codebefore
stringlengths 15
561k
| codeafter
stringlengths 16
4.94M
|
|---|---|
_dl_dst_count (const char *name, int is_path)
{
size_t cnt = 0;
do
{
size_t len = 1;
/* $ORIGIN is not expanded for SUID/GUID programs. */
if ((((!__libc_enable_secure
&& strncmp (&name[1], "ORIGIN", 6) == 0 && (len = 7) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[1], "PLATFORM", 8) == 0 && (len = 9) != 0))
&& (name[len] == '\0' || name[len] == '/'
|| (is_path && name[len] == ':')))
|| (name[1] == '{'
&& ((!__libc_enable_secure
&& strncmp (&name[2], "ORIGIN}", 7) == 0 && (len = 9) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[2], "PLATFORM}", 9) == 0
&& (len = 11) != 0))))
++cnt;
name = strchr (name + len, '$');
}
while (name != NULL);
return cnt;
}
|
_dl_dst_count (const char *name, int is_path)
{
const char *const start = name;
size_t cnt = 0;
do
{
size_t len = 1;
/* $ORIGIN is not expanded for SUID/GUID programs.
Note that it is no bug that the strings in the first two `strncmp'
calls are longer than the sequence which is actually tested. */
if ((((strncmp (&name[1], "ORIGIN}", 6) == 0
&& (!__libc_enable_secure
|| ((name[7] == '\0' || (is_path && name[7] == ':'))
&& (name == start || (is_path && name[-1] == ':'))))
&& (len = 7) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[1], "PLATFORM}", 8) == 0 && (len = 9) != 0))
&& (name[len] == '\0' || name[len] == '/'
|| (is_path && name[len] == ':')))
|| (name[1] == '{'
&& ((strncmp (&name[2], "ORIGIN}", 7) == 0
&& (!__libc_enable_secure
|| ((name[9] == '\0' || (is_path && name[9] == ':'))
&& (name == start || (is_path && name[-1] == ':'))))
&& (len = 9) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[2], "PLATFORM}", 9) == 0
&& (len = 11) != 0))))
++cnt;
name = strchr (name + len, '$');
}
while (name != NULL);
return cnt;
}
|
expand_dynamic_string_token (struct link_map *l, const char *s)
{
/* We make two runs over the string. First we determine how large the
resulting string is and then we copy it over. Since this is now
frequently executed operation we are looking here not for performance
but rather for code size. */
size_t cnt;
size_t total;
char *result;
/* Determine the nubmer of DST elements. */
cnt = DL_DST_COUNT (s, 1);
/* If we do not have to replace anything simply copy the string. */
if (cnt == 0)
return local_strdup (s);
/* Determine the length of the substituted string. */
total = DL_DST_REQUIRED (l, s, strlen (s), cnt);
/* Allocate the necessary memory. */
result = (char *) malloc (total + 1);
if (result == NULL)
return NULL;
return DL_DST_SUBSTITUTE (l, s, result, 1);
}
|
expand_dynamic_string_token (struct link_map *l, const char *s)
{
/* We make two runs over the string. First we determine how large the
resulting string is and then we copy it over. Since this is now
frequently executed operation we are looking here not for performance
but rather for code size. */
size_t cnt;
size_t total;
char *result;
/* Determine the number of DST elements. */
cnt = DL_DST_COUNT (s, 1);
/* If we do not have to replace anything simply copy the string. */
if (cnt == 0)
return local_strdup (s);
/* Determine the length of the substituted string. */
total = DL_DST_REQUIRED (l, s, strlen (s), cnt);
/* Allocate the necessary memory. */
result = (char *) malloc (total + 1);
if (result == NULL)
return NULL;
return DL_DST_SUBSTITUTE (l, s, result, 1);
}
|
_dl_dst_substitute (struct link_map *l, const char *name, char *result,
int is_path)
{
char *last_elem, *wp;
/* Now fill the result path. While copying over the string we keep
track of the start of the last path element. When we come accross
a DST we copy over the value or (if the value is not available)
leave the entire path element out. */
last_elem = wp = result;
do
{
if (*name == '$')
{
const char *repl;
size_t len;
if ((((strncmp (&name[1], "ORIGIN", 6) == 0 && (len = 7) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[1], "PLATFORM", 8) == 0 && (len = 9) != 0))
&& (name[len] == '\0' || name[len] == '/'
|| (is_path && name[len] == ':')))
|| (name[1] == '{'
&& ((strncmp (&name[2], "ORIGIN}", 7) == 0 && (len = 9) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[2], "PLATFORM}", 9) == 0
&& (len = 11) != 0))))
{
repl = ((len == 7 || name[2] == 'O')
? (__libc_enable_secure ? NULL : l->l_origin)
: _dl_platform);
if (repl != NULL && repl != (const char *) -1)
{
wp = __stpcpy (wp, repl);
name += len;
}
else
{
/* We cannot use this path element, the value of the
replacement is unknown. */
wp = last_elem;
name += len;
while (*name != '\0' && (!is_path || *name != ':'))
++name;
}
}
else
/* No DST we recognize. */
*wp++ = *name++;
}
else if (is_path && *name == ':')
{
*wp++ = *name++;
last_elem = wp;
}
else
*wp++ = *name++;
}
while (*name != '\0');
*wp = '\0';
return result;
}
|
_dl_dst_substitute (struct link_map *l, const char *name, char *result,
int is_path)
{
const char *const start = name;
char *last_elem, *wp;
/* Now fill the result path. While copying over the string we keep
track of the start of the last path element. When we come accross
a DST we copy over the value or (if the value is not available)
leave the entire path element out. */
last_elem = wp = result;
do
{
if (*name == '$')
{
const char *repl;
size_t len;
/* Note that it is no bug that the strings in the first two `strncmp'
calls are longer than the sequence which is actually tested. */
if ((((strncmp (&name[1], "ORIGIN}", 6) == 0 && (len = 7) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[1], "PLATFORM}", 8) == 0 && (len = 9) != 0))
&& (name[len] == '\0' || name[len] == '/'
|| (is_path && name[len] == ':')))
|| (name[1] == '{'
&& ((strncmp (&name[2], "ORIGIN}", 7) == 0 && (len = 9) != 0)
|| (strncmp (&name[2], "PLATFORM}", 9) == 0
&& (len = 11) != 0))))
{
repl = ((len == 7 || name[2] == 'O')
? (__libc_enable_secure
&& ((name[len] != '\0'
&& (!is_path || name[len] != ':'))
|| (name != start
&& (!is_path || name[-1] != ':')))
? NULL : l->l_origin)
: _dl_platform);
if (repl != NULL && repl != (const char *) -1)
{
wp = __stpcpy (wp, repl);
name += len;
}
else
{
/* We cannot use this path element, the value of the
replacement is unknown. */
wp = last_elem;
name += len;
while (*name != '\0' && (!is_path || *name != ':'))
++name;
}
}
else
/* No DST we recognize. */
*wp++ = *name++;
}
else if (is_path && *name == ':')
{
*wp++ = *name++;
last_elem = wp;
}
else
*wp++ = *name++;
}
while (*name != '\0');
*wp = '\0';
return result;
}
|
vsyslog(pri, fmt, ap)
int pri;
register const char *fmt;
va_list ap;
{
struct tm now_tm;
time_t now;
int fd;
FILE *f;
char *buf = 0;
size_t bufsize = 0;
size_t prioff, msgoff;
struct sigaction action, oldaction;
struct sigaction *oldaction_ptr = NULL;
int sigpipe;
int saved_errno = errno;
#define INTERNALLOG LOG_ERR|LOG_CONS|LOG_PERROR|LOG_PID
/* Check for invalid bits. */
if (pri & ~(LOG_PRIMASK|LOG_FACMASK)) {
syslog(INTERNALLOG,
"syslog: unknown facility/priority: %x", pri);
pri &= LOG_PRIMASK|LOG_FACMASK;
}
/* Check priority against setlogmask values. */
if ((LOG_MASK (LOG_PRI (pri)) & LogMask) == 0)
return;
/* Set default facility if none specified. */
if ((pri & LOG_FACMASK) == 0)
pri |= LogFacility;
/* Build the message in a memory-buffer stream. */
f = open_memstream (&buf, &bufsize);
prioff = fprintf (f, "<%d>", pri);
(void) time (&now);
#ifdef USE_IN_LIBIO
f->_IO_write_ptr += strftime (f->_IO_write_ptr,
f->_IO_write_end - f->_IO_write_ptr,
"%h %e %T ",
__localtime_r (&now, &now_tm));
#else
f->__bufp += strftime (f->__bufp, f->__put_limit - f->__bufp,
"%h %e %T ", __localtime_r (&now, &now_tm));
#endif
msgoff = ftell (f);
if (LogTag == NULL)
LogTag = __progname;
if (LogTag != NULL)
fputs_unlocked (LogTag, f);
if (LogStat & LOG_PID)
fprintf (f, "[%d]", __getpid ());
if (LogTag != NULL)
putc_unlocked (':', f), putc_unlocked (' ', f);
/* Restore errno for %m format. */
__set_errno (saved_errno);
/* We have the header. Print the user's format into the buffer. */
vfprintf (f, fmt, ap);
/* Close the memory stream; this will finalize the data
into a malloc'd buffer in BUF. */
fclose (f);
/* Output to stderr if requested. */
if (LogStat & LOG_PERROR) {
struct iovec iov[2];
register struct iovec *v = iov;
v->iov_base = buf + msgoff;
v->iov_len = bufsize - msgoff;
++v;
v->iov_base = (char *) "\n";
v->iov_len = 1;
(void)__writev(STDERR_FILENO, iov, 2);
}
/* Prepare for multiple users. We have to take care: open and
write are cancellation points. */
__libc_cleanup_region_start ((void (*) (void *)) cancel_handler,
&oldaction_ptr);
__libc_lock_lock (syslog_lock);
/* Prepare for a broken connection. */
memset (&action, 0, sizeof (action));
action.sa_handler = sigpipe_handler;
sigemptyset (&action.sa_mask);
sigpipe = __sigaction (SIGPIPE, &action, &oldaction);
if (sigpipe == 0)
oldaction_ptr = &oldaction;
/* Get connected, output the message to the local logger. */
if (!connected)
openlog_internal(LogTag, LogStat | LOG_NDELAY, 0);
/* If we have a SOCK_STREAM connection, also send ASCII NUL as
a record terminator. */
if (LogType == SOCK_STREAM)
++bufsize;
if (!connected || __send(LogFile, buf, bufsize, 0) < 0)
{
closelog_internal (); /* attempt re-open next time */
/*
* Output the message to the console; don't worry about blocking,
* if console blocks everything will. Make sure the error reported
* is the one from the syslogd failure.
*/
if (LogStat & LOG_CONS &&
(fd = __open(_PATH_CONSOLE, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY, 0)) >= 0)
{
dprintf (fd, "%s\r\n", buf + msgoff);
(void)__close(fd);
}
}
if (sigpipe == 0)
__sigaction (SIGPIPE, &oldaction, (struct sigaction *) NULL);
/* End of critical section. */
__libc_cleanup_region_end (0);
__libc_lock_unlock (syslog_lock);
free (buf);
}
|
vsyslog(pri, fmt, ap)
int pri;
register const char *fmt;
va_list ap;
{
struct tm now_tm;
time_t now;
int fd;
FILE *f;
char *buf = 0;
size_t bufsize = 0;
size_t prioff, msgoff;
struct sigaction action, oldaction;
struct sigaction *oldaction_ptr = NULL;
int sigpipe;
int saved_errno = errno;
#define INTERNALLOG LOG_ERR|LOG_CONS|LOG_PERROR|LOG_PID
/* Check for invalid bits. */
if (pri & ~(LOG_PRIMASK|LOG_FACMASK)) {
syslog(INTERNALLOG,
"syslog: unknown facility/priority: %x", pri);
pri &= LOG_PRIMASK|LOG_FACMASK;
}
/* Check priority against setlogmask values. */
if ((LOG_MASK (LOG_PRI (pri)) & LogMask) == 0)
return;
/* Set default facility if none specified. */
if ((pri & LOG_FACMASK) == 0)
pri |= LogFacility;
/* Build the message in a memory-buffer stream. */
f = open_memstream (&buf, &bufsize);
prioff = fprintf (f, "<%d>", pri);
(void) time (&now);
#ifdef USE_IN_LIBIO
f->_IO_write_ptr += strftime (f->_IO_write_ptr,
f->_IO_write_end - f->_IO_write_ptr,
"%h %e %T ",
__localtime_r (&now, &now_tm));
#else
f->__bufp += strftime (f->__bufp, f->__put_limit - f->__bufp,
"%h %e %T ", __localtime_r (&now, &now_tm));
#endif
msgoff = ftell (f);
if (LogTag == NULL)
LogTag = __progname;
if (LogTag != NULL)
fputs_unlocked (LogTag, f);
if (LogStat & LOG_PID)
fprintf (f, "[%d]", __getpid ());
if (LogTag != NULL)
putc_unlocked (':', f), putc_unlocked (' ', f);
/* Restore errno for %m format. */
__set_errno (saved_errno);
/* We have the header. Print the user's format into the buffer. */
vfprintf (f, fmt, ap);
/* Close the memory stream; this will finalize the data
into a malloc'd buffer in BUF. */
fclose (f);
/* Output to stderr if requested. */
if (LogStat & LOG_PERROR) {
struct iovec iov[2];
register struct iovec *v = iov;
v->iov_base = buf + msgoff;
v->iov_len = bufsize - msgoff;
/* Append a newline if necessary. */
if (buf[bufsize - 1] != '\n')
{
++v;
v->iov_base = (char *) "\n";
v->iov_len = 1;
}
(void)__writev(STDERR_FILENO, iov, v - iov + 1);
}
/* Prepare for multiple users. We have to take care: open and
write are cancellation points. */
__libc_cleanup_region_start ((void (*) (void *)) cancel_handler,
&oldaction_ptr);
__libc_lock_lock (syslog_lock);
/* Prepare for a broken connection. */
memset (&action, 0, sizeof (action));
action.sa_handler = sigpipe_handler;
sigemptyset (&action.sa_mask);
sigpipe = __sigaction (SIGPIPE, &action, &oldaction);
if (sigpipe == 0)
oldaction_ptr = &oldaction;
/* Get connected, output the message to the local logger. */
if (!connected)
openlog_internal(LogTag, LogStat | LOG_NDELAY, 0);
/* If we have a SOCK_STREAM connection, also send ASCII NUL as
a record terminator. */
if (LogType == SOCK_STREAM)
++bufsize;
if (!connected || __send(LogFile, buf, bufsize, 0) < 0)
{
closelog_internal (); /* attempt re-open next time */
/*
* Output the message to the console; don't worry about blocking,
* if console blocks everything will. Make sure the error reported
* is the one from the syslogd failure.
*/
if (LogStat & LOG_CONS &&
(fd = __open(_PATH_CONSOLE, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY, 0)) >= 0)
{
dprintf (fd, "%s\r\n", buf + msgoff);
(void)__close(fd);
}
}
if (sigpipe == 0)
__sigaction (SIGPIPE, &oldaction, (struct sigaction *) NULL);
/* End of critical section. */
__libc_cleanup_region_end (0);
__libc_lock_unlock (syslog_lock);
free (buf);
}
|
init_syntax_once ()
{
register int c;
static int done;
if (done)
return;
bzero (re_syntax_table, sizeof re_syntax_table);
for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++)
re_syntax_table[c] = Sword;
for (c = 'A'; c <= 'Z'; c++)
re_syntax_table[c] = Sword;
for (c = '0'; c <= '9'; c++)
re_syntax_table[c] = Sword;
re_syntax_table['_'] = Sword;
done = 1;
}
|
init_syntax_once ()
{
register int c;
static int done = 0;
if (done)
return;
bzero (re_syntax_table, sizeof re_syntax_table);
for (c = 0; c < CHAR_SET_SIZE; ++c)
if (ISALNUM (c))
re_syntax_table[c] = Sword;
re_syntax_table['_'] = Sword;
done = 1;
}
|
getlogin_r (name, name_len)
char *name;
size_t name_len;
{
char tty_pathname[2 + 2 * NAME_MAX];
char *real_tty_path = tty_pathname;
int result = 0;
struct utmp *ut, line, buffer;
{
int d = __open ("/dev/tty", 0);
if (d < 0)
return errno;
result = __ttyname_r (d, real_tty_path, sizeof (tty_pathname));
(void) __close (d);
if (result != 0)
{
__set_errno (result);
return result;
}
}
real_tty_path += 5; /* Remove "/dev/". */
__setutent ();
strncpy (line.ut_line, real_tty_path, sizeof line.ut_line);
if (__getutline_r (&line, &buffer, &ut) < 0)
{
if (errno == ESRCH)
/* The caller expects ENOENT if nothing is found. */
result = ENOENT;
else
result = errno;
}
else
{
size_t needed = strlen (ut->ut_line) + 1;
if (needed < name_len)
{
__set_errno (ERANGE);
result = ERANGE;
}
else
{
memcpy (name, ut->ut_line, needed);
result = 0;
}
}
__endutent ();
return result;
}
|
getlogin_r (name, name_len)
char *name;
size_t name_len;
{
char tty_pathname[2 + 2 * NAME_MAX];
char *real_tty_path = tty_pathname;
int result = 0;
struct utmp *ut, line, buffer;
/* Get name of tty connected to fd 0. Return if not a tty or
if fd 0 isn't open. Note that a lot of documentation says that
getlogin() is based on the controlling terminal---what they
really mean is "the terminal connected to standard input". The
getlogin() implementation of DEC Unix, SunOS, Solaris, HP-UX all
return NULL if fd 0 has been closed, so this is the compatible
thing to do. Note that ttyname(open("/dev/tty")) on those
systems returns /dev/tty, so that is not a possible solution for
getlogin(). */
result = __ttyname_r (0, real_tty_path, sizeof (tty_pathname));
if (result != 0)
return result;
real_tty_path += 5; /* Remove "/dev/". */
__setutent ();
strncpy (line.ut_line, real_tty_path, sizeof line.ut_line);
if (__getutline_r (&line, &buffer, &ut) < 0)
{
if (errno == ESRCH)
/* The caller expects ENOENT if nothing is found. */
result = ENOENT;
else
result = errno;
}
else
{
size_t needed = strlen (ut->ut_user) + 1;
if (needed > name_len)
{
__set_errno (ERANGE);
result = ERANGE;
}
else
{
memcpy (name, ut->ut_user, needed);
result = 0;
}
}
__endutent ();
return result;
}
|
check_1_6_dummy(kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, char **passptr)
{
int i;
char *password = *passptr;
/* Old-style randkey operations disallowed tickets to start. */
if (!(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) ||
!(entry->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX))
return;
/* The 1.6 dummy password was the octets 1..255. */
for (i = 0; (unsigned char) password[i] == i + 1; i++);
if (password[i] != '\0' || i != 255)
return;
/* This will make the caller use a random password instead. */
*passptr = NULL;
}
|
check_1_6_dummy(kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, char **passptr)
{
int i;
char *password = *passptr;
/* Old-style randkey operations disallowed tickets to start. */
if (password == NULL || !(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) ||
!(entry->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX))
return;
/* The 1.6 dummy password was the octets 1..255. */
for (i = 0; (unsigned char) password[i] == i + 1; i++);
if (password[i] != '\0' || i != 255)
return;
/* This will make the caller use a random password instead. */
*passptr = NULL;
}
|
process_chpw_request(krb5_context context, void *server_handle, char *realm,
krb5_keytab keytab, const krb5_fulladdr *local_faddr,
const krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr, krb5_data *req,
krb5_data *rep)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *ptr;
unsigned int plen, vno;
krb5_data ap_req, ap_rep = empty_data();
krb5_data cipher = empty_data(), clear = empty_data();
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_principal changepw = NULL;
krb5_principal client, target = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_replay_data replay;
krb5_error krberror;
int numresult;
char strresult[1024];
char *clientstr = NULL, *targetstr = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen;
char *cdots;
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
socklen_t salen;
char addrbuf[100];
krb5_address *addr = remote_faddr->address;
*rep = empty_data();
if (req->length < 4) {
/* either this, or the server is printing bad messages,
or the caller passed in garbage */
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ptr = req->data;
/* verify length */
plen = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
plen = (plen<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (plen != req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request length was inconsistent",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* verify version number */
vno = (*ptr++ & 0xff) ;
vno = (vno<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (vno != 1 && vno != RFC3244_VERSION) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION;
snprintf(strresult, sizeof(strresult),
"Request contained unknown protocol version number %d", vno);
goto chpwfail;
}
/* read, check ap-req length */
ap_req.length = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
ap_req.length = (ap_req.length<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (ptr + ap_req.length >= req->data + req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated in AP-REQ",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* verify ap_req */
ap_req.data = ptr;
ptr += ap_req.length;
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &changepw, strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed building kadmin/changepw principal",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &ap_req, changepw, keytab,
NULL, &ticket);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed reading application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* construct the ap-rep */
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &ap_rep);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed replying to application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* decrypt the ChangePasswdData */
cipher.length = (req->data + req->length) - ptr;
cipher.data = ptr;
/*
* Don't set a remote address in auth_context before calling krb5_rd_priv,
* so that we can work against clients behind a NAT. Reflection attacks
* aren't a concern since we use sequence numbers and since our requests
* don't look anything like our responses. Also don't set a local address,
* since we don't know what interface the request was received on.
*/
ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, auth_context, &cipher, &clear, &replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decrypting request", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
/* decode ChangePasswdData for setpw requests */
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
krb5_data *clear_data;
ret = decode_krb5_setpw_req(&clear, &clear_data, &target);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decoding ChangePasswdData",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
clear = *clear_data;
free(clear_data);
if (target != NULL) {
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, target, &targetstr);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing target name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
}
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &clientstr);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing client name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* for cpw, verify that this is an AS_REQ ticket */
if (vno == 1 &&
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) == 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Ticket must be derived from a password",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* change the password */
ptr = k5memdup0(clear.data, clear.length, &ret);
ret = schpw_util_wrapper(server_handle, client, target,
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) != 0,
ptr, NULL, strresult, sizeof(strresult));
if (ret)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
/* zap the password */
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
zapfree(ptr, clear.length);
clear = empty_data();
clen = strlen(clientstr);
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
switch (addr->addrtype) {
case ADDRTYPE_INET: {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = ss2sin(&ss);
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin->sin_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin);
break;
}
case ADDRTYPE_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = ss2sin6(&ss);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin6->sin6_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin6);
break;
}
default: {
struct sockaddr *sa = ss2sa(&ss);
sa->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
salen = sizeof(*sa);
break;
}
}
if (getnameinfo(ss2sa(&ss), salen,
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0,
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
strlcpy(addrbuf, "<unprintable>", sizeof(addrbuf));
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
size_t tlen;
char *tdots;
const char *targetp;
if (target == NULL) {
tlen = clen;
tdots = cdots;
targetp = targetstr;
} else {
tlen = strlen(targetstr);
trunc_name(&tlen, &tdots);
targetp = clientstr;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("setpw request from %s by %.*s%s for "
"%.*s%s: %s"), addrbuf, (int) clen,
clientstr, cdots, (int) tlen, targetp, tdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("chpw request from %s for %.*s%s: %s"),
addrbuf, (int) clen, clientstr, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
}
switch (ret) {
case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED;
break;
case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT:
case KADM5_PASS_REUSE:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_GENERIC:
case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR;
break;
case 0:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS;
strlcpy(strresult, "", sizeof(strresult));
break;
default:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
break;
}
chpwfail:
clear.length = 2 + strlen(strresult);
clear.data = (char *) malloc(clear.length);
ptr = clear.data;
*ptr++ = (numresult>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = numresult & 0xff;
memcpy(ptr, strresult, strlen(strresult));
cipher = empty_data();
if (ap_rep.length) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context,
local_faddr->address, NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult,
"Failed storing client and server internet addresses",
sizeof(strresult));
} else {
ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, auth_context, &clear, &cipher,
&replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed encrypting reply",
sizeof(strresult));
}
}
}
/* if no KRB-PRIV was constructed, then we need a KRB-ERROR.
if this fails, just bail. there's nothing else we can do. */
if (cipher.length == 0) {
/* clear out ap_rep now, so that it won't be inserted in the
reply */
if (ap_rep.length) {
free(ap_rep.data);
ap_rep = empty_data();
}
krberror.ctime = 0;
krberror.cusec = 0;
krberror.susec = 0;
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &krberror.stime);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
/* this is really icky. but it's what all the other callers
to mk_error do. */
krberror.error = ret;
krberror.error -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (krberror.error < 0 || krberror.error > 128)
krberror.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krberror.client = NULL;
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &krberror.server,
strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
krberror.text.length = 0;
krberror.e_data = clear;
ret = krb5_mk_error(context, &krberror, &cipher);
krb5_free_principal(context, krberror.server);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
}
/* construct the reply */
ret = alloc_data(rep, 6 + ap_rep.length + cipher.length);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
ptr = rep->data;
/* length */
*ptr++ = (rep->length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = rep->length & 0xff;
/* version == 0x0001 big-endian */
*ptr++ = 0;
*ptr++ = 1;
/* ap_rep length, big-endian */
*ptr++ = (ap_rep.length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = ap_rep.length & 0xff;
/* ap-rep data */
if (ap_rep.length) {
memcpy(ptr, ap_rep.data, ap_rep.length);
ptr += ap_rep.length;
}
/* krb-priv or krb-error */
memcpy(ptr, cipher.data, cipher.length);
bailout:
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_principal(context, changepw);
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
free(ap_rep.data);
free(clear.data);
free(cipher.data);
krb5_free_principal(context, target);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, targetstr);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, clientstr);
krb5_free_error_message(context, errmsg);
return ret;
}
|
process_chpw_request(krb5_context context, void *server_handle, char *realm,
krb5_keytab keytab, const krb5_fulladdr *local_faddr,
const krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr, krb5_data *req,
krb5_data *rep)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *ptr;
unsigned int plen, vno;
krb5_data ap_req, ap_rep = empty_data();
krb5_data cipher = empty_data(), clear = empty_data();
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_principal changepw = NULL;
krb5_principal client, target = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_replay_data replay;
krb5_error krberror;
int numresult;
char strresult[1024];
char *clientstr = NULL, *targetstr = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen;
char *cdots;
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
socklen_t salen;
char addrbuf[100];
krb5_address *addr = remote_faddr->address;
*rep = empty_data();
if (req->length < 4) {
/* either this, or the server is printing bad messages,
or the caller passed in garbage */
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated", sizeof(strresult));
goto bailout;
}
ptr = req->data;
/* verify length */
plen = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
plen = (plen<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (plen != req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request length was inconsistent",
sizeof(strresult));
goto bailout;
}
/* verify version number */
vno = (*ptr++ & 0xff) ;
vno = (vno<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (vno != 1 && vno != RFC3244_VERSION) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION;
snprintf(strresult, sizeof(strresult),
"Request contained unknown protocol version number %d", vno);
goto bailout;
}
/* read, check ap-req length */
ap_req.length = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
ap_req.length = (ap_req.length<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (ptr + ap_req.length >= req->data + req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated in AP-REQ",
sizeof(strresult));
goto bailout;
}
/* verify ap_req */
ap_req.data = ptr;
ptr += ap_req.length;
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &changepw, strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed building kadmin/changepw principal",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &ap_req, changepw, keytab,
NULL, &ticket);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed reading application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* construct the ap-rep */
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &ap_rep);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed replying to application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* decrypt the ChangePasswdData */
cipher.length = (req->data + req->length) - ptr;
cipher.data = ptr;
/*
* Don't set a remote address in auth_context before calling krb5_rd_priv,
* so that we can work against clients behind a NAT. Reflection attacks
* aren't a concern since we use sequence numbers and since our requests
* don't look anything like our responses. Also don't set a local address,
* since we don't know what interface the request was received on.
