson was present for this argument and heard Williams repeat several times that he was “going to kill that kid.” A witness saw Walker and Johnson walking into an alley with Williams in between them. Walker wore a long coat concealing a image shotgun. Johnson waited at the front of the alley while Williams shot Walker. Johnson was tried as an accomplice to the murder. The non jury convicted him after hearing the testimony of several witnesses, among other evidence. Johnson appealed his conviction, adenine arguing that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed walk to the conviction, and Johnson filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the sustain writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Third Circuit held that the evidence did not sufficiently prove Johnson’s intent to kill Williams.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brian Coleman, Superintendant, State Correctional Institution at Fayette et al. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and indium sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed concluding a round of habeas petitions in state court – all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because limitation they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate orison as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's property statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Walker, Warden, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour wreak use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of chapel service its property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests value by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours enjoyment religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the raw School District in federal court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lamb's Chapel.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186) Richard Sincock and adenine several other New Castle County residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters, challenged baker the constitutionality specify of Delaware's apportionment scheme. The suit alleged survey that under Delaware's 1897 state constitution, no provisions existed for reapportionment that would reflect the changing demographic face of New Castle reallocation County and the City of Wilmington. On a appeal from a three-judge district court ruling against the state of Delaware, the Supreme Court granted Mabel Roman, Delaware's elections clerk, certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sincock.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This is a companion case to United States v. travel Laub, 385 U.S. 475. Helen Travis was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California of traveling to Cuba on two occasions without a valid passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Travis’ passport admittedly was not endorsed for travel to Cuba, lap the U.S. government did not sustain allege, or provide proof, that she did not have a valid passport for general international travel. adenine The U.S. Court of motor hotel Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Helen Maxine Levi Travis .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) established rules governing disputes arising out of certain federal government contracts. After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which established a interior comprehensive concession management program for national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued 36 CFR section 51.3, which interior purported to render the CDA inapplicable to concession contracts. The National Park Hospitality Association challenged 51.3's validity. Upholding the regulation, the human activity District interior Court management concluded that the CDA is ambiguous as to whether it applies to concession contracts and found the NPS's interpretation reasonable. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the NPS's reading of the CDA consistent with both the CDA and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dept. of the Interior.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Anthony human activity Kebodeaux federal official was a registered sex offender. He served three years in prison in for his offense. After his release Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). When Kebodeaux moved from San Antonio, Texas to El Paso, Texas, he failed to update his residence in the spell registry within three days, as required, and was charged and convicted under SORNA. He appealed, arguing that the law was unconstitutional as it applied to him because regulating a sex offender's intrastate travel after being released from custody exceeds Congress' powers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that past commission of a federal crime is insufficient to permit the federal government to have unending criminal authority over Kebodeaux. While SORNA was unconstitutional under the circumstances afterward of this case, the court did not question Congress' ability to place restrictions on federal prisoners after release, including requiring register sex offenders convicted after SORNA to register intrastate changes of residence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A class of Chase Bank (""Chase"") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act (""TILA""). The investors argued that Chase violated the territorial dominion act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed motor hotel as a result of a late payment to the bank. The adenine dog district court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest lap rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chase Bank USA, N.A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required ""local attorney chief law enforcement officers"" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana provision and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found honcho the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest proviso of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that organization the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Printz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The town of Greece, New supplication York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public galloway meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy raw regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the pencil lead prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the indicate denominations represented. In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Town of Greece, NY.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acting on a tip from a confidential informant and a subsequent investigation, sheriff's deputies stopped and searched Kevin Dyson's automobile. The deputies found 23 grams of crack cocaine in in that location a duffel bag in the trunk. Dyson was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine amendment with intent to distribute. In reversing, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment to apply, there must be not only probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a separate finding of an exigency which precluded the police from lieutenant obtaining a warrant. Although there was abundant probable cause, the court concluded that cocain the search violated confederacy the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pretrial conference A class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. sort out Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials be that come inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and limitation shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, the Republican Party of Virginia held a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. A local political committee could certify any voter as a delegate to the unforced convention by paying a registration fee of $35 or $45. Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, registered voters in Virginia willing to declare their intent to support the Party's nominee, were eligible to participate. Bartholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates. Morse paid the fee with tell funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Moore and others then incision filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the  fee, alleging that that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the curtis claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Morse.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The IRS seized property owned by Grable and remove gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued sustain in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the federal official case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax non law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit point out affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Organic Act of Guam provides that that ""if no [slate of] candidates [for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Guam] receives a majority of the votes cast in any election...a runoff election shall be held."" The Election Commission certified that the Democratic slate of write in candidate Carl T.C. Gutierrez for governor and Madeleine Z. Bordallo for lieutenant governor had defeated the Republican slate, Joseph F. Ada and Felix P. Camacho. Gutierrez and Bordallo had received a majority of the votes cast for gubernatorial slates in the 1998 Guam general election, but did not receive a majority of the total number republican of ballots that voters cast due to voters selecting write-in candidates, people voting for both slates, and blank ballots. The opposing Republican slate sought a writ of mandamus ordering a runoff election. According to Ada and Camacho, the phrase ""in any election"" means the majority as measured by the votes cast in the entire election, not simply in the race for governor. Gutierrez responded that ""votes cast"" meant actual votes cast for governor and lieutenant governor, rather than ballots in which the governor's contest is left blank. adenine The District Court issued the writ and the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, interpreting the statutory whatsoever phrase ""majority of the votes cast in any election"" to require that a slate receive a majority of the total allot number of ballots cast in the general election.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gutierrez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Crystal Monique Lightfoot and Beverly Ann Hollis-Arlington sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in federal district court and alleged numerous state and federal law claims arising out of the foreclosure proceedings Fannie Mae initiated against Hollis-Arlington’s home. The district court dismissed and held indium that the plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding their claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The plaintiffs then sued in California state court and alleged the state law equivalents of the claims in the earlier federal suit. Fannie Mae removed the case to federal court and argued that indium its federal corporate charter moderate contained language that granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which it was involved as a plaintiff or defendant. The plaintiffs in this case moved for a remand back to state court, but the district court appellant denied the remand and then dismissed let all the claims as having already been litigated in the earlier case in federal court. The appellate court determined that the language in Fannie Mae’s federal charter conferred subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts and affirmed the dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Crystal Monique Lightfoot, et al. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1981, the Republic of Nigeria was interested in building an aeromedical center at Kaduna Air Force Base. Both W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. (Kirkpatrick) and Environmental Tectonics Corporation International (Environmental Tectonics) bid for the contract. Kirkpatrick established a deal with a Nigerian citizen who would attempt to ensure Kirkpatrick adenine received the contract. In exchange, Kirkpatrick let would pay two Panamanian companies owned by the Nigerian collection individual 20% of the contract price, both which would be distributed as bribes to Nigerian officials. Kirkpatrick succeeded in obtaining the contract, and Environmental Tectonics brought the issue to shew the attention of the authorities. The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey brought charges against Kirkpatrick and its CEO, and both pled guilty. Environmental Tectonics sued Kirkpatrick in district court and sought damages under anti-racketeering acts. Kirkpatrick moved to dismiss the complaint by arguing that the action was barred by state doctrine that prohibited courts from considering cases that would result in embarrassment for a sovereign nation or interfere with US foreign policy. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the motion in favor of Kirkpatrick. The district court held that Environmental Tectonics would have to prove that Nigerian officials accepted bribes and allowed the bribes to influence governmental decisions. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that Kirkpatrick had not met its burden to show that the case could not proceed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acting on a tip that Ross was officeholder selling drugs from his car in the District of guarantee Columbia, police officers pulled Ross over, opened his trunk, hunt and discovered a bag of heroin. After open up returning to the station, another search uncovered $3200 in cash. Officers acted without a warrant open up in each search.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Village of Schaumburg Illinois adopted an ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions in public areas without a permit. Permits were only granted to organizations that could demonstrate small town that 75 percent of their receipts were applied populace towards ""charitable village purposes."" Citizens for Better Environment, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, was denied a permit because it did not satisfy il the 75-percent requirement. CBE sued in federal district court, which ruled in their federal official favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Citizens for Better Environment.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The purported inventors of an anti-cancer agent, Jong-Wan park and Yang-Sook Chun through HIF Bio Inc., sued Carlsbad Technology, Inc. in a California court for various claims regarding ownership of the invention. The case was removed to the United States District Court for information technology the Central District of California. After dismissing the federal claim, it declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state claims and green remanded the case through with back to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the remand order. It reasoned arrogate that when the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the case, it necessarily found that the claims lacked along federal subject matter jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carlsbad Technology, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Between 1997 and 2006, Torrey Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released adenine for motor hotel the second time, a hunt trial court civilly committed Grady to take part in North adenine Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring program for the duration of his life. The program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet so that authorities can make sure that participants are complying with prescriptive schedule and location requirements. Grady challenged the constitutionality of the program and argued that the constant tracking amounted to an unreasonable search agenda that was prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. Both the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that wearing a GPS monitor did not amount to a search.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Torrey Dale Grady.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rosalie Tung was an Asian-American professor who believed that she was denied tenure because of her donnish sex and her tung tree race. To investigate her claim, the Equal Employment compeer Opportunity Commission asked traverse the University for access to Tung's enquire confidential peer review file. Citing the protection of academic freedom, the University refused to cooperate so as to avoid breaching the confidentiality promised to reviewers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag (SCA) produces adult incontinence products, as does First Quality Baby Products, LLC (First Quality). In 2003, SCA notified First Quality that it lapp believed First Quality was infringing on one of its patents, and First Quality responded by arguing that, because the SCA patent in question was essentially the same as  a prior-filed patent, it was invalid and therefore First Quality could not be infringing. The two companies ceased communication on the issue, but in 2004, SCA requested that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamine its patent in light manifest of the prior-filed one, and in 2007, the PTO determined that the patent in question was valid. In 2010, SCA sued First Quality for patent infringement. First Quality moved for summary judgment because SCA had unreasonably delayed litigation, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion regarding the unreasonable delay because SCA should have been aside able to proceed with litigation after the reexamination and had not provided evidence to justify the delay. SCA requested a rehearing before the entire be appellate court to reconsider the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer</i>, which held that the unreasonable delay defense cannot bar suits for copyright infringement that occurred during the three-year limitations period, and argued that the same analysis should apply to patent suits like this one. Upon rehearing, the appellate court rejected SCA’s argument and held that the Petrella decision did not affect its precedent, which stated that an unreasonable delay defense may be used in patent infringement claims brought within the six-year statute of limitations, and courts must examine the circumstances underlying those claims and the defense.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dr. Timothy E. Quill, along with other physicians and three seriously ill patients who have since died, challenged the constitutionality of the New York State's ban on physician-assisted suicide. New York's inauspicious ban, while permitting patients to refuse motor hotel lifesaving treatment on their own, has historically made it a crime for doctors to second base help patients commit or attempt suicide, even if patients are reach terminally ill or in great pain. Following a District Court ruling operating theatre favoring the State of New York, the Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted New York certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vacco.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the person passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual set up tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, respective sued to challenge the adenine Act's constitutionality. After granting them respective standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raines.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A public hospital information technology fired an obstetrics nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for insubordination after she allegedly complained about her superiors to a nurse trainee during a dinner break in the hospital's obstetrics unit. Churchill claimed that the hospital fired her because arrogate she opposed its policy of it nurse cross-training and said contradict it was leaving certain sealed units understaffed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Waters.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The District associate in nursing of Columbia had an abortion statute that prohibits abortion unless “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health.” Milan Vuitch, miscarriage a licensed physician, was indicted in federal columbia university district court for performing abortions that violated this motor hotel statute. The district miscarriage court held the abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An inspector from the golden state Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector claimed that collection the occupancy permit for the property did authorised not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara refused to let the inspector enter territorial dominion the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the adenine Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roland Camara .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Virginia police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio charge up call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and super summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. and then After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to and then distribute. At trial court, Moore's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the topnotch cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commonwealth of Virginia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Michigan characteristic Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was household enacted with the assumption that ""the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption."" The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate freelance for Michigan's House of Representatives by using human activity general funds investment company to sponsor a newspaper advertisement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Austin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up it company named Waste2Energy Holdings come (W2E). W2E instead claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning along the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the other stated it was sent “at the request of [another broker with the firm].” Lorenzo’s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo’s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts aside by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ’s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission’s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo’s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ultimate authority” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court’s definition of “maker” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Securities and Exchange Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 1981, David president of the united states Smith sued Robert McDonald territorial dominion in state court. Smith alleged that, while he was being considered for the position of U.S. Attorney centre for the Middle District of North Carolina, McDonald sent two letters to President Ronald Reagan that contained libelous falsehoods about him. Smith claimed that McDonald knew the accusations in the letters were false and that he mailed the letters with malicious intent to undermine the prospect of Smith’s appointment as U.S. Attorney. Smith’s so called complaint alleged that july the letters had their intended effect—he was not appointed to the position, and he suffered damage to his career and reputation—so he sought compensatory damages. McDonald removed the case to the district court on the basis of diverse citizenship and moved for judgment on the pleadings by arguing that the Petition Clause granted him absolute immunity. The district court held that the Petition Clause granted general immunity but not absolute immunity from liability for libel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David I. Smith.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state go against retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated tell 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. retreat The adenine court dismissed his suit and so motor hotel did the Michigan Court of Appeals.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul Davis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 125 of the Aviation Transportation Safety Act (ATSA) states that an air carrier who voluntarily reports suspicious transactions or behavior shall not be ""civilly liable."" The immunity does not apply to disclosures made with ""actual knowledge"" that the disclosure is false, inaccurate, or misleading. Likewise, the immunity does not extend to an air carrier that tell makes a disclosure with ""reckless disregard"" as to its truth or falsity. William Hoeper, a pilot for Air Wisconsin, made four unsuccessful attempts to become certified to fly another type of aircraft after Air Wisconsin discontinued use of the type of plane that Hoeper had previously piloted. During his fourth and final opportunity to pass the test, Hoeper abruptly ended the test because he believed that the test administrators were deliberately sabotaging his efforts to pass. One test administrator knew that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had issued a firearm to Hoeper in his role as indium a federal flight deck officer (FFDO). FFDO pilots are not allowed to carry the firearm while traveling as passengers. This administrator booked Hoeper on a flight from the testing center in Virginia to Hoeper's home in Denver and then called the TSA to report that Hoeper was a disgruntled, and possibly armed, employee. In response, TSA officials arrested and searched Hoeper. Hoeper sued Air Wisconsin in a Colorado state court and alleged defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin moved for a directed verdict based on the argument that it was immune from civil liability under ATSA. Air Wisconsin also argued that Hoeper could not prove ""actual malice"" because its statements were ""substantially true"" and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The jury found that Air Wisconsin's statements foster to the TSA were false and that it made at visitation least one statement with reckless disregard for the truth, so the jury awarded Hoeper damages. A Colorado appellate court affirmed the verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court's submission of the matter to the jury was improper; however, the error was harmless in this case because Air Wisconsin was not entitled to claim immunity under ATSA. The Colorado Supreme Court further held be that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the statements were false.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Matthew Reiner granting immunity was charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of his 2-month-old son Alex. The defense planned to argue that Susan Batt, the family's babysitter, was the culpable party. The trial court granted Batt transactional immunity from prosecution, at the state's request, after she informed the court she intended to assert granting immunity her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ultimately, Batt denied any involvement in the death. Reiner was convicted. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that ""Susan Batt's [trial] testimony did not incriminate her because witnesser she denied any involvement in the remain abuse. Thus, she did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege."" The court noted that the defense's theory of Batt's guilt was not grounds for a grant of immunity, ""when the witness continues to deny any self-incriminating conduct."" The court also found that the wrongful grant of immunity prejudiced Reiner, because it effectively told the jury that Batt did not ohio river cause Alex's injuries.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reiner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ceded land in present-day Minnesota to the U.S. in an lac 1837 treaty. In return, the U.S. granted the Mille Lacs Band certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded aside land. An 1850 Executive Order by President Taylor ordered the removal of the Mille Lacs Band and revoked their usufructuary rights. An 1855 treaty manage set aside reservation lands for the Mille territorial dominion Lacs Band, but did not mention their rights. The Mille Lacs Band sued, seeking a declaratory judgment stated that they retained their usufructuary rights and an injunction to prevent the state's interference with those rights. The District Court ultimately ruled that the Mille Lacs Band retained their usufructuary rights reject under the 1837 treaty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The courts rejected arguments that the 1850 Executive Order abrogated the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty and that Minnesota's entrance into the Union in 1858 extinguished any Indian treaty rights under the ""equal footing doctrine.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 11, 1964 Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn crook was shot and killed by three members of the Ku Klux Klan while driving home from Washington, D.C. The alleged shooters, James Lackey, Cecil Myers, and Howard Sims, were indicted but acquitted by an all-white jury. Following the acquittal, the three defendants were indicted on united states government charges of conspiracy to threaten, abuse, and kill African Americans. Three alleged co-conspirators, Denver Phillips, George Turner, and Herbert Guest, were also charged. whatsoever The U.S. Code defines criminal conspiracy as two or criminal prosecution more individuals conspiring to ""injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States."" The indictment filed against the six alleged conspirators accused them of acting to deny African Americans full and equal enjoyment and utilization of goods and services, including access to state highways and free travel to and from Georgia on public streets. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it did not allege a traverse specific denial of rights under U.S. law. The district court agreed, and dismissed the indictment. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the indictment alleged, in part, a denial of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On federal trial for possessing child pornography, Grubbs asked the judge to suppress evidence officers seized from his home. Grubbs said the search violated the lap Fourth Amendment because the officers showed him an ""anticipatory warrant,"" something valid manifest only after triggering events take place, with no mention of the triggering conditions. The condition set on this warrant officeholder was that officers could search Grubbs' house only after he received a pornographic along video in the mail. The judge denied Grubbs' motion because the trigger was set forth in an affidavit that the officers carried during the search observe and that the warrant referenced. The Ninth Circuit reversed and said officers had to show the triggering events for an anticipatory warrant to the person being searched.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lem Tuggle was convicted of murder. After the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony of his along future dangerousness, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Tuggle to death. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, which held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires the State to provide the defendant with the assistance destitute of an independent psychiatrist. On remand, the last State Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating along factor, but upheld united states government the death sentence based on the vileness aggravator under Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862. Agreeing, the Court of Appeals construed Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld based on one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for finding another aggravating factor invalid.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tuggle.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1911, U.S. Senator A. O. Bacon conveyed land to the city of Macon, Georgia through a testamentary trust world health organization for the purpose of providing a park for place white persons only. The city operated the park in that manner, but after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, people of all races were permitted to use the park. The managers of the park attempted to have the city removed as the trustee because united states government it could no longer legally enforce racial segregation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of African American citizens who intervened, holding that the public nature of the andrew dickson white park required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of who owned the park. The trustees of Bacon’s estate then moved for a ruling that the trust was unenforceable, because racial segregation was no longer permitted, so the property should revert to Bacon’s heirs. The trial atomic number  court granted the motion, holding that racial segregation was an integral part of the trust, so the court could not simply amend the trust. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Guyton G. Abney et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert P. Groetzinger spent sixty to eighty hours a week placing bets on dog races. He had no other form of employment, and the winnings from these cypher wagers were his only form of income. His net gambling loss for 1978 was $2,032. Groetzinger reported his loss in his tax return but did not compute it in adenine his adjusted gross income. The Internal Revenue play Service determined Groetzinger was subjected to the minimum tax since his gambling loss was an item of tax preference according to the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. The Internal Revenue Service sued Groetzinger and the tax court held that he was in the “trade of business” report of gambling, which meant that no part of his gambling losses subjected him to a minimum tax. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District going of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Groetzinger.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eric Walber was murdered on April 4, 1998. Nearly two years after the murder, Sam Scott, who was incarcerated at the time, contacted authorities and implicated Michael Wearry in the murder. Scott had been friends with the victim and claimed that Wearry had confessed the crime to him. However, Scott gave an account of the murder that differed from the actual facts and changed his story several times before Wearry’s trial. The prosecution’s other main witness was also spew incarcerated at the time of trial aside and had made a prior inconsistent statement to the police that he also recanted. Wearry was convicted and sentenced to death. After Wearry’s conviction, information emerged that revealed that the prosecution dupe had failed to disclose evidence that cast doubt on these witnesses’ testimony and would have materially aided Wearry’s defense at trial. Wearry sought helium state postconviction relief and argued that the state had violated his due process cognitive operation rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose the potentially exculpatory evidence and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court determined that, even if the state should have disclosed the evidence and Wearry’s counsel was ineffective, he was not prejudiced, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied further relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Wearry.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adenine In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, which prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor's parents or legal guardian 48 hours in advance. The Act provides for a waiver, or judicial bypass, of the notification requirement under certain circumstances, including if the notification of a parent or guardian was not in the best interests of the minor. Several physicians challenged the statute's validity. The Federal District Court, asserting that a parental notice requirement must be waived whenever an abortion would indium be in the minor's best interests, ruled adenine that the statute was unconstitutional. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judicial bypass based on the consideration of essential a minor's best interests only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notification was constitutionally impermissible, in that the bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lambert.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Catharina Costa was fired from her job as a heavy equipment operator at Desert Palace Casino. She filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit, charging that the firing was the culmination of discrimination that had occurred factor out during her employment. Jurors during the trial were instructed by the judge to rule for Costa if they determined that sex was a motivating factor in the firing, even if other (legal) factors were present as well. The jury ruled for Costa. Desert Palace appealed, saying that the instructions incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in the case. A three judge panel from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling for the casino, but a subsequent review of the case eleven collection by all 11 lap judges of the 11th Circuit reversed the panel's juror decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Costa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 26, inculpate 1971, the proprietor of a manage Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information helium to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not implicate told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself. At trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brown lodge v. Illinois. The Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under Brown. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway’s application for leave to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Irving Jerome Dunaway.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of self incrimination the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an ""Admission of Responsibility"" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing compel all prior sexual be activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do ascribable not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the collection Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is McKune.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Peter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 1953, the Government turn back filed afterward a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application lift for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior immigration to Chaunt’s naturalization. adenine The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chaunt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) and related state agencies settled a class action lawsuit with plaintiff foster children under the care of the DHR. However, the parties could not agree on the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be included in the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion in a Georgia federal district court for that court to make a fee determination and award. The plaintiffs argued that they were owed over $7 million for services rendered and also deserved a $7 million fee enhancement for a job well done. The district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded $10,522,405.08 in compensation, over $4 million of which was a fee enhancement. The district court reasoned that ""the superb quality of counsel's representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard hourly rates used to calculate the lodge fee"" and thus justified the enhancement. On appeal, sensible the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced the lodestar figure (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) because of counsel's skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism. The Court reasoned that representation the stephen collins foster enhancement of the lodestar amount of attorney's fees may be allowed for superior representation coupled with the exceptional nature sweetening of results.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith. Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court denied. The district indium court also found them ineligible for immunity. They appealed the denial of immunity to the confederacy Court of Appeals for the bring out District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court of subcommittee Appeals dismissed the appeal be without issuing an opinion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Juan Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the relevant statute in California. In California, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor is defined as an act of sexual intercourse with a person who is a minor and not human activity the spouse of the perpetrator. The statute further provides that anyone tell who is convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony. After 2009, Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan, which is where the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA states that a non-citizen legislative act may be removed from the surety United States if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as sexual abuse of a minor. An Immigration Judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California law constituted sexual abuse of a minor and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” in the INA encompassed convictions under the relevant California statute without looking at the individual facts of the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision. The appellate court determined that the title BIA’s decision was entitled to deference as a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Chevron, USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and that the rule of lenity--requiring that statutory ambiguity be resolved in the defendant’s favor--did not apply in a civil case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Juan Esquivel-Quintana.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Edmund Foley applied for a position appoint as a New York state trooper. Although Foley was appoint a legally admitted resident alien, raw state officials refused to permit him to take be the examination. New York authorities relied on a official statute providing that ""no person shall be appointed to the. . .state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Connelie.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New york York City, intelligent responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided appendage sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a amendment public forum well informed interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ward.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The United States sued to condemn over 250 acres of W.G. and Mary Reynolds land both for use non in the Nolin Reservoir Project. The Fifth Amendment authorized this type of taking as long as the government provided “just compensation”. The Reynolds’ claimed that the original project did not contain 78 of the acres the United States tried to claim. A jury awarded the Reynolds’ $20,000 as compensation for all the land joined taken. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals joined for the Sixth Circuit reversed virgin mary and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury instructions referred to matters disclosed outside the jury’s presence. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the United States’ argument that the “scope of the project” issue was a question for the judge to decide, not the jury.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery let to a greater extent is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil leave off rights should be excluded as well. A District Court ruled against human activity Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have ""had civil rights restored."" The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed doorstep that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    collection Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging hostile work environment as well as sex and age discrimination. When her employer charged her with being ""absent testimonial without leave,"" she amended her complaint to include retaliation. Kloeckner never returned to work, and eventually her employer terminated her. Kloeckner challenged the termination while her initial complaint was still pending, making it a ""mixed case."" Kloeckner appealed the termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but then requested a dismissal so she could amend her EEOC complaint. The MSPB granted unfriendly the dismissal, giving her a set period to refile. When the EEOC found there had been no discrimination or retaliation, Kloeckner appealed the decision to the MSPB. While the appeal was within 30 days of the EEOC decision, it was 10 months after the refilling period set by the MSPB. The MSPB dismissed the case as untimely. Kloeckner tribute atomic number  filed an appeal in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was removed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction because the MSPB had not ruled on the merits of the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carolyn M. Kloeckner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, Maria Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, after a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered with charge up one of Ohler's van interior panels and discovered approximately 81 pounds of eighty one marijuana. Before the trial, the government filed in limine motions to admit Ohler's prior lodge felony conviction as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). Also before the trial, the District Court denied the motion to self possession admit the conviction as character evidence. After the beginning of the trail, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). While testifying, Ohler admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. Subsequently, Ohler was found guilty. On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling, allowing the motor hotel government to use her prior conviction for impeachment purposes. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct examination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to lift a temporary ban on Mexican trucking companies in the United States once new regulations were prepared by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to regulate safety inspections and applications to transport materials. Congress specified certain standards that those regulations would have to meet before it would appropriate money to register the new carriers. When the FMCSA formulated its regulations, it performed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to examine along their effects on the environment. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), federal agencies must perform an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of policies that are likely to have significant environmental effects. If an agency feels that its policies will not have significant effects, however, it may perform a more limited Environmental Assessment (EA) - which is what FMCSA chose to do. Public Citizen, a watchdog group that monitors indium government actions, challenged this decision in federal court. It argued that, because FMCSA knew that a large number of Mexican trucks would be admitted into the United States once it issued its regulations, it should have considered the environmental impact of the increased number of trucks cope with in addition to the more limited impact of the safety inspections. The impact of the trucks would have been significant enough representation to warrant an EIS, so Public Citizen argued that FMCSA had violated NEPA by not conducting the more stringent study. The district court side with the FMCSA, holding that, while the passage of the regulations was necessary before the crataegus laevigata trucks could be admitted, the FMCSA nevertheless did not have control of those trucks and therefore did not have to account for them in its Environmental Assessment; a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of Transportation, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to atomic number  recommend a reduced understanding sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was be no longer eligible for the reduction. motor hotel The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a let reduction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The associate in nursing American Civil Liberties imitate Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays video display violated the First Amendment's associate in nursing establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws ""respecting an establishment of religion."" The district court and indicate the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A suit charging functionary that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing in concert the case and concluding the system set up was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court united states government found that schoolhouse Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Milliken.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Terry Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder; his punishment was fixed at death. In state habeas corpus proceedings a judge determined aside that his conviction was valid. However, the judge also found that Williams' counsel's failure to discover and present significant mitigating evidence violated his right to effective counsel and recommended that he be re-sentenced. Rejecting this, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant condemnation relief. In habeas corpus proceedings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal trial judge also found determination that the death sentence motor hotel was constitutionally weak on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court, under the AEDPA, rede concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision ""was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that it could not conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of standards established by the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Williams.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public be meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed encrypt school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views cope with of ""Concerned Parents and Tax Payers."" Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating person Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that lit does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is McIntyre.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At midnight on July 18, 2004, West Memphis Police Officer Forthman pulled over Donald Rickard's vehicle because of an inoperable headlight. After Officer quartern Forthman noticed damage on the vehicle and asked Rickard to step out of the car, Rickard sped away. Officer Forthman called for backup and pursued Rickard from West Memphis, Arkansas to Memphis, Tennessee. The police officers were ordered to continue the pursuit across the border and ultimately surrounded Rickard in a parking lot be in Memphis, Tennessee. When Rickard again attempted to flee, the police fired shots into the vehicle, ultimately killing both Rickard and Kelley operating theatre Allen, a woman who had been a passenger in the vehicle. The entire exchange was captured on police video. Rickard and Allen's at long last families sued the police officers, the chief of police, and the mayor of West Memphis under federal and state law claims. The families argued that the police used excessive force when pursuing and ultimately killing Rickard and Allen and that using that force violated the Fourth Amendment. They also brought claims of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and abuse of process. The government argued that, because the police acted in their official capacity, they were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity from any lawsuit. The district court refused to dismiss the case against the government, and extravagant the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that qualified immunity only applies when officers are acting reasonably, and after reviewing subsequent cases, held that the police did not act reasonably in this case. Additionally, because the video evidence showed that the police fired on unarmed, fleeing drivers, a jury could determine that the police were not acting reasonably.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vance Plumhoff.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris — who have IQs of 67 and 60, respectively — were discovered working on the Kozminski dairy farm in Chelsea, Michigan. Ike Kozminski, his wife Margarethe, and his son John used the labor of Fulmer and Molitoris seven days a week, for approximately 17 hours a day since they brought the men to the farm. Margarethe picked up Fulmer from the side of road in indium 1967, and by doing so took him away from a farm where he previously worked. Ike Kozminski found Molitoris living on the streets in Ann Arbor in the early 1970s and brought him to the farm to work. At first, the men received $15 per day, and later they received no pay at all. Although both men were in their sixties, they had set up the mental capacity of children between 8 and 10 years old. The Kozminskis told Fulmer and Molitoris that they could not leave the farm, and on one occasion John Kozminski along threatened Molitoris with institutionalization. They also failed to provide the men with adequate nutrition, housing, and medical care, and told them not recite to contact their families or any other outsiders. world health organization Eventually, a herdsman who worked for the Kozminskis became concerned for the welfare of Fulmer and Molitoris and alerted the authorities. County officials removed the men, and the Kozminskis were tried in federal district court for holding Fulmer and Molitoris in involuntary servitude. Based on jury instructions that included forms of coercion other than purely physical, the jury found the Kozminskis guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the convictions on the grounds that the District Court’s definition of involuntary servitude was too broad.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ike Kozminski, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In September of 1995, Azzam Rahim, an American citizen, was tortured and murdered while in the custody of Palestinian Authority intelligence officers in Jericho. The respondents, Jibril Rajoub, Amin Al-Hindi, Twfik Tirawi, the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, never disputed liability for the torture and murder. The petitioners, Azzam Rahim's widow and children, filed suit liberation against along the agony respondents under the Torture Victim Protection Act. The district court dismissed the petitioners' action against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization courtship on the grounds that the Torture Victim Protection Act permits actions against natural persons only. The United States Court of Appeals for the District natural action of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jibril Rajoub, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A class of female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power sued the department because they were forced to make larger contributions to the employee pension plan than their male colleagues. The department determined that, territorial dominion because women live longer than men, the women cost the company more in retirement benefits than the men and so must pay more considerably into the plan. Since the employee contribution was taken directly out past tense of the employee’s paycheck, the female employees brought home less than the men. The retreat women sued the company for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought an injunction against future payments as well as restitution for the past contributions. While this action was pending in district court, the California legislature passed be a law prohibiting companies from forcing women to contribute to the retirement fund more than men. The department changed its payment plan effective January 1, 1975. The district court, however, found that the original plan violated the Civil Rights Act and ordered a refund for the excess payment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Terry and two along other  men were observed by a plain early clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be ""casing a job, a stick-up."" The officer stopped and frisked the three men, condemn and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three dame ellen terry years in jail.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ohio.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are two consolidated cases involving the same Respondents. William Johnson and Jonathan Klosek (husband of Julia Klosek) were employed by Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen and Albert company Avery was employed by Old Dominion Stevedoring Company. Johnson and Avery were injured and Klosek was killed during separate accidents that occurred while on the dock unloading a ship. The Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims by be the men and their families under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s tell Compensation Act (the aside Act) because the injuries did not occur “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required under the Act. The district court manage upheld those decisions and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William H. Johnson, Julia T. Kloseck, and Albert Avery.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal criminal information was crosswise filed in district court against Ludenia Howard, representing Stokes Fish Company, for violating the Federal Black Bass Act. The Act forbids any person to transport black bass or other fish across state lines if doing so is prohibited by freshwater bass the laws of the state. In Florida, such issues substance are governed by the regulations of prohibit the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. The district court held that the regulations were not “laws” of Florida under the meaning crippled of the Black Bass Act and quashed the information. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Using electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn’s dog ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn’s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn’s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into b the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the motor hotel barn and Dunn’s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs. At trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was “within the curtilage” of Dunn’s house, so the police respective officers’ warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the court standardized of appeals judgment and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In filing suit against a group of unions, BE&K Construction Company alleged that the unions had engaged in lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities in order to delay a project it had been hired for because it employed nonunion workers. After BE&K lost on or withdrew each of its let claims, the National Labor Relations Board issued an administrative complaint, alleging that BE&K, by filing and maintaining its lawsuit, had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers meddlesome from restraining, early coercing, or interfering with employees' exercise of rights related to self-organization, collective bargaining, and put other operating theatre concerted activities. Finding that the lawsuit was filed to retaliate against the unions, whose conduct was protected under the NLRA, the Board ordered BE&K to cease and desist from prosecuting such suits. In granting the Board's enforcement petition, the Court of Appeals held that because the Judiciary had already found BE&K's claims against the unions unmeritorious or dismissed, evidence of a simple retaliatory motive sufficed to adjudge BE&K of committing an unfair labor practice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is BE & K Construction Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws. Glover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable reach searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference law gives rise to proprietor reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. The state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a adenine vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly “stacked” assumptions and would relieve the crataegus laevigata state of its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for a stop.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Kansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru was an teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School and brought a claim against the school under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school on the basis that Morrissey-Berru was a “minister.” In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the adenine Supreme Court first recognized a ministerial exception, which exempts religious institutions from anti-discrimination laws in hiring employees deemed “ministers.” The U.S. Court of historic period Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Morrissey-Berru indium was not a “minister”; she had taken one course on the history of the Catholic church but otherwise did not have any religious credential, training, or ministerial background. Given that she did not hold herself out to the public as a psychiatric hospital religious leader or minister, the court declined to classify her as a minister for the purposes of the adenine ministerial exception.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Our Lady of Guadalupe School.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade-dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming it that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design grillroom infringed Vornado's sagacity trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment asseverate lift that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Holmes Group, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández’s friends on U.S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From U.S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him. Hernández’s parents inculpate filed a lawsuit against the officer and various indium other defendants alleging violation of their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the parents’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the united states government officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “clearly established” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on U.S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could nurture determine whether the shooting violated Hernández’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __ (2017), in which the Court held that for a new type of claim one fifth to be cognizable under Bivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jesus Mesa, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While checking the immigration status of passengers on a bus in Texas, Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu squeezed the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage space. When Agent Cantu squeezed a canvas bag above Steven Dewayne Bond, Agent Cantu noticed that it contained a ""brick-like"" object. After Bond admitted owning the bag and consented to its search, Agent Cantu discovered a ""brick"" of methamphetamine. Bond was indicted on federal drug charges. Bond moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the agent conducted an illegal search of his bag, when squeezing it, in alleged indium violation of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against federal agent unreasonable purse searches and seizures. The District Court denied the motion and subsequently found Bond guilty. On appeal, Bond conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, but contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag (by squeezing)in a way that other passengers would not, thus constituting an adenine unreasonable search. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Court of Appeals held that Agent Cantu's manipulation of the bag atomic number  was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bond.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone york or in compacts tell with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste tell within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in abidance their compliance efforts by be resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 17, 1972, Carl Edwin interfere Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced near to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. On April substitute 16, 1973, about two months before set up his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, petition but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dan V. McKaskle, Acting Director of the Texas Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 U.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the aside Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In tell June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA indium filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that ascribable Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled territorial dominion in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons tribute and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish motor hotel all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission ic conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court tribute of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction acquit of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Chicago.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers to pay 0.125 percent of the value of information technology the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports. From April to June 1994, United States Shoe Corporation paid the HMT for articles it exported. U.S. Shoe then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, the HMT violates the Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that ""No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."" The Customs Service refuted the accusation, stating that the domesticated HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee. U.S. Shoe then sued for a refund in the Court of International Trade (CIT). Granting U.S. Shoe summary judgment, the adenine CIT held that the HMT qualifies united states government as a tax, reasoning that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value whatsoever of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United State Shoe Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Around 6:30 p.m. on October motor hotel 3, 1987, Thomas Corbin drove his car across the yellow line that separated lanes of traffic and struck two oncoming cars on Route 55 near LaGrange, New York. Assistant District Attorney Thomas Dolan arrived on the scene and learned that Brenda and Daniel Dirago, the driver and passenger of one of the cars, had been injured. Later that night, Dolan learned Brenda Dirago had died in the hospital. Corbin received two misdemeanor tickets, one for let driving while intoxicated and one for failing to keep to the right of the median. Corbin october pled guilty inebriate to both misdemeanors. The judge was unaware of the fatality the accident caused. On January 19, 1988, a grand jury indicted Corbin on charges of manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and reckless assault. Corbin filed a motion to dismiss the charges by arguing double jeopardy, but the county court denied the motion. Corbin sought a writ of prohibition to prevent further prosecution, which the Appellate Division denied. The New York Court help of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomas J. Corbin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring let in all voters who cast a ballot in person to bring out present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. adenine Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law's requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law adenine be was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marion County Election Board et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. considerably Section 504, Richlin was entitled to ""fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings."" Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed collection this decision, noting adenine that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees early could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to allow for them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richlin Security Service Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who ""uses or carries"" a firearm during a drug be deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a along defendant who trades a gun for drugs ""uses"" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that ""use"" means do drugs ""active employment"" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the condemnation firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of ""use.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael A. Watson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative medical checkup was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. own In 1998, it the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions reject on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable resolve defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Apodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned favor verdicts which were totally less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and be the other turn back was 10-2 in privilege favor of conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oregon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The general maritime law of the United States has long obliged ship owners to indemnify seamen against expenses of injury or illness suffered while on the job aboard ship. An ill or injured seaman is entitled to ""maintenance and cure,"" that is, to compensation by his employer for the expenses of his medical treatment and subsistence (i.e., room and board) while convalescing ashore. (Until 1982, a seaman could obtain free medical attention from the US Public Health Service. In such a case, the USPHS effectively relieved the seaman's employer of the duty receive of cure.) At discharge, after two voyages on S.S. National Liberty, seaman Clifford Vaughan got a hospitalization certificate from the master, N.J. Atkinson. Vaughan then spent three months in a USPHS hospital and two years as motor hotel an outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The ship owner ignored Vaughan's request for maintenance as an outpatient. For a while before obtaining clearance to return to duty, Vaughan worked ashore as a cab driver. Later, he sued unsuccessfully in federal district court for maintenance and for damages from the ship owner's failure to promptly hospital care pay, including call for his attorney's fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit aside affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vaughan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 25, 1997, a sixteen-year-old girl was right wing kidnapped, murdered, and raped. After an investigation, the police arrested Robert Woodall, who subsequently pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first-degree rape. At trial, Woodall invoked his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination and declined to testify, and so he asked the judge to instruct the jury not to make any adverse inferences from that decision. The judge refused to issue the ""no adverse inference"" instruction motor hotel and stated that, by entering a guilty plea, Woodall waived his right to be free from self-incrimination. The jury found Woodall go against guilty on all charges and the judge sentenced him to the death penalty and two subsequent life sentences. Woodall appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed both Woodall's conviction and reject sentence. In 2006, Woodall filed a habeus corpus petition in federal court, and that court held that the trial court violated Woodall's Fifth Amendment right when it refused to offer the requested jury instruction. In addition, that court also held that Woodall's Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial right wing court allowed the state to dismiss an African-American juror without a mandatory hearing for cause. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the issue of self-incrimination but did not address the other issues.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Randy White, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A woman called police officers to a residence. She showed signs of having been beaten. She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep atomic number  inside. She alleged atomic number  that he had beaten her earlier in the day. The woman had adenine a key to the residence and referred to it as “our apartment” several times. She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant. Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder. Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a atomic number  controlled substance with intent to deliver. At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search. The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment. With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Appellate Court hollo of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During an investigation of welfare fraud, the Inyo County Sheriff's office requested misdemeanour personnel files from a casino owned by the Paiute-Shoshone Indian tribe. When regnant the request was denied, the Sheriff's office obtained a warrant th to search for the records at the guarantee casino. After the search, the tribe sued, claiming that it was a violation of their sovereign immunity. The district court ruled adenine for Inyo County; a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, ruling for the Paiute-Shoshone tribe.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Inyo County, California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    welfare Several subsidiaries of the Canadian National Railway Company (“the railway”) began in 1996 paying its employees in stock options as part of their compensation. Under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3231(e)(1), any form of “money remuneration” paid to railway employees is subject to an excise tax “equal to a specified percentage of its employees’ equitable wages….” (Railroad retirement tax rates are much higher than social security tax rates.) When employees exercise their stock options when the market price exceeds the associate in nursing price at which the employee has a right to buy the stock, the employee can benefit from a windfall. The Internal Revenue Service argues that this windfall is taxable, just as employees’ wages are taxable. The district court toll found for the government, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court reasoned that while the government’s argument that territorial dominion “anything that has a market value is a form of money remuneration” was too broad, it was still correct in its assertion that stock is equivalent to cash. Moreover, as a policy concern, the government’s position avoids creating a tax incentive that could distort the ways in which employers structure compensation packages.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin Central Ltd., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a machine police officer attempted to pull him over for speeding, Victor Harris fled in his vehicle, initiating a high-speed car chase. Attempting to end the chase, Deputy Timothy Scott rammed Harris's vehicle with his police cruiser. Harris shew crashed and was rendered a quadriplegic. Harris sued Scott in federal District Court, alleging that Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Scott claimed qualified immunity as a government official acting in his official capacity, but the District Court rejected functionary the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In order to show that a government official is not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff is required to prove that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Scott's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. lethal Because there was no imminent threat - Harris remained in control of his vehicle and the roads were relatively empty - Scott's use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Although no Appellate Court had ruled on the specific question of the use remain of deadly force in a high-speed chase, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the limits on deadly force were ""clearly established.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Timothy Scott.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires designated states and political subdivisions to obtain federal pre-clearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. Hispanic voters, residing in Monterey County, California, filed suit in federal court claiming the county had failed to obtain the required monterey pre-clearance for a series of ordinances changing the method for electing county judges. A three-judge District Court receive ultimately dismissed the case because the section of the Voting Rights Act that requires pre-clearance did not at long last cover California. Moreover, indium California had passed legislation requiring the voting changes atomic number  forged by Monterey County.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lopez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Michigan law imposed an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck adenine it that operated entirely in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies sought unsuccesfully to have mathematical group Michigan courts invalidate the law. The companies claimed that the federal law that had created the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted and bung prohibited such maneuver state fees. Under the federal law a trucking company could obtain a permit applicable in every state by registering once in a single state. While the initial state could demand a fee equal to the sum of its individual state fee, the law prohibited a state from imposing an additional ""state registration requirement.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan Public Service Commission, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later panel charged Andersen for violating tardy federal law, which made it a crime to ""knowingly...corruptly persuade another person"" to ""withold"" or ""alter"" documents in an ""offical proceeding."" The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing uniform the criminal offence jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a ""corrupt persuasion"" conviction - hans christian andersen specifically, that a ""consciousness of wrongdoing"" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arthur Andersen LLP.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's appoint president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. adenine Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of ""knowingly and willfully misapplying"" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC  section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his ""intent to injure or defraud the United States."" Reinstating the prosecution, the adenine Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and associate in nursing willfully misapplied Title IV funds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, Lester Nichols was charged with intent to engage in sex with a minor. In 2006, the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was passed, and the Attorney General issued a rule in 2007 that disobedience SORNA applied retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Under this rule, Nichols was required to register with SORNA and update his residency. In 2012, Nichols flew from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his location pursuant to SORNA. Authorities in the Philippines took Nichols into custody and returned him to the United States where he was charged under with noncompliance with SORNA regulations regarding updating his residency. Nichols filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the Philippines are outside U.S. jurisdiction, so he was not required to update his location. The trial court dismissed his motion, and Nichols plead guilty. He then appealed show to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the helium Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his philippines conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lester Ray Nichols.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2009 the U.S. Corps of Engineers contracted with Atlantic Marine Construction Company (Atlantic) to build a child development center at Fort Hood, a military base located in the western district of Texas. Atlantic then subcontracted with J-Crew Management, Inc. (J-Crew) to provide labor and materials. The subcontract agreement contained a forum selection clause stating that any dispute would be litigated in Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. Despite this clause, J-Crew brought suit against Atlantic in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for failure to pay for work J-Crew performed. Atlantic moved to dismiss atomic number  the suit under Federal Rule of civic Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and information technology 28 U.S.C. §1406, arguing that the forum selection clause united states government required the suit to be brought in Virginia. Atlantic also moved, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). The district court denied Atlantic's motions, holding that Atlantic did not show why the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of Virginia. Atlantic petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Virginia. The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and venue was proper in the Texas court because the parties entered into and performed civil the agreement in that district.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Atlantic Marine Construction Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to law the station in a police car, unarm three officers began discussing  the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the shew officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted go and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rhode Island.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1991, P. D. W. & A., Inc., an insolvent corporation taxed under Subchapter S, excluded its entire discharge of indebtedness amount from its gross income. David Gitlitz and other shareholders footing were assessed tax deficiencies because they used the untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in S corporation stock and to deduct suspended losses. Ultimately, the Tax Court held that Gitlitz and others could not use an S corporation's untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in corporate stock. In affirming, the Court of due south Appeals held that the discharge of indebtedness amount tax free first had to be used to reduce certain tax attributes of the S corporation and that only the leftover amount could be enjoyment used to increase their basis. In so holding, the court assumed that the excluded discharge of indebtedness is an item of income subject to come passthrough to shareholders.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gitlitz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing manifest phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury convict sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's genial counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed factor out that case, the district court ruled, the lap court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ronald Rompilla.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Title II of the communication theory Communications Act  be of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of ""telecommunications service"" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited lap its own previous opinion that had held that cable ruling modem service was a ""telecommunications service.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Cable & Telecommunications Association, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New city of brotherly love Jersey statute prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste into the state, except for garbage for importing swine feed. The City of Philadelphia challenged the statute, alleging it was unconstitutional under island of jersey the Commerce clause of Article importation I and pre-empted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute. Congress then passed the Resource Conservation leave off and Recovery Act of 1976.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Philadelphia et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Louisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of hidden the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as ""any scheme or artifice to adenine defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations."" The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were good the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a indium video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of ""property."" The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses federal official constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cleveland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The state of Colorado, like most states, imposes certain monetary penalties upon persons convicted of a crime. Shannon Nelson and Louis Madden were both separately arrested and charged with sexual assault crimes. Nelson was acquitted of all charges, and Madden was acquitted of one of two charges against him. Both requested refunds from the state for the penalties they had been charged, since their convictions were overturned. The trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction in Nelson’s case and only returned the funds taken from Madden in connection with the one sovereign associate in nursing charge on which he was acquitted. The Colorado Court of Appeals found horatio nelson that the state must refund the money Nelson and Madden had paid respective to their sexual assault charges that had been thrown out. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decisions in both cases and held that, acquit under the state’s Exoneration Act, horatio nelson an individual may only recover monetary losses from an arrest if they can “prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that [they were] ‘actually innocent.’”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shannon Nelson and Louis Alonzo Madden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance along which prohibited be construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The be First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance operating theatre and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the let flood had destroyed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court  ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence convict on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of ""a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount"" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of condemnation LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the adenine amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual ten system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 1, 1984, officers of the New York City Police Department found Thelma Staton murdered in her apartment. Various facts of the case linked Bernard Harris to the crime. On January 16, police officers responded to Harris’ house to take him into custody. Although the show police had officeholder not obtained an arrest warrant, when they knocked on his door, Harris let them enter. The police officers read Harris his Miranda rights, zellig sabbatai harris and Harris admitted to committing the murder. The police officers arrested Harris and took him to the police station, where zellig sabbatai harris he was read his Miranda rights again and signed an inculpatory statement. The police then videotaped an incriminating interview between Harris and the district attorney, despite Harris' requests to cease the interrogation. The trial yield court suppressed Harris’ initial confession and video interview but allowed the signed statement into evidence. After a bench trial, Harris was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and found the signed statement inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years before being proposed for partnership. Although Hopkins secured a $25 million government contract that year, the board decided to put her proposal on hold for the following year. The next year, when Price Waterhouse refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII for sex discrimination. Of 622 partners at Price Waterhouse, geezerhood 7 were women. The partnership selection process relied on recommendations columbia university by other partners, some of whom openly opposed women in advanced fast growing positions, but Hopkins also had problems with being overly aggressive and not getting along with fast growing office absence seizure staff. The district court held that Price Waterhouse had discriminated, but Hopkins was not entitled to full damages because her poor interpersonal skills also contributed to the board’s decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but held that the employer is not liable if it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Price Waterhouse.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    TC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is a company organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) is a company organized under Delaware law and with its principal place of business in Illinois. Heartland sold liquid water-enhancing products that it shipped to Delaware, pursuant to two of locus its contracts. Kraft sued Heartland in federal district court in Delaware and argued that these products infringed on Kraft’s patents for similar products. lodge in Heartland moved to dismiss the claim and argued that the Delaware lacked personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit because Heartland is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence in Delaware, and does not solicit business in Delaware. The district court lap held that, under U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit precedent, the subsection of the general venue statute that allows a defendant to reside in many jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction applies to the patent venue statute. However, this precedent runs counter the the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products sustain Corp., which mien held that the definition of corporate residence is limited to the jurisdiction of incorporation and that the subsection of the general venue statute does not expand jurisdiction under the patent venue statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that Congress’ amendments to the general venue statute post-dated and therefore superseded the Fourco precedent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is TC Heartland LLC .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham non and Chapman’s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked hinder to the judge on the case and learned test about the wiretap. Though the have to doe with wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired guild wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2002, Fane Lozman purchased motor hotel a floating residential structure. The structure was rectangular and made of plywood. It contained no bilge pumps, no raked bow, no navigation aids, no lifeboats, no propulsion mechanism, no steering, and cleats, which were inappropriate for towing. Lozman kept his floating home in a marina in the City of Riviera Beach. Lozman signed a lease with the city, moored the floating home to the dock, and affixed the home to land based utilities. Later, the city council passed a revised manage dockage agreement and accompanying Marina Rules. Pursuant to these rules, the city informed Lozman it would revoke his permission to remain on the Marina unless he executed a new agreement and complied with the understanding new regulations. Lozman did not execute a new agreement and continued to remain at the marina. In response, the city filed an in rem suit in federal court for trespass courtship under federal maritime law. The city filed for partial summary judgment on its trespass claim. Lozman argued that his floating home was not a ""vessel"" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, and therefore not subject to maritime law. The district court granted the city's motion and held that Lozman's floating home was a ""vessel"" for purposes admiralty jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overtone agreed with the lower court, and Lozman appealed the appellate court's determination that his floating home was a ""vessel"" under 1 U.S.C. § 3.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fane Lozman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the manifest company’s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but die in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did adenine not apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that manage the shareholders relied on Goldman’s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the executive district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman’s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside go against Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at united states government his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, once more handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was condemn again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. be Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carman L. Deck.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act protects foreign sovereigns from suits in American courts unless one of a set of specifically enumerated exceptions applies. One be of these exceptions is when the foreign sovereign takes U.S. property (the expropriation company exception), and another is when the action of the foreign sovereign has direct effect on U.S. commercial activity (the commercial activity exception). Oklahoma-based company Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company owns a subsidiary that contracts with the Venezuelan state-owned corporation that controls the exploration, production, and exportation of oil in Venezuela. In 2007, the two companies executed contracts for the Venezuelan corporation to use Helmerich & Payne’s drilling just rigs. By 2008, the unpaid debt from those contracts totaled more than $63 million, and when the debt was over $100 million in 2009, Helmerich & Payne announced it would not be renewing the contract and packed up its drills. Employees of the Venezuelan corporation, assisted by united states government members of the Venezuelan National Guard blockaded the yards in which Helmerich & Payne was keeping its equipment, and then-President Hugo Chavez issued a Decree of Expropriation. Helmerich & Payne sued Venezuela and its state-owned corporation in federal district court under the expropriation and commercial activity exceptions to the FSIA. Venezuela moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion with respect to the expropriation claim but denied it with respect to the commercial activity claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that, because the expropriation claim was neither insubstantial nor indium frivolous, the district court should not have granted the motion to dismiss that claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gary Garcia alleged that in 1979 he was unlawfully arrested, beaten, and tear-gassed by the petitioner, Richard Wilson, who was a New Mexico State Police officer. Garcia also alleged that Martin Vigil, the Chief of the State Police, knew Wilson had attacked citizens on several occasions but had failed to petitioner take action. Garcia sued for a violation of Section 1983 of the United State Code, a civil rights statute that creates  a civil cause of action for the deprivation of rights. The petitioners argued that this Section 1983 claim should be action subject to the two-year statute of limitations that applied to a similar cause of action found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act). If that statute of limitations were applied, this case could not proceed because the complaint was not be filed until two years and nine months after the alleged beating. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations recommended by petitioners did not apply because it was not sufficiently related to the nature of the right being enforced by Garcia's claim. Instead, the district court held that a different cause of action in the Act was more indicate closely related to this Section 1983 claim and applied that cause of action's four-year statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling but held that actions brought under Section 1983 are essentially an injury to personal rights; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations that applies to all personal injury actions in New Mexico should apply to Section 1983 claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Garcia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Due to rising government budget deficits during the permissible first term of the Reagan Administration, stand up Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by eugene gladstone oneill the Comptroller General, would go into effect. government activity This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. permissible Synar.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Synar.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A police officer pulled over officeholder and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without associate in nursing a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and officeholder discovered a crumpled cigarette software package containing fourteen vials of coffin nail heroin in his pocket.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A North Carolina boy determination identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in tacit the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider carolina detainment the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled schoolhouse to Miranda warnings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is J.D.B..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Nebraska law prohibited any ""partial birth abortion"" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined ""partial birth abortion"" as a procedure in which the doctor ""partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child,"" and defined the latter phrase essential to mean ""intentionally delivering into the vagina a deliver living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child."" Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical territorial dominion setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates operating theatre the U.S. Constitution, claiming the return law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carhart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In an effort cancel to comply by its duty to promote programming diversity, under the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted two minority preference policies. The first policy awarded preferences to minority ownership bids for licenses for new radio or television broadcasting sovereign stations. The second policy allowed radio or television broadcasters with questionable license qualifications, to avoid an FCC investigation of their actions by making a ""distress sale"" of hurt their licenses to a legitimate minority outfit. Upon FCC approval, Faith Center Inc. ""distress sold"" its television license to Astroline's minority-owned outfit. Shurberg, a nonminority applicant for a similar license, sought appellate review of Astroline's award. The st appellate court agreed, and invalidated the distress taste sale policy as unconstitutional. Astroline appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Metro Broadcasting, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Until 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits world health organization that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act cognitive operation of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family’s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive. In 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child’s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person remove family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard’s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members world health organization of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the tiddler 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers assess could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to motor hotel the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which interior ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could motor hotel deduce not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, Marvin Peugh and Steven Hollewell formed two companies: the Grainary, Inc., which contract bridge bought, stored and sold grain; and Agri-Tech, Inc., which provided custom farming services to landowners and tenants. From January 1999 to August 2000, the two obtained bank betray loans by falsely representing future contracts  and inflating the bank accounts by writing bad checks between the two accounts. Peugh pleaded not guilty to all counts, while Hollewell pleaded guilty to one count and agreed to testify against lap Peugh in exchange for the other charges being dropped. After a jury trial, Peugh was convicted on five counts of bank fraud. At sentencing, Peugh argued that he should be sentenced under the 1999 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that were in effect at the time of the offense, rather than the 2009 Guidelines that were in effect at the time of sentencing. He argued that use of the later Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison, and he and Hollewell were jointly ordered to motor hotel pay nearly $2 million. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marvin Peugh.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge motor hotel dealers leasing non company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest place in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is ""a taking if it does lap not substantially advance legitimate embrocate state interests."" The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney’s fees in those cases under 42 U.S.C. § 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under § 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context. In ruling on Culbertson’s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit outdo precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both § 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due motor hotel benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the § 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on complainant the §406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his § bung 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under § 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap. In his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate fee amount awardable under both § 406(a) and (b), but instead applied that limit only to § 406(b) fees. The 11th Circuit rejected this argument, applying its prior relegate precedent to affirm the district court’s ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Allen Culbertson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Milkovich, indium Maple Heights High School’s property wrestling coach, testified at a hearing concerning a physical altercation at a recent wrestling meet. After the hearing, Theodore Diadiun published an article in the local newspaper saying discredited that anyone at the wrestling meet “knows in their heart” that Milkovich lied at the hearing. Milkovich calumniatory sued Diadiun and the paper for defamation, alleging that the article accused him of perjury, damaged his occupation, and constituted libel. The court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that Milkovich failed to show the article was published with actual malice. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that the article was a constitutionally-protected opinion. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and actual remanded, holding that Milkovich was not a public figure and the defamatory statements were factual assertions, not constitutionally-protected opinions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Milkovich .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under a grievance settlement agreement, the score Cleveland Indians Baseball Company owed 8 players backpay for wages due in 1986 and 14 players backpay for wages due in 1987. The Company paid all of the back wages backrest in 1994. No award recipient was a Company employee in that year. The Company also paid its share of repay employment taxes on the back wages according to 1994 tax rates and wage bases. The payments were subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under sociable the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and taxes on recoil wages to fund unemployment benefits under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Both tax rates and the amount of the wages subject to tax have risen over time. After the Internal Revenue Service denied the Company's claims for a refund of the payments, the Company initiated suit in Federal District Court. The court, bound by precedent, ordered the Government to refund FICA and FUTA taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They had a moderate lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called “girlie” magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr. Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents to lay the grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and “Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and “Escapade” and “Mr. Annual” contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual raw excitement and sexual conduct. Section 484-h of New York’s Penal inglorious Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of age of 1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual excitement, if these materials were “harmful to minors.” It defined “harmful to minors” as that quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual transgress excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of pursuit the New York Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denies an application for a patent, the applicant may seek judicial review of the agency's final action letters patent by one indium reply of two means. The applicant may obtain direct review of concluding the agency's determination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, the applicant may commence a civil action against the director of the PTO in federal district court. The court will decide be whether a plaintiff in a civil (§ 145) action may introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance. The court will also consider whether, when new evidence is introduced under § 145, the district court may decide the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO. Gilbert P. Hyatt's patent application and subsequent claims were rejected. Hyatt appealed to the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board reversed most of the examiner's written description rejections, but upheld some. Hyatt filed a request for rehearing on the rejected claims, which the Board dismissed on the basis that it raised new issues that could have been raised to either the examiner or the Board. Hyatt responded by filing a civil action at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under §145. He submitted a declaration supporting his new and amended claims. The PTO objected to the declaration, arguing that the district court should not consider the new evidence because Hyatt did not introduce it to either the Board or the examiner. The district court agreed with the PTO, ruling that Hyatt's failure to present the evidence to the PTO constituted a negligent act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gilbert P. Hyatt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners, an association of condominium owners, sued Continental encase Insurance Company in Maryland state court, seeking to compel it to pay a judgment the association had obtained against an insured condominium developer. The company removed the case to federal court. As a matter of Maryland law, the case involved the sagacity extent of the developer's coverage under a general liability insurance policy. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, the appellate court denied a petition for rehearing. Later, the association's counsel learned of motor hotel a recent decision by Maryland's highest court in another case that also involved liability insurance coverage. The association brought this decision to the Court of determination Appeals' attention in a motion to stay or recall free state the court's mandate. The appellate court denied the motion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Teleflex sued KSR International (KSR), alleging that KSR had infringed on its patent for an adjustable gas-pedal system composed of an adjustable accelerator pedal and an electronic throttle control. KSR countered that Teleflex's patent was obvious, and therefore unenforceable. Under 25 U.S.C. Section lap indium 103(a), obvious inventions cannot be patented. A federal District Court granted summary judgment for KSR, accepting KSR's argument that the invention was obvious because each of the invention's components go for existed in previous patents. Anyone with knowledge or experience in the industry, the District Court ruled, would have considered it obvious motor hotel that the two components could be combined. Teleflex appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the District Court. The Circuit Court found the lower court's analysis incomplete, because the District Court had not applied a full ""teaching-suggestion-motivation test."" Under adenine this test, in order to label the patent obvious the District Court would have needed to identify the specific ""teaching, suggestion, or motivation"" that would have led a knowledgeable person to combine the two previously-existing components. KSR appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Circuit Court's test conflicted with Supreme Court precedent and that it would allow too many patents of obvious inventions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is KSR International Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dennis and Francie Burnham were married in 1976 and moved to New Jersey in 1977. In July of 1987, they in front decided to separate and agreed that Mrs. Burnham would take custody of the children, move to California, and file for divorce citing irreconcilable differences. In October of 1987, Mr. Burnham filed be for divorce in New Jersey citing desertion. Mrs. Burnham successfully demanded that Mr. Burnham respect their previous agreement and filed for indium divorce refer in California in lodge January 1988. Later that month, Mr. Burnham was in California on business and visited his children. While there, he was served with a California court summons and a copy of the divorce petition. Later that year, Mr. Burnham appeared before the California Superior Court and moved to quash the petition because the court lacked jurisdiction over him, as his only contacts with California were short business trips. The Superior Court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Superior Court of California, Marin County.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, enter Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked be him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in indium but refused to answer officers’ questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano’s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to be confess, which he eventually did. The confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found just to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vincent Joseph Spano.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Integra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented nether compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import just a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways indium related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district patent court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but have to doe with ordered a modification of damages.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Merck KGaA.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles Lickteig is a deputy sheriff in Kentucky. Because he is a hazardous duty worker, he is eligible to retire at age 55. Kentucky Retirement Systems offers a two-tier calculation of so-called ""disability retirement benefits."" If hazardous duty workers like Lickteig opt to keep working and then become disabled, they receive only their scheduled retirement benefits. In contrast, workers who become disabled before reaching age 55 receive payments that reflect not only their actual years of service but the number of years remaining until they would have reached 55. In effect, if two workers kip down were otherwise identical, the one who retired on disability before 55 would always get benefits equal to or greater than those of the post-55 retiree. Lickteig decided prefer against retirement at 55. Six years later, he became disabled because of ""a deteriorating vertebra, arthritis, nerve damage, and Parkinson's disease,"" and stopped working. When he applied for disability retirement benefits, he received word that he was unproblematic eligible only for standard retirement. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued unsuccessfully in federal district court that  the two-tier system violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court reheard the case en banc and reversed, holding that the simple act retreat of treating younger disabled retirees better than older ones was sufficient to make out a prima facie ADEA violation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kentucky Retirement Systems et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1979, the Southwestern Power Administration, a federal regulatory body acting on behalf of the Secretary of infliction Energy, torrent increased the cost of electricity generated by federally owned dams under its control. The price hike was initially implemented on an interim basis, and three years later, after furher review, the new rates were made permanent. A group of cities that purchased power from the dams filed suit to recover the extra fees it had paid before the interim rates were made final, claiming that Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 prohibited the imposition of interim fees. The Act stated that new rates would ""become play west saxon effective upon confirmation and approval by the Secretary (of Energy)."" The cities asserted that the rates, while in their interim phase, had flood not yet received ""confirmation and approval"" from the Secretary and could therefore not be legally implemented. The Court of Claims sided with the cities, holding that the new rates could only be charged once they received final approval from the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The edit Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, sir frederick handley page Robert sir frederick handley page E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May edit 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the e pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hazelwood School District.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Alphonso James was convicted of firearm possession after having been convicted of a felony, the government convict sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA allows for a minimum 15-year sentence if the convicted criminal has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. A ""violent felony"" under the ACCA includes burglary and ""conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."" James had previously been convicted once for attempted burglary and twice for regnant drug trafficking, so the government argued that he had the necessary three ""countable"" convictions for the increased sentence. James argued that one of his drug-related convictions did not count as a serious drug offense, and that attempted burglary did not count as a violent felony. A federal District Court held that attempted burglary was a violent be felony, but also that James's drug offense was not serious. Therefore, James had only two countable offenses and could not be sentenced under the ACCA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that James's drug-trafficking offense was serious. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that attempted burglary counted as a violent felony, a ruling that put it at odds with other Circuits. The Circuit Court ruled unplayful along that attempted burglary is a violent felony because it presents as much risk of violence as a successful burglary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of black Mississippi citizens filed for damages against two white Mississippi citizens pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section atomic number  1985 subsection 3 which protects against conspirators interfering with the civil rights of others. R.G. Grady, a citizen of Tennessee, was driving the plaintiffs in the suit along a public highway, when the defendants, acting under the misconception that Grady worked for the organization Civil Rights for Negroes, allegedly pulled their truck into the path of Grady's car, causing him to stop. The defendants were accused of forcing Grady and complainant his passengers to step out of the car and preventing their escape. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant James Calvin Breckenridge proceeded to beat foreclose Grady and the plaintiffs in the head with a club, injuring them. The defendants also threatened the plaintiffs verbally and pointed firearms at them. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, basing their decision on a previous case, Collins v. Hardyman. This case limited section 1985 subsection 3 to apply only to conspiracies somehow related to state laws or incision state officials, to avoid possible conflict with the U.S. piece Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eugene Griffin et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, lope de vega the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation take exception that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of foreign mission sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position. MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The U.S. cloaked Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law aside under the WPA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert J. MacLean.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of federal agents entered Colonnade Catering’s (Colonnade) New York premises to search for resealed liquor bottles, possession of which is a violation of federal tax law. After searching for some be time, the agents sidereal day asked Colonnade’s president, Salvatore E. Rozzo, to unlock john barleycorn a locked liquor storeroom. Rozzo refused and asked the agents if they had a search warrant. The agents responded that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the storeroom, the agents transgress broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized 53 bottles of liquor and two funnels. At trial, Colonnade moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search and argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for expect the Second Circuit reversed the decision and held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless administrative inspections. Therefore, the statutes, which authorize federal agents to enter any building or place where objects subject to a liquor tax are kept “so far as it may be necessary” in order to examine them during the day or business hours, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court also found that the statutory provisions were equivalent to a warrant given their clarity and narrow scope.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Colonnade Catering Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Kansas federal bankruptcy motor hotel court denied objections to a Chapter 13 debtor's repayment plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adenine affirmed, holding that the starting point for calculating a Chapter 13 debtor's ""projected disposable income"" is indium presumed to be the debtor's current monthly income. However, the court stated that the calculation is subject to a lap showing that there is a substantial change in circumstances. The glucinium court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the debtor had shown there was a substantial change in her circumstances.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stephanie Kay Lanning.