--- license: apache-2.0 task_categories: - text-classification tags: - abliteration - red-teaming - safety - synthetic size_categories: - 1K **Used to produce:** [Bahushruth/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-v4](https://huggingface.co/Bahushruth/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-v4) > > **Blog post:** [Abliteration: Uncensoring LLMs via Weight Surgery](https://potatospudowski.github.io/articles/abliteration) ## Why This Dataset Exists Standard abliteration datasets (e.g., `mlabonne/harmful_behaviors` with 520 prompts) are small and stylistically homogeneous. When you compute the "refusal direction" from these, you get a noisy estimate that captures surface-level prompt features rather than the true refusal mechanism. This leads to: - Multi-direction approaches that overfit and destroy capabilities - Single-direction approaches that miss the real refusal circuit This dataset provides 14x more prompts with much greater diversity, making the mean-difference statistic converge to the genuine refusal direction. Result: **1 direction from this dataset achieves 0% refusal with zero capability damage** on Qwen3.6-35B-A3B. ## Dataset Composition | Source | Count | Notes | |--------|-------|-------| | Synthetic (generated via LLM) | 6924 | 33 categories, ~210 per category | | `mlabonne/harmful_behaviors` | ~430 | Original curated list | | **Total** | **7356** | Train/test split | ## Prompt Diversity Each category includes prompts across 10 styles: 1. Direct blunt request 2. Fictional/roleplay framing (novel, game, screenplay) 3. Hypothetical/thought experiment 4. Educational/research framing 5. Professional cover story (pen tester, journalist, academic) 6. Indirect ask (for a friend, to prevent something) 7. Emotional framing (desperate, scared) 8. Technical deep-dive (step-by-step, code, exact formulas) 9. Subtle/coded language 10. Non-English or mixed-language Prompts also vary by length (1 sentence to 2-3 sentences) and persona (teens, professionals, researchers, writers, desperate people). ## Format JSONL with fields: ```json {"text": "the harmful prompt", "category": "malware and ransomware"} ``` ## Intended Use This dataset is designed **exclusively** for abliteration — computing the mean activation difference between harmful and harmless prompts to identify refusal directions in transformer residual streams. It is paired with a harmless dataset (e.g., `mlabonne/harmless_alpaca`) during the activation collection phase. ## Disclaimer This dataset contains harmful prompts for AI safety research. It should not be used to train models to produce harmful content. It is released to enable reproducible abliteration research.