*/
ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, auth_context, &cipher, &clear, &replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decrypting request", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
/* decode ChangePasswdData for setpw requests */
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
krb5_data *clear_data;
ret = decode_krb5_setpw_req(&clear, &clear_data, &target);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decoding ChangePasswdData",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
clear = *clear_data;
free(clear_data);
if (target != NULL) {
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, target, &targetstr);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing target name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
}
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &clientstr);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing client name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* for cpw, verify that this is an AS_REQ ticket */
if (vno == 1 &&
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) == 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Ticket must be derived from a password",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* change the password */
ptr = k5memdup0(clear.data, clear.length, &ret);
ret = schpw_util_wrapper(server_handle, client, target,
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) != 0,
ptr, NULL, strresult, sizeof(strresult));
if (ret)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
/* zap the password */
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
zapfree(ptr, clear.length);
clear = empty_data();
clen = strlen(clientstr);
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
switch (addr->addrtype) {
case ADDRTYPE_INET: {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = ss2sin(&ss);
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin->sin_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin);
break;
}
case ADDRTYPE_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = ss2sin6(&ss);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin6->sin6_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin6);
break;
}
default: {
struct sockaddr *sa = ss2sa(&ss);
sa->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
salen = sizeof(*sa);
break;
}
}
if (getnameinfo(ss2sa(&ss), salen,
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0,
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
strlcpy(addrbuf, "<unprintable>", sizeof(addrbuf));
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
size_t tlen;
char *tdots;
const char *targetp;
if (target == NULL) {
tlen = clen;
tdots = cdots;
targetp = targetstr;
} else {
tlen = strlen(targetstr);
trunc_name(&tlen, &tdots);
targetp = clientstr;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("setpw request from %s by %.*s%s for "
"%.*s%s: %s"), addrbuf, (int) clen,
clientstr, cdots, (int) tlen, targetp, tdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("chpw request from %s for %.*s%s: %s"),
addrbuf, (int) clen, clientstr, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
}
switch (ret) {
case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED;
break;
case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT:
case KADM5_PASS_REUSE:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_GENERIC:
case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR;
break;
case 0:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS;
strlcpy(strresult, "", sizeof(strresult));
break;
default:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
break;
}
chpwfail:
clear.length = 2 + strlen(strresult);
clear.data = (char *) malloc(clear.length);
ptr = clear.data;
*ptr++ = (numresult>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = numresult & 0xff;
memcpy(ptr, strresult, strlen(strresult));
cipher = empty_data();
if (ap_rep.length) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context,
local_faddr->address, NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult,
"Failed storing client and server internet addresses",
sizeof(strresult));
} else {
ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, auth_context, &clear, &cipher,
&replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed encrypting reply",
sizeof(strresult));
}
}
}
/* if no KRB-PRIV was constructed, then we need a KRB-ERROR.
if this fails, just bail. there's nothing else we can do. */
if (cipher.length == 0) {
/* clear out ap_rep now, so that it won't be inserted in the
reply */
if (ap_rep.length) {
free(ap_rep.data);
ap_rep = empty_data();
}
krberror.ctime = 0;
krberror.cusec = 0;
krberror.susec = 0;
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &krberror.stime);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
/* this is really icky. but it's what all the other callers
to mk_error do. */
krberror.error = ret;
krberror.error -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (krberror.error < 0 || krberror.error > 128)
krberror.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krberror.client = NULL;
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &krberror.server,
strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
krberror.text.length = 0;
krberror.e_data = clear;
ret = krb5_mk_error(context, &krberror, &cipher);
krb5_free_principal(context, krberror.server);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
}
/* construct the reply */
ret = alloc_data(rep, 6 + ap_rep.length + cipher.length);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
ptr = rep->data;
/* length */
*ptr++ = (rep->length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = rep->length & 0xff;
/* version == 0x0001 big-endian */
*ptr++ = 0;
*ptr++ = 1;
/* ap_rep length, big-endian */
*ptr++ = (ap_rep.length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = ap_rep.length & 0xff;
/* ap-rep data */
if (ap_rep.length) {
memcpy(ptr, ap_rep.data, ap_rep.length);
ptr += ap_rep.length;
}
/* krb-priv or krb-error */
memcpy(ptr, cipher.data, cipher.length);
bailout:
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_principal(context, changepw);
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
free(ap_rep.data);
free(clear.data);
free(cipher.data);
krb5_free_principal(context, target);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, targetstr);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, clientstr);
krb5_free_error_message(context, errmsg);
return ret;
}
|
acc_ctx_cont(OM_uint32 *minstat,
gss_buffer_t buf,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin;
gss_OID supportedMech;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc;
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *ptr, *bufstart;
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*ctx;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
*negState = REJECT;
*minstat = 0;
supportedMech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*return_token = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
*responseToken = *mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
ptr = bufstart = buf->value;
#define REMAIN (buf->length - (ptr - bufstart))
if (REMAIN > INT_MAX)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/*
* Attempt to work with old Sun SPNEGO.
*/
if (*ptr == HEADER_ID) {
ret = g_verify_token_header(gss_mech_spnego,
&len, &ptr, 0, REMAIN);
if (ret) {
*minstat = ret;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
}
if (*ptr != (CONTEXT | 0x01)) {
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ret = get_negTokenResp(minstat, ptr, REMAIN,
negState, &supportedMech,
responseToken, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
if (*responseToken == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER &&
*mechListMIC == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->firstpass = 0;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
cleanup:
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &supportedMech);
}
return ret;
#undef REMAIN
}
|
acc_ctx_cont(OM_uint32 *minstat,
gss_buffer_t buf,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin;
gss_OID supportedMech;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc;
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *ptr, *bufstart;
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*ctx;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
*negState = REJECT;
*minstat = 0;
supportedMech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*return_token = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
*responseToken = *mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
ptr = bufstart = buf->value;
#define REMAIN (buf->length - (ptr - bufstart))
if (REMAIN == 0 || REMAIN > INT_MAX)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/*
* Attempt to work with old Sun SPNEGO.
*/
if (*ptr == HEADER_ID) {
ret = g_verify_token_header(gss_mech_spnego,
&len, &ptr, 0, REMAIN);
if (ret) {
*minstat = ret;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
}
if (*ptr != (CONTEXT | 0x01)) {
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ret = get_negTokenResp(minstat, ptr, REMAIN,
negState, &supportedMech,
responseToken, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
if (*responseToken == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER &&
*mechListMIC == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->firstpass = 0;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
cleanup:
if (supportedMech != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &supportedMech);
}
return ret;
#undef REMAIN
}
|
kadm5_randkey_principal_3(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal,
krb5_boolean keepold,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
krb5_keyblock **keyblocks,
int *n_keys)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_int32 now;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
int ret, last_pwd;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
if (keyblocks)
*keyblocks = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if (principal == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb)))
return(ret);
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto done;
if (krb5_principal_compare(handle->context, principal, hist_princ)) {
/* If changing the history entry, the new entry must have exactly one
* key. */
if (keepold)
return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL;
new_n_ks_tuple = 1;
}
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple,
keepold, kdb);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE;
ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if (have_pol) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd);
if (ret)
goto done;
#if 0
/*
* The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has
* modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this
* check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A
* local caller implicitly has all authorization bits.
*/
if((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life &&
!(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) {
ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON;
goto done;
}
#endif
if (pol.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* unlock principal on this KDC */
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
if (keyblocks) {
ret = decrypt_key_data(handle->context,
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data,
keyblocks, n_keys);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
/* key data changed, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT;
/* | KADM5_RANDKEY_USED */;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal, keepold,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb)))
goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal,
keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
free(new_ks_tuple);
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (have_pol)
kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
return ret;
}
|
kadm5_randkey_principal_3(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal,
krb5_boolean keepold,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
krb5_keyblock **keyblocks,
int *n_keys)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_int32 now;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
int ret, last_pwd, n_new_keys;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
if (keyblocks)
*keyblocks = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if (principal == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb)))
return(ret);
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto done;
if (krb5_principal_compare(handle->context, principal, hist_princ)) {
/* If changing the history entry, the new entry must have exactly one
* key. */
if (keepold)
return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL;
new_n_ks_tuple = 1;
}
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple,
keepold, kdb);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE;
ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if (have_pol) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd);
if (ret)
goto done;
#if 0
/*
* The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has
* modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this
* check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A
* local caller implicitly has all authorization bits.
*/
if((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life &&
!(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) {
ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON;
goto done;
}
#endif
if (pol.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* unlock principal on this KDC */
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
if (keyblocks) {
/* Return only the new keys added by krb5_dbe_crk. */
n_new_keys = count_new_keys(kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data);
ret = decrypt_key_data(handle->context, n_new_keys, kdb->key_data,
keyblocks, n_keys);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
/* key data changed, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT;
/* | KADM5_RANDKEY_USED */;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal, keepold,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb)))
goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal,
keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
free(new_ks_tuple);
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (have_pol)
kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
return ret;
}
|
krb5_ldap_get_password_policy_from_dn(krb5_context context, char *pol_name,
char *pol_dn, osa_policy_ent_t *policy)
{
krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0;
LDAP *ld=NULL;
LDAPMessage *result=NULL,*ent=NULL;
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL;
krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL;
/* Clear the global error string */
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
/* validate the input parameters */
if (pol_dn == NULL)
return EINVAL;
*policy = NULL;
SETUP_CONTEXT();
GET_HANDLE();
*(policy) = (osa_policy_ent_t) malloc(sizeof(osa_policy_ent_rec));
if (*policy == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(*policy, 0, sizeof(osa_policy_ent_rec));
LDAP_SEARCH(pol_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "(objectclass=krbPwdPolicy)", password_policy_attributes);
ent=ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
if ((st = populate_policy(context, ld, ent, pol_name, *policy)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
ldap_msgfree(result);
if (st != 0) {
if (*policy != NULL) {
krb5_ldap_free_password_policy(context, *policy);
*policy = NULL;
}
}
krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle);
return st;
}
|
krb5_ldap_get_password_policy_from_dn(krb5_context context, char *pol_name,
char *pol_dn, osa_policy_ent_t *policy)
{
krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0;
LDAP *ld=NULL;
LDAPMessage *result=NULL,*ent=NULL;
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL;
krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL;
/* Clear the global error string */
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
/* validate the input parameters */
if (pol_dn == NULL)
return EINVAL;
*policy = NULL;
SETUP_CONTEXT();
GET_HANDLE();
*(policy) = (osa_policy_ent_t) malloc(sizeof(osa_policy_ent_rec));
if (*policy == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(*policy, 0, sizeof(osa_policy_ent_rec));
LDAP_SEARCH(pol_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "(objectclass=krbPwdPolicy)", password_policy_attributes);
ent=ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent == NULL) {
st = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
goto cleanup;
}
st = populate_policy(context, ld, ent, pol_name, *policy);
cleanup:
ldap_msgfree(result);
if (st != 0) {
if (*policy != NULL) {
krb5_ldap_free_password_policy(context, *policy);
*policy = NULL;
}
}
krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle);
return st;
}
|
krb5_encode_krbsecretkey(krb5_key_data *key_data_in, int n_key_data,
krb5_kvno mkvno) {
struct berval **ret = NULL;
int currkvno;
int num_versions = 1;
int i, j, last;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
krb5_key_data *key_data;
if (n_key_data <= 0)
return NULL;
/* Make a shallow copy of the key data so we can alter it. */
key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(*key_data), &err);
if (key_data_in == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(key_data, key_data_in, n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data));
/* Unpatched krb5 1.11 and 1.12 cannot decode KrbKey sequences with no salt
* field. For compatibility, always encode a salt field. */
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) {
if (key_data[i].key_data_ver == 1) {
key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2;
key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0;
key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL;
}
}
/* Find the number of key versions */
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data - 1; i++)
if (key_data[i].key_data_kvno != key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno)
num_versions++;
ret = (struct berval **) calloc (num_versions + 1, sizeof (struct berval *));
if (ret == NULL) {
err = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0, last = 0, j = 0, currkvno = key_data[0].key_data_kvno; i < n_key_data; i++) {
krb5_data *code;
if (i == n_key_data - 1 || key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno != currkvno) {
ret[j] = k5alloc(sizeof(struct berval), &err);
if (ret[j] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
err = asn1_encode_sequence_of_keys(key_data + last,
(krb5_int16)i - last + 1,
mkvno, &code);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
/*CHECK_NULL(ret[j]); */
ret[j]->bv_len = code->length;
ret[j]->bv_val = code->data;
free(code);
j++;
last = i + 1;
if (i < n_key_data - 1)
currkvno = key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno;
}
}
ret[num_versions] = NULL;
cleanup:
free(key_data);
if (err != 0) {
if (ret != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i <= num_versions; i++)
if (ret[i] != NULL)
free (ret[i]);
free (ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
|
krb5_encode_krbsecretkey(krb5_key_data *key_data_in, int n_key_data,
krb5_kvno mkvno) {
struct berval **ret = NULL;
int currkvno;
int num_versions = 1;
int i, j, last;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
krb5_key_data *key_data = NULL;
if (n_key_data < 0)
return NULL;
/* Make a shallow copy of the key data so we can alter it. */
key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(*key_data), &err);
if (key_data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(key_data, key_data_in, n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data));
/* Unpatched krb5 1.11 and 1.12 cannot decode KrbKey sequences with no salt
* field. For compatibility, always encode a salt field. */
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) {
if (key_data[i].key_data_ver == 1) {
key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2;
key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0;
key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL;
}
}
/* Find the number of key versions */
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data - 1; i++)
if (key_data[i].key_data_kvno != key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno)
num_versions++;
ret = (struct berval **) calloc (num_versions + 1, sizeof (struct berval *));
if (ret == NULL) {
err = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0, last = 0, j = 0, currkvno = key_data[0].key_data_kvno; i < n_key_data; i++) {
krb5_data *code;
if (i == n_key_data - 1 || key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno != currkvno) {
ret[j] = k5alloc(sizeof(struct berval), &err);
if (ret[j] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
err = asn1_encode_sequence_of_keys(key_data + last,
(krb5_int16)i - last + 1,
mkvno, &code);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
/*CHECK_NULL(ret[j]); */
ret[j]->bv_len = code->length;
ret[j]->bv_val = code->data;
free(code);
j++;
last = i + 1;
if (i < n_key_data - 1)
currkvno = key_data[i + 1].key_data_kvno;
}
}
ret[num_versions] = NULL;
cleanup:
free(key_data);
if (err != 0) {
if (ret != NULL) {
for (i = 0; ret[i] != NULL; i++)
free (ret[i]);
free (ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
|
krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry,
char **db_args)
{
int l=0, kerberos_principal_object_type=0;
unsigned int ntrees=0, tre=0;
krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0;
LDAP *ld=NULL;
LDAPMessage *result=NULL, *ent=NULL;
char **subtreelist = NULL;
char *user=NULL, *subtree=NULL, *principal_dn=NULL;
char **values=NULL, *strval[10]={NULL}, errbuf[1024];
char *filtuser=NULL;
struct berval **bersecretkey=NULL;
LDAPMod **mods=NULL;
krb5_boolean create_standalone_prinicipal=FALSE;
krb5_boolean krb_identity_exists=FALSE, establish_links=FALSE;
char *standalone_principal_dn=NULL;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data=NULL;
krb5_key_data **keys=NULL;
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL;
krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL;
osa_princ_ent_rec princ_ent = {0};
xargs_t xargs = {0};
char *polname = NULL;
OPERATION optype;
krb5_boolean found_entry = FALSE;
/* Clear the global error string */
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
SETUP_CONTEXT();
if (ldap_context->lrparams == NULL || ldap_context->container_dn == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/* get ldap handle */
GET_HANDLE();
if (!is_principal_in_realm(ldap_context, entry->princ)) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("Principal does not belong to the default realm"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the principal information to act on */
if (((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->princ, &user)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_ldap_unparse_principal_name(user)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
filtuser = ldap_filter_correct(user);
if (filtuser == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Identity the type of operation, it can be
* add principal or modify principal.
* hack if the entry->mask has KRB_PRINCIPAL flag set
* then it is a add operation
*/
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)
optype = ADD_PRINCIPAL;
else
optype = MODIFY_PRINCIPAL;
if (((st=krb5_get_princ_type(context, entry, &kerberos_principal_object_type)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_get_userdn(context, entry, &principal_dn)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
if ((st=process_db_args(context, db_args, &xargs, optype)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
unsigned int tree = 0;
int numlentries = 0;
char *filter = NULL;
/* A load operation is special, will do a mix-in (add krbprinc
* attrs to a non-krb object entry) if an object exists with a
* matching krbprincipalname attribute so try to find existing
* object and set principal_dn. This assumes that the
* krbprincipalname attribute is unique (only one object entry has
* a particular krbprincipalname attribute).
*/
if (asprintf(&filter, FILTER"%s))", filtuser) < 0) {
filter = NULL;
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the current subtree list */
if ((st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
found_entry = FALSE;
/* search for entry with matching krbprincipalname attribute */
for (tree = 0; found_entry == FALSE && tree < ntrees; ++tree) {
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
LDAP_SEARCH_1(subtreelist[tree], ldap_context->lrparams->search_scope, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
} else {
/* just look for entry with principal_dn */
LDAP_SEARCH_1(principal_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
}
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
numlentries = ldap_count_entries(ld, result);
if (numlentries > 1) {
free(filter);
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("operation can not continue, more than one "
"entry with principal name \"%s\" found"),
user);
goto cleanup;
} else if (numlentries == 1) {
found_entry = TRUE;
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
/* setting principal_dn will cause that entry to be modified further down */
if ((principal_dn = ldap_get_dn(ld, ent)) == NULL) {
ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESULT_CODE, &st);
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
}
} else if (st != LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
/* could not perform search, return with failure */
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
/*
* If it isn't found then assume a standalone princ entry is to
* be created.
*/
} /* end for (tree = 0; principal_dn == ... */
free(filter);
if (found_entry == FALSE && principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* if principal_dn is null then there is code further down to
* deal with setting standalone_principal_dn. Also note that
* this will set create_standalone_prinicipal true for
* non-mix-in entries which is okay if loading from a dump.
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
standalone_principal_dn = strdup(principal_dn);
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
}
} /* end if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD */
/* time to generate the DN information with the help of
* containerdn, principalcontainerreference or
* realmcontainerdn information
*/
if (principal_dn == NULL && xargs.dn == NULL) { /* creation of standalone principal */
/* get the subtree information */
if (entry->princ->length == 2 && entry->princ->data[0].length == strlen("krbtgt") &&
strncmp(entry->princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", entry->princ->data[0].length) == 0) {
/* if the principal is a inter-realm principal, always created in the realm container */
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
} else if (xargs.containerdn) {
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.containerdn, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
if (st == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || st == KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
int ost = st;
st = EINVAL;
k5_prependmsg(context, ost, st, _("'%s' not found"),
xargs.containerdn);
}
goto cleanup;
}
subtree = strdup(xargs.containerdn);
} else if (ldap_context->lrparams->containerref && strlen(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref) != 0) {
/*
* Here the subtree should be changed with
* principalcontainerreference attribute value
*/
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref);
} else {
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
}
CHECK_NULL(subtree);
if (asprintf(&standalone_principal_dn, "krbprincipalname=%s,%s",
filtuser, subtree) < 0)
standalone_principal_dn = NULL;
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
/*
* free subtree when you are done using the subtree
* set the boolean create_standalone_prinicipal to TRUE
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
free(subtree);
subtree = NULL;
}
/*
* If the DN information is presented by the user, time to
* validate the input to ensure that the DN falls under
* any of the subtrees
*/
if (xargs.dn_from_kbd == TRUE) {
/* make sure the DN falls in the subtree */
int dnlen=0, subtreelen=0;
char *dn=NULL;
krb5_boolean outofsubtree=TRUE;
if (xargs.dn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.dn;
} else if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.linkdn;
} else if (standalone_principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* Even though the standalone_principal_dn is constructed
* within this function, there is the containerdn input
* from the user that can become part of the it.
*/
dn = standalone_principal_dn;
}
/* Get the current subtree list if we haven't already done so. */
if (subtreelist == NULL) {
st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees);
if (st)
goto cleanup;
}
for (tre=0; tre<ntrees; ++tre) {
if (subtreelist[tre] == NULL || strlen(subtreelist[tre]) == 0) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
} else {
dnlen = strlen (dn);
subtreelen = strlen(subtreelist[tre]);
if ((dnlen >= subtreelen) && (strcasecmp((dn + dnlen - subtreelen), subtreelist[tre]) == 0)) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
}
}
}
if (outofsubtree == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("DN is out of the realm subtree"));
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* dn value will be set either by dn, linkdn or the standalone_principal_dn
* In the first 2 cases, the dn should be existing and in the last case we
* are supposed to create the ldap object. so the below should not be
* executed for the last case.
*/
if (standalone_principal_dn == NULL) {
/*
* If the ldap object is missing, this results in an error.
*/
/*
* Search for krbprincipalname attribute here.
* This is to find if a kerberos identity is already present
* on the ldap object, in which case adding a kerberos identity
* on the ldap object should result in an error.
*/
char *attributes[]={"krbticketpolicyreference", "krbprincipalname", NULL};
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
LDAP_SEARCH_1(dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, 0, attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbticketpolicyreference")) != NULL) {
ldap_value_free(values);
}
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbprincipalname")) != NULL) {
krb_identity_exists = TRUE;
ldap_value_free(values);
}
}
} else {
st = set_ldap_error(context, st, OP_SEARCH);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
/*
* If xargs.dn is set then the request is to add a
* kerberos principal on a ldap object, but if
* there is one already on the ldap object this
* should result in an error.
*/
if (xargs.dn != NULL && krb_identity_exists == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("ldap object is already kerberized"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
/*
* link information can be changed using modprinc.
* However, link information can be changed only on the
* standalone kerberos principal objects. A standalone
* kerberos principal object is of type krbprincipal
* structural objectclass.
*
* NOTE: kerberos principals on an ldap object can't be
* linked to other ldap objects.
*/
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL &&
kerberos_principal_object_type != KDB_STANDALONE_PRINCIPAL_OBJECT) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("link information can not be set/updated as the "
"kerberos principal belongs to an ldap object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Check the link information. If there is already a link
* existing then this operation is not allowed.
*/
{
char **linkdns=NULL;
int j=0;
if ((st=krb5_get_linkdn(context, entry, &linkdns)) != 0) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Failed getting object references"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (linkdns != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("kerberos principal is already linked to a ldap "
"object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
for (j=0; linkdns[j] != NULL; ++j)
free (linkdns[j]);
free (linkdns);
goto cleanup;
}
}
establish_links = TRUE;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_success)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_failed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastFailedAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free(strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
krb5_kvno fail_auth_count;
fail_auth_count = entry->fail_auth_count;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
fail_auth_count++;
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) {
int attr_mask = 0;
krb5_boolean has_fail_count;
/* Check if the krbLoginFailedCount attribute exists. (Through
* krb5 1.8.1, it wasn't set in new entries.) */
st = krb5_get_attributes_mask(context, entry, &attr_mask);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
has_fail_count = ((attr_mask & KDB_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_ATTR) != 0);
/*
* If the client library and server supports RFC 4525,
* then use it to increment by one the value of the
* krbLoginFailedCount attribute. Otherwise, assert the
* (provided) old value by deleting it before adding.