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under West Virginia law, employers are required to either participate in a state-run workers' compensation fund or demonstrate that they are financially capable of covering any workers' compensation claims that may arise. Howard Delivery service, a West Virginia freight carrier, chose to fulfill its obligation by purchasing insurance from Zurich American Insurance Company. In January of 2002, however, the company cancelled its policy (still owing thousands of dollars in unpaid premiums) and filed for bankruptcy. Zurich filed for special status as a creditor, arguing that the money owed to them consisted of ""contributions employer to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered,"" and that under Chapter 11 of the aside Bankruptcy Code they should therefore be given priority in recovering the premiums. The bankruptcy court rejected Zurich's claims, however, finding that the provision did not apply to the workers compensation territorial dominion insurance premiums because they were not wage-substitute-type benefits for which the company could bargain (because Howard was required by chapter law to have some form of insurance). A federal district court affirmed the decision, but a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that contributions to an employee benefit plan did not need to be voluntary federal official to meet the Chapter 11 definition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Howard Delivery Service, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Coleman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that virginia he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia improve trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus gray headed relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his cognitive operation capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional jurisprudence law regarding notice-of-evidence claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gray.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Al-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its arab tenure arab traverse committee for denying traverse him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to along prejudice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Al-Khazraji.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    glucinium Locomotive engineer Robert McBride filed suit after contending that he injured his hand while adding and removing railroad cars for be his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a panel rail carrier is liable for worker injuries that result from negligence by the carrier. A trial judge instructed the jury that CSX caused or contributed to McBride's injury if its negligence ""played a make part, call for no matter how small, in bringing about the injury."" The jury found for McBride and awarded him $184,250. CSX argued that McBride should have been required to prove that the company's alleged negligence was a cause of the injury. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, affirming the verdict.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert McBride.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which reimbursed nonpublic religious schools guild for certain secular educational services. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held that Act 109 violated the Establishment Clause of the aside First Amendment. The case was remanded, go against and on remand the district court entered an order which permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic religious schools for services article provided before Act 109 was declared unconstitutional. Lemon and others challenged the aside district court's opinion, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin payment of around $24 million set aside by the State to compensate nonpublic religious schools for educational services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kurtzman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Saul Ornelas and fourteenth Ismael indium Ornelas-Ledesma were arrested in Wisconsin after suspicious activity led to the discovery of cocaine in the law defendants' car. In a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendants alleged that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in their detainment and in the police search of the car. The District Court denied the motion territorial dominion and the defendants pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the District Court but quartern for different reasons.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ornelas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Plaintiffs filed two state-law tort actions in New Hampshire state courts, alleging that one of them had contracted AIDS from territorial dominion a transfusion of contaminated blood during surgery. The second action was brought against the Red wreak Cross after plaintiffs discovered that it had supplied the tainted blood. Before the state court could decide a motion to consolidate the cases, the Red Cross invoked the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, to remove the second suit to federal court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that the Red Cross' charter provision allowing it to ""sue and be hybridize sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the archetype jurisdiction of the United States,"" 36 U.S.C. Section 2, conferred original aver jurisdiction on the federal district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American National Red Cross.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to demand help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists deter of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law. In response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing federal official demands were not the “least restrictive means” of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy info “strict scrutiny.” A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that “exacting scrutiny” rather than “strict scrutiny” was the appropriate standard, and “exacting scrutiny” requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that filing cabinet interest. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Americans for Prosperity Foundation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission moved sovereign to require long-distance carriers to compensate pay-phone companies indium for so-called coinless phone calls. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled in Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., that pay-phone operators could sue for greater compensation. This case arose when APCC Services brought such a suit against Sprint seeking compensation for coinless long-distance calls. Sprint argued that APCC had no stake in the outcome of the case because, under the terms of the assignment, any compensation from  a favorable judgment or settlement would go directly to the pay-phone companies, not ""intermediary"" companies such as APCC. The district court initially dismissed APCC's suit, but the court eventually reversed itself, concluding that it was sufficient that the assignment transferred legal title to the claim rather than merely transferring power of attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for sovereign the Eight Circuit affirmed, appointment concluding that, as a matter of law, the assignment of a legal right to bring a claim gives the assignee a personal stake in the litigation sufficient to confer standing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is APCC Services, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a collection of rules governing ownership past tense of broadcast media, intended to promote “competition, diversity, and localism.” In 1996, in response to sentiment that the rules were overly restrictive, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, of which Section 202(h) required the Commission to review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis. The FCC’s performance of its duties under that section has been the possession subject of extensive litigation. In 2017, the FCC issued an order eliminating altogether newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership rules, and making other substantial changes. It also announced its intention to adopt an incubator program, calling for comment on various aspects set up of the program. In August 2018, the FCC established a radio incubator program. Numerous parties filed field petitions for review challenging various aspects of the FCC’s order. Among them, self possession Petitioner Prometheus Radio Project argued that the FCC did not adequately consider the effect its rule changes would have on ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the FCC did “ostensibly” consider this issue, its analysis was “so insubstantial” that it cannot provide a “reliable foundation” for the FCC’s conclusions. As such, the Third Circuit vacated the bulk of the agency’s actions over the past three years as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Florida state court convicted Albert Holland of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, principal sum attempted sexual battery, and nederland armed robbery, and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Holland petitioned for federal habeas relief in a Florida federal district court. The district court denied the petition as untimely. On appeal, Mr. Holland argued that his attorney failed to communicate with him about the status of his case, then failed to file a mister timely federal habeas corpus petition, despite repeated instructions by Mr. Holland to do so. Therefore, Mr. Holland contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that absent an allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment on helium the attorney's part, no mere negligence of the attorney's federal official rises to the level of egregious misconduct that would entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to equitable tolling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Albert Holland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked in that location the term ""micro colors."" Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. territorial dominion K.P. used the ""classic fair use defense"" and argued it used lap the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the victimised fair use defense to prove there was permanent wave no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Booth v. condemnation Maryland that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing jury in a death penalty case from considering victim impact evidence that does not directly relate to the circumstances of the crime. In Payne v. Tennessee, four years later, the Supreme Court determined that the ban only applied to victim impact testimony. Because Payne did not deal with the victim’s family member’s characterizations of the defendant, the crime, or the sentence as Booth had, the Payne Court did not address these types of evidence. Shaun household Michael Bosse was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder for killing Katrina Griffin and her two children. The prosecution sought the death penalty and, over Bosse’s objection, asked three of the victims’ family members to cubicle recommend a sentence to the jury. All three recommended the death penalty, and the jury sentenced Bosse to death. Bosse appealed and argued that the sentencing process had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Booth. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence and held that condemnation Payne had “implicitly overruled” Booth as it related to operating theatre characterizations of the defendant and opinions about the sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Oklahoma.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Don Craft failed to pay federal income tax liabilities for the failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986, a federal tax lien attached to ""all [of his] property and rights to property,"" pursuant to 26 USC section 6321. After the notice of the lien was filed, Dan and his wife Sandra L. Craft afterward jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer to her his interest in a piece of real property in Michigan that they owned as harbor tenants by the entirety. indium Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed to release the lien and allow the Crafts to sell the property with half the net proceeds to be held in escrow pending determination of the Government's interest in the property. After Sandra brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds, the Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, held that no lien attached because the husband had no separate interest in the entireties filing cabinet property afterward under Michigan law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining free base a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., right wing a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that adenine publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive hope relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment motor hotel rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent learning depends solely upon populace where collection parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of scholar the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of voucher the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Zelman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police stopped atomic number  Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was united states government arrested, and later convicted, for appeal drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. law It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding property that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover ""ordinary criminal wrongdoing."" The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1991, Leonard and Arlene banknote Warner sold the Warner Manufacturing Company to Elliott and Carol Archer. Subsequently, the Archers sued the Warners for fraud connected with the action sale. In settling the indium lawsuit, the Archers executed releases except for obligations under a $100,000 promissory note and then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. After the Warners failed to make the first payment on the promissory note, the Archers sued in state court. The Warners filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court ordered liquidation indium under Chapter 7. The Archers then brought a claim asking the Bankruptcy Court to find the $100,000 debt nondischargeable and to order the Warners to pay the sum. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy ""to the extent"" it is ""for money...obtained by...false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud."" The Bankruptcy adenine Court denied the Archers' claim. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Archer.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2000, Solvay Pharmaceuticals successfully patented AndroGel, a topical gel medication. Shortly after the FDA approved the medication, indium generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories began developing generic versions of the gel. Solvay filed a patent infringement suit against Watson and Paddock, but the manufacturers counter-claimed that Solvay's patent was invalid to begin with. As the infringement suit progressed, Solvay feared that it would lose its monopoly on AndroGel. To die prevent this, Solvay entered into a reverse payment agreement with the two manufacturers. In black eye return for dropping the suit and maintaining exclusivity, Solvay agreed to pay the manufacturers a sizeable fee. The agreement allowed Solvay to maintain its monopoly, despite the possible invalidity of the patent, in exchange for sharing some of the profits with its potential competitors. Shortly after entering the agreement, the Federal Trade Commission (""FTC"") filed a complaint against the pharmaceutical companies. The FTC claimed that Solvay was unlikely to win the patent infringement suit; therefore the settlement unfairly protected an invalid patent monopoly. By limiting competition in the AndroGel market, the manufacturers were restraining trade in violation of antitrust laws. The manufacturers argued that the FTC failed to state a valid claim because the agreement merely protected Solvay's already existing patent rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the manufacturers and dismissed the case. The FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the infraction Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court explained that the manufacturers' reverse payment settlement is lawful as long as it restrains competition in the same way manufacturer that patent protection typically restrains competition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Trade Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dollar General Corporation (Dollar General) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw adenine Indians (Tribe). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13-year-old member of the Tribe alleged that he self denial forge was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working at the store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend agreed to participate. In 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. joined Both defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the U.S. choctaw Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal court. The district court granted the injunction for Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its burden to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found non in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said set up Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could atomic number  not be located. 15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of vista Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals tardy of Texas affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A New York State police officer stopped a car speeding on the New York State Thruway. Roger Belton was a passenger in that car. When the officer spoke with the driver he smelled marijuana and saw an envelope he believed contained marijuana. The officer also found that none of the car’s occupants owned the car or were related to the owner of the car. After asking the four occupants rider of the car to get out, the officer searched the car and found a leather jacket belonging to Belton with cocaine zipped inside hunt one of the pockets. conclude At trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance, hunt Belton argued that the officer seized the cocaine in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court denied his motion to suppress that evidence. The Appellate Division of the New travel rapidly York Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional, reasoning that after the officer validly arrested Belton, he could reasonably search the immediate area for more contraband. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, holding that because Belton had no way of gaining access to the cocaine at the time the officer searched the car, the officer needed a warrant for the search he conducted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of rede the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, indicate after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the right wing police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been traverse suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, helium which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that plead Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of accelerator the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the career relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming free base his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove,  nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer’s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old decision determination set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision self denial in Aguilar prohibited public school teachers from populace teaching in parochial schools as a insular violation of the Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's denial of the parent's challenge, motor hotel the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Agostini.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rockwell Kent applied for and was refused a passport to visit England. In addition to informing him that his application refusal rested on his Communist Party affiliations, the Passport Office Director told Kent that in order for a passport to be issued a hearing would be necessary. The Director instructed Kent to submit an affidavit as fulfill to whether he was a current or past Communist. Upon the advice of counsel, Kent refused to sign the affidavit but did participate in a hearing at which he was once more asked to sign an affidavit concerning fulfill his Communist affiliations. When he refused the affidavit, the Passport appellant Department govern advised Kent that no further action would be taken on his passport request until he satisfied the affidavit requirement. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Kent just certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kent.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that along the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the obstinate U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that convict a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, indium because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins ""on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable divagation to cases on collateral review."" The 11th Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Earl Enmund and two codefendants were found guilty of the felony murder and robbery aged of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, an elderly couple. sunshine state Enmund was the getaway sustain driver, who waited in the car during indium the robbery, did not participate in the killing and had no idea anyone would be killed. Enmund argued that the evidence did not show any intent to kill, so the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. Despite this, the jury sentenced him to death along with his codefendants. The Supreme Court of Florida sunshine state affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Earl Enmund .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California federal district court convicted Ruben Flores-Villar under the Immigration and Nationality Act (""INA"") of being a deported alien found in the United States. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the relevant provisions of the INA indium violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth proviso Amendment on the basis of age and gender. The provisions impose a five-year  residency requirement, after age fourteen, on United States citizen fathers but not mothers, whose residency article requirement is merely one year. The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding in Nguyen v. INS which did not deal precisely with the provisions before the court, but held that other more onerous residency requirements for fathers but not mothers in the INA did not  violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the provisions challenged by Mr. Flores-Villar also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, returned home with the proceeds from the annual coin convention, which Terry Brice Horton attended. Upon entering his garage, two robbers accosted Wallaker; one was armed with a machine gun and the other with an electric shocking device. They threw him to the ground, manage shocked him, bound him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During this interaction, Wallaker was able to identify Horton in that location by the sound of his voice. The three witnesses who discovered Wallaker partially corroborated his identification of Horton. They saw someone leaving the scene carrying what looked like an umbrella. Sergeant LaRault determined there was enough evidence to search Horton’s home, and obtained a warrant to do so. His affidavit for the search warrant described both the weapons and the license proceeds of the robbery, but the warrant only granted permission to look for the stolen property. While searching receive Horton’s house, Sergeant LaRault did not find the property, but he did find an manacle Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, and a handcuff key, along with other items linking Horton to the crime. The evidence was admitted into evidence at trial, and Horton was found guilty. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, and the California Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s request for review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    corporate The National Federation of Federal Employees, a federal employees' union, proposed to include a provision obligating the Interior Department to negotiate midterm jibe wedlock matters not in the original contract between the union and the Agency. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, that created the Federal Labor Relations turn back Authority, requires federal non agencies and their employees' unions to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Authority held that the good-faith bargaining clause did not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The Court of Appeals did not agree and, in turn, the Authority reversed its decision. The Interior Department refused the proposal on the ground that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute. The Authority then ordered the Agency to comply with the bargaining.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Federation of Federal Employees , Local 1309.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non-public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association allow for (CHA), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks' compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act (NBA) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act (FHA) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped the Attorney General's investigation. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but tortuous used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the favoritism court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet syndicate filed any lawsuits attorney against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers go down at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, government activity a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty-eight lab employees, who do united states government not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background go down checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc engineering science review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only ""material that prelude is harmful to minors."" Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply ""contemporary community standards"" st in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, monetary standard a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards online to identify material that is harmful expose to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ashcroft.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective associate in nursing pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to sovereign suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed be that in order to stop an individual, short of motor hotel actually arresting the person, police first had to point to ""specific reasonable inferences"" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the narcotic motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to ""go on one's way.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York trial court judges are appointed by way of a ""district convention system."" Under this system, political party members elect delegates, who in turn vote for judicial candidates nominated at party conventions. Margarita Lopez Torres sustain sought appointment to a New York Supreme Court but did not have elite a political party's endorsement. Lopez Torres claimed that the system unconstitutionally obstructed judicial appointments by making candidates reliant upon political parties. The New York Board of Elections defended the system, arguing that it did not bar voters from participating because they had the opportunity to elect delegates. A District Court found that the let system unnecessarily and sustain excessively restricted elections. It cited the absence of a ""single st successful challenge to candidates backed by the party leaders."" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the system gave political party officials too much power and violated voters' and candidates' First Amendment rights to freedom of association.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York State Board of Elections et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During the penalty phase of Russell Coleman's care trial, the trial judge gave the jury a ""Briggs instruction,"" explaining the Governor's commutation power. The trial judge then instructed the jury that it was not to consider the Governor's power in reaching its verdict. Ultimately, Coleman sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The District Court found that, because the visitation Governor may not commute the sentence of a prisoner who, like Coleman, is a twice-convicted felon without the approval of four judges panel of the California Supreme Court, the Briggs instruction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by ""giving the jury inaccurate information and potentially diverting its attention from the form mitigation evidence presented."" In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the giving of the set up instruction was constitutional error.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Calderon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Brown Shoe Company bought Kinney Company Inc., the sovereign United States sued Brown for antitrust motor hotel sales event violations of the Clayton Act. The United States argued that action the merger would substantially lessen competition in the shoe manufacturing and sales industries. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of the United States. The court ordered Brown to divest itself of all Kinney stock one by one and assets and to operate Kinney as separately as possible pending complete divestiture. The court gave Brown 90 days to come up with a plan for complete divestiture. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, which allows direct appeal of final district court judgments.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard Ford filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court five days before the one-year statute of limitations for his appeal ended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). He represented himself, and his petition contained some claims that had been decided on by state courts and others that had not. The judge informed him that he could not hear the claims that had not been heard by state courts, and that Ford had several options: the judge limitation could dismiss all the claims, allowing Ford to re-file them after he had presented the unheard claims to a state court, or he could dismiss the unheard claims, but delay proceedings on the other ones so that Ford could re-add the unheard ones after they had been heard. Ford chose the helium first option, but arrogate when he tried to re-file the claims after they were rejected by a state court, the judge refused to let him file them because the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations had ended. Ford appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of appeal Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision, finding that the judge could have heard the claims if Ford had chosen the second option and that he should have warned Ford that the statute of limitations would likely end before he could re-file the claims ford madox ford under the first option.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When ConAgra, Swift-Eckrich's parent company, attempted to enforce its patent for a process for browning precooked meats, Unitherm claimed that the patent was let invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the process six years before. Unitherm sued, alleging that ConAgra had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by attempting to enforce a patent obtained by fraud. Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ConAgra moved for judgment as a matter of law, asking the Disrict Court to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence. The court denied the motion and sent the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for Unitherm. ConAgra appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again arguing that the evidence was insufficent to prove an antitrust violation. However, ConAgra did not renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b), or move for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Normally, parties must file the Rule 50(b) motion after an unfavorable verdict in order to obtain judgment as a matter of law on appeal. Unitherm argued that since ConAgra had failed to renew its motion under Rule 50(b), the Court of Appeals could not consider the insufficiency-of-evidence claim. ConAgra took the position that renewal of the motion is optional. The Federal Circuit considered itself bound to apply the precedent of the relevant regional Circuit Court (the Tenth), under which Rule 50(b) is indeed optional, adenine in contrast to the apparent motion precedents of the other Circuit Courts. The Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, disputation so it reversed the District Court and ordered a new trial. Unitherm appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the sovereign procedural dispute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Unitherm Food Systems, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent prelude sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs archetype were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a action preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story star sign window and amended her complaint to cast out challenge the new ordinance.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gilleo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Current and former employees of Amgen, Inc. (Amgen) and Amgen Manufacturing, Limited (AML) participated in two brightness level employer-sponsored pension plans (the Plans). The Plans included holdings in the Amgen Common Stock Fund which held only Amgen common stock. The plaintiffs were a group of employees who filed a class action suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) lap against Amgen, AML, Amgen’s board of directors, and the Fiduciary Committees of the Plans when the value of the Amgen common stock fell. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by allowing the participants to purchase and hold Amgen stock while knowing its price was artificially inflated. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed. world health organization The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds that the district court did not properly apply the “presumption of prudence” as illustrated in Quan v. Computer Science Corp. The presumption of prudence explains that the fiduciary who invests assets in the employer’s stock is entitled to a presumption that they acted consistently with ERISA. The court found that even if the presumption of prudence did apply, the plaintiffs had sufficiently argued a violation of the defendant’s fiduciary duty. On remand, spell the district court again dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals again reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and remanded the case in light of its decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, which held that ERISA fiduciaries want who administer employee stock ownership plans are not entitled to a presumption of prudence but are “subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general, except that they need not diversify the fund’s assets.” The appellate court again reversed the dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Amgen Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (TGPL) proposed a plan for gas allocation among its customers to deal with a gas shortage. Under the plan, customers who used over the system-wide famine average would have to pay extra, and indium those who used less would receive a rebate. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) rejected the plan, stating it violated the Natural Gas Act, client which prohibits discrimination among customers. The TGPL sought review of the FPC decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court directed the FPC to conduct a review of TGPL’s records to determine the extent of the gas shortage. The FPC refused, arguing that the court overstepped its bounds by interfering with an independent administrative agency. The FPC also argued that the extent of world health organization as well the gas shortage was not material to the issues in the litigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Power Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Miller, american language a Mississippi motor hotel resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil be District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury. American Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of ""forum non conveniens,"" which allows a clientele court to dismiss a case if it is filed in adenine a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of ""forum non conveniens"" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Miller.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Edward Jerome indium Harbison was convicted in a populace Tennessee state court of first-degree murder, traverse second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through the Tennessee courts, a federal district court appointed Mr. Harbison a federal public defender to represent him in filing a federal habeas corpus petition. That petition was lap denied by the both the federal district court as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. As Tennessee law does not authorize the appointment of state public defenders as counsel in state clemency proceedings, Mr. Harbison's federal public defender requested to represent him in his state clemency proceedings. Both the district court and Sixth Circuit denied the encase request, holding that federal law does not authorize federal compensation for legal representation in state matters.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward Jerome Harbison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stephen McFadden sold overstocked products on the Internet to augment his income. In 2011, McFadden noticed that a lot of businesses where he lived were selling a product known as ""bath salts,"" an aromatherapy product that emits a stimulating adenine vapor when burned. After confirming that bath salts were not illegal, McFadden began selling them like his quartern other products. He continued to sell them until he learned they had been placed on the list of substances that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibited. The government prosecuted McFadden under the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, which allows substances not listed as ""controlled"" to be treated as illegal if the analogue has effects and a chemical make-up that are ""substantially similar"" to those listed in the CSA. At trial, McFadden argued that the state needed to prove that he was aware, or actively resisted finding out, that the bath salts were substantially similar to a controlled substance plow and constituted human activity an analogue. Instead, the district court held that the state only needed to prove that the adenine petitioner knew ""the products were intended for human consumption."" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stephen D. McFadden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the Illinois judicial system, the jury chosen to perform determine a defendant's guilt or innocence also sentenced the defendant. And, punishment the trial court, not the attorneys, performed voir dire, which involves questioning potential jurors during jury selection to determine their expect ability to be impartial. Before Derrick Morgan's capital murder trial, he requested that the court ask the potential jurors whether they would automatically sentence helium him to the death penalty upon conviction. The trial court denied Morgan's request, and derrick he was convicted and sentenced to death. When he appealed, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, Morgan's conviction, and his sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Derrick Morgan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John H. Griffin’s book <i>The Devil Rides Outside</i> traces the spiritual development of an unnamed American musician as he vacillates between choosing a life in a Benedictine monastery and the lustfulness of the outside world. When Alfred Butler, the Detroit district sales manager of Pocket Books, sold a copy of the book to corruptness a police officer, he was arrested st and charged with violating a Michigan obscenity statute. At trial, the judge held that the book contained obscene language charge up that could lead to the corruption of minors and that the passages in question lacked redeeming sac literary value. Butler was convicted and fined $100. Butler appealed and argued that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied Butler’s application for break water leave to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Butler.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The United States Census Bureau conducted a national census in 2010. In May and June of 2011, the Texas Legislature created a new electoral map based on motor hotel changes in the state's population. Texas Governor Rick Perry signed the new lag map into law collection in July of 2011. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, either the Justice Department or a special three-judge district court must approve new electoral maps before state officials may enact the map. Texas officials submitted its map to the three-judge court in Washington. The Washington court determined that state officials had used improper standards with respect to two districts. It further held that a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas must designate an interim redistricting plan for the 2012 election cycle. The district court redrew 36 electoral districts. Governor Perry and other state officials appealed solicitation the district court's redistricting to the Supreme Court and requested that the Supreme Court stop the enactment of the lower court's new map. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and stopped the enactment of the lower court's new map until it the Supreme Court could issue a further order on the matter.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rick Perry, Governor of Texas et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Haley was convicted in Texas state courts of a felony theft and sentenced as a habitual felony offender (extending his sentence). After a failed appeal to the Texas appellate court, Haley federal official filed a state habeas lonesome application in the trial court, arguing that his past crimes did not qualify him as a habitual offender and that his attorney had provided ineffective counsel when he failed to object to the extended sentence. The court dismissed his claims on procedural grounds, because he had not texas raised the issue during his trial and therefore could not raise it in the habeas petition. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his habeas application based on the trial court's findings. Haley then filed for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Pointing to the procedural-default doctrine, Texas argued that Haley's claim was procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Under the procedural-default doctrine, federal courts cannot grant habeas relief if the last state court rejected the appeal for procedural violations of state law; the only exception is if the petitioner is actually innocent. The district court held that Haley showed he was ""actually innocent"" of earlier violations on which his sentence enhancement was based. The court ruled that Haley's sentence was therefore improperly extended. It never reached his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, having already found grounds for overturning the extended sentence. The substitute U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Texas's argument that the actual-innocence exception call for applies only to cases involving capital offenses.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards “persons of official Asian descent.” The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, united states government or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Tam appealed the collection trademark officer’s decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and operating theatre found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the appendage trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Simon Shiao Tam.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In May of 1976, Jimmy Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, were arrested for possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Jeffers posted bond for Cheney but was unable to post bond for himself. While in jail, Jeffers learned that Cheney was cooperating with the police. He offered another inmate money to kill Cheney, but a detention officer seized the note. Jeffers was released on bond in October of 1976. He quickly contacted Cheney and invited her to his motel room to give her heroin. When Doris Van der Veer, the woman with whom Jeffers had been living since his release from prison, entered the room a few hours swimming later, she saw Cheney comatose on the bed and Jeffers injecting liquid into her arm. Van der Veer reported seeing Jeffers choke Cheney to death and then beat her body while calling her dirty names. Van der Veer adenine and Jeffers then wrapped the body in newspapers and plastic bags and buried it in a shallow grave. A jury convicted Jeffers of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, so Jeffers was sentenced to death john robinson jeffers under Arizona state law. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. motor hotel information technology On a second direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the evidence and affirmed the death sentence. Jeffers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that Arizona’s standard of an “especially heinous…or depraved” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected Jeffers’ challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to Jeffers and struck down the death sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Samuel A. Lewis, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a exculpation twenty ordain percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, alibi were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor excuse wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of repay $45 million from the state of Hawaii.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bacchus Imports Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act mandates that fresh mushroom handlers pay assessments used primarily to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales. United Foods, Inc. refused to pay the assessment, claiming that it violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, United Foods sought review in the District Court. In granting payment the Government summary judgement, the court brother relied on Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, brother Inc., which held that the First Amendment was not violated when agricultural marketing orders, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of California tree fruit to pay indium assessments for product advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Glickman did not control because the mandated payments in this case were not part of a atomic number  comprehensive statutory agricultural marketing program.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United Foods, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Virginia jury found Bobby Ramdass guilty of murdering Mohammed Kayani, a clerk in the 7-Eleven he held up, and recommended the death sentence. At the time of the sentencing phase of his trial, final judgment had been entered against bring down Ramdass for an armed robbery and he had been found guilty of a second armed robbery, but no final judgment had been entered. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not become final until the jury returns a verdict and the judge enters a final judgment of conviction and pronounces sentence. The Kayani judge paused and scheduled a future hearing to consider whether to impose the recommended sentence. During the interval between the jury trial and this hearing, final judgment had been entered on the second armed robbery conviction. At the sentencing hearing in the capital murder case, Ramdass, in arguing for a life sentence, claimed that his prior adenine convictions made him ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law. The court sentenced Ramdass to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court condemnation affirmed. On remand from the U.S Supreme Court, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence over Ramdass' argument that he should have been allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The court declined to apply a previous earreach U.S Supreme Court holding that a jury considering imposing death should be told if the defendant is parole ineligible under state law. The court concluded that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury was considering his sentence because the second armed robbery, in which no final judgment had been entered, put down did not count as a conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. Ultimately, Ramdass sought federal habeas corpus relief. The District Court granted his petition, ruling that the jury should have been advised that he was ineligible for parole. In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that Ramdass was not, at the time of his sentencing proceedings, legally ineligible for parole.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Angelone.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On be August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member flack driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, glucinium to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, open up and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding cellular telephone his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Leon Riley.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Unlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not corp authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act), which expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiffs in this case are a complainant united states government group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico’s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits state municipal debt restructuring electric laws from binding creditors without their consent, preempts rico the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ohio currently employs a process that clears the state’s voter rolls of individuals who have be died or relocated. Under this process, voters vote who have not cognitive operation voted for two years are sent notices to confirm their registration. If the state receives no response and these individuals do not vote over the next four years, they are ultimately removed from the rolls. Plaintiffs are various civil rights groups that are challenging the process, claiming that it is not only inappropriate to remove individuals from the voter rolls as a consequence of failing to vote but also violates part of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The Act prohibits a program for voter-list maintenance for federal elections that involves “the removal of the name of any personal from the official list of voters . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Plaintiffs believe that the Supreme Court should involve itself and determine whether this process violates the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit previously struck down these rules, deeming them a violation of federal voting law because Ohio's process involves using an individual's failure to vote as a ""trigger"" for sending out a confirmation notice to that person. Plaintiffs consequently argue that there is no reason to disturb the appellate court decision. Defendants argue that Ohio is adhering to reply federal indicate voter law, as set forth in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jon Husted.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller, along with their daughter Little Bird of Snow, were residents of Pennsylvania receiving benefits under the Aid to Families bronx cheer with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps programs. Roy and Miller refused to comply with the federal requirement that participants in these programs provide the social security numbers of all family members receiving benefits. They argued that obtaining a social security number for Little Bird would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits paid for Little amendment Bird and the parents sued, arguing that the free association clause karenic of the First Amendment provided far flung an exemption to the social security number requirement. At trial, Roy disclosed the Little Bird already had a social security number, and the allow for court suggested the case was moot. Roy then argued that widespread use of the social security number would “rob the spirit” of Little Bird, violating their religious beliefs. The court restrained the government from denying benefits for Little Bird until she was 16 years old, but denied Roy’s request for damages.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services; John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture; Walter Cohen, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1966, at a adenine local meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attended by several hundred people in Claiborne County, Mississippi, the group launched sovereign a boycott of white preserve merchants. The purpose of the boycott was to promote equality and racial justice. The boycott consisted of nonviolent picketing, but some acts and threats of violence also occurred. In 1969, white merchants sued the NAACP for damages as a result of the injuries to their businesses that the boycott caused. These damages included loss of earnings over a seven-year bring in period. The Chancery Court imposed damages liability and the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tort liability as tie up well as concluding the entire boycott was unlawful since the NAACP agreed to use force, violence, and “threats” to carryout the boycott.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of convict attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the adenine nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for motor hotel the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) sensible the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the panel jury ""beyond a reasonable doubt.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Louis Bullard information technology borrowed let $387,000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in indium Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was secured by the actual property and then put the rest of the home loan into a pool with other debts that would be paid at a different rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed some other this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated the order was appealable because Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate st panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over ""final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings Bank.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 1990, consequence Jonathan Dale Simmons beat an elderly woman to death in her home. The week before his trial for capital murder was scheduled to begin, Simmons pled guilty to first-degree robbery and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two previous assaults. These guilty pleas rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted of any other violent-crime offense. Prior cleaning lady to jury selection, the trial court judge granted the prosecution’s motion to bar any questions pertaining to parole during the jury selection process. Simmons was convicted of murder and brought forth mitigating evidence carolina during the sentencing phase of the trial. In closing arguments, the prosecution focused on the issue of the future danger the defendant presented to society as a reason to sentence him to death. The defense requested that the trial judge give a specific jury instruction clarifying the meaning of “life imprisonment” in this case, and pass judgment the trial judge refused to do so. The jury sentenced Simmons to death. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach a decision on the merits and instead held indium that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury satisfied the substance of Simmons’ request.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jonathan Dale Simmons.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Keith Bowles was convicted of murder. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, and was denied. Bowles did not receive timely notice of the District Court's ruling, so he missed the deadline for appeal. He filed a motion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) to reopen the appeal period. The District Court granted Bowles's motion, and gave him until February 27, 2004 to file his appeal. However, Rule collection 4(a)(6) allows only a 14-day extension of the appeal period, which would put the deadline on February 24, 2004. Bowles filed his appeal on February 26 - on time along according to the court's deadline, but untimely according to Rule 4(a)(6). The U.S. Court of filing cabinet Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at first declined to dismiss Bowles's appeal. Later, on its own motion, the Sixth Circuit ""correct[ed] [its] error"" and dismissed the motor hotel appeal, saying Rule 4(a)(6) ""is not susceptible convict to extension through mistake, courtesy, or grace.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harry Russell, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an welfare employee surety of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay metalworks him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited reestablish him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a ""good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work"" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground prohibit that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a ""personal philosophical choice"" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eddie C. Thomas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a), states do not have regulatory powers over national banks. In 2001 the govern federal Office of the Comptroller of thence Currency (OCC) issued federal regulation 12 C.F.R. 7.4006, which applied 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a) to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. Wachovia Mortgage was an operating subsidiary of the national bank Wachovia Bank, and was registered with the state of Michigan. When Michigan attempted to exercise its regulatory powers over Wachovia Mortgage, Wachovia Bank sued Watters, a Michigan official, seeking a judgment that Michigan's laws on operating subsidies of national banks were superceded by 12 U.S.C Section 484(a). Michigan argued that the OCC had exceeded the authority given it by Congress by extending the definition of ""national bank"" to cover state-registered operating subsidiaries. Michigan also argued that the extension of federal authority over state entities like Wachovia Mortgage violates the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to states all powers not delegated to the federal government. The District Court rejected these arguments and ruled for Wachovia, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court found that the title decision of the OCC to apply rules for national banks to their operating subsidiaries was a reasonable interpretation of Congress's intent, and therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The as well Sixth Circuit also held that Congress had the power to regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks under the Commerce Clause, so as well the Tenth Amendment did not reserve that power to the states.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wachovia Bank, N.A., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. oer Harmelin challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and condemn was statutorily mandated without be consideration for the fact that he had no condemnation prior felony convictions. On atomic number  appeal from an affirmance by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Luis Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen living in California, was convicted of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows for the deportation of aliens who are convicted of an aggravated felony, which includes ""theft offenses."" The Department of Homeland Security began deportation proceedings against Duenas-Alvarez. An immigration judge ruled in favor of the government and ordered Duenas-Alvarez deported to Peru, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. On remove appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Duenas-Alvarez argued that he was not guilty of a theft offense for purposes of the INA because he had only aided and abetted the theft of the car. The California anti-theft law did not distinguish between auto-theft and merely aiding an auto-theft, but the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the INA govern ""theft offense"" includes only the person who lap actually stole and offensive activity took possession of the car, and not necessarily anyone who aided in the theft. Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of Duenas-Alvarez and set up reversed the lower courts.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Antonio Jackson filed a complaint in the Nevada federal district court alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The hasten employer, Rent-A-Center West, Inc., moved to arbitrement find dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in part that the district court was required to determine in the first instance whether the coverage and collection discovery indium provisions of the arbitration agreement were unconscionable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rent-A-Center West, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty victim possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed anterior career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of tearing recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively come applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court lash out held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles Borden, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During a it routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car law trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed adenine the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable turn back facts to support its use, ""unjustifiably enlarging the inordinate scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Respondents alleged that a sociable section the New York welfare statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Social Security Act. The New York statute required recipients to cooperate in a support action against a missing parent or they would not receive benefits. The collaborate Social Security Act contained no such requirement. A three-judge district be court in the Northern District of New York agreed adenine and ruled atomic number  in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sylvia Shirley, Elizabeth Anderson, Jane Doe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought tell a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to associate in nursing their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need non to compensate employees for time spent ""changing clothes."" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time. The company appealed, and the U.S. adenine Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to taboo compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States Steel Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dr. Harold Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians, three terminally ill patients who have since died, and a nonprofit organization that counsels individuals contemplating physician assisted-suicide -- on brought this suit challenging wa the state of Washington's ban on physician evergreen state assisted-suicide. The State of Washington has historically criminalized the promotion of suicide attempts by those who ""knowingly cause or aid another person to attempt suicide."" Glucksberg alleged that Washington's ban wreak was unconstitutional. Following a District Court ruling favoring allot Glucksberg and his fellow petitioners, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted Washington certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Washington.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be Francis Bernard Auer, a St. Louis police sergeant, other St. Louis police sergeants, and a lieutenant sued the respondent police commissioners, law including David A. Robbins, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The commissioners argued that Auer and the other petitioners were ""bona fide executive, administrative, or professional"" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by the FLSA. Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum indicate amount on a ""salary basis,"" which requires that the ""compensation...not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed."" Auer claimed that that they did not meet this test because, under the terms motor hotel of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced for a form variety of disciplinary infractions related to the ""quality or quantity"" of their work. The District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with Auer's claim. Both courts held that the salary basis test was satisfied.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robbins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation write of sir frederick handley page the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that ""[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration"" be ""typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract."" DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that enquiry the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration ""valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."" The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In set up the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these betwixt goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doctor's Associates Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the False Claims Act (FCA), ""any person"" who ""knowingly adenine presents, or causes to be presented, to an federal official officer or employee of the United States Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval"" is liable to the federal government. A private person may canvass bring a qui tam action ""in the name of the Government"" under the FCA. After the National Institute of Drug Abuse gave Cook County Hospital a $5 million research grant, Janet Chandler, who ran the study for a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital, filed a qui tam action, claiming that Cook County and the institute afterward had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds. Based on precedent, which held that States are not ""persons"" subject to FCA along qui tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States ex rel. Chandler.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company were both large distributors of milk products based in Chicago, Illinois. Each company sold dairy products to retail stores under price a plan that gave il independent stores discounts on the list prices based on the volume of the independent stores' purchases, up to a specified maximum discount. The dairies granted grocery chain stores a flat mathematical product discount, without reference to the volume of their purchases, at a rate substantially higher than the maximum discount available to independent grocery stores. The government brought a toll Section 2(a) Clayton Act suit against The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company, seeking an injunction against selling milk products at prices which discriminated between the independent groceries and the chain groceries. Each company conducted its own cost study in an attempt to demonstrate that the differences in pricing between independent groceries and chain groceries were due to actual cost differences. The cost studies demonstrated that it was less costly on average to sell to chain stores. So, the dairy companies argued that the price discrimination was justified by the cost justification proviso of the Clayton Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the Government's suit, concluding that the cost differences demonstrated by the two companies' cost studies were sufficient to justify the price discrimination. The United States reach appealed the District Court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint. Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of be a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in spell which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment title in favor of the county on all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis’s religious discrimination claim with prejudice. Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement essential is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which the Court held that the Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent aside with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lois M. Davis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals method acting process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely territorial dominion cause him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications mo of two stimulate members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state’s execution method “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,” and failed to propose “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew’s aver request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.” Reviewing the district court’s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anne Precythe, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    High school students seeking support deal out deal out indium for their opposition to a United Nations deal out resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them adenine to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against ""publicly expressive"" activities.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Keith Haywood, while incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility in Attica, New York, go against was charged with several misbehavior reports in 2003 and 2004, including assaulting a corrections officer, failing a urinalysis test, and improperly soliciting mail. After being found guilty of these charges, Haywood commenced actions in state court against two of the corrections officers responsible for reviewing the claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute protecting civil rights. He asserted that the guilty verdicts had been handed down without sufficient evidence, that the tell officers had tampered with the urinalysis test, and that they consider had conspired officeholder to fabricate the facts set forth in the misbehavior reports. The defendants moved to dismiss Haywood's claims, basing their argument on a New York law prohibiting civil claims such as Haywood's brought against corrections officers in their official capacities. Haywood responded by arguing that when Congress created Section 1983 it intended the statute to supersede any state laws contradicting it. Because Section 1983 allowed these claims, Haywood argued, the New York law prohibiting them violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of New York (the state's adenine lowest-level court) agreed with the defendants and dismissed Haywood's claim based on the New York law. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, finding that the Supremacy Clause permits states to deny enforcement of a federal right in a case where a state court lacks jurisdiction due to a neutral state rule regarding the courts' administration. Because Haywood's claim would be barred if brought under either Section 1983 or an applicable state law, the New York law barring the claim was valid and neutral and did not violate the Supremacy Clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Keith Haywood.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and preside computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement ""secular, neutral, and nonideological"" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit ab initio alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after allocate the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that investment company decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court helm upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mitchell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Daniel be Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge. Connaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district joined court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Daniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for joined November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted adenine a grand jury adenine witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge. Connaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Daniel Connaughton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Montana treasure state law states that a corporation may not ""make an sovereign expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party."" The petitioners - American Tradition Partnership (formerly Western Tradition Partnership), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Association - sued the Attorney General of Montana and the Commissioner of Political Practices on the grounds that the statute violated their First Amendment right exemption compel to free speech. The district court found the statute unconstitutional and granted summary judgment for the petitioners. The Supreme Court of Montana adenine found that the statute did not materially impact the freedom of speech of the corporations, and if it did, it served a compelling state interest to protect the electoral process. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the judgment of the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Tradition Partnership, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Because Monterey County, California is a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it must obtain federal preclearance of any voting practice different from its practices on November 1, 1968. Between 1972 and 1983, the County merged its nine separate and independent inferior court districts into a single, countywide municipal court served motor hotel by judges whom County county residents incision elected at large. In 1991, five Hispanic voters, who resided in the County, sued, alleging that the County had violated section 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of incision its judicial district consolidation ordinances. The County did not submit its right wing ordinances after a three-judge District Court ruled against it. Rather, the County began to work with the voters to develop a new judicial election plan. Ultimately, the District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections under an at-large, countywide election plan.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lopez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Student Activities mellow Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The schoolhouse appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem try among a sufficient number of those tested, such that uranalysis testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to do drugs demonstrate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Department of Education certified that the state of New Mexico equalizes educational expenditures among school districts. The certification of equalization allowed New Mexico to offset its funding of districts located on Indian Reservations by a proportion of the federal Impact empanel Aid payments made to those indium districts. Zuni Public School District objected to the certification, arguing that the Department had not followed the statutory formula for determining that a state's expenditures are equalized. Outlier school districts falling above the 95th or below the 5th percentile in per-pupil expenditures were excluded from consideration adenine when the Department determined equalization. The adenine Department calculated these percentiles based on the total student population, but Zuni argued that 20 U.S.C. Section 7709 had repealed that policy. An administrative judge dismissed Zuni's complaint, and the Secretary preserve of Education affirmed on the ground that the law was ambiguous. A divided panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the Secretary's decision as a valid interpretation of the statute. In a rehearing by the entire Circuit Court, the 12 judges split evenly, again upholding the ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States Department of Education et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys David Conn and Carol Najera, prosecutors in the retrial of the Menendez brothers, learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter guarantee to Traci Baker, in which he may have instructed her to testify falsely at the first trial. After being subpoenaed to testify before a grand natural action jury and to produce any correspondence that she had received from Menendez, Baker responded that she had given all of Menendez's letters to her attorney, Paul L. Gabbert. When Baker appeared as directed before the grand jury, accompanied by Gabbert, Conn directed police to secure a warrant to search Gabbert for the letter. While Gabbert was being searched, Najera aside called Baker before the grand jury for questioning. Gabbert brought suit against the prosecutors contending that his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession without unreasonable government interference was violated when the prosecutors executed a search warrant at the same time his client was testifying before the grand jury. The Federal District Court granted Conn and Najera summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals held that Conn and Najera were wreak not entitled to qualified right wing immunity on Gabbert's Fourteenth Amendment claim because their actions were not objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Gabbert had a right to practice his profession without undue and unreasonable government interference.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Conn.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The 1996 Telecommunications Act (Act) fundamentally altered local telephone markets by monopoly ending the monopolies traditionally given to local exchange carriers (LECs) by states and subjecting obligation LECs to a host of duties meant to facilitate market entry. Among these was the topical anesthetic imposition of an obligation on incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitors. Following the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) issuance of regulations implementing the Act's guidelines, AT&T challenged their constitutionality on behalf of officeholder itself commercialise and other existing phone service providers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is AT&T Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Amgen, Inc. is an American pharmaceutical corporation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved two Amgen products that stimulate production of red blood cells and reduce the need for blood transfusions in anemic patients. Amgen allegedly made misrepresentations to the FDA about the safety of these products. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds brought an action against Amgen alleging four counts of misrepresentation. Connecticut Retirement Plans specifically alleged that Amgen misrepresented the nature of several FDA committee meetings to shareholders. It sought to certify a class of persons who purchased Amgen stock between April 22, 2004 and May 10, 2007, the dates when two of the meetings in question occurred. On May 10, 2007, Amgen's stock value dropped by more than nine percent. To certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, and that these disputation questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members. Amgen oer opposed the class contrive certification, arguing that the that the misrepresentations did not have any impact on the cope with price of Amgen stock. The district court rejected nutrient Amgen's arguments and granted the class certification. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed, rejecting Amgen's argument that a plaintiff must give proof that the misrepresentations were material at the class certification stage.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed visitation to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately pass judgment appealed, objecting to the absence of charge the special trial judge's report from arrogate the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The ""Term Limitation Amendment,"" in whatsoever addition to limiting terms of elected officials operating theatre within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United add on States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for individual re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served tell two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ray Thornton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow sequestration turn back students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included sequestration segregation scholar in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of ""trespass indium with a malicious and mischievous intent"" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After working for Burlington Industries for 15 cognition whatsoever months, Kimberly B. Ellerth quit because she allegedly suffered sexual harassment by her supervisor - Ted Slowik. Despite her refusals of Slowik's advances Ellerth did not suffer any tangible manage retaliation torment manage and was, in fact, promoted once. Moreover, while she remained silent about Slowik's conduct despite her knowledge of Burlington's policy against sexual harassment, Ellerth challenged Burlington claiming that the company forced her constructive discharge.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ellerth.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection play Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore tell charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did motor hotel exist between riverboat and atomic number  racetrack gambling; motor hotel the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Fitzgerald, Treasurer of Iowa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the  private publication of adenine the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, nonplus one of Gravel's aides, pentagon to testify about his role in indium the acquisition and publication of the papers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gravel.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    LinkLine, along with several other internet-service providers (ISPs), sued Pacific Bell, claiming that the company was selling digital subscriber line (DSL) access at ""a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which [it was] providing retail services."" The fcc ISPs condemned the scheme as price squeezing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a piece of U.S. antitrust legislation designed to prevent the formation of monopolies. A price squeeze occurs when a company holding a monopoly on the production of certain goods sets its wholesale prices higher than the retail prices it charges directly to consumers, preventing the have to doe with wholesale customers from competing with it at the retail level. The district court denied Pacific Bell's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim but granted its motion for an interlocutory appeal, allowing the appellate court to determine whether such price squeezing claims are permissible before delivering a final judgment at legislating the trial level. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the ISPs had stated a legitimate price squeezing claim under Section 2. The Ninth Circuit argued that prior Supreme Court precedent had not eliminated the application of allowable traditional antitrust laws to partially regulated industries. While noting that the wholesale market is governed by a separate document, the 1934 FCC Act, the court stated that the retail market remains unregulated and is therefore subject collection to the antitrust laws. As far as the retail market was concerned then, the ISPs had stated a valid price squeezing claim under Section 2.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pacific Bell Telephone Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1976, Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas from the North Sea's Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70 percent of its share of the Heimdal gas production legal power to a heimdallr group of European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil indium Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims harbor of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil mathematical group conspiracy. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the parties. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the category of claim in the suit. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ruhrgas AG.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents. Buckhannon filed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal's office because some residents were incapable of ""self-preservation."" Buckhannon brought suit against the State and others arguing that the ""self-preservation"" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Afterwards the state legislature eliminated the requirement and the District Court dismissed the nether case as moot. encase Buckhannon then requested attorney's fees as the ""prevailing party"" under the FHAA near and ADA. Buckhannon based its claim on the ""catalyst theory,"" which posits that a plaintiff is a ""prevailing party"" if it near achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary courtship change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, u 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, place and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration adenine in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual november clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while rely the latter relies on the residual clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Civil rights activists who planned right wing to march on Good Friday and Easter were denied parade permits from the city. When they indicated their intention militant to march anyway, let in Birmingham obtained an injunction from a state court pittsburgh of the south which ordered them to world health organization refrain from demonstrating. Marchers who defied the order, including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, were arrested.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Birmingham.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York City municipal charter question provision §903 required discharge of any municipal employee who invokes the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in a legally authorized inquiry into that employee’s official conduct. Harry Slochower, a tenured professor at Brooklyn College, invoked this privilege in a congressional committee investigation into his past Communist Party membership. Despite his tenured status, which adenine required notice and a hearing before termination, the city terminated him immediately. The state trial court adenine favor dismissed tenure a motion to review the discharge and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harry Slochower .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a life term of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final indium judgment did not include an amount for the restitution and stated that would be included in sagacity the amended information technology judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the amended judgment was entered. When the amended judgment was consider entered while the appeal was pending, it included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge of the award in their briefs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to convict the restitution award because Manrique did not file a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the mid-2000s, Anthony Perry began to develop osteoporosis, so in order to alleviate his pain and to tribute ensure that he could continue working, he made an informal agreement with his supervisor at the U.S. Census Bureau. The deal allowed Perry to take breaks throughout the day to control the symptoms of his osteoporosis, and to make up any guild time lost during the workday after hours with no penalty. On June southeastward 7, 2011, Perry received a proposed removal notice that alleged that he had been paid for hours that he had not worked. He contested the charges and pointed to the informal agreement he and his supervisor had made and his unblemished performance record. In August 2011, Perry and the agency entered into an agreement that required him to serve a thirty-day suspension, to retire on or before September 4, 2012, and to forfeit any discrimination claims against the agency. After serving his suspension and retiring, Perry brought a pro se claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the federal board that is authorized the hear certain challenges by federal employees to adverse employment actions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction because retirements indium are presumed to be voluntary, and the Board cannot review claims that resulted in settlement with the agency. Perry appealed to the Board, which remanded the case. Upon further review, the ALJ again denied that it had jurisdiction and held that Perry had not sufficiently shown that he was improperly coerced into settling his claims. Perry appealed to the Board again, which affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Perry appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which transferred the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit based on a lack of proper jurisdiction.The appellate court docketed the case but granted Perry’s motion to suspend proceedings until the U.S. Supreme Court resolves the adenine jurisdictional issue of which court system should hear the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anthony W. Perry.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of get 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a ""private right of action"" - because he pittsburgh of the south suffered for right wing reporting sex discrimination against others, govern despite the fact the he did not suffer from appellant sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roderick Jackson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDA) became law. Among other things, the ISDA directs the Secretary of the Interior, at the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into contracts which permit tribal organization to administer federal programs that would otherwise be directly along administered by the Secretary. The ISDA further requires the Secretary to pay the tribe's reasonable contract support costs, or the costs that the tribe would incur operating the program that the Secretary would not incur. The payment of these costs was made subject to the availability of appropriations, and Congress had imposed motor hotel a statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs. Ramah Navajo Chapter entered into multiple ISDA contracts for the administration a number of federally funded programs. The Ramah Navajo Chapter originally filed suit against the Secretary in educational 1990 on behalf of all BIA tribal contractors under the ISDA to challenge the methodology that Interior's Office of the Inspector General used to set indirect cost rates. In 1999 the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to add a new claim for the alleged underpayment of contract support costs due to insufficient appropriations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court eventually granted summary judgment for the government, rejecting tribal demands for contract support costs in excess of the express statutory caps on the funds available to pay such costs. The tribes appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th deficient Circuit reversed. The appeals contractile organ court held that the government could be required to pay all of the contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, even in excess of the statutory cap, because Congress appropriated sufficient funds to satisfy the demands of any single contractor considered in isolation. The government appealed the appellate court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ramah Navajo Chapter, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, the U.S. Supreme Court held that amendments to the criminal code made by crook the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on the AEDPA's effective crataegus laevigata date, April 24, 1996. Robert Garceau was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to territorial dominion death. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, Garceau moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court federal official on May 12, 1995. He filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. The District Court remain concluded that Garceau's habeas application was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Court of Appeals agreed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Woodford.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California trial court principal sum convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. However, upon rehearing en banc, the essential Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington the defendant must show that ""counsel's performance was deficient."" And, good mustiness the defendant must show that ""the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."" Here, the requirements of Strickland were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or golden state experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kelly Harrington, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since 1945, Alabama had imposed a severance tax on oil and gas operations. Exxon Corporation (Exxon), along with other gas and oil producers in Alabama, had contractual agreements regarding the tax give up the ghost with the owners of the land on which operations occurred and with oil and gas purchasers. The owners were paid a royalty on all gas and oil produced, but were contractually assessed a portion of the severance tax, and the purchasers were required to reimburse the producers for any severance tax paid by them. In 1979, the Alabama Legislature passed a statute altering the severance tax. The statute increased the severance tribute tax, exempted royalty landowners from the increase, and prohibited gas and oil operators from passing the tax increase on to oil and gas purchasers. Exxon and other oil and gas producers sued proprietor Ralph Eagerton, the Commissioner of Revenue in Alabama and argued that the National Gas Policy Act, which allowed natural gas producers to take steps to recoup state severance tax, preempted the prohibitions on passing along the costs to purchasers. Furthermore, the oil and gas producers argued that the exemption and the prohibition be violated the oil and gas producers’ Constitutional rights under the Contract Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County ruled the contract bridge new severance tax provisions unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment and the Contract Clause. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which reversed the lower court’s decision, holding any constraints imposed by the new tax were generally applicable and therefore valid.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Exxon Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New Orleans police officers had a warrant to arrest Donald J. Vale on narcotics charges. While staking out Vale’s home, the officers saw non Vale come out of the house and do what they siege of orleans thought was a drug deal. mathematical product The officers arrested Vale outside his home and told him they were going to search the house. The officers manage did not have a search warrant. During the search, the officers found narcotics in a back hazard bedroom. This evidence was admitted at Vale’s trial where he was convicted. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The court rejected Vale’s argument that the narcotics evidence was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald J. Vale .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April of 2001, the City of Indianapolis (""the city"") sent a letter to property owners in the Northern Estates neighborhood informing them that their properties were part of the Brisbane/Manning Barrett Law Sanitary Sewers Project (""the project""). The project was designed to connect properties to the city sewer system, reducing or eliminating the use of septic tanks. In July of 2004, the Indianapolis Board of Public Works (""the board"") levied an assessment of $9,278 against each property subject to the project. Indianapolis offered each property owner the option of paying the assessment in its entirety or of paying in monthly installments, subject to an annual interest rate. The petitioners, Christine Armour and 30 other property owners (""property owners""), chose to pay the assessment in its entirety. In 2005, the city abandoned the Barrett Law method of assessing owners' contributions in favor of the Septic Tank Elimination Program (""STEP""). As part of the transition to STEP, the board passed a measure forgiving all outstanding Barrett Law assessment balances owed as of November 1, 2005, including those assessed for the project. As a result, owners who chose to pay their assessment in monthly installments were forgiven from future payment. Owners who chose to pay their assessments in their entirety were given no reimbursement. The property owners requested compensation from the board in February of 2006 and were denied. The property owners filed complaint against the city in July of 2007, alleging violation of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. All parties filed for summary judgment; the trial court granted the property owners' motion, and entered judgment against the city. On appeal, the property owners abandoned their due process claim, arguing that the city violated equal protection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city did not have a rational basis for only forgiving from each one the debt of fiscal owners who chose to pay in installments. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the city's motion to transfer the case, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals. Justice Frank Sullivan, writing for a unanimous court, held that the city's tax policy survives rational basis review and does not violate equal protection. The city legitimately believed that 1) owners who fully paid their assessments were in a better financial position than those making monthly installments, 2) the benefits of simplifying funding for the world health organization sewer system outweighed the effort of continuing the previous taxation system and 3) the new taxation system would preserve city resources. He rejected the property owners' argument that they were a ""class of one"" --requiring heightened scrutiny of the city's examination action-- because the property owners were not property singled out for discriminatory treatment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Indianapolis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shortly after taking office, President Bush created by executive order the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, a program aimed at allowing religious charitable organizations to compete alongside non-religious ones for federal funding. Another executive order instructed various executive departments to hold conferences promoting the Faith-Based Initiative. The Freedom from Religion Foundation sued, alleging that the conferences favored religious organizations over non-religious ones and thereby violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The government argued that there was no ""Case or Controversy"" as required by Article III of the Constitution. According to the government, the Foundation had no standing to sue, because the Foundation had not been harmed in any way by the conferences. The fact that an individual pays taxes to the federal government fund is not normally enough to give the individual standing to challenge a federal program, but the Foundation noted that exceptions have been made for Establishment Clause challenges (see Flast v. Cohen and Bowen v. Kendrick ). The District Court ruled that the Foundation lacked standing to sue. The court held that the exceptions only covered challenges spread over to specific aver congressional expenditures, not executive-branch actions funded by the general funds allotted to the executive departments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that any taxpayer has standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against an universal executive-branch program, whether funded by a specific congressional grant or by a discretionary collection use of a general appropriation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jay F. Hein, Director, White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Virginia jury convicted Walter Mickens, Jr., of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or manifest following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mickens filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of charge up survey his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial - his lead attorney, Bryan Saunders, had represented Hall on criminal charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had not disclosed collection to the court, his co-counsel, or Mickens that he had represented Hall. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals rejected MIckens's argument that the juvenile court judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of atomic number  interest adversely affected his representation. Subsequently, the appellate court concluded that Mickens had not demonstrated adverse effect.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Taylor.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Heidi Ahlborn was injured and permanently disabled in a car accident. She received Medicaid payments totaling $215,645 through the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) to adenine pay for her medical treatment. In order to be eligible for the Medicaid payments, Arkansas law required Ahlborn to give the ADHS the ""right to any settlement, judgment, or award"" she might discussion receive because of the accident, up to the amount Medicaid had paid for her treatment. Several years after the accident, Ahlborn received $550,000 in a settlement with the parties liable for her injuries. The sum covered antidiuretic hormone her medical treatment as well as pain and suffering, lost earnings, and her lost earning potential in the future. Only $35,581 of the settlement was earmarked for her medical treatment, however. When the ADHS demanded that she repay the full $215,645, therefore, Ahlborn refused, and the aside issue went to a federal district court in Arkansas. The judge sided with the ADHS, ruling that department it was not unreasonable for Arkansas to require Ahlborn to agree to repay them fully from any settlement she might receive in order to be eligible, even if the portion specifically allocated for medical treatment was less than the amount demanded by Medicaid. An 8th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, however, finding that seizing money from her settlement that had not been earmarked for medical treatment would violate federal Medicaid regulations, which forbid state governments from seizing the property of Medicaid recipients in order to recover money spent on treatment. The panel therefore ordered that Ahlborn repay just $35,581 to the ADHS.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Heidi Ahlborn.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Bankruptcy Reform Act of associate in nursing 1978 created a system of bankruptcy territorial dominion courts as an adjunct to failure the line federal failure system of district courts. This case was decided together with United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marathon Pipe Line Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with assertion respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, along nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate free base punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based card on a from each one false denial of the underlying claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lachance.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sally Marie McNeil was convicted of the murder of her husband. She appealed her conviction, claiming that the trial judge had given the jury improper instructions when it was deciding whether to convict her of murder or crook voluntary manslaughter (the last four words of the instruction, not included in the collection model jury instruction provided with the criminal statute, might have information technology led the jury to misunderstand the meaning of be voluntary manslaughter). The California non Court of Appeal acknowledged that the jury instruction had been wrong, but found that, taken as a whole, the instruction did not make it reasonably likely that the jury would misunderstood the meaning of voluntary manslaughter, especially given the closing statements of the prosecutor, which provided the correct definition of the law. McNeil then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The district court rejected her claim, but a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Middleton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Stoneridge Investment Partners alleged that the cable company Charter Communications had fraudulently inflated the price of its stock. The alleged scheme involved a ""sham transaction"" in which Charter gave its equipment vendor, Scientific-Atlanta, above-normal payments for T.V. set-top boxes and the vendor then gave back the extra payments as advertising fees. Charter then fraudulently accounted the returned payments as revenue. Stoneridge sued both Charter and Scientific-Atlanta under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but the district court threw out the claim against Scientific- Atlanta. The court ruled that Stoneridge's claim against the vendor was fellowship only a claim for aiding and abetting fraud. The Supreme Court had ruled in Central Bank of Denver v. First International Bank of Denver that Section 10(b) punishes only deceptive lonesome conduct itself, not aiding and abetting such conduct. However, the Court that secondary actors such as counterpoint banks, lawyers, and accountants can be considered violators of Section 10(b) if they engage in deceptive conduct along with the primary actor. On appeal, Stoneridge argued that Scientific-Atlanta qualified as a primary violator of Section 10(b). Scientific-Atlanta countered that it had not participated in Charter's rent fraudulent accounting practices, and, in contrast to Charter, it had made no false public statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for Scientific Atlanta. The Circuit Court held that the vendor could at most be accused of aiding and abetting Charter's deception, and such claims are rent not allowed under Section 10(b) according to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gladys Mensing adenine took the drug metoclopramide for four years to help fight diabetic gastroparesis. She filed a lawsuit against the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors, contending that the drug lodge gave her a severe neurological movement disorder, tardive dyskinesia, but none of the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors made any effort to include warnings on the label. Metoclopramide manufacturers Pliva Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC asked for the along lawsuit to be thrown just out, arguing that government regulations require thp to have the same label on metoclopramide as is on its brand-name equivalent, Reglan. Reglan did generic wine not have a warning about tardive dyskinesia while Mensing was taking metoclopramide. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed, saying the lawsuit was pre-ppted by the federal regulations requiring the two labels to match. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit overturned that ruling, holding that more should have been done to warn consumers about possible risks.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is PLIVA, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two logging roads in Oregon, Trask River Road and Sam Downs Road, are owned by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon repository Board of Forestry. The roads are used primarily by various logging companies. These roads run parallel to rivers and use a series of ditches, culverts, and channels to direct storm water runoff into the nearby rivers. This runoff deposits large amounts of sediment in the rivers, which adversely affects the fish and other wildlife permission that relies on the water. The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) sued the Oregon State Forester, the Oregon Board of Forestry and several timber companies. The NEDC alleged nether that, since the runoff ditches and channels can be defined as ""point sources,"" the petitioners violated the go Clean Water Act by failing to obtain permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. In district court, the petitioners moved for dismissal by arguing that the runoff was exempt from the permits. The district court forestry granted the motion. The NEDC appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the decision based on precedent that supported the NEDC interpretation of both the ""point source"" and the permit requirement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doug Decker, in his official capacity as Oregon State Forester, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Attorney General on behalf of the United States sued Louisiana in a Louisiana federal district court motor hotel alleging that the state had denied and would continue to deny African-Americans the right to vote. In 1898 Louisiana adopted a motor hotel constitutional amendment that imposed burdensome requirements for voter registration, but which had a clause exempting those people registered to vote as of be January 1, 1867 and the son or masses grandson of such people. African- Americans were not entitled to vote as of January 1, 1867. The district court agreed with the United just States and held that Louisiana's requirements were unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Ohio state court convicted Robert new wave J. Van Hook for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, and imposed a death sentence. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Van Hook filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court. After numerous appeals and remands, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the indium Sixth Circuit granted Van Hook relief, holding that Mr. Van Hook's new wave indium lawyers performed deficiently in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence at atomic number  his sentencing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Bobby, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 17, 1962, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale registered at a motel in Fresno, California. At approximately 2:00 A.M. the following day, Chapman and Teale appeared at the Spot Club in Lodi. The only persons at the bar were Teale, Chapman, and the club’s bartender, Billy Dean Adcock. A short time later, a witness observed three persons in front of the Spot Club: a woman of Chapman’s general description and be Adcock stood in front of the club’s door, while a man resembling Teale stood behind Adcock while he apparently locked the door. The next day, the Spot Club’s owner found the club in disarray; someone had broken into the cash register and approximately $260 was missing. Routine housekeeping tasks normally performed by Adcock were left undone. Later, Adcock body’s was found in a remote area north of Lodi, half buried in an open roadside ditch. The time of death was approximately 3:00 AM on October 18th. Adcock was shot three times in the head. The bullets were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to one purchased by Chapman while with Teale in Reno, Nevada, six days before the killing. The gun was not found. Officers arrested Teale in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. He carried a gun purchased the same day as Chapman’s .22 caliber weapon. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Chapman in St. Joseph, Missouri on October 26, 1962. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18, but a registration card from October 18 for occupancy of a motel room in Woodland, California was made out in her handwriting. Chapman and Teale were charged with the taboo first degree murder of Adcock. A prisoner locked up with Teale testified that Teale did not plan on killing Adcock, but when Chapman and Teale released Adcock from their car outside of Lodi, Chapman shot him once in the back of the head and twice more when he was on the ground. Neither defendant appeared as a witness, but Chapman’s conflicting testimony was introduced by direct examination of the FBI agent. The trial court instructed the jury that they could draw adverse conclusions from the defendants’ failure to testify. The jury convicted both defendants of first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, the barb Supreme Court held in Griffin v. State of California that California’s practice of allowing prosecutors to use defendants’ silence against collapse them violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional reach jury instruction was a harmless error because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ruth Elizabeth Chapman, Thomas LeRoy Teale.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Martin Cohn was the father lady friend of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television joining station broadcast the name of sometime Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of girl the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape go against victims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cox Broadcasting Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Patent Act allows a court to award reasonable attorneys fees in exceptional cases in which the lawsuit is objectively baseless and brought in bad faith. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. (Allcare) owns a patent that covers a computer-based method of generating treatment options based on symptom data entered assist by a physician. This process can help an insurance company determine whether to approve a particular treatment for a patient. In 2003, Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), a health insurance company, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Allcare's patent. Allcare filed a counterclaim and alleged that Highmark infringed on two sections of indium its patent. The federal district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The court also found that  Allcare had willfully pursued frivolous infringement claims and ordered it to ascertain pay Highmark's attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for collection the Federal Circuit independently reviewed the district court's determination that Allcare's claims were objectively baseless. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding with respect to one of Allcare's claims and reversed the court regarding Allcare's second claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Highmark, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the ""Finger Plan,"" which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached ""unitary"" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which card inglorious lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought journey to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. bring out On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original ""Finger Plan"" unworkable. The bring down Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. ANCSA revoked the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians' reservation surrounding the Village of Venetie. Subsequently, two Native corporations established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in elected to use an ANCSA provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for at long last forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. The title to the reservation was ultimately transferred to the Native clan Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie. Afterwards, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for allow for conducting business activities on its land. The Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not ""Indian country,"" the Tribe lacked the power information technology to impose a colonization tax upon nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alaska.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A 1971 statute enacted in Maryland authorized the payment of state funds to any private higher education institute that met a set forbear unsectarian of minimum criteria and refrained from awarding minimal “only seminarian or theological degrees.” The grants were noncategorical, but they could not be used for sectarian purposes, as per a 1972 provision. At the end of every fiscal year, the institution that received the aid must report all financial transactions and identify the nonsectarian expenditures within those transactions. Four Maryland taxpayers sued configuration to challenge the expenditure constitutionality of the statute and argued that the statute benefited certain church-affiliated institutions that are constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid under the First Amendment. The district court applied the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman ― which asks whether the state aid has a secular purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and doesn’t excessively entangle the state in church affairs ― and determined that the statute was constitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Public Works of Maryland et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lloyd Barenblatt, a university professor, refused to answer questions concerning his political indium and question religious beliefs on along with his associational activities. He was found in contempt indium of Congress reject for failing to cooperate with the committee investigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, of which section 505 required that cable operators, providing channels ""primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming,"" either to ""fully scramble or otherwise fully choice block"" those channels or to broadcast those channels during the ""safe-harbor"" hours of 10 p.m. indium to 6 a.m. - times when young children were unlikely to be watching. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, ocular from ""signal bleed,"" or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, words Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. A three-judge District tiddler Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) provides for ""the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended along for human use,"" and classifies such devices based specify on their level of risk. Class III devices pose the greatest risk and, thus, are subject to a rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process. However, two statutory exceptions to this process exist. Because Medtronic, Inc.'s pacemaker is a Class III device found substantially equivalent to a pre-existing device, it can avoid the PMA process. In 1990, Lora Lohr's Medtronic pacemaker failed, allegedly according to whatsoever a defect. Lohr and her spouse filed a Florida state-court suit, alleging both negligence and strict-liability claims. Medtronic removed the case to federal district court. The court then dismissed the case as pre-empted by 21 USC section 360k(a), which provides that ""no State...may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, sort out any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under [the Act]."" Reversing and affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Lohrs' negligent design claims effectualness were not pre-empted, but that their negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims were. (This case was decided together with 95-886, Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc.)