*/
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
if (ldap_server_handle->server_info->modify_increment &&
has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT, 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
#endif /* LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT */
if (has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_DELETE,
entry->fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD,
entry->fail_auth_count + 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
}
#endif
} else if (optype == ADD_PRINCIPAL) {
/* Initialize krbLoginFailedCount in new entries to help avoid a
* race during the first failed login. */
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD, 0);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxticketlife", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxrenewableage", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->max_renewable_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketflags", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->attributes)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = user;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalname", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(&princ_ent, 0, sizeof(princ_ent));
for (tl_data=entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data=tl_data->tl_data_next) {
if (tl_data->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA) {
if ((st = krb5_lookup_tl_kadm_data(tl_data, &princ_ent)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
}
if (princ_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context, princ_ent.policy, &polname)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
strval[0] = polname;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, "Password policy value null");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD && found_entry == TRUE) {
/*
* a load is special in that existing entries must have attrs that
* removed.
*/
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA || entry->mask & KADM5_KVNO) {
krb5_kvno mkvno;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_mkvno(context, entry, &mkvno)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data,
entry->n_key_data, mkvno);
if ((st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
/* Update last password change whenever a new key is set */
{
krb5_timestamp last_pw_changed;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(context, entry,
&last_pw_changed)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(last_pw_changed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastPwdChange",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
} /* Modify Key data ends here */
/* Set tl_data */
if (entry->tl_data != NULL) {
int count = 0;
struct berval **ber_tl_data = NULL;
krb5_tl_data *ptr;
krb5_timestamp unlock_time;
for (ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
count++;
}
if (count != 0) {
int j;
ber_tl_data = (struct berval **) calloc (count + 1,
sizeof (struct berval*));
if (ber_tl_data == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (j = 0, ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
/* Ignore tl_data that are stored in separate directory
* attributes */
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
if ((st = tl_data2berval (ptr, &ber_tl_data[j])) != 0)
break;
j++;
}
if (st == 0) {
ber_tl_data[count] = NULL;
st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbExtraData",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE |
LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ber_tl_data);
}
for (j = 0; ber_tl_data[j] != NULL; j++) {
free(ber_tl_data[j]->bv_val);
free(ber_tl_data[j]);
}
free(ber_tl_data);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_admin_unlock(context, entry,
&unlock_time)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (unlock_time != 0) {
/* Update last admin unlock */
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(unlock_time)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastAdminUnlock",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
}
/* Directory specific attribute */
if (xargs.tktpolicydn != NULL) {
int tmask=0;
if (strlen(xargs.tktpolicydn) != 0) {
st = checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.tktpolicydn, "objectclass", policyclass, &tmask);
CHECK_CLASS_VALIDITY(st, tmask, _("ticket policy object value: "));
strval[0] = xargs.tktpolicydn;
strval[1] = NULL;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* if xargs.tktpolicydn is a empty string, then delete
* already existing krbticketpolicyreference attr */
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (establish_links == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = xargs.linkdn;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbObjectReferences", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* in case mods is NULL then return
* not sure but can happen in a modprinc
* so no need to return an error
* addprinc will at least have the principal name
* and the keys passed in
*/
if (mods == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (create_standalone_prinicipal == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = "krbprincipal";
strval[1] = "krbprincipalaux";
strval[2] = "krbTicketPolicyAux";
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st == LDAP_ALREADY_EXISTS && entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
/* a load operation must replace an existing entry */
st = ldap_delete_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Principal delete failed (trying to replace "
"entry): %s"), ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal add failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
/*
* Here existing ldap object is modified and can be related
* to any attribute, so always ensure that the ldap
* object is extended with all the kerberos related
* objectclasses so that there are no constraint
* violations.
*/
{
char *attrvalues[] = {"krbprincipalaux", "krbTicketPolicyAux", NULL};
int p, q, r=0, amask=0;
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, (xargs.dn) ? xargs.dn : principal_dn,
"objectclass", attrvalues, &amask)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
for (p=1, q=0; p<=2; p<<=1, ++q) {
if ((p & amask) == 0)
strval[r++] = attrvalues[q];
}
if (r != 0) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (xargs.dn != NULL)
st=ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, xargs.dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
else
st = ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("User modification failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_MOD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
entry->fail_auth_count++;
}
cleanup:
if (user)
free(user);
if (filtuser)
free(filtuser);
free_xargs(xargs);
if (standalone_principal_dn)
free(standalone_principal_dn);
if (principal_dn)
free (principal_dn);
if (polname != NULL)
free(polname);
for (tre = 0; tre < ntrees; tre++)
free(subtreelist[tre]);
free(subtreelist);
if (subtree)
free (subtree);
if (bersecretkey) {
for (l=0; bersecretkey[l]; ++l) {
if (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val)
free (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val);
free (bersecretkey[l]);
}
free (bersecretkey);
}
if (keys)
free (keys);
ldap_mods_free(mods, 1);
ldap_osa_free_princ_ent(&princ_ent);
ldap_msgfree(result);
krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle);
return(st);
}
|
krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry,
char **db_args)
{
int l=0, kerberos_principal_object_type=0;
unsigned int ntrees=0, tre=0;
krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0;
LDAP *ld=NULL;
LDAPMessage *result=NULL, *ent=NULL;
char **subtreelist = NULL;
char *user=NULL, *subtree=NULL, *principal_dn=NULL;
char **values=NULL, *strval[10]={NULL}, errbuf[1024];
char *filtuser=NULL;
struct berval **bersecretkey=NULL;
LDAPMod **mods=NULL;
krb5_boolean create_standalone_prinicipal=FALSE;
krb5_boolean krb_identity_exists=FALSE, establish_links=FALSE;
char *standalone_principal_dn=NULL;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data=NULL;
krb5_key_data **keys=NULL;
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL;
krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL;
osa_princ_ent_rec princ_ent = {0};
xargs_t xargs = {0};
char *polname = NULL;
OPERATION optype;
krb5_boolean found_entry = FALSE;
/* Clear the global error string */
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
SETUP_CONTEXT();
if (ldap_context->lrparams == NULL || ldap_context->container_dn == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/* get ldap handle */
GET_HANDLE();
if (!is_principal_in_realm(ldap_context, entry->princ)) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("Principal does not belong to the default realm"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the principal information to act on */
if (((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->princ, &user)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_ldap_unparse_principal_name(user)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
filtuser = ldap_filter_correct(user);
if (filtuser == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Identity the type of operation, it can be
* add principal or modify principal.
* hack if the entry->mask has KRB_PRINCIPAL flag set
* then it is a add operation
*/
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)
optype = ADD_PRINCIPAL;
else
optype = MODIFY_PRINCIPAL;
if (((st=krb5_get_princ_type(context, entry, &kerberos_principal_object_type)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_get_userdn(context, entry, &principal_dn)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
if ((st=process_db_args(context, db_args, &xargs, optype)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
unsigned int tree = 0;
int numlentries = 0;
char *filter = NULL;
/* A load operation is special, will do a mix-in (add krbprinc
* attrs to a non-krb object entry) if an object exists with a
* matching krbprincipalname attribute so try to find existing
* object and set principal_dn. This assumes that the
* krbprincipalname attribute is unique (only one object entry has
* a particular krbprincipalname attribute).
*/
if (asprintf(&filter, FILTER"%s))", filtuser) < 0) {
filter = NULL;
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the current subtree list */
if ((st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
found_entry = FALSE;
/* search for entry with matching krbprincipalname attribute */
for (tree = 0; found_entry == FALSE && tree < ntrees; ++tree) {
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
LDAP_SEARCH_1(subtreelist[tree], ldap_context->lrparams->search_scope, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
} else {
/* just look for entry with principal_dn */
LDAP_SEARCH_1(principal_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
}
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
numlentries = ldap_count_entries(ld, result);
if (numlentries > 1) {
free(filter);
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("operation can not continue, more than one "
"entry with principal name \"%s\" found"),
user);
goto cleanup;
} else if (numlentries == 1) {
found_entry = TRUE;
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
/* setting principal_dn will cause that entry to be modified further down */
if ((principal_dn = ldap_get_dn(ld, ent)) == NULL) {
ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESULT_CODE, &st);
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
}
} else if (st != LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
/* could not perform search, return with failure */
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
/*
* If it isn't found then assume a standalone princ entry is to
* be created.
*/
} /* end for (tree = 0; principal_dn == ... */
free(filter);
if (found_entry == FALSE && principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* if principal_dn is null then there is code further down to
* deal with setting standalone_principal_dn. Also note that
* this will set create_standalone_prinicipal true for
* non-mix-in entries which is okay if loading from a dump.
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
standalone_principal_dn = strdup(principal_dn);
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
}
} /* end if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD */
/* time to generate the DN information with the help of
* containerdn, principalcontainerreference or
* realmcontainerdn information
*/
if (principal_dn == NULL && xargs.dn == NULL) { /* creation of standalone principal */
/* get the subtree information */
if (entry->princ->length == 2 && entry->princ->data[0].length == strlen("krbtgt") &&
strncmp(entry->princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", entry->princ->data[0].length) == 0) {
/* if the principal is a inter-realm principal, always created in the realm container */
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
} else if (xargs.containerdn) {
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.containerdn, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
if (st == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || st == KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
int ost = st;
st = EINVAL;
k5_prependmsg(context, ost, st, _("'%s' not found"),
xargs.containerdn);
}
goto cleanup;
}
subtree = strdup(xargs.containerdn);
} else if (ldap_context->lrparams->containerref && strlen(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref) != 0) {
/*
* Here the subtree should be changed with
* principalcontainerreference attribute value
*/
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref);
} else {
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
}
CHECK_NULL(subtree);
if (asprintf(&standalone_principal_dn, "krbprincipalname=%s,%s",
filtuser, subtree) < 0)
standalone_principal_dn = NULL;
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
/*
* free subtree when you are done using the subtree
* set the boolean create_standalone_prinicipal to TRUE
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
free(subtree);
subtree = NULL;
}
/*
* If the DN information is presented by the user, time to
* validate the input to ensure that the DN falls under
* any of the subtrees
*/
if (xargs.dn_from_kbd == TRUE) {
/* make sure the DN falls in the subtree */
int dnlen=0, subtreelen=0;
char *dn=NULL;
krb5_boolean outofsubtree=TRUE;
if (xargs.dn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.dn;
} else if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.linkdn;
} else if (standalone_principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* Even though the standalone_principal_dn is constructed
* within this function, there is the containerdn input
* from the user that can become part of the it.
*/
dn = standalone_principal_dn;
}
/* Get the current subtree list if we haven't already done so. */
if (subtreelist == NULL) {
st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees);
if (st)
goto cleanup;
}
for (tre=0; tre<ntrees; ++tre) {
if (subtreelist[tre] == NULL || strlen(subtreelist[tre]) == 0) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
} else {
dnlen = strlen (dn);
subtreelen = strlen(subtreelist[tre]);
if ((dnlen >= subtreelen) && (strcasecmp((dn + dnlen - subtreelen), subtreelist[tre]) == 0)) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
}
}
}
if (outofsubtree == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("DN is out of the realm subtree"));
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* dn value will be set either by dn, linkdn or the standalone_principal_dn
* In the first 2 cases, the dn should be existing and in the last case we
* are supposed to create the ldap object. so the below should not be
* executed for the last case.
*/
if (standalone_principal_dn == NULL) {
/*
* If the ldap object is missing, this results in an error.
*/
/*
* Search for krbprincipalname attribute here.
* This is to find if a kerberos identity is already present
* on the ldap object, in which case adding a kerberos identity
* on the ldap object should result in an error.
*/
char *attributes[]={"krbticketpolicyreference", "krbprincipalname", NULL};
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
LDAP_SEARCH_1(dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, 0, attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbticketpolicyreference")) != NULL) {
ldap_value_free(values);
}
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbprincipalname")) != NULL) {
krb_identity_exists = TRUE;
ldap_value_free(values);
}
}
} else {
st = set_ldap_error(context, st, OP_SEARCH);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
/*
* If xargs.dn is set then the request is to add a
* kerberos principal on a ldap object, but if
* there is one already on the ldap object this
* should result in an error.
*/
if (xargs.dn != NULL && krb_identity_exists == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("ldap object is already kerberized"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
/*
* link information can be changed using modprinc.
* However, link information can be changed only on the
* standalone kerberos principal objects. A standalone
* kerberos principal object is of type krbprincipal
* structural objectclass.
*
* NOTE: kerberos principals on an ldap object can't be
* linked to other ldap objects.
*/
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL &&
kerberos_principal_object_type != KDB_STANDALONE_PRINCIPAL_OBJECT) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("link information can not be set/updated as the "
"kerberos principal belongs to an ldap object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Check the link information. If there is already a link
* existing then this operation is not allowed.
*/
{
char **linkdns=NULL;
int j=0;
if ((st=krb5_get_linkdn(context, entry, &linkdns)) != 0) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Failed getting object references"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (linkdns != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("kerberos principal is already linked to a ldap "
"object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
for (j=0; linkdns[j] != NULL; ++j)
free (linkdns[j]);
free (linkdns);
goto cleanup;
}
}
establish_links = TRUE;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_success)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_failed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastFailedAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free(strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
krb5_kvno fail_auth_count;
fail_auth_count = entry->fail_auth_count;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
fail_auth_count++;
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) {
int attr_mask = 0;
krb5_boolean has_fail_count;
/* Check if the krbLoginFailedCount attribute exists. (Through
* krb5 1.8.1, it wasn't set in new entries.) */
st = krb5_get_attributes_mask(context, entry, &attr_mask);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
has_fail_count = ((attr_mask & KDB_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_ATTR) != 0);
/*
* If the client library and server supports RFC 4525,
* then use it to increment by one the value of the
* krbLoginFailedCount attribute. Otherwise, assert the
* (provided) old value by deleting it before adding.
*/
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
if (ldap_server_handle->server_info->modify_increment &&
has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT, 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
#endif /* LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT */
if (has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_DELETE,
entry->fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD,
entry->fail_auth_count + 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
}
#endif
} else if (optype == ADD_PRINCIPAL) {
/* Initialize krbLoginFailedCount in new entries to help avoid a
* race during the first failed login. */
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD, 0);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxticketlife", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxrenewableage", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->max_renewable_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketflags", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->attributes)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = user;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalname", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(&princ_ent, 0, sizeof(princ_ent));
for (tl_data=entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data=tl_data->tl_data_next) {
if (tl_data->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA) {
if ((st = krb5_lookup_tl_kadm_data(tl_data, &princ_ent)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
}
if (princ_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context, princ_ent.policy, &polname)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
strval[0] = polname;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, "Password policy value null");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD && found_entry == TRUE) {
/*
* a load is special in that existing entries must have attrs that
* removed.
*/
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA || entry->mask & KADM5_KVNO) {
krb5_kvno mkvno;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_mkvno(context, entry, &mkvno)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data,
entry->n_key_data, mkvno);
if (bersecretkey == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* An empty list of bervals is only accepted for modify operations,
* not add operations. */
if (bersecretkey[0] != NULL || !create_standalone_prinicipal) {
st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES,
bersecretkey);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
/* Update last password change whenever a new key is set */
{
krb5_timestamp last_pw_changed;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(context, entry,
&last_pw_changed)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(last_pw_changed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastPwdChange",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
} /* Modify Key data ends here */
/* Set tl_data */
if (entry->tl_data != NULL) {
int count = 0;
struct berval **ber_tl_data = NULL;
krb5_tl_data *ptr;
krb5_timestamp unlock_time;
for (ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
count++;
}
if (count != 0) {
int j;
ber_tl_data = (struct berval **) calloc (count + 1,
sizeof (struct berval*));
if (ber_tl_data == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (j = 0, ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
/* Ignore tl_data that are stored in separate directory
* attributes */
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
if ((st = tl_data2berval (ptr, &ber_tl_data[j])) != 0)
break;
j++;
}
if (st == 0) {
ber_tl_data[count] = NULL;
st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbExtraData",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE |
LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ber_tl_data);
}
for (j = 0; ber_tl_data[j] != NULL; j++) {
free(ber_tl_data[j]->bv_val);
free(ber_tl_data[j]);
}
free(ber_tl_data);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_admin_unlock(context, entry,
&unlock_time)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (unlock_time != 0) {
/* Update last admin unlock */
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(unlock_time)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastAdminUnlock",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
}
/* Directory specific attribute */
if (xargs.tktpolicydn != NULL) {
int tmask=0;
if (strlen(xargs.tktpolicydn) != 0) {
st = checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.tktpolicydn, "objectclass", policyclass, &tmask);
CHECK_CLASS_VALIDITY(st, tmask, _("ticket policy object value: "));
strval[0] = xargs.tktpolicydn;
strval[1] = NULL;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* if xargs.tktpolicydn is a empty string, then delete
* already existing krbticketpolicyreference attr */
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (establish_links == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = xargs.linkdn;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbObjectReferences", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* in case mods is NULL then return
* not sure but can happen in a modprinc
* so no need to return an error
* addprinc will at least have the principal name
* and the keys passed in
*/
if (mods == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (create_standalone_prinicipal == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = "krbprincipal";
strval[1] = "krbprincipalaux";
strval[2] = "krbTicketPolicyAux";
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st == LDAP_ALREADY_EXISTS && entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
/* a load operation must replace an existing entry */
st = ldap_delete_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Principal delete failed (trying to replace "
"entry): %s"), ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal add failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
/*
* Here existing ldap object is modified and can be related
* to any attribute, so always ensure that the ldap
* object is extended with all the kerberos related
* objectclasses so that there are no constraint
* violations.
*/
{
char *attrvalues[] = {"krbprincipalaux", "krbTicketPolicyAux", NULL};
int p, q, r=0, amask=0;
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, (xargs.dn) ? xargs.dn : principal_dn,
"objectclass", attrvalues, &amask)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
for (p=1, q=0; p<=2; p<<=1, ++q) {
if ((p & amask) == 0)
strval[r++] = attrvalues[q];
}
if (r != 0) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (xargs.dn != NULL)
st=ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, xargs.dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
else
st = ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("User modification failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_MOD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
entry->fail_auth_count++;
}
cleanup:
if (user)
free(user);
if (filtuser)
free(filtuser);
free_xargs(xargs);
if (standalone_principal_dn)
free(standalone_principal_dn);
if (principal_dn)
free (principal_dn);
if (polname != NULL)
free(polname);
for (tre = 0; tre < ntrees; tre++)
free(subtreelist[tre]);
free(subtreelist);
if (subtree)
free (subtree);
if (bersecretkey) {
for (l=0; bersecretkey[l]; ++l) {
if (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val)
free (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val);
free (bersecretkey[l]);
}
free (bersecretkey);
}
if (keys)
free (keys);
ldap_mods_free(mods, 1);
ldap_osa_free_princ_ent(&princ_ent);
ldap_msgfree(result);
krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle);
return(st);
}
|
krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry,
char **db_args)
{
int l=0, kerberos_principal_object_type=0;
unsigned int ntrees=0, tre=0;
krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0;
LDAP *ld=NULL;
LDAPMessage *result=NULL, *ent=NULL;
char **subtreelist = NULL;
char *user=NULL, *subtree=NULL, *principal_dn=NULL;
char **values=NULL, *strval[10]={NULL}, errbuf[1024];
char *filtuser=NULL;
struct berval **bersecretkey=NULL;
LDAPMod **mods=NULL;
krb5_boolean create_standalone_prinicipal=FALSE;
krb5_boolean krb_identity_exists=FALSE, establish_links=FALSE;
char *standalone_principal_dn=NULL;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data=NULL;
krb5_key_data **keys=NULL;
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL;
krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL;
osa_princ_ent_rec princ_ent = {0};
xargs_t xargs = {0};
char *polname = NULL;
OPERATION optype;
krb5_boolean found_entry = FALSE;
/* Clear the global error string */
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
SETUP_CONTEXT();
if (ldap_context->lrparams == NULL || ldap_context->container_dn == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/* get ldap handle */
GET_HANDLE();
if (!is_principal_in_realm(ldap_context, entry->princ)) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("Principal does not belong to the default realm"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the principal information to act on */
if (((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->princ, &user)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_ldap_unparse_principal_name(user)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
filtuser = ldap_filter_correct(user);
if (filtuser == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Identity the type of operation, it can be
* add principal or modify principal.
* hack if the entry->mask has KRB_PRINCIPAL flag set
* then it is a add operation
*/
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)
optype = ADD_PRINCIPAL;
else
optype = MODIFY_PRINCIPAL;
if (((st=krb5_get_princ_type(context, entry, &kerberos_principal_object_type)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_get_userdn(context, entry, &principal_dn)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
if ((st=process_db_args(context, db_args, &xargs, optype)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
unsigned int tree = 0;
int numlentries = 0;
char *filter = NULL;
/* A load operation is special, will do a mix-in (add krbprinc
* attrs to a non-krb object entry) if an object exists with a
* matching krbprincipalname attribute so try to find existing
* object and set principal_dn. This assumes that the
* krbprincipalname attribute is unique (only one object entry has
* a particular krbprincipalname attribute).
*/
if (asprintf(&filter, FILTER"%s))", filtuser) < 0) {
filter = NULL;
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the current subtree list */
if ((st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
found_entry = FALSE;
/* search for entry with matching krbprincipalname attribute */
for (tree = 0; found_entry == FALSE && tree < ntrees; ++tree) {
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
LDAP_SEARCH_1(subtreelist[tree], ldap_context->lrparams->search_scope, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
} else {
/* just look for entry with principal_dn */
LDAP_SEARCH_1(principal_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
}
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
numlentries = ldap_count_entries(ld, result);
if (numlentries > 1) {
free(filter);
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("operation can not continue, more than one "
"entry with principal name \"%s\" found"),
user);
goto cleanup;
} else if (numlentries == 1) {
found_entry = TRUE;
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
/* setting principal_dn will cause that entry to be modified further down */
if ((principal_dn = ldap_get_dn(ld, ent)) == NULL) {
ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESULT_CODE, &st);
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
}
} else if (st != LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
/* could not perform search, return with failure */
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
/*
* If it isn't found then assume a standalone princ entry is to
* be created.
*/
} /* end for (tree = 0; principal_dn == ... */
free(filter);
if (found_entry == FALSE && principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* if principal_dn is null then there is code further down to
* deal with setting standalone_principal_dn. Also note that
* this will set create_standalone_prinicipal true for
* non-mix-in entries which is okay if loading from a dump.
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
standalone_principal_dn = strdup(principal_dn);
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
}
} /* end if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD */
/* time to generate the DN information with the help of
* containerdn, principalcontainerreference or
* realmcontainerdn information
*/
if (principal_dn == NULL && xargs.dn == NULL) { /* creation of standalone principal */
/* get the subtree information */
if (entry->princ->length == 2 && entry->princ->data[0].length == strlen("krbtgt") &&
strncmp(entry->princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", entry->princ->data[0].length) == 0) {
/* if the principal is a inter-realm principal, always created in the realm container */
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
} else if (xargs.containerdn) {
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.containerdn, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
if (st == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || st == KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
int ost = st;
st = EINVAL;
k5_prependmsg(context, ost, st, _("'%s' not found"),
xargs.containerdn);
}
goto cleanup;
}
subtree = strdup(xargs.containerdn);
} else if (ldap_context->lrparams->containerref && strlen(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref) != 0) {
/*
* Here the subtree should be changed with
* principalcontainerreference attribute value
*/
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref);
} else {
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
}
CHECK_NULL(subtree);
if (asprintf(&standalone_principal_dn, "krbprincipalname=%s,%s",
filtuser, subtree) < 0)
standalone_principal_dn = NULL;
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
/*
* free subtree when you are done using the subtree
* set the boolean create_standalone_prinicipal to TRUE
*/
create_standalone_prinicipal = TRUE;
free(subtree);
subtree = NULL;
}
/*
* If the DN information is presented by the user, time to
* validate the input to ensure that the DN falls under
* any of the subtrees
*/
if (xargs.dn_from_kbd == TRUE) {
/* make sure the DN falls in the subtree */
int dnlen=0, subtreelen=0;
char *dn=NULL;
krb5_boolean outofsubtree=TRUE;
if (xargs.dn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.dn;
} else if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
dn = xargs.linkdn;
} else if (standalone_principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* Even though the standalone_principal_dn is constructed
* within this function, there is the containerdn input
* from the user that can become part of the it.
*/
dn = standalone_principal_dn;
}
/* Get the current subtree list if we haven't already done so. */
if (subtreelist == NULL) {
st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees);
if (st)
goto cleanup;
}
for (tre=0; tre<ntrees; ++tre) {
if (subtreelist[tre] == NULL || strlen(subtreelist[tre]) == 0) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
} else {
dnlen = strlen (dn);
subtreelen = strlen(subtreelist[tre]);
if ((dnlen >= subtreelen) && (strcasecmp((dn + dnlen - subtreelen), subtreelist[tre]) == 0)) {
outofsubtree = FALSE;
break;
}
}
}
if (outofsubtree == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("DN is out of the realm subtree"));
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* dn value will be set either by dn, linkdn or the standalone_principal_dn
* In the first 2 cases, the dn should be existing and in the last case we
* are supposed to create the ldap object. so the below should not be
* executed for the last case.
*/
if (standalone_principal_dn == NULL) {
/*
* If the ldap object is missing, this results in an error.
*/
/*
* Search for krbprincipalname attribute here.
* This is to find if a kerberos identity is already present
* on the ldap object, in which case adding a kerberos identity
* on the ldap object should result in an error.
*/
char *attributes[]={"krbticketpolicyreference", "krbprincipalname", NULL};
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
LDAP_SEARCH_1(dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, 0, attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbticketpolicyreference")) != NULL) {
ldap_value_free(values);
}
if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbprincipalname")) != NULL) {
krb_identity_exists = TRUE;
ldap_value_free(values);
}
}
} else {
st = set_ldap_error(context, st, OP_SEARCH);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
/*
* If xargs.dn is set then the request is to add a
* kerberos principal on a ldap object, but if
* there is one already on the ldap object this
* should result in an error.
*/
if (xargs.dn != NULL && krb_identity_exists == TRUE) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("ldap object is already kerberized"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
/*
* link information can be changed using modprinc.
* However, link information can be changed only on the
* standalone kerberos principal objects. A standalone
* kerberos principal object is of type krbprincipal
* structural objectclass.
*
* NOTE: kerberos principals on an ldap object can't be
* linked to other ldap objects.
*/
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL &&
kerberos_principal_object_type != KDB_STANDALONE_PRINCIPAL_OBJECT) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("link information can not be set/updated as the "
"kerberos principal belongs to an ldap object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Check the link information. If there is already a link
* existing then this operation is not allowed.
*/
{
char **linkdns=NULL;
int j=0;
if ((st=krb5_get_linkdn(context, entry, &linkdns)) != 0) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Failed getting object references"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (linkdns != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("kerberos principal is already linked to a ldap "
"object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
for (j=0; linkdns[j] != NULL; ++j)
free (linkdns[j]);
free (linkdns);
goto cleanup;
}
}
establish_links = TRUE;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_success)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_failed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastFailedAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free(strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
krb5_kvno fail_auth_count;
fail_auth_count = entry->fail_auth_count;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
fail_auth_count++;
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) {
int attr_mask = 0;
krb5_boolean has_fail_count;
/* Check if the krbLoginFailedCount attribute exists. (Through
* krb5 1.8.1, it wasn't set in new entries.) */
st = krb5_get_attributes_mask(context, entry, &attr_mask);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
has_fail_count = ((attr_mask & KDB_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_ATTR) != 0);
/*
* If the client library and server supports RFC 4525,
* then use it to increment by one the value of the
* krbLoginFailedCount attribute. Otherwise, assert the
* (provided) old value by deleting it before adding.
*/
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
if (ldap_server_handle->server_info->modify_increment &&
has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT, 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
#endif /* LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT */
if (has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_DELETE,
entry->fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD,
entry->fail_auth_count + 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
}
#endif
} else if (optype == ADD_PRINCIPAL) {
/* Initialize krbLoginFailedCount in new entries to help avoid a
* race during the first failed login. */
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD, 0);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxticketlife", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxrenewableage", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->max_renewable_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketflags", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->attributes)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = user;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalname", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(&princ_ent, 0, sizeof(princ_ent));
for (tl_data=entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data=tl_data->tl_data_next) {
if (tl_data->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA) {
if ((st = krb5_lookup_tl_kadm_data(tl_data, &princ_ent)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
}
if (princ_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context, princ_ent.policy, &polname)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
strval[0] = polname;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, "Password policy value null");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD && found_entry == TRUE) {
/*
* a load is special in that existing entries must have attrs that
* removed.
*/
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA || entry->mask & KADM5_KVNO) {
krb5_kvno mkvno;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_mkvno(context, entry, &mkvno)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data,
entry->n_key_data, mkvno);
if ((st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
/* Update last password change whenever a new key is set */
{
krb5_timestamp last_pw_changed;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(context, entry,
&last_pw_changed)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(last_pw_changed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastPwdChange",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
} /* Modify Key data ends here */
/* Set tl_data */
if (entry->tl_data != NULL) {
int count = 0;
struct berval **ber_tl_data = NULL;
krb5_tl_data *ptr;
krb5_timestamp unlock_time;
for (ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
count++;
}
if (count != 0) {
int j;
ber_tl_data = (struct berval **) calloc (count + 1,
sizeof (struct berval*));
if (ber_tl_data == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (j = 0, ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
/* Ignore tl_data that are stored in separate directory
* attributes */
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
if ((st = tl_data2berval (ptr, &ber_tl_data[j])) != 0)
break;
j++;
}
if (st == 0) {
ber_tl_data[count] = NULL;
st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbExtraData",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE |
LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ber_tl_data);
}
for (j = 0; ber_tl_data[j] != NULL; j++) {
free(ber_tl_data[j]->bv_val);
free(ber_tl_data[j]);
}
free(ber_tl_data);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_admin_unlock(context, entry,
&unlock_time)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (unlock_time != 0) {
/* Update last admin unlock */
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(unlock_time)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastAdminUnlock",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
}
/* Directory specific attribute */
if (xargs.tktpolicydn != NULL) {
int tmask=0;
if (strlen(xargs.tktpolicydn) != 0) {
st = checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.tktpolicydn, "objectclass", policyclass, &tmask);
CHECK_CLASS_VALIDITY(st, tmask, _("ticket policy object value: "));
strval[0] = xargs.tktpolicydn;
strval[1] = NULL;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* if xargs.tktpolicydn is a empty string, then delete
* already existing krbticketpolicyreference attr */
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (establish_links == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = xargs.linkdn;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbObjectReferences", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* in case mods is NULL then return
* not sure but can happen in a modprinc
* so no need to return an error
* addprinc will at least have the principal name
* and the keys passed in
*/
if (mods == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (create_standalone_prinicipal == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = "krbprincipal";
strval[1] = "krbprincipalaux";
strval[2] = "krbTicketPolicyAux";
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st == LDAP_ALREADY_EXISTS && entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
/* a load operation must replace an existing entry */
st = ldap_delete_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Principal delete failed (trying to replace "
"entry): %s"), ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal add failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
/*
* Here existing ldap object is modified and can be related
* to any attribute, so always ensure that the ldap
* object is extended with all the kerberos related
* objectclasses so that there are no constraint
* violations.
*/
{
char *attrvalues[] = {"krbprincipalaux", "krbTicketPolicyAux", NULL};
int p, q, r=0, amask=0;
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, (xargs.dn) ? xargs.dn : principal_dn,
"objectclass", attrvalues, &amask)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
for (p=1, q=0; p<=2; p<<=1, ++q) {
if ((p & amask) == 0)
strval[r++] = attrvalues[q];
}
if (r != 0) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (xargs.dn != NULL)
st=ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, xargs.dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
else
st = ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("User modification failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_MOD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
entry->fail_auth_count++;
}
cleanup:
if (user)
free(user);
if (filtuser)
free(filtuser);
free_xargs(xargs);
if (standalone_principal_dn)
free(standalone_principal_dn);
if (principal_dn)
free (principal_dn);
if (polname != NULL)
free(polname);
for (tre = 0; tre < ntrees; tre++)
free(subtreelist[tre]);
free(subtreelist);
if (subtree)
free (subtree);
if (bersecretkey) {
for (l=0; bersecretkey[l]; ++l) {
if (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val)
free (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val);
free (bersecretkey[l]);
}
free (bersecretkey);
}
if (keys)
free (keys);
ldap_mods_free(mods, 1);
ldap_osa_free_princ_ent(&princ_ent);
ldap_msgfree(result);
krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle);
return(st);
}
|
krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry,
char **db_args)
{
int l=0, kerberos_principal_object_type=0;
unsigned int ntrees=0, tre=0;
krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0;
LDAP *ld=NULL;
LDAPMessage *result=NULL, *ent=NULL;
char **subtreelist = NULL;
char *user=NULL, *subtree=NULL, *principal_dn=NULL;
char *strval[10]={NULL}, errbuf[1024];
char *filtuser=NULL;
struct berval **bersecretkey=NULL;
LDAPMod **mods=NULL;
krb5_boolean create_standalone=FALSE;
krb5_boolean establish_links=FALSE;
char *standalone_principal_dn=NULL;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data=NULL;
krb5_key_data **keys=NULL;
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL;
krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL;
osa_princ_ent_rec princ_ent = {0};
xargs_t xargs = {0};
char *polname = NULL;
OPERATION optype;
krb5_boolean found_entry = FALSE;
/* Clear the global error string */
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
SETUP_CONTEXT();
if (ldap_context->lrparams == NULL || ldap_context->container_dn == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/* get ldap handle */
GET_HANDLE();
if (!is_principal_in_realm(ldap_context, entry->princ)) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("Principal does not belong to the default realm"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the principal information to act on */
if (((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->princ, &user)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_ldap_unparse_principal_name(user)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
filtuser = ldap_filter_correct(user);
if (filtuser == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Identity the type of operation, it can be
* add principal or modify principal.
* hack if the entry->mask has KRB_PRINCIPAL flag set
* then it is a add operation
*/
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)
optype = ADD_PRINCIPAL;
else
optype = MODIFY_PRINCIPAL;
if (((st=krb5_get_princ_type(context, entry, &kerberos_principal_object_type)) != 0) ||
((st=krb5_get_userdn(context, entry, &principal_dn)) != 0))
goto cleanup;
if ((st=process_db_args(context, db_args, &xargs, optype)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
unsigned int tree = 0;
int numlentries = 0;
char *filter = NULL;
/* A load operation is special, will do a mix-in (add krbprinc
* attrs to a non-krb object entry) if an object exists with a
* matching krbprincipalname attribute so try to find existing
* object and set principal_dn. This assumes that the
* krbprincipalname attribute is unique (only one object entry has
* a particular krbprincipalname attribute).
*/
if (asprintf(&filter, FILTER"%s))", filtuser) < 0) {
filter = NULL;
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* get the current subtree list */
if ((st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
found_entry = FALSE;
/* search for entry with matching krbprincipalname attribute */
for (tree = 0; found_entry == FALSE && tree < ntrees; ++tree) {
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
LDAP_SEARCH_1(subtreelist[tree], ldap_context->lrparams->search_scope, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
} else {
/* just look for entry with principal_dn */
LDAP_SEARCH_1(principal_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS);
}
if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
numlentries = ldap_count_entries(ld, result);
if (numlentries > 1) {
free(filter);
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("operation can not continue, more than one "
"entry with principal name \"%s\" found"),
user);
goto cleanup;
} else if (numlentries == 1) {
found_entry = TRUE;
if (principal_dn == NULL) {
ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result);
if (ent != NULL) {
/* setting principal_dn will cause that entry to be modified further down */
if ((principal_dn = ldap_get_dn(ld, ent)) == NULL) {
ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESULT_CODE, &st);
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
}
} else if (st != LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
/* could not perform search, return with failure */
st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0);
free(filter);
goto cleanup;
}
ldap_msgfree(result);
result = NULL;
/*
* If it isn't found then assume a standalone princ entry is to
* be created.
*/
} /* end for (tree = 0; principal_dn == ... */
free(filter);
if (found_entry == FALSE && principal_dn != NULL) {
/*
* if principal_dn is null then there is code further down to
* deal with setting standalone_principal_dn. Also note that
* this will set create_standalone true for
* non-mix-in entries which is okay if loading from a dump.
*/
create_standalone = TRUE;
standalone_principal_dn = strdup(principal_dn);
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
}
} /* end if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD */
/* time to generate the DN information with the help of
* containerdn, principalcontainerreference or
* realmcontainerdn information
*/
if (principal_dn == NULL && xargs.dn == NULL) { /* creation of standalone principal */
/* get the subtree information */
if (entry->princ->length == 2 && entry->princ->data[0].length == strlen("krbtgt") &&
strncmp(entry->princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", entry->princ->data[0].length) == 0) {
/* if the principal is a inter-realm principal, always created in the realm container */
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
} else if (xargs.containerdn) {
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.containerdn, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
if (st == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || st == KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
int ost = st;
st = EINVAL;
k5_wrapmsg(context, ost, st, _("'%s' not found"),
xargs.containerdn);
}
goto cleanup;
}
subtree = strdup(xargs.containerdn);
} else if (ldap_context->lrparams->containerref && strlen(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref) != 0) {
/*
* Here the subtree should be changed with
* principalcontainerreference attribute value
*/
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref);
} else {
subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn);
}
CHECK_NULL(subtree);
if (asprintf(&standalone_principal_dn, "krbprincipalname=%s,%s",
filtuser, subtree) < 0)
standalone_principal_dn = NULL;
CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn);
/*
* free subtree when you are done using the subtree
* set the boolean create_standalone to TRUE
*/
create_standalone = TRUE;
free(subtree);
subtree = NULL;
}
/*
* If the DN information is presented by the user, time to
* validate the input to ensure that the DN falls under
* any of the subtrees
*/
if (xargs.dn_from_kbd == TRUE) {
/* Get the current subtree list if we haven't already done so. */
if (subtreelist == NULL) {
st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees);
if (st)
goto cleanup;
}
st = validate_xargs(context, ldap_server_handle, &xargs,
standalone_principal_dn, subtreelist, ntrees);
if (st)
goto cleanup;
}
if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) {
/*
* link information can be changed using modprinc.
* However, link information can be changed only on the
* standalone kerberos principal objects. A standalone
* kerberos principal object is of type krbprincipal
* structural objectclass.
*
* NOTE: kerberos principals on an ldap object can't be
* linked to other ldap objects.
*/
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL &&
kerberos_principal_object_type != KDB_STANDALONE_PRINCIPAL_OBJECT) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("link information can not be set/updated as the "
"kerberos principal belongs to an ldap object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Check the link information. If there is already a link
* existing then this operation is not allowed.
*/
{
char **linkdns=NULL;
int j=0;
if ((st=krb5_get_linkdn(context, entry, &linkdns)) != 0) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Failed getting object references"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (linkdns != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("kerberos principal is already linked to a ldap "
"object"));
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
for (j=0; linkdns[j] != NULL; ++j)
free (linkdns[j]);
free (linkdns);
goto cleanup;
}
}
establish_links = TRUE;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_success)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_failed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastFailedAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free(strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
krb5_kvno fail_auth_count;
fail_auth_count = entry->fail_auth_count;
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
fail_auth_count++;
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) {
int attr_mask = 0;
krb5_boolean has_fail_count;
/* Check if the krbLoginFailedCount attribute exists. (Through
* krb5 1.8.1, it wasn't set in new entries.) */
st = krb5_get_attributes_mask(context, entry, &attr_mask);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
has_fail_count = ((attr_mask & KDB_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_ATTR) != 0);
/*
* If the client library and server supports RFC 4525,
* then use it to increment by one the value of the
* krbLoginFailedCount attribute. Otherwise, assert the
* (provided) old value by deleting it before adding.
*/
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
if (ldap_server_handle->server_info->modify_increment &&
has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT, 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
#endif /* LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT */
if (has_fail_count) {
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_DELETE,
entry->fail_auth_count);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD,
entry->fail_auth_count + 1);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
#ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT
}
#endif
} else if (optype == ADD_PRINCIPAL) {
/* Initialize krbLoginFailedCount in new entries to help avoid a
* race during the first failed login. */
st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount",
LDAP_MOD_ADD, 0);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxticketlife", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxrenewableage", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->max_renewable_life)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) {
if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketflags", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
entry->attributes)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = user;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalname", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE,
strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY || entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_HIST) {
memset(&princ_ent, 0, sizeof(princ_ent));
for (tl_data=entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data=tl_data->tl_data_next) {
if (tl_data->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA) {
if ((st = krb5_lookup_tl_kadm_data(tl_data, &princ_ent)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
if (princ_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context, princ_ent.policy, &polname)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
strval[0] = polname;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, "Password policy value null");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD && found_entry == TRUE) {
/*
* a load is special in that existing entries must have attrs that
* removed.
*/
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_HIST) {
bersecretkey = krb5_encode_histkey(&princ_ent);
if (bersecretkey == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdhistory",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES,
bersecretkey);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
free_berdata(bersecretkey);
bersecretkey = NULL;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA || entry->mask & KADM5_KVNO) {
krb5_kvno mkvno;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_mkvno(context, entry, &mkvno)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data,
entry->n_key_data, mkvno);
if (bersecretkey == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* An empty list of bervals is only accepted for modify operations,
* not add operations. */
if (bersecretkey[0] != NULL || !create_standalone) {
st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES,
bersecretkey);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods,
"krbpasswordexpiration",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
/* Update last password change whenever a new key is set */
{
krb5_timestamp last_pw_changed;
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(context, entry,
&last_pw_changed)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(last_pw_changed)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastPwdChange",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
} /* Modify Key data ends here */
/* Auth indicators will also be stored in krbExtraData when processing
* tl_data. */
st = update_ldap_mod_auth_ind(context, entry, &mods);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Set tl_data */
if (entry->tl_data != NULL) {
int count = 0;
struct berval **ber_tl_data = NULL;
krb5_tl_data *ptr;
krb5_timestamp unlock_time;
for (ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
count++;
}
if (count != 0) {
int j;
ber_tl_data = (struct berval **) calloc (count + 1,
sizeof (struct berval*));
if (ber_tl_data == NULL) {
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (j = 0, ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) {
/* Ignore tl_data that are stored in separate directory
* attributes */
if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE
#ifdef SECURID
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS
#endif
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL
|| ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK)
continue;
if ((st = tl_data2berval (ptr, &ber_tl_data[j])) != 0)
break;
j++;
}
if (st == 0) {
ber_tl_data[count] = NULL;
st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbExtraData",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE |
LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ber_tl_data);
}
free_berdata(ber_tl_data);
if (st != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_admin_unlock(context, entry,
&unlock_time)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (unlock_time != 0) {
/* Update last admin unlock */
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(unlock_time)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastAdminUnlock",
LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) {
free (strval[0]);
goto cleanup;
}
free (strval[0]);
}
}
/* Directory specific attribute */
if (xargs.tktpolicydn != NULL) {
int tmask=0;
if (strlen(xargs.tktpolicydn) != 0) {
st = checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.tktpolicydn, "objectclass", policyclass, &tmask);
CHECK_CLASS_VALIDITY(st, tmask, _("ticket policy object value: "));
strval[0] = xargs.tktpolicydn;
strval[1] = NULL;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* if xargs.tktpolicydn is a empty string, then delete
* already existing krbticketpolicyreference attr */
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (establish_links == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = xargs.linkdn;
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbObjectReferences", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* in case mods is NULL then return
* not sure but can happen in a modprinc
* so no need to return an error
* addprinc will at least have the principal name
* and the keys passed in
*/
if (mods == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (create_standalone == TRUE) {
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
strval[0] = "krbprincipal";
strval[1] = "krbprincipalaux";
strval[2] = "krbTicketPolicyAux";
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st == LDAP_ALREADY_EXISTS && entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) {
/* a load operation must replace an existing entry */
st = ldap_delete_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf),
_("Principal delete failed (trying to replace "
"entry): %s"), ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
} else {
st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal add failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
/*
* Here existing ldap object is modified and can be related
* to any attribute, so always ensure that the ldap
* object is extended with all the kerberos related
* objectclasses so that there are no constraint
* violations.
*/
{
char *attrvalues[] = {"krbprincipalaux", "krbTicketPolicyAux", NULL};
int p, q, r=0, amask=0;
if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, (xargs.dn) ? xargs.dn : principal_dn,
"objectclass", attrvalues, &amask)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval));
for (p=1, q=0; p<=2; p<<=1, ++q) {
if ((p & amask) == 0)
strval[r++] = attrvalues[q];
}
if (r != 0) {
if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (xargs.dn != NULL)
st=ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, xargs.dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
else
st = ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL);
if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("User modification failed: %s"),
ldap_err2string(st));
st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_MOD);
k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf);
goto cleanup;
}
if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT)
entry->fail_auth_count++;
}
cleanup:
if (user)
free(user);
if (filtuser)
free(filtuser);
free_xargs(xargs);
if (standalone_principal_dn)
free(standalone_principal_dn);
if (principal_dn)
free (principal_dn);
if (polname != NULL)
free(polname);
for (tre = 0; tre < ntrees; tre++)
free(subtreelist[tre]);
free(subtreelist);
if (subtree)
free (subtree);
if (bersecretkey) {
for (l=0; bersecretkey[l]; ++l) {
if (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val)
free (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val);
free (bersecretkey[l]);
}
free (bersecretkey);
}
if (keys)
free (keys);
ldap_mods_free(mods, 1);
ldap_osa_free_princ_ent(&princ_ent);
ldap_msgfree(result);
krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle);
return(st);
}
|
krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, context_handle, time_rec)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
OM_uint32 *time_rec;
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5_context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) <= 0) {
*time_rec = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED);
} else {
*time_rec = lifetime;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
}
|
krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, context_handle, time_rec)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
OM_uint32 *time_rec;
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5_context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) <= 0) {
*time_rec = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED);
} else {
*time_rec = lifetime;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
}
|
krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
|
krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
|
krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, context_handle, initiator_name,
acceptor_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type, ret_flags,
locally_initiated, opened)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_name_t *initiator_name;
gss_name_t *acceptor_name;
OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec;
gss_OID *mech_type;
OM_uint32 *ret_flags;
int *locally_initiated;
int *opened;
{
krb5_context context;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_gss_name_t initiator, acceptor;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
initiator = NULL;
acceptor = NULL;
context = ctx->k5_context;
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) < 0)
lifetime = 0;
if (initiator_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->here : ctx->there,
&initiator))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (acceptor_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->there : ctx->here,
&acceptor))) {
if (initiator)
kg_release_name(context, &initiator);
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) initiator;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) acceptor;
if (lifetime_rec)
*lifetime_rec = lifetime;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = (gss_OID) ctx->mech_used;
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = ctx->gss_flags;
if (locally_initiated)
*locally_initiated = ctx->initiate;
if (opened)
*opened = ctx->established;
*minor_status = 0;
return((lifetime == 0)?GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED:GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, context_handle, initiator_name,
acceptor_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type, ret_flags,
locally_initiated, opened)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_name_t *initiator_name;
gss_name_t *acceptor_name;
OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec;
gss_OID *mech_type;
OM_uint32 *ret_flags;
int *locally_initiated;
int *opened;
{
krb5_context context;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_gss_name_t initiator, acceptor;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
initiator = NULL;
acceptor = NULL;
context = ctx->k5_context;
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) < 0)
lifetime = 0;
if (initiator_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->here : ctx->there,
&initiator))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (acceptor_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->there : ctx->here,
&acceptor))) {
if (initiator)
kg_release_name(context, &initiator);
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) initiator;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) acceptor;
if (lifetime_rec)
*lifetime_rec = lifetime;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = (gss_OID) ctx->mech_used;
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = ctx->gss_flags;
if (locally_initiated)
*locally_initiated = ctx->initiate;
if (opened)
*opened = ctx->established;
*minor_status = 0;
return((lifetime == 0)?GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED:GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
kg_seal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (!ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (conf_req_flag && kg_integ_only_iov(iov, iov_count)) {
/* may be more sensible to return an error here */
conf_req_flag = FALSE;
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto) {
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
|
kg_seal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (conf_req_flag && kg_integ_only_iov(iov, iov_count)) {
/* may be more sensible to return an error here */
conf_req_flag = FALSE;
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto) {
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
|
kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned int bodysize;
int err;
int toktype2;
int vfyflags = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */
/* verify the header */
ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
&bodysize, &ptr, -1,
input_token_buffer->length,
vfyflags);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (bodysize < 2) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
ptr += 2;
bodysize -= 2;
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
break;
case KG_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
toktype);
break;
default:
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
break;
}
if (ret != 0)
save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return ret;
}
|
kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle, input_token_buffer,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_qop_t *qop_state;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned int bodysize;
int err;
int toktype2;
int vfyflags = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* parse the token, leave the data in message_buffer, setting conf_state */
/* verify the header */
ptr = (unsigned char *) input_token_buffer->value;
err = g_verify_token_header(ctx->mech_used,
&bodysize, &ptr, -1,
input_token_buffer->length,
vfyflags);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (bodysize < 2) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
toktype2 = load_16_be(ptr);
ptr += 2;
bodysize -= 2;
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG2_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(&ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx,
ptr, bodysize, message_buffer,
conf_state, qop_state, toktype);
break;
case KG_TOK_MIC_MSG:
case KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG:
case KG_TOK_DEL_CTX:
ret = kg_unseal_v1(ctx->k5_context, minor_status, ctx, ptr, bodysize,
message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state,
toktype);
break;
default:
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
break;
}
if (ret != 0)
save_error_info (*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return ret;
}
|
kg_unseal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 code;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (!ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM) != NULL) {
code = kg_unseal_stream_iov(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
} else {
code = kg_unseal_iov_token(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
}
return code;
}
|
kg_unseal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 code;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM) != NULL) {
code = kg_unseal_stream_iov(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
} else {
code = kg_unseal_iov_token(minor_status, ctx, conf_state, qop_state,
iov, iov_count, toktype);
}
return code;
}
|
krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 majerr;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* "unseal" the token */
if (GSS_ERROR(majerr = kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, NULL, NULL,
KG_TOK_DEL_CTX)))
return(majerr);
/* that's it. delete the context */
return(krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &context_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER));
}
|
krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 majerr;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* We only support context deletion tokens for now, and RFC 4121 does not
* define a context deletion token. */
if (ctx->proto) {
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
}
/* "unseal" the token */
if (GSS_ERROR(majerr = kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, NULL, NULL,
KG_TOK_DEL_CTX)))
return(majerr);
/* Mark the context as terminated, but do not delete it (as that would
* leave the caller with a dangling context handle). */
ctx->terminated = 1;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag,
qop_req, req_output_size, max_input_size)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
OM_uint32 req_output_size;
OM_uint32 *max_input_size;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 data_size, conflen;
OM_uint32 ohlen;
int overhead;
/* only default qop is allowed */
if (qop_req != GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if (ctx->proto == 1) {
/* No pseudo-ASN.1 wrapper overhead, so no sequence length and
OID. */
OM_uint32 sz = req_output_size;
/* Token header: 16 octets. */
if (conf_req_flag) {
krb5_key key;
krb5_enctype enctype;
key = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey
: ctx->subkey;
enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
while (sz > 0 && krb5_encrypt_size(sz, enctype) + 16 > req_output_size)
sz--;
/* Allow for encrypted copy of header. */
if (sz > 16)
sz -= 16;
else
sz = 0;
#ifdef CFX_EXERCISE
/* Allow for EC padding. In the MIT implementation, only
added while testing. */
if (sz > 65535)
sz -= 65535;
else
sz = 0;
#endif
} else {
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
krb5_error_code err;
size_t cksumsize;
cksumtype = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey_cksumtype
: ctx->cksumtype;
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(ctx->k5_context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/* Allow for token header and checksum. */
if (sz < 16 + cksumsize)
sz = 0;
else
sz -= (16 + cksumsize);
}
*max_input_size = sz;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Calculate the token size and subtract that from the output size */
overhead = 7 + ctx->mech_used->length;
data_size = req_output_size;
conflen = kg_confounder_size(ctx->k5_context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
data_size = (conflen + data_size + 8) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
ohlen = g_token_size(ctx->mech_used,
(unsigned int) (data_size + ctx->cksum_size + 14))
- req_output_size;
if (ohlen+overhead < req_output_size)
/*
* Cannot have trailer length that will cause us to pad over our
* length.