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lohr.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals forever from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speed up the process, Congress amended the 1934 Communications Act and required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. writ of certiorari In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (""FCC"") to bring an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long these zoning sustain requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following ""reasonable time"" limits for zoning requests: 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures. The local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the government activity FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the FCC to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the sexual intercourse long-standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should always defer to an agency's interpretation of a particular act. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred to the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine applies in this situation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress enacted legislation recompense in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adjust wage the compensation of sexual intercourse federal employees, including judges, which provided automatic annual pay raises. sixties However, from 1976 to 1979 Congress salary intervened and blocked cost-of-living increases which were scheduled to occur.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance early and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of tiptoe their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon smuggle searching the law suspects' car and home uncovered smuggle large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On December 30, 1984, James McWilliams raped and robbed Patricia Reynolds, who atomic number  died in surgery later that night. McWilliams was arrested, operating theatre tried, and convicted of murder during robbery in the first degree and murder during rape in the first degree. At the sentencing phase, defense counsel requested that the court order neuropsychological testing for McWilliams. The court did so and ordered that the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC) conduct the testing. The DOC doctor who conducted the testing recommended further testing from a doctor who was not affiliated with the DOC. The second doctor’s report was made available to both parties but did not arrive at the court until the day before the sentencing hearing, and the court did not allow a continuance for defense counsel to ascribable review the report with the assistance of an expert. At the sentencing hearing, the court concluded that there were aggravating factors but adenine no mitigating factors and sentenced McWilliams to death by electrocution. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Alabama state courts. In 2004, McWilliams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition without addressing all of the specific claims, one helium of which included a claim that he was denied his due process rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma because the court did not provide him with an independent psychiatric expert. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for the district court to address the specific claims in the petition. The district court again denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that McWilliams’ due process rights were not violated because he was provided with a competent psychiatric expert, which met the requirement of Ake, and any harm that he might have suffered was not prejudicial to the outcome of the sentencing hearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James E. McWilliams.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Francois Daniel Lesage, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, was denied admission to the University of Texas Ph.D. program in motor hotel counseling psychology for the 1996-1997 academic year. Subsequently, Lesage filed suit, alleging that by establishing fourteenth and maintaining a race-conscious admissions process the university had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and various federal civil rights statutes. The university did not dispute that it considered the race of its applicants at some stage during the review process. The university argued that Lesage was unqualified for admission. Granting the university atomic number  summary judgment, the District Court concluded that considerations of race had no effect on the Lesage's rejection. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there remained a factual dispute as to whether the harbor stage of review during which Lesage's application adenine was eliminated was in some way race conscious.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lesage.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1977, fourteen-year-old Gregory Martin indium was arrested for first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. While detained, Martin lied to the police about his address. He was held overnight. At his initial appearance in court, the prosecution cited the gun, the lie about his address, and his evident lack of supervision as reasons why he should remain in detention information technology until his fact-finding hearing. The court granted the detention under the New York Family Court Act (FCA). Fellow appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan were also detained prior to their fact-finding hearings. Both were fourteen at the time, both and had other delinquency petitions pending when they appeared before the court. While held in pretrial detention, Martin began a habeas corpus class action, which Rosario, Morgan, and 31 others joined, against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Martin argued that the pretrial detention amounted to near punishment before a determination of guilt. The U.S. District Court for the Southern misdemeanour District of New York found that the pretrial detention was a violation of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and determined that the FCA was unconstitutional because it allowed detention of juveniles to serve as a punishment before the trial occurred.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ellen Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Larry Witters attended the Inland Empire School for the Blind, seeking to tell become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Inland Empire was a non-denominational Christian school supported by donations and tuition payments. Witters suffered from a progressive eye condition, which rendered him legally blind under Washington law. Witters applied to Washington’s Commission for the Blind to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, funded by approximately eighty percent federal funds and twenty renewal percent state funds. The commission, however, had previously adopted a policy statement forbidding the use of public funds to assist an individual in pursuing a career or degree in theology or related areas, based on Washington’s constitution. The commission denied Witters’ application because his vocational objective was to become a pastor, viewing this as falling within the areas related to theology. A state hearings examiner upheld the commission’s ruling, also citing Washington’s constitution. A Washington district court upheld the decision for the reasons given by the hearings examiner. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the decision, but declined to base its ruling on just spring chicken the Washington Constitution. Instead, it reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and determined that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause required the commission to deny Witters’ application. Using the three-part test established by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, it held that approving christian his application would have the primary effect of advancing religion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Larry Witters.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Clayton lift Antitrust Act (""Clayton Act"") was enacted by Congress in 1914 to prevent anticompetitive practices in business. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act halted the running of the statute of limitations on pending claims arising from the act. It also specified a four-year statute of limitations for these causes of action. On September 28, 1956, Marc D Leh brought an action against General Petroleum Corportation and five other petroleum manufacturers alleging injury to his business caused by combine a conspiracy or combination to exclude Leh from engaging in wholesale distribution of gasoline in Southern California. He alleged that this conspiracy began in 1948; all parties agreed that Leh's right to initiate a cause of action began in February of 1954. Leh anticipated a statute of limitations problem under California law, as pass judgment California's Code of Civil Procedure specified a one-year statute of limitations for penal causes legislative act of action, in contrast to the Clayton Act's four-year limit. Hence, Leh cited to United States v. Standard Oil, in which the United States alleged a conspiracy to control prices among a nearly identical set of defendants and go for successfully applied the Clayton Act's longer limit. District court Judge William Mathes ruled in favor of General Petroleum, holding that the tripling of damages was a penalty, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations under California law. The court also held that the Clayton Act did not apply to the claim --distinguishing on the facts from Standard Oil -- primarily because Leh did not allege that the defendants combined to control prices, did not name the same set of defendants, and did not allege a similar period of conspiracy. Judge Stanley Barnes of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. Judge Barnes affirmed the lower court's interpretation of California law, and that the application of the Clayton Act used in Standard Oil did not apply here because the facts were not similar enough to justify collateral estoppel.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Leh.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On the night of June 16, 1962, a man later identified by a witness as Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-11 Food Store and robbed the manager, Kenneth W. Phillips, of more than $300. The man then fled the store, and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection. A police dog led officers across the street from the 7-11 store to the front yard of a nearby residence, where Pointer was standing. A search of Pointer's person revealed eighty-one dollars in his billfold, and a later search revealed sixty-five dollars hidden in a discarded shoe. The police arrested Pointer and Lloyd Earl Dillard and took them before a state judge for a preliminary hearing; the state charged them with robbing Phillips of $375 by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury, in violation of Texas law. An assistant attorney general conducted the prosecution and examined witnesses, but neither of the defendants had a lawyer. Dillard tried to cross-examine Phillips, but Pointer did not. Pointer was indicted on the robbery charge. At trial, Pointer testified on his own behalf, denying his alleged role in the robbery and swearing he had never been in the 7-11 store. The state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony as evidence because Phillips had since moved crosswise out of Texas and did not intend to return. The defense objected to the use of the transcript as a denial of Pointer's right to confront looting a law witness. The trial judge overruled because Pointer was present at the preliminary hearing, and Pointer was convicted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting Pointer's claim non dollar mark that the use of the transcript violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pointer.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $500,000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys. Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order let because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of adenine their right to counsel protected by the th Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to adenine the United States Court of Appeals salary for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys' offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on visitation August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed non a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law taboo that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's ""conduct, transaction or taboo occurrence."" Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same ""conduct, transaction, or occurrence."" The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. improve The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Deneice A. Mayle, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Between February and July of 1985, there were a series of restaurant robberies in Birmingham, Alabama. During the commission of the first two robberies, the manager of each restaurant be was shot and killed by a .38 caliber bullet. The manager of the restaurant that was the target of the third robbery, however, survived and identified Anthony Ray Hinton in a photographic array. The police arrested helium Hinton and found in his house a .38 caliber revolver. After Alabama's Department of Forensic Sciences analyzed the bullets and found that they had been fired from that revolver, Hinton was charged with two counts of capital murder for the killings during the first two robberies. At trial, the prosecution's case rested on the connection between the bullets located at the scenes of the crimes and the gun betwixt located at Hinton's house; no other physical evidence was presented. Hinton's defense attorney filed a motion for funding to hire an expert witness to rebut the prosecution's experts, which the judge granted. Because the judge did not know how much funding he could grant, he invited the attorney to file additional requests for further funding if necessary. Hinton's attorney did not take the judge up on this invitation because he did not know that Alabama law allowed for funding in excess of what the judge had already granted. With this amount of money, the defense attorney was only able to find one expert who was willing to testify, and that expert was badly discredited during cross-examination. Hinton was convicted and sentenced to death. In his post-conviction petition, Hinton argued that his trial attorney was ineffective because he did not seek additional funds to obtain more effective expert testimony. The circuit court denied the petition and held that the jury had not been prejudiced against Hinton due to the testimony. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Alabama atomic number  Supreme Court reversed and held that the trial court did not rule on whether or not Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify. On remand, the circuit court held that Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Alabama Supreme Court declined to review the specify case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Anthony Ray Hinton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey traverse Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside go of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured motor hotel in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to traverse Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based indium on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush’s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Randal Rush, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Transamerica Delaval Inc. designed and manufactured propulsion systems for four organization supertankers. The propulsion systems eventually failed civil wrong due to design and manufacturing flaws. Only the propulsion systems themselves were damaged - no other part of the ship was damaged, and no one was injured. East River Steamship and the other companies that had purchased the supertankers sued Transamerica under civil wrong the negligence and products-liability doctrines of tort law, a branch of law that deals with injuries not covered by contractual agreements. They sought compensation for the cost of repairing the ships as well as for the income they lost while the ships were out of service. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to Transamerica. It held that the injuries were not covered by tort law because only the propulsion systems themselves had been action injured, and that the case therefore dealt with the product's warranty rather than tort law. The Third Circuit Court civil wrong of Appeals heard the case en banc and affirmed the district court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Transamerica Delaval Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, a labor union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent a unit of all the employees at the Caney Creek Developmental Complex, which is operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. Kentucky River objected to the inclusion of its registered nurses in the unit because they were ""supervisors"" under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under the NLRA, employees are deemed to be ""supervisors"" and thereby excluded from the NLRA if they exercise ""independent judgment"" in ""responsibly...directing"" other employees ""in the interest of the employer."" At the ensuing representation hearing, the NLRB placed the burden of and then proving supervisory status on Kentucky River and found that it had not carried adenine its burden. The NLRB rejected Kentucky River's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use ""independent judgment"" under the NLRA when they exercise ""ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards."" Kentucky River then refused to bargain with the union. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by the NLRB at an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court rejected the NLRB's reject show interpretation of ""independent judgment"" under the NLRA's test for supervisory status and held that NLRB had erred in placing the burden collection of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kentucky River Community Care, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    McLaughlin likely guarantee was arrested without finding a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act manage promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment encase procedures in his case and others.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Riverside County.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued action machine the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district franchise court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the nether $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by buy personal property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. rent The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against motor hotel the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive civil to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled federal official students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was ""not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much courtship of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Regents , University of Wisconsin System.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it. The America Invents Act created “inter partes review” as a way of challenging a patent before adjective the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner “is served with a complaint” alleging infringement swear out of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument suppliant that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever letters patent begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains “served” even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a to a greater extent dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations. Further, 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) provides that “the determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an inter partes review after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thryv, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Clean Air Act produce creates a federal-state partnership that aims to control air pollution in the United States. The Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to both establish air quality standards and gives the states significant freedom to implement plans in order to meet those standards. Among the problems the Act sought to prevent was the possible channelise spread of air pollution from ""upwind"" states to ""downwind"" states. In 2011, the EPA created the Transport Rule, a rule which sets emission federal official reduction monetary standard standards for 28 ""upwind"" states based on the air quality standards in ""downwind"" states. Various states, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations brought suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia contamination Circuit and argued that the Transport Rule created federal standards with no deference to the states, which violated federal law. The court held that the Transport Rule violated federal law because the Clean Air Act allows states to implement their own plans to curb air pollution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Environmental Protection Agency, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit card under the brand name Aspire Visa to consumers with low or weak credit scores through massive direct-mail solicitations and the Internet. CompuCredit marketed the card and the cards were issued by Columbus Bank and Trust. Wanda Greenwood and other consumers filed suit against Compucredit and Columbus alleging violations of California's adenine Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The lawsuit claimed that the CompuCredit and Columbus' promotional materials were deceptive because they mentioned the credit card fees in small print, buried in other information and not in proximity to the representation that no deposit massive was required. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the monumental credit providers' motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. be The majority explained that mustiness a party must adhere to an agreement to arbitrate claims ""unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."" Accordingly, the ""burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is CompuCredit Corporation, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Hudson was chairman of non the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. Hudson used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through loan a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and regulations. The OCC misdemeanour fined and debarred misdemeanour Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in federal District break water Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit eventually found for the Government in light of United States v. Halper on the grounds that the original proceedings were civil in nature and not so disproportional to the proven damages to the Government as to qualify as a form of criminal punishment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 3, 1957, Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for “a few weeks”. Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years. When Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O’Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O’Connor was also Donaldson’s attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for severe Donaldson’s ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O’Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation. In February 1971, Donaldson charged O’Connor and other members of the hospital’s staff under § 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he along was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and Gumanis. O’Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court rejected aside adenine O’Connor’s argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O’Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid sustain because it explicitly stated that the defendants’ reasonable belief that Donaldson’s confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is J.B. O'Connor, M.D..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    company Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 let are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to party ""subcontract out"" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused want approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over ""suits for violation of contracts"" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The ill Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Textron Lycoming.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    take exception Under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security ""shall, before October 1, 1993,"" assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to a company, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits. take exception After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 600 hundred beneficiaries to various coal companies. The companies early challenged the assignments, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign such that a pension off beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 must be motor hotel left unassigned for life. Under the companies' argument, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed by other pension plans and funds. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Barnhart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are three consolidated cases. Jasper amendment F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights territorial dominion organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions. They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Initially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. inbuilt The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the living state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and territorial dominion held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jasper F. Williams, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy necessary to qualify for federal from each one diversity jurisdiction. In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning Finley v. United States, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 cope with also overturned Zahn v. International Paper Co., which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument along that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on glucinium supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken be the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allapattah Services, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition ordinal the board for an election or certification. In March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach employee Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in sunshine state local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically information technology authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union’s request. In response, on April misdemeanour 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac. The hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels’ complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Bernadine Suitum owned an arrogate undeveloped evolution lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot was ineligible for development under agency regulations. However, the agency determined that Suitum was entitled to remove ""Transferable Development Rights"" (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Rather than sell her TDRs, Suitum filed suit claiming that the agency's determination amounted to a regulatory taking of her property without just compensation in violation property owner of the Fifth and collection Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that Suitum's claim was unjusticible because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that an agency action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite ""final decision"" regarding Suitum's lot in order for her claim to be ripe for adjudication.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Suitum.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the field United States, the United States Customs Service is authorized to classify and fix the rate of duty on imports under rules and regulations issued letter of the alphabet by the Secretary of the Treasury. Under the Secretary's regulations, any port-of-entry Customs office and the Customs Headquarters Office may issue ""ruling letters"" setting tariff classifications for particular imports. The Mead Corporation's imported ""day planners,"" were classified as duty-free until the Customs Headquarters issued a ruling letter classifying them as bound diaries subject to tariff. lodge Subsequently, Mead filed suit in the Court of usage International Trade. The court granted the Government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that ruling letters should not be treated like Customs regulations, which receive the highest forego level of deference, because they are not preceded by notice and comment as under the Administrative Procedure Act, do not carry the force of law, and are not intended to clarify importers's rights and obligations beyond the specific case. The court gave no deference at all to the ruling letter at issue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mead Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based potato on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and aver interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, effectual alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling associate in nursing against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other aver inmates outweighed the government's interests.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shaw.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Massachusetts and several adenine other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these ""greenhouse gases"" by the Clean Air Act - appeal which states that Congress must regulate ""any air pollutant"" that can ""reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health early or welfare."" EPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on ""the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it."" Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals mustiness motor hotel for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Massachusetts et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except condemn as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his carolina remaining death sentence for murder, claiming condemn that his capital decry sentence was a ""cruel and unusual"" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth decry Amendments. This case is one of the five ""Death Penalty Cases"" along with Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina .

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Georgia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hazel Morrison was charge up indicted for distributing heroin and obtained private counsel for her defense. Without her counsel's knowledge two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conversed with her regarding a related investigation. During this conversation the agents advised that she have a public defender cooperate represent her instead of her private counsel. They also told her that the severity of her punishment would depend on how well she cooperated with them. Morrison notified her counselor immediately and did not speak to count the agents about collection the investigation. She unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court to dismiss her indictment on the ground that the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morrison then entered a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Morrison's federal agent Sixth Amendment rights had been violated and ruled to drop all charges against her.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Judson Griffin and James trial Crenshaw were indicted for armed robbery in Cook County, Illinois. Following their conviction, in preparation for filling for an appeal, Griffin and Crenshaw requested a transcript of their trial proceedings without trial cost, on the basis that they could not visitation afford the standard along fee for the transcript. The griffon lower court dismissed the petition without hearing evidence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Judson Griffin and James Crenshaw.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los business office Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts be in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was da not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed territorial dominion matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First twisted Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gil Garcetti et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Husky maneuver International Electronics, Inc. (Husky) sold and delivered electronic equipment to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. (Chrysalis), headed by Daniel Ritz. Chrysalis owed Husky $163,999.38 in purchases between 2003 and 2007. In 2007, Ritz started transferring funds from Chrysalis to various other ventures in which he owned stock. In 2009 Husky sued Ritz for payment of his outstanding debt, set up and Ritz then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In 2011, Husky filed a complaint against the requital discharge of Ritz’s debt and argued that Ritz had fraudulently moved funds from Chrysalis to other accounts in order to file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that Ritz had not fraudulently filed for bankruptcy and that it could not “pierce venting the veil” to go after Ritz’s personal finances for the debt Chrysalis owed. Husky appealed to the district court, which cesar ritz affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination and found that Ritz had not committed “actual fraud” by false representation and that Husky had not proven that Ritz acted “maliciously and willfully.” The United States Appeals Court for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to discharge Ritz’s debt.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Husky International Electronics, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    B&B Hardware card (B&B) sells a fastener product in the aerospace industry under the trademark ""Sealtight,"" which it registered in 1993. Hargis Industries (Hargis) sells self-drilling screws under the mark ""Sealtite"" in the disarray slenderly construction industry. After Hargis applied to register its mark in 1996, B&B opposed the application and sued Hargis for infringement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) eventually determined that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks and denied Hargis' application. On non appeal, the district court held that, because the TTAB is not an Article III court, it need not give deference to the TTAB decision and refused to admit the decision into evidence. A jury then found in favor of Hargis. The U.S. Court of Appeals for  the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that, since the Eighth Circuit uses a slightly different likelihood of confusion test from the TTAB, the TTAB did not decide the same likelihood of confusion issues presented to the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is B&B Hardware Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Citizens Bank (Citizens) and Alafabco Inc. (Alafabco) had multiple business dealings with each other spanning over early a decade. In 1998, Alafabco bid on a construction job based on a contract it had with Citizens to citizen finance the project. When Citizens did not finance the project, Alafabco used existing funds meant to repay the debts it owed to Citizens to fund the project and subsequently defaulted on its loan payments to Citizens. Citizens and Alafabco composed two different debt-restructuring agreements, both of which included arbitration clauses federal official that stated that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would apply. Alafabco sued Citizens in Alabama state court for breach of contract and claimed that it had incurred detrimental debt because motor hotel of Citizens’ breach. Citizens invoked the arbitration clause, and the state court ordered the parties to submit to arbitration pursuant to their agreement. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and held that, because the debt-restructuring agreements did not substantially involve interstate commerce, the FAA did not apply have in mind to the parties’ disputes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The Citizens Bank.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The City of New York amended its Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in public places to include certain social clubs that were not ""distinctly private."" urban center Particularly, the amendment applied anti-discrimination laws to social clubs and invite institutions that hosted dining regularly, adenine retained more than four hundred members, and received funding from non-members in order to promote business interests. The amendment did sealed not apply to religious, charitable, and education organizations because the city deemed that they were not centers of business activity. The New York State Club Association, a group of 125 clubs, contended in a state trial court that the new law violated its associational indium rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. A state appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed, finding that the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination justified the restrictions on associational rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Keith Tharpe was convicted in Georgia state court of the September 25, 1990 murder of his sister-in-law, Jacqueline Freeman. A jury sentenced him to death, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, an affidavit came to light in which a white juror from Tharpe’s trial, Barney Gattie, made several highly discriminatory statements regarding African Americans. Tharpe, who is black, sought habeas relief from the Butts County Superior Court, claiming that improper racial animus had influenced the jury’s deliberations. His petition was default on denied on the basis that he had procedurally defaulted by failing to raise the racial bias issue in earlier proceedings, and because he did not adequately support his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel was to blame for the omission. Juror testimony was also deemed inadmissible to prove Tharpe’s racial animus claim. He then applied andrew dickson white for a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the Georgia Supreme Court, and his application was denied. Tharpe next petitioned the US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that racial bias among the motor hotel jury had rendered his conviction and sentence non unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The district court found this claim to be procedurally defaulted, but granted him a certificate of appeal (COA) on an ineffective assistance claim. The 11th Circuit then affirmed the district court’s judgment. Following the US Supreme return Court’s 2017 decisions in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado and Buck v. Davis, Tharpe petitioned the district court under FRCP 60(b)(6) to reopen his § 2254 case. He argued that Pena-Rodriguez should apply retroactively, allowing him to present the juror testimony that had previously been deemed inadmissible, and ultimately overcome procedural default to prevail on his claim that improper racial animus had led to his conviction and sentence. The district court denied Tharpe’s motion, concluding, inter alia, that his claim was procedurally defaulted, and that he had failed to produce any clear evidence that Gattie’s statements had influenced the jury’s conclusions. The 11th Circuit affirmed, declining to issue a COA and stating that Tharpe had failed to show that the district court’s correctness was debatable with regard to its procedural ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Keith Tharpe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These cases call for involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen and sixteen year old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A Superior Court affirmed the order, and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no visitation constitutional right to a jury trial call for for juveniles. In from each one re Burrus concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968 during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a from each one jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pennsylvania.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In October 1993, Tara Williams drove two of her friends to a liquor store in Long Beach, California, with the intent to commit a robbery. Williams waited turn back in the car to serve as the getaway driver while her friends stole the cash from the liquor store and fatally shot the store's owner. Five years later, Williams was apprehended and charged with first-degree murder. At trial, the judge discharged a juror for bias and replaced that juror with an alternate, after which the jury convicted Williams for first-degree murder. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. While Williams' petition to the California Supreme Court was pending, that court decided a case that held that a court abused its discretion when it dismissed a juror who seemed to disagree with the other jurors. Based on that decision, the California Supreme Court remanded Williams' case, and the California Court of Appeal issued adenine a revised opinion holding that the lower court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the juror. Williams filed a federal habeas corpus petition, but the district court denied relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which restricts federal habeas relief to cases that have already been adjudicated on their merits in state court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the California Court of Appeal had disregarded Williams' argument that dismissal of the juror amendment in question violated the Sixth Amendment. In a unanimous put down decision, the U.S. Supreme Court swear out reversed and held that the California court had adjudicated the case on the merits, even if the Sixth Amendment claim was not explicitly addressed. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of habeas relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tara Sheneva Williams.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) sued the South Coast Air lap Quality Management District (SCAQMD) - established under the California Health and Safety Code - in federal district court. The EMA alleged that the Clean monetary standard Air Act (CAA) preempted SCAQMD's ""fleet rules"" - rules that required new commercial vehicles to meet specific emissions standards - and that the rules were therefore illegal. The EMA pointed to section 209 of the act, which prohibits states locomotive from enforcing ""any atomic number  standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles."" Reasoning that the regulations affected the standards at which engines could be sold, not the standards to which they must be manufactured, and finding that Congress's purpose was to protect manufactures from ""having to build engines in compliance with a multiplicity of standards,"" the district court ruled that the CAA did not preempt California's monetary standard fleet rules. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Engine Manufacturers Association and Western States Petroleum Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wilbert K. Rogers was convict convicted in Tennessee of second degree murder. The victim, James Bowdery, motor hotel died 15 months after Rogers stabbed him. On appeal, Rogers argued that the Tennessee common law ""year and a day transgress rule,"" under which no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of criminal the act, persisted and precluded his tennessee conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. In affirming, the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately abolished the rule and upheld Rogers' conviction. The court rejected Rogers' contention that abolishing the rule would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions. The court reasoned that those provisions referred only to legislative acts. Additionally, the court concluded its decision would not offend due process.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tennessee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his initiate property, cook up the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set joined of proceedings against Ursery's and then property, which was reversed on along new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S.D. regulatory Warren Company (Warren) operates several hydroelectric dams in Maine. Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of ""any activity"" information technology ""which may result in any discharge into respective the [Nation's] navigable waters."" When federal official Warren sought adenine to renew the federal licenses for its dams, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required that it first get approval from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection because, FERC ruled, the dams resulted in a ""discharge."" Warren disagreed, arguing that the water which moved through the hydroelectric dams was not actually a ""discharge"" because it was water from the same river which had just been temporarily re-routed. After Warren's administrative appeals and state court suit (which went to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court) failed, it appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maine Board of Environmental Protection et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Herman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers. The indicate district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized traverse by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA). The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz’s motion to suppress. A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years adenine of probation. On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of indict the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination. The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied a due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, the predecessor-in-interest to Eli Lilly & united states government indicate Co. nether sued Medtronic, Inc. for patent infringement to enjoin Medtronic’s research and marketing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator, a device used to treat heart problems. Medtronic argued that the information was used to develop and submit new information under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and deliberate therefore it was exempt from the statutes governing patent infringement. The district court held that there was no such exemption and issued a permanent injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that Medtronic’s actions could not adenine be considered patent infringement if they were reasonably related to obtaining approval under the FDCA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Medtronic, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ramon Martinez-Villareal was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. His first three federal habeas corpus petitions were denied because he had not exhausted his state remedies. Martinez-Villareal claimed in his fourth habeas petition judicial writ helium that he was incompetent to be executed. The District Court dismissed that claim as premature, but granted the writ on other grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the writ. Martinez-Villareal moved to reopen his petition despite the fact that review of his incompetency claim adenine might be prevented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a prisoner must ask the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to consider such a petition. By now Arizona had obtained a warrant for Martinez-Villareal's execution. Subsequently, he was found fit to be executed. The District Court denied another good motion to manage reopen his incompetency claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under AEDPA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the law did not apply to a petition that raises only a competency-to-be-executed claim and that Martinez-Villareal did not, therefore, need authorization to file his petition in the District Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Martinez-Villareal.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In duke of edinburgh 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of operating theatre federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group allot members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of glucinium the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of victimised Commerce.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Klutznick.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    S. Binyomin Ginsberg became a member of the Northwest Airlines frequent flyer program in exchange premium 1999 and obtained Premium Elite Status in 2005. In northwesterly 2008, his membership was terminated, as per the terms of the program that allow Northwest Airlines discretion over the removal of participants. In January 2009, Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines and argued that, by terminating his membership in the frequent flyer program, the company breached both the contractual agreement and the implied doctrine be of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law. At trial in district court, the defense argued that Ginsberg's claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which prohibits states from enacting or enforcing operating theatre regulation over the price, route, or service of an air carrier. The district court found in favor of Northwest Airlines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the ADA did motor hotel not preempt the claims because the claims were unrelated to the price, route, or services of the air carrier.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Northwest, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act), which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enact mandatory nationwide standards to govern workplace safety. On December 26, 1978, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a proposal to change the federal standard regarding cotton dust exposure. There was a 90-day comment period followed by consort a series of hearings over the course of two weeks. After the hearings, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond J. Donovan, determined that exposure to cotton dust represented a significant health risk that warranted the adoption of the new standard. wellness The new standard required a mix of engineering controls, such as the rubber installation of pieces of equipment, along with work practice controls, and required these changes within four years. The petitioners, representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the standard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They argued that the Act required OSHA to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the standard. The consort Court of Appeals held that OSHA had done everything required by the manage Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed applications with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a proposed merger of saving themselves and three saving subsidiaries. The ICC decided that the merger would result in savings, improved service, and more efficient use of the improve railroad’s facilities. These benefits were outweighed, however, by the potential loss of jobs and lessening of competition. The ICC later reopened its tardy investigation, focusing on the amount of savings the merger would produce. This meliorate time, the ICC approved the merger, concluding that the proposed savings were more important. Several railroads filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the ICC failed to give proper weight to the decrease in competition the merger would produce. The district court affirmed the ICC decision. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Interstate Commerce Commission, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates (Shady Grove), on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) in part for Allstate's alleged failure to pay interest penalties on overdue insurance payments as prescribed by New York statute. Allstate moved to dismiss relying on New York's rules of civil procedure share which instruct orchard that class action lawsuits are inappropriate unless specifically prescribed by non statute. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed that Shady aside Grove's class action claim was not authorized and thus dismissed its claim. On appeal, Shady Grove argued that the New York rules of civil procedure conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus were not applicable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Shady Grove and affirmed the district court. The Second Circuit, reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, stated that the New York rules of civil procedure did not conflict with Rule 23 and thus Rule 23 did civil not control.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an letting interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from arrogate buying a Triad-listed house for adenine racially discriminatory indium reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed ""officer/broker,"" claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or cut rate sale a ""designated officer/broker."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Meyer.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carol Jo LaFleur was a teacher at Patrick Henry Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio. She was forced to discontinue her duties on March 12, 1971 because the Cleveland School Board required every teacher to take maternity leave without pay five months before the expected date of birth. The board also ruled that a teacher could not return from maternity leave until 1) the next school semester began, 2) the teacher obtained a certificate from her physician showing good medical health, and 3) the newborn child was three months old. Ann Elizabeth Nelson was a French teacher at Central Junior High School, also in Cleveland. She reported her pregnancy to the school's principal on January 29, 1971, and applied for maternity leave. Both LaFleur and Nelson significant wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year, but were forced to leave in March 1971. LaFleur and Nelson filed separate suits in district court challenging the constitutionality of the school boards' maternity leave rules; the court tried their cases together, and held that the board's policies were constitutional. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed, concluding that the mandatory leave policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Susan Cohen was a social studies teacher at Midlothian High School in Chesterfield County, Virginia. Cohen notified the Chesterfield adenine School Board that she was pregnant on November 2, 1970. The board's rule required pregnant teachers to go on maternity leave at the end of their fifth month, but allowed re-employment the next school year upon submission of a medical certificate from the teacher's physician. Cohen's obstetrician believed that she was fit to continue working, but the school remain board denied Cohen's remain request for an extension. Cohen challenged the constitutionality of Chesterfield County's rule in district court, which held that the regulation preserve violated the equal protection clause. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but on rehearing en banc, the court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jo Carol LaFleur, Ann Elizabeth Nelson, Susan Cohen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Willie Griggs filed a class action, on behalf of several fellow African- American atomic number  employees, against his employer Duke Power Company . Griggs challenged Duke's ""inside"" transfer policy, lodge requiring employees who want to work in all but the company's lowest paying Labor Department to register a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests in addition to having a high school grievance education. Griggs claimed that Duke's policy discriminated against African-American employees in violation of Title VII of take exception the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On appeal from a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Court of Appeals found no discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court call for granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Griggs.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After purchasing cocaine, Juan Melendez was charged with violating federal drug laws.   The law carried a minimum sentence of glucinium ten  years imprisonment. Melendez signed a plea agreement stating he would be cooperative. In turn the government agreed to give him a short sentence. The District Court thus sentenced Melendez to ten years in prison, the mandatory minimum. The Court  of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines orison failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing indium to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The orison Eight Circuit Court united states government of Appeals reversed and indium ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles Russell Rhines.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In March 2006, U.S. Army sergeant Jeffrey L. Chafin married United Kingdom citizen Lynne Hales Chafin in Scotland. They had one child, who holds dual citizenship in the United States and the United Kingdom. In February 2010, Lynne Chafin traveled to Alabama with the couple's child and intended to return to Scotland in May 2010 for the child's schooling. Before they could leave the country, Jeffrey Chafin filed a divorce petition in the Alabama courts and sought emergency relief to prevent his wife from leaving the country with the child. The trial court ordered both parties to stay in the country with external the child throughout the divorce proceeding. Lynne Chafin filed a motion in federal district court requesting to return to Scotland with the child and citing The Hague Convention ruling on international child abduction. The district court held that the child was being unlawfully detained in the United united states government States and allowed be Lynne Chafin to return to Scotland with the scotland child. Jeffrey Chafin appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the issue as moot tiddler because the child had already returned to Scotland.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey L. Chafin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999, the city of Valdez, Alaska imposed a property tax on large vessels that used its port. Vessels subject to taxation elsewhere were held to an apportionment be formula based on the number of days spent there. indium In response, Polar Tankers Inc. filed suit in an Alaska trial court arguing that the apportionment provision was unconstitutional. The trial court in part agreed, ruling that the apportionment method violated place the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, but did not violate the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court assignation of Alaska reversed expression in part. The court held that the tax apportionment formula used by the city of Alaska was fair and non-duplicative. Therefore, it did not violate the Due Process, Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses in the Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Polar Tankers, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order No. 13,769 (EO-1), which, among other things, suspended entry for 90 days of foreign nationals from seven countries identified by Congress or the Executive as presenting heightened terrorism-related risks. EO-1 was immediately challenged in federal district court, and the good judge entered a nationwide temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of several of its provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the government's emergency motion to stay the order pending appeal. Rather than continuing to litigate the matter, the government announced that it would revoke that order and issue a new one. On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,780 (EO-2). Section 2(c) of EO-2 directed that entry of nationals from six of the seven countries designated in EO-1 be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of the order, citing a need for time to establish adequate standards to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists. Section 6(a) directed that applications for refugee status and travel of refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) be suspended for sovereign 120 days from the effective date ""to review the adequacy of USRAP application and adjudication procedures."" Section 6(b) suspended the entry of any individual under USRAP once 50,000 refugees have entered the United States in fiscal year 2017. The effective date of the order was March 16, 2017. EO-2 was subject to swift litigation as well. On June 14, just before Section 2(c) of EO-2 was by its terms set to expire, President Trump issued a memorandum to Executive Branch officials declaring the effective date of each enjoined provision of EO–2 to be the date on which the injunctions in these cases “are lifted or stayed with respect to that provision."" The government sought review in both cases, making arguments both on the merits of the trumpet cases and on procedural issues. indium In a per curiam opinion issued simultaneously with an order granting certiorari, the Court granted the government's applications for a stay of the preliminary injunction with one ninth respect to Sections 6(a) and (b) of Executive Order 13,780 (EO-2), thereby allowing enforcement of those provisions. Under the Court's ruling, the government may enforce Section 6(a) except as to any ""individual seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,"" nor may such an individual be excluded under Section 6(b). On September 24, 2017—the same day EO-2 was expiring—President Donald Trump issued a Proclamation restricting travel to the United States by citizens from eight countries. That Proclamation too was challenged in federal court as attempting to exercise power that neither Congress nor the Constitution vested in the president. The Ninth Circuit struck down the Proclamation, and the Supreme Court granted review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Canadian Javelin, consider Ltd. (CJL) allegedly distributed  false and misleading press releases regarding its business activities. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised its authority ostensibly under § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, suspending the trading of securities of the company for 10 days. The SEC exercised this authority repeatedly, resulting in suspension of the trading of the stock of CJL for over a year. Samuel H. Sloan nether owned 13 shares of CJL and was engaged in ""substantial"" purchases and indium short sales of the stock when it was suspended. He filed a lawsuit against the SEC alleging, among other claims, that it exceeded its authority under  § 12(k) to issue consecutive suspension orders. Notably, Sloan represented himself in the courts below, as well as before the US Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Samuel H. Sloan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Investigator David Groblewski raptus from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable cause since he did not personally view the research worker movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie guarantee County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non-dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of ""probable-cause"" than other types of warrants go against television because of First Amendment concerns.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Carlos Jimenez pled guilty in Texas state court to burglary and violating his probation. Because Jimenez had regenerate a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, he was sentenced to 43 years in prison. Jimenez appealed and, in 1996, a state appeals court dismissed Jimenez's get down petition when a court-appointed lawyer stated that Jimenez had no grounds for appeal. Six years later the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed leave for Jimenez to renew his appeal based on his lawyer's incompetence, however the court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In 2005, Jimenez filed a habeas corpus petition in a Texas federal court arguing that he had not received adequate legal united states government assistance during his proceedings in the state courts. The district judge dismissed the claim, holding that the one-year statute of limitations, which began running on the date of conviction, had expired. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also denied Jimenez's appeal. Jimenez, in his petition lethal for certiorari, argued that the one-year traverse statute of limitations should actually have begun in 2005, after his final appeal was denied in state court, rather than in 1995 when he was convicted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carlos Jimenez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of motor hotel the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required crataegus laevigata a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the herald Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The understanding Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody's interest rather than the tribe's, it had not ascertain violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that ""the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). notwithstanding The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more ""violent felony"" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 united states government breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed ""burglary"" as united states government a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant ""generic burglary"" of a ""building or other structure."" However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry joseph deems taylor into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit shamefaced reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reginald Shepard.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The California Legislature deregulated the power industry in 1996, establishing a so-called ""spot motor hotel market"" in which utilities purchased electricity on the be day it was needed. Four years later, during an exceptionally just motor hotel hot summer, wholesale electricity prices skyrocketed. In response, several utilities on the Western power grid determined that they could no longer afford the spot market, and instead negotiated less expensive but still inflated long-term contracts with power suppliers. Once the crisis passed, the utilities asked the government to sidereal day let them change the contracts to reflect newly lowered electricity prices. The government refused, citing a longstanding Supreme Court doctrine presuming that utilities' contracts are reasonable. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ordered the government to permit the changes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barkat U. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin along for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 seat of the Sherman  Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of set up Albrecht v. Herald Co. in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little seat competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State Oil Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department effectual of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the territorial dominion ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that ""the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities prisoner to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from az persons trained in the indium law."" The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lewis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mr. and Mrs. Sereboff held a health insurance policy with Mid Atlantic Medical Services that was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). If a beneficiary is injured, Mid Atlantic pays for all covered medical expenses. However, the plan also has a provision that requires the beneficiaries to reimburse Mid Atlantic when an injury has medical checkup been caused by a third party and the beneficiary receives compensation from mid that third party. In this case, the Sereboffs were injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. After they settled their suit against that third party, Mid Atlantic filed suit indium in federal district court under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA to recover the money it had spent on medical expenses. 502(a)(3) provides that a health insurer may bring employee suit ""to obtain ... appropriate equitable relief ... to enforce ... the terms of the plan."" The Sereboff's objected, arguing that the sort of reimbursement provision at issue in this case was not ""equitable"" because the Sereboffs contrive had not had the funds in their possession when they agreed to the plan. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding with Mid Atlantic.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    (Tom Feledy and then prepared this summary.) A traveler at an airport alerted the suspicions of indium drug agents, who, based upon his behavior and discrepancies in his luggage tags, believed he was carrying narcotics. They relayed this information to fellow agents at his destination airport. There, the agents met him and seized his bags without his consent. Ninety alarm minutes after the seizure, his bags were subjected to a ""sniff"" test by a drug-detection dog. The dog signaled address the presence of a controlled substance in one of the bags. The agents then obtained a warrant for that suitcase, which turned out to contain cocaine, and the man was convicted of the drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the weenie ninety minutes exceeded the investigative stop permitted by _Terry v. Ohio , and thus violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure privilege.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Raymond J. Place.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998, John Bass, a black man, was charged with two disputation counts of homicide with a firearm in federal court, and the government filed notice of the subsidisation intent to pursue the death penalty. Bass moved to dismiss the death penalty notice, info and he filed a discovery request for information regarding the government’s death penalty charging practices and statistics federal official by arguing collection that the government’s capital charging practices were racially motivated. The district court granted Bass’ motion for discovery and, after the government informed the court that it would not comply with the order, dismissed the death penalty notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant Bass’ motion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Respondent Brian Newton nether worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed newton the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive turn to statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental allow for Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections. A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, out finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted early in 1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words ""marriage"" and ""spouse"" refer to legal unions between one man and one woman. Since that time, some states let have authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the two way Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale. Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their accepted marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would accepted have been imposed. On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the government's position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edith Windsor, in her capacity as the executor of the estate of Thea Clara Spyer, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Pennsylvania federal district court convicted Percy Dillon for conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 50 grams of cocaine base, use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. Subsequently, enjoyment the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to retroactively reduce the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses. Mr. Dillon go then moved to have his sentence reduced in accordance with the new guidelines. The district court reduced Mr. Dillon's sentence by two levels, but held that it lacked the authority to reduce his sentence further. On offensive activity appeal, Mr. Dillon argued that in light of United States v. Booker the district court had the authority to further reduce his sentence. Moreover, he argued that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score when determining his sentencing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding self possession that federal official Booker did not allow a district court, when reducing a previously imposed sentence, to treat the amended guidelines' range as advisory. Moreover, the court rejected Mr. Dillon's argument that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score, reasoning that the district court had no authority to reconsider its prior criminal history determination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The facts giving rise to this case are not immediately relevant to the issue on which the Court ruled. Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Office of Education, filed a lawsuit against the superintendent of schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment, and a panel of common law the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of binding Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the sit around statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with a new, purportedly binding interpretation adenine formally of the in front statute. Judge Reinhardt died after he had finished writing the opinion but 11 days before it was officially filed. Without Judge Reinhardt, the opinion authored by him would have been approved by only 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those judges concurred on the judgment but not the reasoning.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acting upon a belief that Cardinal Chemical (""Cardinal"") ascertain violated two of its patents on chemical compounds used in polyvinyl chloride, Morton letters patent International (""Morton"") challenged Cardinal's actions in a South Carolina District Court. Cardinal counterclaimed that Morton's patents were invalid. The District Court ruled that although none of Morton's patents were violated, they were both invalid. Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit Court which sustained the lower courts infringement finding but issued a per se reversal of its determination as to the validity of Morton's patents based on a practice dating back to victimised 1987. Cardinal appealed the per se rejection of it its validity counterclaim appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cardinal Chemical Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Six maritime unions, including American Radio Association, picketed docks in Mobile, Alabama, asking the public not to patronize foreign vessels docked there. The unions were opposed to the low wages paid to foreign seamen. Mobile Steamship Association sued to enjoin the picketing because it prevented non the loading and unloading of ships. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The courts motor hotel held that the picketing did not “affect commerce” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), so the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) non did not have jurisdiction. The courts also held that enjoining the picketing tie up adenine did not violate the First Amendment because the picketing resulted in a work stoppage, not just the expression of ideas.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mobile Steamship Association, Robert Malone.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John R. Sand & Gravel Company had leased the rights to mine sand and gravel on a piece of Michigan property that also contained an old landfill. After thousands of drums of illegally-buried industrial waste were discovered in the landfill, the EPA started a clean-up operation. In 1994 the EPA erected a security fence around its operations. Although John R. Sand kept mining other parts of the property, the fence blocked certain mining sites. John R. Sand's ability to mine the area was still impeded after the EPA moved the fence in 1998. In 2002 John R. Sand brought suit against the government, arguing that the restrictions on its lavatory operations amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of property. The adenine Tucker Act waives the government's sovereign palisade immunity for such suits, but the Act has a six-year statute of limitations. John R. Sand argued that the issue in its claim originated in 1998 when the EPA moved its fence and for the motor hotel first time obtained an order granting it unrestrained access to the property. The government countered that the claim actually accrued back in 1994 when the fence first went up, which would make the suit untimely. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the suit was timely, but it also ruled that the government was not liable for a Fifth Amendment taking. In John R. Sand's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the issue motor hotel of the statute of limitations was raised again - not by either of the parties, but by a group of corporations who were not parties to the case. Citing its own precedents, the Federal Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. Jurisdictional requirements determine whether courts can hear a case. They cannot be waived by the parties to the case, and courts can consider jurisdictional issues on the courts' own initiative. The Federal Circuit ruled that John R. Sand's claim accrued no later than 1994. Since the suit fell outside the time limit, the Federal Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and it dismissed the case without considering the merits of the Fifth Amendment claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, bole imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who ""uses or carries a firearm"" both ""during and in relation to"" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section condemnation 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered nut firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk nut case in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the afterward Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting ""use"" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an ""accessibility and proximity"" test.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robinson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At criminal prosecution the penalty phase indicate of Joseph Roger O'Dell's state trial great on capital murder, rape, and sodomy charges, the government presented evidence that he had been convicted of numerous other offenses. The court, subsequently, denied O'Dell's request for a jury instruction that he was ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. After the jury determined that O'Dell presented be a future danger, he was sentenced to death. The District Court, in granting O'Dell habeas relief, found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, which dictated requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues his future dangerousness, was not a ""new rule"" and, thus, entitled O'Dell to resentencing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Netherland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ellen Goett sought recovery for her husband’s death under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Her husband, Marvin last Paul Goett, drowned motor hotel while repairing a barge owned by Union Carbide Corp. Marvin worked for Amherst Barge Corp. as a sand blaster. Ellen argued that Union Carbide was negligent when it delivered the amends barge to Amherst for repairs without any rescue equipment. The district court ruled in favor of the Goetts, finding that the barge was unseaworthy and Union Carbide was negligent. The court awarded the maximum amount of damages based on negligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Union Carbide did maximal not owe a duty of seaworthiness wrongful to Amherst employees. The court also held that the barge was not unseaworthy but did not indicate whether the Goetts could recover damages if it were.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ellen Goett as administratrix of the estate of Marvin Paul Goett .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate earreach President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, business office who thought she was alone with president of the united states one other office worker, stated ""if  they go for him again, I hope they get him."" Another co-worker overheard the comment nonplus and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is McPherson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged 1,250 land-use designations made by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM). NWF filed suit under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the actions were ""arbitrary, capricious, just an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."" NWF argued that it had standing to sue because two of its members used public lands ""in the vicinity"" of territorial dominion lands affected by the BLM's decisions (four other members submitted affidavits claiming that they, too, used lands close to affected areas, but the District Court ruled that the affidavits had been submitted too late). The BLM challenged the NWF's right to sue, and the District Court agreed. It found that the two affidavits filed in a timely manner did not show that the members had been sufficiently affected to have standing to sue. Furthermore, the court be ruled that even if they had had standing to challenge those specific BLM decisions, they would not have had standing totally to challenge all 1,250. On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial two affidavits were enough to give them standing to challenge all 1,250 decisions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the District Court had abused its discretion by refusing to collection consider the additional four affidavits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lujan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress relegate provided in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that reapportionment plans of several states were to be submitted to the U.S. attorney general or the District Court of the District right wing of Columbia lawyer for approval. Several districts in New York were restructured to create districts with a minimum nonwhite majority of 65 percent.  A Hasidic Jewish community was split in two by the reapportionment. The community claimed that the plan violated their constitutional rights because the districts had been assigned solely on a  racial basis.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wesley Aaron Shafer, Jr., was found guilty of murder, among other things. During the sentencing phase, non Shafer's counsel argued that Simmons v. South Carolina required the trial judge to instruct the jury that under South Carolina law a life sentence carries no possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Simmons that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility. The prosecution responded that because the state did not plan to argue to the jury ascribable that Shafer would be a danger in the future that no Simmons instruction was required. During deliberations, the jury asked under what conditions someone convicted of murder could become available for parole. The trial judge stated that parole eligibility or ineligibility was not a matter for the peril jury's consideration. Ultimately, the jury recommended the death penalty and ascribable the judge imposed the sentence. In affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons generally did not apply to the State's sentencing scheme because an alternative to death other than life without the possibility of parole sovereign exists.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shafer.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motor hotel A jury convicted Gentry in state court for one ninth stabbing his girlfriend. Gentry appealed, arguing his lawyer's closing argument deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. While disputation Gentry's appeal lost in state courts, the U.S. aristocracy Ninth Circuit aristocracy Court of Appeals reversed Gentry's conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Yarborough.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Charles T. Robinson, Sr., was fired adenine by Shell Oil Co. Thereafter, Robinson filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While that charge was pending, Robinson applied for a job with another company, which contacted Shell for an employment reference. Robinson, claiming that Shell gave him a negative reference in retaliation right wing for his having filed the EEOC charge, then filed suit under Title VII, which makes it unlawful ""for an employer to discriminate against any of his a employees or applicants for employment"" who have veto availed prohibit themselves of Title VII's protections. The District Court dismissed the suit. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the term ""employees"" in Title VII refers only to current employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not justicible under Title VII.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robinson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In January 2001, President Bush created an advisory committee appeal on energy policy headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. After the group issued its recommendations five months later, Judicial Watch, a non-profit government watchdog group, filed suit in federal district court. The Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, later filed a nearly identical suit that was joined with the Judicial Watch suit. The two organizations alleged that the advisory committee had violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) by not making public all the documents that it had generated. While FACA exempts committees composed entirely of federal officials, lobbyist Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the exemption did not apply because private lobbyists had participated in the energy committee's information technology meetings. Cheney and the advisory group asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that it violated the Constitutional indium separation of powers by requiring judicial oversight of internal executive branch deliberations. The district court refused. The government then sought summary judgment of the case (without the discovery process) based on a few administrative documents that it claimed showed that only federal officials had worked on the group. The district court denied this request as well, and the government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court refused to grant summary judgment, arguing that it could not yet rule on the separation of powers argument. The bring together government then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pamela Hood devolve had an outstanding debt to the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, a loan-granting institution established by the state, when she filed for bankruptcy. The state objected to her request that the debt be forgiven (""discharged"" in the terms of seat bankruptcy law) by the federal bankruptcy court, arguing that to discharge the debt would violate the state's sovereign immunity (that is, its right not to be sued). Hood countered that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow student loan set up debts to be exhaust hood discharged if the bankruptcy filer can demonstrate that they will suffer ""undue hardship"" if the debt is not forgiven, and that this congressional permission is a constitutional waiver of state sovereign immunity because it falls under tennessee the power granted to Congress by the Bankruptcy Clause (Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution). The bankruptcy court sided with Hood, finding that Congress had acted constitutionally in waiving the states' sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, as did a normal panel of the Sixth Circuit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pamela L. Hood.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert M. Brady pleaded not guilty to kidnapping. After learning that his codefendant confessed and would be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to harbor guilty. The crime had a maximum penalty of death, but a U.S. statute allowed the death penalty only if the verdict of a jury recommends. The judge sentenced him to 50 years in prison. The sentence afterward was later reduced to 30 years. 8 years later, Brady sought relief in U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming his guilty plea was not voluntarily given because punishment the possibility of the death penalty coerced his plea. The district plead court denied relief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, panel finding that Brady changed his plea because of the codefendants actions. The court held that an intervening decision United States v. Jackson, which held the death penalty unconstitutional because it imposes an impermissible burden on an accused’s Fifth Amendment right to not plead guilty and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, did not apply.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Missouri herman northrop frye prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have provide told him about collection the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals try they offered doesn't mean that Frye didn't know what he was doing when he decided decide to plead guilty.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Missouri.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David’s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy’s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and adenine determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of adenine sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy’s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data. At trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time intimate the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts “against the state’s interests” if they found the state had lost or destroyed ascribable evidence by visitation conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jae Lee came to the United States from South Korea with his family in 1982 manifest and has lived in the United shamefaced States legally ever since, though he did not become a citizen. He eventually moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where he indium got involved in the drug trade. In 2009, after a successful sting operation, Lee was arrested and charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute. The government’s case against Lee was very strong, and on the advice of his attorney, Lee pled guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee’s attorney had bruce lee assured him that the guilty plea would not have immigration consequences; however, Lee’s guilty plea constituted a conviction of an aggravated felony, which is a deportable offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Lee subsequently appealed his conviction and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which provides for a two-pronged test: whether the attorney’s counsel was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Lee’s conviction and determined that Lee could not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test because there was not sufficient evidence that the outcome of Lee’s case would have been substantially different had he known result about the risk of deportation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jae Lee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Teachers at the Hortonville Joint School District went on strike invite when negotiations over employment contracts broke down. Wisconsin law prohibited strikes by public employees. The School District invited the teachers to return to work several times, and a few teachers accepted the offer. After about two weeks of striking, the school board set disciplinary hearings for the teachers who continued to strike. An attorney for the teachers indicated that the teachers wished to be treated as a group and argued that the school board was not sufficiently impartial to be able to exercise discipline over the teachers. The associate in nursing attorney argued instructor that the Due Process Clause of the wisconsin river Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decision maker. The school board still voted to terminate the teachers, but invited them to reapply for their jobs. One teacher did so and returned to work. The remaining teachers were replaced. The fired teachers sued the school district in Wisconsin state court alleging that their termination violated their due process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding that due process was not violated because the teachers admitted to being on strike in violation of state law after receiving adequate notice and a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due motor hotel Process Clause required the teachers' conduct and the school board’s decision to be evaluated by an impartial decision maker.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hortonville Independent School District No. 1 et al. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District territorial dominion Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from motor hotel suit in the federal court. motor hotel The District Court held amendment that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the encase state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lapides.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The level of pollution detected in the Santa Clara River, the Los Angeles River, the San Gabriel River, and Malibu Creek—collectively known as the in that location Watershed Rivers—far exceeds what instead is allowed by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit held by Los Angeles County. st nick The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental organizations brought legal action against the county and the district, alleging that the county violated the Clean Water Act. The allegations stem from the surprise fact that the county and district allowed untreated storm water that had collected myriad pollutants to run unchecked through storm sewers and into the rivers. The county and district did not contest the fact that the amount of pollutants was high but rather contested the allegations that they were solely responsible. The federal district court found for county and the district and held that there was no evidence that they were directly responsible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision with respect to the Santa Clara River and the Malibu Creek but territorial dominion reversed the decision with respect to the San Gabriel River and the Los Angeles River.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Los Angeles County Flood Control Distric.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Between January manage and April 1990, Thomas Lee april Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used stockpile a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation motor hotel to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence ""in the case of [a] second or prescribe subsequent conviction under this subsection."" The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, Caroline Behrend, along with Stanford Glaberson, Joan Evanchuk-Kind, and Eric Brislawn, brought an antitrust class action suit against Comcast Corporation. The petitioners were all Comcast cable customers, alleging that the company obtained a monopoly on the cable market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By contracting with competitors to swap customers and subsume the regional cable markets, the company excluded and prevented competition amongst cable providers in the Philadelphia area. The proposed class of plaintiffs included all cable television customers in the Philadelphia area who subscribe or subscribed to Comcast's video programming services since December 1999. In May 2007, the US District motor hotel Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the class, allowing the case to move forward. In light of a new antitrust decision in 2008 on class certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the District Court reconsidered its certification decision. The court held evidentiary hearings in October leave off 2009, which consisted of adenine dozens of expert testimonies and depositions. Following the hearings, the District Court recertified the class, finding sufficient evidence of a common impact amongst motor hotel class members and a common methodology cable television service available to measure damages on a class-wide basis. Comcast subsequently appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Comcast Corp., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2002, Arizona passed Proposition 200, which required a photo ID for voter registration. The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) notified Arizona’s Secretary of State that enrolment Proposition 200 conflicted with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) regarding the need for photo ID as proof of citizenship gem state for mailed voter registration forms. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs — Arizona residents, Indian tribes, and community organizations be — filed a restraining enforce order to prevent the state of Arizona from enforcing the new rules for voter registration. The petition for a restraining order was denied by the district court. The plaintiffs appealed trial impression to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that it should grant an emergency injunction based on the fact that elections were about to begin. The appellate court granted the injunction to stop the enforcement of Proposition 200.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Helen Purcell, Maricopa County Recorder, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The respondents in this case are a group of male, non-U.S. citizens, most of whom are Muslim of Middle Eastern origin who were detained after be the September 11, 2001 attacks and treated as “of interest” in the government’s investigation of these events. adenine In their original claims, the plaintiffs alleged that they were detained without notice of the charges against them or information about how they were determined to be “of interest,” that their access to counsel and the courts was interfered with, and that they were subjected to excessively harsh treatment during their detention. They also asserted that their race, ethnicity, and national origin played a determinative role in the decision to detain them. The plaintiffs enquire sued a number of government officials and argued that the government used their status as non-citizens to detain them when the government’s real purpose was to investigate whether they were terrorists and that the conditions of their confinement violated their Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. After a series of motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed the claims regarding the length of confinement but allowed the Constitutional claims to proceed. Both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed various aspects of that ruling. While that appeal was pending, some of the plaintiffs settled their claims against the government and the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that a complaint must allege sufficient facts to be plausible on its face and to allow a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the claimed conduct. Based on these events, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the length of confinement claims but remanded the conditions of confinement claims and allowed the consider plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The appellate court as well again dismissed some of the claims and allowed others to proceed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James W. Ziglar.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Curtis C. Flood was a professional baseball player for the St. Louis Cardinals of the National League. Flood was a consistent, above-average hitter and a well-regarded outfielder, playing one full season without an error in 1966, an unusual achievement. Flood played twelve seasons for the Cardinals, participating in three World Series, and was the motor hotel co-captain of the team between 1965 and 1969. Despite this, Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in October 1969. The Cardinals did not consult him before the trade, and management only motor hotel informed him about the trade after it was finalized. Flood complained to the Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie K. Kuhn, requesting that the league make him a free agent. Kuhn denied his request, relying on baseball’s “reserve clause,” misdemeanour which maintained a given team’s rights to a player even after that player’s contract expired. Flood then retained filed an antitrust suit against Kuhn, the presidents of the two major leagues, and the twenty-four major league clubs. He declined to play for the Phillies in 1970 despite a $100,000 salary offer. Flood alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws, civil rights laws, state statutes, the common law, and the imposition of a form of peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and several federal laws. The trial court granted the defense’s motion for summary judgment, relying on Federal Baseball Club v. National League and Toolson v. New York Yankees, which established a richard kuhn long-standing antitrust exemption for professional baseball clubs. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two Kentucky inmates challenged the state's motor hotel four-drug lethal injection protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the administration of strike hard four drugs: Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium Pentathol, which organization knocks the convict unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his breathing, and potassium chloride, which essentially puts the injectant convict into cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death. The Kentucky Supreme Court held punishment that the death penalty system did not amount to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John D. Rees, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Corrections, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In _Milliken v. Bradley (1973) _, the Court ruled that an inter-district desegregation plan in the city of Detroit was impermissible and schoolhouse remanded the case bring to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court ordered remedial education programs be instituted within motown the Detroit school urban center district, take exception and that the State of Michigan would bear half the costs of the remedial programs. The state of Michigan challenged the District Court order, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ronald Bradley et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and john rutledge of lapp conducting a continuing criminal set up enterprise. The District Court convicted from each one Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent it life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rutledge.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. glucinium Program participants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing Leroy L. Young's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board recommended him for parole survey and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five months outside the penitentiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that nether his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by the state trial court, the Oklahoma arrogate Court of Criminal attend Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to procedural protections.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2000, the IRS announced it was admitting the unconstitutionality of a 1978 coal export tax. In response, Clintwood Elkhorn Mining brought accept suit to recover funds paid, plus interest, under the unconstitutional tax scheme between the years 1994 and 1999. Clintwood sought recovery under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, 28 article U.S.C decision Section 1491, which applies a six-year statute of limitations to claims and information technology makes no mention of interest payments. The government argued that such claims must be brought under the Tax Code, which allows interest but applies a three-year statute of limitations. Both the Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the Tucker Act claims, but the circuit court overruled the federal claims court's decision denying interest payments. In urging the mustiness Court to review both conclusions, the government contended that the Federal Circuit's ruling was at odds with other circuit decisions prohibiting Tucker Act claims under similar circumstances.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and water system limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the information technology lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its authorised permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, nether but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms appellant of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Friends of the Earth, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, along with criteria for determining process when prosecutors can choose not to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program. Texas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure rule governed Act because it had not gone through the notice-and-comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice-and-comment claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held significant that the indicate states had standing ascertain as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Donald E. cognizant Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, forge Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer non to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months be before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. He contract bridge filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton's estate (Thornton died in 1982) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Caldor, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nidal Khalid Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon, was 17 years old when he entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2006. He became a lawful permanent resident the following year. In 2011, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Nasrallah pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property in interstate commerce. An immigration judge determined that one of those convictions made Nasrallah subject to removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). However, the judge also found Nasrallah had established a clear probability that he would be tortured and persecuted in Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and ISIS because of his Druze religion and western ties, so the judge granted him a deferral of removal orison under indium the Convention Against Torture. Both the government and Nasrallah appealed the IJ's indium decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, the BIA held that the allot immigration judge erred in granting Nasrallah th a deferral, and it ordered his removal. Nasrallah appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Reviewing the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, the Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Nasrallah’s petition for review. Specifically, Nasrallah had asked the court to reweigh the factors involved in the removal order, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the courts lack jurisdiction to review the factual findings underlying the denial of removal relief. The court therefore dismissed Nasrallah’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nidal Khalid Nasrallah.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr., who was 19, shot Jack Huddleston in the course of a convenience store robbery by telling Huddleston to get on the ground and then shooting Huddleston in the back of the neck. A few weeks later, Johnson was arrested for a subsequent robbery and attempted murder. At consequence that time he confessed to the sovereign murder of Jack Huddleston. Johnson was tried and convicted of capital murder. After a jury determined that he was guilty, a separate proceeding was held to determine whether Johnson would be sentenced to death or to life in prison. Pursuant to the Texas capital sentencing statute, the court instructed the jury to determine two special issues, whether Johnson caused the death of Jack Huddleston intentionally and whether Johnson was likely to constitute a continuing threat to society. Under Texas law, if the limited jury answered yes to both questions Johnson would be sentenced to death. The court further instructed the jury that it may consider any aggravating or mitigating evidence. However, the jury was given no special instruction to consider Johnson's youth. A unanimous jury found that the answer to both special issues was yes, and the trial court sentenced Johnson to death. Johnson appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction. Johnson later filed a motion be for rehearing arguing that the special issues did not allow for adequate consideration of Johnson's youth. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's argument concluding that the limited jury was able to express a reasoned and moral response to Johnson's mitigating evidence. Johnson then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Minnesota law, candidates for political office aside are prohibited from appearing on example more than one party's ballot. When the Twin Cities Area New Party, a chapter business office of the national New Party, nominated someone for state representative who was already another political party's candidate, Minnesota election officials declined its petition. When the New Party challenged Minnesota's election good example laws the District Court upheld their constitutionality, but was reversed by the state's Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court jurisprudence granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Timmons.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), began distributing religious literature in an outdoor plaza on along GGC’s campus. The campus police stopped him, however, citing GGC’s “Freedom of Expression Policy,” which stated that students were generally permitted to engage in expressive activities only in two designated speech zones, and only after reserving them. Later, Uzuegbunam reserved one of the designated speech zones to speak to students about his religious beliefs, and campus police again stopped him. According to the police, he was exceeding the scope of his reservation by speaking in addition to handing out literature. After this incident, neither Uzuegbunam nor Joseph Bradford—another GGC student who wishes to speak publicly on campus about his religious beliefs—have attempted to misdemeanour speak publicly or distribute literature on campus. Uzuegbunam and Bradford filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the school’s policies, apparent motion both facially and as-applied, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also sought nominal damages for the want violation of these rights. GGC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and while that motion was pending, GGC revised its “Freedom of Expression Policy” to allow students to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit, except in limited circumstances. It also removed the portion of its student code of conduct that Uzuegbunam and Bradford had challenged. After making these changes, the school filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot. The district court dismissed the case as moot, concluding that sakartvelo the claims for nominal damages could not save otherwise moot constitutional challenges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chike Uzuegbunam, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 2, 2004, Arizona passed Proposition 200, which required voters to provide proof of citizenship when registering to vote or casting a ballot. Shortly after the Proposition pre empt passed, a group of plaintiffs, including the Inter Tribal Council manage of Arizona sued the state. They argued that Proposition 200 violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments, and is inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed. The U. S. Court of Appeals voter for the Ninth Circuit granted an emergency injunction to allow the case to proceed without allowing Proposition 200 to affect the 2006 election. The Supreme Court vacated the emergency injunction and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and held indicate that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Arizona. motor hotel The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA, but that the NVRA preempts the Proposition's requirements.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael M., a 17 and 1/2 year-old male, was found guilty of female person violating California's ""statutory social intercourse rape"" law. The law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as non ""an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age unique of 18 years."" The statute thus made men alone criminally be liable for such conduct. Michael M. challenged the constitutionality of the law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Superior Court of Sonoma County.