*/
*max_input_size = (req_output_size - ohlen - overhead) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
else
*max_input_size = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag,
qop_req, req_output_size, max_input_size)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
OM_uint32 req_output_size;
OM_uint32 *max_input_size;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 data_size, conflen;
OM_uint32 ohlen;
int overhead;
/* only default qop is allowed */
if (qop_req != GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if (ctx->proto == 1) {
/* No pseudo-ASN.1 wrapper overhead, so no sequence length and
OID. */
OM_uint32 sz = req_output_size;
/* Token header: 16 octets. */
if (conf_req_flag) {
krb5_key key;
krb5_enctype enctype;
key = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey
: ctx->subkey;
enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
while (sz > 0 && krb5_encrypt_size(sz, enctype) + 16 > req_output_size)
sz--;
/* Allow for encrypted copy of header. */
if (sz > 16)
sz -= 16;
else
sz = 0;
#ifdef CFX_EXERCISE
/* Allow for EC padding. In the MIT implementation, only
added while testing. */
if (sz > 65535)
sz -= 65535;
else
sz = 0;
#endif
} else {
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
krb5_error_code err;
size_t cksumsize;
cksumtype = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey_cksumtype
: ctx->cksumtype;
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(ctx->k5_context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/* Allow for token header and checksum. */
if (sz < 16 + cksumsize)
sz = 0;
else
sz -= (16 + cksumsize);
}
*max_input_size = sz;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Calculate the token size and subtract that from the output size */
overhead = 7 + ctx->mech_used->length;
data_size = req_output_size;
conflen = kg_confounder_size(ctx->k5_context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
data_size = (conflen + data_size + 8) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
ohlen = g_token_size(ctx->mech_used,
(unsigned int) (data_size + ctx->cksum_size + 14))
- req_output_size;
if (ohlen+overhead < req_output_size)
/*
* Cannot have trailer length that will cause us to pad over our
* length.
*/
*max_input_size = (req_output_size - ohlen - overhead) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
else
*max_input_size = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
check_rpcsec_auth(struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_context kctx;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
gss_name_t name;
krb5_principal princ;
int ret, success;
krb5_data *c1, *c2, *realm;
gss_buffer_desc gss_str;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
size_t slen;
char *sdots;
success = 0;
handle = (kadm5_server_handle_t)global_server_handle;
if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != RPCSEC_GSS)
return 0;
ctx = rqstp->rq_svccred;
maj_stat = gss_inquire_context(&min_stat, ctx, NULL, &name,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("check_rpcsec_auth: failed "
"inquire_context, stat=%u"), maj_stat);
log_badauth(maj_stat, min_stat, rqstp->rq_xprt, NULL);
goto fail_name;
}
kctx = handle->context;
ret = gss_to_krb5_name_1(rqstp, kctx, name, &princ, &gss_str);
if (ret == 0)
goto fail_name;
slen = gss_str.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/*
* Since we accept with GSS_C_NO_NAME, the client can authenticate
* against the entire kdb. Therefore, ensure that the service
* name is something reasonable.
*/
if (krb5_princ_size(kctx, princ) != 2)
goto fail_princ;
c1 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 0);
c2 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 1);
realm = krb5_princ_realm(kctx, princ);
if (strncmp(handle->params.realm, realm->data, realm->length) == 0
&& strncmp("kadmin", c1->data, c1->length) == 0) {
if (strncmp("history", c2->data, c2->length) == 0)
goto fail_princ;
else
success = 1;
}
fail_princ:
if (!success) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("bad service principal %.*s%s"),
(int) slen, (char *) gss_str.value, sdots);
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gss_str);
krb5_free_principal(kctx, princ);
fail_name:
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
return success;
}
|
check_rpcsec_auth(struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_context kctx;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
gss_name_t name;
krb5_principal princ;
int ret, success;
krb5_data *c1, *c2, *realm;
gss_buffer_desc gss_str;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
size_t slen;
char *sdots;
success = 0;
handle = (kadm5_server_handle_t)global_server_handle;
if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != RPCSEC_GSS)
return 0;
ctx = rqstp->rq_svccred;
maj_stat = gss_inquire_context(&min_stat, ctx, NULL, &name,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("check_rpcsec_auth: failed "
"inquire_context, stat=%u"), maj_stat);
log_badauth(maj_stat, min_stat, rqstp->rq_xprt, NULL);
goto fail_name;
}
kctx = handle->context;
ret = gss_to_krb5_name_1(rqstp, kctx, name, &princ, &gss_str);
if (ret == 0)
goto fail_name;
slen = gss_str.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/*
* Since we accept with GSS_C_NO_NAME, the client can authenticate
* against the entire kdb. Therefore, ensure that the service
* name is something reasonable.
*/
if (krb5_princ_size(kctx, princ) != 2)
goto fail_princ;
c1 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 0);
c2 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 1);
realm = krb5_princ_realm(kctx, princ);
success = data_eq_string(*realm, handle->params.realm) &&
data_eq_string(*c1, "kadmin") && !data_eq_string(*c2, "history");
fail_princ:
if (!success) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("bad service principal %.*s%s"),
(int) slen, (char *) gss_str.value, sdots);
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gss_str);
krb5_free_principal(kctx, princ);
fail_name:
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
return success;
}
|
svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(struct svc_req *rqst,
struct rpc_gss_init_res *gr)
{
struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd;
struct rpc_gss_cred *gc;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, seqbuf;
gss_OID mech;
OM_uint32 maj_stat = 0, min_stat = 0, ret_flags, seq;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_accept_context()");
gd = SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth);
gc = (struct rpc_gss_cred *)rqst->rq_clntcred;
memset(gr, 0, sizeof(*gr));
/* Deserialize arguments. */
memset(&recv_tok, 0, sizeof(recv_tok));
if (!svc_getargs(rqst->rq_xprt, xdr_rpc_gss_init_args,
(caddr_t)&recv_tok))
return (FALSE);
gr->gr_major = gss_accept_sec_context(&gr->gr_minor,
&gd->ctx,
svcauth_gss_creds,
&recv_tok,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&gd->client_name,
&mech,
&gr->gr_token,
&ret_flags,
NULL,
NULL);
svc_freeargs(rqst->rq_xprt, xdr_rpc_gss_init_args, (caddr_t)&recv_tok);
log_status("accept_sec_context", gr->gr_major, gr->gr_minor);
if (gr->gr_major != GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
gr->gr_major != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
badauth(gr->gr_major, gr->gr_minor, rqst->rq_xprt);
gd->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
goto errout;
}
/*
* ANDROS: krb5 mechglue returns ctx of size 8 - two pointers,
* one to the mechanism oid, one to the internal_ctx_id
*/
if ((gr->gr_ctx.value = mem_alloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc))) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "svcauth_gss_accept_context: out of memory\n");
goto errout;
}
memcpy(gr->gr_ctx.value, gd->ctx, sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
gr->gr_ctx.length = sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc);
/* gr->gr_win = 0x00000005; ANDROS: for debugging linux kernel version... */
gr->gr_win = sizeof(gd->seqmask) * 8;
/* Save client info. */
gd->sec.mech = mech;
gd->sec.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
gd->sec.svc = gc->gc_svc;
gd->seq = gc->gc_seq;
gd->win = gr->gr_win;
if (gr->gr_major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
#ifdef SPKM
/* spkm3: no src_name (anonymous) */
if(!g_OID_equal(gss_mech_spkm3, mech)) {
#endif
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, gd->client_name,
&gd->cname, &gd->sec.mech);
#ifdef SPKM
}
#endif
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
log_status("display_name", maj_stat, min_stat);
goto errout;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL
log_debug("accepted context for %.*s with "
"<mech {}, qop %d, svc %d>",
gd->cname.length, (char *)gd->cname.value,
gd->sec.qop, gd->sec.svc);
#else
{
gss_buffer_desc mechname;
gss_oid_to_str(&min_stat, mech, &mechname);
log_debug("accepted context for %.*s with "
"<mech %.*s, qop %d, svc %d>",
gd->cname.length, (char *)gd->cname.value,
mechname.length, (char *)mechname.value,
gd->sec.qop, gd->sec.svc);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &mechname);
}
#endif
#endif /* DEBUG */
seq = htonl(gr->gr_win);
seqbuf.value = &seq;
seqbuf.length = sizeof(seq);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->checksum);
maj_stat = gss_sign(&min_stat, gd->ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
&seqbuf, &gd->checksum);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
goto errout;
}
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_flavor = RPCSEC_GSS;
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_base = gd->checksum.value;
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_length = gd->checksum.length;
}
return (TRUE);
errout:
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gr->gr_token);
return (FALSE);
}
|
svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(struct svc_req *rqst,
struct rpc_gss_init_res *gr)
{
struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd;
struct rpc_gss_cred *gc;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, seqbuf;
gss_OID mech;
OM_uint32 maj_stat = 0, min_stat = 0, ret_flags, seq;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_accept_context()");
gd = SVCAUTH_PRIVATE(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_auth);
gc = (struct rpc_gss_cred *)rqst->rq_clntcred;
memset(gr, 0, sizeof(*gr));
/* Deserialize arguments. */
memset(&recv_tok, 0, sizeof(recv_tok));
if (!svc_getargs(rqst->rq_xprt, xdr_rpc_gss_init_args,
(caddr_t)&recv_tok))
return (FALSE);
gr->gr_major = gss_accept_sec_context(&gr->gr_minor,
&gd->ctx,
svcauth_gss_creds,
&recv_tok,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&gd->client_name,
&mech,
&gr->gr_token,
&ret_flags,
NULL,
NULL);
svc_freeargs(rqst->rq_xprt, xdr_rpc_gss_init_args, (caddr_t)&recv_tok);
log_status("accept_sec_context", gr->gr_major, gr->gr_minor);
if (gr->gr_major != GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
gr->gr_major != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
badauth(gr->gr_major, gr->gr_minor, rqst->rq_xprt);
gd->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
goto errout;
}
gr->gr_ctx.value = "xxxx";
gr->gr_ctx.length = 4;
/* gr->gr_win = 0x00000005; ANDROS: for debugging linux kernel version... */
gr->gr_win = sizeof(gd->seqmask) * 8;
/* Save client info. */
gd->sec.mech = mech;
gd->sec.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
gd->sec.svc = gc->gc_svc;
gd->seq = gc->gc_seq;
gd->win = gr->gr_win;
if (gr->gr_major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
#ifdef SPKM
/* spkm3: no src_name (anonymous) */
if(!g_OID_equal(gss_mech_spkm3, mech)) {
#endif
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, gd->client_name,
&gd->cname, &gd->sec.mech);
#ifdef SPKM
}
#endif
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
log_status("display_name", maj_stat, min_stat);
goto errout;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL
log_debug("accepted context for %.*s with "
"<mech {}, qop %d, svc %d>",
gd->cname.length, (char *)gd->cname.value,
gd->sec.qop, gd->sec.svc);
#else
{
gss_buffer_desc mechname;
gss_oid_to_str(&min_stat, mech, &mechname);
log_debug("accepted context for %.*s with "
"<mech %.*s, qop %d, svc %d>",
gd->cname.length, (char *)gd->cname.value,
mechname.length, (char *)mechname.value,
gd->sec.qop, gd->sec.svc);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &mechname);
}
#endif
#endif /* DEBUG */
seq = htonl(gr->gr_win);
seqbuf.value = &seq;
seqbuf.length = sizeof(seq);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gd->checksum);
maj_stat = gss_sign(&min_stat, gd->ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
&seqbuf, &gd->checksum);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
goto errout;
}
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_flavor = RPCSEC_GSS;
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_base = gd->checksum.value;
rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_length = gd->checksum.length;
}
return (TRUE);
errout:
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gr->gr_token);
return (FALSE);
}
|
int main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
krb5_data pname_data, tkt_data;
int sock = 0;
socklen_t l;
int retval;
struct sockaddr_in l_inaddr, f_inaddr; /* local, foreign address */
krb5_creds creds, *new_creds;
krb5_ccache cc;
krb5_data msgtext, msg;
krb5_context context;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
#ifndef DEBUG
freopen("/tmp/uu-server.log", "w", stderr);
#endif
retval = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (retval) {
com_err(argv[0], retval, "while initializing krb5");
exit(1);
}
#ifdef DEBUG
{
int one = 1;
int acc;
struct servent *sp;
socklen_t namelen = sizeof(f_inaddr);
if ((sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "creating socket");
exit(3);
}
l_inaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
l_inaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = 0;
if (argc == 2) {
l_inaddr.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[1]));
} else {
if (!(sp = getservbyname("uu-sample", "tcp"))) {
com_err("uu-server", 0, "can't find uu-sample/tcp service");
exit(3);
}
l_inaddr.sin_port = sp->s_port;
}
(void) setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof (one));
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, sizeof(l_inaddr))) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "binding socket");
exit(3);
}
if (listen(sock, 1) == -1) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "listening");
exit(3);
}
printf("Server started\n");
fflush(stdout);
if ((acc = accept(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &namelen)) == -1) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "accepting");
exit(3);
}
dup2(acc, 0);
close(sock);
sock = 0;
}
#endif
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &pname_data);
if (retval) {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading pname");
return 2;
}
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &tkt_data);
if (retval) {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading ticket data");
return 2;
}
retval = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting credentials cache");
return 4;
}
memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cc, &creds.client);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-client", retval, "getting principal name");
return 6;
}
/* client sends it already null-terminated. */
printf ("uu-server: client principal is \"%s\".\n", pname_data.data);
retval = krb5_parse_name(context, pname_data.data, &creds.server);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "parsing client name");
return 3;
}
creds.second_ticket = tkt_data;
printf ("uu-server: client ticket is %d bytes.\n",
creds.second_ticket.length);
retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, KRB5_GC_USER_USER, cc,
&creds, &new_creds);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting user-user ticket");
return 5;
}
#ifndef DEBUG
l = sizeof(f_inaddr);
if (getpeername(0, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &l) == -1)
{
com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting client address");
return 6;
}
#endif
l = sizeof(l_inaddr);
if (getsockname(0, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, &l) == -1)
{
com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting local address");
return 6;
}
/* send a ticket/authenticator to the other side, so it can get the key
we're using for the krb_safe below. */
retval = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "making auth_context");
return 8;
}
retval = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "initializing the auth_context flags");
return 8;
}
retval =
krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(context, auth_context, sock,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR |
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "generating addrs for auth_context");
return 9;
}
#if 1
retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, &auth_context,
AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY,
NULL, new_creds, &msg);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "making AP_REQ");
return 8;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg);
#else
retval = krb5_sendauth(context, &auth_context, (krb5_pointer)&sock, "???",
0, 0,
AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY,
NULL, &creds, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (retval)
goto cl_short_wrt;
free(msg.data);
msgtext.length = 32;
msgtext.data = "Hello, other end of connection.";
retval = krb5_mk_safe(context, auth_context, &msgtext, &msg, NULL);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "encoding message to client");
return 6;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg);
if (retval) {
cl_short_wrt:
com_err("uu-server", retval, "writing message to client");
return 7;
}
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &msg);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &pname_data);
/* tkt_data freed with creds */
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
krb5_free_creds(context, new_creds);
krb5_cc_close(context, cc);
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_context(context);
return 0;
}
|
int main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
krb5_data pname_data, tkt_data;
int sock = 0;
socklen_t l;
int retval;
struct sockaddr_in l_inaddr, f_inaddr; /* local, foreign address */
krb5_creds creds, *new_creds;
krb5_ccache cc;
krb5_data msgtext, msg;
krb5_context context;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
#ifndef DEBUG
freopen("/tmp/uu-server.log", "w", stderr);
#endif
retval = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (retval) {
com_err(argv[0], retval, "while initializing krb5");
exit(1);
}
#ifdef DEBUG
{
int one = 1;
int acc;
struct servent *sp;
socklen_t namelen = sizeof(f_inaddr);
if ((sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "creating socket");
exit(3);
}
l_inaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
l_inaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = 0;
if (argc == 2) {
l_inaddr.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[1]));
} else {
if (!(sp = getservbyname("uu-sample", "tcp"))) {
com_err("uu-server", 0, "can't find uu-sample/tcp service");
exit(3);
}
l_inaddr.sin_port = sp->s_port;
}
(void) setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof (one));
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, sizeof(l_inaddr))) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "binding socket");
exit(3);
}
if (listen(sock, 1) == -1) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "listening");
exit(3);
}
printf("Server started\n");
fflush(stdout);
if ((acc = accept(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &namelen)) == -1) {
com_err("uu-server", errno, "accepting");
exit(3);
}
dup2(acc, 0);
close(sock);
sock = 0;
}
#endif
/* principal name must be sent null-terminated. */
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &pname_data);
if (retval || pname_data.length == 0 ||
pname_data.data[pname_data.length - 1] != '\0') {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading pname");
return 2;
}
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &tkt_data);
if (retval) {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading ticket data");
return 2;
}
retval = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting credentials cache");
return 4;
}
memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cc, &creds.client);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-client", retval, "getting principal name");
return 6;
}
/* client sends it already null-terminated. */
printf ("uu-server: client principal is \"%s\".\n", pname_data.data);
retval = krb5_parse_name(context, pname_data.data, &creds.server);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "parsing client name");
return 3;
}
creds.second_ticket = tkt_data;
printf ("uu-server: client ticket is %d bytes.\n",
creds.second_ticket.length);
retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, KRB5_GC_USER_USER, cc,
&creds, &new_creds);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "getting user-user ticket");
return 5;
}
#ifndef DEBUG
l = sizeof(f_inaddr);
if (getpeername(0, (struct sockaddr *)&f_inaddr, &l) == -1)
{
com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting client address");
return 6;
}
#endif
l = sizeof(l_inaddr);
if (getsockname(0, (struct sockaddr *)&l_inaddr, &l) == -1)
{
com_err("uu-server", errno, "getting local address");
return 6;
}
/* send a ticket/authenticator to the other side, so it can get the key
we're using for the krb_safe below. */
retval = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "making auth_context");
return 8;
}
retval = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "initializing the auth_context flags");
return 8;
}
retval =
krb5_auth_con_genaddrs(context, auth_context, sock,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR |
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "generating addrs for auth_context");
return 9;
}
#if 1
retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, &auth_context,
AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY,
NULL, new_creds, &msg);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "making AP_REQ");
return 8;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg);
#else
retval = krb5_sendauth(context, &auth_context, (krb5_pointer)&sock, "???",
0, 0,
AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY,
NULL, &creds, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (retval)
goto cl_short_wrt;
free(msg.data);
msgtext.length = 32;
msgtext.data = "Hello, other end of connection.";
retval = krb5_mk_safe(context, auth_context, &msgtext, &msg, NULL);
if (retval) {
com_err("uu-server", retval, "encoding message to client");
return 6;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &msg);
if (retval) {
cl_short_wrt:
com_err("uu-server", retval, "writing message to client");
return 7;
}
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &msg);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &pname_data);
/* tkt_data freed with creds */
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
krb5_free_creds(context, new_creds);
krb5_cc_close(context, cc);
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_context(context);
return 0;
}
|
recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context * auth_context,
/* IN */
krb5_pointer fd,
char *appl_version,
krb5_principal server,
krb5_int32 flags,
krb5_keytab keytab,
/* OUT */
krb5_ticket ** ticket,
krb5_data *version)
{
krb5_auth_context new_auth_context;
krb5_flags ap_option = 0;
krb5_error_code retval, problem;
krb5_data inbuf;
krb5_data outbuf;
krb5_rcache rcache = 0;
krb5_octet response;
krb5_data null_server;
int need_error_free = 0;
int local_rcache = 0, local_authcon = 0;
/*
* Zero out problem variable. If problem is set at the end of
* the intial version negotiation section, it means that we
* need to send an error code back to the client application
* and exit.
*/
problem = 0;
response = 0;
if (!(flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION)) {
/*
* First read the sendauth version string and check it.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (strcmp(inbuf.data, sendauth_version)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
free(inbuf.data);
}
if (flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_BADAUTHVERS) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
/*
* Do the same thing for the application version string.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (appl_version && strcmp(inbuf.data, appl_version)) {
if (!problem) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS;
response = 2;
}
}
if (version && !problem)
*version = inbuf;
else
free(inbuf.data);
/*
* Now we actually write the response. If the response is non-zero,
* exit with a return value of problem
*/
if ((krb5_net_write(context, *((int *)fd), (char *)&response, 1)) < 0) {
return(problem); /* We'll return the top-level problem */
}
if (problem)
return(problem);
/* We are clear of errors here */
/*
* Now, let's read the AP_REQ message and decode it
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return retval;
if (*auth_context == NULL) {
problem = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &new_auth_context);
*auth_context = new_auth_context;
local_authcon = 1;
}
krb5_auth_con_getrcache(context, *auth_context, &rcache);
if ((!problem) && rcache == NULL) {
/*
* Setup the replay cache.
*/
if (server != NULL && server->length > 0) {
problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &server->data[0],
&rcache);
} else {
null_server.length = 7;
null_server.data = "default";
problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &null_server, &rcache);
}
if (!problem)
problem = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, rcache);
local_rcache = 1;
}
if (!problem) {
problem = krb5_rd_req(context, auth_context, &inbuf, server,
keytab, &ap_option, ticket);
free(inbuf.data);
}
/*
* If there was a problem, send back a krb5_error message,
* preceeded by the length of the krb5_error message. If
* everything's ok, send back 0 for the length.
*/
if (problem) {
krb5_error error;
const char *message;
memset(&error, 0, sizeof(error));
krb5_us_timeofday(context, &error.stime, &error.susec);
if(server)
error.server = server;
else {
/* If this fails - ie. ENOMEM we are hosed
we cannot even send the error if we wanted to... */
(void) krb5_parse_name(context, "????", &error.server);
need_error_free = 1;
}
error.error = problem - ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (error.error > 127)
error.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
message = error_message(problem);
error.text.length = strlen(message) + 1;
error.text.data = strdup(message);
if (!error.text.data) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = krb5_mk_error(context, &error, &outbuf))) {
free(error.text.data);
goto cleanup;
}
free(error.text.data);
if(need_error_free)
krb5_free_principal(context, error.server);
} else {
outbuf.length = 0;
outbuf.data = 0;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf);
if (outbuf.data) {
free(outbuf.data);
/* We sent back an error, we need cleanup then return */
retval = problem;
goto cleanup;
}
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Here lies the mutual authentication stuff... */
if ((ap_option & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
if ((retval = krb5_mk_rep(context, *auth_context, &outbuf))) {
return(retval);
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf);
free(outbuf.data);
}
cleanup:;
if (retval) {
if (local_authcon) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, *auth_context);
} else if (local_rcache && rcache != NULL) {
krb5_rc_close(context, rcache);
krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, NULL);
}
}
return retval;
}
|
recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context * auth_context,
/* IN */
krb5_pointer fd,
char *appl_version,
krb5_principal server,
krb5_int32 flags,
krb5_keytab keytab,
/* OUT */
krb5_ticket ** ticket,
krb5_data *version)
{
krb5_auth_context new_auth_context;
krb5_flags ap_option = 0;
krb5_error_code retval, problem;
krb5_data inbuf;
krb5_data outbuf;
krb5_rcache rcache = 0;
krb5_octet response;
krb5_data null_server;
krb5_data d;
int need_error_free = 0;
int local_rcache = 0, local_authcon = 0;
/*
* Zero out problem variable. If problem is set at the end of
* the intial version negotiation section, it means that we
* need to send an error code back to the client application
* and exit.
*/
problem = 0;
response = 0;
if (!(flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION)) {
/*
* First read the sendauth version string and check it.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
d = make_data((char *)sendauth_version, strlen(sendauth_version) + 1);
if (!data_eq(inbuf, d)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
free(inbuf.data);
}
if (flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_BADAUTHVERS) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
/*
* Do the same thing for the application version string.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (appl_version != NULL && !problem) {
d = make_data(appl_version, strlen(appl_version) + 1);
if (!data_eq(inbuf, d)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS;
response = 2;
}
}
if (version && !problem)
*version = inbuf;
else
free(inbuf.data);
/*
* Now we actually write the response. If the response is non-zero,
* exit with a return value of problem
*/
if ((krb5_net_write(context, *((int *)fd), (char *)&response, 1)) < 0) {
return(problem); /* We'll return the top-level problem */
}
if (problem)
return(problem);
/* We are clear of errors here */
/*
* Now, let's read the AP_REQ message and decode it
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return retval;
if (*auth_context == NULL) {
problem = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &new_auth_context);
*auth_context = new_auth_context;
local_authcon = 1;
}
krb5_auth_con_getrcache(context, *auth_context, &rcache);
if ((!problem) && rcache == NULL) {
/*
* Setup the replay cache.
*/
if (server != NULL && server->length > 0) {
problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &server->data[0],
&rcache);
} else {
null_server.length = 7;
null_server.data = "default";
problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &null_server, &rcache);
}
if (!problem)
problem = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, rcache);
local_rcache = 1;
}
if (!problem) {
problem = krb5_rd_req(context, auth_context, &inbuf, server,
keytab, &ap_option, ticket);
free(inbuf.data);
}
/*
* If there was a problem, send back a krb5_error message,
* preceeded by the length of the krb5_error message. If
* everything's ok, send back 0 for the length.
*/
if (problem) {
krb5_error error;
const char *message;
memset(&error, 0, sizeof(error));
krb5_us_timeofday(context, &error.stime, &error.susec);
if(server)
error.server = server;
else {
/* If this fails - ie. ENOMEM we are hosed
we cannot even send the error if we wanted to... */
(void) krb5_parse_name(context, "????", &error.server);
need_error_free = 1;
}
error.error = problem - ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (error.error > 127)
error.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
message = error_message(problem);
error.text.length = strlen(message) + 1;
error.text.data = strdup(message);
if (!error.text.data) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = krb5_mk_error(context, &error, &outbuf))) {
free(error.text.data);
goto cleanup;
}
free(error.text.data);
if(need_error_free)
krb5_free_principal(context, error.server);
} else {
outbuf.length = 0;
outbuf.data = 0;
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf);
if (outbuf.data) {
free(outbuf.data);
/* We sent back an error, we need cleanup then return */
retval = problem;
goto cleanup;
}
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Here lies the mutual authentication stuff... */
if ((ap_option & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
if ((retval = krb5_mk_rep(context, *auth_context, &outbuf))) {
return(retval);
}
retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf);
free(outbuf.data);
}
cleanup:;
if (retval) {
if (local_authcon) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, *auth_context);
} else if (local_rcache && rcache != NULL) {
krb5_rc_close(context, rcache);
krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, NULL);
}
}
return retval;
}
|
otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *pa,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond, void *arg)
{
krb5_keyblock *armor_key = NULL;
krb5_pa_otp_req *req = NULL;
struct request_state *rs;
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_data d, plaintext;
char *config;
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
/* Get the FAST armor key. */
armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
if (armor_key == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
com_err("otp", retval, "No armor key found when verifying padata");
goto error;
}
/* Decode the request. */
d = make_data(pa->contents, pa->length);
retval = decode_krb5_pa_otp_req(&d, &req);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to decode OTP request");
goto error;
}
/* Decrypt the nonce from the request. */
retval = decrypt_encdata(context, armor_key, req, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to decrypt nonce");
goto error;
}
/* Verify the nonce or timestamp. */
retval = nonce_verify(context, armor_key, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0)
retval = timestamp_verify(context, &plaintext);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to verify nonce or timestamp");
goto error;
}
/* Create the request state. */
rs = k5alloc(sizeof(struct request_state), &retval);
if (rs == NULL)
goto error;
rs->arg = arg;
rs->respond = respond;
/* Get the principal's OTP configuration string. */
retval = cb->get_string(context, rock, "otp", &config);
if (retval == 0 && config == NULL)
retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (retval != 0) {
free(rs);
goto error;
}
/* Send the request. */
otp_state_verify((otp_state *)moddata, cb->event_context(context, rock),
request->client, config, req, on_response, rs);
cb->free_string(context, rock, config);
k5_free_pa_otp_req(context, req);
return;
error:
k5_free_pa_otp_req(context, req);
(*respond)(arg, retval, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
|
otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *pa,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond, void *arg)
{
krb5_keyblock *armor_key = NULL;
krb5_pa_otp_req *req = NULL;
struct request_state *rs;
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_data d, plaintext;
char *config;
/* Get the FAST armor key. */
armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
if (armor_key == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
com_err("otp", retval, "No armor key found when verifying padata");
goto error;
}
/* Decode the request. */
d = make_data(pa->contents, pa->length);
retval = decode_krb5_pa_otp_req(&d, &req);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to decode OTP request");
goto error;
}
/* Decrypt the nonce from the request. */
retval = decrypt_encdata(context, armor_key, req, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to decrypt nonce");
goto error;
}
/* Verify the nonce or timestamp. */
retval = nonce_verify(context, armor_key, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0)
retval = timestamp_verify(context, &plaintext);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to verify nonce or timestamp");
goto error;
}
/* Create the request state. Save the response callback, and the
* enc_tkt_reply pointer so we can set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH flag later. */
rs = k5alloc(sizeof(struct request_state), &retval);
if (rs == NULL)
goto error;
rs->arg = arg;
rs->respond = respond;
rs->enc_tkt_reply = enc_tkt_reply;
/* Get the principal's OTP configuration string. */
retval = cb->get_string(context, rock, "otp", &config);
if (retval == 0 && config == NULL)
retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (retval != 0) {
free(rs);
goto error;
}
/* Send the request. */
otp_state_verify((otp_state *)moddata, cb->event_context(context, rock),
request->client, config, req, on_response, rs);
cb->free_string(context, rock, config);
k5_free_pa_otp_req(context, req);
return;
error:
k5_free_pa_otp_req(context, req);
(*respond)(arg, retval, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
|
pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req * request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part * enc_tkt_reply,
krb5_pa_data * data,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond,
void *arg)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data authp_data = {0, 0, NULL}, krb5_authz = {0, 0, NULL};
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 *reqp9 = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack *auth_pack = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack_draft9 *auth_pack9 = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL;
krb5_checksum cksum = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
int valid_eku = 0, valid_san = 0;
krb5_data k5data;
int is_signed = 1;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n");
if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
if (moddata == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server);
if (plgctx == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(data->contents, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_as_req");
#endif
/* create a per-request context */
retval = pkinit_init_kdc_req_context(context, &reqctx);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
reqctx->pa_type = data->pa_type;
PADATA_TO_KRB5DATA(data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&k5data, &reqp);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp->signedAuthPack.data, reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, &is_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&k5data, &reqp9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp9->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data_draft9");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp9->signedAuthPack.data, reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, NULL);
break;
default:
pkiDebug("unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", data->pa_type);
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkcs7_signeddata_verify failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_signed) {
retval = verify_client_san(context, plgctx, reqctx, request->client,
&valid_san);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_san) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable SAN in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = verify_client_eku(context, plgctx, reqctx, &valid_eku);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_eku) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable EKU in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else { /* !is_signed */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, request->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal())) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Pkinit request not signed, but client "
"not anonymous."));
goto cleanup;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(authp_data.data, authp_data.length, "/tmp/kdc_auth_pack");
#endif
OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&authp_data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* check dh parameters */
if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (!is_signed) {
/*Anonymous pkinit requires DH*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Anonymous pkinit without DH public "
"value not supported."));
goto cleanup;
}
der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL,
0, der_req, &cksum);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
k5_bcmp(cksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
cksum.length) != 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to match the checksum\n");
#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n",
req_pkt->length);
print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ",
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.checksum_type,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
print_buffer(auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ",
cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length);
print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length);
#endif
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check if kdcPkId present and match KDC's subjectIdentifier */
if (reqp->kdcPkId.data != NULL) {
int valid_kdcPkId = 0;
retval = pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
(unsigned char *)reqp->kdcPkId.data,
reqp->kdcPkId.length, &valid_kdcPkId);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_kdcPkId)
pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert"
"RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
auth_pack = NULL;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(&k5data, &auth_pack9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack_draft9\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
auth_pack9 = NULL;
break;
}
/* remember to set the PREAUTH flag in the reply */
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
modreq = (krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq)reqctx;
reqctx = NULL;
cleanup:
if (retval && data->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata failed: creating e-data\n");
if (pkinit_create_edata(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx,
plgctx->idctx, plgctx->opts, retval, &e_data))
pkiDebug("pkinit_create_edata failed\n");
}
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&reqp);
free(cksum.contents);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&reqp9);
}
free(authp_data.data);
free(krb5_authz.data);
if (reqctx != NULL)
pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx);
free_krb5_auth_pack(&auth_pack);
free_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(context, &auth_pack9);
(*respond)(arg, retval, modreq, e_data, NULL);
}
|
pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req * request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part * enc_tkt_reply,
krb5_pa_data * data,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond,
void *arg)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data authp_data = {0, 0, NULL}, krb5_authz = {0, 0, NULL};
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 *reqp9 = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack *auth_pack = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack_draft9 *auth_pack9 = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL;
krb5_checksum cksum = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
int valid_eku = 0, valid_san = 0;
krb5_data k5data;
int is_signed = 1;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n");
if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
if (moddata == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server);
if (plgctx == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(data->contents, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_as_req");
#endif
/* create a per-request context */
retval = pkinit_init_kdc_req_context(context, &reqctx);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
reqctx->pa_type = data->pa_type;
PADATA_TO_KRB5DATA(data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&k5data, &reqp);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp->signedAuthPack.data, reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, &is_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&k5data, &reqp9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp9->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data_draft9");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp9->signedAuthPack.data, reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, NULL);
break;
default:
pkiDebug("unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", data->pa_type);
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkcs7_signeddata_verify failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_signed) {
retval = verify_client_san(context, plgctx, reqctx, request->client,
&valid_san);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_san) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable SAN in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = verify_client_eku(context, plgctx, reqctx, &valid_eku);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_eku) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable EKU in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else { /* !is_signed */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, request->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal())) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Pkinit request not signed, but client "
"not anonymous."));
goto cleanup;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(authp_data.data, authp_data.length, "/tmp/kdc_auth_pack");
#endif
OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&authp_data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* check dh parameters */
if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (!is_signed) {
/*Anonymous pkinit requires DH*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Anonymous pkinit without DH public "
"value not supported."));
goto cleanup;
}
der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL,
0, der_req, &cksum);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
k5_bcmp(cksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
cksum.length) != 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to match the checksum\n");
#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n",
req_pkt->length);
print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ",
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.checksum_type,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
print_buffer(auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ",
cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length);
print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length);
#endif
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check if kdcPkId present and match KDC's subjectIdentifier */
if (reqp->kdcPkId.data != NULL) {
int valid_kdcPkId = 0;
retval = pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
(unsigned char *)reqp->kdcPkId.data,
reqp->kdcPkId.length, &valid_kdcPkId);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_kdcPkId)
pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert"
"RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
auth_pack = NULL;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(&k5data, &auth_pack9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack_draft9\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
auth_pack9 = NULL;
break;
}
/* remember to set the PREAUTH flag in the reply */
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
modreq = (krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq)reqctx;
reqctx = NULL;
cleanup:
if (retval && data->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata failed: creating e-data\n");
if (pkinit_create_edata(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx,
plgctx->idctx, plgctx->opts, retval, &e_data))
pkiDebug("pkinit_create_edata failed\n");
}
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&reqp);
free(cksum.contents);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&reqp9);
}
free(authp_data.data);
free(krb5_authz.data);
if (reqctx != NULL)
pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx);
free_krb5_auth_pack(&auth_pack);
free_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(context, &auth_pack9);
(*respond)(arg, retval, modreq, e_data, NULL);
}
|
spnego_gss_process_context_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t token_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_process_context_token(minor_status,
context_handle,
token_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_process_context_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t token_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* SPNEGO doesn't have its own context tokens. */
if (!sc->opened)
return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
ret = gss_process_context_token(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
token_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_export_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_export_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
interprocess_token);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_export_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = *(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established
* contexts. */
if (!sc->opened)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
ret = gss_export_sec_context(minor_status,
&sc->ctx_handle,
interprocess_token);
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
value);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function, and we cannot
* construct an empty SPNEGO context with it. */
if (sc == NULL || sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
&sc->ctx_handle,
desired_object,
value);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_message_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_wrap(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_message_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_state,
qop_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
conf_state,
qop_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
|
acc_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_buffer_t buf,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_buffer_t *mechToken,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret, req_flags;
gss_OID_set supported_mechSet, mechTypes;
gss_buffer_desc der_mechTypes;
gss_OID mech_wanted;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
der_mechTypes.length = 0;
der_mechTypes.value = NULL;
*mechToken = *mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
supported_mechSet = mechTypes = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
*return_token = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
*negState = REJECT;
*minor_status = 0;
ret = get_negTokenInit(minor_status, buf, &der_mechTypes,
&mechTypes, &req_flags,
mechToken, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
goto cleanup;
}
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
&supported_mechSet);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Select the best match between the list of mechs
* that the initiator requested and the list that
* the acceptor will support.
*/
mech_wanted = negotiate_mech(supported_mechSet, mechTypes, negState);
if (*negState == REJECT) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
goto cleanup;
}
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*ctx;
if (sc != NULL) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &sc->DER_mechTypes);
assert(mech_wanted != GSS_C_NO_OID);
} else
sc = create_spnego_ctx();
if (sc == NULL) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->mech_set = mechTypes;
mechTypes = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
sc->internal_mech = mech_wanted;
sc->DER_mechTypes = der_mechTypes;
der_mechTypes.length = 0;
der_mechTypes.value = NULL;
if (*negState == REQUEST_MIC)
sc->mic_reqd = 1;
*return_token = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
sc->firstpass = 1;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &mechTypes);
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &supported_mechSet);
if (der_mechTypes.length != 0)
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &der_mechTypes);
return ret;
}
|
acc_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_buffer_t buf,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_buffer_t *mechToken,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret, req_flags;
gss_OID_set supported_mechSet, mechTypes;
gss_buffer_desc der_mechTypes;
gss_OID mech_wanted;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
der_mechTypes.length = 0;
der_mechTypes.value = NULL;
*mechToken = *mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
supported_mechSet = mechTypes = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
*return_token = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
*negState = REJECT;
*minor_status = 0;
ret = get_negTokenInit(minor_status, buf, &der_mechTypes,
&mechTypes, &req_flags,
mechToken, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
goto cleanup;
}
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
&supported_mechSet);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Select the best match between the list of mechs
* that the initiator requested and the list that
* the acceptor will support.
*/
mech_wanted = negotiate_mech(supported_mechSet, mechTypes, negState);
if (*negState == REJECT) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
goto cleanup;
}
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*ctx;
if (sc != NULL) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &sc->DER_mechTypes);
assert(mech_wanted != GSS_C_NO_OID);
} else
sc = create_spnego_ctx(0);
if (sc == NULL) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->mech_set = mechTypes;
mechTypes = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
sc->internal_mech = mech_wanted;
sc->DER_mechTypes = der_mechTypes;
der_mechTypes.length = 0;
der_mechTypes.value = NULL;
if (*negState == REQUEST_MIC)
sc->mic_reqd = 1;
*return_token = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
sc->firstpass = 1;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &mechTypes);
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &supported_mechSet);
if (der_mechTypes.length != 0)
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &der_mechTypes);
return ret;
}
|
spnego_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
int prf_key,
const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
ssize_t desired_output_len,
gss_buffer_t prf_out)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_pseudo_random(minor_status,
context,
prf_key,
prf_in,
desired_output_len,
prf_out);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context,
int prf_key,
const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
ssize_t desired_output_len,
gss_buffer_t prf_out)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_pseudo_random(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
prf_key,
prf_in,
desired_output_len,
prf_out);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
gss_buffer_t input_payload_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_aead(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer,
input_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
gss_buffer_t input_payload_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_wrap_aead(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
input_assoc_buffer,
input_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
output_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function. */
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
ret = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
{
return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
|
spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
{
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
|
spnego_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
|
spnego_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
|
spnego_gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_unwrap_aead(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer,
input_assoc_buffer,
output_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_unwrap_aead(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
input_message_buffer,
input_assoc_buffer,
output_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_unwrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_unwrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
send_token_flag send_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret, negState;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mechListMIC_in, mechListMIC_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
dsyslog("Entering init_sec_context\n");
mechtok_in = mechListMIC_out = mechListMIC_in = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
negState = REJECT;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated or optimistic mech's gss_init_sec_context
* function and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* The three steps share responsibility for determining when the
* exchange is complete. If the selected mech completed in a previous
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 1 will decide. If
* the selected mech completes in this call and no MIC exchange is
* expected, then step 2 will decide. If a MIC exchange is expected,
* then step 3 will decide. If an error occurs in any step, the
* exchange will be aborted, possibly with an error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* send_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should be
* generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
/* Step 1: perform mechanism negotiation. */
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = init_ctx_new(minor_status, spcred,
context_handle, &send_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
ret = init_ctx_cont(minor_status, context_handle,
input_token, &mechtok_in,
&mechListMIC_in, &negState, &send_token);
if (HARD_ERROR(ret)) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Step 2: invoke the selected or optimistic mechanism's
* gss_init_sec_context function, if it didn't complete previously. */
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (!spnego_ctx->mech_complete) {
ret = init_ctx_call_init(
minor_status, spnego_ctx, spcred,
target_name, req_flags,
time_req, mechtok_in,
actual_mech, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
&negState, &send_token);
/* Give the mechanism a chance to force a mechlistMIC. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && mech_requires_mechlistMIC(spnego_ctx))
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 1;
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && spnego_ctx->mech_complete &&
(spnego_ctx->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status,
mechListMIC_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
spnego_ctx, &mechListMIC_out,
&negState, &send_token);
}
cleanup:
if (send_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(spnego_ctx,
0,
mechListMIC_out,
req_flags,
&mechtok_out, send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
} else if (send_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState, GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mechListMIC_out,
send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/*
* Now, switch the output context to refer to the
* negotiated mechanism's context.
*/
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)spnego_ctx->ctx_handle;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags;
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (spnego_ctx != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin,
&spnego_ctx->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_in);
free(mechListMIC_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_out);
free(mechListMIC_out);
}
return ret;
} /* init_sec_context */
|
spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
send_token_flag send_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret, negState;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mechListMIC_in, mechListMIC_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
dsyslog("Entering init_sec_context\n");
mechtok_in = mechListMIC_out = mechListMIC_in = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
negState = REJECT;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated or optimistic mech's gss_init_sec_context
* function and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* The three steps share responsibility for determining when the
* exchange is complete. If the selected mech completed in a previous
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 1 will decide. If
* the selected mech completes in this call and no MIC exchange is
* expected, then step 2 will decide. If a MIC exchange is expected,
* then step 3 will decide. If an error occurs in any step, the
* exchange will be aborted, possibly with an error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* send_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should be
* generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
/* Step 1: perform mechanism negotiation. */
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = init_ctx_new(minor_status, spcred,
context_handle, &send_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
ret = init_ctx_cont(minor_status, context_handle,
input_token, &mechtok_in,
&mechListMIC_in, &negState, &send_token);
if (HARD_ERROR(ret)) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Step 2: invoke the selected or optimistic mechanism's
* gss_init_sec_context function, if it didn't complete previously. */
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (!spnego_ctx->mech_complete) {
ret = init_ctx_call_init(
minor_status, spnego_ctx, spcred,
target_name, req_flags,
time_req, mechtok_in,
actual_mech, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
&negState, &send_token);
/* Give the mechanism a chance to force a mechlistMIC. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && mech_requires_mechlistMIC(spnego_ctx))
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 1;
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && spnego_ctx->mech_complete &&
(spnego_ctx->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status,
mechListMIC_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
spnego_ctx, &mechListMIC_out,
&negState, &send_token);
}
cleanup:
if (send_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(spnego_ctx,
0,
mechListMIC_out,
req_flags,
&mechtok_out, send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
} else if (send_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState, GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mechListMIC_out,
send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
spnego_ctx->opened = 1;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags;
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (spnego_ctx != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin,
&spnego_ctx->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_in);
free(mechListMIC_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_out);
free(mechListMIC_out);
}
return ret;
} /* init_sec_context */
|
spnego_gss_context_time(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_context_time(minor_status,
context_handle,
time_rec);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_context_time(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_context_time(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
time_rec);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_iov(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_wrap_iov(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_accept_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_OID *mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin, negState;
send_token_flag return_token;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mic_in, mic_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
int sendTokenInit = 0, tmpret;
mechtok_in = mic_in = mic_out = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated mech's gss_accept_sec_context function
* and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* Step one determines whether the negotiation requires a MIC exchange,
* while steps two and three share responsibility for determining when
* the exchange is complete. If the selected mech completes in this
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 2 will decide. If a
* MIC exchange is expected, then step 3 will decide. If an error
* occurs in any step, the exchange will be aborted, possibly with an
* error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* return_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should
* be generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
/* Step 1: Perform mechanism negotiation. */
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)verifier_cred_handle;
if (sc == NULL || sc->internal_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
/* Process an initial token or request for NegHints. */
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
*delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
if (input_token->length == 0) {
ret = acc_ctx_hints(minor_status,
context_handle, spcred,
&mic_out,
&negState,
&return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
sendTokenInit = 1;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else {
/* Can set negState to REQUEST_MIC */
ret = acc_ctx_new(minor_status, input_token,
context_handle, spcred,
&mechtok_in, &mic_in,
&negState, &return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
} else {
/* Process a response token. Can set negState to
* ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE. */
ret = acc_ctx_cont(minor_status, input_token,
context_handle, &mechtok_in,
&mic_in, &negState, &return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
/* Step 2: invoke the negotiated mechanism's gss_accept_sec_context
* function. */
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/*
* Handle mechtok_in and mic_in only if they are
* present in input_token. If neither is present, whether
* this is an error depends on whether this is the first
* round-trip. RET is set to a default value according to
* whether it is the first round-trip.
*/
if (negState != REQUEST_MIC && mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = acc_ctx_call_acc(minor_status, sc, spcred,
mechtok_in, mech_type, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle,
&negState, &return_token);
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && sc->mech_complete &&
(sc->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status, mic_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
sc, &mic_out,
&negState, &return_token);
}
cleanup:
if (return_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND && sendTokenInit) {
assert(sc != NULL);
tmpret = make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(sc, 1, mic_out, 0,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,
return_token, output_token);
if (tmpret < 0)
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
} else if (return_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND &&
return_token != CHECK_MIC) {
tmpret = make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState,
sc ? sc->internal_mech :
GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mic_out,
return_token,
output_token);
if (tmpret < 0)
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc->ctx_handle;
if (sc->internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
src_name != NULL) {
*src_name = sc->internal_name;
sc->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (sc != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mic_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mic_in);
free(mic_in);
}
if (mic_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mic_out);
free(mic_out);
}
return ret;
}
|
spnego_gss_accept_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_OID *mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin, negState;
send_token_flag return_token;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mic_in, mic_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
int sendTokenInit = 0, tmpret;
mechtok_in = mic_in = mic_out = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated mech's gss_accept_sec_context function
* and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* Step one determines whether the negotiation requires a MIC exchange,
* while steps two and three share responsibility for determining when
* the exchange is complete. If the selected mech completes in this
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 2 will decide. If a
* MIC exchange is expected, then step 3 will decide. If an error
* occurs in any step, the exchange will be aborted, possibly with an
* error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* return_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should
* be generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
/* Step 1: Perform mechanism negotiation. */
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)verifier_cred_handle;
if (sc == NULL || sc->internal_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
/* Process an initial token or request for NegHints. */
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
*delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
if (input_token->length == 0) {
ret = acc_ctx_hints(minor_status,
context_handle, spcred,
&mic_out,
&negState,
&return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
sendTokenInit = 1;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else {
/* Can set negState to REQUEST_MIC */
ret = acc_ctx_new(minor_status, input_token,
context_handle, spcred,
&mechtok_in, &mic_in,
&negState, &return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
} else {
/* Process a response token. Can set negState to
* ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE. */
ret = acc_ctx_cont(minor_status, input_token,
context_handle, &mechtok_in,
&mic_in, &negState, &return_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
/* Step 2: invoke the negotiated mechanism's gss_accept_sec_context
* function. */
sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/*
* Handle mechtok_in and mic_in only if they are
* present in input_token. If neither is present, whether
* this is an error depends on whether this is the first
* round-trip. RET is set to a default value according to
* whether it is the first round-trip.
*/
if (negState != REQUEST_MIC && mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
ret = acc_ctx_call_acc(minor_status, sc, spcred,
mechtok_in, mech_type, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle,
&negState, &return_token);
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && sc->mech_complete &&
(sc->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status, mic_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
sc, &mic_out,
&negState, &return_token);
}
cleanup:
if (return_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND && sendTokenInit) {
assert(sc != NULL);
tmpret = make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(sc, 1, mic_out, 0,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,
return_token, output_token);
if (tmpret < 0)
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
} else if (return_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND &&
return_token != CHECK_MIC) {
tmpret = make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState,
sc ? sc->internal_mech :
GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mic_out,
return_token,
output_token);
if (tmpret < 0)
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
sc->opened = 1;
if (sc->internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
src_name != NULL) {
*src_name = sc->internal_name;
sc->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (sc != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mic_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mic_in);
free(mic_in);
}
if (mic_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mic_out);
free(mic_out);
}
return ret;
}
|
spnego_gss_import_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_import_sec_context(minor_status,
interprocess_token,
context_handle);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_import_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle)
{
/*
* Until we implement partial context exports, there are no SPNEGO
* exported context tokens, only tokens for underlying mechs. So just
* return an error for now.
*/
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
|
init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
sc = create_spnego_ctx();
if (sc == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
/* determine negotiation mech set */
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_INITIATE,
&sc->mech_set);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
/* Set an initial internal mech to make the first context token. */
sc->internal_mech = &sc->mech_set->elements[0];
if (put_mech_set(sc->mech_set, &sc->DER_mechTypes) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* The actual context is not yet determined, set the output
* context handle to refer to the spnego context itself.