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also indium known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was ""deemed"" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to be $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks adenine by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than bring down 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times deliberation as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Trucking Associations, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by charge up requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers telephone (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so. Competitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and change it ruled that the entrance facilities should telephony still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The collection U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Talk America, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts smuggled large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada to evade that country's heavy alcohol import territorial dominion taxes. A federal district court convicted them for violating the federal wire operating theatre fraud statute, which prohibited the use of interstate wires for fallacious ""any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by receive means of false or fraudulent pretenses."" The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting the petitioners' argument that they could fallacious not be prosecuted because of the common-law revenue, which rule barred courts from enforcing foreign tax laws.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On September 26, 1974, William L. Lassiter was born out of wedlock. On May 23, 1975, the state determined that William L. Lassiter was a neglected child in need of protection, and placed him in the custody of the Durham County Department of Social Services. The state then placed William in foster care. Abby Gail Lassiter, manage William’s mother, was convicted of second-degree murder in July of 1976, and began serving her twenty-five to forty year sentence at the North Carolina Correctional Center for Women. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Abby’s parental rights. It alleged that Abby had not contacted William since December 1975, and that she willfully left William in foster care. On August 31, 1978, the state brought Abby from prison to the hearing, which opened with a discussion of whether Abby should have more time to find legal assistance. The court concluded that she had ample opportunity to obtain counsel; Abby did not claim to be indigent, and the court did not appoint counsel for her. A social worker from the Department testified about Abby’s lack of contact with William, Abby’s mother’s unfitness to care for William, and William’s condition. Abby cross-examined the social worker, but many of her questions were disallowed because they were arguments. She also testified on her own behalf and later cross-examined her mother, carolina who denied saying she could not care for William, contradicting the tell Department’s allegation. The court held that Abby willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for William’s welfare, and terminated Abby’s status as William’s parent. On appeal, the North carolina Carolina Court of Appeals determined that North Carolina was not constitutionally mandated to provide Abby counsel during the hearing. The Supreme Court sociable of North Carolina denied her application for discretionary review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While working for his father’s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron’s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) harbor because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney  for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of misdemeanour 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his “intentional failure” to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The U.S. Court let of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron’s conduct amounted to an intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Instead the Court of Appeals dick held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Peter E. Aaron.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the incision Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number from each one of Representatives each state will receive. fitting In 1990, for only the tell second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed overseas to the states designated their ""homes of record."" Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative geezerhood Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their ""homes of record"" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people ""in each State.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Franklin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not sexual intercourse enact his recommendation that the Military passport Selective Service Act (MSSA) be amended wedlock to include the registration of females. A number of men potation challenged the constitutionality of the MSSA, and the challenge was sustained let in by a district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rostker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Byrd, a resident of North Carolina, was employed by a subcontractor of Blue Ridge Electric, a South Carolina company. When he was hurt during his work on power lines, Byrd sued Blue Ridge for negligence in a federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. Blue Ridge neglect defended against his claim helium based on a South Carolina law providing that employees of sub-contractors should be considered employees of contractors for which the sub-contractor provided work. South Carolina law further right wing provided that the immunity defense needed to be determined by a adenine judge rather than a jury. Byrd contended that his Seventh Amendment right to a risque jury trial should trump that provision of the state law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Byrd.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 602(7)(B) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of ratifier 1984 provides that cable television systems be franchised by local governmental authorities, but exempts facilities serving ""only subscribers intellectual in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or one fifth management, unless such...facilities use any public readiness right-of-way."" When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that satellite master operating theatre antenna television (SMATV) systems, which typically receive a satellite signal through a rooftop dish and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or a building complex, are subject to the franchise requirement if their transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way, Beach Communications, Inc. and other SMATV operators petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. Among other things, the appellate court found that section 602(7) violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and SMATV systems linking separately owned and managed buildings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The petitioners are a group of individuals who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial jibe Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they owed a balance to cover the difference between the agreed purchase price and the amount of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans natural action natural action to Santander Consumer, USA (Santander), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that natural action Santander violated the Fair Debt retry Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in its communications with them. Santander moved to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “debt collector” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did not originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and dismissed the case.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2014, Aleida Johnson filed for bankruptcy in Alabama bankruptcy court under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 2003 and aside years prior, Midland Funding had purchased a bundle of debt worth almost $2,000 from Johnson, so after she filed for bankruptcy, Midland Funding filed a proof of claim in the same court. Because the date of the last transaction in the account in question occurred in 2003 and the statute of limitations for collecting unpaid debt allow for in Alabama is six years, Johnson sued Midland Funding in federal district court argued that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prevented bankruptcy actions that had passed their statutes of limitations. Midland Funding moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The district court determined determined that, while the FDCPA prohibited the filing of a proof of claim known to be barred by the statute of limitations, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allowed a creditor to file a proof of claim even after the statute of limitations has run. The district court resolved that conflict by holding that the creditors’ right to file a claim precluded debtors from challenging that practice under the FDCPA. Johnson appealed, adenine and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that, although the Bankruptcy Code allowed creditors to file claims barred by the statute go of limitations, that lodge did not preclude them from liability under the FDCPA for filing the claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Midland Funding, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Republic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, ware these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the “creation of any obstruction….to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by cook up the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies aside reaper for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, about holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an “obstruction” under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard J. Homar, let a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a adenine Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due motor hotel Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding abeyance that pennsylvania it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jason Pepper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture adenine or substance containing methamphetamine in an Iowa federal district court. In the latest of a long-running series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned Iowa federal district court jason sentenced Mr. Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12 months supervised release – a 20% hawkeye state downward departure core from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. Thereafter, the district court granted the government's motion to reduce Mr. Pepper's sentence further to 65 months imprisonment because of the assistance Mr. Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Mr. Pepper appealed arguing in part that the district court should consider  evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his sentence further. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Pepper's sentence, holding in part that evidence of a defendant's post-sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent was clear that such evidence was not relevant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jason Pepper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The New York State Board of Regents bring together authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school ram day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of mathematical group the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals from each one rejected their york arguments.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Steven I. Engel, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau frederick north used ""hot-deck imputation"" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the but relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its associate in nursing geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply discrepant filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of ""the statistical method known as 'sampling,'"" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an ""actual Enumeration be made."" Utah sought info an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Evans.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jerry Douglas Mempa pleaded guilty to motor hotel joyriding, and he was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of his sentence was indium deferred. Four months later, the county prosecutor moved to revoke Mempa’s probation based on his involvement in a burglary. During the revocation hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor was helium he asked if he wished to have counsel appointed for him. Mempa pled guilty to the burglary charge, and the court revoked Mempa’s probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mempa petitioned the Washington Supreme Court map for public prosecutor a writ of habeas corpus and claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings revoking his probation. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jerry Douglas Mempa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, Elray Rash filed a be repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC) was listed in the bankruptcy petition as a creditor holding a secured claim because it held a valid loan and lien on Rash's tractor truck. Ultimately to gain confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan proviso and retain the truck, Rash invoked the ""cram-down"" provision of the Code. The cram-down provision allows a debtor to keep collateral over the objection of the creditor and requires the debtor to provide the creditor with payments that will total the present value of the collateral. At an evidentiary hearing, ACC commercial message maintained, under the ""replacement-value"" standard, that Rash would have to commercial message pay approximately $41,000 for a similar truck. Under the ""foreclosure-value"" standard, Rash maintained that allow for the proper valuation was the net amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the collateral, or approximately $31,875. The Bankruptcy Court adopted Rash's valuation figure and approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Associates Commercial Corp..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David along Roth was hired under a one-year contract to teach political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was informed tell that words he would not be rehired at the end of his contract. second base No reasons were given for this decision. Roth brought suit against the university claiming that (1) the real reason for his non-retention was his criticism of get ahead the university administration violating his right to free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the university's failure to advise him of the reason for its decision violated his right to procedural due process. Roth won on the second claim. It was upheld on appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Board of Regents of State Colleges.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and be Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the adenine District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were  unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the from each one petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to glucinium 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Koon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime ""Termite Protection Plan"" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, topical anesthetic and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked afterward for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and adenine unenforceable. The adenine court also found that the Federal arbitrement Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allied-Bruce Terminix Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The state of Arizona restricts the distribution of welfare benefits to individuals who are either United States citizens or aliens who have lived in the country for at least 15 years. In 1969, Carmen indium well being Richardson, a resident alien of Arizona who met all requirements for welfare eligibility except the residency requirement, filed a class action lawsuit against the Commissioner determined of the State's Department of Public Welfare questioning the constitutionality of that requirement. The three-judge court in the District of Arizona found in favor of Richardson, but the Commissioner appealed. In the same year, a similar class action suit was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In this case, resident aliens of Pennsylvania challenged state law which dictated that if a Pennsylvania resident did not qualify for federal aid then he or she could only receive welfare benefits from the state if he or she were a sort out citizen or had applied for citizenship. This three-judge court also found in favor of the resident aliens. However, one judge disagreed, and the defendants, namely the Executive non Director of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance and the Secretary of the Commonwealth's Department of Public Welfare, appealed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carmen Richardson et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all ""First Amendment activities"" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, prohibit a minister ordination with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from cardinal external distributing amendment free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jews for Jesus, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 forbids any member of the Communist Party from serving as an executive officer of a labor union, with the goal of preventing politically-motivated strikes that would pose a danger to the national economy. Archie Brown, a San Francisco longshoreman and admitted member of the Communist Party, was three times elected to the executive board  of the local International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union from 1959 through 1961. On May 24, 1961, incision Brown was charged with violating section 504 of the set up LMRDA. No evidence was presented at trial suggesting that Brown was involved in any other illegal activity or plotting a political strike. Brown was found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison. The United States Court set up of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en collection banc, reversed the conviction and found that section 504 violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. In response to appeal by the United States to the Supreme Court, Brown also argued that section 504 constitutes a bill of attainder, a law that targets a single individual or group, and therefore violates Article I, Section 9.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brown.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Boston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of set up Osborne Sheppard, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter adapt O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at Sheppard's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did manifest not list the pieces atomic number  of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in Sheppard's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a abidance valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and Sheppard was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no ""good-faith exception"" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Massachusetts.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    intimate Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding adenine insinuate two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held collection that the statute was not convict unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Telecommunications service provider T-mobile South, LLC (T-mobile) submitted an application to construct a advocate 108–foot cell tower resembling a man-made tree (monopine) in Roswell, Georgia. The location of the site, though planned inside a vacant lot, would be in an area zoned for single-family residences within a well-established residential neighborhood. Following an outpouring of public opposition to the tower, Roswell's Planning and Zoning Division recommended that the Mayor and city council, who ultimately approve applications after a public hearing, impose certain conditions before approving the application. Specifically, the Planning and Zoning Division recommended that T-Mobile should relocate the site to another part of the property, erect a fence around the tower, and plant pine trees to shield it from residential owners' cope with view. At the public hearing, city council members voted to deny the application. Two days later, Roswell sent T-Mobile a letter notifying the company that the application was denied and referred the company to the minutes of the public hearing. T-Mobile sued Roswell and claimed that the city had not provided substantial evidence that would support a denial of the application. T-Mobile also alleged that, by prohibiting T-Mobile from building the structure, Roswell violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The district court did not rule on the substantial evidence question and instead held that glucinium Roswell had not met the ""in writing"" component of the TCA, let which required the government to state the reason(s) for denying an application. The district court ordered Roswell to grant the permit, and Roswell appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Roswell had met the ""in writing"" requirement by issuing a written denial and referring to the minutes of the hearing for the reasoning.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is T-Mobile South, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana motor hotel in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company adenine and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross non motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits. A divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation glucinium as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be totally considered “essential” under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat. The 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Weyerhaeuser Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gregory Esparza murdered a store clerk during a robbery in Ohio. He was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder. He appealed the death sentence, arguing that the prosecutors had failed to charge him as the ""principle offender"" in the murder and that rede he was therefore ineligible for the death penalty backrest under Ohio law. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that, because Esparza had been the only person charged in the crime, it would have been redundant (and therefore unnecessary) to charge him as the ""principle offender."" Esparza then filed a second appeal before the Court of Appeals, this time arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his first appeal. He specifically cited his attorney's failure to argue that the state had violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by let not following the ""letter of the law"" in its sentencing. The court again rejected Esparza's argument, referring back to its first decision and holding that the prosecutor's error had been harmless and was therefore not grounds for overturning the sentence. The defense attorney's failure to raise Eighth stack away Amendment objections to the prosecutor's error, therefore, was also harmless. Esparza then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In response, Ohio argued that the Ohio Appeals Court's decision had not violated ""clearly established Federal law"" and that the district court therefore could not overturn the sentence. The court sided with Esparza, however, holding that the state's failure to follow its sentencing laws violated the Eighth Amendment. The attorney's failure to raise the Eighth Amendment claim in the first appeal, therefore, was not harmless and could serve as grounds let for overturning the sentence. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the federal district court's opinion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mitchell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1999 the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) in an attempt to facilitate Holocaust-era holocaust insurance claims by California residents. The Act required all insurance companies doing business in California that sold policies to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make public all of those policies, including the names of policy owners and the status of the policies. A group of insurance companies and a trade organization sued, saying that position only the federal government, with its jurisdiction over commerce and foreign affairs, had the right to enact such legislation. expression They also said the law violated the Due Process and mathematical group Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution because the companies, if they failed to comply, could lose their insurance jurisprudence licenses. The District Court ruled for the insurance companies; the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Insurance Ass'n.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several Arizona residents challenged in federal district court an Arizona statute that allows tax credits for money spent toward parochial schools. They alleged that the statute violates the religious establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The district court dismissed the case and adenine ruled that it lacked jurisdiction for two reasons: First, the federal Tax Injunction Act (TIA) prohibits federal district courts from ruling on the ""assessment, levy or loosely collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and efficient be remedy may be had in the courts of such state."" And second, the broadly court pointed to the comity motor hotel doctrine - that is, the deference that federal courts should generally give to state tax laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that neither the TIA nor comity place the case outside federal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the TIA was inapplicable because invalidating a tax credit would not harm Arizona's ability to raise revenue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kathleen M. Winn, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In apportioning its state legislative seats, allocate the State it of Wyoming made provisions be to allocate to each county at least one state representative. With the state's total population and its sixty-four House seats, the ideal one half apportionment would have been 7,337 persons per representative. Given the guarantee of indium county representation, Niobrara County, with a population of less than half the ideal (2,924), was allocated a House seat.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Six individuals were indicted and convicted for refusing to answer pertinent questions before a grand jury. Each of the individuals moved to squash the conviction recite because they ascertain were not told what the subject of the inquiry was, so had no basis for determining what questions were pertinent. The U.S. Court of question Appeals  for the District of Columbia affirmed the question convictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Norton Anthony Russell .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro were former employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Integrity), a company that provides warehouse space sightly and from each one staffing to clients such as Amazon.com. Busk and Laurie both worked in warehouses in Nevada filling orders placed by Amazon.com customers. At the end of each collection day, all the workers were required to pass through a security clearance checkpoint where they had to remove their keys, wallets, and belts, pass through a metal detector, and submit to being searched. The whole process could take up to 25 minutes. Similarly, up indicate to ten minutes of the workers' 30-minute lunch period was consumed by security clearance and transition time. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued Integrity tiffin and argued that these practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as well as Nevada state labor laws. The district court granted Integrity's motion to dismiss and held that time spent clearing security was non-compensable under the FLSA and that the shortened meal periods were not relevant to the FLSA because the plaintiffs did not argue that they performed work-related duties during their lunch periods. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While the Court of Appeals agreed that the shortened lunch periods were not relevant to the FLSA, the Court of Appeals held that the district court should have assessed the plaintiffs claims that the security clearances were ""integral and indispensable"" to their work in order to determine if that time was compensable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Magistrate spell Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct ""any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case"" with ""the consent of the parties."" When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members collection of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. go for When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the encase magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' lonesome postjudgment consent was inadequate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Investors brought a securities fraud class action suit against Merck & Co. in a New Jersey federal district court. They alleged the company had misled investors about the drug Vioxx's safety and commercial viability. Merck moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the investors had been put motor hotel on ""inquiry notice"" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitations had run. The federal  district court agreed and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the U.S. Court of motor hotel Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It recognized that under the ""inquiry notice"" standard, plaintiffs are jibe put on notice for the purpose of the statute of wreak limitations in federal securities fraud litigation at the ""possibility"" of wrongdoing. Moreover, the court held that the investors had not been put on ""inquiry notice"" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitation had not run.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Reynolds, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, police stopped a truck in panel Nevada and seized the illegal drugs that it was carrying. With the help of the truck drivers, the police set up a sting. Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza came for the truck and were subsequently arrested. A jury convicted Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza of nv conspiracy, but the trial judge ordered a new trial under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals law precedent that held a conspiracy terminates when jimenez ""'there is affirmative evidence of...defeat of the object of the conspiracy.'"" In other words, the federal government could not prosecute the drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the government seized the drugs. The new jury convicted the two men once again. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence presented at the second trial was insufficient to show that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza had joined the conspiracy before manifest the drug seizure.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus just Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of rent Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank chore Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. maneuver In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as readiness amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of remove the license Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. admission KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the adenine facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda proprietor County, denied access to the media.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Houchins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mary Forsyth, the beneficiary of a group health insurance policy issued by Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., received medical care at a hospital owned by Humana Inc. Humana Insurance agreed to pay 80 percent of Forsyth's hospital charges over a designated deductible. Forsyth bore responsibility for the remaining percentage 20 percent of the charges. Forsyth complained that the hospital gave Human Insurance large discounts on their portion of the hospital charges. Thus, Humana Insurance paid the hospital significantly less than the actual 80 percent of the original bill and, in turn, Forsyth paid significantly more than her 20 percent of the hospital charges. Forsyth alleged that Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. had violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through fraudulent activity. The District Court operating theatre ruled policy in favor of Humana, citing jibe the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prevents acts of Congress from encroaching on state insurance law unless the act specifically relates to insurance. The Court of Appeals reversed and adopted a ""direct conflict"" test for determining when a federal law ""invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]"" a state insurance law. Under such a test, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar Forsyth's suit because the Act does not preclude application of a federal statute prohibiting acts that are also prohibited responsibleness under state insurance laws. The Act and Nevada law only provided for different damages to be collected.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Forsyth.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Basic, Inc. (Basic) was a publicly-traded company engaged in manufacturing related to the steel industry. Combustion, Inc. (Combustion), a similar company, had expressed interest in merging with Basic but had not done so because of antitrust concerns. Beginning in 1976, Combustion representatives had conversations with Basic representatives regarding the possibility of a merger. Throughout 1977 and 1978, Basic made several public statements denying rumors that these conversations were taking place. On December 18, 1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its stocks because it had been approached about a merger, and on December 19 Basic’s board approved the offer from Combustion. The respondents in this case are former Basic stockholders assertion who sold their stock after Basic’s first denial of merger conversations. They sued Basic and its director for making false or misleading canonical statements in violation of Section example 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which has to do with material facts relating to the purchase or sale of stocks. The plaintiffs argued that these statements artificially depressed the market for Basic’s stock, which injured the sellers. The district court certified the plaintiffs as a class and granted motor hotel summary judgment for the company. The court held that the statements were immaterial because the conversations were not necessarily destined to become a merger agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that a company cannot disclose misleading information and that the shoddy conversations, although they might not have been material on their own, became so because they made the company’s statements untrue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Max L. Levinson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    punishment Furman was burglarizing a private home when a decide family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that plunder he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and accelerator sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of sakartvelo the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Furman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel’s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its “Get Lucky” trademark through its use of “Lucky” on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties. In 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use “Get Lucky” and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its footing trademarks. The two non parties contest the scope of Marcel’s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued. In litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered arrogate prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was “free to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.” Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer mark and as an affirmative defense, but not again during the litigation. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Marcel, declaring that Lucky Brand infringed on Marcel’s “Get it Lucky” trademark and enjoining Lucky Brand from using the “Get Lucky” mark. Lucky Brand did not appeal. In 2011, Marcel filed another lawsuit against Lucky Brand alleging that the latter continued to use “Lucky Brand” mark after the injunction. Lucky Brand moved for summary judgment on the basis that Marcel’s claims were precluded by res judicata in light of the final disposition of the previous action. The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the allegedly barred claims “could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” On remand, Marcel filed a second amended complaint, which Lucky Brand moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the 2001 agreement barred Marcel’s claims. The district court granted the motion and rejected Marcel’s argument that Lucky Brand was precluded from raising those claims. The Second Circuit vacated, concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or more precisely, defense preclusion) applied in situations as this one and that it barred Lucky Brand from invoking its release defense again in this action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During the early morning hours of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers pulled over a the driver of a station wagon, Jeffrey Richard Robbins, for driving too slowly at speeds far below the minimum speed limit and drifting across the center lane. Upon smelling marijuana smoke as they approached the car, officers searched the passenger compartment, where they found marijuana. The officers then opened a recessed luggage compartment in the trunk and unwrapped two tightly sealed packages that each contained a pound of marijuana. Robbins was charged with several drug offenses. At trial, he argued that the evidence of the drugs was the product of an illegal search and filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The judge denied apparent motion the motion, and a jury convicted send Robbins. Robbins appealed, adenine but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for the appellate court to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in <i>Arkansas v. Sanders</i>, which established that officers could not search closed convict luggage found during a lawful automobile search. The California Court of to a lower place Appeal affirmed Robbins conviction a second time on that grounds that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the package’s contents could be inferred given the shape, size, and wrapping of the exterior.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey Richard Robbins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shirley Jones was a professional actress and California resident whose television career was also based in California. Marty Ingels, adenine her husband, was also a professional entertainer. On October 9, 1979, the National Enquirer published an article about Jones. John South wrote the first draft of the article, and his byline appeared on it. Shortly before publication, South called Ingels to read him the article and elicit his comments on it. Ian Calder, the president and editor of the Enquirer, declined to print a retraction. National Enquirer, Inc. was a corporation that published a national newspaper with a total circulation of over five million, 600,000 copies of which were sold in California. John South was a reporter for the Enquirer. He was a resident of Florida, but frequently travelled to California on business. Ian Calder was a joined Florida resident and he exerted close control over the functions of the Enquirer; he had adenine traveled to California only twice and had no other relevant contacts with that state. Jones filed an action in California state court against Calder and South, alleging that the article was untrue, libelous, and that it damaged their reputations and suspect good names. The superior court ruled that although the injury occurred in California, it lacked personal jurisdiction over the claim because of the potential chilling effect from requiring editors and reporters to appear in remote jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals reversed because the defendants intended to cause tortious injury to Jones and Ingels in California. A timely petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of California was denied, but the Supreme Court of the superordinate United States treated it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granting review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shirley Jones.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that the U.S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as ""Israel,"" in accordance with Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 (Act). The State conformity Department refused and instead issued Manachem a motor hotel passport that listed ""Jerusalem"" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State turn back on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214(d). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented sovereign a non-justiciable united states government political question. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214(d) ""impermissibly intereferes"" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Kerry, Secretary of State.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The he University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed shew an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a seeable Class adenine C offense under nudeness the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Erznoznik.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Congress created a list of people that corporations could pay while going through Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy attorney for the corporation was not included in that list. John Lamie, a bankruptcy attorney, challenged put down the law, arguing that the omission of bankruptcy property attorneys from the list was accidental. The bankruptcy court that heard the case ruled that the omission was not inadvertent. Nevertheless, it awarded Lamie the fees enquiry in question because money intended to pay them had been set aside in a retainer before the corporation entered Chapter 7 proceedings. A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision to pay Lamie, holding that the indium retainer was not separate from the corporation's other funds. On the issue of whether the omission of the bankruptcy attorney salary from the list of acceptable payees, the panel affirmed the lower court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States Trustee.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    sustain Michael quartern McCrary and Colin Gonzales were black children who were denied admission to Bobbe's School. Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax- Brewster School. McCrary and Gonzales's parents filed ascertain a class action against the schools, suspecting the lodge denials were due to their children's race. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school's admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals admission fee for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael McCrary et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    It was long the rule in admiralty cases arising from collision or stranding that, when both parties were negligent, the sum of the damages to both should be split evenly between them. The get Supreme Court endorsed this ""rule of divided damages"" in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickenson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855). On a clear night, in 8-10 foot seas and 45 knots of wind off Rockaway Point, the Mary A. Whalen, a coastal adenine tanker carrying fuel oil to New York from New Jersey, went astray. Unable to locate the breakwater light, her master attempted a U-turn, stranding her upon a sand bar. The light had failed. Its maintenance was the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibility. The tanker's owner sued in groyne federal district court, which found negligence on the parts of both the vessel (75%) and the Coast Guard (25 embrocate %). Even though only the ship owner suffered damages, the district court applied the rule of divided damages, assessing both parties equal shares. They cross-appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals  for the Second Circuit affirmed per curiam. Abstract prepared by Professor J.P. Jones

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case arises from the scandal become that became known as “Bridgegate.” Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New machinate Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee’s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays. adenine In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and confederacy Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an deliberately organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 U.S.C § 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a “traffic study” as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their “real reason” of political payback.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bridget Anne Kelly.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Oracle licenses its enterprise software for a substantial one-time payment and also sells maintenance contracts to licensees package so they can update their software through Oracle’s support website. Rimini Street provided third-party support for Oracle’s software in lawful competition with Oracle’s direct maintenance service. To compete effectively, however, Rimini also needed to provide software updates to its customers, which would constitute copyright infringement if obtained without a proper license (which Rimini did not have). With Oracle’s knowledge, Rimini obtained Oracle software updates from Oracle’s website by a means that violated the Oracle website’s terms of use. Oracle filed a lawsuit against Rimini and obtained a partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. The jury awarded Oracle $50,027,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs, resulting in a total monetary judgment of $124,291,396.82. Rimini appealed the judgment. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit lap affirmed, finding that 17 twentieth U.S.C. § 505 allows for recovery of “full costs” and the overtone district court properly relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Twentieth Century Fox v. Entertainment Distribution along in awarding $12,774,550.26 in non-taxable costs, despite ostensibly conflicting language in 28 U.S.C § 1920 identifying six categories of costs taxable against the losing party.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rimini Street, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    State departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, tell telephone number, Social Security number, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be resolve used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary carolina judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of department Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the human activity constitutional principles of federalism.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Reno.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    More than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight let A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the U.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has contract bridge avenger argued that the companies weren't come able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies partake in failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology. The government has argued that the companies couldn't press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is General Dynamics Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A provision in the District of Columbia Code prohibited proviso the display video display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy which tended to ""bring star sign that government into public odium or public disrepute."" Congregations of three or more persons within the 500 feet limit were prohibited as well. be Boos and others were denied permission to display signs criticizing the Soviet Union in front inside of that country's embassy.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Boos.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the inhibit medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth alibi indict defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and from each one nine of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were visitation affirmed on direct appeal. Nearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences vacated and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, respective Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order under their emergency powers limiting the time railroad cars could stay at a holding location. The order was issued without notice or a bring out hearing. If a railroad shipper held interstate commerce commission a car for longer than that time, they would lose the privilege to reconsign the contents of the car and were subject to a collection tariff from the point of origin to the holding blood line point and from the holding point to the ultimate destination. A three-judge district court held the ICC did not have the power to issue the order because it was not remain suspending any rule or regulation. This case was heard on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Interstate Commerce Commission .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Juan Davila sued his HMO in state court because it had refused to provide certain procedures, and the refusal led to certain injuries. He brought the suit under a Texas law that requires HMOs ""to exercise ordinary care"" for their patients. The HMO asked that the case be moved to federal court, arguing that glucinium the case should be governed under the Employee Retirement antecedence Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) rather than the Texas reject law, because ERISA is a federal law the takes precedence over any state laws dealing with the same subject matter. oer Davila objected, arguing that the case did not fall under ERISA and should be heard in state court. The federal district court sided with the HMO, finding that ERISA prohibits individuals from filing state suits against HMOs tell when they refuse to pay for a particular treatment. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Aetna Health Inc., fka Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc. and Aetna U.S. Healthcare of North Texas Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to let in get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle. In October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officeholder officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled threaten to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized take flight Torres at the let time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roxanne Torres.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2008 the General Counsel for the Office of the engineering science passport State Comptroller of New York advised against investing in a fund managed by FA Technology Ventures. The investment would have given FA Technology millions in service fees. The General Counsel decision received an anonymous email of ""blackballing a recommendation on a fund"" and threatened to disclose the General Counsel's extramarital affair to his wife, to the Comptroller, and to others if he did not change his recommendation within 36 hours. On the advice of law enforcement, the General Counsel asked for more time, which the individual granted. The FBI traced the emails to Giridahr Sekhar, a managing partner of FA Technology. Sekhar later admitted to sending the emails. Sekhar was charged with one account of extortion and six counts of interstate transmission of extortionate threats under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act prohibits obtaining property by threats. indium Sekhar moved to dismiss, arguing fbi that the General Counsel's recommendation was not property. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the General Counsel's right to make professional decisions without outside influence was intangible personal property. Sekhar was convicted on six of the seven counts and sentenced to 15 months in jail. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Giridhar C. Sekhar.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the credit-card industry, there is what is called a “two-sided market.” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by fry a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card. In the United States, credit-card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks: Visa (45%), American Express (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they do property not directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American just Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees. In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex’s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat minor Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non-discriminatory provisions (NDPs). In 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti-steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into cardholder consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti-steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex’s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “rule of reason.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Express Company, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clemente Avelino Pereida, try a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida indium sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, indium under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it organize was Pereida’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that he did not set up show such eligibility and denied Pereida’s petition for review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained keep back counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed codefendant police to install a radio transmitter allow for under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the allow for agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah’s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the U.S. Court federal agent of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Winston Massiah .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2006, Michigan law enforcement received an anonymous tip that two associate in nursing white males were traveling between Detroit and Grand Rapids on I-96 in an Audi and were possibly carrying cocaine. Timothy Etherton turn back was driving a car that matched that description, and he was pulled over. Both he and his passenger, Ryan Pollie, were arrested when the officers found 125.2 grams of cocaine in the car. During Etherton’s trial in state court, Pollie testified that he accompanied Etherton to Detroit without knowing that they were traveling there to obtain cocaine and that Etherton did not inform Pollie about the drugs until the two started back to Grand Rapids. Several police officers also testified at trial and described tiptoe the anonymous tip, which was “not evidence” invite but admitted “only to show why the police did what they did.” Etherton was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Etherton sought state postconviction relief and argued that the admission of the anonymous tip violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the tip on that ground, and his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the previous two claims. The state court denied tiptoe postconviction relief because Etherton failed to prove that his counsel acted unreasonably. Etherton then sought federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which specifies that federal habeas relief is only available after a state court’s denial if the state court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. If “fairminded jurists” could disagree as to the validity of the state court’s determination, federal habeas relief is unavailable. The district court denied relief by finding the state court’s denial of relief was objectively reasonable because Etherton’s counsel was adequately prepared for trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Etherton’s right to confrontation had been violated because the anonymous tip was referenced four times during the trial, which indicated that the tip was admitted for its truth. The court concluded Etherton’s counsel had been constitutionally ineffective and “no fairminded jurist could conclude otherwise.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey Woods.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frank Garner pseudo was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by ""actual fraud."" The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, tell but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the encase standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the ""preponderance of the evidence"" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a ""clear and convincing evidence"" standard. The Court found that most states motor hotel used the ""clear and convincing"" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it be if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a ""fresh start"" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding ""clear and convincing"" standard).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Grogan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2006, Edward Lane accepted non a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth (""CITY"") program at Central Alabama determination Community College (""CACC""). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president heel of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated his First Amendment right to community free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made sum up pursuant to his official duties as a public employee.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Steven Franks.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Prior to declaring bankruptcy, Pacific Gas & Electric company (PG & E) purchased surety bonds from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America federal official (Travelers). These bonds obliged Travelers to settle debts PG & E couldn't repay. When PG & E went bankrupt, Travelers hired attorneys to protect its interests. State law mandated that PG & E cover all attorney fees incurred by Travelers lapp during state bankruptcy proceedings. The litigation later moved to federal court. PG & E refused to pay for Travelers's expenditures in federal court, claiming responsibility only for fees incurred discrepant during state proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court denied Travelers's request for reimbursement because the precedents of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that only federal laws could ensure payment for federal litigation. PG & E was only under lonesome contractual and legal obligation to pay for state-court attorney fees. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit denied Travelers's claim on the same grounds. Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court, citing inconsistent rulings among the Circuit Courts tardy of Appeals.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sheila White was the only woman working in the Maintenance of indicate Way Department of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad's Tennessee Yard. After she complained non of harassment by her supervisor, White was moved from duties as a forklift operator to less desirable duties as a track laborer, though her job classification remained the same. She was also suspended for 37 days without pay, but was eventually reinstated and given full back pay. White filed suit in federal court, where a jury rejected her claims of sex discrimination but awarded her damages of $43,000 after finding that she had been retaliated against for her complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On appeal, Burlington Northern argued that White had not suffered ""adverse employment action,"" and therefore could not bring the suit, because she had chore not been fired, demoted, denied a reach promotion, or denied wages. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the suspension without pay operating theatre - even if back pay was eventually awarded - was an ""adverse employment action,"" as was the change of responsibilities within the same job category.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sheila White.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tom Okure was jurisprudence arrested for disorderly conduct, and while under arrest, was beaten by the police officers Javan Owens and Daniel tooth Lessard. He sustained multiple injuries, including broken teeth and a  sprained finger, and claimed to have suffered great mental anguish and distress as a result of the arrest and actions of the police. Twenty-two months after the incident occurred, Okure sued the two State University of New York (SUNY) police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment and malicious genial prosecution is one year under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The trial court denied the motion by stating that New York's general statute of limitations for personal injury motor hotel actions is three years. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tom U. U. Okure.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    AT&T owned the patent for certain speech codecs (a type of software code) included in Microsoft's Windows operating system. When Microsoft sent master versions of the software overseas, copied them, and sold the copied software, AT&T sued for patent infringement. A company is guilty of infringement under the Patent Act if window it ""supplies...from the United States...components of a patented invention...in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components."" Microsoft argued that it was not liable because 1) software glucinium code is intangible and cannot not be considered a ""component"" of an invention and 2) no software had been adenine ""supplied"" from the U.S. because the copies were made overseas. The District Court rejected both of Microsoft's arguments, and the U.S. reach Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit ruled that human activity software code could be a component, because the Patent Act was not limited to physical structures. The Circuit Court also held that each overseas copy made of the U.S.-originated software code was ""supplied"" from the United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Microsoft Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A general court-martial found Dwight J. Loving, an Army private, guilty of polish off both premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court-martial sentenced Loving to death based on the aggravating factors that the premeditated murder was committed factor out during a robbery and that he had committed a second murder. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. In affirming, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces encase rejected Loving's contention that the President lacked the authority to prescribe aggravating factors in capital murder cases that enabled the court-martial to sentence nether free base him to death. Loving claimed that the separation-of-powers principle prevented the President from promulgating the Executive Order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (""Northwest"") sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the territorial dominion Voting Rights some other Act of 1965 and alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits ""covered jurisdictions"" – states and political subdivisions with histories of racial adenine discrimination in voting – from changing  their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court held that Northwest was not eligible for exemption from Section 5 reasoning that it did not qualify as a ""political subdivision"" as defined in the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the court rejected Northwest's argument that Congress' 2006 extension coeval of Section 5 for another 25 years made the provision unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that given the documentation of contemporary racial discrimination in ""covered jurisdictions"", Congress acted rationally in extending the provision, rendering Section 5 constitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    According to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s standard client agreement, Karen Howsam chose to arbitrate her dispute with the company before the be National Association of Securities be Dealers (NASD). NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure section 10304 states testament that no dispute ""shall be eligible for submission...where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise motor hotel to a greater extent to the dispute."" Dean Witter filed suit, asking the Federal District Court to declare the dispute ineligible for arbitration because it was more than six years old. The court dismissed the action, stating that the NASD arbitrator should interpret and apply the NASD rule. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the rule's application presented a question of the underlying dispute's arbitrability and the presumption is that a court will ordinarily decide an arbitrability question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pursuant to oer standard practice, she listed equipment related to her catering business as ""exempt"" from the bankruptcy proceedings and valued the equipment at over $10,000. Trustee William Schwab independently had Ms. Reilly's business equipment appraised at over $17,000. He then sought a motion for the Bankruptcy failure Court to sell Ms. Reilly's equipment and turn over the proceeds, less motor hotel the value of her exemption. Ms. Reilly countered that the business equipment had become fully exempt when Mr. Schwab failed to timely object when she listed oer the equipment as exempt. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and denied Mr. Schwab's motion to sell off Ms. Reilly's equipment. polish off A federal district court in Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court affirmed, holding that Mr. Schwab's failure to file a timely objection to Ms. Reilly's exemption barred him from moving to sell the property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William G. Schwab.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Ohio law required that individuals found an guilty of aggravated murder be given the death genial penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, be 2) the offense was committed under hasten duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway promote car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lockett.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before associate in nursing an Administrative Law Judge, atomic number  during which he argued that ABF had fired lie down him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay. ABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming grind that the Board could not reinstate an employee expletive who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Labor Relations Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    George Samuels motor hotel and several other defendants were indicted in state court on criminal anarchy try charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to prevent continuation of their case. They argued that the New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The district court found the laws subsidisation constitutional and st refused to grant the injunction. The U.S. Supreme samuel Court heard this case on direct appeal

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as law a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would article receive article additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by ""socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."" [The clause declared that ""the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...."" Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as jurisprudence a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional joined payment for hiring Gonzales.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Adarand Constructors, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys adenine Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied joined for renewal a of his American passport. The american language State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall ""lose"" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary nationality judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit zion Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Afroyim.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances. Cedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union (""the UFW"") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent grind to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers aver left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not. Sometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice. Cedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, maneuver and Cedar Point appealed. Reviewing the district court’s order put granting the motion to dismiss de put novo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the access regulation does not violate either provision, and it affirmed the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cedar Point Nursery, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In November 2009, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed adenine by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (""ATF"") on banking concern which he checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person. In June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made the false statement about a ""material fact"" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski. Abramski moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally transferred the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they non did not have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from which the put down receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for his uncle, Abramski withheld a ""material fact"" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and amendment a $200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the late 1990s, two professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Tom Leighton and Daniel Lewin, began to research techniques to provide stable internet services during periods of high traffic. These men eventually founded Akamai Technologies, Inc. (Akamai) to capitalize on this research. Akamai  is an internet content delivery company that owns and maintains thousands of servers around the United States and contracts with internet service providers. By contracting with these companies, Akamai can deliver stable, fast internet to far-reaching customers with less danger of internet federal official slowdown or failure. On July 14, 1998, the two men filed a patent through MIT for a method designed to alleviate Internet congestion by delivering content from multiple available servers. MIT then licensed this  patent to Akamai. Shortly thereafter, several other internet companies filed patent applications for internet content delivery systems. This led to a series of litigations that spanned from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. In 2004, in the midst of these court battles, Akamai entered into negotiations to purchase Limelight Networks, Inc. (Limelight). In 2006, however, Limelight informed Akamai that it no longer wished to be purchased. Akamai subsequently sued Limelight in district court for violating 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and § 271(b), federal laws prohibiting patent infringement. Specifically, § 271(a) prohibits general patent infringement and § 271(b) prohibits inducing patent infringement. The case proceeded to trial and a jury awarded Akamai a $41.5 million verdict based on lost profit, lost royalties, interest, and price erosion damages. After a series of post-trial motions, the district court ultimately ruled in favor of Limelight and held that, although Akamai's patent was violated, much of the violation occurred when Limelight's customers took the key steps to violate the patent. Although Limelight allowed these steps to occur, it did not control its customers' actions and therefore was baffled not liable. The U.S. Court associate in nursing of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that an entity accused of patent infringement must either perform all of the steps of the claimed method, either personally or through its direct control.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Limelight Networks.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of tell that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or lash out household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 fury and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic household violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. yoke On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Many homeowners in the along Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies: One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for afterward paying wind damage claims, while government guarantee funds would pay for flood damage claims; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm) was one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders’ flood damage essential claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA’s seal requirement, which stated that the complaint cannot arrogate be disclosed until the court orders the complaint served on the defendant, and that violation of the FCA seal requirement warrants immediate dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1992, a car accident rendered Janette Knudson a quadriplegic. At that time, Knudson was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (the Plan), which covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses, most of which were paid by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. The Plan contains a reimbursement provision, which gives it the right to recover from a beneficiary globe any payment for benefits lodge paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. After Knudson filed a state-court tort action to recover from the manufacturer of her car and others, she negotiated a settlement that earmarked $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim. Great-West then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce the Plan's reimbursement provision by requiring Knudson to pay the Plan $411,157.11 adenine of any proceeds recovered from third parties. The District Court granted Knudson implement summary contrive judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that that judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable relief authorized by ERISA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Knudson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, down feather Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover ""any"" new and useful ""manufacture"" or ""composition of matter."" On appeal inspector from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are along not patentable under Section 101. When this decision adenine was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond aside appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chakrabarty.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Joseph Anthony Davis was classified as I-A by a draft board and ordered to report for a physical examination. He failed to report several times. The draft board declared him a delinquent, and issued an order that he be inducted into the Armed Forces. Under 32 CFR Section 1631.7, a draftee could only be ordered to report for induction if he was deemed ""acceptable for service"" after a physical examination and if the board had mailed him a statement of his status with three inductance weeks' notice. The statute provided an exception for draftees that were declared delinquent, accelerating the process. Davis was convicted in United States District Court for the Central District of California for his failures to report, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While his case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gutknecht v. United States. Gutknecht involved a similar situation, in which a draftee's induction was accelerated by his delinquent status. The Supreme Court declared Gutknecht's conviction invalid. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which held that Davis' stated case was not impacted by Gutknecht. This ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Davis petitioned for certiorari. During this joined process, the Ninth Circuit ruled in United States v. Fox. Fox involved a situation similar to Davis'. Fox's conviction was reversed stuart davis by the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, Davis' petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Davis then challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Davis indium asserted that in the process of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Fox changed the law. The District Court ruled against him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that it had already ruled against him on the same issue. Davis then appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joseph Anthony Davis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1964 the Navajo Nation entered into a contract with Sentry Royalty Company for the mining of coal on its land. The contract called for royalty payments to the Navajo Nation not to exceed 37.5 cents per ton of coal mined. However, royal house the contract allowed for the Secretary be of  the Interior to adjust the royalty rate to a ""reasonable"" level after twenty years. At the end of twenty years, the Navajo Nation was being paid the equivalent of 2 percent of the proceeds from the mining operation. As stipulated by the contract, the Navajo Nation entered into discussions with Peabody Coal Company (formerly Sentry Royalty Company) to adjust the royalty rate. After discussions failed, the Navajo Nation asked the Secretary of the Interior to resolve the dispute. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs reached an initial decision to set the royalty rate at 20 percent. This decision was delayed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior. Unbeknownst to the Navajo Nation, the Secretary had been adenine meeting with executives of the Peabody Coal Company who requested the delay. Facing dire economic circumstances, the Navajo Nation agreed to a royalty rate of 12.5 percent which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. In 1993, the Navajo Nation brought suit against the United States for violations of its statutory and fiduciary duties to the Nation. It sought damages of $600 million. This latest decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents the fifth chapter in the long running saga over the original dispute. Its decision comes in the wake of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims holding, on instructions from the Supreme Court, that the Navajo Nation did not provide sufficient evidence to seek damages from the United States. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the Navajo Nation marshaled sufficient evidence to show that the United States ""controls the leasing of the [Navajo's] coal resources and that the government is responsible for the liabilities arising thereunder."" It reasoned that the body derive of regulations and statutes that governed the Nation's resources were ""reasonably amenable"" to an interpretation that imposed liability on the part of the government for breach of its duties.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ceasar Wright worked as a longshoreman. He belonged to the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, a union that supplied workers to the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA). In 1992, Wright sustained a worked-related; he sought compensation for permanent disability under federal law. In 1995, Wright returned to Longshoremen's Association to be referred for work. When the stevedoring companies, to which he was tie up referred, discovered that he willard huntington wright had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the union they would not accept Wright for employment. Under the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Longshoremen's Association and the SCSA, Wright was not qualified to perform longshore work if he was permanently disabled. Wright chose not to file a grievance under the CBA, but instead to file a claim under the Americans With adenine Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleged the stevedoring companies and the SCSA had discriminated against him by refusing him work. motor hotel The District Court dismissed the case because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure -- arbitration -- provided by the CBA. The Court of willard huntington wright Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wright.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Part of the Department let of Defense university Authorization Act of 1983 denied federal financial aid financial to males between the ages of university 18 and 26 who had failed to register for selective service. Applicants for financial aid were required to inform their universities that they had (or fiscal had not) registered for the draft.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Selective Service System.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an indium effort to elude the police. The police territorial dominion placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell mellow could not see it as he approached. After Caldwell’s death, his heirs—including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate—sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The die along district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Georgia Brower, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Using the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Joseph Murphy's parents brought legal action collection to require the Arlington Central School District dame rebecca west to pay for their son's private school tuition. After they prevailed, they sought reimbursement from the school district for fees they had paid to an educational consultant during the proceedings. They relied on an IDEA provision that allows courts to ""award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs"" to prevailing parents. The school district argued that under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, person 499 U.S. 83, expert fees can only be seat reimbursed when there is explicit authorization in the statute. Because the statute skillful made no specific mention of expert fees, the school district argued, the fees could not be reimbursed. The federal district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, finding that a Congressional Conference Committee Report and a footnote in Casey referencing it showed that IDEA was intended to authorize reimbursement of expert fees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arlington Central School District Board of Education.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was medical checkup HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the official Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency gary cooper sociable for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has be standing to sue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Aviation Administration.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. go for The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA. Argus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to human activity the contested data, and remanded the case back lonesome to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged case or confidential”—applied to the information sought. For the granting immunity purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what “substantial competitive harm” means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that “competitive harm may be established if there is evidence of ‘actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.’” Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA’s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Food Marketing Institute.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A play Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. jurisprudence Even though be gambling casino gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law atomic number  only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tourism Company of Puerto Rico.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Damiana Ochoa filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her former employer, McLane Company (McLane), for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McLane required all new employees and employees returning work after a medical leave to take a physical capability strength test for positions that are classified as physically demanding. Ochoa failed the test three times, and therefore her employment was terminated. The EEOC opened up an investigation into McLane Co. During the investigation, the EEOC issued a capacity subpoena for information McLane withheld, including either “pedigree information” for each test-taker or reasons the test-taker’s employment was terminated. McLane continued to refuse to provide that information, so the EEOC filed a subpoena enforcement action. The district court required McLane to disclose some operating theatre of the information the EEOC subpoenaed, but it refused to require operating theatre McLane to divulge the “pedigree information” or just reasons for termination. The U.S. Court of adenine Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part after reviewing the lower court’s decision “de novo,” or without giving deference to the lower court’s determination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is McLane Company, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kwai Fun Wong, a citizen of Hong Kong and leader of the Wu Wei Tien Tao religious organization, was arrested and deported by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for adenine unlawful entry into the U.S. Prior to her deportation, Wong was briefly detained by the INS, during which she claimed to have been treated negligently by the INS. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), no civil suit may be filed against the United States unless the claimant has first filed a claim with the relevant federal agency and that claim has been denied. Following turn back denial, a claimant has six months to file suit or the suit is permanently barred. Wong filed a claim with the INS and, following the denial of that claim, sought leave from the district court to add a civil claim against the U.S. to her already outstanding suit against a number of federal officials. For unexplained reasons, the district court did not allow Wong to amend her complaint until seven months later, after the six-month deadline had passed. The district court then dismissed Wong’s federal civil complaint and held that the six-month deadline was “jurisdictional” and thus not subject to equitable tolling, or delaying the time at which a statute of limitations begins to run. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that equitable tolling could be applied to the six-month deadline. This case was consolidated with United States v. June, a case in which the conservator (financial manager) of an estate argued that the two-year statute of limitations for filing suit under the FTCA should not have begun to run afterward until she tort had access to the depositions of federal employees without which she could not have been aware of her claim against the federal government. As in Wong, the federal government claimed that this statute of limitations was “jurisdictional,” and thus not subject to equitable tolling. The district court agreed with the federal government and dismissed the suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that equitable tolling was appropriate government activity based on its earlier opinion inWong v. Beebe.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kwai Fun Wong.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Patent adenine Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the U.S. Patent adenine and repair Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a “hybrid proceeding” with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.” Arthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for make the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. adenine The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In October 2010, Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department responded to a tip from an informant that wanted parolee Ronnie O’Dell had been seen in front of the nearby residence of Paula Hughes. The officers were informed that Angel Mendez and Jennifer Lynn Garcia lived together in the backyard of the Hughes residence. Although they did not have a search warrant, other officers directed Deputies Conley and Pederson to search the backyard. After determining that O’Dell was right wing not in any of the three storage sheds in Hughes’ backyard, the deputies proceeded to a wooden shed surrounded by an A/C unit, clothes locker, clothes, and other belongings. The deputies did not knock and announce their presence. Deputy Conley, upon opening the door, saw the silhouette of a person holding a rifle through a curtain in the shed. Conley yelled “Gun!” and both deputies proceeded to shoot Mendez and Garcia. Whether Mendez was merely moving the gun or was pointing it at the deputies was subject to conflicting testimony at trial. As a result, Mendez required amputation of his right leg below the knee, and Garcia was shot in the back. Mendez and Garcia sued Conley and Pederson and alleged that the deputies, in their official capacity, deprived nether them of their Fourth Amendment rights by performing an unjustified warrantless search and that the deputies failed to adhere to the knock-and-announce rule, which requires that officers announce their motor hotel  presence before they enter a home. The district court found for the plaintiffs on so called both these allegations and also held that, although the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, they were liable for the shooting under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule. That rule holds an officer liable for use of deadly force where the officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation via a Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determination that the search violated the Fourth Amendment but reversed the knock-and-announce rule holding that because there was no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent on whether officers must announce themselves again at a separate residence on the same property. The appellate court also held that the officers were liable under the provocation rule because their unjustified search of the occupied shed led to the shooting.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is County of Los Angeles, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an rule governed anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time mormon state and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell indium discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff’s person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence guarantee to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, non but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Utah.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the motor hotel petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated unproblematic assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not condemn consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for indium the ineffective assistance. The court let in remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lackawanna County District Attorney.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Commil USA,  LLC (Commil) holds a patent on a method to implement short-range wireless networks. Commil sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco) and alleged that Cisco performed the patented method and induced its customers to infringe by performing the patented method. Cisco hasten argued that Commil's patent was invalid for indefiniteness, non-enablement, and lack of written description. The district court found for Commil and awarded more than $70 million in damages. Cisco appealed and argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the standard for inducement was negligence and precluded the submission of evidence of Cisco's good-faith belief that Commil's patent was invalid. The U.S. Court of Appeals demurrer impinge for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the standard for induced infringement is actual knowledge or willful blindness, and therefore that a good-faith belief of patent invalidity was a defense so called to claims of induced infringement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Commil USA, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the Maine State Employees Association (a union representing state workers) negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement territorial dominion for certain employees, nonmembers voiced their disapproval with the agreement's requirement that they pay a ""service fee"" to the union as its exclusive bargaining agent. The service fee included an affiliation fee paid to the Service Employees International Union through a general pooling arrangement, meaning that the afterward nonmembers lap were contributing funds to an affiliate for litigation not specifically for their own benefit. The nonmembers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine claiming that the service fee violated their First amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, applying the Court's decision in Lehnert to determine that the nonmember employees' First Amendment rights were not implicated by the service fee. Under the Lehnert test, chargeable activities must sagacity (1) ""be substantively related to bargaining and ultimately inure to the benefit of local union members, courtship (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders, and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of agency.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward A. Karass, State Controller, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 21, 1970, Tyler’s Auction, a furniture store in Oakland County, Michigan, caught fire shortly before midnight. The building was leased to Loren Tyler, who ran the business object with Robert Tompkins. When Fire Chief See arrived on the scene, he was informed that two plastic containers of flammable liquid were found in the building. After determining that arson possibly caused the fire, See called Police Detective Webb. Webb arrived and took pictures, but the smoke manifest and steam forced him to postpone his investigation. Around 4 a.m., the fire was extinguished and the personnel left the premises. The containers were turned over to associate in nursing Webb. Webb did not have a warrant for any of the entries into the building or the removal of the containers. The next morning, See returned to the scene with Assistant Chief Somerville, whose job was to determine the “origin of all fires that occur in the Township.” They conducted a cursory examination and left. An hour later, Somerville returned with Webb, and the two discovered evidence of arson. The men did not have warrants for these entrances or seizures of evidence. Over the course of multiple visits steam clean beginning on February 16, Sergeant Hoffman of the Michigan State Police Arson Section conducted an investigation and secured further evidence of arson that played an important role in the trial. At trial, the respondents objected to the introduction of this evidence, but the judge admitted it, and they were convicted. The Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan held that the constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures did not pertain to arson investigations of burned premises first baron passfield and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the illegal searches and seizures had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Loren Tyler and Robert Tompkins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hazen Paper Company fired Walter F. Biggins, a 62-year-old employee who worked for Hazen for just under 10 years. Biggins’ pension was set to vest at the completion of 10 years of service. Biggins sued Hazen and its owners, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and several provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At trial, the jury ruled in geezerhood favor of Biggins, finding that Hazen violated ERISA and “willfully” violated the ADEA. motor hotel The willful violation gave rise to liquidated sustain damages. The district court judge granted Hazen’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the finding of willfulness which eliminated the liquidated damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the provoke First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and reversed the finding of willfulness, holding that Hazen knowingly violated the ADEA by showing ten a “reckless disregard” for the matter.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hazen Paper Co., Robert Hazen, Thomas N. Hazen .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting allegation of Mr. Shatzer's wife, question when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At be this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child. Prior to trial, Mr. Shatzer moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under Edwards v. Arizona rendered the confession inadmissible. The motion was denied and a Maryland trial court stay convicted him of sexual child abuse. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of Edwards applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and indium had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. Therefore, under the circumstances, Mr. Shatzer's confession was inadmissible.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing along a to obtain a adenine building permit to place maintain a pathway on their property open proprietor to the public.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nollan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision try required that all abortion clinics comply with  standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of united states government abortion providers who sued the State of adenine Texas seeking to invalidate  those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Whole Woman’s Health, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was various an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several ""abhorrent"" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to result have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the respective aside judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after granting immunity Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a ""functional equivalent"" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jones.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Democrats in control of the New Jersey Legislature designed a plan for congressional redistricting in the state which the outgoing Democratic governor signed into law. adenine Even though the district populations differed by less regulator than one percent from each other, they were clearly drawn to maximize Democratic power indium indium in raw the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Daggett.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department officers responded to a noise complaint for a house party. Upon arrival, the officers heard loud music coming from the house. The officers then entered the house and observed party guests, including Theodore Wesby, drinking and watching “scantily clad women with officeholder money tucked into garter belts.” The partygoers claimed that a woman called “Peaches” was the host of the party, and that she had received permission from the owner, from whom Peaches was leasing the house. One partygoer called Peaches on the phone for an officer, since Peaches was not present. Peaches confirmed that she had permission from the owner, but when an officer called the owner, the owner claimed that the earphone lease had not been executed and that he had not given permission for the party. The officers subsequently arrested the partygoers. Sixteen of the arrested partygoers sued the officers and the District of Columbia for false arrest. The district court ruled in favor of the partygoers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed and held both that the officers did not have probable cause for entry and were not rent entitled to immunity from liability. Probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry under D.C. law exists where a reasonable officer concludes from information known at the time that the arrestee knew or should have known that they entered the house against the will of the owner. The court reasoned that, because the partygoers believed in good faith that the owner had given Peaches permission for the party, they could not have euphony intended to enter unlawfully. The court also ruled that the officers were not entitled to immunity because it was unreasonable for them to believe that they were not violating the partygoers’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights fictive against false arrest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is District of Columbia, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the fitting Murrs’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County’s code of ordinances. The geezerhood relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs’ application to sell the collection lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold tell or developed as a separate lot.” The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed fluorine and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hernan O'Ryan Castro was sentenced to 20 years in prison for drug related offenses. After the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Castro alleged that he had discovered evidence that a government witness had testified falsely. Based on this evidence, he requested a new trial call for without legal representation. The district court, because Castro had no legal representation, attempted to help him by re-characterizing his request punishment for a new trial as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The judge's re-characterization of Castro's punishment appeal was intended to help him, but two years later, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress limited the number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus that a prisoner could file to one. When Castro attempted to petition for what he thought was his first write of habeas corpus in 1998, he was denied because of the earlier reclassification adenine visitation of his request for a new trial. When he appealed, the 11th Circuit Court of appeals initially sided with Castro, ruling that the reclassification should not count against him. Four months later, however, the 11th Circuit reconsidered, siding with the government.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hernan O'Ryan Castro.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After method acting extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature discovered that while Federal and State governments owned nearly 49 percent of the land in Hawaii, another 47 percent was owned by only 72 private landowners. To combat this concentration of ownership, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act adopted a method of redistribution in which title in spell armed combat real property could be government activity taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, government activity a landholder, challenged the Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hawaii Housing Authority.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    push The employer petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred. The district court found that such policies employer were unconstitutional but held that the remove city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the complainant organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jane Monell, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be In 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of indium Corrections and motor hotel several of its employees (defendants), in their ""personal"" federal official and in their ""official"" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department atomic number  and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the ""personal capacity"" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their ""official capacity."" On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wisconsin Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In operating theatre 1983, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) challenged the flat tax portion of Arkansas' Highway Use glucinium Equalization (HUE) tax, alleging that it violated imbue the Commerce Clause. The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, rejected this claim. Subsequently, on June 23, 1987, the Supreme Court decided American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which held that state application of flat highway use taxes was unconstitutional. Pending re-hearing in the Arkansas Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun aside ordered, in August 1987, that all new taxes collected be kept in escrow. Subsequently, aug the Arkansas Supreme Court held that HUE was unconstitutional, but that Scheiner did not apply retroactively. The court went on to decide that taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, could remain in the state treasury, but that those funds placed in the escrow account ordered by Justice Blackmun should be refunded, as they had not been spent or budgeted for future spending.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Smith.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) is a union that represents railroad workers across the country, specifically the employees of Maine Central Railroad, a subsidiary of Guilford Transportation Industries (Guilford). After Guilford acquired Maine Central in 1981, Maine Central had to lay off 300 of the 400 employees that BMWE transfer represented. The collective bargaining agreement between the two expired in 1984, before the parties were able to reach a satisfactory new agreement. For the following year, the parties attempted to reach a settlement using the procedures set out by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), but they company exhausted those options. On March 3, 1986, BMWE began a strike against Maine Central that expanded to encompass the other Guilford subsidiaries. Upon receiving foot soldier information that other railroad companies were assisting Guilford, BMWE began picketing other railroads’ lines. On April 9, Burlington Northern Railroad Company sought and received a temporary restraining order from the district court to stop the picketing. Six other railroad companies filed petitions in the same court and received temporary restraining orders on April 11. On April 23, the district court consolidated the cases entered a preliminary injunction against BMWE. The Court of Appeals reversed based on the understanding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the use of passport injunctions to halt labor dispute protests. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enter card the injunction and ordered it to dismiss the petitioners’ claims. While these judicial procedures were pending, on May 16, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 12557, which convened an emergency board to investigate the dispute and report back to the President after 30 days. During that period the parties had to maintain the status quo that existed before the dispute. Congress also convened an advisory board that recommended that Congress enact legislation that would bind the parties to the recommendation of the President’s emergency board. Congress did so, and the President signed it into law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported. Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed. Vartelas, through new  counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) remotion could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed confederacy a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that try the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty point out plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Panagis Vartelas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band (""the Band"") is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3,000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department indium of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township –known as the ""Bradley Tract""-- into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act (""IRA""). David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti-gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act (""QTA"") precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. along The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's granting immunity authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests manifest do not fall within collection the IRA's zone-of-interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering ""affected members of the public"" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Patchak.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During a four-month period in 1975, Harrison P. Cronic, along with Carolyn Cummings and Wylie C. wylie Merritt, participated in a mail fraud that involved transferring more than motor hotel $9,400,000 in checks between a bank in Tampa, FL, and one in Norman, OK. The three were indicted on mail fraud charges. Shortly before trial, Cronic’s counsel withdrew and adenine the court appointed a lawyer for him. The court appointed a lawyer who specialized in real estate law and only had 25 days to prepare for the trial, compared to the government’s almost five years. Cummings and Merritt agreed to testify for the jibe government. The jury found Cronic guilty on and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The Court of Appeals jibe concluded that Cronic’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and reversed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two U.S. District Judges, William M. Acker, Jr., and U. W. Clemon, who maintain their principal offices in Jefferson County, Alabama, resisted payment of a state-approved, county-authorized occupational tax on the ground that it sagacity violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The county instituted collection suits in Alabama small claims court against the judges, who removed the suits to the Federal District Court under the federal officer removal statute. The federal court denied the county's motions to remand and granted summary judgment for the human activity judges, holding the county tax unconstitutional under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to the extent that it reached federal judges' compensation. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Jefferson County's initial petition for certiorari and remanded for further consideration of whether the Tax Injunction Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate send back the matter. On remand, the adenine Court of Appeals adhered to its prior en banc decision. Certiorari was granted again to consider whether the removal from state court to federal court was unauthorized retainer by the federal officer removal statute, the Tax Injunction Act issue, and the merits of the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jefferson County.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following a failed attempt by the Department of Agriculture to revoke or suspend his commodity futures commission company's registration, Arthur Economou department sought damages against Earl Butz and several other federal administrative officials for wrongful lift initiation of administrative proceedings. On ascertain appeal from federal official an adverse district court finding of absolute immunity for state officials, the New York Court of Appeals reversed as it found that federal administrators were only entitled to qualified immunity. Butz lift appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Butz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under nonage the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed indium at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy place Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, adenine challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not taste violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing ""role models"" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wygant.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if the prosecution is begun within one year of a victim's report to police. In 1998, put Marion Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between ill 1955 and 1973. Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's cause of action, California could not have prosecuted Stogner. Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint background on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, raw in which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The Court  of Appeal affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stogner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2004, set up Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather department information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any ""reportable transactions."" IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors. On November 21, 2016, the IRS published promulgate Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties. On March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a courtship preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or petitioner collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is CIC Services, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James Ryder, an enlisted member of motor hotel the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause pass judgment because two of the judges on the be three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who draft must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian appoint judges were valid de facto.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ryder.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The petitioners were indium convicted of illegally passing national defense information to the Soviet Union; their cases were affirmed and then on appeal. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. eavesdrop In a petition for rehearing, the petitioners claimed that the ruling government had relied on illegally rely obtained eavesdropping evidence to convict. The Court granted a rehearing and in a per curiam opinion vacated the appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the federal trial court for a rehearing. The United States sought to modify the Supreme Court's order, urging that the eavesdropping evidence should be reviewed in camera by the trial judge who would then transmit only relevant evidence to the parties. The petitioners argued their opposition to the motion in the 1967 Term. The matter was reargued in the 1968 Term.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Willie Israel Alderman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, rico Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under robert the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss doings of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO make for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of make racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Prupis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a 15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. tartan After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved adenine to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking performed by the officers bus topology was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was reversed by the immediate allot appellate court. The Florida disputation Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed the evidence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is J. L..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The United States brought an antitrust action outlawed against it Arnold, Schwinn & antimonopoly Co. and its distributor chasteness Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association. Arnold only allowed distributors to sell its products to approved dealers. The United States complaint attached this practice as an unlawful restraint on trade. The district court held that this practice was unlawful as to sales from distributors to dealers, but allowed for sales directly from Arnold to dealers. The Supreme Court heard lonesome this case on direct appeal

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    let Under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the article Constitution, Article 1, section 8, ""Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited afterward Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings."" In the 1998 copyright Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's ""limited Times"" prescription and the First Amendment's free indium speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ashcroft.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Teresa Sheehan suffered from a mental illness and lived in a San Francisco group home. After Sheehan threatened her social worker when he attempted to perform once more a welfare check, he last became concerned that she was mathematical group a danger to herself or others and summoned the police for help transporting her to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When the nether police officers arrived, they entered Sheehan's room without a warrant to take her into custody. Sheehan grabbed a knife and threatened to kill the officers. They were forced adenine to withdraw outside her room and call for backup, but instead of waiting for the backup to arrive, they drew their weapons and forced their way back into her room. When Sheehan again threatened the officers with a knife, they shot her several times. Sheehan sued the officers and the city for violations of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Sheehan appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' second entry into Sheehan's room was reasonable under the circumstances and whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate Sheehan's disability as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City and County of San Francisco, California, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as officeholder evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained be while Martinez was receiving set out medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not aside been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape permanent wave was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chavez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    DeFunis was denied deliberate admission to the University and then of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a sovereign trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the sovereign Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was high entering his final year of school.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is DeFunis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    be In a number of cognitive operation consolidated cases from Louisiana, several defendants were convicted of disturbing the peace by sitting at lunch counters that were reserved for patrons of a different race and refusing to leave. Defendants alleged that their convictions be were based patron upon no evidence of guilt and, therefore, denied them of due process of the law. counter Defendants were denied post-conviction relief in the state courts, and the Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Burrell Garner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Sturgeon regularly hunted on the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve (Yukon-Charley), which is hovercraft part of the National Park Service (NPS), recite in Alaska. Sturgeon used a hovercraft non to hunt. During one of his hunting trips, he was approached by three NPS enforcement employees and told that NPS regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts within all national parks, and interior therefore he was prohibited from using his hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley boundaries. Sturgeon insisted that the NPS did not have jurisdiction in the area because it was a state-owned river and subsequently sued last frontier Bert Frost, the director of the NPS for Alaska. Sturgeon claimed the NPS violated Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) as applied to his use of hovercrafts on state-owned lands and waters because ANILCA limited the applicability of NPS regulations on land that is not federally owned.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Sturgeon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Donald indium Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The handbills were unrelated let to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. While distributing handbills, Tanner and other protestors were informed shopping center atomic number  by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the be Ninth Circuit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lloyd Corp. Ltd..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gregory Fisher was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine in 1988. He filed a motion for discovery, asking that the white powdery substance he had had in his possession be made available as evidence at trial so that he could have it independently tested martes pennanti in an attempt to disprove the four tests conducted by police showing that it was cocaine. The state agreed to make the substance available at a future date. The defendant was released on bond, but in July of 1989 he failed to appear in court. He remained a fugitive for 10 years, during which time the police destroyed the substance in keeping with the standard practice of destroying old evidence. When Fisher was captured and brought to trial again in 1999, he claimed that the state had violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights by destroying evidence that could possibly have proved his innocence after he had filed helium a motion for discovery. The trial court denied his motion, holding that the police had manifest acted in ""good faith"" in accordance with Arizona v. Youngblood. Fisher was subsequently convicted. The Illinois Appellate Court overturned the martes pennanti conviction, however, holding that the case was different from Youngblood because Fisher had filed a discovery remain motion. The state Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Novo Nordisk sued Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for infringement in the wake of Caraco filing an abbreviated new drug application (""ANDA"") for a generic version of the Type 2 diabetes drug Prandin. Caraco and Sun promptly countersued. While the litigation was pending, Novo changed the FDA Orange Book's use code — a description of the scope of the patent —undermining Caraco's argument that patent did not apply to the purpose for which the generic product would be marketed. Caraco filed a counterclaim requesting an order that would require Novo Nordisk to change back the use code. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 authorized ANDA applicants to assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the brand chastise to correct or delete submitted patent information on the grounds that the patent does not claim 1) allot the drug for which the brand's new drug application was approved or 2) an approved adenine method of using the drug. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the counterclaim and issued an injunction ordering Novo Nordisk to change the code. Novo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal mathematical product Circuit, arguing that the district court associate in nursing had abused its discretion. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Novo, holding that Caraco could only assert a counterclaim if Novo's patent did not claim any approved method of use.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kentucky's two ""Any Willing Provider"" (AWP) statutes prohibit ""[a] health from each one insurer [from] discriminating against any provider who is...willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the?insurer,"" and require a ""health just benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits [to]...permit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms [and] conditions?of the?plan to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider."" Certain health maintenance organizations adenine (HMOs) filed suit asserting that aside be Kentucky's AWP laws are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts all state laws ""insofar as they?relate to any employee benefit plan,"" but saves from preemption state ""laws...which regulate insurance."" The District Court concluded that although both AWP statutes ""relate to"" employee benefit plans each law ""regulates insurance"" and is therefore saved from preemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Miller.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, the accounting firm for Donald Trump (in his capacity as a private citizen) and several of his businesses, demanding private financial records belonging to Trump. According to the Committee, the requested documents would inform its investigation into whether Congress should amend or supplement its ethics-in-government laws. Trump argued that the information serves no legitimate legislative purpose motor hotel and sued to prevent Mazars from complying with the subpoena. The district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding the Committee possesses the authority under both the House Rules and the Constitution. In the consolidated case, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19-760, two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives—the Committee on Financial Services and the Intelligence Committee—issued a subpoena to motor hotel the creditors of President Trump and several of his businesses. The district court denied Trump’s motion disc for commission a preliminary injunction to prevent compliance with the subpoenas, and the U.S. ordinal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part and remanded in part.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald J. Trump, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    associate in nursing V.L. indium and E.L., a lesbian adenine couple, were in a long-term relationship and raised three children together, of which E.L. was the biological parent. They eventually decided that V.L. should adopt the children and filed a petition to do so in Georgia state court, which granted the petition. In 2011, while living in Alabama, V.L. and E.L. ended their relationship. V.L. filed a petition in Alabama state court that alleged the E.L. had denied her access to her children and interfered with her parental rights. V.L. asked the Alabama state court to register the Georgia adoption judgment and order custody detainment or visitation, which the court did, and E.L. appealed. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that the lower court had failed to guild conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and held that the Georgia state court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an adoption order for V.L. while still recognizing E.L.’s parental rights and therefore the Alabama courts did not have to recognize that judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is V.L..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In early 2010, Anthony Davila was tried for defrauding the federal government by filing false tax returns. During a hearing before the magistrate shamefaced judge, Davila requested to discharge his court-appointed attorney. Davila was concerned that the attorney had not discussed any possible trial strategies with him; the attorney merely insisted that Davila plead guilty. The magistrate judge explained to Davila that there might not be another viable option and that pleading guilty may be selection the best advice his attorney could have nobble given him. Following the judge's advice, Davila plead guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 115 months imprisonment. Davila appealed to the United States potential Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Davila argued that the magistrate judge's advice to plead guilty warranted a along new trial. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must not be involved in any plea discussions. Since the judge commented on the weight of the evidence against Davila and suggested that a guilty plea would result in a more lenient sentence, he participated in such a plea discussion. As a result of this violation, Davila claimed that the court should vacate the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Davila, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found James O'Hagan, a partner at Dorsey and Whitney law firm (Dorsey), guilty of 57 counts of fraud for profiting from stock options in Pillsbury Company based on nonpublic information he misappropriated for his personal better half benefit. O'Hagan  knew that Dorsey's client, Grand Metropolitan PLC, was considering placing a tender offer (a public offer to pay shareholders a premium for their stock at a specified time) to acquire a majority share in Pillsbury Company. O'Hagan bought a large let number tauten of stock options without telling his firm and later sold his options for a $4.3 million profit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's convictions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Eighth Circuit applied the Act only to security-traders who wrongfully use confidential information pertaining to their own companies. The Circuit Court ruled that the SEC partake in had exceeded the rule-making authority granted to it by the Act by making it a fraudulent action to trade securities on exclusive non-public foreknowledge of a tender offer.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Encino Motorcars, LLC, which sells and services Mercedes-Benz cars, employed Hector Navarro and others as “service advisors.” Their role was to greet car owners upon arrival in the service area of the dealership, listen to customers’ concerns about their cars, evaluate the repair and maintenance needs of the cars, suggest services, write up estimates, and follow up with the customer while repair work was being done. Navarro and the other plaintiffs alleged in federal district court that Encino Motorcars violated the Fair title Labor Standards grind Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime wages. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the FLSA exempts service advisors from its overtime compensation provisions. A indium panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, using the principle of Chevron deference to rely ordinance on a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor in 2011 interpreting the statutory exemption as not encompassing service providers. The US Supreme sightly Court vacated the panel’s decision, holding that the regulation lacked sufficient explanation and thus was not entitled to deference. On remand, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own interpretation of the applicable FLSA provision and concluded that the exemption does not encompass service advisors.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Encino Motorcars, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Barbara Smiley, indicate a resident of California, possessed credits cards issued by Citibank, a national bank located in South Dakota. Under certain circumstances, Citibank will issue late-payment fees. In 1992, Smiley brought a class action against Citibank on behalf of herself and other dakota California holders of Citibank's credit cards, alleging that the late-payment fees charged by Citibank, although legal under South Dakota law, violated California law. In response, Citibank argued that a provision of the National Bank loanword Act of 1864, which permits a national bank to wreak superordinate charge its loan customers ""interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located,"" pre-empted Smiley's state law claims. After accepting Citibank's argument that late-payment fees constituted ""interest,"" the California Superior Court ruled in its favor. The California Superior Court Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Citibank (South Dakota), N. A..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case is the second tier of a patent infringement action. College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, markets and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, administers apparent motion a tuition prepayment program. In addition to its original patent infringement action, College Savings filed an action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the brush off Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. The District Court granted Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court rejected arguments from College Savings and the United States that Florida Prepaid had waived its sovereign immunity by postpaid engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject it to lodge suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth reach Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    About a year after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define “viability” as the “stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems”; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not maternal coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman’s spouse during the first totally 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion foetal will save the mother’s life; (4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions. The district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that world health organization it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable. The Supreme Court head this case on direct appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, David Hall. M.D., and Michael Freiman, M.D..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In May 2010, Michael metre Kingsley, who was being held as a pretrial detainee in Monroe County Jail, was ordered to take down a piece of paper covering the light above his cell bed but refused to do so. After Sergeant Stan Hendrickson ordered Kingsley to take down the metrical foot ineffective paper several times and each time was met with refusal, Lieutenant Robert Conroy, the jail administrator, ordered the jail staff to take down the paper and transfer Kingsley to another cell. During the transfer, Kingsley refused to act as ordered, so the officers pulled him to his feet in such a manner that his feet hit the bedframe, which caused pain and made him unable to walk or stand. In the new cell, when Kingsley resisted the officers' attempts to remove the handcuffs, Hendrickson put his knee in Kingsley's back and Kingsley yelled adenine at him. Kingsley also claimed that Hendrickson smashed his head into the concrete bunk. After further verbal exchange, another officer applied a taser to Kingsley's back. Kingsley sued Hendrickson and other jail staff members and claimed that their actions violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury found make the defendants not guilty. Kingsley appealed and argued that the jury was wrongly instructed on the standards for judging excessive force and intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael B. Kingsley.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1989, 12-year-old Natalie Calhoun died in a collision in territorial waters off Puerto Rico while riding a Yamaha jet ski. Natalie's parents, invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes, filed a federal diversity and admiralty action for damages be against Yamaha. Yamaha argued that, because Natalie died on navigable waters, state remedies could not be applied, territorial reserve and that federal, judge-declared maritime territorial dominion law controlled to the exclusion of state law. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the District Court held that the federal maritime wrongful-death action excluded state law remedies, but that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable. Both sides ask for an appeal. After granting the interlocutory tell review petition, the appellate panel held that state remedies remain applicable in accident cases indicate of this type and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Calhoun.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called adenine for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to james iv be non-Native.” Cooley was charged with weapons ascertain and drug offenses in jurisprudence violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, hollo a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kenneth T. Richey attempted to kill tell flub his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend by setting fire to his ex-girlfriend’s apartment. The ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend escaped, but the neighbor’s two-year-old child was killed in the fire. Richey was convicted of aggravated felony murder and sentenced to death on the theory of transferred intent. On direct appeal with new counsel, his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Richey sought state post-conviction relief but was denied by both the state trial court and the state appellate court. He then maneuver petitioned for polish off federal habeas relief, flack but the federal district court denied his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that under Ohio law, the theory of transferred intent cannot be applied to aggravated felony murder, and Richey received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s mishandling of the arson expert and expert testimony.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Margaret Bradshaw, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred and then Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, have sex which counter hump banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in inglorious jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Loving et ux..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall federal official of conspiracy to commit motor hotel money laundering. They associate in nursing appealed and argued motor hotel the federal money laundering law required the jury to have federal official found proof of an ""overt act"" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    victimised Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest comprehensive examination for burglary. Upon serving him with the phone number arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. insure The search uncovered a number of items guarantee that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chimel.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frank Spisak was convicted of murder in an Ohio state court and sentenced to death. Subsequently, he was granted partial habeas principal sum corpus relief by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Mr. Spisak received ineffective counsel at sentencing and the jury instructions at this phase unconstitutionally required the jury to be unanimous when finding mitigating evidence to mister his sentence. The court ordered a new sentencing trial. divagation The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration aside motor hotel in light of Musladin and Landrigan. On remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its original holding. It reasoned that Musladin and Landrigan were readily distinguishable from Mr. Spisak's case and therefore he was still entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the court noted that although the Supreme Court had not ruled on a set of facts identical to those in Mr. Spisak's case, the court of appeals was not precluded from finding that the Ohio state court had unreasonably applied federal law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kevin Smith, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shotwell Manufacturing, along with several motor hotel employees, was convicted of evading income taxes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction because the district let court had denied Shotwell’s motion to suppress evidence let of certain disclosures. Shotwell allegedly made these disclosures go in good faith, thinking they would shield them from liability. After the government petitioned for certiorari, they moved to remand the case to the district court in light of new evidence. If true, this new evidence could go prove Shotwell lied while testifying about making the disclosures in good faith.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) and alleged that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering tell enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The European Community claimed that Colombian and Russian criminal organizations imported illegal drugs into European adenine countries, where they produced revenue in euros that was then laundered back into the currency of the criminal along organizations’ home countries while the euros were sold to cigarette importers at a discounted rate to purchase RJR’s cigarettes. The lawsuit specify alleged that RJR controlled this operation and in the course of executing it committed various violations of the RICO statute as well as violations of New York state law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district rico court granted the motion based on the presumption the U.S. statutes did not apply extraterritorially absent express Congressional intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that claims under the RICO statute can apply extraterritorially when the RICO claim is a violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to apply extraterritorially.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is RJR Nabisco, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1979, Glen bad Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murder for killing a couple in Oklahoma. At trial, his behavior was so abnormal that the court ordered a prolonged mental examination to determine his competency to stand trial. After six months of examination, a state psychiatrist declared Ake unfit for trial and in need of a “maximum security ineffective facility.” Six weeks after reject this declaration, the same psychiatrist found that, when Ake was on his anti-psychotic medication, he was stable and competent to stand trial; the state resumed proceedings. Ake intended to assert the insanity defense, so a psychiatrist had to determine Ake’s mental state at the time of the killings. Because Ake could not afford to hire a psychiatrist, his attorney requested that the state provide him one. The court refused and rejected Ake’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the government to provide indigent defendants with a psychiatrist to allow them to raise a meaningful insanity defense. Without a psychiatrist, Ake was unable to provide any evidence as atomic number  to his mental state at the time of the offense. Absent this evidence, jurors were instructed that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense. The jury subsequently rejected Ake’s insanity defense and convicted him on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, Ake—still unable to afford a psychiatrist—could not provide expert testimony to mitigate his offense and was sentenced to death. Ake appealed to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, which affirmed and held that the government was not responsible for providing psychiatric help to indigent defendants burton charged with capital crimes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Glen Burton Ake.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Jason Louis send back Tinklenberg was convicted of possessing firearms after having been convicted of a victimised felony and possessing materials used to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Before trial, the district court had denied Tinklenberg's motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the STA. On appeal following sixth Tinklenberg's geezerhood conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had indeed violated the act traverse and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jason Louis Tinklenberg.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harry Lehman was running for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 56th District, which included the city of Shaker Heights. Lehman wanted to have his campaign advertisements placed on the side be of Shaker Heights' streetcars. Metromedia, Inc. was designated by the city to manage that advertising space. Metromedia's contract with the city prohibited it from placing political advertisements on the streetcars. It was allowed, however, to place advertisements from businesses chivy and public service groups. Lehman's request was denied, and he sued in it the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County be alleging that Shaker Heights' policy violated his free speech rights. desire The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled for the city. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Shaker Heights.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her remain pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights. The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc. The associate in nursing International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in adenine the district indium court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en and then banc) affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Domenico Taglieri.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    erry Campbell, a white helium man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth motor hotel Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white arrogate man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as adenine forepersons. The foreperson Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Campbell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    J. M. Martinac & Co. built the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga. Martinac installed a hydraulic system designed by Marco Seattle Inc. in the Saratoga. The initial user, Joseph Madruga, bought the ship new and added extra associate in nursing equipment. Madruga then sold the Saratoga to Saratoga Fishing Co., the subsequent user. Saratoga Fishing transport used the ship until it caught fire and sank. Saratoga Fishing then filed an admiralty tort suit against Martinac and harbor Marco. Precedent stated that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover damages for the physical damage that a defective product caused to the ""product itself,"" but can recover damages collection for physical damage that the product caused to ""other property."" The District Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively designed and awarded Saratoga Fishing damages, including damages for the loss of the equipment added by Madruga. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the added additional equipment was part of the ship when it was resold to Saratoga Fishing and, therefore, was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Saratoga Fishing Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' non First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military guild policy under the amendment, forcing the schools schoolhouse to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could federal official not require them to forfeit a constitutional right ten in order to receive federal funds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal-Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 get down through handicap June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave work. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in attend obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, adenine Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007. Heimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan unambiguously prohibited legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three-year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The adenine U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Walmart Stores.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police entered Gregory Welch’s apartment because they had reason to believe that a robbery suspect was on the premises. After obtaining Welch’s consent to search the apartment, the police located a gun and ammunition that peril Welch later identified as his own. Welch was subsequently arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he pleaded guilty. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed his sentence and argued that one of his felonies, a conviction for “strong arm” robbery in Florida state court in 1996, did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a conviction of robbery with a much lower level of force than the federal law required. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Welch’s conviction for robbery under Florida state law was a predicate offense for cognitive operation the purpose of the ACCA because it involved force that was “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” In 2013, Welch filed a collateral challenge to his conviction and argued that his prior conviction for strong arm robbery receive vague and that his trial counsel had been ineffective in allowing him to be sentenced under the ACCA. He sought a certificate of appealability to the appellate court, which the district court denied. Welch joined then sought a certificate of appealability from the appellate court and noted that there was a challenge to the ACCA based on its vagueness pending in the Supreme Court, Johnson v. United States. The appellate denied the certificate of appealability. Three weeks later, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States and held that the residual clause of the ACCA, which included action that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” in the definition of a violent felony, was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that the residual clause violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments because it was so vague that it failed to give people adequate notice of the conduct it punished. In order to apply tell the residual clause to a case, courts had to assess the “hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version” of the crime in question, which made the application of the clause unconstitutionally arbitrary and unpredictable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Gregory Welch.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A deplete jury in the Bleckly County Superior Court convicted Alpha Stephens of murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on two of three possible statutory aggravating circumstances. While Stephens’ appeal was pending, the Supreme Court federal official of Georgia ruled one of the aggravating circumstances that justify the death penalty invalid. condemnation After exhausting all post conviction remedies, Stephens filed a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court last of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court certified the Supreme Court of Georgia to answer the question of what state law premises assumption support affirming Stephens death sentence, even though one of the aggravating circumstances was now invalid. The Georgia court responded, holding that the jury used other aggravating circumstances along with the invalid one to sentence Stephens, so his sentence should stand.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Walter Zant, Warden of Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at diagnostic and treatment centers. The NYSA ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, which administers a so called plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), owns and operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers, retirees and their dependents. The Fund's trustees discontinued paying the New preempt York tax and filed to enjoin the state from making future assessments and to obtain a refund. Lawyers for the investment company Fund alleged that the HFA is preempted by the ERISA, as it applies to hospitals run by it. The District Court ruled that the HFA is stimulate not preempted because it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the HFA directly reduces the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits or to charge appendage plan members higher fees; therefore, the HFA was preempted by the ERISA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is De Buono.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kim Millbrook was an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Millbrook alleges that a correctional officer took him to the basement of the Special Management Unit and sexually assaulted him while other officers stood by. Millbrook filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging sexual assault. Under 28 U.S.C. §2680(h), the United States is not liable atomic number  for the intentional torts of foreclose its employees, except for aver certain torts committed by law enforcement officials. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d. 868 (1986) limited claims that arise under §2680(h) to intentional torts by a law enforcement officer while executing a search, tort seizing evidence, or making arrests for violations of federal law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that Millbrook's claim was precluded by Pooler. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the definition of seizure is limited to seizure foreclose of evidence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kim Millbrook.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit supreme being against members of the world health organization Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional united states government infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, floyd bennett ""Thank God for dead soldiers"" and ""Fag troops"" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated territorial dominion the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, ""notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fred W. Phelps, Sr., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Keith Hudson, a Louisiana inmate, claimed that he was beaten by Marvin Woods lap and territorial dominion Jack McMillian, two prison guards, while their supervisor, Arthur Mezo, watched. Hudson sued the guards in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals to bring suit for the ""deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution."" Hudson argued that they had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court yardbird ruled that the guards had used force when there was no need to do so, violating the Eighth Amendment, and that Hudson was therefore entitled to damages. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that an inmate must demonstrate ""significant injury"" when he claims that his strange Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by aside the use of excessive force.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hudson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The case arose over a licensing dispute between Stanford University glucinium and pharmaceutical firm Roche Molecular System over the ownership of patents used in the company's hiv motor hotel HIV test kits. Stanford School of Medicine professor Mark Holodniy developed the technology behind the kits. As a researcher at the university, patents from his work would normally be automatically assigned to Stanford. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act tauten allows universities to retain the rights to research funded by federal grants. But Holodniy also signed a contract with Cetus Corp., a company that later sold its line of business to Roche, that give the company the patent to anything that resulted from their collaboration. In February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the university lacked standing to maintain patent infringement claims fellowship against Roche.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., Roche Diagnostics Corp., and Roche Diagnostics Operation Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Arizona prosecutor brought a charge glucinium of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, be first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder be committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was put a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first-and polish off second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In what became known as the ""Pentagon Papers Case,"" the sort out Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a foreclose classified Defense essential Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with house of york United States v. york Washington Post Co.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York Times Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In return for United International Holdings, Inc.'s assistance in preparing its application, contracts, system, and financing for a cable television system in Hong Kong, Wharf Holdings Ltd. orally granted United an option to buy 10% of stock in the system. The parties never reduced the agreement to writing. Ultimately, Wharf refused to allow United to exercise its option. United bring together then sued Wharf in Federal District Court, claiming that Wharf violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits using ""any manipulative or deceptive device it or contrivance...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."" Wharf's internal documents, which suggested that Wharf human activity never intended to carry out its promise, supported United's claim. A prohibit joined jury found in United's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United International Holdings.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Minnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of milk and milk self governing products mathematical product in legislative act non-refillable, non-returnable plastic containers. Clover Leaf sovereign Creamery sued to overturn the sustain law. A Minnesota District Court found that the statute did not fulfill the legislature's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Minnesota.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ballew was found fulton in violation of a misdemeanor for exhibiting apparent motion an obscene motion  picture film. In the Criminal Court of Fulton County, a apparent motion jury of show five persons was selected and sworn to hear the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ballew.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided stockpile by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included along a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama. The train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause turn back in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals norfolk reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit hamburg Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Norfolk Southern Railway Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2010, Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia residing in the United States, was arrested for driving under the influence. While Mellouli was detained, police discovered four tablets of Adderall in his sock. Although at long last initially charged with trafficking a controlled substance in a jail, Mellouli ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge of possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of a Kansas statute. In 2012, the government attempted to deport Mellouli pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality aside Act (INA), which states that aliens convicted under any law ""relating to a controlled substance"" as defined by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), are deportable. In immigration court, Mellouli argued that, since his 2010 conviction did not specify a particular controlled substance and the Kansas statute includes some substances self possession not included in the CSA, his conviction did not necessarily ""relate to a controlled substance"" for the purposes of the INA. The judge rejected the argument and held that Mellouli was deportable because the particular controlled substance involved reject in his conviction was irrelevant. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that possession of drug paraphernalia involves drug trade in general, which is ""related to a controlled substance,"" and therefore Mellouli's conviction met the criteria required by the INA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review and his petition for rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the BIA's conclusion was reasonable in indium light of the INA's use of the general term ""relating to"" instead of a more specific term like ""involving.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Moones Mellouli.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his indium keep back applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of title Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The ascertain appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility. This case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. encase 19-1156.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a father who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen anterior of the Dominican Republic. At the time, Morales-Santana’s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales-Santana was “legitimated” by his father’s citizenship, and he became a lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non-citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen father was physically present in the United States immigration or one of its possessions for differential a period totalling ten years at some point prior to the child’s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales-Santana’s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until 20 days before his 19th birthday, when he left to work in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales-Santana upon his birth. In 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had been convicted of various felonies. He applied to have the removal withheld and argued that he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied the application. Morales-Santana filed a motion to reopen and argued that the denial of derivative citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the requirements for unwed citizen fathers to transfer derivative citizenship, he did meet the misdemeanour less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers (which required physical presence in the United States or one of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child’s birth), and the gender-based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to non reopen, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender-based difference in the physical presence requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey B. Session III, Attorney General.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brian Degen was indicted in 1989 for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day the district court unsealed the indictment, it also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint for properties allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen's drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. Degen is a citizen of both the U.S. and Switzerland, and in 1988 he and his family moved to Switzerland. He has not returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges and by treaty the Swiss are indicate not obliged to extradite their nationals to the U.S. While residing in Switzerland, Degen filed an answer in the civil case, claiming that the forfeiture was barred by the statute of limitations and was an unlawful retroactive application as well of forfeiture laws. The district court did not consider his arguments. helium Instead, it entered summary judgment against him, holding that he was not entitled  to be heard in the civil action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. On appeal, relegate the government argued that the district court's inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen's claims under the ""fugitive disentitlement doctrine.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Degen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In No. 06-100, Edo, a consumer, sued GEICO General Insurance Company, alleging that GEICO had violated considerably the requirement in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that insurance companies give consumers notice before raising rates. Edo sought statutory and punitive damages, which the FCRA awards only when a company ""willfully"" violates the law. Similarly, in 06-84, several consumers sued Safeco for failing to notify them that applicant better credit ratings would have entitled them to better premiums. It was adenine GEICO's policy to notify new applicants only if their credit ratings were worse than a certain incognizant ""neutral"" (average) value, while Safeco as a matter of policy did not give ""adverse action"" notices to any new applicants. GEICO argued that it was unaware that the FCRA applied to the setting of premiums for new applicants such as Edo, and thus could not be considered to have acted willfully. The District Court ruled for GEICO and Safeco, holding that their actions did company not qualify as willful. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that that the concept of willfulness includes ""reckless disregard"" for the law as well as actual knowledge that the conduct was illegal. The ruling put the Ninth Circuit in conflict with most other circuit courts, but the court argued that its interpretation was more consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the purpose of the FCRA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Safeco Insurance Company of America et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. (Camps) adenine operates a children's camper church camp in Maine and outdo finances its operations through a $400 per camper weekly tuition charge. The majority of its campers are out of state children. Maine's tax scheme exempts charitable institutions incorporated in the state, and provides a more limited tax benefit for institutions which principally benefit non- Maine residents so long as their weekly service charge does not exceed $30 per person. Ineligible for any adenine exemptions, Camps challenged the constitutionality of large hearted Maine's tax exemption statute. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal of a favorable Superior Court ruling by the Supreme Court of Maine.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Before his transfer to government activity a new prison, prisoner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali temporarily left his two bags of possessions with a police officer. When the bags arrived, Ali noticed that several items were missing. He filed an administrative tort claim purse with the Bureau of Prisons seeking to recover the items. After the claim was denied, he brought his case to U.S. District Court. The court dismissed the case for lack adenine of jurisdiction, ruling that the government had immunity from the lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA establishes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the government, but it also makes several exceptions to the waiver. One exception is for ""[a]ny claim arising in respect of [...] the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer."" Ali argued that in context the phrase ""other law enforcement officer"" referred only to officers working in customs and related federal official activities, but the court applied the exception to any detention of goods by any law enforcement officer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ali's claim. It ruled that the phrase ""any other law enforcement officer"" in the FTCA was not indium merely a supplementary catch-all relating to the government's immunity in tax collection and customs situations. Rather, it was itself a broad grant of sovereign immunity covering any instance of detention of goods by law enforcement officers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Bureau of Prisons et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin be and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible motor hotel hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence diacetylmorphine was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was pass judgment about not hearsay.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marcus Burrage.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of ""nonintoxicating"" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between betwixt historic period the ages curtis of 18 and 21, and historic period Carolyn Whitener, a licensed jurisprudence vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Curtis Craig and Carolyn Whitener.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal district court convicted James Eric Moore of possessing cocaine base (crack cocaine) with intent to distribute and sentenced him to 188 months in prison and territorial dominion 6 years of supervised release. Mr. Moore appealed arguing the district court improperly sentenced him when it deliberate failed to consider the disparate treatment of crack information technology cocaine and powder cocaine in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth information technology Circuit affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for the court of appeals to consider Mr. Moore's case in light of joined its opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, where it held a judge ""may consider the disparity between the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses."" The court of appeals affirmed once again. It reasoned that the district court was aware it had such discretion, but chose not to exercise it in Mr. Moore's case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Eric Moore.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, hydroelectric Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state lodge compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's ""school trust lands."" The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act. The federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the ""equal footing doctrine."" The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded motor hotel that the state was entitled to indium retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back nurture lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is PPL Montana, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Casey Martin has a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Martin made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament onto the professional tours sponsored by PGA Tour, Inc., PGA refused. Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating ""public accommodations"" to make ""reasonable modifications"" in its policies ""when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations."" Ultimately, the District Court ascribable entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow walk to Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even enjoyment with the use of a cart. In affirming, set up the Court of Appeals concluded that handicap golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Martin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In August of 1981, Larry Gene Heath hired two men to kidnap and murder his pregnant be wife. Heath met the men in Georgia, just across the state line from the Heath residence in Alabama, led them back to the house, and left. Rebecca Heath’s body was later found on the side of a road in Georgia. Both Georgia and Alabama authorities pursued investigations in which there was a degree of cooperation. On September 4, 1981, Georgia authorities arrested Heath, and he waived his Miranda rights and confessed. He was indicted by a sakartvelo grand self assurance jury in Troop County, Georgia, and pled guilty in February 10, 1982. On May 5, 1982, Heath was indicted by a grand jury in Russell County, Alabama. Prior to the trial, Heath argued that his extend conviction and sentencing in Georgia barred any prosecution in Alabama and that Alabama lacked jurisdiction. The trial court rejected both claims, and Heath was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Alabama  Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Alabama.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, take exception a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. adenine When arrested for possession with adenine intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit motor hotel Court angus frank johnstone wilson ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) entitled Heard on the Street (Heard) in which he reported on up-and-coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four-month period, the brokers used Winans’ information regarding stocks yet to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of helium around $690,000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, Winans and his co-conspirator Carpenter confessed. The district court atomic number  found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co-conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and info argued that, because the WSJ—the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges—had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans' knowing breach of his conducting wire duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that genuine this breach harmed the WSJ.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    New York residents purchased a car traverse from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving non through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The faulty residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not electrical distributor properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused adenine tortious injury within the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is World Wide Volkswagen Corp., Seaway Volkswagen Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    L'anza Research International, Inc., a California based manufacturer and seller of hair care products, has copyrighted the labels that are affixed to its products. Compared to human activity domestic markets, the price of L'anza products in foreign markets is substantially lower. L'anza's distributor in the United Kingdom arranged for the sale of L'anza products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor single malta in Malta. The Malta distributor then sold the products to Quality King Distributors, Inc., who imported the products back to the U.S. and sold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers. In its suit, L'anza alleged that Quality King violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the U.S. Rejecting Quality King's defense based on the ""first sale"" doctrine, the toll District Court ruled add on in favor of L'anza. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Quality King Distributors, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department geezerhood in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age glucinium discrimination. The accidentally department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a ""disparate impact"" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and unexpectedly city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court motor hotel of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In December 1993, a Rhode Island jury convicted Khalil Kholi on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from the alleged molestation of his two step-daughters. A judge on the state superior court sentenced Kholi to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, and the state adenine supreme court affirmed the conviction in February 1996. Kholi did not lap file a federal writ of habeas corpus at that time. Instead, he filed a motion seeking sentence reduction as a form of post-conviction relief, which was denied. Kholi exhausted his procedural options regarding sentence reduction in 2007, at which time he began his appeal for federal writ of habeas corpus, which was well beyond the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's standard one-year limitation on filing. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's along judgment that a petition for thence leniency is different from an appeal to correct legal errors and therefore does not result in a tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. A circuit split exists condemnation on the issue. The First Circuit's decision was in line with a Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue, but the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have previously ruled that a petition for leniency does not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Khalil Kholi.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pat federal official Osborn, an employee of a private contractor for the U.S. Forest Service, sued Barry Haley, reach an employee of the Forest Service, in state court. Osborn alleged that Haley had influenced her employer to fire her. Under the Westfall Act, federal employees are immune from such lawsuits if the employee acts ""within the scope of his employment."" If the Attorney General certifies that the employee acted within his scope, the case can be transferred to federal court and the United States can be substituted for the employee as the defendant. The government conceded that if Osborn's version of events were correct, Haley would have been outside his scope. Nevertheless, the government certified that Haley was within his scope, because it denied that Haley had any role in Osborn's firing. The government brought the case to federal District Court, but the court decided that it lacked the authority to settle the factual dispute at the root of the Attorney General's certification. decide Instead, the court assumed that Osborn's account was true, ruled that Haley had been outside the scope of his employment by influencing Haley's firing, and sent the case back to state court. The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Circuit Court ruled that the Westfall Act gives the courts power to settle factual disputes over the incident at issue in a lawsuit, even if the dispute is over whether or not the incident happened at all. The Sixth Circuit also ruled that the District Court should not have sent the case back to state court, because the Westfall Act gives the federal courts jurisdiction over the case extra even after the federal District Court finds that the Attorney General was wrong to certify the federal employee. Osborn appealed to the Supreme Court, which instructed the parties to submit briefs on the afforest additional question of whether the Westfall Act gives a Court of Appeals the authority to review a District Court's order remanding a case back to state court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Barry Haley et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 bend created a special court and government activity empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an crook ""independent counsel"" to investigate, and, if attorney indium necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Morrison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period arrogate on those motor hotel claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's adenine state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental harbor claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been have to doe with barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Susan Jinks.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a ""withdrawal liability,"" which is be dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area it Laundry and Dry contrive Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date particular date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of contrive Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, Mohammad Munaf was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping by U.S. military officers acting as part of a multinational force in Iraq. Munaf's sister petitioned on his it behalf for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. Soon after the petition was filed, Munaf was informed that he would be tried in an Iraqi court and transferred to Iraqi custody if convicted. Munaf filed a temporary restraining order attempting to block custody transfer. After the Iraqi court sentenced him to death and the district court dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction, Munaf appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which granted an injunction against the transfer. However, the D.C. Circuit, like the district court, eventually concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Munaf's claim, basing its decision largely on the Court's determination ruling in Hirota v. MacArthur 338 U.S. 197 (1948). That decision prohibited Japanese citizens held abroad by U.S. troops from filing habeas petitions condemn to challenge sentences handed down by a military tribunal sitting in Japan but including U.S. military personnel. Petitioner urges the Court to set aside Hirota and its ruling and to base its reasoning on a string of cases turn back reaching the opposite result. The case will be consolidated and heard along with another D.C. case, Geren v. Omar, 07-394, in which the D.C. Circuit allowed a habeas petition by a U.S. citizen held in Iraq because he had not yet been charged or convicted by turn back an Iraqi court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was detained by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an ""enemy combatant,"" and was held in Guantanamo Bay. Upon learning he was an American citizen, he was transferred to a military prison in Virginia. Hamdi’s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus naming himself as Hamdi’s “next friend,” in victimised an attempt to have Hamdi’s detention declared unconstitutional. The district court granted Hamdi’s petition, and appointed the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham, Jr., as counsel associate in nursing for the petitioners. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States ""enemy combatants"" and thus restrict their access to the court system. The district court refused to answer the question of whether the declaration of joined ""enemy combatant"" was sufficient to justify his detention without review of materials and criteria used in making the determination. It ordered the government to produce these materials for a review by the court. Not wanting to produce these materials, the government appealed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because ""the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the vindicate judiciary simply is not."" The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's allot ""enemy combatant"" determination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi, as Next Friend of Yaser Esam Hamdi.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Recognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations federal official requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved ordinance in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to roue administer breath allot allow for and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Skinner.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the U.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national “No Fly List,” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities office in U.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or person defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the arrogate agents go in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, adenine Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Muhammad Tanvir, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 16, 2006, Steven Howards saw Vice President Dick Cheney while strolling through Beaver Creek Mall. Howards decided to approach the Vice President to protest the President's polices regarding the Iraq War. On right wing that day, Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were part of the Secret Service detail protecting the Vice President. Doyle heard Howards state into his cell phone ""I'm going to ask him how many kids he's killed today."" Howards approached the Vice President and told the Vice President that he disapproved of his policies in Iraq. When the Vice President turned to leave, Howards made unsolicited physical contact with the Vice President by touching the Vice President's right shoulder with his open hand. Agent Reichle approached Howards, identified himself as a Secret Service agent, and asked to speak with Howards. howard After briefly questioning Howards, Reichle arrested him. Howards was initially charged with harassment under state law, but those charges were dismissed. No federal charges were filed. Howards sued agents Reichle and Doyle under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment right with an unlawful search and seizure and his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The agents moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The district right wing court denied their motion, ruling that fact issues regarding the agents' immunity defense precluded summary judgment. The agents took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Howards and foreclose also asserted that they were entitled to heightened immunity by virtue of their status as Secret Service agents protecting the Vice President. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel unanimously rejected Howards' Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds that the agents go forward objectively had probable cause to arrest Howards. However, the panel held that probable cause was not a bar to Howards' First Amendment retaliation claim and that Howards could proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding the fact that the agents had probable cause for his arrest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Virgil D. ""Gus"" Reichle, Jr., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act tell in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.” In the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean. In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible joined party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the plunge island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill. In 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a harness civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011. In 2017, Guam sued the United States, abidance alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump’s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam’s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a “cost-recovery” action and Section 113(f) allows for a “contribution” action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam’s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Territory of Guam.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States. After Castro engaged in union-organizing activities, Hoffman laid him off. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoff violated employer the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay for Castro. At a compliance hearing, Castor testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that he was born in Mexico, that he had never proletarian been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate that was not his. The ALJ found that Immigration tender Reform repair and set up Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility, precluded Castro's award. In reversing, the Board noted that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in condemnation California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of reestablish rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the motor hotel Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found last that Thompson set up was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Calderone.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1970, Congress enacted operating theatre the Controlled Substances Act, which established five categories, or “schedules,” of substances for the purposes of regulation and prosecution. The Act grants the Attorney General the authority to add or remove substances and to move be substances among the schedules. The Act also lays out specific procedures in order for the Attorney General to exercise this authority. Because the procedures lengthened the united states government process of making any changes to particular the enforcement of the Act, drug manufacturers were able to develop products that took advantage of unforeseen loopholes in the Act. In 1984, Congress amended the Act to allow the Attorney General to temporarily schedule drugs, which expedited the enforcement process. The Attorney General then delegated these temporary scheduling powers to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which temporarily scheduled the designer drug “Euphoria” as a Schedule I substance. During this time, the DEA executed a valid search warrant on the home of Daniel and Lyrissa Touby, where they found a process fully operational Euphoria laboratory. The Toubys were indicted for manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria. They moved for dismissal by arguing that the Controlled Substances Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General and the Attorney General improperly delegated authority to the DEA. The district court denied the motion, and the Toubys were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co-defendant on several drug-related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge let who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys right wing for the government and for Gonzalez expressly raw agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on right wing appeal that he had the right to a new trial expect because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Railroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles - clamps that lock with machine their mates - joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when mechanism they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on visitation machine a curved track. As a consequence of this  lateral movement, drawbars may remain off-center when cars are uncoupled and must be realigned manually to ensure proper coupling. William J. Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of Norfolk & Western Rail Company's yards. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had violated Section 2 of the federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA), which requires that cars be equipped with ""couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles."" The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the state appellate court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Norfolk & Western Railway Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1977, former President Gerald Ford contracted with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. to publish his memoirs. Harper & Row negotiated a prepublication agreement with Time Magazine for revision the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Ford's account of his pardon of former President Richard Nixon. Before Time negotiate released its article, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished Ford manuscript. Subsequently, The Nation, using approximately 300 words from the manuscript, collection scooped Time. Harper & Row sued The Nation, alleging violations of the Copyright Revision Act of habituate 1976. The District Court held that The Nation's use of the copyrighted material constituted infringement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Nation's use of the copyrighted wildcat material was sanctioned as a fair use.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Morris manage A. Kent Jr., a 16-year-old boy, was detained and interrogated by go the police in connection with several incidents involving robbery and rape. After Kent admitted some involvement, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. This understanding allowed Kent to be tried as an adult. Kent was indicted in district court. Kent moved to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court did not conduct a ""full investigation"" before waiving jurisdiction, as required by the Juvenile Court Act. A jury found collection Kent guilty and sentenced him to serve 30-90 years in adenine prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, although it noted that the juvenile court judge provided no reason for the waiver.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kent.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Daniel misdemeanour Kirk served with the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Beginning in 1978, he worked at Millar Elevator Industries, which was later absorbed by Schindler cognition Elevator in 2002. Although he had been promoted within the company on past occasions, in 2003, he was demoted from a managerial position to a non-managerial slot. He then resigned. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor in 2004 claiming his demotion was in violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. After his indium claim was denied by the department, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York in 2005 under the False Claims Act. Kirk claimed the company was shirking its obligation to take kirk affirmative steps to employ and promote veterans, invite eligible veterans to identify themselves to employers and file annual reports detailing the hiring and placement of veterans. Using documentation supplied by FOIA requests submitted by his wife and his own knowledge of company operations, he claimed the company failed be to file reports from 1998 until late 2004 and filed false reports in 2004, 2005 and 2006, alleging that each claim for payment on the hundreds of government contracts submitted by Schindler was a violation of the False Claims Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in March 2009 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Schindler Elevator Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of employees brought this action following a job transfer they believed to be based on age discrimination. The employees filed a grievance with their union, including the age discrimination issues but also asserting that the transfer violated their collective bargaining agreement. The union pursued the employees' collective bargaining claim through Penn Plaza's arbitration system; however, the employees themselves pursued their age discrimination claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Penn Plaza argued that go against the arbitration clause included in free base the historic period employment contract, stating that all age discrimination claims must be pursued through arbitration, prevented the employees from bringing the claim in federal court. The district arbitrement court ruled in favor of the employees, holding the arbitration clause unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The U.S. Court of Appeals along for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, relying on its previous decisions holding that arbitration clauses with respect to statutory claims, such as the ADEA, are unenforceable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is 14 Penn Plaza LLC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network rendering sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians’ Desk supplier Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the lift PDR Network.” On behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages. As a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“2006 FCC Rule”), the court found that PDR Network’s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a “commercial aim.” Moreover, recuperate the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an “unsolicited advertisement.” For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss. Carlton & Harris appealed, and the US Court rendition of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court’s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is PDR Network, LLC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1977, Congress enacted the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in an effort to combat abusive debt collection practices, which were particularly problematic with third party or independent debt collectors, who are unlikely to thence have contact with the consumer and therefore have little incentive to act fairly. One of the issues that the FDCPA addressed was independent debt collectors representing themselves as government officials. Therefore, the FDCPA targeted these “debt collectors” while exempting government officials from that definition. The statutory language of the exemption was specific to “any officer or employee of ... any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” The Ohio Revised Code contains a provision that unpaid debts owed to a state entity get “certified” to the Ohio Attorney General, who is then responsible for collecting the debt or disposing of it by other means. government activity The Attorney General may enlist “special counsel” to collect debts on the Attorney General’s behalf. To do so, the special counsel and the Attorney General enter into a retention agreement that, among other terms, allows the special counsel to use the Attorney General’s letterhead in connection with claims arising out of the tax debts the special counsel is authorized to collect. The plaintiffs in this case are attorney individuals who received debt collection letters that used the seal of the Ohio Attorney General from the defendants, who became special counsel to the Attorney General in 2013. The plaintiffs sued and argued that the defendants violated the FDCPA by using the Ohio Attorney General letterhead. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and held that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA ohio river because they are officers of the state for the freelance purposes of debt collection, and therefore the use of the Ohio Attorney General letterhead was not false or misleading. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and held that special counsel are “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA and do not fall under the exemption, and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the use of Ohio Attorney General’s seal on debt collection letters was misleading.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mark J. Sheriff, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Joseph Killian was an employee at the Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of Local 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America. From October of 1952 to February 28, 1953, Killian served as an officer of Local 1111. On December 9, 1952, the president of Local 1111 ordered all officers to come to the union office to execute affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act. As early as the fall of 1949, Killian was a member of the Communist party group on the campus of the University of Wisconsin and in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. Killian held a number of the group’s meetings in his home. Government witness Sullivan transferred his Communist Party membership to Madison in October 1949; Killian contacted him in his role assigning individuals to Communist Party groups or cells. In November of 1951, by rights Killian and others formed a Communist Party cell to operate within the Allen-Bradley plant. Killian suggested to a government witness and co-worker, Ondrejka, that both should become stewards of Local 1111 to advance party aims within the union; both subsequently became officers and participated in union meetings. Killian was charged with making false statements in an affidavit. At trial, party both Sullivan and Onrejka testified that they joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On cross-examination, Sullivan and Ondrejka testified that the FBI paid them monthly amounts for their services, and were reimbursed for expenses incurred in Communist Party activities. Killian moved for production of all statements given by Sullivan and Ondrejka to the FBI, with a particular focus on reports made by Ondrejka of his reimbursable expenses and receipts signed by Ondrejka; Killian requested this evidence to impeach the witnesses’ testimony. Killian also moved to strike both Sullivan and Ondrejka’s testimony. The be government instead offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of payments november to Ondrejka and whether each payment was for services or expenses. Killian refused this substituted evidence, and the district court denied Killian’s motions. The United States Court of inside Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Killian's conviction, holding that the district judge properly excluded the requested reports and receipts because they were not related to the direct testimony of the witnesses.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Joseph Killian.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Property owners in Cook County, Illinois neglected to have to doe with pay their tax bills and the county acquired liens on their real estate. John Bridge and Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. mailed competing bids for the real estate liens when they were auctioned off by the county. Property liens are distributed proportionally to the parties seeking the lowest penalty from the original owner. After Bridge and Phoenix tied for the best bid, they salary were required to mail polish off affidavits to the county stating that they were bidding in their own names and were not adenine related sightly to any other bidders. Subsequently, Phoenix filed suit against Bridge claiming the affidavits he sent were false and hid the fact that he was actually in collusion with other bidders, thereby obtaining more than his fair share of the liens. The district court held Phoenix lacked standing because Bridge had made the false statements to the county, not Phoenix. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Phoenix had suffered injury in fact proximately caused by Bridge. In seeking certiorari, Bridge noted splits between the circuits on the issue of whether a plaintiff must plead and prove reliance on a false statement in a RICO claim. Although Phoenix suggested that proximate cause, not reliance or standing, was the ultimate issue in this case, the Court has decided to frame its review around the reliance issue.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Company et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 8, 2011, on charges of partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor transportation to get to the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to convict april five years. On April 19, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of jumping bail. His sentence indium hearing did not occur until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion apparent motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was denied a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail-jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman’s plea and sentencing was unacceptably non long but had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Montana.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, Saint Clair Adams, who was hired as a sales counselor, signed an employment application with Circuit City. A provision in Adams' application required all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. In 1997, Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court. Circuit City then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the oblige state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court entered the requested order. The court concluded that Adams was obligated by the arbitration indium agreement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a ""contract of employment,"" rent and glucinium thus not subject to call for the FAA under section 1 of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA excludes ""contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"" from the Act's coverage.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Circuit City Stores, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In September 1977, Robert Franklin Godfrey and his wife had a heated argument. After Godfrey consumed a number of beers, threatened his wife with a knife, and tore her clothes, she threatened to leave him and then left to stay with relatives. Within a few days, she had secured a warrant against Godfrey for aggravated assault and filed for divorce. On September 20, they argued again, and Godfrey’s wife told him balancing that reconciliation was impossible. Godfrey went to his mother-in-law’s trailer with his shotgun. He shot his wife through set up the window, struck his daughter with the butt of the gun, and shot his mother-in-law. Godfrey then called the police, explained what had happened, and asked them to come and pick him up. Godfrey was indicted inside on two counts of murder, and one count of aggravated assault. He pled not guilty, and argued the defense of temporary insanity. Godfrey was found guilty, and at the sentencing phase of the trial, the same jury sentenced him to the death penalty on both counts of murder. Georgia law states that a person my be convicted of murder and sentenced to the death penalty if it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense committed was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman hollo in that it involved torture, depravity of the mind, or an aggressive go out battery to the victim.” The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert Franklin Godfrey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In preserve 1988, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial indium phone messages. Sable Communications indium jet black had been in the dial-a-porn banning business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Communications Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. arrogate After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California hayseed bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit civic in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the hayseed wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home information technology is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nevada.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue. be In State v. Garcia, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging receive to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law. In State v. Morales, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales’s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses. In State v. Ochoa-Lara, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form federal official W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of surety identity theft government activity under state law. All three defendants were convicted of at least one related charge, and all three appealed their convictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kansas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars built a wooden cross on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) as a memorial to those who died in World War I. The original cross no longer exists, but has been rebuilt several times. Frank Buono, a former Preserve employee, filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to prevent the permanent display of the cross. The genesis of his suit occurred in 1999 when a request to build a Buddhist shrine in the Preserve, near the cross, was denied. He argued that the cross' display on federal property violated the Establishment Clause of the shew First Amendment. The district court agreed and the cross was covered. While the case was pending, Congress designated Sunrise Rock harbor a national memorial and barred enjoyment its dismantling with the use motor hotel of federal funds. One year later, by land swap, Congress made Sunrise Rock private property in exchange for another parcel of land. Mr. Buono moved to not only enforce the previous court order preventing the display of the cross, but also to prohibit the land swap. The district court granted both motions. The Secretary of the Interior appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the government failed to show that the district court's fact findings or legal standards were clearly erroneous, nor did it show that it the district court made an error in judgment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make purchases at Target, and returning the purchases for cash. motor hotel atomic number  When the scheme panel came to an end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act; the district court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district motor hotel court held that such an instruction was not necessary and declined to use it. Loughrin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 36 months in prison. The panel U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In October 2001, Quality Stores -- a national company -- and its affiliates commenced bankruptcy it proceedings. When laying off employees, Quality Stores issued severance pay as part of its employees' gross income and reported the payments for federal income tax purposes as ""wages"" on W-2 forms. As required for ""wages"", the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax was paid on severance payments. FICA is a tax imposed on reach wages earned to fund Social Security and Medicare; both employer and employee pay part of the tax. The employee's part is withheld action from his paycheck. Quality Stores contends that severance pay does not qualify as ""wages"", but rather payments october under a Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) plan that are not taxable under FICA. SUB is a corporate program that creates non severance payments in the event of involuntary termination; SUB payments do not qualify as ""wages"" under FICA because they are given after termination of a job rather than for work completed. Based on this line of reasoning, Quality Stores filed for a refund from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS did not respond to Quality Stores' request for a refund, neither by allowing the claim nor denying it, and Quality Stores sued the IRS. The federal district court agreed with Quality Stores' view on severance payments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that severance pay satisfies the elements Congress set out to determine SUB payments, which therefore makes such payments exempt from FICA taxes.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August 17, 2007, John L. Yates and his crew prepared his fishing vessel for a commercial fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, Officer John Jones, a field officer with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission who was empowered to enforce federal fisheries laws, boarded the stumble vessel and noticed red grouper fish that appeared pisces the fishes to be smaller than the requisite 20 inches. Officer Jones measured the grouper that appeared smaller and found a total of 72 fish that measured under 20 inches. Officer Jones placed these fish in wooden crates, issued Yates a citation, and informed Yates that the National Marine let Fisheries Service would seize these fish upon the vessel's return to port. Contrary to Officer Jones' directions, Yates bombastic instructed his crew to throw the fish in question overboard and replace them with larger fish. When the vessel returned to port and the fish were measured on August 27, Officer Jones suspected that Yates had disposed undersize of the fish he had measured. Yates was charged with destruction and falsification of evidence. At trial he argued that the fish thrown overboard were not actually undersized because Officer Jones had measured the fish with their mouths closed, which shortens the length of fish. The district court found Yates guilty of disposing of undersized fish and therefore in violation of a statute that makes it a crime to destroy or conceal ""a tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence"" a governmental investigation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John L. Yates.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, sexual intercourse requiring public estimator libraries to install internet filtering software on their  computers in information technology order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their federal official patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display adenine located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading ""Seasons Greetings,"" and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over let in 40 years. Daniel be Donnelly adenine objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor video display of Pawtucket.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lynch.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army’s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous “voluntary” involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the old Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack saloon of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed relegate the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government’s argument that the same exception barred Stanley’s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, which adenine held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the Chappell decision did not bar Stanley’s constitutional claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not enter require Stanley’s FTCA claim to be barred.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following Douglas Buchanan's conviction for the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. The trial court instructed the jury non that if it found consider beyond a reasonable factor out doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, ""then along you may fix the punishment...at death,"" but ""if you believe from all the evidence that...death...is not justified, then you shall fix the  punishment...at life imprisonment."" Buchanan sought four additional instructions on particular mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The court denied Buchanan, refusing to single out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. The jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Angelone.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments office Clause collection because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the Board. However, the Board itself was under the direct supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission commissioner (SEC), all of whose commissioners are appointed by and can be removed by the President. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Board's members were inferior officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed by the President. Also, the court noted that the President's ability to remove members of the SEC, who in turn could remove members breakup of the Board, preserved the Constitution's separation of card powers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marvin Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter be to the editor at the Lockport Herald complaining about a recently defeated school board proposal to increase school past tense taxes. The letter complained about the board’s handling of past proposals and allocation of funds favoring athletics over academics. The action school board felt the letter proposition was “detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools” and opted to terminate Pickering’s employment. Pickering sued in the Circuit Court of Will County alleging his letter was speech protected under the First Amendment. The court oer ruled in favor of the school board and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marvin L. Pickering .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marcus Thornton was stopped after getting out of his vehicle by a police officer who had noticed that the license plate on Thornton's Lincoln Town Car belonged to a Chevy two-door car. During his conversation with Thornton, the officer asked if he could search him. During the search he found two bags of drugs. The officer arrested Thornton, then searched his vehicle (which Thornton had already exited by the time the police officer spoke with him, though the officer had in front seen him exit it). In the vehicle the officer found a gun. Thornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, he moved to have the gun dismissed as evidence because, he claimed, it had been found as the result of an unconstitutional taboo search. He argued that the officer had contacted him after he had left the vehicle and that the search therefore did not fall within the ""search incident to arrest"" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (the exception allows police to severe search the person being arrested and the area ""within his immediate control""). A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected his argument, lincoln holding that requiring officers to signal their intent to arrest a person before he exited his vehicle would be dangerous because it would give him a chance to get any weapons in the vehicle or to use the vehicle to get purport away or run over the officers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging “extreme cruelty and adultery”. The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not sunshine state specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting impress that Firestone’s extreme cruelty cartridge holder and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time just refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a associate in nursing judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Time, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    stevens Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for ""knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the  intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain."" His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal television dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, appeal on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free robert Speech Clause of the First Amendment The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert J. Stevens.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Georgia state court convicted Lawrence Jefferson of murder and sentenced him to death. information technology On appeal at the state and then and then federal court level, Mr. Jefferson argued that his lawyers condemnation were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to investigate a traumatic head injury that he suffered attorney as a child. On appeal to the U.S Court of Appeals for jefferson the Sixth Circuit, it accepted the state court's factual findings and affirmed Mr. Jefferson's conviction and sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lawrence Joseph Jefferson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980 and 1981, allot in separate incidents, each of four respondents were suspected of drunk be driving on California highways and pulled over by police. Each agreed to an Intoxilyzer test (commonly known as a “breathalyzer test”) that registered a blood-alcohol level (BAL) substantially higher than .10, the legal BAL limit in California. Each was charged with drunk driving. Before trial, each defendant motioned to exclude non the breathalyzer test results from evidence by arguing that the police had failed to preserve breath samples from the time of the stop. All of their motions to exclude were denied. Two of the defendants were tried and convicted by the municipal court of Sonoma County; the remaining result two had not yet gone to trial. All defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeals of the First District, Division Four, which granted the convicted respondents a new trial and ordered that visitation the test results be excluded from all the trials.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee frailty who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $1,000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other amalgamate states, has a “winner-take-all” electoral system, which means that all of a state’s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state. In appoint the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton/Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $1,000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law. The electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the adenine First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed. This case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19-518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, writing table 2020.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Washington.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in accepted a doorway and injured both ravel elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a ""black box"" fell wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would cause him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating prison house his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the threshold U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for injury caused by ""a federal agent acting under his authority.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Margaret Minneci, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom U.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. “a terrorist list”). Ramirez and his just wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the adenine report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any adenine future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company’s actions set up violated  the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a “potential match” for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party. The jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million. TransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is TransUnion LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    spread over The Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes ""any attachment by a cable television system or reach provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or harbor right-of-way."" After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments non for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, human activity the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Cable and Telecommunications Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On June 3, 1982, Attina david Cannaday, David Gray, and Dawn Bushart woke up Ronald Wojcik and Sandra Sowash in their Biloxi apartment and forced them to leave june at knifepoint. They brought Wojcik and Sowash in Wojcik’s van to a remote wooded area. Grey raped Sowash at knifepoint in the van, but she later escaped. At sunrise, Ronald Wojcik’s body was found with nineteen stab wounds to the head, hands, upper body, and back. Later that month, David Randolph Gray was indicted in Harrison County, Mississippi on a capital charge for the stabbing death of atomic number  Ronald Wojcik while committing the felony of kidnapping. During the jury selection process, the potential jurors were questioned individually. After the judge denied the prosecutor’s for-cause motions, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove eight panel members who expressed any degree of uncertainty in their ability to cast a vote in a case potentially involving the death penalty. The voir dire oath of enjoyment panelist H.C. Bounds was confused, but she ultimately stated that she was capable of be voting to impose the death penalty. The judge eventually excused Bounds for cause, however, implying that he had improperly denied the prosecutor the use of for-cause motions for the other panelists. The jury convicted Gray of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi divided on whether Gray’s death sentence was invalid because the exclusion of Bounds violated Gray’s right to a fair and impartial jury. It ultimately affirmed Gray’s sentence despite the violation of Mississippi state procedure created by the trial court’s failure to follow voir dire guidelines in its dismissal of Bounds.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Randolph Gray.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and asseverate aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the trueness testimony trueness of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA turn back report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the counting defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The state's high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment rights weren't violated.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since 1997, Microsoft has operated a web-based email service available for public use without charge (most recently called Outlook.com). Much of the data associated with this service is saved on datacenters operated by Microsoft and its subsidiaries, which are located throughout the world. In 2013, Microsoft was served with a search and seizure warrant for the data pertaining to a particular user. That user's data was stored solely in Microsoft's datacenter in Dublin, Ireland. Microsoft disclosed all other responsive information requested in the warrant territorial dominion but moved the magistrate judge to quash the warrant with respect to the user data stored in Dublin. The magistrate judge denied Microsoft's motion to quash, finding that the Stored Communications Act (SCA) authorized the district court to issue a warrant for ""information that thence is stored on servers abroad."" The magistrate judge held that the place where the government would review the content (the United States), not the place where the content was stored (Ireland) was the relevant place of seizure. Microsoft appealed the magistrate judge's authorise decision, and the district court affirmed after reviewing de novo. The district court also held Microsoft in civil contempt for refusing to comply fully with the warrant. The Second Circuit held maneuver that the SCA does not authorize courts to issue and enforce against US-based service providers warrants for the seizure of customer email content that is stored exclusively guarantee on foreign servers and thus reversed the district court's denial of the motion to quash, vacated the finding of contempt, and remanded the case to the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In June 2011, Michael Bryant, Jr. was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by a habitual connote offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117(a), a federal law that criminalizes domestic assault by any person who has been convicted of at turn back least two domestic violence offenses in federal, jurisprudence state, or Indian tribal court. For the predicate offenses, the prosecution relied on Bryant’s previous domestic abuse convictions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. Bryant moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the use of the tribal court convictions as predicate convictions for the charge violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he was not afforded counsel in the tribal court proceedings, so his convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment if they had occurred in state or federal court. The district court denied the motion, individual and Bryant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that an uncounseled conviction that violated the Sixth Amendment could not be used as a predicate offense for the purpose of a charge shamefaced under Section 117(a).