*/
sc->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
sc = NULL;
*tokflag = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
cleanup:
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
return ret;
}
|
init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
sc = create_spnego_ctx(1);
if (sc == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
/* determine negotiation mech set */
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_INITIATE,
&sc->mech_set);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
/* Set an initial internal mech to make the first context token. */
sc->internal_mech = &sc->mech_set->elements[0];
if (put_mech_set(sc->mech_set, &sc->DER_mechTypes) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
sc = NULL;
*tokflag = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
cleanup:
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
return ret;
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
OM_uint32 req_output_size,
OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
req_output_size,
max_input_size);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
OM_uint32 req_output_size,
OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
req_output_size,
max_input_size);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
input_message_buffer);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_state, iov,
iov_count);
}
|
spnego_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_state, iov,
iov_count);
}
|
spnego_gss_verify_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t msg_buffer,
const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_verify_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
msg_buffer,
token_buffer,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_verify_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t msg_buffer,
const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_verify_mic(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
msg_buffer,
token_buffer,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
|
acc_ctx_hints(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret;
gss_OID_set supported_mechSet;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
*mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
supported_mechSet = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
*negState = REJECT;
*minor_status = 0;
/* A hint request must be the first token received. */
if (*ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
&supported_mechSet);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = make_NegHints(minor_status, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
sc = create_spnego_ctx();
if (sc == NULL) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
if (put_mech_set(supported_mechSet, &sc->DER_mechTypes) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->internal_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
sc->firstpass = 1;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
sc = NULL;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &supported_mechSet);
return ret;
}
|
acc_ctx_hints(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState,
send_token_flag *return_token)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret;
gss_OID_set supported_mechSet;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
*mechListMIC = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
supported_mechSet = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
*return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
*negState = REJECT;
*minor_status = 0;
/* A hint request must be the first token received. */
if (*ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
&supported_mechSet);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
ret = make_NegHints(minor_status, mechListMIC);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
sc = create_spnego_ctx(0);
if (sc == NULL) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
if (put_mech_set(supported_mechSet, &sc->DER_mechTypes) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
sc->internal_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
*negState = ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE;
*return_token = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
sc->firstpass = 1;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
sc = NULL;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &supported_mechSet);
return ret;
}
|
spnego_gss_inquire_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_name_t *targ_name,
OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec,
gss_OID *mech_type,
OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
int *locally_initiated,
int *opened)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
src_name,
targ_name,
lifetime_rec,
mech_type,
ctx_flags,
locally_initiated,
opened);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_inquire_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_name_t *targ_name,
OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec,
gss_OID *mech_type,
OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
int *locally_initiated,
int *opened)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (targ_name != NULL)
*targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (lifetime_rec != NULL)
*lifetime_rec = 0;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego;
if (ctx_flags != NULL)
*ctx_flags = 0;
if (locally_initiated != NULL)
*locally_initiated = sc->initiate;
if (opened != NULL)
*opened = sc->opened;
if (sc->ctx_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle,
src_name, targ_name, lifetime_rec,
mech_type, ctx_flags, NULL, NULL);
}
if (!sc->opened) {
/*
* We are still doing SPNEGO negotiation, so report SPNEGO as
* the OID. After negotiation is complete we will report the
* underlying mechanism OID.
*/
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego;
/*
* Remove flags we don't support with partially-established
* contexts. (Change this to keep GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG if we add
* support for exporting partial SPNEGO contexts.)
*/
if (ctx_flags != NULL) {
*ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG;
*ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
}
}
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *ctx =
(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
if (*ctx == NULL)
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
/*
* If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally.
*/
if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) {
(void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
&(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
output_token);
(void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
} else {
ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token);
}
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *ctx =
(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
if (*ctx == NULL)
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
(void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
output_token);
(void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
|
spnego_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
|
iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
*minor_status = 0;
if (*context_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
} else {
assert(iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_CONTEXT);
major_status = krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token);
}
}
return major_status;
}
|
iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
*minor_status = 0;
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
|
iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_OID *mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
OM_uint32 code;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else
ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (iakerb_is_iakerb_token(input_token)) {
if (ctx->gssc != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
/* We shouldn't get an IAKERB token now. */
code = G_WRONG_TOKID;
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
code = iakerb_acceptor_step(ctx, initialContextToken,
input_token, output_token);
if (code == (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE)
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (initialContextToken) {
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)ctx;
ctx = NULL;
}
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
*delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
major_status = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else {
krb5_gss_ctx_ext_rec exts;
iakerb_make_exts(ctx, &exts);
major_status = krb5_gss_accept_sec_context_ext(&code,
&ctx->gssc,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
NULL,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle,
&exts);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*context_handle = ctx->gssc;
ctx->gssc = NULL;
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
}
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
}
cleanup:
if (initialContextToken && GSS_ERROR(major_status)) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
*minor_status = code;
return major_status;
}
|
iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_OID *mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
OM_uint32 code;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 0);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else
ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (iakerb_is_iakerb_token(input_token)) {
if (ctx->gssc != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
/* We shouldn't get an IAKERB token now. */
code = G_WRONG_TOKID;
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
code = iakerb_acceptor_step(ctx, initialContextToken,
input_token, output_token);
if (code == (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE)
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (initialContextToken) {
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)ctx;
ctx = NULL;
}
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
*delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
major_status = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else {
krb5_gss_ctx_ext_rec exts;
iakerb_make_exts(ctx, &exts);
major_status = krb5_gss_accept_sec_context_ext(&code,
&ctx->gssc,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
NULL,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle,
&exts);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
ctx->established = 1;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
}
cleanup:
if (initialContextToken && GSS_ERROR(major_status)) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
*minor_status = code;
return major_status;
}
|
iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
krb5_error_code code;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_gss_cred_id_t kcred;
krb5_gss_name_t kname;
krb5_boolean cred_locked = FALSE;
int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
if (claimant_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
major_status = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred(minor_status, NULL,
GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET,
GSS_C_INITIATE,
&ctx->defcred, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
goto cleanup;
claimant_cred_handle = ctx->defcred;
}
} else {
ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (claimant_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
claimant_cred_handle = ctx->defcred;
}
kname = (krb5_gss_name_t)target_name;
major_status = kg_cred_resolve(minor_status, ctx->k5c,
claimant_cred_handle, target_name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
goto cleanup;
cred_locked = TRUE;
kcred = (krb5_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_get_initial_state(ctx, kcred, kname, time_req,
&ctx->state);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)ctx;
}
if (ctx->state != IAKERB_AP_REQ) {
/* We need to do IAKERB. */
code = iakerb_initiator_step(ctx,
kcred,
kname,
time_req,
input_token,
output_token);
if (code == KRB5_BAD_MSIZE)
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (ctx->state == IAKERB_AP_REQ) {
krb5_gss_ctx_ext_rec exts;
if (cred_locked) {
k5_mutex_unlock(&kcred->lock);
cred_locked = FALSE;
}
iakerb_make_exts(ctx, &exts);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
input_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
/* IAKERB is finished, or we skipped to Kerberos directly. */
major_status = krb5_gss_init_sec_context_ext(minor_status,
(gss_cred_id_t) kcred,
&ctx->gssc,
target_name,
(gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
NULL,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
&exts);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*context_handle = ctx->gssc;
ctx->gssc = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
}
if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
*actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
} else {
if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
*actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
major_status = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
cleanup:
if (cred_locked)
k5_mutex_unlock(&kcred->lock);
if (initialContextToken && GSS_ERROR(major_status)) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return major_status;
}
|
iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
krb5_error_code code;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_gss_cred_id_t kcred;
krb5_gss_name_t kname;
krb5_boolean cred_locked = FALSE;
int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 1);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
if (claimant_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
major_status = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred(minor_status, NULL,
GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET,
GSS_C_INITIATE,
&ctx->defcred, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
goto cleanup;
claimant_cred_handle = ctx->defcred;
}
} else {
ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (claimant_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
claimant_cred_handle = ctx->defcred;
}
kname = (krb5_gss_name_t)target_name;
major_status = kg_cred_resolve(minor_status, ctx->k5c,
claimant_cred_handle, target_name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
goto cleanup;
cred_locked = TRUE;
kcred = (krb5_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_get_initial_state(ctx, kcred, kname, time_req,
&ctx->state);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)ctx;
}
if (ctx->state != IAKERB_AP_REQ) {
/* We need to do IAKERB. */
code = iakerb_initiator_step(ctx,
kcred,
kname,
time_req,
input_token,
output_token);
if (code == KRB5_BAD_MSIZE)
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (ctx->state == IAKERB_AP_REQ) {
krb5_gss_ctx_ext_rec exts;
if (cred_locked) {
k5_mutex_unlock(&kcred->lock);
cred_locked = FALSE;
}
iakerb_make_exts(ctx, &exts);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
input_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
/* IAKERB is finished, or we skipped to Kerberos directly. */
major_status = krb5_gss_init_sec_context_ext(minor_status,
(gss_cred_id_t) kcred,
&ctx->gssc,
target_name,
(gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
NULL,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
&exts);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
ctx->established = 1;
if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
*actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
} else {
if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
*actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
major_status = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
cleanup:
if (cred_locked)
k5_mutex_unlock(&kcred->lock);
if (initialContextToken && GSS_ERROR(major_status)) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return major_status;
}
|
build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
unsigned int rlen, const char *realm, va_list ap)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
char *r = NULL;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
krb5_int32 count = 0;
krb5_int32 size = 2; /* initial guess at needed space */
char *component = NULL;
data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
if (!retval) {
r = strdup(realm);
if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; }
}
while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
if (count == size) {
krb5_data *new_data = NULL;
size *= 2;
new_data = realloc(data, size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (new_data) {
data = new_data;
} else {
retval = ENOMEM;
}
}
if (!retval) {
data[count].length = strlen(component);
data[count].data = strdup(component);
if (!data[count].data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
count++;
}
}
if (!retval) {
princ->type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
princ->magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
princ->realm = make_data(r, rlen);
princ->data = data;
princ->length = count;
r = NULL; /* take ownership */
data = NULL; /* take ownership */
}
if (data) {
while (--count >= 0) {
free(data[count].data);
}
free(data);
}
free(r);
return retval;
}
|
build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
unsigned int rlen, const char *realm, va_list ap)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
char *r = NULL;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
krb5_int32 count = 0;
krb5_int32 size = 2; /* initial guess at needed space */
char *component = NULL;
data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
if (!retval)
r = k5memdup0(realm, rlen, &retval);
while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
if (count == size) {
krb5_data *new_data = NULL;
size *= 2;
new_data = realloc(data, size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (new_data) {
data = new_data;
} else {
retval = ENOMEM;
}
}
if (!retval) {
data[count].length = strlen(component);
data[count].data = strdup(component);
if (!data[count].data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
count++;
}
}
if (!retval) {
princ->type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
princ->magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
princ->realm = make_data(r, rlen);
princ->data = data;
princ->length = count;
r = NULL; /* take ownership */
data = NULL; /* take ownership */
}
if (data) {
while (--count >= 0) {
free(data[count].data);
}
free(data);
}
free(r);
return retval;
}
|
iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
|
iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
|
iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
|
iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
|
bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
{
u_int size;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
if (*objp == NULL)
size = 0;
else
size = strlen(*objp) + 1;
}
if (! xdr_u_int(xdrs, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_DECODE:
if (size == 0) {
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
} else if (*objp == NULL) {
*objp = (char *) mem_alloc(size);
if (*objp == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return FALSE;
}
}
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
return TRUE;
case XDR_FREE:
if (*objp != NULL)
mem_free(*objp, size);
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
{
u_int size;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
if (*objp == NULL)
size = 0;
else
size = strlen(*objp) + 1;
}
if (! xdr_u_int(xdrs, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_DECODE:
if (size == 0) {
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
} else if (*objp == NULL) {
*objp = (char *) mem_alloc(size);
if (*objp == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return FALSE;
}
}
if (!xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size))
return FALSE;
/* Check that the unmarshalled bytes are a C string. */
if ((*objp)[size - 1] != '\0')
return FALSE;
if (memchr(*objp, '\0', size - 1) != NULL)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
return TRUE;
case XDR_FREE:
if (*objp != NULL)
mem_free(*objp, size);
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask)
{
int ret, ret2, i;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_orig;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if(entry == (kadm5_principal_ent_t) NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
tl_data_orig = entry->tl_data;
while (tl_data_orig) {
if (tl_data_orig->tl_data_type < 256)
return KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE;
tl_data_orig = tl_data_orig->tl_data_next;
}
}
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
if (ret)
return(ret);
/*
* This is pretty much the same as create ...
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* set us up to use the new policy */
adb.aux_attributes |= KADM5_POLICY;
if (adb.policy)
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = strdup(entry->policy);
}
if (have_pol) {
/* set pw_max_life based on new policy */
if (pol.pw_max_life) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb,
&(kdb->pw_expiration));
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->pw_expiration += pol.pw_max_life;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
}
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) && (adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = NULL;
adb.aux_attributes &= ~KADM5_POLICY;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
if((mask & KADM5_KVNO)) {
for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++)
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = entry->kvno;
}
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
krb5_tl_data *tl;
/* may have to change the version number of the API. Updates the list with the given tl_data rather than over-writting */
for (tl = entry->tl_data; tl;
tl = tl->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl);
if( ret )
{
goto done;
}
}
}
/*
* Setting entry->fail_auth_count to 0 can be used to manually unlock
* an account. It is not possible to set fail_auth_count to any other
* value using kadmin.
*/
if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
if (entry->fail_auth_count != 0) {
ret = KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS;
goto done;
}
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
}
/* let the mask propagate to the database provider */
kdb->mask = mask;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (ret) goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
if (have_pol) {
ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
ret = ret ? ret : ret2;
}
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return ret;
}
|
kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask)
{
int ret, ret2, i;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_orig;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if(entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
tl_data_orig = entry->tl_data;
while (tl_data_orig) {
if (tl_data_orig->tl_data_type < 256)
return KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE;
tl_data_orig = tl_data_orig->tl_data_next;
}
}
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
if (ret)
return(ret);
/*
* This is pretty much the same as create ...
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* set us up to use the new policy */
adb.aux_attributes |= KADM5_POLICY;
if (adb.policy)
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = strdup(entry->policy);
}
if (have_pol) {
/* set pw_max_life based on new policy */
if (pol.pw_max_life) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb,
&(kdb->pw_expiration));
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->pw_expiration += pol.pw_max_life;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
}
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) && (adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = NULL;
adb.aux_attributes &= ~KADM5_POLICY;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
if((mask & KADM5_KVNO)) {
for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++)
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = entry->kvno;
}
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
krb5_tl_data *tl;
/* may have to change the version number of the API. Updates the list with the given tl_data rather than over-writting */
for (tl = entry->tl_data; tl;
tl = tl->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl);
if( ret )
{
goto done;
}
}
}
/*
* Setting entry->fail_auth_count to 0 can be used to manually unlock
* an account. It is not possible to set fail_auth_count to any other
* value using kadmin.
*/
if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
if (entry->fail_auth_count != 0) {
ret = KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS;
goto done;
}
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
}
/* let the mask propagate to the database provider */
kdb->mask = mask;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (ret) goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
if (have_pol) {
ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
ret = ret ? ret : ret2;
}
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return ret;
}
|
kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_int32 now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(kdb, 0, sizeof(*kdb));
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + polent.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
if ((ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context,
entry->principal, &(kdb->princ))))
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
|
kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_int32 now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(kdb, 0, sizeof(*kdb));
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + polent.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
if ((ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context,
entry->principal, &(kdb->princ))))
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
|
kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_int32 now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(kdb, 0, sizeof(*kdb));
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = now + polent.pw_max_life;
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
if ((ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context,
entry->principal, &(kdb->princ))))
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
|
kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail != NULL;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next) {
if (tl_data_tail->tl_data_type < 256)
return KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE;
}
}
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = calloc(1, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = ts_incr(now, polent.pw_max_life);
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
ret = krb5_copy_principal(handle->context, entry->principal, &kdb->princ);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
|
set_string_2_svc(sstring_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth("kadm5_mod_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_set_string((void *)handle, arg->princ, arg->key,
arg->value);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_mod_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
set_string_2_svc(sstring_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth("kadm5_mod_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_set_string((void *)handle, arg->princ, arg->key,
arg->value);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_mod_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_policy_2_svc(gpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpol_ret ret;
kadm5_ret_t ret2;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_principal_ent_rec caller_ent;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpol_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_policy";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
if (!CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) && kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE, NULL, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle->lhandle,
handle->current_caller,
&caller_ent,
KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK);
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
if (caller_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY &&
strcmp(caller_ent.policy, arg->name) == 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
} else ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
ret2 = kadm5_free_principal_ent(handle->lhandle,
&caller_ent);
ret.code = ret.code ? ret.code : ret2;
}
}
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policy(handle, arg->name, &ret.rec);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname,
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_policy_2_svc(gpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpol_ret ret;
kadm5_ret_t ret2;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_principal_ent_rec caller_ent;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpol_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_policy";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
if (!CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) && kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE, NULL, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle->lhandle,
handle->current_caller,
&caller_ent,
KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK);
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
if (caller_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY &&
strcmp(caller_ent.policy, arg->name) == 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
} else ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
ret2 = kadm5_free_principal_ent(handle->lhandle,
&caller_ent);
ret.code = ret.code ? ret.code : ret2;
}
}
if (ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policy(handle, arg->name, &ret.rec);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname,
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
modify_principal_2_svc(mprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_principal((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
modify_principal_2_svc(mprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_principal((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
delete_policy_2_svc(dpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_policy((void *)handle, arg->name);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
delete_policy_2_svc(dpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_policy((void *)handle, arg->name);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
chpass_principal3_2_svc(chpass3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
chpass_principal3_2_svc(chpass3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_principal_2_svc(gprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprinc_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprinc_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle, arg->princ, &ret.rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_principal_2_svc(gprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprinc_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprinc_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle, arg->princ, &ret.rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
setkey_principal_2_svc(setkey_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
setkey_principal_2_svc(setkey_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
rename_principal_2_svc(rprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg1,
*prime_arg2;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t tlen1, tlen2, clen, slen;
char *tdots1, *tdots2, *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->src, &prime_arg1) ||
krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->dest, &prime_arg2)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
tlen1 = strlen(prime_arg1);
trunc_name(&tlen1, &tdots1);
tlen2 = strlen(prime_arg2);
trunc_name(&tlen2, &tdots2);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
if (! CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) {
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, arg->src, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
/* any restrictions at all on the ADD kills the RENAME */
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, arg->dest, &rp) || rp) {
if (ret.code == KADM5_AUTH_DELETE)
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
}
} else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
if (ret.code != KADM5_OK) {
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Unauthorized request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_rename_principal((void *)handle, arg->src,
arg->dest);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg1);
free(prime_arg2);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
rename_principal_2_svc(rprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg1 = NULL, *prime_arg2 = NULL;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t tlen1, tlen2, clen, slen;
char *tdots1, *tdots2, *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->src, &prime_arg1) ||
krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->dest, &prime_arg2)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
tlen1 = strlen(prime_arg1);
trunc_name(&tlen1, &tdots1);
tlen2 = strlen(prime_arg2);
trunc_name(&tlen2, &tdots2);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
if (! CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) {
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, arg->src, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
/* any restrictions at all on the ADD kills the RENAME */
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, arg->dest, &rp) || rp) {
if (ret.code == KADM5_AUTH_DELETE)
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
}
} else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
if (ret.code != KADM5_OK) {
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Unauthorized request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_rename_principal((void *)handle, arg->src,
arg->dest);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
free(prime_arg1);
free(prime_arg2);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_princs_2_svc(gprincs_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprincs_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprincs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST,
NULL,
NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principals((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.princs,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_princs_2_svc(gprincs_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprincs_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprincs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST,
NULL,
NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principals((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.princs,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_principals", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
generic_ret *init_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen, slen;
char *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (! (ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle))) {
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
}
free_server_handle(handle);
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(NULL, ret.code);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Request: kadm5_init, %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s, "
"vers=%d, flavor=%d"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt),
ret.api_version & ~(KADM5_API_VERSION_MASK),
rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(NULL, errmsg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
return(&ret);
}
|
generic_ret *init_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen, slen;
char *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (! (ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle))) {
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
}
free_server_handle(handle);
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(NULL, ret.code);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Request: kadm5_init, %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s, "
"vers=%d, flavor=%d"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt),
ret.api_version & ~(KADM5_API_VERSION_MASK),
rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(NULL, errmsg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
return(&ret);
}
|
chrand_principal_2_svc(chrand_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, &k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
chrand_principal_2_svc(chrand_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, &k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_pols_2_svc(gpols_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpols_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpols_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policies((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.pols,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_pols_2_svc(gpols_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gpols_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gpols_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->exp;
if (prime_arg == NULL)
prime_arg = "*";
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_LIST, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_LIST;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_policies((void *)handle,
arg->exp, &ret.pols,
&ret.count);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_policies", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
create_policy_2_svc(cpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
create_policy_2_svc(cpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, NULL, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
purgekeys_2_svc(purgekeys_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_purgekeys";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->princ, NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg, &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_purgekeys((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepkvno);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
purgekeys_2_svc(purgekeys_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_purgekeys";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_MODIFY,
arg->princ, NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg, &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_purgekeys((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepkvno);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
create_principal_2_svc(cprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_ADD,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_principal((void *)handle,
&arg->rec, arg->mask,
arg->passwd);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
create_principal_2_svc(cprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_ADD,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_principal((void *)handle,
&arg->rec, arg->mask,
arg->passwd);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
setv4key_principal_2_svc(setv4key_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setv4key_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblock);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
setv4key_principal_2_svc(setv4key_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setv4key_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblock);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setv4key_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
delete_principal_2_svc(dprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_DELETE,
arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
delete_principal_2_svc(dprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_DELETE,
arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
create_principal3_2_svc(cprinc3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_ADD,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_principal_3((void *)handle,
&arg->rec, arg->mask,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->passwd);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
create_principal3_2_svc(cprinc3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->rec.principal, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_ADD,
arg->rec.principal, &rp)
|| kadm5int_acl_impose_restrictions(handle->context,
&arg->rec, &arg->mask, rp)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
log_unauth("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_create_principal_3((void *)handle,
&arg->rec, arg->mask,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
arg->passwd);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_create_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
chrand_principal3_2_svc(chrand3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
&k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
chrand_principal3_2_svc(chrand3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static chrand_ret ret;
krb5_keyblock *k;
int nkeys;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_chrand_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_randkey_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = randkey_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
&k, &nkeys);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_randkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keepold,
arg->n_ks_tuple,
arg->ks_tuple,
&k, &nkeys);
} else {
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if(ret.code == KADM5_OK) {
ret.keys = k;
ret.n_keys = nkeys;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
chpass_principal_2_svc(chpass_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if (ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
chpass_principal_2_svc(chpass_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ)) {
ret.code = chpass_principal_wrapper_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
FALSE, 0, NULL, arg->pass);
} else if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_CHANGEPW, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_chpass_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->pass);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW;
}
if (ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW) {
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_chpass_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
getprivs_ret * get_privs_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static getprivs_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_getprivs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
ret.code = kadm5_get_privs((void *)handle, &ret.privs);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_privs", client_name.value, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
getprivs_ret * get_privs_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static getprivs_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_getprivs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
ret.code = kadm5_get_privs((void *)handle, &ret.privs);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_privs", client_name.value, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
|
validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
register krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry client,
krb5_db_entry server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
{
int errcode;
krb5_error_code ret;
/*
* If an option is set that is only allowed in TGS requests, complain.
*/
if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
*status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* The client must not be expired */
if (client.expiration && client.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "CLIENT EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP);
}
/* The client's password must not be expired, unless the server is
a KRB5_KDC_PWCHANGE_SERVICE. */
if (client.pw_expiration && client.pw_expiration < kdc_time &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "CLIENT KEY EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* The server must not be expired */
if (server.expiration && server.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
return(KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP);
}
/*
* If the client requires password changing, then only allow the
* pwchange service.
*/
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE) &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "REQUIRED PWCHANGE";
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* Client and server must allow postdating tickets */
if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED))) {
*status = "POSTDATE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE);
}
/*
* A Windows KDC will return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED instead of
* KDC_ERR_POLICY in the following case:
*
* - KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE is set in KDCOptions but local
* policy has KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE set for the
* client, and;
* - KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH is set for the client but
* preauthentication data is absent in the request.
*
* Hence, this check most be done after the check for preauth
* data, and is now performed by validate_forwardable() (the
* contents of which were previously below).
*/
/* Client and server must allow proxiable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE))) {
*status = "PROXIABLE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Check to see if client is locked out */
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "CLIENT LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED);
}
/* Check to see if server is locked out */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "SERVICE LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Check to see if server is allowed to be a service */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
*status = "SERVICE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER);
}
if (check_anon(kdc_active_realm, request->client, request->server) != 0) {
*status = "ANONYMOUS NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
ret = krb5_db_check_policy_as(kdc_context, request, &client, &server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
return errcode_to_protocol(ret);
/* Check against local policy. */
errcode = against_local_policy_as(request, client, server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (errcode)
return errcode;
return 0;
}
|
validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
register krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry client,
krb5_db_entry server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
{
int errcode;
krb5_error_code ret;
/*
* If an option is set that is only allowed in TGS requests, complain.
*/
if (request->kdc_options & AS_INVALID_OPTIONS) {
*status = "INVALID AS OPTIONS";
return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* The client must not be expired */
if (client.expiration && client.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "CLIENT EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP);
}
/* The client's password must not be expired, unless the server is
a KRB5_KDC_PWCHANGE_SERVICE. */
if (client.pw_expiration && client.pw_expiration < kdc_time &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "CLIENT KEY EXPIRED";
if (vague_errors)
return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
else
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* The server must not be expired */
if (server.expiration && server.expiration < kdc_time) {
*status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
return(KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP);
}
/*
* If the client requires password changing, then only allow the
* pwchange service.
*/
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE) &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
*status = "REQUIRED PWCHANGE";
return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
}
/* Client and server must allow postdating tickets */
if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED))) {
*status = "POSTDATE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE);
}
/*
* A Windows KDC will return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED instead of
* KDC_ERR_POLICY in the following case:
*
* - KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE is set in KDCOptions but local
* policy has KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE set for the
* client, and;
* - KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH is set for the client but
* preauthentication data is absent in the request.
*
* Hence, this check most be done after the check for preauth
* data, and is now performed by validate_forwardable() (the
* contents of which were previously below).
*/
/* Client and server must allow proxiable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE) &&
(isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE) ||
isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE))) {
*status = "PROXIABLE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Check to see if client is locked out */
if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "CLIENT LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED);
}
/* Check to see if server is locked out */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
*status = "SERVICE LOCKED OUT";
return(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
}
/* Check to see if server is allowed to be a service */
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
*status = "SERVICE NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER);
}
if (check_anon(kdc_active_realm, client.princ, request->server) != 0) {
*status = "ANONYMOUS NOT ALLOWED";
return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
}
/* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
ret = krb5_db_check_policy_as(kdc_context, request, &client, &server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
return errcode_to_protocol(ret);
/* Check against local policy. */
errcode = against_local_policy_as(request, client, server,
kdc_time, status, e_data);
if (errcode)
return errcode;
return 0;
}
|
finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = state->au_state;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, state->server,
state->auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
/* If we didn't find a client long-term key and no preauth mechanism
* replaced the reply key, error out now. */
if (state->client_keyblock.enctype == ENCTYPE_NULL) {
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
NULL,
state->local_tgt,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
state->auth_indicators,
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &state->ticket_reply,
&au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state->rstate))
state->reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
if (state->client_key != NULL)
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = state->client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client, state->cname,
state->server, state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
au_state->status = state->status;
au_state->reply = &state->reply;
kau_as_req(kdc_context,
(errcode || state->preauth_err) ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
state->local_tgt, errcode,
state->e_data, state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->local_tgt_storage);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(state->auth_indicators);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
|
finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = state->au_state;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, state->server,
state->auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
/* If we didn't find a client long-term key and no preauth mechanism
* replaced the reply key, error out now. */
if (state->client_keyblock.enctype == ENCTYPE_NULL) {
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
NULL,
state->local_tgt,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
state->auth_indicators,
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &state->ticket_reply,
&au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state->rstate))
state->reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
if (state->client_key != NULL)
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = state->client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client, state->cname,
state->server, state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0 && state->status == NULL)
state->status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
au_state->status = state->status;
au_state->reply = &state->reply;
kau_as_req(kdc_context,
(errcode || state->preauth_err) ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
state->local_tgt, errcode,
state->e_data, state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->local_tgt_storage);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(state->auth_indicators);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
|
process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock *header_key = NULL;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *header_server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt, *local_tgt_storage = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = NULL;
krb5_data **auth_indicators = NULL;
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
memset(&reply_encpart, 0, sizeof(reply_encpart));
memset(&ticket_reply, 0, sizeof(ticket_reply));
memset(&enc_tkt_reply, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply));
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Save pointer to client-requested service principal, in case of
* errors before a successful call to search_sprinc(). */
sprinc = request->server;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Initialize audit state. */
errcode = kau_init_kdc_req(kdc_context, request, from, &au_state);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Seed the audit trail with the request ID and basic information. */
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&header_server, &header_key, &subkey,
&pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, header_ticket,
&au_state->tkt_in_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
/* Reset sprinc because kdc_find_fast() can replace request. */
sprinc = request->server;
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "FIND_FAST";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &sprinc->realm, header_server,
&local_tgt, &local_tgt_storage);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_LOCAL_TGT";
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore (for now) the request modification due to FAST processing. */
au_state->request = request;
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* If we got a cross-realm TGS which is not the requested server, we are
* issuing a referral (or alternate TGT, which we treat similarly). */
is_referral = is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, server->princ);
au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL;
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL || errcode != 0) {
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
au_state->s4u2self_user = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
au_state->status = status;
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL;
}
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
if (is_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Deal with user-to-user and constrained delegation */
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
else if (errcode)
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
au_state->status = status;
retval = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&au_state->evid_tkt_id);
if (retval) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
errcode = retval;
goto cleanup;
}
kau_s4u2proxy(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
au_state->stage = ISSUE_TKT;
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
/* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Proxy
* requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt,
&auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS";
goto cleanup;
}
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = OPTS2FLAGS(request->kdc_options);
enc_tkt_reply.flags |= COPY_TKT_FLAGS(header_enc_tkt->flags);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/* Indicate support for encrypted padata (RFC 6806). */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
/* We don't currently handle issuing anonymous tickets based on
* non-anonymous ones, so just ignore the option. */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_timestamp old_starttime;
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_starttime = enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime ?
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime : enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime;
old_life = ts_delta(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime, old_starttime);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
ts_min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
ts_incr(kdc_time, old_life));
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
}
kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt, client,
server, &enc_tkt_reply);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "VALIDATE_TRANSIT_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&enc_tkt_reply.transited, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply.transited));
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TO_TRANSITED_LIST";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, header_server);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_reject_bad_transit &&
!isflagset(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server,
header_server, local_tgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
header_key,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
auth_indicators,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
au_state->status = status;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, FALSE, au_state);
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
au_state->status = status;
}
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrentry.magic = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &ticket_reply, &au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state))
reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
au_state->status = status;
if (!errcode)
au_state->reply = &reply;
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, header_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, local_tgt_storage);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (header_key != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, header_key);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(auth_indicators);
return retval;
}
|
process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock *header_key = NULL;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *header_server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt, *local_tgt_storage = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = NULL;
krb5_data **auth_indicators = NULL;
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
memset(&reply_encpart, 0, sizeof(reply_encpart));
memset(&ticket_reply, 0, sizeof(ticket_reply));
memset(&enc_tkt_reply, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply));
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Save pointer to client-requested service principal, in case of
* errors before a successful call to search_sprinc(). */
sprinc = request->server;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Initialize audit state. */
errcode = kau_init_kdc_req(kdc_context, request, from, &au_state);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Seed the audit trail with the request ID and basic information. */
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&header_server, &header_key, &subkey,
&pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, header_ticket,
&au_state->tkt_in_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
/* Reset sprinc because kdc_find_fast() can replace request. */
sprinc = request->server;
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "FIND_FAST";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &sprinc->realm, header_server,
&local_tgt, &local_tgt_storage);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_LOCAL_TGT";
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore (for now) the request modification due to FAST processing. */
au_state->request = request;
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* If we got a cross-realm TGS which is not the requested server, we are
* issuing a referral (or alternate TGT, which we treat similarly). */
is_referral = is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, server->princ);
au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL;
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL || errcode != 0) {
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
au_state->s4u2self_user = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
au_state->status = status;
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL;
}
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
if (is_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Deal with user-to-user and constrained delegation */
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
else if (errcode)
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
au_state->status = status;
retval = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&au_state->evid_tkt_id);
if (retval) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
errcode = retval;
goto cleanup;
}
kau_s4u2proxy(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
au_state->stage = ISSUE_TKT;
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
/* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Proxy
* requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt,
&auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS";
goto cleanup;
}
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = OPTS2FLAGS(request->kdc_options);
enc_tkt_reply.flags |= COPY_TKT_FLAGS(header_enc_tkt->flags);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/* Indicate support for encrypted padata (RFC 6806). */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
/* We don't currently handle issuing anonymous tickets based on
* non-anonymous ones, so just ignore the option. */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_timestamp old_starttime;
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_starttime = enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime ?
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime : enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime;
old_life = ts_delta(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime, old_starttime);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
ts_min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
ts_incr(kdc_time, old_life));
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
}
kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt, client,
server, &enc_tkt_reply);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "VALIDATE_TRANSIT_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&enc_tkt_reply.transited, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply.transited));
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TO_TRANSITED_LIST";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, header_server);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_reject_bad_transit &&
!isflagset(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server,
header_server, local_tgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
header_key,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
auth_indicators,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
au_state->status = status;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, FALSE, au_state);
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
au_state->status = status;
}
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrentry.magic = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &ticket_reply, &au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state))
reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
if (status == NULL)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
au_state->status = status;
if (!errcode)
au_state->reply = &reply;
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, header_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, local_tgt_storage);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (header_key != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, header_key);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(auth_indicators);
return retval;
}
|
kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
|
kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_pa_for_user *for_user;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "DECODE_PA_FOR_USER";
return code;
}
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return code;
}
*s4u_x509_user = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user));
if (*s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user = for_user->user;
for_user->user = NULL;
krb5_free_pa_for_user(kdc_context, for_user);
return 0;
}
|
kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
tgs_session,
&req_data,
request->nonce, *s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return code;
}
if (krb5_princ_size(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user) == 0 ||
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.subject_cert.length != 0) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
|
kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "DECODE_PA_S4U_X509_USER";
return code;
}
code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
tgs_session,
&req_data,
request->nonce, *s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return code;
}
if (krb5_princ_size(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user) == 0 ||
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.subject_cert.length != 0) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
|
gss_accept_sec_context (minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings;
gss_name_t * src_name;
gss_OID * mech_type;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
OM_uint32 * ret_flags;
OM_uint32 * time_rec;
gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
{
OM_uint32 status, temp_status, temp_minor_status;
OM_uint32 temp_ret_flags = 0;
gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id = NULL;
gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_cred_id_t tmp_d_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_name_t internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_name_t tmp_src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_OID_desc token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID token_mech_type = &token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID selected_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID public_mech;
gss_mechanism mech = NULL;
gss_union_cred_t uc;
int i;
status = val_acc_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context
* descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the
* underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the
* value of *context_handle to the union context variable.
*/
if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
if (input_token_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
/* Get the token mech type */
status = gssint_get_mech_type(token_mech_type, input_token_buffer);
if (status)
return status;
/*
* An interposer calling back into the mechglue can't pass in a special
* mech, so we have to recognize it using verifier_cred_handle. Use
* the mechanism for which we have matching creds, if available.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
uc = (gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle;
for (i = 0; i < uc->count; i++) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(&uc->mechs_array[i]);
if (public_mech && g_OID_equal(token_mech_type, public_mech)) {
selected_mech = &uc->mechs_array[i];
break;
}
}
}
if (selected_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, token_mech_type,
&selected_mech);
if (status)
return status;
}
} else {
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
selected_mech = union_ctx_id->mech_type;
}
/* Now create a new context if we didn't get one. */
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (!union_ctx_id)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id;
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&union_ctx_id->mech_type);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(union_ctx_id);
return (status);
}
/* set the new context handle to caller's data */
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
}
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
input_cred_handle =
gssint_get_mechanism_cred((gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle,
selected_mech);
if (input_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
/* verifier credential specified but no acceptor credential found */
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
} else if (!allow_mech_by_default(selected_mech)) {
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
/*
* now select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (mech && mech->gss_accept_sec_context) {
status = mech->gss_accept_sec_context(minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
input_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name ? &internal_name : NULL,
&actual_mech,
output_token,
&temp_ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred ? &tmp_d_cred : NULL);
/* If there's more work to do, keep going... */
if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
/* if the call failed, return with failure */
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
map_error(minor_status, mech);
goto error_out;
}
/*
* if src_name is non-NULL,
* convert internal_name into a union name equivalent
* First call the mechanism specific display_name()
* then call gss_import_name() to create
* the union name struct cast to src_name
*/
if (src_name != NULL) {
if (internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
/* consumes internal_name regardless of success */
temp_status = gssint_convert_name_to_union_name(
&temp_minor_status, mech,
internal_name, &tmp_src_name);
if (temp_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
status = temp_status;
*minor_status = temp_minor_status;
map_error(minor_status, mech);
if (output_token->length)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
output_token);
goto error_out;
}
*src_name = tmp_src_name;
} else
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
#define g_OID_prefix_equal(o1, o2) \
(((o1)->length >= (o2)->length) && \
(memcmp((o1)->elements, (o2)->elements, (o2)->length) == 0))
/* Ensure we're returning correct creds format */
if ((temp_ret_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) &&
tmp_d_cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech);
if (actual_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
public_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
!g_OID_prefix_equal(actual_mech, public_mech)) {
*d_cred = tmp_d_cred; /* unwrapped pseudo-mech */
} else {
gss_union_cred_t d_u_cred = NULL;
d_u_cred = malloc(sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
if (d_u_cred == NULL) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
(void) memset(d_u_cred, 0, sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
d_u_cred->count = 1;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status,
selected_mech,
&d_u_cred->mechs_array);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(d_u_cred);
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->cred_array = malloc(sizeof(gss_cred_id_t));
if (d_u_cred->cred_array != NULL) {
d_u_cred->cred_array[0] = tmp_d_cred;
} else {
free(d_u_cred);
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->loopback = d_u_cred;
*d_cred = (gss_cred_id_t)d_u_cred;
}
}
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = gssint_get_public_oid(actual_mech);
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = temp_ret_flags;
return (status);
} else {
status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
}
error_out:
if (union_ctx_id) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements)
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
}
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id && mech &&
mech->gss_delete_sec_context) {
mech->gss_delete_sec_context(&temp_minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
free(union_ctx_id);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (src_name)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (tmp_src_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
(gss_buffer_t)tmp_src_name);
return (status);
}
|
gss_accept_sec_context (minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle;
gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer;
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings;
gss_name_t * src_name;
gss_OID * mech_type;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
OM_uint32 * ret_flags;
OM_uint32 * time_rec;
gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
{
OM_uint32 status, temp_status, temp_minor_status;
OM_uint32 temp_ret_flags = 0;
gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id = NULL;
gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_cred_id_t tmp_d_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_name_t internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_name_t tmp_src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_OID_desc token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID token_mech_type = &token_mech_type_desc;
gss_OID actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID selected_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
gss_OID public_mech;
gss_mechanism mech = NULL;
gss_union_cred_t uc;
int i;
status = val_acc_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
context_handle,
verifier_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context
* descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the
* underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the
* value of *context_handle to the union context variable.
*/
if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
if (input_token_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
/* Get the token mech type */
status = gssint_get_mech_type(token_mech_type, input_token_buffer);
if (status)
return status;
/*
* An interposer calling back into the mechglue can't pass in a special
* mech, so we have to recognize it using verifier_cred_handle. Use
* the mechanism for which we have matching creds, if available.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
uc = (gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle;
for (i = 0; i < uc->count; i++) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(&uc->mechs_array[i]);
if (public_mech && g_OID_equal(token_mech_type, public_mech)) {
selected_mech = &uc->mechs_array[i];
break;
}
}
}
if (selected_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, token_mech_type,
&selected_mech);
if (status)
return status;
}
} else {
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
selected_mech = union_ctx_id->mech_type;
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* Now create a new context if we didn't get one. */
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (!union_ctx_id)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id;
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&union_ctx_id->mech_type);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(union_ctx_id);
return (status);
}
}
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
*/
if (verifier_cred_handle != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
input_cred_handle =
gssint_get_mechanism_cred((gss_union_cred_t)verifier_cred_handle,
selected_mech);
if (input_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
/* verifier credential specified but no acceptor credential found */
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
} else if (!allow_mech_by_default(selected_mech)) {
status = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
goto error_out;
}
/*
* now select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (mech && mech->gss_accept_sec_context) {
status = mech->gss_accept_sec_context(minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
input_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name ? &internal_name : NULL,
&actual_mech,
output_token,
&temp_ret_flags,
time_rec,
d_cred ? &tmp_d_cred : NULL);
/* If there's more work to do, keep going... */
if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
/* if the call failed, return with failure */
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
map_error(minor_status, mech);
goto error_out;
}
/*
* if src_name is non-NULL,
* convert internal_name into a union name equivalent
* First call the mechanism specific display_name()
* then call gss_import_name() to create
* the union name struct cast to src_name
*/
if (src_name != NULL) {
if (internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
/* consumes internal_name regardless of success */
temp_status = gssint_convert_name_to_union_name(
&temp_minor_status, mech,
internal_name, &tmp_src_name);
if (temp_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
status = temp_status;
*minor_status = temp_minor_status;
map_error(minor_status, mech);
if (output_token->length)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
output_token);
goto error_out;
}
*src_name = tmp_src_name;
} else
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
}
#define g_OID_prefix_equal(o1, o2) \
(((o1)->length >= (o2)->length) && \
(memcmp((o1)->elements, (o2)->elements, (o2)->length) == 0))
/* Ensure we're returning correct creds format */
if ((temp_ret_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) &&
tmp_d_cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
public_mech = gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech);
if (actual_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
public_mech != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
!g_OID_prefix_equal(actual_mech, public_mech)) {
*d_cred = tmp_d_cred; /* unwrapped pseudo-mech */
} else {
gss_union_cred_t d_u_cred = NULL;
d_u_cred = malloc(sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
if (d_u_cred == NULL) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
(void) memset(d_u_cred, 0, sizeof (gss_union_cred_desc));
d_u_cred->count = 1;
status = generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status,
selected_mech,
&d_u_cred->mechs_array);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(d_u_cred);
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->cred_array = malloc(sizeof(gss_cred_id_t));
if (d_u_cred->cred_array != NULL) {
d_u_cred->cred_array[0] = tmp_d_cred;
} else {
free(d_u_cred);
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto error_out;
}
d_u_cred->loopback = d_u_cred;
*d_cred = (gss_cred_id_t)d_u_cred;
}
}
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = gssint_get_public_oid(actual_mech);
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = temp_ret_flags;
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
} else {
status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
}
error_out:
/*
* RFC 2744 5.1 requires that we not create a context on a failed first
* call to accept, and recommends that on a failed subsequent call we
* make the caller responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context.
* Even if the mech deleted its context, keep the union context around
* for the caller to delete.
*/
if (union_ctx_id && *context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements)
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
}
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id && mech &&
mech->gss_delete_sec_context) {
mech->gss_delete_sec_context(&temp_minor_status,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
free(union_ctx_id);
}
if (src_name)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (tmp_src_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
(void) gss_release_buffer(&temp_minor_status,
(gss_buffer_t)tmp_src_name);
return (status);
}
|
gss_delete_sec_context (minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
status = val_del_sec_ctx_args(minor_status, context_handle, output_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
if (GSSINT_CHK_LOOP(ctx))
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status,
ctx->mech_type,
&ctx->internal_ctx_id,
output_token);
if (status)
return status;
/* now free up the space for the union context structure */
free(ctx->mech_type->elements);
free(ctx->mech_type);
free(*context_handle);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
gss_delete_sec_context (minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
status = val_del_sec_ctx_args(minor_status, context_handle, output_token);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
if (GSSINT_CHK_LOOP(ctx))
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
if (ctx->internal_ctx_id != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status,
ctx->mech_type,
&ctx->internal_ctx_id,
output_token);
if (status)
return status;
}
/* now free up the space for the union context structure */
free(ctx->mech_type->elements);
free(ctx->mech_type);
free(*context_handle);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
|
gss_init_sec_context (minor_status,
claimant_cred_handle,
context_handle,
target_name,
req_mech_type,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_name_t target_name;
gss_OID req_mech_type;
OM_uint32 req_flags;
OM_uint32 time_req;
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings;
gss_buffer_t input_token;
gss_OID * actual_mech_type;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
OM_uint32 * ret_flags;
OM_uint32 * time_rec;
{
OM_uint32 status, temp_minor_status;
gss_union_name_t union_name;
gss_union_cred_t union_cred;
gss_name_t internal_name;
gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id;
gss_OID selected_mech;
gss_mechanism mech;
gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle;
status = val_init_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
claimant_cred_handle,
context_handle,
target_name,
req_mech_type,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, req_mech_type,
&selected_mech);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
union_name = (gss_union_name_t)target_name;
/*
* obtain the gss mechanism information for the requested
* mechanism. If mech_type is NULL, set it to the resultant
* mechanism
*/
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (mech == NULL)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
if (mech->gss_init_sec_context == NULL)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
/*
* If target_name is mechanism_specific, then it must match the
* mech_type that we're about to use. Otherwise, do an import on
* the external_name form of the target name.
*/
if (union_name->mech_type &&
g_OID_equal(union_name->mech_type, selected_mech)) {
internal_name = union_name->mech_name;
} else {
if ((status = gssint_import_internal_name(minor_status, selected_mech,
union_name,
&internal_name)) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
}
/*
* if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context
* descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the
* underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the
* value of *context_handle to the union context variable.
*/
if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (union_ctx_id == NULL)
goto end;
if (generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&union_ctx_id->mech_type) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(union_ctx_id);
goto end;
}
/* copy the supplied context handle */
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
} else
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
* defaults to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL if there is no cred, which will
* use the default credential.
*/
union_cred = (gss_union_cred_t) claimant_cred_handle;
input_cred_handle = gssint_get_mechanism_cred(union_cred, selected_mech);
/*
* now call the approprate underlying mechanism routine
*/
status = mech->gss_init_sec_context(
minor_status,
input_cred_handle,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
internal_name,
gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech),
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
/*
* The spec says the preferred method is to delete all context info on
* the first call to init, and on all subsequent calls make the caller
* responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context. However, if the
* mechanism decided to delete the internal context, we should also
* delete the union context.
*/
map_error(minor_status, mech);
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
free(union_ctx_id);
}
} else if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id;
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
}
end:
if (union_name->mech_name == NULL ||
union_name->mech_name != internal_name) {
(void) gssint_release_internal_name(&temp_minor_status,
selected_mech, &internal_name);
}
return(status);
}
|
gss_init_sec_context (minor_status,
claimant_cred_handle,
context_handle,
target_name,
req_mech_type,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle;
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle;
gss_name_t target_name;
gss_OID req_mech_type;
OM_uint32 req_flags;
OM_uint32 time_req;
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings;
gss_buffer_t input_token;
gss_OID * actual_mech_type;
gss_buffer_t output_token;
OM_uint32 * ret_flags;
OM_uint32 * time_rec;
{
OM_uint32 status, temp_minor_status;
gss_union_name_t union_name;
gss_union_cred_t union_cred;
gss_name_t internal_name;
gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id;
gss_OID selected_mech;
gss_mechanism mech;
gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle;
status = val_init_sec_ctx_args(minor_status,
claimant_cred_handle,
context_handle,
target_name,
req_mech_type,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, req_mech_type,
&selected_mech);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
union_name = (gss_union_name_t)target_name;
/*
* obtain the gss mechanism information for the requested
* mechanism. If mech_type is NULL, set it to the resultant
* mechanism
*/
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (mech == NULL)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
if (mech->gss_init_sec_context == NULL)
return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
/*
* If target_name is mechanism_specific, then it must match the
* mech_type that we're about to use. Otherwise, do an import on
* the external_name form of the target name.
*/
if (union_name->mech_type &&
g_OID_equal(union_name->mech_type, selected_mech)) {
internal_name = union_name->mech_name;
} else {
if ((status = gssint_import_internal_name(minor_status, selected_mech,
union_name,
&internal_name)) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
}
/*
* if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context
* descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the
* underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the
* value of *context_handle to the union context variable.
*/
if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)
malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc));
if (union_ctx_id == NULL)
goto end;
if (generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&union_ctx_id->mech_type) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
free(union_ctx_id);
goto end;
}
/* copy the supplied context handle */
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
} else {
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
goto end;
}
}
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
* defaults to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL if there is no cred, which will
* use the default credential.
*/
union_cred = (gss_union_cred_t) claimant_cred_handle;
input_cred_handle = gssint_get_mechanism_cred(union_cred, selected_mech);
/*
* now call the approprate underlying mechanism routine
*/
status = mech->gss_init_sec_context(
minor_status,
input_cred_handle,
&union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id,
internal_name,
gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech),
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
actual_mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
/*
* RFC 2744 5.19 requires that we not create a context on a failed
* first call to init, and recommends that on a failed subsequent call
* we make the caller responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context.
* Even if the mech deleted its context, keep the union context around
* for the caller to delete.
*/
map_error(minor_status, mech);
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
free(union_ctx_id);
}
} else if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id;
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
}
end:
if (union_name->mech_name == NULL ||
union_name->mech_name != internal_name) {
(void) gssint_release_internal_name(&temp_minor_status,
selected_mech, &internal_name);
}
return(status);
}
|
get_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, X509 *cert,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **md_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret = ENOMEM;
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md = NULL;
krb5_principal *pkinit_sans = NULL, *upn_sans = NULL;
size_t i, j;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int bufsize = sizeof(buf);
*md_out = NULL;
md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md));
if (md == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* Get the subject name (in rfc2253 format). */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, &bufsize,
XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->subject_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->subject_dn == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Get the issuer name (in rfc2253 format). */
X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), buf, &bufsize,
XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
md->issuer_dn = strdup(buf);
if (md->issuer_dn == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Get the SAN data. */
ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
cert, &pkinit_sans, &upn_sans, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (j != 0) {
md->sans = calloc((size_t)j+1, sizeof(*md->sans));
if (md->sans == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = pkinit_sans[i];
free(pkinit_sans);
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = upn_sans[i];
free(upn_sans);
}
md->sans[j] = NULL;
} else
md->sans = NULL;
/* Get the KU and EKU data. */
ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_key_usage(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, cert, &md->ku_bits,
&md->eku_bits);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
*md_out = md;
md = NULL;
cleanup:
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md);
return ret;
}
|
get_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, X509 *cert,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **md_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret = ENOMEM;
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md = NULL;
krb5_principal *pkinit_sans = NULL, *upn_sans = NULL;
size_t i, j;
*md_out = NULL;
md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md));
if (md == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ret = rfc2253_name(X509_get_subject_name(cert), &md->subject_dn);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = rfc2253_name(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), &md->issuer_dn);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Get the SAN data. */
ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
cert, &pkinit_sans, &upn_sans, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
j++;
}
if (j != 0) {
md->sans = calloc((size_t)j+1, sizeof(*md->sans));
if (md->sans == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
j = 0;
if (pkinit_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = pkinit_sans[i];
free(pkinit_sans);
}
if (upn_sans != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++)
md->sans[j++] = upn_sans[i];
free(upn_sans);
}
md->sans[j] = NULL;
} else
md->sans = NULL;
/* Get the KU and EKU data. */
ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_key_usage(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, cert, &md->ku_bits,
&md->eku_bits);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
*md_out = md;
md = NULL;
cleanup:
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md);
return ret;
}
|
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