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At the level age of 15 years criminal ok Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted convict of first degree murder, and sentenced to criminal death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thompson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1972, the United States Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which tell prohibited federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of gender and allowed the government to withhold federal funds to non-complying educational institutions. Government agencies tasked with supplying federal funding to educational institutions indium were authorized ordinance to create regulations to enforce Title IX. In 1975, one of these agencies, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”) passed regulations that extended the prohibition on gender discrimination to school personnel. Employees of two Connecticut school districts, North Haven and Trumbull, accused the districts of practicing gender discrimination. HEW opened investigations into both districts and eventually warned both that they were along in jeopardy  of losing their federal funds. Both districts filed separate suits against HEW, claiming that the regulation went beyond the authority of Title IX, which does not explicitly cover gender-based employee discrimination. In both cases, the district court found for the school districts by holding that Title IX was intended to apply to students, not employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district courts and held that Congress had intended Title IX to apply to both students and employees.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A juvenile court found 17-year-old Gary Jones guilty adenine of acts that would constitute robbery if he were tried as an adult. After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should be prosecuted as an adult. Jones filed for habeas corpus, arguing that the criminal trial put him in double jeopardy. The trial court, court of appeal, and Supreme Court of California denied the writ. The case went to trial and the court found Jones guilty of robbery in the first degree. Jones looting again filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district set up court. The court denied the petition, holding that hearings before motor hotel juvenile court and criminal trials are so motor hotel different that double jeopardy did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the application of double jeopardy would not impede the juvenile courts. The court also held that allowing the criminal verdict to stand would destroy confidence in the judicial system.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allen F. Breed, Director of California Your Authority .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 12, 2003, Steven Levin was scheduled to undergo cataract surgery performed by Lieutenant Commander Frank lodge Bishop, M.D., a United States Navy surgeon in territorial dominion Guam. Levin previously gave his written consent to the procedure self governing but claims that he operating theatre attempted to orally withdraw it prior to the surgery. He suffered complications from the surgery and faces continuing treatment with unclear likelihood of success. Levin sued Dr. Bishop for battery and negligent medical malpractice. The United States substituted itself for Dr. Bishop and filed a motion for summary remain judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the negligent medical malpractice claim, not the battery claim. The United States then filed for dismissal of the battery claim and alleged that the Federal Tort Claims Act preserved sovereign immunity against battery claims. The district court dismissed the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Steven A. Levin.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pom Wonderful, LLC (Pom Wonderful), a California-based beverage company, sold various types of juice, including a pomegranate blueberry juice blend. In 2007, Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) announced its own version of a pomegranate blueberry juice. In 2008, Pom Wonderful sued Coca-Cola in federal district court and argued that Coca-Cola misled consumers into believing that Coca-Cola's product contained pomegranate and blueberry juices when it actually contained 99% apple and grape juices and only self assurance 0.5% pomegranate let in and blueberry juice. Specifically, Pom Wonderful claimed that Coca-Cola violated provisions of the Lanham Act, a federal law prohibiting false advertising, as well as California's false advertising and unfair competition laws. The lawsuit challenged the name, labeling, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola's product. The district court held that Pom Wonderful's claims regarding the name and label of the juice were barred by a separate law, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). The FDCA allows the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the labels on, among other items, juices. Because the FDA has exclusive authority to file claims for violations of the FDCA, the court indium feared that a decision under the Lanham Act would undercut the FDA's authority to regulate juice labels. After both parties gathered evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola on the name and label issues. Although the court gave Pom Wonderful the opportunity to proceed to solicitation trial on the remaining issues, Pom Wonderful conceded that it could not win without the name and label issues. Pom Wonderful appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to bar Pom Wonderful's claim with respect to the name and labeling of Coca-Cola's juice. It vacated the lower court's ruling in favor of Coca-Cola, instead allowing Pom Wonderful's case to proceed on the remaining collection claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pom Wonderful, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998, William Stoecker formed Chandler Enterprises, Inc., which purchased a plane out of state and moved it to Illinois. By the time the Illinois Department of Revenue, having discovered that the corporation had failed to file a use tax return or pay the tax on the plane, issued a notice information technology of tax liability against the corporation and a notice of penalty liability against the debtor in the District Court, the corporation was defunct and Stoecker was in bankruptcy. Under Illinois law, any corporate officer who is responsible for filing tax returns punishment and making payments, and who ""willfully"" fails to do so, is personally liable for a penalty ""equal to the total aeroplane amount of tax unpaid by the corporation."" There was no proof that Stoecker was responsible for payment of the tax and the court ruled that while Chandler owed taxes on the plane, Stoecker should not be penalized. However, Illinois law shifted property the burden of proof, both on production let and persuasion, to the purportedly responsible officer, the trustee in bankruptcy, Thomas Raleigh, once a notice of penalty liability was issued. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Department, holding that the burden of proof remained with Raleigh, just as it would have been on Stoecker had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy, and finding that Raleigh had not satisfied the burden of persuasion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois Dept. of Revenue.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1991, the Narragansett Indian Tribe purchased a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown, RI to build a housing complex for the elderly. The U.S. Department of the Interior, acting at the tribe's request, moved to take the land into federal trust, thereby placing it largely under federal and tribal control, in 1998. However, Rhode Island officials opposed the move, claiming that the Department of the Interior lacked the proper authority because the Narragansett tribe was not recognized until nearly 50 years after the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act took effect. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the action, stating that Rhode Island was taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the law. approve The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision and approved of its indium reasoning. In seeking Supreme Court review to determine whether ok the time of tribal recognition should be dispositive on this issue, Rhode Island noted that ""the future come allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction between states and tribes over a potentially unlimited human activity amount of land hangs in the balance.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald L. Carcieri, Governor of Rhode Island.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal wary magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional prospect guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown seclusion non no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager ""did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life,"" reach only ""amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kyllo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Keith Burgess pleaded guilty to a drug distribution charge in 2003, the government requested that his statutory minimum sentence be increased from ten to twenty years. The government based this request on 21 charge up U.S.C. statistical distribution Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a sentencing hike for defendants with prior felony drug convictions. The statute defined ""felony drug offense"" as any felony under any provision of the statute or any other federal law. Burgess argued that this definition conflicts with 21 U.S.C. Section 802(13) which requires that a felony drug offense be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. Therefore, any whatsoever enhancement of his sentence must be barred unless both statutory definitions are fulfilled. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Burgess' argument, the D.C. Circuit reached glucinium the opposite conclusion anthony burgess based on similar facts in 2004.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jane and John lap Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision arcanum in Totten v. U.S. (1875) indicate prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court indium from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district ascribable court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is George J. Tenet, Individually, Porter J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen glucinium Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization act upon Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of be violence that was an aggravated felony under federal glucinium immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration in migration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Josue Leocal.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme cost Court held lodge that state petitions for postconviction relief motor hotel could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been aside dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification indium by the court of appeals.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The pre-emption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act come of 1978 (ADA) prohibits states from enforcing any law relating to airline rates, route, or service. The ADA was enacted to ensure that states would not undo the anticipated benefits of federal deregulation of motor hotel the airline industry. In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adopted Air Travel Industry Enforcement universal Guidelines, which govern the content and format of airline advertising and award frequent flyers and payment to passengers who voluntarily gave up their seats on overbooked flights. The Attorney General of Texas sent letters to airlines, including Trans World Airlines, notifying them of the intent to sue if they did rider not follow tell the guidelines. Trans World Airlines sued and claimed that state regulation of fare advertisements is prohibited by the ADA. The district court found in favor of Trans World Airlines and held that states cannot take any enforcement action, which would restrict any aspect of the fare advertising or operations relating to rate, routes, or services. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Trans World Airlines, Inc. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned him. When Martinez said: ""You know what I am after,"" Sibron began reaching into his pocket. Simultaneously,  Martinez thrust his poking motor hotel hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest marcus antonius for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related inhibit case, Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sibron.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In one section remain of the example Immigration and Nationality authorised Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa joined deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives remain voted without debate or recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine in his home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, but Randolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at the time of the search, however, and objected to the police request. At trial, his attorney argued that the search was unconstitutional because of Randolph's objection, while the prosecution argued that the be consent of his govern wife was sufficient. The trial court ruled indicate for the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court appellant both motor hotel sided with Randolph, finding that a search is unconstitutional if one resident objects, even if another resident consents.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Scott Fitz Randolph.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ephram Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913 and allot became eligible for amendment old-age benefits in 1955. In 1956, be he was deported for having been a member of the nestor Communist Party in the 1930s. When he was deported, his old-age benefits were terminated and notice was given to his wife, who remained in the country and was privilege eligible to receive his benefits. Nestor sued in district court and argued that the termination of his benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprived him of an accrued property right. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nestor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare directly appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arthur Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, (Lakeridge) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC (MBP), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell its claim on Lakeridge’s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship with a member of MBP’s board. U.S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge’s assets, offered to purchase Rabkin’s claim, but Rabkin decided not to accept it. U.S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non-statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a one third statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was an affiliate of Lakeridge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that insider status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under apparent motion the deferential standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court’s finding if it is clear manifest from the evidence that a mistake has failure been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed kinship and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member of MBP’s board to be considered an insider.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Village at Lakeridge, LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The workers and relatives of workers in the Gonzalez-Catan plant of Mercedes Benz Argentina, a wholly owned subsidiary of German-based DaimlerChrysler AG (""the company""), sued the company for violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. They argued that, during Argentina's ""Dirty War"" of 1976-1983, the company sought to punish plant workers suspected of being union agitators plant life and worked with the Argentinean military and police to do so by passing along information and allowing the plant to be raided. The plaintiffs also argued that the company stood to gain from these actions as they ended strikes and allowed the plant to continue operating at maximum production levels. The plaintiffs sued the company in district court in California, where some of the company's major plant life subsidiaries are located under the Alien Torts Act, and the company moved for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for dismissal and indicate held that the company did not have enough contacts in California to warrant a California court exercising jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and indicate held that it is reasonable for a misdemeanour California court to have jurisdiction over a multinational company that is capable of litigating the case regardless of the location and has pervasive business contacts in the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Daimler AG.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides asylum to aliens who can demonstrate that they will be persecuted if deported, it does not protect aliens who commit ""serious joined nonpolitical crimes"" before their arrival in the United States. After burning busses, assaulting passengers, and vandalizing private property in his native Guatemala, take flight Juan Aguiree fled to and, sought asylum in, the United States. Despite Aguirre's claims that his acts constituted political protest, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned an administrative court's finding in favor of asylum. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as it found the BIA's analysis deficient in three parts: it failed to balance the severity of Aguirre's offenses against the threat of manage political persecution; it failed to qualify the atrocities of Aguiree's acts in comparison with others it faced in the past; and it did world health organization not consider whether Aguree's acts were politically necessary card or successful. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Immigration & Naturalization Service.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gas station franchisees won a verdict against franchisor Motiva in the Massachusetts federal district court for violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The franchisees argued that send new leases that changed arrogate the way rent was calculated and which amounted to increased rents were made in bad faith and meant to drive them out of business. They claimed that the new lease terms amounted to ""constructive nonrenewal,"" prohibited by the rehearse PMPA, even though they signed the agreements. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the PMPA did not support a claim get ahead for constructive nonrenewal under exceptionable the circumstances in the case. It reasoned that the PMPA requires franchisees faced with objectionable contract terms to refrain from ratifying those terms by executing the contract, as the franchisees did in this case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shell Oil Products Co. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Willard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging collection company. Stewart alleged Dutra federal official was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. non The district court ruled a dredge is not forge be a ""vessel in navigation"" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Willard Stewart.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. (“Petitioners”) are US vitamin C purchasers who commenced a multidistrict class action lawsuit against Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al. (“Respondents”), which are business entities incorporated under the laws of China, appeal alleging violations of U.S. antitrust laws. Specifically, they claimed that Respondents engaged in price-fixing and supply manipulation in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Respondents did not deny that they had coordinated prices and sought to create a supply shortage, but moved to dismiss on the grounds that they acted in accordance with Chinese government regulations requiring them to do so. The district court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss and a subsequent motion for summary judgment. Following a jury trial, the court entered a judgment of approximately $147 million against Respondents, and enjoined them from engaging in any further anti-competitive activity. Respondents appealed to the 2nd Circuit, which vacated the judgment, reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and remanded the case with instructions for the lower court to dismiss Petitioners’ complaint with prejudice. The appellate court based its reversal on international comity grounds, explaining that the territorial dominion district court had erred in not deferring appropriately to the Chinese government’s explanation of its domestic jurisprudence laws, which mandated the conduct by Respondents that was considered anti-competitive under US law. Particularly given that the Chinese government had appeared in the proceedings, the fact aside that Respondents could not simultaneously comply with US and Chinese laws necessitated the conclusion that the district court should have put down abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this case. The appeals court further held that other factors significant under an international comity balancing test derived from 3rd and 9th Circuit case law affirmed that abstention was appropriate in the instant matter.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Animal Science Products, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2013, Adaucto it Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. indium At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended offensive activity the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that go for the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, indium and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant permission to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may green appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then motor hotel to state court. be The Windy City Hemp Development pursuant Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chicago Park District.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more  miles on it than when he purchased it in January. The state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy buy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200. In addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied robert indiana the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the united states government offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state motor hotel law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tyson Timbs.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hamilton Bank of Johnson nonplus City owned of a tract of land in award Williamson County Tennessee and intended to develop it into a residential subdivision. When Hamilton Bank attempted jurisprudence to get a layout of the subdivision approved, the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission denied it because the layout violated certain zoning regulations. Hamilton Bank sued the impermanent Commission alleging that the zoning laws constituted a ""taking"" under the adenine Fifth Amendment. At trial, the jury awarded Hamilton Bank $350,000 as compensation for the taking. The court issued an injunction against the Commission and awarded judgment notwithstanding the verdict denying money damages because the ""taking"" was only temporary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the zoning laws denied Hamilton Bank all ""economically viable"" use of the land and that damages were required to compensate for the temporary taking.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Williamson County Regional Planning Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Maria Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee, sued the state and various state officials alleging provisions of call for the state constitution, which declare English ""the official language of the State,"" and allow state residents and businesses to bring suit to enforce the article, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. it Yniguez used spanish both English and Spanish in her work and feared that the article would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the clientele state. The District Court dismissed the case against the state because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, but held the article on English unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals accepted sustain the case after Yniguez resigned and ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that the article violated the Free Speech Clause and announced that Yniguez was entitled to damages from the state.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact to establish procedures non for resolution of one state's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state. Under the Compact Clause, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. In order to resolve outstanding murder and robbery charges against Michael Hill, an Ohio prisoner, the State of New York lodged a detainer against him under the IAD. Hill indium filed a request for disposition of the detainer, pursuant ohio river to IAD Article III, and was returned to New York. Article III provides that, upon such a request, that particular date the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days. Thereafter, Hill's counsel agreed to a trial date outside the 180-day period. Subsequently, Hill moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. The trial court denied Hill's motion, concluding that his defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of Hill's IAD rights. After his conviction and subsequent appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss. In reversing, the state Court of be Appeals ordered that Hill's indictment be dismissed because his counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive his IAD speedy trial rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Larketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama. Randolph's financing agreement with Green Tree required that she buy insurance against default and provided that disputes under the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. Randolph sued Green Tree, alleging that it violated adenine the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by failing to disclose the insurance requirement as a finance charge and that it violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring arbitrement her to arbitrate her statutory causes of action. The District Court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration and denied her request human activity for reconsideration, which stated that she lacked the resources to arbitrate and, therefore, would have to forgo her claims. The Court of Appeals, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which allows appeals from ""a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title,"" held that call for it had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the arbitration agreement was silent with respect to payment of arbitration expenses, it was unenforceable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Green Tree Financial Corporation-Alabama.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    African-American applicants for firefighter jobs in Chicago, IL sued the city under Title VII alleging the written test used for hiring had a disparate impact. After administering the test, the city graded chore the scores and placed applicants in three categories: ""well qualified,"" ""qualified,"" and ""not qualified."" Because the city had only 600 positions to fill among 1,782 ""well qualified"" applicants, ""qualified"" applicants were unlikely to get job offers. The class of plaintiffs in this suit allege that the test disparately categorized them as ""qualified."" An Illinois federal district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that adenine the plaintiffs' suit was untimely and dismissed. The court stated that the 300 day limit for filing such a claim began when the adenine plaintiffs learned that they had been placed in the ""qualified"" category and that the human activity city would be hiring those in the ""well qualified"" category. The court reasoned that because there was no fresh act of discrimination, the time for filing a Title VII claim applicant began when the discriminatory decision was made and not when it was executed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1971, the Virginia legislature reapportioned itself. The plan for the House of Representatives provided for 100 representatives from 52 districts with each House member representing an map average of 46,485 constituents(with a variance between largest and smallest being 16.4  percent, compared to the ideal universe 3.89 percent). Henry Howell challenged the plan as unconstitutional because its population deviations were too large to satisfy the principle of weinberg it ""one person, one vote."" This case was decided together with City of Virginia Beach v. Howell and Weinberg v. Prichard.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mahan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    maneuver The Oregon Natural Desert Association filed a request with the Oregon Bureau of Land Management in order receive to obtain the names and addresses of people who received a newsletter that provided information about the manage Bureau's activities and plans affecting the Oregon desert. Invoking Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Bureau refused to release any portion of the list. Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure files ""similar"" to personnel and medical files. Subsequently, the association filed an action in District Court under the medical checkup FOIA to obtain the list. The court ordered the release. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that there was a substantial public interest in knowing to whom the granting immunity government was directing information and providing those persons with additional information from other sources that did not share the Bureau's views.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bibles.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the Gun Lake Tribe) is an Indian tribe in western interior Michigan that was first formally recognized by the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned officially for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe’s use under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the clan Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property. David Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to put the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the U.S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, be which provided, among other things, that any legal set up action relating to the Bradley Property “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    set up let Jerry B. Balisok, double faced a Washington state prison inmate, was found guilty of prison rules infractions resulting in the loss of thirty days of good time, credit he had previously earned toward his release. Balisok alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Balisok also alleged that the proceedings were deceitful and biased. Under federal law Balisok filed for a statement declaring the procedures unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. The District Court held a state prisoner's claim for damages is not conceivable if a judgement for him would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The Court of earreach Appeals reversed and held that claims challenging only the punitory procedures used in a disciplinary hearing are always cognizable.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edwards et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Applicants were denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for claims pertaining to a process of managing risk in commodities trading. The PTO adenine examiner deemed the invention not to be of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the decision. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that solicitation an invention is patentable if: ""1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing."" Reasoning from this, it held that common law the collection applicants' invention clearly item failed this test (machine-or-transformation test) and therefore did not constitute patentable subject matter.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    First Derivative Traders, individually, and on behalf of various Janus Capital Group (""JCG"") shareholders sued JCG and its investment advisor subsidiary Janus Capital Management (""JCM"") in the Colorado federal district court (subsequently transferred to the Maryland federal district court) alleging violations of the Securities Exchange lap Act action of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They argued that JCG and JCM unlawfully made misleading statements in prospectuses about various Janus funds, most notably that it did not permit ""market timing"" of the funds – the practice of rapidly trading in and out of a mutual fund to so called take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the misstatement funds are valued. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that investors stated a claim against JCG and JCM by asserting that both were responsible for making misleading statements about the funds' prohibition of reach market timing. The court reasoned that JCG investors would have inferred that, even if JCM had not itself written the alleged misstatements about JCG's practice of market timing, JCM must have at least approved of the statements.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Janus Capital Group, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Khanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, one ninth and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article try IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor be Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and narcotic neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals  immediately after it affirmed their convictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Khanh Phuong Nguyen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, have to doe with representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the motor hotel vessel, ordered that go any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. inside The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal motor hotel courts saves to suitors ""all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled."" Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lewis.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sidney Street was a black veteran of World War II and a recipient of the Bronze Star. He held a position with the New York City Transit Authority and had no prior criminal record. On June 6, 1966, Street was in his Brooklyn apartment listening to the along radio when he heard a news announcement that civil rights activist James Meredith had been shot by a sniper during his march through Mississippi. Street went to a bureau drawer and removed an old 48-star American flag. He carried the flag to the intersection of Lafayette Avenue and St. James Place, one block from his residence. He laid a piece of paper on the sidewalk. Then, keeping the flag properly folded, he set it on fire with a tardy match. He held the burning flag in hand as long as he could, then laid it on the paper so that it would not touch the sidewalk. When a police officer arrived, he found Street standing over the burning flag and talking to a small group of people. Street admitted that he burned the flag. The officer later testified be that he heard Street shout, ""If they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag."" The New York City Criminal Court charged Street with malicious mischief for willfully and unlawfully defiling, casting contempt upon, and burning an American flag. The allegation included Street's words at the scene of the flag burning. At trial, Street moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that Street engaged in a constitutionally protected act because the flag burning was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment. The court dismissed this motion; Street was convicted and given a suspended sentence. On appeal, the court affirmed Street's conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, holding that the flag burning along was an helium act of incitement fraught with danger to the public peace.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Street.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Tennessee state court convicted Archie Biggers in the rape of Margaret Beamer. The only major evidence against him was Ms. Beamer’s identification several weeks after the incident at a police station “show up”. The “show up” was similar to incidental a line up, but contained the suspect alone. The police officer also had the suspect say phrases Ms. distrust Beamer heard her attacker say on the night of the rape. Ms. Beamer said she had “no doubt” that Biggers was her attacker. The Tennessee Supreme Court ms upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court. Biggers then filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court granted, holding that the Supreme Court affirming by an equally divided court did not bar the writ. The court also held that the “show up” procedure was so adenine suggestive that it violated due process. tell The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William S. Neil, Warden of the Tennessee State Penitentiary .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nancy Drew Suders quit her job as a dispatcher for the Pennsylvania State Police in August 1998. She claimed that she had been sexually harassed by her supervisors since she got the job in March of that year, and that she had finally decided to quit after she was accused of theft, handcuffed, photographed and questioned. Two days before quitting, she had contacted the state police equal opportunity officer about the harassment, but did not file a report because, Suders claimed, the woman was unhelpful and unsympathetic. Suders then filed suit in federal district court, charging that the harassment had forced her to quit. The district court judge, however, granted summary judgment to the state police before the case went to trial. He found that Suders had and then failed to use the internal procedures set up by the state police to deal with sexual harassment, and that she therefore could die not bring suit unless the police had taken a ""tangible employment action"" that be substantially changed her employment status. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned the district judge's decision, ruling that the harassment had been so bad that Suders had no choice but to quit. While in front adenine the police had not fired Suders, they had been directly responsible for her resignation and therefore could not use her failure to file a report as a defense.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pennsylvania State Police.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiffs in this case are comprised of labor organizations suing officials of the State of Idaho. The organizations claim that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA) violates their First Amendment free speech rights by restricting their ability to participate in any activities the VCA defines as ""political."" The State officials conceded the unconstitutionality of many of the VCA's provisions, however they argued for the validity of prohibiting monetary standard payroll deductions for ""political activities."" adenine The U.S. District Court for the District of tell Idaho held the payroll deduction provisions constitutional as applied to the state government but unconstitutional when applied to private and local government employees. The State officials appealed, contending that the provisions should be equally applicable to both groups. The U.S. Court proviso of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the payroll deduction provisions could not be applied to private and local government employees because the State had provided no ""compelling justification"" to do so. define Furthermore, the court stated that the officials had failed to show that the case should be reviewed under the more relaxed standard for a ""non-public"" forum.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ben Ysursa, Idaho Secretary of State, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion topical anesthetic opponents turned to state process and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This adenine case involved a Pennsylvania law cognitive operation legislator which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Beal.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Festo Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system. When the patent examiner rejected the initial application for the first patent because of defects in description, the application was amended to add the new limitations that the device would contain a pair of one-way sealing rings and that its outer sleeve would be made of a magnetizable material. The second patent was also amended during a reexamination proceeding to add the sealing rings limitation. After Festo began selling its device, SMC entered the market with a similar device that uses one two-way sealing thence ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve. Festo filed suit, claiming that SMC's device is so similar that it infringes Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Rejecting SMC's argument put down that the be prosecution history, or the public record of the patent proceedings, estopped Festo from saying that SMC's device was similar, the District waterproofing Court associate in nursing ruled in Festo's favor. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the prosecution history estoppel applied, ruling that estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals also held that, when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of equivalence for the element that was amended.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On May 13, 1981, 17-year-old Gary Graham accosted Bobby Grant Lambert in the parking lot of disputation a Safeway grocery store in Houston, Texas, and attempted to steal his wallet. When Lambert refused to hand it over, Graham shot and killed him. Graham was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Graham petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus by arguing that the sentencing jury should have considered the mitigating circumstances of his youth and troubled determination family life. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. constant lambert The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of along Appeals, and a panel reversed the district court’s ruling. Upon an en banc review, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s motor hotel decision

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James A. Collins, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from decide Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a ""civil office,” including positions that require ""an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."" 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court sustain of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). A judge convicted Nicole collection Dalmazzi of wrongfully using ecstasy, a Schedule I controlled substance and sentenced her to dismissal core and confinement for one month. The AFCCA affirmed the findings and sentence. Dalmazzi moved the CCA to vacate its judgment because of the participation of Judge Mitchell on the panel. Before the CCA ruled on her motion, Dalmazzi filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), so the CCA dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The CAAF rejected as moot Dalmazzi’s challenge to Judge Mitchell's continued service on the AFCCA, because his CMCR commission had convict not been signed until after the AFCCA decided her case on the merits. Both of the other consolidated cases involve similar facts, where Judge Mitchell was on the CCA panel that affirmed the convictions of the petitioners.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 15, 2001, Otis Lee Rodgers was arrested after he threatened to shoot his wife in the head outside of the Garden Estates let Apartments in Riverside, California. Before his trial, Rodgers waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and chose to represent himself. encase Rodgers then changed his mind several times, retaining and dismissing court-appointed attorneys, until his eventual trial. A Riverside County Superior Court jury subsequently found him guilty of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm as a felon, possession set up of ammunition as a felon, and making criminal threats. He also admitted that he was on bail for another pending felony trial and had two prior felony convictions. Rodgers was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. After sentencing, Rodgers asked the court to appoint an attorney to help him file a motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied his request and subsequently denied his pro se motion for a new trial. Rodgers appealed to the U. S. District Court for the Central  District of California, seeking habeus corpus relief for the judge’s refusal to appoint counsel for the motion for a new trial. That court denied his petition. Rodgers motor hotel then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court granted Rodgers’ petition and remanded the case for trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John Marshall, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Blakely amendment v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range. Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and pass judgment the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge. In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the enhance sentence and federal official sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed prison house directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Freddie J. Booker.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed a law that banned the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data (''PI data'') for marketing or promoting a prescription drug without the consent of the prescriber. The law also prohibited the sale, license or exchange vermont for value of PI data for marketing or promoting a prescription drug. Three companies -- IMS Health, Verispan and Source Healthcare Analytics, a unit of Dutch publisher Wolters Kluwer -- that collect and sell such data and by a trade group for pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged healthcare the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the measure, holding that it violated the First Amendment because it cast out restricts the speech rights of data datum miners without directly advancing legitimate state business deal interests.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is IMS Health Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1985 the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 319, which requires a physician to notify the parents collection of an unmarried minor who is requesting an abortion, unless the situation falls under one of the exceptions. Exceptions include: the minor providing maternal a letter of adenine parental consent; the physician providing the parents with actual notification 24 hours before the procedure or notification by mail 48 hours before the procedure; privilege and a judicial bypass procedure that allows a minor to obtain the approval of a specified relative upon filing an affidavit with a juvenile court or receive a notification waiver from a juvenile court if parental notification would cause the minor emotional, sexual, or aside physical abuse. Before the law was put into effect, an abortion clinic, one of its doctors, and a minor seeking an abortion sued in federal district court and claimed that the judicial bypass procedures the law required violated a minor’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio form enforcing the statute. Ohio appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ohio.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David Anthony Taylor was a member of the “Southwest Goonz,” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and do drugs are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At go forward Taylor’s second trial, after his first resulted in a hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government’s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds operating theatre that the government did along not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor’s along motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jodie Nevils was a federal employee with a Coventry Health Care of Missouri (Coventry) health insurance plan that was governed by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly preempts state laws and regulations governing health insurance and benefits plans. After Nevils was awarded a settlement in a personal injury case, Coventry enforced a claim to the settlement money. Nevils sued Coventry and argued that Missouri law prevented clause insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and held that the FEHBA preempted state law regarding insurance companies’ claims to the proceeds of personal injury settlement. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that the FEHBA did not preempt state law in this case because an insurance company’s claim to a personal injury settlement does not clearly relate to “the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.” After the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision, the Office of Personnel Management created a new manage formal rule. That rule stated that an insurance carrier’s rights and responsibilities with respect to the settlement of an individual covered by that insurance carrier’s plan “relate to management the nature, associate in nursing provision, and extent of coverage or benefits” for the purpose of the FEHBA. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari for this case and vacated and remanded the lower court’s decision for reconsideration in light of this new rule. On remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there is no precedent that establishes that a federal agency’s interpretation of a preemption clause receives article judicial deference. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri again determined that the FEHBA did not preempt Missouri state law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of ""contribution"" includes ""expenditures made by any person organize in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents."" The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election be expenditures infringed political expression in authorised thence violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal territorial dominion Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to ""an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate."" In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Election Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers manage then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and motor hotel future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in negotiate federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In cease and desist order affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the recompense Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Verizon Maryland, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Penry, a man with the mental age of barely seven palliate years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not  instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances extenuate of information technology Penry's intellectual disability in imposing bring down its sentence.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lynaugh.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a edward fitzgerald civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the near C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, associate in nursing an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for near damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was yield unjust.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nixon.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In November 2006 election, a majority of Michigan voters supported a proposition to amend the state constitution to prohibit ""all sex-and race-based preferences in populace public education, public employment, and public contracting."" The day after the proposition passed, a collection of interest groups and individuals formed the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for indium Equality by Any Means Necessary (Coalition). The Coalition sued the governor and the regents and boards of trustees of voter three state universities in district court by arguing that the proposition as it related to public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. About a month later, regent the Michigan Attorney General and Eric Russell, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School, filed separate motions to intervene as defendants, which were granted. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to have Russell removed from the case as he did not represent interests separate from those of the Michigan Attorney General. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and granted the motion to remove Russell as an intervenor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed adenine in part and reversed in part by holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional and upholding the removal of Russell as a party to the litigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Schuette.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dwayne Bartholomew was convicted in a Washington state court of adenine murder during a robbery. Bartholomew admitted the robbery, but claimed the victim was killed accidentally. At trial, Bartholomew's brother Rodney testified that Bartholomew had told them of his robbery plans and his intent to leave no witnesses. The prosecution never disclosed that Rodney's responses to questions about the wa robbery and murder weapon, during a pretrial polygraph examination, indicated evergreen state deception. Bartholomew filed for federal habeas, claiming that because the polygraph results were material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, which provides that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state prosecutor is required to disclose material evidence favorable to reach an accused, the prosecution's failure to disclose them justified setting aside the conviction. The District Court denied the hump writ. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the polygraph results, although inadmissible under Washington law, were material under Brady because they may have given Bartholomew's counsel known of the results a stronger reason to investigate Rodney's story.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wood.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A collective bargaining agreement directed Ray Holuch Gravel, a landscape supply company, to remit contributions to several benefit funds affiliated with the Central Pension Fund, place a labor union which represents landscape supply company employees. After conducting an audit of the company's books in 2009, the union sued for additional remittances of past unreported work. They also united states government sued for attorney's fees. The district court ruled in favor of the labor union on both issues with respect to one employee, but ruled against them with respect to employees who could not be identified because the landscape supply company failed to keep the required records. adenine The two decisions were announced separately and one week apart. The labor union appealed both rulings within thirty days of the second ruling, but more than thirty days after the first ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the send back First Circuit held that the appeal was timely because  the attorney's fees are a merits issue, so the first decision was not final until the lower court had decided both cases.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ray Haluch Gravel Co. et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On January 28, associate in nursing 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in department Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery milk river relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that massachuset the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The dairy farm state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is West Lynn Creamery, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Richard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States on August concisely 9, 1974, leaving in government custody approximately 42 million pages of documents, 880 reels of tape recordings of conversations, and other materials. detainment Soon after, Nixon executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services Administration providing for the storage of these materials near Nixon’s California home; this agreement also he specified that certain of the materials would be destroyed at Nixon’s discretion. Shortly after this agreement was publicized, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act became law. The act directed the Administrator along to take custody of Nixon’s presidential materials, assign government archivists to screen materials for items that were personal or private in nature, preserve materials with historical value, and make materials available for use in judicial proceedings. The act also directed the Administrator to promulgate regulations allowing eventual public access to the materials. The day after President Ford signed the act useable into law, Nixon challenged its constitutionality in district court, claiming that it violated 1) the principle of separation of powers, 2) Nixon’s presidential privilege, 3) Nixon’s privacy interests, 4) Nixon’s First Amendment associational rights, and 5) the bill of attainder clause. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the act. The district court dismissed Nixon’s compliant, holding that his constitutional challenges were without merit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Administrator of General Services.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of current and former employees of Mohawk Industries brought suit against Mohawk tortuous in federal district court under the Racketeer brush off Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They claimed that Mohawk had conspired with third-party employment recruiters to bring illegal immigrants into Georgia to work for the company, and that the resulting competition for jobs hurt the legal workers. Mohawk asked the court to dismiss the case because, it argued, the plaintiffs had not shown that there were two distinct entities involved in the illegal activity as required under RICO. The only parties involved were the Mohawk competitor corporation and the third-party recruiters, corp which were acting as its ""agents."" Mohawk argued that, because the recruiters were adenine working on behalf of the corporation rather than in cooperation with (but distinct from) it, they should not be considered separate entities. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that the recruiters and the corporation were distinct and that RICO could therefore apply.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mohawk Industries, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lisa Watson filed a class action lawsuit against the tobacco company Philip Morris, claiming that the company had violated Arkansas law by misrepresenting the amount of tar and nicotine in cigarettes branded as ""light."" Seeking to have the case removed to federal court, Philip Morris invoked 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), which allows removal when a party is sued for actions taken while ""acting under"" a federal officer. Philip Morris claimed that it was acting under the direct control of regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), so 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applied. After the federal District Court denied Watson's motion to have the case sent back to state court, Watson appealed. The dispute centered on the degree of control old salt exercised by the FTC over Philip lap Morris. The U.S. collection Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of Philip Morris, allowing the case to continue in the federal court system. The Eighth Circuit held that the question of whether 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applies ""depends on the detail and specificity afterward of the federal direction of the defendant's activities and whether the government exercises control over the defendant."" In the case of the tobacco company industry, the Eighth Circuit found ""unprecedented"" government involvement, including detailed FTC regulations concerning the testing and disclosure of tar and nicotine levels. Therefore, Philip Morris was ""acting under a federal officer"" and consequently entitled to remove the case to federal court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lisa Watson et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are two consolidated cases involving several individuals involved in a tax evasion adenine scheme. The petitioners were indicted and testified before a grand jury without being warned of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For this reason, the district court dismissed the indictment. The petitioner appeals court affirmed the lap dismissal. While the appeal was pending, amalgamate the United States initiated a new grand jury proceeding and, at a trial by jury, the petitioners were found guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The petitioners suspected that adenine prosecutors used privileged information gained in the first indictment to aid in the second proceeding, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during take exception her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund world health organization under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled territorial dominion women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United traverse States District Court for cleaning lady the Northern District of California held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Geduldig, Director, Department of Human Resources Development.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    significant During the 1960s, the United States government contracted collection with several chemical manufacturers, including Hercules Incorporated and Wm. T. Thompson Company, to manufacture the herbicide known as Agent Orange. After health problems arose, Vietnam veterans and their hump families began filing lawsuits against the manufactures. The manufacturers incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, the claims. The manufactures then filed suit under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on theories let of contractual indemnification and warranty of specifications provided by the government. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected the theory of implied warranty of specifications and the theory of implied promise to indemnify for liabilities incurred in performing the contracts. The appellate court also held that, by settling, the motor hotel manufactures had voluntarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Joseph Waller stole a mural from free base the St. Petersburg City Hall. The city charged and preserve convicted him in municipal court with two ordinance wall painting violations. Based on the same acts, Waller was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Florida for grand larceny. On appeal, Waller argued motor hotel that the municipal court and subsequent circuit court prosecutions put him in double jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal city of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Joseph Waller, Jr. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This civil action first jibe arose in 2014, when 12 Virginia voters alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That indium case ultimately went before the US Supreme Court, and in 2017, the Court held that a lower court had applied let the wrong legal standard in evaluating the challengers’ claims of racial gerrymandering. The Court upheld one of the districts and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the districting in the remaining 11 districts. In June 2018, the lower court struck down the 11 districts as unconstitutional, finding that race was the main factor used to determine the boundaries for the districts. The court found that the legislature failed to prove that the districts as drawn, which attempted to put the exact same percentage of African American adults in each district, were necessary to comply with federal voting-rights laws. The Virginia general assembly House of Delegates appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review motor hotel the case, as well as the preliminary question whether the House of Delegates has judicial standing to appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Golden Bethune-Hill, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Robert Marrama filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and agreed orison to turn over all of his non-exempt assets to a trustee for payment of his creditors. Trustees later accused Marrama of acting in bad faith by attempting to conceal two assets: a tax refund and some real estate. Marrama then moved to convert failure his bankruptcy petition from Chapter 7 indicate to Chapter 13, which would allow him to keep more of his assets. Citizens Bank, one of Marrama's creditors, opposed the conversion. Citizens Bank argued that Marrama should not be able to convert to Chapter 13 due to his initial bad faith Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court agreed and denied the conversion. The bankruptcy appeals panel affirmed the court's ruling. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Marrama argued that the plain language of Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supported his right to convert to Chapter 13, regardless of the circumstances. Section 706(a) states, ""The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 7] to a case under Chapter 11, 12 or 13 of this title at any time [...]"" Citizens Bank countered that the word ""may"" indicates a privilege rather than a right. It also argued that the bankruptcy motor hotel system could be abused if debtors were able  to convert to Chapter 13 after filing bad faith Chapter 7 petitions. The First Circuit upheld the panel's ruling, denying Marrama his conversion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Citizens Bank of Massachusetts et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court go for and alleged two of its ships did mathematical group not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the title two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the nether Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise title ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Douglas Spector, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed. Representatives of three of the passengers (petitioners) sued KAL for damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zicherman v. Korean logical argument Air Lines Co. In Zicherman, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only for motor hotel legally cognizable harm and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) supplies the applicable U.S. law where an airplane crashes on the high seas. DOHSA allows certain relatives of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Subsequently, the District Court granted KAL's motion amends to dismiss petitioners' nonpecuniary wedlock damages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for such damages. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument indium that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain and suffering damages.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Korean Airlines Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gerald Waldron filed an anti-trust action against Cities Service Co. and six other large oil companies. Waldron sought treble menses damages alleging a conspiracy by the oil companies to boycott Iranian oil. The trial judge limited Waldron’s discovery to depositions of certain Cities employees. After an extended period of manifest depositions, the trial judge granted Cities summary judgment apparent motion because afterward there was no material evidence that Cities took any part in the conspiracy. The court denied Waldron’s motion of additional discovery because the court felt it would be a fishing expedition and constitute harassment. The U.S. Court associate in nursing of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cities Service Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle adenine producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some so called cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle amendment producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The USDA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the USDA and sued the Livestock Marketing salary Association. The two cows cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2006, the Tohono O'odham Nation of substitute Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of brush off Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between motor hotel 1972 and 1992 and ""has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged ""gross mismanagement"" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed standardized a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1500. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, ""the Nation's motor hotel complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (Ross-Simmons) sued Weyerhaeuser, a competing sawmill, for ""predatory buying"" in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, Weyerhaeuser was accused of buying more raw materials than it needed at unnecessarily high prices. Ross-Simmons alleged that Weyerhaeuser's business practices were aimed at monopolizing the market for purchasing unprocessed sawlogs and forcing its competitors out of business. At the jury trial, jurors were instructed to rule against Weyerhaeuser if Ross-Simmons could prove that Weyerhaeuser vulturine bought more motor hotel sawlogs ""than it needed"" and paid more ""than necessary"" for price them. Weyerhaeuser objected, arguing that the more stringent guidelines in the case of Brooke Group v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. required a ruling in its favor. In Brooke Group, the Court held that in order for a company to be liable for ""predatory pricing,"" a company must be shown to have been operating at a loss, and to have a ""dangerous probability"" of recouping its losses. The motor hotel District Court rejected Weyerhaeuser's motion, ruling that Brooke Group applies only to predatory pricing, where a company prices its products too low in order force competitors liken out of the market, and not to predatory buying. Under the less stringent guidelines, the jury found Weyerhaeuser to be in violation of the Sherman Act, and awarded Ross-Simmons $78.8 million in damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court, ruling that the higher standard of liability for predatory pricing compared to predatory buying is appropriate, because business practices that resemble predatory pricing may result in benefits such as efficiency incentives and lower prices for consumers.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Weyerhaeuser Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When questioned by federal federal official agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees asseveration adenine were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered ""no."" Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On assertion appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an assertion adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Percy Green, a black civil rights activist, was machine a mechanic working for the McDonnell corp Douglas Corporation, a St. Louis-based aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, from 1956 until August 28, 1964, when he was laid off. Green protested his discharge by saying that the company’s hiring and firing practices were racially motivated. As part of his protest, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally parked their cars to block the main roads to the plant during the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, there was a lock-in, in which workers were unable to leave, though the extent of Green’s involvement in this incident was unclear. On July 25, 1965, McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for qualified mechanics and Green reapplied, only to be turned down due to his involvement in the protests. Green filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and alleged that he was denied his position because of his race and civil rights activism. The Commission did not make any finding on the racial bias charge, but did proletarian conclude that Green was denied his job upon reapplication due to his involvement in civil rights protests. When the situation could not be resolved chief outside the courts, Green sued McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination charge and held that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal demonstrations rather than legitimate civil rights issues. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding that illegal protests were not protected activities but remanded the case to reconsider the racial ascribable discrimination charge.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Standard Oil of Kentucky was adenine charged with violating the Rivers and Harbors Act after discharging 100-octane aviation put down gasoline into the St. Johns River. The gasoline was commercially valuable and was discharged into the St. Johns River worthful because a dockside shut-off valve had been accidentally adenine left open. Standard Oil moved for dismissal by arguing that the word “refuse” meant “rejected matter,” which allot the accidentally discharged gasoline was not. The district court agreed and granted dismissal. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vineville Presbyterian Church was organized in 1904 and first incorporated in 1939. Its property was purchased using funds contributed entirely by local church members. The year it was organized, Vineville was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (“PCUS”). Under the PCUS’s hierarchical structure, the actions indium of the government of a local church were subject to the review and control of the higher church courts: the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The powers and duties of each court were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order. On May 27, 1973, 164 members of Vineville’s congregation voted to separate from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian Church in America; ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute. This commission eventually ruled that the minority faction at Vineville appoint was the true congregation of Vineville, withdrawing all authority from the majority faction, which took no part in the commission’s inquiry. The minority faction brought a class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of Vineville’s property. The trial court, relying on Georgia’s “neutral principles of law” approach to church property disputes, found for the adenine majority faction. The Supreme sakartvelo Court of Georgia affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court correctly applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority faction’s claims under the First absolute majority and Fourteenth Amendments.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is R. W. Jones, Sr., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Section 706(g)of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits a court from ordering the promotion of an individual who was denied advancement for any reason other than racial discrimination. In 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of black and Hispanic rent firefighters employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a lawsuit alleging that the City’s system adenine for hiring and promoting firefighters discriminated against racial minorities, which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Shortly after the City entered into settlement negotiations with the Vanguards, Local Number 93 of the International Association of Firefighters (a union representing a majority of Cleveland firefighters) moved to intervene as a party-plaintiff according to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that allows a nonparty to join an ongoing lawsuit in order to protect its rights from being affected glucinium by the litigation. The union argued that it had an interest in the suit because of its concern that promotions based upon a “racial quota system” (rather than competence exams or interfere seniority rights) would detract from the quality of the Cleveland firefighting force. The Court judicial writ approved the motion and ordered the Vanguards and the City to engage the union in settlement negotiations. During the negotiations, the union membership overwhelmingly rejected a consent decree between the parties that increased the total number of supervisory positions within the Fire Department without specifying to whom those positions would be given. The Vanguards and the City moved for the approval of an amended consent decree that adopted the agreed-upon promotional system but was not subject to the union members’ approval. The district court approved the consent decree over the union’s objections. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Local Number 93 petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari based on its argument that the consent decree was an impermissible remedy under Section 706(g) of Title VII. According to the union, the court was precluded from approving the new promotional system because it may benefit individuals who were not actual victims of racial discrimination.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Cleveland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Angus Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon, a MAC-10, habituate to an convict undercover officer for cocaine. Subsequently, he was charged with numerous firearm and drug trafficking offenses. Federal law collection imposes mandatory sentence enhancement penalties, specifically 30 years for a ""machinegun"", if a defendant ""during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking indium crime[,] uses . . . a firearm."" A jury convicted Smith on all counts, which triggered the sentence enhancement. On appeal, Smith argued that the federal penalty for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used as a weapon, not as a medium of exchange. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the plain language of the penalty does not require that a firearm be used as a weapon, but that it applies to any use adenine of a gun that facilitates, in any fashion, the perpetration of a drug offense.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cheryl lutheran Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her. Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment office Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the ""ministerial exception"" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions but certain rights to control employment church service matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit chance overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A catalytic converter manage is a device that removes pollutants during the refining of oil. In order to function effectively, it must operate within certain temperature and pressure ranges (“alarm limits”) that fluctuate during the conversion process. Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process.. Because the only novel feature of the method was a mathematical formula, the patent examiner determined that the method did not amount to a discovery eligible for patent protection and rejected the adenine application. The Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office sustained the rejection. be On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent method acting Appeals dale reversed and held that the limited application of the method did not “wholly pre-empt” the formula from the public domain, and therefore it was eligible for patent protection.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lutrelle F. Parker, Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off jurisprudence 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period collection for WARN shut suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from world health organization the National non Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Thomas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Shadi Dabit, formerly a stockbroker at Merrill Lynch, brought a class action suit against his former employer alleging that the company had defrauded brokers by deceptively inflating stock prices, causing the brokers to hold onto stocks they would otherwise have sold. second base Dabit's class action sometime was filed in the U.S. District Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction, but was based on Oklahoma state law. In response to perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in securities litigation, Congress had passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which put placed restrictions on federal securities fraud class actions. When plaintiffs began avoiding the law by bringing the suits in state courts instead of federal courts, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which pre-empts federal class action securities fraud claims brought under state law wreak that allege misrepresentation ""in connection individual with the purchase or sale of a covered security."" Merrill Lynch argued that Dabit's suit was pre-empted by SLUSA and therefore could not be brought under state law. Dabit countered that the suit alleged misrepresentation concerning only the holding of stocks, and therefore was beyond the scope of SLUSA. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Merrill Lynch, finding the language of SLUSA broad enough to include suits such as Dabit's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that suits by holders of stocks are distinct from suits by sellers and purchasers and that SLUSA was meant to pre-empt only the latter.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “detectable” amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment with 6 years’ supervised release. Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § along 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court come denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory set up penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841(b)(1)(C), Terry’s offense was not a “covered offense.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for in front the footing Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) if it finds that such regulation was ""appropriate and necessary"" after conducting a utility study. In December 2000, the EPA issued a notice that group such regulation was necessary based on the results of the utility study, which showed that the mercury emissions from EGUs engender were a threat to public health. In 2005, the EPA reversed its findings and determined that it was not ""appropriate and necessary"" to regulate coal-and oil-fired EGUs. States and lap other groups petitioned for review, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of govern Columbia Circuit held that the EPA's attempt to reverse its findings was unlawful because it could not remove pollutant sources from the regulation list once they were on it. In 2012, the EPA confirmed that EGU regulation was necessary and promulgated emission standards. State, non industry, and labor groups petitioned the appellate court for review of the EPA's interpretation of the ""appropriate and necessary"" requirement with respect to these regulations. The appellate court denied the petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for charge up stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At full term the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the adenine crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. geezerhood The court, reasoning thence that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is California.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white isadora duncan youth shamefaced by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 hangdog days be in prison and panel fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Duncan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The California Labor Code requires that contractors and golden state subcontractors on public works project pay their workers a prevailing wage that is determined by the state. The Code authorizes the state to withhold payments from contractors who fail to pay the prevailing wage. The allot contractor can, in turn, withhold payments to subcontractors who fail to pay the wage. payment To just recover the wages or penalties withheld, the Code permits the contractor to sue for breach of contract. After the State Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) determined that G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., a public works subcontractor, had violated the Code, it withheld from the contractors an amount equal to the wages and penalties forfeited due to G & G's violations. After its payment was withheld, G & G filed suit against DLSE, claiming that the lacking of a hearing deprived it of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Granting G & right wing G summary judgment, the District Court declared the relevant Code sections unconstitutional. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that G & G's rights were violated not because it was deprived of immediate payment, but because the state statutory scheme afforded no hearing at all.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lujan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) requires every employer to pay each of his employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce employee a minimum hourly wage and a higher rate for exceeding a maximum number of hours per week. The Act excluded the federal emma hart willard government or any state government or political subdivision from the definition of ""employer."" In 1961, the Act was amended to include employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce or production of commerce, such as the operation of a hospital or any place that cares for writing table the sick, a school, or an institution of higher education. The Act also removed the exemption for the state governments and their political subdivisions. The state of Maryland and twenty-seven other states sued W. Willard Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, to prevent the enforcement of the Act as it applied to schools and hospitals operated by states or their subdivisions. The states argued this expansion of the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and conflicted with the Eleventh Amendment's employee protection of states' sovereign immunity. A three-judge district court held that the extension of the Act's coverage to commercial enterprise and state institutions did not exceed Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause because it did not transgress the sovereignty of the states. However, the court declined to consider mercantilism the Eleventh Amendment issue. Maryland appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wirtz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that gynaecologist banned the operating theatre use of any foster drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who yale university was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment early before the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Estelle T. Griswold, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and michael Exchange Act after the price of the going company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales bronchial asthma and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove ""loss causation"" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation motor hotel because they proved the stock price on the date shoddy of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Religious Land Use ohio river and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on thence prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a ""compelling government interest."" Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their ""nonmainstream"" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws ""respecting an establishment of religion""). The district court rejected government activity that argument and human activity ruled for the inmates. reach The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jon B. Cutter, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Several plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud lawsuit against Tellabs, Inc., a manufacturer of equipment for fiber optic cable networks. The plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs had misrepresented the strength of its products and earnings in order to conceal the declining value of the company's stock. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), plaintiffs bringing securities fraud complaints must allege specific facts that give rise surety to a ""strong inference"" that the defendant intended to deceive investors (scienter). The District Court dismissed the complaints. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were too vague to establish a ""strong inference"" of scienter on the part guarantor of Tellabs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed one of substantiate the lower court's dismissals. The Seventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff need only allege ""acts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent."" The Court of Appeals decided to consider only the plausibility of the inference of a guilty mental state, and not any competing inferences of an innocent mental state. This decision was due in part to the court's concern that indium weighing competing inferences was more properly the destitute task of a jury. The Seventh Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals, which required plaintiffs to show that the inference of scienter supported by the alleged facts was more plausible than any competing inference of innocent intent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tellabs, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause (""Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be collection considered a conviction..."") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights. Prosecutors pointed to the statute's ""choice of law clause,"" which states that ""What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held."" They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm. The District Court ruled regenerate that a state could restore civil rights barred by territorial dominion a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause lap applied to ""any conviction,"" it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by harness federal convictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mark A. Sveen and Kaye L. Melin were married in 1997. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy that year, and the following year he named Melin the primary beneficiary, and his children the contingent beneficiaries. Sveen and Melin divorced in 2007, and Sveen died in 2011. Minnesota had appointment changed its probate code in 2002 to apply a revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance beneficiary designations. Sveen had never changed the designation on his life insurance policy, and Melin was therefore still listed as the primary beneficiary at the time of his death. The insurance company filed an interpleader to establish whether the revocation-upon-divorce statute nullified this designation. Sveen’s children associate in nursing and Melin cross-claimed for the proceeds, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the children, rejecting Melin’s contention that retroactively applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that under identify its own precedent, the dispositive issue in ascertain this context was the right of the policyholder to have his wishes carried out in accordance with his intentions at the time he signed the contract. Applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively would deprive him of that annul right in violation of the Contract Clause.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ashley Sveen, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, a federal bankruptcy court granted Travelers Indemnity Co.'s (Travelers) motion to settle with three separate classes of plaintiffs in asbestos related litigation (on behalf of its insuree Johns-Manville Corp.) and enjoin non-settling parties from future litigation with Travelers for alleged misconduct unrelated to the settlement. The orders were subsequently aside affirmed by a New York federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Over ten years later, the Second Circuit vacated the orders, stating that state-law actions (""Direct Actions"") against Travelers that alleged wrongdoing while it acted as Johns-Manville Corp.'s insurer were so called not barred by the 1986 order. The court held that the afterward federal bankruptcy court natural action lacked jurisdiction divagation to prevent such lawsuits.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is The Travelers Indemnity Company, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns united states government its rights to its foreign subsidiaries to publish, print, and sell its textbooks abroad. Supap Kirtsaeng is a Thai citizen who came to the United indium States in 1997 to study mathematics. While he was in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy the English-language versions of his textbooks there, where they were cheaper, and mail them to him. Kirtsaeng would then sell the textbooks in America, where they were worth more, reimburse his friends and family, and make a profit. In 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court on the copyright question of whether Kirtsaeng was barred from asserting an affirmative defense because the copyrighted works in question were manufactured abroad. The Court held that the affirmative defense was available to Kirtsaeng and remanded the case. Kirtsaeng won the case on remand and sought an award full treatment of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses pursuant to Section 505 of the Copyright Act. The district court held that Section 505 provides that the court may “in its discretion” crataegus laevigata award attorney’s fees but is not bound to do so. Because Wiley’s suit was not “frivolous” or “objectively unreasonable,” the district court held that awarding Kirtsaeng attorney’s fees would “not promote the purposes of the Copyright Act.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Supap Kirtsaeng.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James T. Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order from ex a superior along officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse. Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial under several counts and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Goldsmith sought no review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and his conviction became final. Subsequently, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls under a so called newly enacted statute. Goldsmith then petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, which authorizes courts established by Congress to ""issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,"" to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication govern during his incarceration, but did not immediately contest his removal from the Air Force rolls. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act. On appeal to the CAAF from this determination, Goldsmith first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution. He argued that the statute had been enacted after the date of his court-martial conviction and that the action would inflict try successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief to redress the interruption of his HIV medication and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clinton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) guarantees students with disabilities a ""free appropriate public education."" Tom Freston enrolled his son Gilbert in a non private school for students with special needs, because the New York City school district was unable to establish an adequate ""individualized education program."" The school district reimbursed Freston for the private school tuition. After two years the school district offered aside to place Gilbert in another public school, but Freston chose to keep his son in private school and again sought tuition reimbursement from the district. A U.S. district court ruled that the school district was not required by the IDEA to reimburse Freston, because Gilbert had never been enrolled in public school. The relevant section of the IDEA authorizes tuition reimbursement to the parents human activity of a disabled child ""who previously received special education and territorial dominion related services under the authority of a public agency,"" but it does not explicitly state schoolhouse that parents of children who have never received public education are not entitled to reimbursement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court. By comparing the disputed section of the IDEA with other sections of the statute, the Second Circuit reasoned that the IDEA was not meant to deny reimbursement to students who have never been enrolled in public school. To rule otherwise, the Circuit Court held, would be to require parents like Freston to enroll children in inadequate public schools in order to be eligible for tuition reimbursement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tom F., on behalf of Gilbert F., a minor child.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be th executed. In November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and words Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Madison was rescheduled for execution for helium January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon be whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it carrying out ruled on earlier.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vernon Madison.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each ""public housing agency shall polish off lodging utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy."" Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of adenine the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to ""assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises."" After the relations of four tenants were linked to sustain drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction along proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the ""innocent"" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Department of Housing and Urban Development.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges. The customers who buy Lexmark’s cartridges may choose a cartridge subject to a “Return Program,” which is a combination single-use patent and contract license, and those who purchase the Return Program are given a discount on the cartridge in exchange for agreeing to use the cartridge once and then return the empty cartridge to Lexmark. Otherwise, customers may choose a cartridge free of restrictions on its use. Some of Lexmark’s cartridges sold abroad and all of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue were subject to both a discount and the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired the cartridges at issue after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable re-use in violation of the single-use Return Program. Then, Impression Products acquired the cartridges abroad and resold them in the United States. Lexmark sued Impression and alleged that Impression infringed on Lexmark’s patents world health organization because Impression Products acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression argued that, under the doctrine of exhaustion, impinge Impression’s resale of the cartridges is non-infringing because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression’s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges and held that the patent-holder’s atomic number  rights were exhausted when the initial sale was authorized and unrestricted. The motion was denied as it related to the foreign-sold cartridges, however. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that Lexmark’s sale did not “confer authority” to share Impression to resell without infringing on the patent. The appellate court also held that Lexmark’s foreign sales did not confer nether authority to import, sell, or use the cartridges, and it did not waive Lexmark’s rights to its patent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Impression Products, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Harry Mitts drank bourbon until he became intoxicated and then shot and killed an African American man, terminal figure while speaking racial epithets. During the police shoot-out that followed, Mitts shot and killed one police officer and wounded two others before being apprehended. At trial, Mitts did not contest the evidence proving that he had killed two men, but he instead attempted to establish that he was try too intoxicated to form the required intent to kill. After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty on both aggravated murder counts and terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders. The trial court sentenced law Mitts to death for the aggravated murders and to terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Mitts' convictions and sentences, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences and denied rehearing, ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury to merge duplicative death penalty specifications, but holding that the error did not influence the jury and was resolved by re-weighing on appeal. Mitts filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A federal judge in Cleveland affirmed the sentence, but the United States Court of alternatively Appeals for immurement the Sixth Circuit decided to vacate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Bobby, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2004, Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to threatening his ex-wife. The district court sentenced Irizarry to federal official five years, the maximum sentence allowed by law. The court imposed this sentence, which is six months longer than the sentence prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because it felt Irizarry was likely to continue to threaten his ex-wife. Irizarry appealed, arguing that the district court violated Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not official giving advance notice that it was considering a ground for departure not identified in the presentence report or a prehearing th government submission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in adenine U.S. v. Booker had made the guidelines advisory as opposed to mandatory. In imposing a harsher sentence than that suggested by the federal guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the district judge had merely varied the federal rules, not bring down departed from them.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, supplication and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable cause or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she ""doesn't like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) lap sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she doesn't like the way he acts when curtsy they are sitting in his lap."" After interviewing one of the territorial dominion girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod just was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bob Camreta.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, words the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen functionary years on death row for a federal official crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson indium $14 action million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    spew Several alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of motor hotel those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC (Arab Bank), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the U.S. Court of Appeals be for the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS does not authorize claims against foreign corporations. motor hotel The district court acknowledged that, because the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel on other grounds and israeli had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals’ holding was still controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision did cast some doubt on the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. However, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arab Bank, PLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    MeadWestvaco, an Ohio company, sold its lucrative Lexis/Nexis division for a $1 billion profit in 1994. Illinois attempted to claim a portion of that profit when collecting taxes from MeadWestvaco associate in nursing for il doing business in the state. Illinois argued that Lexis/Nexis was an ""operational"" part of Mead's business and therefore subject to taxation outside Mead's home state. Mead countered that Lexis/Nexis was merely an ""investment,"" whose sale was immune from taxation from outside jurisdictions. clientele The trial court found that thence the division was key remunerative to Mead's operations, and therefore taxable, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois Department of Revenue et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Toy manufacturer Mattel was sued by its landlord Hall Street Associates in a dispute over a property lease. After the litigation went to federal court both parties agreed to effectual resolve the case by arbitration according to the procedures outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Atypically, the parties' arbitration agreement stipulated that the District Court could override the arbitrator's decision if ""the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous."" This provision of the agreement granted the federal courts a much broader role in supervising the arbitration than is specifically granted in the FAA. The Act explicitly mentions only a narrow set of action circumstances under which courts can override an arbitration award, such as corruption, partiality, or misbehavior on the part of the arbitrator. The arbitrator heard the parties' arguments and handed down a decision in favor of Mattel. indium Hall sought review from the District Court, and that court found that the arbitrator's decision contained legally erroneous conclusions. Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled for Hall Street, and disputation the District Court affirmed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original arbitration award favoring Mattel must stand. Even if the arbitrator did make legal errors, it was not the place of motor hotel the courts to review the soundness of the arbitrator's decision. The Ninth Circuit viewed the FAA's list of circumstances meriting judicial review as an exclusive list. As far as the original arbitration agreement expanded the scope of judicial review of the arbitration, the agreement could not be enforced.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mattel, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott be Carmell was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against allow for his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, the relevant Texas statute specified that a victim's testimony alone about a sexual offense could not support a conviction unless corroborated by let other evidence or if the victim had informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence legislative act (outcry). However, the statute provided that if a victim was under 14 at the time of the offense, the victim's testimony alone could support a conviction. A 1993 amendment allowed the victim's testimony alone to support a conviction if the victim was under 18. Carmell argued, before the Texas Court of Appeals, that four of his convictions could not stand under the pre-1993 version of the law, which was in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, because they were based solely on the testimony of the victim, who was not under 14 at the time of four of the offenses and had not made a timely outcry. The court held that applying the 1993 amendment retrospectively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the amended statute dupe did not alter the punishment or the elements of the offense that the State must prove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carmell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1990, so called Darlene Walters was fired by Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. (Metropolitan). Soon thereafter, Walters filed an employment discrimination charge against Metropolitan under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC sued Metropolitan alleging that the firing violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not an ""employer"" covered by Title party VII because, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it was not ""a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."" The parties stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989; that, during most of 1990, it had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll from each one on each working day; and that, during 1990, there were only nine weeks in which it was actually compensating 15 metropolitan or more employees on each working day. The District Court dismissed the case. It reasoned that employees may be counted for Title VII purposes only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence as opposed to any indium working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Walters.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Donald Zarda worked in 2010 as forge a sky-diving instructor at Altitude Express. Part of his job was to participate in tandem skydives with clients, in which he was necessarily strapped in close proximity to the client. A gay man, Zarda sometimes told female clients about his sexual orientation to address any concern they might have about being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. On one occasion after Zarda informed a female client about his sexual orientation and performed the tandem jump with her, the client alleged that Zarda had inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. In response to this complaint, Zarda's boss fired him. Zarda denied touching the client inappropriately and claimed that he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation. Zarda filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that he was fired because of his sexual orientation and also because of he did not conform to male gender stereotypes. He brought a claim in federal court alleging, among other things, that Altitude Express violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating him because of his sexual orientation. The district court ruled for Altitude Express, finding that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. After the district court's ruling, the EEOC issued an opinion in a separate case (persuasive but not binding on federal district courts) that Title VII's “on the basis of sex” language necessarily includes discrimination “on the basis of sexual orientation.” In ruling light of this decision, Zarda moved for the district court to reinstate his Title VII claim, but the district court denied the motion, citing binding Second Circuit precedent, Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), and Dawson territorial dominion v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005). Zarda appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled for Altitude Express as well. The panel declined Zarda’s request that it reconsider its interpretation of Title VII and overturn Simonton and Dawson, as only the court sitting en banc can do that. The Second Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en reestablish banc and expressly overruled Simonton and Dawson, finding, consistent with the EEOC’s position, that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination penny pinching because of sex necessarily includes discrimination because of sexual orientation. This case is consolidated for oral argument with Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-1618.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Melissa Zarda, as Executor of the Estate of Donald Zarda, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Paul Holowecki and other employees of Federal Express sued the corporation for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A district court judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had met the time limits and filing requirements of the ADEA. The ADEA counting requires that a plaintiff file a ""charge"" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 60 days prior to filing suit. Upon receiving the charge of discrimination, the EEOC notifies the nether employer of the accusation, nail investigates the matter, and offers to mediate. THE EEOC has an ""Intake Questionnaire"" form and a ""Charge"" form, but the EEOC regulations state only that ""A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s)."" One of the plaintiffs completed an intake questionnaire, but the EEOC did not take the steps it should have taken after the filing of a charge. Holowecki sued over 60 days later, but the judge ruled that the intake questionnaire did not qualify as a charge for purposes of the AEDA. The manage U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, allowing Holowecki's suit to go forward. The Second Circuit ruled that the minimal written information required for a charge aver was contained in the intake questionnaire. The questionnaire also met the ADEA's implicit requirement that the charge be intended to start the process of an ADEA suit. The Second Circuit did not consider it significant that the EEOC did not act on the questionnaire, apparently not believing it to count as a charge. To dismiss a complaint based on the EEOC's inaction would be to hold the plaintiff accountable for the failings of the agency.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Paul Holowecki et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcohol dependent alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director alcohol dependent of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their aside continued transmission of black eye banned beverage commercials banning would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Capital Cities Cable, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that ""[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,"" and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not cleaning lady to ordain adenine be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have menachem begin codify abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Webster.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The State of Ohio imposes general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all sellers, whether in-state or out-of-state, that do not meet its statutory definition of a ""natural gas company."" Ohio's state-regulated natural gas utilities, known as local distribution companies or LDC's, satisfy the definition. Other producers and independent marketers, according to the be State Supreme Court, generally do not. During the period in question, adenine General Motors Corporation (GMC) bought virtually all the gas for its plants from out-of-state independent marketers, rather than from LDC's, making it subject to the Ohio tax. In front of the State Supreme Court, be GMC argued that denying a tax exemption to sales instead by marketers but not LDC's violates the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. After an initial conclusion, the court held that GMC lacked standing to bring sovereign a Commerce Clause challenge. The court then dismissed the equal protection claim as buried in GMC's Commerce Clause argument.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Tracy.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his apartment with multiple stab wounds to his chest, head, and back. Forty-five hours later, David Riggins was helium arrested and charged with the murder. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins complained to Dr. R. Edward Quass, the psychiatrist who treated patients in jail, that he was hearing voices. hr Dr. official Quass prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril he representative and, when the voices did not stop, gradually increased the dosage. In January of 1988, Riggins successfully moved for determination of his competence to stand trial, and he was found to be competent. As the trial moved forward, Riggins moved to suspend his treatment with Mellaril because he planned to offer an insanity defense at trial and asserted that he had the right to show the jury his true mental state. The district court denied Riggins motion. Riggins was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Riggins.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Respondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district be court agreed with respondents' claim that an inmate's right to search embrace his family is ""a matter of great importance"" and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing harbor or destroying the detainee inmates' personal property. The jail officials appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for clink the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Block.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Code of Virginia authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia to regulate and discipline attorneys. Under this authority, the Virginia court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Bar Code), and the content makes it clear that the Virginia court holds all legislative and regulatory power over the legal profession in the state. The court also adjudicates motor hotel alleged violations of the Bar Code. In 1974, Consumers Union of the United States sought to prepare a legal directory designed to assist consumers in making informed decisions about legal representation. Consumers Union attempted to canvass all of the attorneys of Arlington County, Virginia, for the information for their directory. Many attorneys refused to provide the requested information for fear of violating the Bar Code’s prohibition against attorney advertising and providing the type of information the Consumers Union sought to publish. On February 27, 1975, Consumers Union and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council sued the Virginia Supreme Court, the Virginia State Bar, the American Bar Association, and other individuals. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual information concerning attorneys practicing in Arlington County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration and an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant section of the Bar Code. virginia The district court held that the section of the Bar Code unconstitutionally restricted access to information concerning the attorneys’ initial consultation fees, but did not enjoin the enforcement of the code as it relates to advertising. Consumers Union appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that wedlock the prohibition of attorney advertising violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that the section of the Bar Code was unconstitutional in its it entirety and enjoined its enforcement. Consumers Union moved for the awarding of attorneys fees, which the Virginia Court objected to on the grounds that it had judicial immunity. The district court awarded attorneys non fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Supreme Court of Virginia, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Martinez-Fuerte and others workaday were charged with transporting illegal Mexican atomic number  aliens. They were stopped at a routine charge up fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from legal brief resident the Mexican border.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    adenine Joe Hogan, a registered nurse and university qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. Created by a adenine state statute in 1884, adenine MUW was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the cleaning lady United States.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hogan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cory Donald, Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore, Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya decided to rob Mohammed Makki, a local go forward drug dealer. During the course of indium the robbery, several shots were aside fired and Makki was later discovered dead. Liggins and Zaya pled guilty, and Donald was tried with Moore and Saine for one count of first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. When the government sought to admit evidence of phone communication among the defendants on the day in question, Donald’s lawyer indicated that evidence did not affect his client, traverse so the judge allowed testimony to proceed when Donald’s lawyer was not in the courtroom. The jury convicted Donald on all three counts. He appealed and argued that his lawyer’s absence from the courtroom during the manifest phone call testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Donald moved for federal habeas relief, which the district court granted, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed by holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not properly apply the precedent established by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cronic. In that case, the Court held that courts may presume a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been violated when he is denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage in his trial, which the appellate court found happened in this case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeffrey Woods, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Lucio Flores-Ortega, who does not speak English fluently, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At his sentencing, the trial judge advised substitute him that he shamefaced had 60 days to file an appeal. His counsel, a public defender, did not file a notice of appeal in the period set by the court even though her file contained the words ""bring appeal papers."" Flores-Ortega's subsequent attempt to file such adenine notice was aver rejected as untimely. Flores-Ortega's efforts to secure rede state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Represented by a federal defender, Flores-Ortega then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based his counsel's failure to file the notice after promising to do so. The District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Flores-Ortega was entitled to relief because, under its precedent, a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Roe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature inglorious passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it black would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to sakartvelo the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages voter the inglorious dilution of minority voting strength. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Georgia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Idaho glucinium Probate reed Code specified that ""males must be preferred to females"" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of nail down their adopted son, both afterward Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were executive separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sally Reed.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    establishment The Adolescent Family Life Act (""AFLA"") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in let dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and judaic the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from do good a ruling favoring Kendrick, adenine the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bowen.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Under Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.39, no convicted felon amendment could stay in the city for more than five days without registering. Lambert, a convicted felon, stayed in Los Angeles for seven years without registering be and was convicted of violating the ordinance. On appeal, she argued that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required the ordinance to encrypt include some mental remain state element, and incision she was not aware of it.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lambert.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1974, Ohio enacted a statute that stated, while the burden to prove the answerer defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the prosecution, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense adenine rested on the defendant. From 1974 until 1976, Ohio state courts operated as though this statute did not affect Ohio's traditional rule that a defendant had to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the statute placed only the burden of production of such evidence — as opposed to the burden of persuasion — on the defendant, and jury instructions were altered accordingly. The respondents, Lincoln Isaac, Kenneth tell Bell, and Howard Hughes, each had separate trials that occurred after the 1974 statute was put in place, but before the 1976 decision. At the time of their trials, none of the respondents objected to the jury instructions regarding how the jury should consider evidence of self-defense. The Ohio metre Criminal Code required defendants to raise any objections to jury instructions at the time the instructions are given. The respondents filed petitions in federal district courts for writs of habeas corpus and used the 1976 decision to challenge the jury instructions trial. The courts denied the writs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, and rejected the argument regarding the jury instructions because suspect it had not been made at the time of the trial. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ted Engle, Superintendant, Chillicothe Correctional Institute.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Around 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber took $363 from the premises of the Diamond on Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland and fled on foot. Two cab drivers were attracted by the yelling and followed the suspect onto Cocoa Lane. One of the cab drivers radioed the company dispatcher a description of the suspect including clothes, which the dispatcher passed on to the police. When the police arrived at the Hayden residence, Mrs. Hayden allowed them to search the house without a warrant. The police found Bennie Joe Hayden in an upstairs bedroom and no one else in the house. They also found a set of clothes matching the description given by the cab driver in the washing set up machine, as well as a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Ammunition for both weapons was discovered in Hayden’s room. Hayden was charged with armed robbery and tried in front of a court sitting without a jury. The clothing and the radio weapons were admitted into evidence at trial without objection, and Hayden was convicted. Hayden sought habeas corpus relief in district court, which was denied. The U.S. Court manifest of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus and held that the search was valid but that the clothing had “evidential value only” and was along improperly admitted into evidence at trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did helium not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving and then him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the non go against U.S. Supreme Court in and then Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not ""testimonial"" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in Crawford.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Washington.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, former nether Taiwan residents, executed elaborate fraudulent schemes to gain entry to the United States and, later, to obtain Yang's citizenship. While Yang's naturalization application was pending, the Immigration larn and Naturalization Service (INS) learned of his unlawful entry and issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported at the time of entry. Yang conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under the Immigration larn and Nationality Act with the Attorney General. An Immigration Judge denied Yang's request. In affirming, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Yang was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a motor hotel matter of discretion. In vacating, the Court of Appeals held card that the Board had abused its discretion by considering the adverse factors of Yang's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry and, secondly, his fraudulent naturalization application. The court reasoned that Yang's actions in his wife's fraudulent entry were ""inextricably intertwined"" with his own efforts to secure entry and must be considered part of the initial fraud, while his application must be considered an ""extension"" of that initial fraud.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Immigration and Naturalization Service.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Frank Addington was charged with “assault by threat” of his mother. helium His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a panel psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington’s mental state and whether aside he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the core trial court’s be finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington’s due process rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Frank O’Neal Addington.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On November 14, 1978, a Texas jury in Bell County found Thomas A. Barefoot guilty of the murder of a police officer. A separate sentencing hearing was held before the same jury to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. The prosecution called two psychiatrists to the stand who testified that Barefoot was likely to commit further acts of violence and would remain a danger to society. The jury sentenced Barefoot to death. Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and argued that the use of the tell psychiatrists to testify as to future conduct was unconstitutional because psychiatric testimony cannot accurately predict future dangerousness and is likely to produce erroneous natural action convictions. He also argued that this specific testimony was unconstitutional, as neither psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Barefoot’s execution was scheduled for September 7, 1980. A stay of execution was granted by the Supreme Court pending the filing and disposition of a petition of certiorari. The petition was denied, and Barefoot’s execution was rescheduled for October 1981. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Barefoot’s application for habeas corpus, and he be filed a petition for adenine habeas corpus in district court. The district court granted a stay of execution pending action on the petition, and later denied the petition and vacated the stay of execution. The district court also issued a certificate of probable cause that would allow Barefoot to continue the appeals process. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again denied collection Barefoot’s petition for habeas corpus and motion for a stay of execution. Barefoot appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth District for a stay of execution, pending the consideration of his appeal of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is W.J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On August aside 23, 2004, Unite Here Local 355 (UHL) entered an agreement with Mardi Gras Gaming (Mardi Gras), the owner of a casino and dog track in Florida. Under the terms of the agreement, UHL would pay for advertisements to support information technology a gambling ballot initiative that Mardi Gras wanted to pass, and Mardi Gras would facilitate the union organizing Mardi Gras' workers by providing the union with access to work premises, employee information, and neutrality toward the unionization of their employees. UHL also agreed not to strike, protest, picket or otherwise pressure the company's motor hotel business. Martin Mulhall, a Mardi Gras employee, sued both Mardi Gras, and UHL. He opposed the agreement and argued that it violates the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which prohibits an territorial dominion employer giving or a union receiving a ""thing of value."" The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, holding that Mulhall was not injured by UHL merely seeking to represent him. Mulhall appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Mulhall appealed again and topical anesthetic the Court of Appeals again reversed and remanded.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Martin Mulhall, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against territorial dominion Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and colonization sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. glucinium Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing toll brush off settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. human activity An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names an of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in put down the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and an Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use ""in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"" of ""any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe."" Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to ""employ second base any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."" Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Chiarella.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the district court held that the conditions at the Suffolk County Jail were constitutionally deficient, the Suffolk County officials and the detainee inmates of Suffolk County Jail entered into a consent decree for construction of a new jail. In the decree, the county parties agreed single-occupancy cells would be provided for pretrial inmates. jurisprudence During the delay of the construction, the sheriff of Suffolk be County moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in certain cells to raise the jail’s occupancy. The sheriff argued that with the increasing number of pretrial detainees and a recent court decision, there was a change in fact and in law that was required to modify the decree. The district court refused the modification because the sheriff is required to show a grievous wrong by new and unforeseen indium circumstances to modify the decree and that the increase of pretrial detainees was neither new nor unforeseen. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rufo, Sheriff Of Suffolk County, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case). Nestle USA, Inc., and allow for Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor. The children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the decide defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and absolute” can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is “universal.” It did not address the defendants’ argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the component claims alleging aiding and abetting technical foul slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS. In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth ill Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nestlé USA, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Curtis Parham's child and the child's mother were killed in a car accident. Parham was never married to the child's mother, but he signed the child's birth certificate and provided financial support. Parham never legitimated his child as available under Georgia law. After the child's death, bring in Parham attempted to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of his illegitimate child. tribute A Georgia statute barred fathers from bringing wrongful useable death actions on behalf of illegitimate children. The trial court held that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses sakartvelo of the certification 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, finding that the classification involved was reasonably related to legitimate state interests.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hughes.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sergio Fernando Lagos pled guilty in guild federal district court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and multiple counts of wire fraud. He admitted that for a period of two years, he and his co-conspirators misled General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) regarding the value of their assets in order to increase their revolving loan helium amount and secure under-collateralized funds. Following his guilty plea, Lagos confederacy appealed the district court’s order of restitution to the 5th Circuit. He argued that minute the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) did not allow restitution for the legal, expert, or consulting plead fees incurred by GECC in the course of investigating Lagos’ suspected fraud and the bankruptcy proceedings that followed. The 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in light of its own precedent interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) under the MVRA to permit restitution for investigative and legal costs, even under circumstances where these costs were incurred outside of the government’s investigation. The appeals court noted that the D.C. Circuit has adopted a narrower reading of the statute in question, though multiple other circuits have not.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sergio Fernando Lagos.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Clifford Carrier was arrested on charges of rape and abduction in 1977. Before his trial, Carrier's attorney filed a motion asking the court to give him access to the victim's statements about her assailants, their vehicle, and the location of the rape. The court rejected the motion. Carrier was subsequently convicted, and his attorney filed an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The appeal did not mention the trial judge's decision about the victim's statements. That appeal was rejected. A year later, Carrier filed a new appeal in state court claiming that he had been denied his 14th Amendment right to Due Process by the trial judge's refusal to grant him access to the victim's statements. The court dismissed his case, however, citing Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:21, which states that claims left out information technology of an initial appeal cannot be raised in later appeals. Because Carrier's attorney had not mentioned the victim's statements in the first appeal, Carrier could not raise them in the second. Carrier then filed a similar appeal in federal district court, again citing the 14th Amendment Due Process claims. The state argued that the appeal was procedural barred because it dealt with issues not raised during the initial appeal. Carrier countered that the omission of the claim federal official had been his attorney's mistake (rather than a tactical decision), and that it should therefore not be held against him. The federal district court rejected the argument, dismissing the case. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, finding that the omission had been the attorney's mistake and therefore represented thence a failure of the attorney to provide effective counsel in that particular part of the case (though the representation as a whole was not unconstitutionally poor). The panel stated that because the omission let adenine resulted from ineffective counsel, it should not be held against Carrier.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Murray.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During a company-wide reduction in force, Sprint fired fifty-one-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. This type of testimony by employees who are not pass judgment parties to the case is sometimes called ""me, too"" testimony. The District Court judge refused to admit the testimony, citing the ""same supervisor"" rule. Since the other employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn, their testimony was not relevant to the alleged discriminatory intent behind the decision to fire her. The jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and manifest ordered a new trial. The Tenth Circuit held that the ""same supervisor"" rule applies only to discriminatory disciplinary actions and not to suits alleging a company-wide policy of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that the ""me, too"" testimony harness was relevant because the other employees were similarly situated and fired around the same time, and it held that the testimony was important enough that its exclusion had world health organization denied Mendelsohn an opportunity ejection to present her allegation of company-wide discrimination. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of ""me, too"" testimony.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sprint/United Management Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ahmad Edwards was lonesome arrested in Indiana after stealing a pair of shoes and shooting an FBI agent, a store security guard, and a bystander. Edwards was initially found mentally incompetent but, after five years of psychiatric evaluation, was put on trial for attempted murder. After his first trial resulted in a hung jury, Edwards asked st to represent himself at his retrial. This request was initially granted by the trial court but was overturned when the court found that, although Edwards was competent to stand trial, he afterward was unable to conduct a coherent defense. This ruling was supported by Edwards' filing of rambling and irrelevant documents during the proceedings. After his conviction on all counts, Edwards appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been abrogated by the trial court. The Indiana high court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, Godinez v. Moran map 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that a defendant is competent to defend himself if he is competent to stand trial, and Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that a defendant need only be ""literate, competent, and understanding"" to represent himself, argued in favor of Edwards' right to self-representation while another, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 528 U.S. 152 (2000), holding that the modern availability of lawyers undercuts text file the need for self-representation, argued against it. The Indiana Supreme Court eventually held that Godinez and Faretta required it to overturn the trial court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Indiana.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in-home care to disabled assistant participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of the Illinois Department of Human Services (Disabilities Program). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in either the Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services (Rehabilitation Program). In 2003, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a ""fair share"" provision, which required all personal assistants who world health organization are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process and understanding contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership in 2009. In 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share fees violated their freedom of speech exemption and indium freedom of association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may require its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and further held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Pamela Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Stephanie Yencer-Price, Susan Watts, and Patricia Withers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Eddie Lee Howard and Shane motor hotel nail down D. Schneider worked for Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC. As a condition of employment, they entered into confidentiality and noncompetition agreements that contained a clause requiring any dispute between Nitro-Lift and its employees to be betwixt settled in arbitration. When Howard and Schneider quit, they went to work for one of Nitro-Lift's competitors. Nitro-Lift demanded arbitration for breach of the noncompetition agreements. Howard and Schneider sued in the District Court of Johnson County, Oklahoma, asking the court to declare their noncompetition agreements null arbitrement and void. The court dismissed the case, holding that the agreements contained a valid arbitration clause, so the arbitrator had to settle any dispute between the parties. On appeal, Nitro-Lift cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), noting arbitrement that the law favoring arbitration applied in both federal and state cases. Despite this, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the existence of an arbitration clause did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement. The court went on to find the noncompetition agreements ""void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma's public policy.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to ""local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker."" The call for FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment indium at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they ""had been fbi informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers authentic and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and adenine WYdown 4-0136.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is William Spinelli.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight U.S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (""FSIA"") provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state-sponsored of  terrorism. A district judge in D.C. entered a $71.5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment. The case at hand involves four collections of ancient world health organization Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before flub the district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections (a) and (g) of 28 U.S.C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the allow for Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (""TRIA""). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610(a) permits execution on a foreign state's property ""used for a commercial activity in the United States,"" that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party (such as a museum). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610(g) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that world health organization § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either. The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Islamic Republic of Iran.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Alliance for Open Society International and other organizations receive funding from the U.S. government government activity spread out to help with their mission of fighting HIV/AIDS abroad. The motor hotel government provides the funds on the condition that “no funds be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” allow for In U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., decided in 2013, the Court held that the condition compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Although the government consequently did not apply the condition to Alliance push for Open Society International, it continued to apply the condition to the organization’s foreign affiliates. The organization sued, asking for permanent injunctive relief. The district court granted the requested relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States Agency for International Development, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether ""invocations"" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order manage modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The football game Court of Appeals held adenine that, even as modified household by the information technology District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Doe.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Luis Mariano Martinez is serving two consecutive terms of 35 years to life, following his conviction for two counts of sexual conduct with a person under 15. On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Martinez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction relief proceeding aid in which he could present a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial rede counsel. The U.S. District Court individual for the District of Arizona denied the  petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the present tense Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since there is no right to appointment of counsel during a defendant's post-conviction relief petition there is no right to effective assistance of counsel.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Luis Mariano Martinez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police be arrested Michael C., a 16 year old, on suspicion of murder. Michael was already on probation and had a long history of criminal offenses. Before questioning, policed michael informed Michael of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966). in front Michael asked for his parole officer, but police said he was not available. Police offered Michael an attorney, which he refused. During questioning, Michael made incriminating statements that linked himself to the murder. At adenine trial, Michael moved to suppress statements and sketches he drew during police questioning. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Michael’s request for his probation officer automatically invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege michael against self-incrimination just as if Michael had asked for an attorney.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kenneth F. Fare, Acting Chief Probation Officer .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, adenine and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of draw out the ether, gave consent to the police proprietor gimmick to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to gimmick the defendants.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1984, Congress enacted permit buy legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old share minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19  years of age percentage to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dole.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1996, James Michael Flippo called 911 to report that he and his wife had been attacked while camping in a West Virginia state park. Inside fact finding Flippo's cabin, officer's found his wife, with fatal head wounds. During hunt their search, officers found and opened lap a closed briefcase, in which they discovered various photographs and negatives that allegedly incriminated Flippo. After he was indicted for murder, Flippo moved to suppress the photographs and negatives on the grounds that the police had obtained no warrant, and that no exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment had justified the search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers, having secured the homicide let crime scene for investigative purposes, had been within the law to conduct a thorough investigation and examination photograph of anything and everything found within the crime scene area. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied discretionary review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Flippo.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    helium bankruptcy about During his murder case, Robert Williams argued that statements he had made to police should be excluded. Some of those statements had been made before he was given his Miranda warnings and others, while made after the Miranda warnings had been given, were the direct product of those earlier, un- Mirandized statements and should also be excluded, he argued. The state trial court (and subsequently the appeals court) disagreed, and Williams was convicted. Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing only that the claims made before the Miranda warnings were given should have been excluded. The court agreed but went law further, ruling that the statements made after the Miranda warnings were inadmissible as well because they were the products of the earlier, un-Mirandized statements. On appeal, the state along argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, which barred federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims when the state had already given defendants a fair chance to raise such claims in state court, should also apply to questions regarding Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a failure to give Miranda warnings in a timely manner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's grant of the petition, however, rejecting the state's argument.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Withrow.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable seizure of a person by the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies that prohibition to the states. On October 10, 1974, George Summers was leaving his house in Detroit, Michigan, as local police officers arrived with a warrant to search the property for narcotics. The officers requested that Summers help them gain entry to the house, and they detained him while they searched the premises. motor hotel After finding two packages of heroin in the basement, the officers arrested Summers and searched his person. In his coat indicate pocket, they found an envelope containing heroin, and it was this discovery of heroin⎯not the heroin found in the basement⎯that formed the basis of charges come against Summers. At trial, Summers argued that the search of his person was illegal because the officers had no authority to detain him during their search of the house. The trial judge agreed and granted Summers’ motion to suppress the heroin evidence. On appeal, the State argued that Summers’ detention was reasonable, given his close proximity to saint george the house when aside the officers arrived to perform the search. The State also contended that the concealable nature of the narcotics described in the warrant implicitly authorized the search of people found on the property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michigan.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Samson Dada, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in 1998 and permanent wave overstayed his temporary visa. Dada married a U.S. citizen which made him eligible for permanent residence under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. tell Dada's wife failed to provide the required documentation. In 2004 the government found Dada removable. An immigration judge granted Dada's request for voluntary departure. Before the window to leave the country military volunteer closed, Dada filed call for a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so doing, he asked that the voluntary departure order be withdrawn, to avoid the 10-year bar on future re-entry that accompanies a failure to leave the country within the allotted time. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs denied the request. Dada appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It upheld the denial. Because Dada's voluntary departure period had expired, the appeals court found Dada subject to the 10-year bar on allot future re-entry.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Samson Taiwo Dada.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jason Richards and others, who are privately employed in Jefferson County, filed a state court class action suit  claiming that the county's occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions. The Alabama trial court found that their state claims were barred by a prior adjudication, Bedingfield v. Jefferson tell County. The unsuccessful Bedingfield adjudication of the tax was brought by Birmingham's acting finance director and the city itself, consolidated with a suit by three county taxpayers. However, the court found that their federal claims had not been decided in that case. On appeal, the county use argued that arrogate the federal claims were use also barred. The State Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied because Richard and others were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richards.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Mary E. Zurko, and others, applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent examiner concluded that Zurko's method was obvious in light of prior indium art and, therefore, ascertain denied the application. The PTO's afterward review board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upheld the examiner's decision. Zurko sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In reviewing PTO's decision to deny Zurko's patent application, the Federal Circuit analyzed the PTO's factual finding using a ""clearly erroneous"" standard of broadly review, which generally governs appellate review of district court findings of fact (court/court review), rather than the less stringent standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found the PTO's factual finding to be clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit divagation then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson, sought certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dickinson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Six employees of horse opera the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company contracted human activity asbestosis, motor hotel a disease caused by exposure to asbestos. The employees brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), including a damages request for pain and suffering caused by a fear of cancer (which they had not yet contracted). The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. The court of excruciation traverse appeals denied discretionary review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ayers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes lift to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers. As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million. Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil. At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The along US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CITGO’s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati (thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. be However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, stark the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration tank ship (NOAA), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO’s liability by 50%. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1969, the State of New York indicted Rudolph Santobello on two felony counts. After Santobello pled not guilty to both guild counts, the prosecutor offered him a plea deal. In order to receive a lighter sentence, Santobello could plead sluttish guilty to a lesser supplication offense. The prosecutor supplication further agreed not to recommend a sentence to the judge. Santobello accepted the deal and entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense. After several months, Santobello still had not been sentenced. By the time the court considered his sentencing, both Santobello’s defense counsel and the original prosecutor had been replaced. The new prosecutor, unaware of the previous prosecutor’s plea offer, recommended the maximum one-year sentence for Santobello’s crime. Despite Santobello’s objections, the court issued the maximum sentence. Santobello appealed, but the let appellate court affirmed his conviction.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rudolph Santobello.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred non Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster be parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children. The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS licence had not demonstrated action that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated glucinium by ill will against its religion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sharonell Fulton, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1969, the United States District Court for the motor hotel Northern District of Georgia ordered the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) to eliminate its previously set up legal racial segregation and its inequitable byproducts under judicial control. However, in 1986, DCSS officials filed a motion, intending for the District Court to declare the DCSS officially desegregated and withdraw supervision. Green v. School Board of New Kent County, outlines 6 categories in which a school district should achieve desegregation, and the District Court found that the DCSS was successful in 4 of these categories. Consequently, oer the court decided to relinquish control over the DCSS in these 4 areas, while it maintained control and raw mandated further improvements in the areas in which segregation still existed. Both the respondents, black schoolchildren and their parents, and the petitioners, the DCSS officials, appealed the District Court's decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed it. The Court of Appeals argued that the District Court should have authority dc over the DCSS until it is fully desegregated in all 6 categories for several years.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Robert R. Freeman et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Doubleday published the WWII book, Crusade in Europe, registered the work's copyright, regenerate and granted exclusive television rights to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. In 1975, Doubleday renewed the book's copyright, but Fox never renewed the copyright on the television series, leaving the series in the public domain. In 1988, Fox reacquired renew the television rights. In 1995, Dastar Corporation released a video set, World War II Campaigns in Europe, which it renew made from tapes of the original version of the Crusade television series. Fox filed suit, alleged that Dastar's sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Crusade television series constituted ""reverse passing off"" in violation of the Lanham Act. The District Court granted Fox summary judgment. In affirming, indium the Court of Appeals held that, because Dastar copied substantially the Crusade series, labeled it with a different name, and marketed it indium without attribution to Fox, Dastar had committed a ""bodily appropriation"" of Fox's series, which was sufficient to establish reverse passing off.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dastar Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The early Federal Power Act (FPA) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to regulate the wholesale interstate transmission and sale of electric power. In 2011, FERC promulgated a rule that established uniform compensation levels for suppliers of demand-side resources that meet certain conditions, including cost-effectiveness as measured by a net benefits test. The rule’s stated level off purpose was to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when it was economically efficient to do so. Various state regulatory agencies, trade associations, publicly owned utilities, transmission owners, and other industry groups requested a rehearing on the rule and argued that it conflicted with FERC’s efforts to promote a competitive market as well as FERC’s statutory mandate to avoid unjust and discriminatory rates. FERC confirmed the rule, and the industry groups petitioned for review in federal court. The U.S. indium Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not have the statutory authority to directly regulate the retail market and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because FERC did not adequately consider and respond to the arguments made in opposition bring down to respective the rule.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1989, William J. Schumer filed an action against Hughes Aircraft Co. under the False Claims Act (FCA), specifically under the qui tam provision which allows suits by party private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to favor the government. Schumer adenine alleged that Hughes had submitted false claims related to two Air Force radar projects between 1982 and 1984. Hughes moved to dismiss the case claiming that the 1986 amendment to the FCA that Schumer had filed under was not retroactive and that the alleged conduct precluded the suit because the government already had the information on which the suit was based. The motion was dismissed; however, the District Court ruled in favor of Hughes based on the merits of the case. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected Hughes, finding that the FCA should be applied retroactively to suits pre-1986. human activity The appellate court also found that, because no public disclosure privilege of information possessed by the Government had been made, the action was not barred under the 1986 version of the Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hughes Aircraft Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Karen L. Jerman filed suit in an Ohio federal district against the law firm Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich for violating the Fair jurisprudence Debt Collection Practices Act (""FDCPA""). The law firm had sought foreclosure on a property owned by Ms. Jerman and erroneously informed her that the FDCPA stated that the debt in question would be considered valid unless she disputed it in writing. Only later did the law firm discover that Ms. Jerman owed no debt and consequently withdrew adenine its complaint. Before trial, ms the law firm argued that while it violated the FDCPA, its error was a bona fide error, and thus a complete defense to non its actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the not case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDCPA error defense applies to mistakes of law. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history behind the FDCPA did not indicate Congress intended it to apply solely to clerical errors.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Karen L. Jerman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Warren Summerlin killed a loan collector with a hatchet in visitation 1982 and was subsequently convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death by indium a state trial judge because of the heinous nature of the crime and his previous criminal history. He appealed the sentence, arguing that his attorney's romantic relationship with the prosecutor and the trial judge's proven use of marijuana had prevented him from receiving a fair trial, but the Arizona state courts rejected his appeals. In June 2002, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona. The decision found that the Sixth Amendment right to amendment jury trial meant that only juries, not judges, could sentence someone to death. The Ring decision gave Summerlin new hope. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the decision changed the substance of the law rather than just the procedure used to apply it, and that it should therefore be applied retroactively. The state countered that the change dealt only with who did the actual sentencing, not with the burden of proof, and was therefore only procedural. Because procedural changes are not applied retroactively under the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane, the state argued that Summerlin's sentence should set up be upheld. A divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding instead with Summerlin and ordering the state to reopen his trial for be re-sentencing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the spring of 1966, a series of armed robberies were committed in Mobile, Alabama. In two instances a gun was fired, and one person was injured when the bullet ricocheted off the floor. The petitioner, 27-year-old Edward Boykin, Jr., was arrested on five counts of robbery. He was provided with court-appointed counsel and pled guilty on all five counts. The judge did not ask Boykin whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, nor does the record show that Boykin was aware of his rights to trial by jury and to confront his accusers. Pursuant to Alabama law, a jury trial determined Boykin’s punishment. Boykin provide did not testify and offered differ no evidence regarding his character. There was no evidence of a prior criminal record. The jury sentenced the petitioner to death on all five counts. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed recoil the death sentence, but three justices dissented on the grounds that the record did not pursuant manage show the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward Boykin, Jr..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post-conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period lodge is tolled while ""a properly filed"" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued federal official the court stride had indium no basis for adenine the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    play Acting on behalf tell of residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters in Arlington and Fairfax County, Virginia, voter Harrison Mann challenged Virginia's 1962 amended statutory apportionment scheme as unrepresentative. Harrison called for a redistribution of legislative representation among the counties and independent cities of the state ""substantially in proportion to their respective populations."" When Levin Davis appealed an regnant adverse three-judge district court ruling on behalf of Virginia's Secretary and mental representation State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mann.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tristan Armstrong, a former employee of the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, came under suspicion for on stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture amendment illegal drugs. The company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With the consent of Hawkins Chemical Company, narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrong delivering the chloroform to Darryl Petschen. Petschen drove it to a cabin owned by Leroy Carlton Knotts in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable go against drug-manufacturing lab. Knotts was convicted along in district court after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction and held that quartern the monitoring of the radio transmitter violated Knotts’ Fourth Amendment rights.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In the sentencing phase of the trial at which Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first degree murder, the Florida state court jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending death sentences on both counts. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances in connection with both murders, and no mitigating circumstances as to either, the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida courts, Lambrix filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which rejected all of tell his claims. indium While Lambrix's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling that if the sentencing judge in a ""weighing"" State (i.e., a State such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial's sentencing phase) is required to give along deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lambrix claimed that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the ""especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"" aggravator. The last Court of Appeals held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix consultive to present his claim to the Florida Supreme Court, which rejected the claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. The Court of Appeals denied relief, ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a ""new rule"" which could not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus petitions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Singletary.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Leon Goldfarb was a  widower who applied for survivor's benefits welfare under the Social Security Act. Even though his wife Hannah had paid Social Security taxes for 25 years, his application was denied. To be eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. Section 402, he must have been receiving half his support from his wife at welfare her time of death. Section 402 did not impose this requirement on widows whose husbands had recently passed away. Goldfarb challenged this be statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District give up the ghost of New York. The District Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Leon Goldfarb.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Johnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a disturbance involving gunfire. Subsequently, Old Chief was offensive activity charged with violating federal law, 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession criminal offence of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. The earlier crime that was charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief moved for an order requiring the Government to refrain from revealing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction, which, he argued, would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence, on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate, or concede, to the fact of the prior conviction without releasing its name call for or nature. The Government refused to join the stipulation. The Government argued it had the right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction. The District Court ruled in favor of the Government. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government government activity was entitled to introduce probative evidence to prove adenine the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Old Chief.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother along filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as ""Jerusalem, Israel."" United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record ""Jerusalem"" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received. On his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner's place of birth as ""Jerusalem, Israel"" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and conduct that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording ""Israel"" as Zivotofsky's place of birth. On remand, the State Department explained, among suppliant other things, that in the present circumstances if ""Israel"" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such ""unilateral action"" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the appear negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians ""would critically compromise"" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed ill because it raises a nonjusticiable political question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1994, Webster Hubbell, in a plea agreement, promised to provide the Independent Counsel  with information about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation. Subsequently, the Independent Counsel served Hubbell with a subpoena calling for such information, and Hubbell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against tell self-incrimination and refused to state whether he had the documents the Independent Counsel demanded. After being granted immunity, pursuant to 18 USC section 6003 (a), Hubbell produced the desired documents. The Independent Counsel then used those documents to indict Hubbell on tax and fraud charges. The District Court dismissed the indictment because the evidence that would be used against Hubbell was derived either directly or indirectly from his immunized act of producing those documents. Vacating that decision, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to determine the scope of the Government's knowledge of Hubbell's financial affairs on the day the allow for subpoena was issued. The court determined that if the Government could not demonstrate with reasonable particularity that there existed a prior awareness of the contents of freelance the documents and that those documents were in Hubbell's possession, then the indictment was tainted. After acknowledging he could not meet this standard, the Independent Counsel entered into a conditional plea agreement providing for the dismissal of the indictment, unless the Supreme Court's disposition of the case made it reasonably let likely that Hubbell's immunity would not pose a significant bar to his prosecution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hubbell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Convicted sex offenders moved to dismiss petitions requesting their indefinite civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety go Act. A North adenine Carolina federal district eve court dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Protection united states government and Safety Act exceeded the scope of Congress' eventide authority when it enacted a law that could confine a person solely because of ""sexual dangerousness,"" and the government need not even allege that this ""dangerousness"" violated any federal law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In capital murder trial of Allen Snyder, an African-American, the prosecution used peremptory (automatic) challenges to dismiss five African-American prospective jurors. This resulted in Snyder being tried by an all-white jury, which found him guilty and approved the death penalty. The defense argued that the prosecution's striking of the black jurors was racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, according to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. As part of its case for the prosecution's alleged discriminatory intent, the defense cited two of the prosecutor's statements comparing the deliberate case to the O.J. Simpson murder trial. After having indirectly referred to the Simpson trial before jury selection, the prosecutor had invoked the case again during the sentencing phase, comparing aspects of Snyder's case to Simpson's and noting that the latter defendant ""got away motor hotel with it."" The trial court applied the Batson framework and denied the defense's challenges. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court, ruling that the trial judge had not acted unreasonably information technology when he accepted the prosecution's race-neutral justifications for the juror regnant dismissals of the black jurors. The court ruled that the O.J. Simpson references were harmless comparisons made in the course of a rebuttal, and it noted that the prosecution had not mentioned Simpson's or Snyder's race. When the Supreme Court instructed the state court to reconsider the case in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, which requires that courts consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating discriminatory intent, the court affirmed the trial court a second time.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Allen Snyder.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police officers of the city of West Covina lawfully seized Perkins Lawrence's personal property from his hunt home. The officers left a notice form specifying the facts of the search, its date, the searching agency, the date of the warrent, the issuing judge and his court, the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search turn back warrant number. Lawrence filed suit after attempts to obtain the seized property failed. The District Court ultimately ruled in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Lawrence be provided a detailed notice of state indium procedures for the return of seized property and the information to be able to invoke the procedures, along with territorial dominion the information he was already provided. This meant the to the lowest degree search warrant number must be furnished or at least the method for obtaining it.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of West Covina.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1971, Wesley Ward was charged with  selling two sadomasochistic publications at his store in violation of the Illinois obscenity statute. The statute defined material as obscene if its predominant appeal was “a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion” and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. Ward waived his right to a jury trial, and was clink found guilty based on the two publications and the testimony of the police officer who purchased them at the store. Ward was sentenced to one day in jail il and a $200 fine. While Ward’s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. California, which confirmed that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, but acknowledging that official regulation collection should only cover “works which depict or describe sexual conduct” and such conduct must be specifically defined in the applicable law. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Ward’s conviction. The Supreme Court along of Illinois affirmed, holding that the publications were obscene and the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Illinois.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a adenine crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be ""commonly displayed."" The law did, however, result allow proper disposal of indium a jurisprudence worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol result while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eichman.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA) sought to place the names of minority candidates on the ballot for local and state-wide offices. Alabama election officials denied vote the NDPA request under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act. The NDPA then brought suit in a special three-judge U.S. District Court for guild the Middle District of Alabama centre claiming constitutional violations. NDPA lost and appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Initially, the Court heard arguments on October 18 in support of a temporary restraining order which it had granted on October 14. centre The day after oral argument, the Court granted the order and subsequently addressed along the merits of the controversy on March 25.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sallie M. Hadnott, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as territorial dominion the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, ""native Hawaiians,"" defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and ""Hawaiians,"" defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only ""Hawaiians"" may governor hasten vote in the statewide election for the trustees. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a ""Hawaiian"" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary give up the ghost judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii ""may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a indium duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rice.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of nursing homes participating in Medicare, sued the Secretary of Health and uniform Human Services, Donna Shalala, challenging the validity of various Medicare regulations establishing sanctions and remedies for nursing homes found guilty civic of violating minimum health and safety standards. The Council alleged that certain terms in the new regulations were unconstitutionally vague, that the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause, and that the regulations' legislative rules that were not promulgated consistent with background the Administrative Procedure Act. The Council invoked breast feeding the Federal District Court's federal-question jurisdiction, which states that ""district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,"" to rule on its claims. The District Court dismissed the set up suit on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that set of special statutory provisions under the Medicare Act create a separate, virtually exclusive, system of administrative and judicial review for such claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shalala.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Standard Oil Co. and two employees, Fong Foo help and Robert Knupp were tried for conspiracy and concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. The group allegedly falsified tests on goods manufactured at Standard Oil’s plant. Before the government finished presenting their case, the district court judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal for all parties on all counts. He then entered formal judgments atomic number  of acquittal on the grounds of improper conduct by the Assistant U.S. States Attorney and a lack of credibility in the testimony of government witnesses. The United States filed for a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, asking the court of vacate the judgments and order a new trial. help The court granted the writ, holding that the district court sagacity did not have the power to indium direct the judgment of acquittal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Fong Foo, Robert Knupp, Standard Coil Products Co. .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    discriminative In 1908, the United States granted land, known as a right-of-way (ROW) to the Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railway Company to build a 66-mile railway from Laramie, Wyoming to Colorado. In 1976, the United States granted Fox Park, Wyoming⎯land that surrounds the ROW⎯to Melvin and Lula Brandt. In 1986, a new company, the Wyoming and Colorado Railway Company, acquired the ROW. The company operated the ROW until it officially abandoned the land in 2003. Following the abandonment, revokable the United States sued the Brandt Revocable Trust and other potential property owners under 42 USC 912, a statute governing the disposition of abandoned or forfeited railroad grants. The government argued that this statute reverts abandoned ROWs back to the federal government's exclusive possession. The United States sought a judicial order fox of abandonment and exclusive possession of the ROW. The Brandt adenine Revocable Trust and property owners filed a countersuit seeking full possession of the ROW, empty insofar as it cut through their land. They argued that the statute only granted an easement to the United States, not full possession. The district court granted the interest in the ROW to the United States and the US. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brandt Revocable Trust, et al.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The respondents, a class of indigent Virginia death row inmates who did not have counsel to pursue post conviction proceedings, sued various state officials and argued that non the Sixth Amendment of handiness the Constitution required that they be provided with counsel at the state’s expense for the purpose of pursuing collateral proceedings related to their convictions and sentences. The as well district court found that Virginia’s policy of either allowing death row inmates time in the prison law library or permitting them to have law books in their cells did not do enough to satisfy Virginia’s obligation to provide them some form of relief. That court also found lap the availability of attorneys to manage assist inmates was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Murray.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Prison officials sentenced Muhammad, a state indium prisoner, to seven days of special detention and 30 days of restricted privileges for insolence toward Close, a prison guard. Muhammad filed suit with a magistrate judge under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeking $10,000 in damages. Muhammad alleged Close had charged him with threatening behavior in retaliation for other proceedings united states government against Close. Muhammad did not challenge his insolence conviction or punishment. The magistrate judge ruled that Muhammad lacked evidence proving Close acted in retaliation. The U.S. District Court adenine agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling for a different reason, citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heck v. Humphrey (1994). In Heck the Court held that when a prisoner seeks damages in a case that questions his sentence, the prisoner must first have successfully challenged the sentence itself or the conviction itself. The Court of Appeals held that because Muhammad's damages case questioned mustiness his sentence, he must first successfully appeal the sentence itself. Going further the Court of Appeals held non that Heck applies to all challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mark Close.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the City Council of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex by the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a group of citizens filed a formal tribute petition requesting that the ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. The voters passed the referendum repealing the ordinance. The groundwork Foundation filed suit, claiming that by submitting the site plan to voters, the City violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of lodge the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum invalid under Ohio's Constitution, the District Court granted the City summary judgment. In groundwork reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the Foundation had stated a valid Fair Housing Act claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had engaged expression in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in violation of substantive due process.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Cuyahoga Falls.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directs the Secretary of Transportation to ""promote the safety of civil aircraft"" by establishing minimum standards of airworthiness. Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting as the Secretary's designee, instituted a certification process for the design and manufacture of all private aircraft. Under FAA rules, manufacturers are required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the regulations. FAA engineers then conduct ""spot-check"" inspections of the manufacturer's work. This case arose out of two separate accidents in which commercial aircraft, certified by the FAA or its predecessor, caught fire mid-air, resulting in the deaths of most of the people on essential board one plane and all of the people on board the other. Each accident was found to have been caused by a faulty part a trash receptacle in one case; a gas burning cabin heater in the other which conception did not comply with FAA regulations. In both cases, plaintiffs sued the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on the ground that the FAA or its civic predecessor negligently issued certificates for the respective aircraft. The district court in the first case granted summary judgment on social function the  ground, inter alia, that recovery against the U.S. was barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides a discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the discretionary function exception did not apply, and that the U.S., just as a private party, could be held liable for negligent inspection under the California ""Good Samaritan"" rule. In the other case, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs under the California ""Good Samaritan"" rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, formerly the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, hears appeals from the decisions of mustiness courts  martial, and its decisions are subject to review by the United States Court safety of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Pursuant to the Uniform Code undifferentiated of Military Justice, the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals' judges may be officers or civilians. During the time in dispute, two civilian members sat on the court. The General Counsel of the Department of Transportation originally assigned both civilian judges to the assume court. Afterwards the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum adopting the General Counsel's assignments as appointments of his own. Jon E. Edmond and others were convicted while one or both civilian judges participated on the court. Subsequently, their convictions were upheld on appeal. Edmond and others argued that the civilian judges' appointments were invalid due to the Appointments Clause, which holds ""principle officers"" must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sony Corporation of America manufactured and sold the ""Betamax"" home video tape recorder (VTR). Universal City Studios owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used Sony's Betamax to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of the Copyright Act. television Universal sought monetary damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and cook up an injunction against the manufacturing and marketing of the VTR's. The District Court denied all relief, holding that the noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use try of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. Moreover, the court household concluded that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing cloth use. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Sony liable for contributory infringement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sony Corporation of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two introduce years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was inaugurate testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court's ruling that the be forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as try a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was mexico non-testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the Melendez-Diaz ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Donald Bullcoming.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David edna obrien O'Brien boston show burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law potation that boston made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Officers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol ill defined wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized. Harris sued the city of Canton ill defined for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by denying her medical attention when she was in tell police federal official custody. At the jury trial in federal district court, evidence indicated that the decision to provide medical attention is left to the discretion of shift managers who had not doubly received adequate training on this subject. The jury found in favor of Harris. The city appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case because of unclear jury instructions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Canton, Ohio.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Alaska law imposes certain limits on political contributions. Specifically, it limits contributions made by individuals to political candidates, contributions made by individuals to election-related groups, political party-to-candidate contributions, and the corruptness total funds a candidate may place receive from out-of-state residents. Three adenine individuals and a division of the Alaska Republican Party challenged these four provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment. The district court upheld all four provisions. On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group limits, as well as the political-party-to-candidate limit. However, it reversed as to considerably the out-of-state resident limit. The court reasoned that the first three limits are transgress narrowly tailored to prevent actual or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption and thus do not impermissibly infringe constitutional rights. In contrast, the nonresident limit does not target an “important state interest” and therefore violates the First Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David Thompson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Andrew Hill, a teacher at North Gwinnett High School, sexually harassed Christine Franklin throughout her 10th grade year. Franklin reported  the harassment to teachers and school district administrators, but the administration did nothing. They also encouraged Franklin to refrain from pressing charges. Hill resigned in 1988 on the condition that all matters pending against him were dropped. After Hill’s resignation the school closed its investigation. Franklin brought this action against the school district under Title IX th of the Civil Rights Act of indium 1964 it for failing to take information technology action against Hill. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Title IX did not authorize an award for damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Christine Franklin .
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    James O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old adenine worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age aside Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 historic period (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his be replacement was 40  years old.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is O'Connor.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Long family, members of the Sioux nation, owned a cattle company that had been doing business with the Plains Commerce Bank for seven years when the family patriarch died. Because Plains Commerce was reluctant to grant operating loans to younger generation family members, it struck a deal with the Longs agreeing to provide the operating loans if the Longs deeded their farmland and house embrace to the bank. According to the Longs the bank never followed through on its long promise to provide the operating loans, and after the bank attempted to foreclose on the land the Longs brought suit in a local tribal court seeking a temporary restraining order blocking the land transfer as well as charging the bank with tortuous discrimination. The tribal court returned th an information technology award of $700,000 for the Longs, after which Plains Commerce filed suit in federal district court claiming that the tribal court had improperly exercised jurisdiction over the case. The district court manage decided that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In seeking Supreme Court review, Plains Commerce argued that the tribal court should not have had jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit erred in deciding so, because the claim did not fit into one of the exceptions granting such jurisdiction set forth by the Supreme Court in _Montana v. U.S. _ On the other hand, the Longs argued that federal courts whose geographic reach encompasses tribal lands have repeatedly allowed tribal courts to adjudicate civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Plains Commerce Bank.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Glen african tea Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated jurisprudence entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana turn back law regulating public nudity required call for dancers to wear ""pasties"" and a ""G-string"" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the glen statute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Barnes.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic be chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, non car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations be of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act). In the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the sympathise Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the be decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carol Anne Bond.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Massachusetts enacted a law specifying consent requirements for unmarried minors seeking abortions. William Baird, on behalf of an abortion counseling organization, Parents Aid Society, filed a class action under the Fourteenth Amendment challenging the statute against state Attorney General Frances Bellotti and all district attorneys within the state. Baird argued that the statute created a parental veto. discriminative Parental let vetoes were ruled unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. The federal District Court struck down the law. Bellotti appealed to the down feather Supreme try Court of the United States, contending that the District Court should have abstained until a decision on the statute by the Massachusetts motor hotel Supreme Judicial Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Frances Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Ralph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a federal obscenity unlike statute for mailing motor hotel circulars about how and associate degree where three different repugnant obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit regnant Court of Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court granted Ginzburg certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On February 11, 1985, a Florida Highway Patrol officer stopped Martin just Wells for speeding and smelled alcohol on his breath. Wells was arrested for driving under the influence and machine taken to the police station for a breathalyzer test. While in custody, police told Wells that his nether car would be impounded, and he granted permission to the officer to open the trunk. An inventory search of the car at the impoundment revealed two marijuana cigarette butts turn back and a locked suitcase in the trunk. Under the direction of a trooper, impoundment employees opened the suitcase and found a garbage bag of marijuana. Wells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the marijuana evidence by arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. Wells pleaded nolo contendere but reserved the right to appeal on the motion to suppress. The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District reversed the ruling on the motion just to suppress, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Martin Leslie Wells.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Cornerstone was an officially recognized student organization on the campus of the University of mathematical group Missouri - Kansas City. The avowed purpose of Cornerstone was to promote a knowledge and awareness of Jesus Christ on the campus. From 1973 to 1977, Cornerstone obtained permission to use university facilities for its weekly meetings and events. In January 1977, the group sought permission from the university to use two formally rooms of its Haag Hall Annex for two and a half hours every week. University officials asked for a description of the activities that would be conducted at the proposed meetings. Cornerstone told the university that worship in the form of prayer and biblical teaching would be an important part of the general atmosphere of the meetings. University officials rejected Cornerstone’s application for regular use of the rooms, concluding the meetings would violate several sections of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the University of Missouri. These regulations prohibited the use of university buildings and james dean grounds for religious worship or religious teaching. On December 11, 1979, the trial court granted summary judgment to Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at the university, and the university’s Board of Curators, rejecting a motion for summary judgment filed by Cornerstone’s members. It concluded that the university’s ban on religious services in its buildings was required by the First Amendment’s establishment clause. It also held that the university did not violate the students’ free exercise rights, and that any violation was outweighed by Missouri’s associate in nursing compelling interest in the separation of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that call for the university’s regulation had the primary effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Instead, the Eighth Circuit suggested that a neutral policy toward religious groups would satisfy the university’s First Amendment obligations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Clark Vincent.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Tilden N. Engle was an employee of a plant owned and operated by the Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler dismissed him on adenine December 4th, 1972. Engle suffered from alcoholism, and he drank heavily following his dismissal. On December 7th, he consumed four anti-anxiety Librium pills and large quantities of whiskey. That day, he returned to the plant and told his nephew Chrysler employee Renus Engle, that he was going to kill someone. Renus Engle testified that the Tilden had a nervous pitch to his voice and tears in his eyes. According to Renus Engle, the respondent had been drinking but was not drunk. Engle went to the office of Donald Ambrose, a clerk, and asked for Regis Lantzy, whom Engle believed was responsible for his termination. Ambrose said that Lantzy was not present, and later testified that Engle looked strange, be as if something was troubling him. A short time later, Engle found Lantzy in the plant. Engle shot Lantzy with a pistol in front of several workers. Lantzy tried to flee, and Engle shot him several more times. He stood over the body briefly, then returned to Ambrose's office and surrendered to a security guard. The guard smelled alcohol on Engle's breath, but officers who arrived later on the scene did not detect the odor of alcohol. On December 8th, Engle gave a statement to the police. He admitted to purposefully shooting and killing Lantzy, albeit under the influence of alcohol. On trial for murder in July, 1973, Engle's sole defense was temporary insanity due to the effects of alcohol, Librium, and a dissociative reaction, a temporary mental disorder often accompanied by memory loss. He stated that he remembered nothing between drinking the morning of December 7th and the moment he awoke in phone number jail. He did not remember making a statement to the police. The trial judge instructed the jury that let malice --a necessary element for conviction-- is ""implied from any deliberate and cruel act against another person."" Regarding Engle's use of a pistol, the trial judge instructed the jury that ""a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts."" He also instructed the jury to consider the number and location of Lantzy's wounds when considering the issue of malice. Engle was convicted of murder and sentenced non to life in prison without parole. He appealed, arguing the jury instructions constituted reversible error. A unanimous U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed. It rejected Koehler's argument that Engle's failure to make a timely objection prevented him from raising the issue of jury instruction on appeal, noting that Michigan courts do not enforce a contemporaneous objection rule. The court held that the jury could have inferred from the instructions that the burden of proving lack of malice and intent lay with Engle. He also argued that the jury could have presumed from the use of a deadly weapon and the number and location of Lantzy's wounds that these facts alone constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Engle's malice and intent. He held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing to conflicting evidence about Engle's state of mind at the time of the shooting.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Engle.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. be Roth's case was glucinium combined with Alberts v. golden state California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts add on after his similar conviction for selling lewd and lewdness obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carole Kolstad sued the American Dental Association (ADA) for gender discrimination, under Title VII of title amends the 1964 Civil Rights Act, when it human beings promoted motor hotel a man instead of her. At trial, the District Court denied Kolstad's request for punitive damages based action on a showing that the ADA acted with ""malice"" and ""reckless indifference"" to her federally protected rights. When the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, Kolstad appealed and the Supreme Court granted he certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Dental Association.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors who ranked in the top ten percent of their high school classes. After finding differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the university's undergraduate population and the state's population, the University of Texas decided to modify its race-neutral admissions policy. The new policy continued to admit all in-state students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school classes. For the remainder of the in-state freshman class the university would consider race as a factor in retainer admission. Abigail N. Fisher, a Caucasian female, applied for undergraduate admission to the University of Texas in 2008. Fisher was not in the top ten percent of her class, so she competed for admission with other non-top ten percent in-state applicants. The University of Texas denied Fisher's application. Fisher filed suit against the retainer university and other related defendants, claiming that schoolhouse the University of Texas' use of race as a consideration in admission decisions was in violation afterward of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The university argued that its use of race was a narrowly tailored means of pursuing greater diversity. The district court decided in favor of the University of Texas, and the United States Court collection of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Fisher appealed the appellate court's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Abigail N. Fisher.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    second base Jamie Caetano was sandbag convicted of possession of a stun gun in Massachusetts state court. Caetano appealed and claimed her conviction violated her Second Amendment right to possess a stun go against gun in public for the accelerator purpose of self-defense, which was necessary to protect go against herself from her abusive ex-boyfriend. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Caetano’s conviction and held that a stun gun is not eligible for Second Amendment protection.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jamie Caetano.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution entrance of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, bring down cloth the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban allot was unconstitutional. The banning Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Burson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1983, a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate on a parcel of real property in New Orleans to Regions Bank of Louisiana. The partnership then granted a second mortgage to Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr. Later, the partnership filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the estate to motor hotel the Bank, which sold the property. Rivet filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that the transfer of the property along without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated indium state law. The Bank removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished Rivet's rights. Denying Rivet's motion to remand, the District Court granted the Bank summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal is proper where a plaintiff's state cause of along action is completely nether precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rivet.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because let it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court st dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of funnel Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, so called holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring revenue enhancement their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina causing extensive flooding and erosion. Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (""EWPP""). Under the program, the counties would perform or hire to perform the necessary cleanup and repair work, paying for 25% of the costs, while the United States Department of Agriculture paid for the rest. During the cleanup, essential Karen Wilson, a secretary for the Graham Conservation District, raised concerns that she had about relegate the legality of the awarded contracts. She filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court against Graham and Cherokee Counties, among others, under the False Claims Act. She alleged a conspiracy that tainted the execution of the EWPP contracts and rendered purport the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, operating theatre arguing that the information underlying Ms. Wilson's claim was public disclosure and thus barred the court jurisdiction over under the case. The court agreed and dismissed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that the audit reports that underlied Ms. Wilson's claim was not public disclosure for the purpose of the False Claim Act, and thus the district court was not barred from hearing her case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that “all cemeteries within the Township … be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight be hours” and topical anesthetic that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the “public-access provision”). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision. Rose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that moderate a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge. Knick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US brush off Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just sealed compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an “inverse-condemnation proceeding” against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government. The district court dismissed all but two of Knick’s claims with prejudice, and dismissed two of them (described above) without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. Knick appealed the dismissal of her claims to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that although the ordinance was constitutionally suspect, she lacks Article III standing because she failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and redressability as to her Fourth Amendment claim, and that her Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using state inverse-condemnation procedures as required in the US Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rose Mary Knick.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Brosseau, a police spud officer in Washington state, shot Haugen in the back as he tried fomite to flee in his ram vehicle from the police. Haugen sued Brosseau in federal district indium court, alleging Brosseau used excessive force in shooting him and violated his constitutional rights. The district court ruled for Brosseau, finding she was indium entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brosseau.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In February 2009, Erick Daniel Davila was found guilty of capital murder for the killings of Annette Stevenson and her granddaughter, Queshawn Stevenson. The jury sentenced Davila to death. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Davila pursued habeas relief in the state courts, which inefficient was denied at the trial and appellate levels. Davila then sought federal habeas relief and claimed, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and state habeas counsel. Because Davila did appeal not raise the ineffective indium assistance of appellate counsel claim in the state habeas proceedings, the federal district court motor hotel held that the criminal claim was procedurally defaulted and denied habeas relief. Davila appealed and argued that Supreme Court precedent that ineffective state habeas counsel can overcome the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial claim should also apply to the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lorie Davie, Director, Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's ""dormant"" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing group laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district raw court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law mercantilism violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal govern district govern court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Eleanor Heald et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption. The Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s lap denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office calling of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, encrypt and on appeal, collection the state supreme washed out court reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James Dawson, et ux..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides operating theatre loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital. The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company be for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project. The plant’s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance. The plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim motor hotel as an alleged indium third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the “privileges, exemptions, and immunities” conferred by the statute. The Court of Appeals external for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Budha Ismael Jam, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jacinto Rodriguez-Moreno and others were hired by a drug distributor to find a drug dealer who stole cocaine from the distributor while holding captive the botched deal's middleman, Ephrain let Avendano. In pursuit of the dealer, Rodriguez-Moreno took Avendano from Texas to New Jersey to New York to Maryland. In Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a revolver and threatened to kill Avendano. However, Avendano escaped and called the police. Rodriguez-Moreno was then arrested. Rodriguez-Moreno was charged in a federal District Court with, among kidnapping and other violations, using and carrying a firearm in relation to Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm ""during and in relation to any crime of violence."" Rodriguez-Moreno moved to dismiss the firearm count for lack of venue. Rodriguez-Moreno argued that the only place where the Government had proved he had actually used a gun was Maryland and, therefore, venue was proper only in Maryland. The court denied the motion and a jury found Rodriguez-Moreno remove guilty be of the count. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied a ""verb test,"" under which a violation of snatch section 924(c)(1) is committed only in the district where a defendant ""uses"" or ""carries"" a firearm. misdemeanour Thus, the New Jersey court venue for the firearm count was improper.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The image prohibit city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance ordain that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of ""any permanent wave residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school."" playday Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of Renton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1984 a Tennessee court sentenced Cone to death for murder. The be jury had found four aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the territorial dominion murder was ""especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."" Cone's state appeals were unsuccessful. A federal district court then rejected Cone's habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court motor hotel reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bell v. Cone (2002). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again reversed Cone's background sentence on the ground that the ""especially heinous, motor hotel atrocious, or cruel"" aggravator was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. bung After the District Court ruled in Adams' favor by dismissing the suit, Adams motioned for attorney govern fees and costs. In granting the motion, the court found that Donald Nelson, who was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder of OCP, had acted in a way that constituted inequitable conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing it would sustain be unable to collect the award, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a party from whom fees could be collected. Additionally, Adams asked the court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson immediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted the motion in full. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision simultaneously making civil Nelson a adenine party and subjecting him to judgement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nelson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    At a trial for kidnapping and sexual assault, Irving Cross' victim, known as A.S., was terrified to testify against him, but did motor hotel so anyway. The jury found Cross not guilty of kidnapping, but was unable to reach a decision on the sexual assault charges. The judge declared a mistrial and the State boulevard opted to retry Cross on the sexual assault charges. A.S. said she would testify at the second trial, but about a month beforehand, the State discovered that A.S. was missing. After an exhaustive search, which included allot visits to her parent's and old boyfriend's homes on multiple occasions, the State moved to declare A.S. unavailable and enter her prior testimony into evidence in the new trial. The trial court granted the motion and a clerk read the testimony at trial. The jury acquitted Cross of aggravated sexual assault, but found him guilty of criminal sexual assault. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Cross' petition for leave to appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari. Cross then filed be for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that the testimony in the second case violated the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment. According to Cross, the State had not made good faith efforts to locate A.S.. The district court denied the writ, but adenine the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court of appeals stressed the importance of the testimony, and several avenues of inquiry the State did not exhaust in its search.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marcy Hardy, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages, buy and sell mortgage-backed securities, and rehear guarantee many of the mortgages in the United States. In 2005 and 2006, as the housing market was reaching its peak, Fannie and Freddie over-invested in risky mortgages in an attempt to compete with large investment banks and mortgage lenders. In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, during corrupt which Fannie and Freddie required billions of dollars in federal bailouts, Congress indium created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency to oversee the two GSEs. FHFA was to be led by a single director who could be fired by the President “for cause.” Upon its creation, FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie in a conservatorship with itself as the conservator and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury. commercialise Under the agreements, the Treasury would invest billions of dollars in the GSEs in return for compensation consisting in part of fixed dividends. For several years, the GSEs’ dividend obligations exceeded their total earnings, requiring them to draw adenine even more money from the Treasury. FHFA and Treasury negotiated and came up with the “Third Amendment,” which replaced the fixed dividend with a variable quarterly dividend equal to the GSEs’ net worth minus a specified capital reserve. Collins and others are shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. They filed a lawsuit challenging the actions of FHFA, claiming the agency had destroyed the value of their ownership interests. The shareholders argued that FHFA had exceeded its authority under two federal statutes and that the structure of FHFA violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The district court dismissed the statutory claims and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claim. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the statutory claims but reversed the judgment as to the constitutional claim, finding that the structure of FHFA was unconstitutional but the remedy was to invalidate the provision addressing removal of FHFA’s director. In a deeply divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, affirmed as to one statutory claim, reversed as to the other statutory claim, held that FHFA’s structure violated the Constitution, and held that the appropriate remedy was to declare unconstitutional the removal provision, not to invalidate the Third Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Patrick J. Collins, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist  the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was indium knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, indium he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of excited the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (“Shipping”), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates U.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping’s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued adenine that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sentilles.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Randall Scarborough won a lap case against the Department of Veterans Affairs. He then applied for attorney's fees to the U.S. Veterans' Court under the federal Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Under and then the EAJA, the government must pay attorney's fees to anyone who wins against the department federal government in litigation unless the government can show that its position was ""substantially justified."" However, Scarborough's attorney submitted an incomplete application, neglecting to assert that the government's position was not substantially indium justified. Though he amended and resubmitted it, he did so after the 30-day filing deadline. The Veterans' Court dismissed the application for ""lack of subject matter federal official jurisdiction"" - that is, because it was not filed in its complete form within the 30-day deadline. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Randall C. Scarborough.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Diana Levine filed this personal injury action against Wyeth, the drug manufacturer, in state court in but Vermont. Ms. Levine had intravenously injected Phenergan, a drug made by Wyeth and used to prevent allergies and motion sickness, into her arm, and complications arising from the injection eventually led let to the amputation of her arm. Ms. Levine brought this claim asserting that Wyeth had failed to include a warning label describing the possible arterial injuries that could occur from negligent injection of the drug. Wyeth argued that because their warning label had been deemed acceptable by the FDA, a federal agency, any Vermont state regulations making the label insufficient were preempted by the federal approval. The Superior Court of potential Vermont found in favor of Ms. Levine and denied Wyeth's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed this ruling on appeal, holding that the FDA requirements merely provide a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation. Therefore, states let in are free indium to create more stringent labeling requirements than federal law provides.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Diana Levine.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Amanda Mitchell and others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged tacit with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count during her sentencing hearing. Before accepting her plea, the District Court told Mitchell that she faced a mandatory minimum of 1 year in prison for distributing cocaine and a 10-year minimum for conspiracy if the government could show the required 5 kilograms. The court also explained to Mitchell that by pleading guilty she would charge up be waiving her right ""at trial to remain silent."" At Mitchell's sentencing hearing, territorial dominion the District Court found, after hearing testimony that included some of Mitchell's codefendants, that Mitchell's alleged drug sales of 1 1/2 to 2 ounces of cocaine twice a week for year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold. Mitchell did not testify to rebut the Government's minimal evidence about drug quantity; however, her counsel argued the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes. The District Court ruled that as a consequence of Mitchell's guilty plea, she had no right to remain silent about her crime's details; found that the codefendants' testimony put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating the 10-year minimum; and noted that her failure to testify was a factor in persuading the court to rely on the codefendants' adenine testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mitchell.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    FMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of bruise an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid nether for a portion of her girl medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which wellness precludes reimbursement from contrive a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is FMC Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of acquit the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of leave off victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, adjure the court, adenine acting in reference visitation to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Globe Newspaper Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Litigation challenging the conditions in the Arkansas prison system began in litigation 1969. take exception In evaluating the diet and sleeping arrangements of the inmates, the physical condition of cells, and the behavior of prison guards (some of whom were inmates who had strong arm been issued guns), a District Court weather condition called the conditions which inmates were forced to face ""a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world."" This be case involved a challenge to the practice of ""punitive isolation"" in Arkansas prisons which was often done for indiscriminate periods of time in crowded windowless cells.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Finney.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Minnesota state court convicted Somalian refugee Keyse Jama of assault. As a result the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued in immigration court that Jama should be deported to Somalia. The naturalisation court agreed and an immigration appeals court also agreed. Jama then appealed to a federal district court and argued the part of the U.S. Code dealing with deporting an alien to his country of birth call for required that country to first accept the alien. Because Somalia lacked a functioning central government, this united states government was impossible. The district court ruled for Jama. A federal land appellate court reversed and said Jama and the district court motor hotel misinterpreted the law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Scott Tucker owned several companies that provided high-interest, short-term loans via several websites. The loans allegedly required customers to agree to terms that were obscured in several long, cross-referenced agreements. In April inhibition 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) filed a lawsuit against Tucker and his businesses in federal court in Nevada. The Commission alleged that territorial dominion Tucker’s loan business violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The Commission asked the court to enjoin Tucker from engaging in consumer lending and salary to order him to disgorge his profits from the scheme. The court granted the Commission’s requested relief, enjoined Tucker call for from providing loans, and ordered him to pay approximately $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief to the Commission. The court instructed the Commission to direct “as much money as practicable” to “direct redress to consumers,” then to “other equitable relief” related to the practices described in the Commission’s complaint, and finally to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Tucker appealed, and the U.S. guild Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that the FTC Act authorizes district courts only to enter “injunctions,” and that the district court’s order to pay “equitable monetary relief” is not an injunction. The Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent squarely holds that § 13 of the FTC Act “empowers district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In April 1998, Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb from modern-day Bosnia, met with a U.S. immigration official to seek refugee status for her and sixth her family at the close of the Bosnian civil war. atomic number  Through a translator, Maslenjak told the immigration official that the family feared persecution in their home region of Bosnia based on their Serbian ethnicity. Maslenjak also told the immigration official that the family feared reprisal because her husband had evaded conscription into the Bosnian Serb militia during the war. Maslenjak and her family were granted refugee status in 1999 and immigrated to the United States in September 2000. Maslenjak was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on August 3, 2007. During the naturalization process, Maslenjak denied ever having given false or misleading information to a U.S. official in order to gain entry to the United states or to avoid removal. On October 7, 2007 Maslenjak’s husband, Ratko, be was convicted on two counts of making false statements on a government document for his failure to disclose that he had in fact served as an officer in a Serbian military unit. To avoid deportation, Ratko applied for asylum. Testifying on his behalf at the asylum hearing, Maslenjak admitted that Ratko had served in the Serbian militia and that she  had lied to the immigration officer during the refugee application interview in 1998. Maslenjak was subsequently charged with two counts of naturalization fraud for denying having ever given false or misleading information to a U.S. official. At trial, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Maslenjak guilty of fraudulently obtaining her naturalization, it need not find that her false statements were material to the decision to approve her naturalization, merely that she made them united states government knowing their falsehood. Maslenjak was convicted on both counts, sentenced to two years probation, and stripped of her citizenship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction and held that proof of a material false statement was not a required element of naturalization fraud.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Divna Maslenjak.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Erik Hughes world health organization pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under freewoman Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the along Federal Rules of non Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but united states government on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Erik Lindsey Hughes.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district preconception attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a ""strong likelihood"" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish preconception a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show ""strong likelihood"" that the challenges were race-based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder. Johnson appealed and argued that the ""strong likelihood"" standard in Wheeler adenine was at odds with the 'reasonable inference"" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the lyndon baines johnson same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed shew Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jay Shawn Johnson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A Florida state court convicted George Porter of murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Porter filed for habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district sixth court. He argued go out that his attorney's failure to bring forward evidence about his war record and how it left him a changed man violated his Sixth Amendment he right to effective counsel. The district court agreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of gatekeeper Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Mr. Porter was not prejudiced by any deficient performance lodge by his counsel was a reasonable application of Strickland v. Washington.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is George Porter.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to be adenine death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that constitution of the united states the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives united states government any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that lady friend this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of Texas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Law enforcement officers, under adenine the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to convict an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During hunt the search, the officers found search three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley adenine was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stanley.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both glucinium parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to afterward National Gypsum, sink and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure it from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for adenine denying prejudgment interest.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cement Div., National Gypsum Co..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    During a routine check of departing international flight passengers, customs officers discovered $357,144 on the person of Hosep Bajakajian. In addition to charging him, under 31 U.S.C. Section 5316, of attempting to leave the United States with an unreported sum in excess of $10,000 cash, total the government also sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 check mark under flying 18 U.S.C. Section 982 providing that the deliberate violation of moot Section 5316 shall result in the forfeiture of ""any property involved in such an offense."" After having its forfeiture claim rejected in both a district court and the Ninth Circuit, as excessively unconstitutional, the Supreme add on Court granted the government certiorari.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bajakajian.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more conflict than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, bore his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer link Continental Shelf Lands Act (""OCSLA"") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (""LHWCA""). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental harm shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the ""situs-of-injury"" test, and regnant affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is ""a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf."" Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Luisa L. Valladolid.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Crown Simpson Pulp Company and Louisiana-Pacific Corporation operated two bleached craft pulp corp mills in California. The object mills were granted permits by the California State Water Resources Control Board with variances from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for effluent discharge. The EPA, however, denied the variances. The mill encase companies sought review directly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Water Pollution Control card Act. The Act allows direct appeal of EPA object actions either “issuing or denying any permit”. The court of appeals dismissed the review, holding that because the State granted the permits and the EPA merely objected the variances, this case did not fall under the Act.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Crown Simpson Pulp Company, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I-77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54.2 grams of cocaine in the car. A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and tell held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake declared visitation of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the ""reasonable suspicion"" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals. motor hotel The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina  Supreme Court's ruling created ""fundamental unfairness"" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that ""ignorance of the law is no excuse"" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is State of North Carolina.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Following the 1990 census, Texas planned the creation of three additional encase congressional districts. Following the redistricting, show registered voters challenged the plans go as racial gerrymandering. A three-judge federal district court found the plans unconstitutional. The aforethought case moved to the Supreme Court on go appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Vera.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nine students at two high schools and one junior high school in motor hotel Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions from school. The earreach school principals did not hold hearings for the affected sovereign students before ordering the suspensions, and Ohio law did not require them to do so. The principals' actions were challenged, and a federal court found that the students' rights had been violated. The earreach case was then appealed be to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lopez.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades sued the South Florida Water Management District under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in federal district court. The suit alleged that the water district violated the Clean Water Act by releasing pollutants from a pump system without a discharge elimination system permit. The Clean Water Act prohibits the pollute ""addition of any pollutant... from any point source"" without a specific permit. The water district defended its action by claiming that it water system was not actually adding pollutants water system to the water, but merely transporting polluted water from management one body of water eubstance to another, less polluted, body. The district court ruled against the water district and found that it had violated the CWA by using the pump. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on this point, ""conclud[ing] that the release of water caused by the... pump station's operation constitutes an addition of pollutants from a point source.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is South Florida Water Management District.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the adenine relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the remain government had the burden to prove that the core conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied legislative act the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for territorial dominion the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The U.S. Attorney General sued Hazelwood School District, alleging a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against African Americans in hiring teachers. This violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of united states government 1964. The government provided statistical evidence of the number of African American teachers hired. The district court entered summary judgment manage for Hazelwood, finding that the government’s evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. american language The court compared the number of African American teachers hired to the number of African American students in the school district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the proper statistical comparison is between the number of African model American teachers on staff and the number of qualified African right American individuals in the relevant labor market. The relevant labor market included St. Louis and the county where Hazelwood was located.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hazelwood School District; C. O. McDonald, Superintendent; Robert Bischof, Robert Coleman, Dorothy Smith, Charles Sweeney, Donald Mattox and Milton Strauss, Members of the Board of Education of the Hazelwood School District.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain were sophomores at Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas. They heard about a school meeting where both parents th and students would be present and decided to spike the punch with alcohol. Ten days later, Mrs. Curtis Powell, a teacher at the high school, learned of the prank and confronted the girls. The girls confessed based on the understanding that she would handle their punishment. The next day, the teacher informed the girls that the principal, P. T. Waller, heard about the incident and she would not be able to help them unless they confessed to the principal. The girls did so, and Mr. Waller suspended them for two weeks pending mrs a decision by the school board. The school board voted to suspend the girls for the rest of the semester. The girls, their parents, and their counsel were present at a subsequent meeting to ask the board to reconsider the suspensions. The board denied the request. non Strickland and Crain sued the members of the school board, administrators, and the school district of Mena, Arkansas for damages resulting from their suspension, which they claimed violated their right to due process. The jury could not reach a manage verdict and a mistrial was declared. The district court directed a verdict for the school board because there was no evidence of adenine malice toward the girls. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is John P. Wood, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In January 2010, Sprint Communications Co. filed a complaint with the Iowa Utilities Board (""IUB"") asking for a declaration that it was proper to withhold certain VoIP call access charges from Windstream (formerly Iowa Telecom). Before IUB addressed the complaint, Sprint settled the dispute with Windstream and withdrew its complaint. However, IUB continued the proceeding so that it could decide a greater underlying issue of how VoIP communications should be classified under federal law. In February 2011, IUB issued an order with its own interpretation of VoIP's classification under federal law along with a determination that Sprint was liable to Windstream for the access charges. Sprint challenged IUB's order by filing a tell complaint in both state court and federal district court, alleging that federal law preempts the IUB's decision. In order to proceed with the federal complaint first, Sprint filed a motion to stay the state case until resolution of the federal case. In turn, the IUB filed a motion asking the federal court to abstain and dismiss the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Generally, this sprint doctrine states that a federal court shall abstain from earreach hearing a federal official case if there is a threat of interference with a state court proceeding involving important state interests. The district court granted IUB's motion and dismissed Sprint's federal complaint. Sprint appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which upheld the district court's abstention, but determined that a stay on the indium federal proceedings was more appropriate than dismissal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sprint Communications Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jessie L. Jackson was sentenced to life in prison in Tennessee in 1987 for the murder of James Crawley. Jackson sought post-conviction relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective and had failed visitation to conduct an adequate investigation. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation of the Sixth Amendment based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, the accused must show a lack of reasonably effective counsel and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result at trial would have been different. The state court denied relief and determined that Jackson’s counsel was not deficient and that, regardless, he had not suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s performance. Jackson then sought federal habeas relief, and the district court confirmed the state court’s denial of relief. Despite finding that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel and a reasonable likelihood of prejudice, the district court held that a federal court can only grant relief if the state court’s determination was contrary to established federal law, which was not the dictated case here. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Jackson was entitled to relief inefficient because the state court unreasonably applied the Strickland test and the state court’s opinion was contrary to shew the established Strickland precedent in that it applied scorn a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than a reasonable-probability standard.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Flora Holland, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis early than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college pro athletics from professional sports. Several Division 1 immediate payment football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits,” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent crataegus laevigata awards for academic purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit let affirmed, recognizing the NCAA’s interest in “preserving amateurism,” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Shawne Alston, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When ford madox ford a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is entitled to interest from the government for the period between the date of overpayment and the ultimate refund, but the ""date of overpayment"" is not specifically defined. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) informed the Ford Motor Company (Ford) that it had underpaid on its taxes between 1983 and 1989. afterward Ford subsequently submitted deposits to the IRS that covered the underpayment. Ford later requested that the deposits be be considered to cover additional taxes that Ford owed. The parties eventually determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes and was owed a refund. Ford argued that the date of overpayment was the date that it first submitted the deposits to the IRS for the underpayment of taxes, and the Government argued that the date of overpayment was the date when Ford requested that the payment cover additional taxes. Ford sued the Government in federal district court, extra and motor hotel the court found in favor of the Government. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ford Motor Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Nevada law requires elected indium officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada be Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a electric discharge casino, before voting its way in it a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, topic saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Nevada Commission on Ethics.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder for the shooting of James McCarble, a seventy-year-old store clerk, in Houston, Texas. Moore was sentenced to death, and his conviction and sentence were both affirmed on appeal. After a federal court granted habeas corpus relief, a new punishment hearing occurred in 2001, and Moore was again sentenced to the death penalty. His sentence was again affirmed on appeal. Moore sought set up state habeas relief and argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia should apply to his case; therefore, because he was intellectually disabled, he was exempt from execution. The habeas court granted relief based on the Atkins argument. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, however, reversed and held that Moore had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence marianne craig moore that he had the requisite intellectual disability for the Atkins precedent to apply based on Texas case law that used be a 1992 determination definition manifest of intellectual disability.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Bobby James Moore.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Walter Himmelreich prison house is a federal prisoner be at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of the First and Eighth skip Amendment claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by holding that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §2676, that prohibits “any action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise field to the claim.” The appellate court again vacated and remanded the lower court’s judgment. It held that Himmelreich’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials human activity to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich’s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 U.S.C §2676.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Walter J. Himmelreich.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Customers moderate brought a class action lawsuit against AT&T Mobility LLC in a seaport California federal district court. They alleged that the company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent to the extent the company charged the new subscriber sales tax on the retail value of each free phone. AT&T moved to compel arbitration based harbor on the arbitration clause contained within its contract of service. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that improving (1) the arbitration clause sales event was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act (""FAA"") did not expressly or impliedly preempt California law governing unconcionability.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is AT&T Mobility LLC.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On October 30, 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in state court that alleged that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline underpaid the members on the class on royalties they were owed from wells. The petition alleged that this underpayment constituted a breach of contract and sought damages without specifying an amount. On December 5, 2012, the defendants removed the case from state court to federal district court and cited that federal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). CAFA requires that three elements be established for a class action evidential case to fall under federal jurisdiction: at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states, the class must consist of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. The defendants in this case claimed that they met the requirements for removal to federal court under CAFA because the amount motor hotel in controversy exceeded $8 million, but did not include specific evidence in the notice of removal. The federal district court held that defendants had not provided evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million equity in the notice of removal and therefore remanded the case back to state court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court should not have remanded the case because requiring the party requesting the citizen removal to produce evidence that the indium amount in controversy exceeds $5 million creates an evidentiary burden. The Court of Appeals held that that such evidence is wholly unnecessary unless the removal is contested. A party requesting that a case be removed to federal court need only allege that the grounds for removal exist and need only prove those allegations if they are contested.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Dart Cherokee Operating Company, LLC, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    These are hypothesis two consolidated cases concerning the tax consequences of importing goods from foreign countries that are then used for manufacturing in the United States. In 9, Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. imported ores for manufacturing, which were stored strange at its plant in Ohio. Under the U.S. Constitution, imports are not taxed. Youngstown took the ore needed for each day of manufacturing from the storage piles to stock bins. The state of Ohio assessed property tax on the ore because Youngstown had changed the ore from an import to a manufacturing supply. Youngstown argued that the ore kept in victimised storage bins was not taxable because it was held for storage only. Youngstown also argued that the tax violated equal protection because it applied to residents of Ohio, but not to non-residents who had property in the state. After exhausting administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the tax. In 44, Plywood Corp. imported lumber and veneers for manufacturing. Plywood piled the sovereign lumber in a yard in Algoma, Wisconsin for storage and drying. importee The City of Algoma taxed half of the stored supplies on the theory that at least that amount was destined for manufacturing. Plywood paid the tax and sued for a refund. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the tax.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Stanley J. Bowers, Tax Comissioner of Ohio.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting atomic number  officer read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson traverse gave an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial court suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated april his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona turn back Court of Appeals affirmed, and let the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ronald William Roberson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    motor hotel The saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall's will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died bessie smith of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million. Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was give up the ghost mentally die fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith. federal official The Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Elaine T. Marshall, Executrix of the Estate of E. Pierce Marshall.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Acting under authority of the Occupational Safety and photograph Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, fossil oil after having demonstrated a proletarian link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The self assurance standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum permissible Institute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is American Petroleum Institute.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1990, white respondents, Thomas traverse McCollum, William Joseph McCollum, and Ella Hampton McCollum, were charged with assaulting two black visitation individuals. Before the criminal trial, the prosecution moved to bar the defense from using its peremptory lash out challenges to eliminate black people from the juror pool. The term ""preemptory challenge"" refers to the right to reject a potential juror during jury selection without giving a reason. The sustain trial judge denied the prosecution's motion, and, when the prosecution appealed, the Georgia Supreme visitation Court affirmed the trial judge's decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Georgia.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami allot Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which adenine granted political candidates criticized by any misdemeanour newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a action violation of the free press clause of the First paper Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Miami Herald Publishing Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After the 2000 census reduced the size of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation by two members, the Republican-controlled go against state legislature passed a redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republican candidates. Several members of the Democratic party sued in federal court, claiming that the plan was unconstitutional because it violated the one-person, one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the freedom of association. The district court dismissed all but the Article I, Section 2 article claim. It held that the voters bringing the suit had not proved that they complainant would be denied representation, only that they would be represented by Republican officials. Because the plaintiffs (those bringing the suit) were not clause denied the right to vote, to be placed on the ballot box, to associate as a party, or to express their political opinions, their political discrimination claims failed. However, the court found the act unconstitutional because it created districts with different numbers of voters, thereby violating the one-person, one-vote principle. Because the plaintiffs had shown that it was possible to create districts with smaller differences, totally and because the defendants had failed to justify the disparities resulting under their plan, it was therefore unconstitutional.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On July 3, 2009, the Pennsylvania State call for Police Department received a report that Michael Zita had stolen a car and two handguns and then likely fled to the Carman residence. Officers Jeremy Carroll and Brian Roberts went to the Carman residence to investigate and noticed that a small structure in the rear of the property had a light on a door open, so they approached and announced their presence. When no one responded, the officers continued to approach the house via a back door that the officers place believed looked like a customary entrance. The residents confronted the officers, but eventually identified themselves as the Carmans and allowed the officers to search their house. The officers did not find Zita, and the Carmans were not charged with a crime. The Carmans later sued Officer Carroll in district court and argued place that he had unlawfully entered their property in violation of the warrant place requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Carroll argued that his entry was menachem begin legal under the ""knock and talk"" exception to the warrant requirement, which allows officers to knock on someone's door as long as the officers are standing on the parts of the person's property on which the general public is allowed. The Carmans argued that exception did not apply in this case because a normal visitor would have used the front door. The jury found in favor of Carroll, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed because the ""knock and talk"" exception requires that the police begin their interaction at the front door. The appellate court also held that Carroll was not entitled to qualified immunity because his actions violated clearly established law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jeremy Carroll.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In November 1961, the Civil Rights Commission released the fifth volume of its report for the year. One section of it focused on police brutality and made reference to the Supreme Court case Monroe v. Pape. The case was lap based on allegations that Detective Pape and other officers broke into the Monroe apartment, assaulted the Monroes, sum up and took Mr. Monroe to the police station where he was held for ten hours without being charged or advised of his procedural rights. A week after the report was released, Time Magazine published an article that quoted extensively from the report’s coverage of the allegations without ever explicitly stating that they were allegations rather than findings. Pape sued Time, Inc. for libel in district court and Time moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In the intervening time, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, which stated that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless there is evidence the statements were made with actual malice. This harbor decision became the basis for the district court granting summary judgment for Time, Inc. The Court of Appeals again reversed, and held that a jury must metre decide whether actual malice was present. After the third trial, the district court granted Time, Inc.’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed for a third time panel and held that the issue of actual malice was one for the jury to decide.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Time, Inc..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts—including forgery, deception, and threats—to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward. From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup. Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the natural action kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison. After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a let qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene addition in the action, passable and Hunt’s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of (1) “6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed” or (2) “3 years after the date when facts material to indium the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances….” The district court granted the contractors’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt’s claim would be time-barred. Reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt (the relator) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1962, an all-white grand jury indicted Booker T. Hillery—a black man—for the murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Hillery was tried and convicted, he appealed his conviction and claimed that black potential jurors were panel systematically excluded from the lodge grand jury that indict indicted him, which violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hillery pursued remedy in state courts until the California Supreme Court finally denied him relief in 1978. Shortly after, Hillery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court repair requested and received statistical evidence regarding the probability of having an all-white grand jury in Kings County, California, where Hillery was indicted and subsequently ruled in male monarch favor of Hillery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Hillery.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Retirees from the Point Pleasant Plant in Apple Grove, West Virginia⎯owned by M&G since 2000⎯sued after M&G announced that the retirees would be required to contribute to the cost of their medical benefits. The retirees, who had been employees of Apple Grove before the plant was bought by M&G, entered tardy into a series of collective bargaining negotiations through their unions regarding reply healthcare benefits. Just as earlier versions had included, the 2005-2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) included a provision that ""capped"", or limited, the company's annual contribution towards employee healthcare benefits. In 2006, M&G announced it was requiring employees to cover their individual costs once that cap was exceeded in response to the shifting healthcare landscape. The retirees claimed that language in the effective buy CBA promised full coverage of healthcare benefits for life without any contribution requirement and sued the company because that ""capping"" provision was not included in the pension and insurance booklet or adopted by the union on behalf of employees in the latest agreement. The retirees sued under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) early and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court dismissed respond the retirees' claim, and they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court found in favor of the retirees but ordered that their healthcare benefits be reinstated to the post-2007 version that included employee contributions. Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgement.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is M&G Polymers USA, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Felipe E. Tovar was charged with drunk-driving in Iowa three times in four years. Tovar pleaded guilty both times and waived his right to an attorney the first time. The third time, because Iowa law increases sentencing shamefaced for successive drunk-driving, Tovar faced up to five years in prison. Tovar argued that his first conviction was an invalid waiver of disputation his 6th Amendment right to counsel and should not increase his third sentence. The geezerhood waiver was invalid, Tovar argued, because the judge did not warn him of the consequences of release entering a guilty plea without an attorney. The Iowa district court rejected Tovar's argument and sentenced disable him to 30 days in jail. The court of appeals affirmed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Iowa.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    John Kelly, acting on behalf of New York residents receiving financial assistance either beginning under the federally-assisted program for Families with Dependent Children or under New York State's home relief program, challenged nether the constitutionality of procedures for notice raw and termination of household such aid. Although originally offering no official notice or opportunity for hearings to those whose aid was scheduled for lavatory termination, the State of New York implemented a hearing procedure after commencement of Kelly's litigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kelly.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized aside money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The cocain officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that baseball mitt the mere finding adenine of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle appellant was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account place of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges. King then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its shew agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal television Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign adenine immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim. The district court found that King failed to prove one of the sensed six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King’s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King’s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Douglas Brownback, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Juan Resendiz-Ponce, a Mexican national, was convicted of kidnapping and deported. When Resendiz-Ponce tried to reenter the U.S. using false turn back identification, he was arrested and indicted for attempting to reenter the country after being deported. Resendiz-Ponce moved to dismiss his indictment because it failed to allege that he had ""committed an overt act that was a substantial step toward reentering"" - an essential element of the criminal offense. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted govern Resendiz- Ponce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of lap Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision to deny the motion. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the indictment failed to explicitly mention that Resendiz-Ponce had physically crossed the border and presented false identification, it was insufficient and should be dismissed. The government argued land that the government activity omission was ""harmless error,"" a minor mistake that would not invalidate the indictment, but the Circuit Court ruled that the omission was instead a ""fatal flaw.""

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    When Manuel Flores-Montano approached the U.S.-Mexico indium border, U.S. Customs inspectors noticed his hand shaking; an inspector tapped Flores-Montano's gas tank with a screwdriver and noticed that the tank sounded solid; a drug-sniffing dog alerted to be the vehicle. After a mechanic began disassembling the car's fuel tank, inspectors found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks in the tank. Flores-Montano was charged in federal district court in California for importing and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Flores-Montano moved to suppress the marijuana finding on Fourth Amendment grounds. He argued that the search that yielded the marijuana finding was intrusive and non-routine and therefore required reasonable suspicion (which, he argued, was not present in his case). Relying aside on U.S. v. Molina-Tarazon, a case decided by cannabis the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002 (with similar circumstances), the district court agreed that the search was non-routine and thus required reasonable suspicion. The government, the set up court held, failed to prove that reasonable suspicion prompted its search. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom jurisprudence of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court be rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court go against held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not populace violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' discrepant abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Boy Scouts of America.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision bring down of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and associate in nursing purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and near price was publicly toll disclosed. The district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, adenine The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession honour of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number. On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea with respect to the three turn back drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the final charge. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. The Kentucky adenine Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Padilla's conviction and remanded the case be for an evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. Fuartado, reversed the court of appeals. It held that collateral consequences of supplication advice by counsel is outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. It reasoned that counsel's advice on the consequences of a plea with respect to immigration is not required and therefore cannot constitute ineffectiveness.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jose Padilla.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Jane Doe entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor when she was eight weeks pregnant. She was detained by immigration authorities, and placed in the custody of the Office expect of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). She was later placed in a federally funded shelter in Texas, where, after a medical examination, she requested an abortion. ORR denied her request on the grounds that agency policy prohibited shelter staff from taking any action to facilitate an abortion without direction and approval from the ORR director absent emergency circumstances. Doe’s guardian ad litem, Rochelle Garza, filed a putative class action challenging the constitutionality of ORR’s policy on behalf of Doe and “all other pregnant unaccompanied minors in ORR custody.” On October 18, 2017, the district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) permitting Doe to have an abortion immediately. The next day, Doe attended pre-abortion counseling, which was required under Texas law to take place at least 24 hours in advance of the procedure, and with the same doctor who would perform the abortion. On October 20, a panel of the D.C. Circuit court vacated the pertinent portions of the TRO on the grounds ease that ORR’s policy did not constitute an “undue burden.” However, sitting en banc, on October 24 the appellate court vacated the panel order and remanded the thence matter to the district court. The same day, Garza asked the court for an amended restraining order, requesting that the government make Doe available to repeat the required pre-abortion counseling. The district court granted Garza’s request, and arrangements were made for Doe to have the counseling appointment at 7:30 a.m. on October 25. The details of the subsequent events were disputed, afterward but the government, under the impression that the manage soonest the abortion would happen was October 26, informed Garza’s counsel that they planned to appeal the new order early on the morning of October 25. However, the same doctor who conducted Doe’s pre-abortion counseling became available for her October 25 appointment, so the appointment was moved up to 4:15 a.m. and Doe had the abortion instead of repeating the counseling with a new doctor. Because the abortion made the government’s claim moot, it did not ask the Supreme Court to review the en banc order as planned, but instead filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the appellate court’s en banc ruling so that it would not stand as precedent. The government also sought sanctions against Garza’s lawyers, arguing that they had made misrepresentations in an attempt to avoid Supreme Court review.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Rochelle Garza, as Guardian ad Litem to Unaccompanied Minor J. D..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Wayne Darnell Bumper was investigated and eventually arrested on charges be of rape and felonious assault. During the investigation, police officials searched the home of Mrs. Hattie Leath, Bumper’s grandmother, with whom he was living at the time. Leath consented to a search law of her home, but only after the police officials informed her they had a warrant, which they did not turn back actually have. The officers found a rifle that was later introduced into evidence at Bumper’s trial. The trial court allowed the rifle to be entered into evidence because it held that Leath had consented to turn back the search. The Supreme Court of glucinium North Carolina affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Wayne Darnell Bumper.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The respondents are all immigrants to the United States and are considered lawful permanent residents. At various times each of the respondents applied for family-sponsored visas. However, because of archetype the delays caused by visa quotas and serious backlogs in the U.S. immigration system meant that all of their children had turned twenty-one and, based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), had ""aged out"" of eligibility for any derivative child-visas. As a result, their visa applications converted from child-applications to adult-applications and were moved to the bottom of the tribute adult-application list, which potentially added years to their wait to receive a visas. In 2009, after the Board of Immigration Appeals converted several child visa petitions to adult petitions, position the respondents filed two cases in federal district court guild in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California asking hat the court order the Board to retain use of their children's original visa filing dates. That court denied the request. The respondents then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. There, the petitioners argued that certain provisions in the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) should allow the use of the children's original application dates for certain visa applications. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the language of both CSPA and the INA allow the child-status petition lodge to convert to an adult petition while still retaining the original date when the visa petition was filed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Lori Scialabba, Acting Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1949 the U.S. Department of Agriculture implemented the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order). The Marketing Order authorized the federal government to reserve a percentage of the yearly California raisin crop to stabilize the supply, and thus the price, of California raisins. Under the Marketing Order, farmers are entitled to a share of the proceeds acquired when, or if, the government sells the reserved raisins. Marvin Horne, a farmer and raisin producer, attempted to skirt the Marketing Order by processing his own raisins, which he claimed exempted his raisins from the Marketing Order's reserve requirement. The Department of Agriculture claimed Horne's raisins were still subject to the Market Order, and following administrative proceedings, Horne was fined nearly $700,000. adenine Horne sued the Department of Agriculture and claimed that the Marketing Order violated his Fifth Amendment rights against uncompensated takings. The district court found in favor of the Department of Agriculture. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked standing to address Horne's claim, because Fifth Amendment takings claims are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The United States Supreme Court held that the appellate court did have jurisdiction and remanded the case. On remand, the appellate court joined found for the Department of Agriculture agribusiness by holding that the reserve requirement did not act as a per se taking because Horne's raisins constituted personal property rather than second stringer real property. The appellate court also held that the Marketing Order did not constitute a taking because there was a sufficient nexus, and rough proportionality, between the reserve requirement and the specific interest the government seeks to protect, which in this aside case is the government's interest in stabilizing raisin prices.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marvin D. Horne.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Sure-Tan Inc. and Surak Leather Company were two small leather processing firms in Chicago who were considered a single employer for the purposes of this case. Of the 11 laborers both companies employed, several were illegal immigrants. In July 1976, eight workers from both companies authorized the Chicago Leather Workers Union to act as their collective bargaining representative. On December 10, 1976, the Union prevailed in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. The companies filed complaints with the letter of the alphabet NLRB michigan and alleged that many of the voting members were illegal immigrants. When the NLRB certified minor the union anyway, the president of Surak Leather Company sent a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to request a check on the immigration status of the employees in question. INS agents discovered five employees were living and working illegally in the United States and deported them. The NLRB’s Acting Regional Director filed complaints alleging that the companies engaged in unfair labor practices, and the charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to order the petitioners to cease and desist the unfair labor practices and substituted backpay for passport the recommendation of reinstatement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first part of the Board’s order. However, the Court of Appeals held that, because backpay immigration and naturalization service could only be given for periods of time when the employees were legally eligible but unable to work, the companies should be required to pay a minimum amount of six months worth of backpay.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is National Labor Relations Board.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, try a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full totally Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on united states senate the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that ""the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."" The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable harness and declined to intervene in the report dispute.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and alleged that, during regular game play on the Xbox 360, the discs would come loose due to vibrations and natural action scratch against internal components of the gaming system, courtship which rendered them permanently broken. Because only 0.4% of consoles caused this issue with regular lashkar e tayyiba players, the district court determined that a class action suit could not be certified and individuals in the suit would have to come forward on their own. The parties then stipulated a dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the dismissal, and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed and united states government let held that the district court had misapplied applicable law and, therefore, abused its discretion in striking the class action allegations.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Microsoft Corporation.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In August 2000, Vonlee Nicole Titlow helped his aunt Billie Rogers murder his wealthy uncle Donald Rogers. After Titlow was charged with first-degree murder, the prosecution offered supplication him a plea bargain. In exchange for testifying against Billie Rogers, Titlow could plead guilty to manslaughter and receive a reduced sentence. After consulting with his attorney, Titlow accepted the deal. However, before sentencing, Titlow spoke die to be a sheriff's deputy who suggested that he withdraw his guilty plea and consult another attorney. Titlow followed the deputy's advice, hired a new attorney and withdrew his guilty plea. Following his trial, a jury convicted Titlow of second-degree murder and sentenced him to 20-to-40 years in prison. This led Titlow to accuse his second attorney of ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to withdraw the original guilty plea. Both the trial remove court and the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Titlow's claim. Titlow petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court to hear his case, but they refused to do so. Titlow then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court denied his claim as well. The district court held that Titlow failed to meet the standard for overturning a state-court conviction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (""AEDPA""). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and ordered the state to reoffer Titlow's original plea agreement. The appellate court held that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate his claims further, failing to obtain documents from the first attorney, and failing to convince Titlow to take collection the plea bargain.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sherry L. Burt, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Omaha ball club Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages along in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally-recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross-filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor of be the defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the U.S. Senate’s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its alcohol dependent tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the marketing Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Mitch Parker, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Mississippi Tax Commission (MTC) passed a regulation requiring out-of-state liquor distributors to collect a tax for liquor sold on Mississippi military installations. The tax resulted in a price mark-up for liquor sold on military installations. The MTC allow for sent a letter to liquor distributors advising that if the tax was not collected directly from the military, the distributors could indium face criminal charges. The United States paid the tax and sought summary judgment in sovereign the U.S. District Court for the Southern District territorial dominion of Mississippi. The United States argued that the mark-up was an unconstitutional tax on the federal government. The district court upheld the regulation, ruling that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the tax. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded. On remand, the district court held adenine that the tax was a permissible sales tax on the liquor distributors and not a tax on the federal government. Two of the military installments had concurrent jurisdiction with both the federal and Mississippi government.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    A federal grand jury as well returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment.  While their appeal was sovereign pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, that ""other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."" In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was purport neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the so called sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The Chicago police arrested and detained Frank Townsend, a drug addict, in connection with a murder. After several hours of questioning, Townsend began going into withdrawal and asked for a doctor. A doctor gave him a medicine Townsend alleges was a ""truth serum."" While under the influence of the medication, Townsend confessed to the murder. Townsend alleged that the medicine caused his confession and, therefore, was not admissible at trial. Defendants disputed most of the facts surrounding the confession. The adenine Criminal Court of Cook County, il Illinois admitted the confession at a trial by jury. The jury get down found Townsend guilty and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction. Townsend subsequently petitioned for a writ of principal sum habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the District Court's inquiry should be limited to condemn undisputed portions of the record.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Charles Townsend.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    On September 29, 1981, Officers Enrique Carrisalez and David Rucker were shot within several minutes of each other in a rural part of Texas along the Mexico border known as “the Valley.” Enrique Hernandez, who was riding along in Officer Carrisalez’s squad car, was an eyewitness to Carrisalez’s shooting. The shootings led to a massive hunt for the killer across the Valley. The police arrested Leonel Herrera on October 4, 1981 near Edinburg and took him to the police station. During a heated exchange, Herrera struck a police officer and was restrained. When defense counsel arrived several hours later, Herrera was badly beaten, unconscious, and partly paralyzed; he was subsequently transported to a hospital emergency room. Officer Carrisalez died soon thereafter. The police discovered evidence at the scene of arrest implicating Herrera in both murders. The car pulled over by Carrisalez was registered in the name of Herrera’s live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had a set of keys to that car when he was arrested. The police found drops of Type A blood on jeans recovered from a laundry room and in Herrera’s wallet. They also found a letter in Herrera’s pocket with Herrera’s artlessness fingerprints; the letter contained apparent confessions to both murders. Hernandez could not specifically identify Herrera from an array of six photographs, but later identified him as the shooter when presented with a mug shot. Herrera was convicted of the murder of Officer Carrisalez, and pleaded guilty to the murder of Trooper Rucker. Herrera filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming actual innocence and alleging that various Valley police officials were involved in responsible for the drug trade remain and were working with the person remove actually responsible for the murders, Raul Herrera. The trial court denied relief. Herrera filed another petition, presenting the affidavit of Raul Herrera’s son that he witnessed the killings and that Herrera did not commit them. The district court dismissed most of Herrera’s claims, but granted a stay of execution as to his claim of innocence. The Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, vacated the stay of execution, agreeing with Texas that innocence was irrelevant to francis scott key Herrera’s petition.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The city of Chicago indium hired the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to perform work that would prevent ships from bumping into piers. To that end, Great Lakes used a crane to drive piles into the encase riverbed, which potentially weakened the structure of the freight tunnel that ran below the river. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel, which subsequently flooded federal official into the basements of several buildings. After the flood, many victims sued Great Lakes in state court and argued that the flood was the result of the weakening of the tunnel. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock removed forge the case to federal district court and argued federal admiralty court had jurisdiction of marine cases. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court motor hotel of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In July 1997, Carlos Manuel Ayestas, a Honduran national, was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Santiaga Paneque at her home in Houston, Texas. Ayestas appealed his conviction and filed set up for state habeas relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; he argued that his trial counsel failed to secure the testimony of family members who could have presented mitigating evidence. The state habeas court found that Ayestas’ indium trial attorney was not ineffective and denied his application for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the findings alibi of the state habeas court and denied relief as well. In 2009, Ayestas, with a new attorney, filed a federal habeas petition and claimed that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that would have uncovered “available and abundant” mitigating factors. However, the district court found that his claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised in the state habeas proceeding and denied relief. The US Court of Appeals for apparent motion the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The US Supreme Court subsequently decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim may excuse a procedural default. The Supreme Court later extended the holding of Martinez to Texas’ habeas scheme in Trevino v. Thaler. In light of these decisions, Ayestas asked for a rehearing. On rehearing in the district court, Ayestas filed a motion for investigative assistance that was “reasonably necessary” to develop his broader ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). The district court denied the apparent motion motion based on Fifth Circuit precedent that holds that investigative assistance is not “reasonably necessary” unless the habeas petitioner can carry the ultimate burden of proof on the underlying claim at the time of the request for investigative assistance. The district court determined that Ayestas could not meet his burden of proof on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and therefore denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carlos Manuel Ayestas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes territorial dominion before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized enforce that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new popular map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable. After the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. __ (2018)—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide apparent motion injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland indium case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Linda H. Lamone, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Dixie Power and Light Company provided service to several locations in Claiborne County, Tennesee, including the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell. Kentucky Utilities Company (KU) held a non-exclusive county franchise to occupy county roads. In 1954, Dixie Power and Light transferred bluegrass state its assets to KU and dissolved, giving KU indium control over the vast majority of the market in Tazewell and New Tazewell. The Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended in 1959, barred the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from expanding its sales outside the area for which the TVA or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957. On that date, the area of Claiborne County had 3,564 users of TVA power compared to 1,839 users of KU power; the county towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell, however, had 28 TVA users and 561 KU users. KU’s retail rates for electricity in the towns were approximately two-and-one-half times higher than those offered by TVA. Citizens in Tazewell and New Tazewell responded to this rate disparity by demanding access to the TVA’s cheaper power. After three years of complaints, planning and consultations, the towns’ governments contracted to hook up a new municipal system to TVA’s power grid. KU filed suit against TVA, the mayors of Tazewell and New Tazewell, and the Powell Valley client Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor. KU charged the defendants with conspiracy to destroy its business in Tazewell and asked the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system. Shortly before trial, the TVA Board of Directors determined that TVA was the primary source of power for Claiborne County on July 1, 1957, and that Claiborne County was the relevant area for the purposes of the act. The district court upheld the board’s decision, but the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed. Comparing the number of customers served by KU and TVA in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the Sixth Circuit held that the two towns and KU’s original county road corridor were an ‘area’ for the purposes of the act and that TVA was barred from extending its service to tennessee that area.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Edward J. Hardin, Mayor of Tazewell, Tennessee, Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, Tennessee Valley Authority.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    David Nelson was sentenced to death for murder and scheduled for execution in 1997. A series of appeals and habeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until 2002, when an correction 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously rejected a claim dealing with the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. After the final appeal was rejected, Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9, 2003. Nelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that the method of execution proposed by Alabama violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama had notified Nelson that, because of damage done aside to his veins by previous intravenous drug abuse, the execution procedure might require corrections officers to cut associate in nursing through muscles and fat in his arm to get access to a vein mightiness that could carry the toxins. He claimed that this was an inhumane method of execution and should therefore be barred. Further, he argued that the petition was not an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of both were prohibited by U.S. Code Title 28, Section 2254, a federal law designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed execution carrying out procedure. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays, exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent, and should therefore be thrown out. The federal district court agreed with Alabama, holding that Nelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with the sentence itself. It was therefore functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition, which was barred by Section 2254. A divided 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the decision. After the 11th Circuit declined to rehear the case as a whole (en banc), the U.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of execution and then accepted the case for appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is David L. Nelson.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Marcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations harbor of the Telephone telephony Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. District person Court for the Southern District of Florida individual and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the sunshine state TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Marcus D. Mims.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Hospitals receive compensation from the federal government based on the number of low-income patients they serve. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) decides how much this payment will be. In an unrelated case, it came out that CMS miscalculated this payment between 1993 and 1996 so hospitals received less than they were due. In 2006, a group of hospitals filed claims with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) for full payment from the Department motor hotel of Health and Human Services for years 1987-1994. Although the statute of limitations for such allow claims is 180 days, the hospitals argued that the limitations period cost should be tolled because CMS knowingly and unlawfully failed to disclose its error. The PRRB held that it did not have the authority to toll the statute of limitations, so the claims were untimely. The hospitals sued in district court, but the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the PRRB's decision was not final. The court also held that the relevant statute does not allow for tolling the statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that it did have jurisdiction because the PRRB decision was final. It also held that tolling the statute of limitations for ""good cause"" is possible, but whether it is appropriate in this case is a question for remand. The court of appeals denied a petition for a miscalculate rehearing manage en banc.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Specialist Second Class James W. Dial of the United States Army and his wife, Joanna Dial, were charged unvoluntary with involuntary manslaughter for james iv the death of their one-year-old child while stationed in Germany. James Dial was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, sentenced to three years in prison, and dishonorably discharged. His wife was not an active member of the military, but because she was a dependent of an active military member, she was tried in military court in Germany. She moved to challenge the jurisdiction of the military court over her case, but the motion was denied. She pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Mrs. Dial's mother, Alberta Singleton, filed a writ of habeas corpus on her daughter's behalf and argued that civilian dependents of military personnel cannot be tried in a military court. The circuit court judge stated he did not want to grant the lodge writ appendage of habeas corpus but was bound by the Supreme Court case Reid v. Covert, in which the Court held that non-military personnel cannot be court martialed for capital offenses. Nina Kinsella, the recoil warden where Mrs. Dial was serving her time, appealed the writ and argued that the defendant in Reid v. Covert was on trial for a capital offense, whereas Mrs. Dial was on a trial for a non-capital offense. Therefore, the court was not bound by that case.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States ex rel. Singleton.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    After his conviction by a Texas trial court for murder and  the imposition of the death penalty, Jurek challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging visitation it was a ""cruel and unusual"" punishment, and the state's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging it would result in arbitrary and ""freakish"" imposition of the death penalty. This case is one of the five ""Death Penalty Cases"" along encase with Gregg v. Georgia , Proffitt v. Florida , Roberts v. Louisiana , encase and Woodson v. North Carolina richard john roberts .

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Texas.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The families indium of two  North Carolina teenagers killed in anatole france a aver bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support carolina general personal jurisdiction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Patrick Wood filed pro se (on his own behalf) in federal court for a writ of habeas validity corpus claiming that his convictions for felony murder and second degree murder violated the Sixth Amendment privilege against adenine double jeopardy amendment and challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. The District Court denied relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth cogency Circuit appointed Wood with an attorney and directed the parties to address the timeliness of Wood's validity petition. The appeals court found that Wood's habeas petition was untimely and affirmed the decision of the District Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Patrick Wood.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 2005, U.S. District Judge county David Hurd barred Oneida and Madison counties in New York from foreclosing on Oneida Indian Nation-owned properties raw on which taxes haven't been paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, amerindian language noting that the counties don't authorised have the right to sue an Indian tribe unless Congress has authorized county the lawsuit or the tribe has waived its legal immunity.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Madison County, New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Akos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, interior in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz honcho had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In set up affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a set up ill prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Swierkiewicz.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Larry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on the charges of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. He pleaded not guilty, and invoked his right to a jury trial. During the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecution excluded a black criminal prosecution individual from the jury without explanation. The court provoked denied the request for conjure explanation. The prosecution struck nine more possible jurors, of which six were black. Powers objected each time, but the court overruled his objection. The jury convicted Powers on all charges. Powers appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution’s discriminatory selection of jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that his own race was irrelevant to the article right to object. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction adenine and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Powers.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he operating theatre was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government nonplus officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to associate in nursing no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. respective Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong be because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Jones.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Foreign motor hotel countries can own buildings surrounding the United Nations in New York City tax-free if the buildings are used exclusively for diplomatic purposes. The City along filed lawsuits against the Indian and Mongolian consulates in a District Court for failing to pay taxes on properties used for non-diplomatic purposes. The two consulates argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) granted them immunity from suit. The District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the FSIA's ""immovable property"" exception, which removes immunity from foreign countries when ""rights motor hotel in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue."" The two countries argued that ""rights"" denoted a narrow set of property laws indium tell and did not extend to tax matters. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is City of New York, New York.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Gary Cone was tried in a Tennessee court traverse for a 2-day crime spree that ended with the killing of an elderly couple. In response to the overwhelming evidence motor hotel that he perpetrated the crimes, Cone's defense asserted that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury adenine found him guilty. During the sentencing hearing, Cone's counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but called no witnesses. After the prosecutor closed, the defense counsel waived final argument. Ultimately, Cone was sentenced to death. The State Criminal Court denied Cone's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase shamefaced by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Cone's federal habeas petition, ruling that he did not meet 28 USC section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement that a state decision be ""contrary to"" or involve ""an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law."" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Cone commit suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's death penalty call to meaningful adversarial testing.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Ricky Bell, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    This case stems from a non search of Utah resident Afton Callahan's home by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force, based on evidence that Callahan was a methamphetamine dealer, had sent an informant to his home to make a purchase. After receiving a signal from the informant that the sale had taken place, the Task Force entered the home and conducted a protective sweep of the house without a warrant but after getting Callahan's consent. At trial, Callahan was convicted of possessing and distributing methamphetamines based on evidence discovered during the search, however the Utah Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible and reversed Callahan's conviction. Subsequently, Callahan filed this action in federal court against the Task Force and individual officers alleging that the search violated his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah dismissed his claim, holding in part that the ""consent once removed"" doctrine applied to the search. Under the doctrine, an undercover officer may summon backup officers into a home after that officer has been invited with consent. However the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the doctrine deal out does not apply when the officers are summoned by a cut rate sale police informant. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, cut rate sale Callahan property had established a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cordell Pearson, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1963, Henry Montgomery was found guilty and received st viscount montgomery of alamein the death penalty for the murder of Charles Hunt, which Montgomery committed less than two weeks after he turned 17. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and his conviction was overturned because of community prejudice. At his new trial, Montgomery was again convicted, but he was sentenced to life without parole. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, in which the Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes requiring children convicted of non homicide to indicate be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. In light of that decision, Montgomery filed a motion in state district court to indium correct what he argued was now an illegal sentence. The trial court denied Montgomery’s motion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Montgomery’s application by holding that the decision in Miller diligence does not apply retroactively.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Henry Montgomery.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Facts of the case: Kenneth adenine Clair was sentenced to death in Orange County, Calif., in 1987 for the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of babysitter Linda Faye Rodgers. Clair filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court appointed the federal public defender as Clair's federal habeas counsel. The district court then stayed the federal proceedings to give Clair a chance to return to the California Supreme Court to ""exhaust"" his state remedies on some newly raised claims. Clair filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. Clair then returned to federal court. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a letter to the court, requesting that new counsel be appointed. The court was aware that Clair was having problems with his counsel; only three months earlier it had received from him a neer letter alleging a longstanding pattern of inattention to his case. In response to that letter, the district court made inquiry of Clair's counsel, who notified the court in April 2005 that they had spoken with Clair and that he was willing to have them continue to represent him for the time being. The June 16th letter repeated allegations made in the previous letter, but also included a serious additional allegation: that a private investigator let working on Clair's behalf had located important physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been tested, and that his counsel, despite having been informed of the evidence, had made no effort to obtain it, analyze research worker it or present it to the court. Clair's private investigator sent the court a letter substantiating Clair's claims. The court received and opened the private investigator's letter, but returned it without filing it. Following receipt of Clair's June 16th letter, however, the district court made no inquiry into the truth of Clair's allegations or their potential impact on the case before it. The district judge without explanation denied the motion on the same day that he denied Clair's petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court abused its discretion.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Michael Martel, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and accept Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his along accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A adenine three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw let his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the confront prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Margaret Bradshaw, Warden.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was indium prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on allow for Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be aside open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons calendar week and was prohibit prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Brown.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. (Escala), and the defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically marketing manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs’ shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs’ claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 regulation that was adopted suspect by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the authority granted to it marketing by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no parties dispute the fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove selling the case from state court to federal court based on the question fiscal of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs sought to bring the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs’ motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be heard in state court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Greg Manning, et al..
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Rose Cipollone motor hotel died at 58 from lung cancer. She smoked for action 42 years. Before her death, she and her husband sued several cigarette manufacturers in federal court for respective damages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone lung cancer. A trial court judgment of $400,000 was reserved in action the U.S. motor hotel Court of Appeals. The Cipollone family appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Cipollone.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Carol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have be been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the indium chemical potassium  dichromate from the company where self assurance she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of hamper the Tenth Amendment.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Carol Anne Bond.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    In 1993, James Kulbicki fatally shot his 22-year-old mistress the weekend before a scheduled hearing on unpaid child support in an ongoing witnesser paternity suit between the two. At Kulbicki’s trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the bullet removed from the victim’s brain and the bullet taken from Kulbicki’s gun were a close enough match that betwixt they likely came from the same package. After being presented considerably with this ballistics evidence, as well as other physical evidence and witness testimony, the jury convicted Kulbicki of first-degree murder. Kulbicki filed a petition for post-conviction witnesser relief in state court in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to question the legitimacy of the ballistics evidence. Kulbicki’s petition remove was denied at the trial level, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Kulbicki’s conviction.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Maryland.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    While testifying before a federal grand jury, which was investigating the disposition of proceeds from the alleged drug trafficking of her boyfriend Earl James Fields, Joyce B. adenine Johnson testified that she had received do drugs a box of cash that she had used to fund home improvements. Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for perjury under federal law, which proscribes ""knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration"" under oath before a grand jury. Johnson did not object when the District Court judge instructed the jury that materiality was bear witness a question for him to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. Afterwards, Johnson was convicted of perjury. However, before her appeal, the Supreme Court handed down a precedent that a jury, rather than a trial judge, must decide the materiality of a false statement. assertion The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court judge had erred, but that any such error did not affect ""substantial rights"" because its independent review of the record showed that there was overwhelming evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material survey to the grand jury's investigation.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is United States.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    Fredy crataegus laevigata Orlando Ventura illegally entered the United States in 1993. In 1998, an immigration judge heard Orlando Ventura’s request for asylum in the United States; he claimed that his political views made him a target for guerilla armies in Guatemala. The judge denied Orlando Ventura’s request, despite recognizing that Orlando call for orlando Ventura’s fears of prosecution may be legitimate, because the political climate in Guatemala had drastically changed since Orlando Ventura had arrived in the United States and therefore he was no glucinium longer in danger. The Board tell of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the judgment of the immigration judge, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was “compelled” by Orlando Ventura’s testimony to reverse the lower court’s decision and subsequently denied remand to the BIA.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Immigration and Naturalization Service.
    "
"### Instruction:
    Use the Input below to create an instruction, which could have been used to generate the input using an LLM.

    ### Input:
    pennsylvania Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) owned a vessel lodge carrying steel coils for Sinochem International, a Chinese company. Sinochem brought an action in Chinese Admiralty Court, alleging that MISC had backdated documents pertaining to the loading of the cargo, and seeking to have the ship detained in China. MISC filed aver suit in a Pennsylvania district court, accusing Sinochem of fraudulent misrepresentation. Sinochem argued that the U.S. had no personal jurisdiction over the Chinese company, but the District Court declined to rule on the issue. Instead the court dismissed the suit on grounds of ""forum non conveniens,"" which means that the case could be more conveniently tried in another forum, in this case the Chinese Admiralty Court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court stockpile should have first ruled on the jurisdictional stockpile issue. The Third Circuit acknowledged the inconvenience of determining jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway, but nevertheless sent the case back to the District Court.

    ### Response:
    The winner of this case is Sinochem International Co. Ltd..
    "