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Download src/explicit_learning/logging_setup.py from sungguk/visual-answerability: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
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https://huggingface.co/datasets/sungguk/visual-answerability/resolve/main/src/explicit_learning/logging_setup.py
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3.26 kB
| """Structured logging with token and secret redaction. | |
| No raw prompt, image, token, signed URL, or HF credential is ever written to a | |
| log. A :class:`RedactingFilter` scrubs known secret patterns and any value of | |
| sensitive environment variables from every record before it is emitted. | |
| """ | |
| from __future__ import annotations | |
| import logging | |
| import os | |
| import re | |
| from typing import Any | |
| # Environment variables whose values must never appear in logs. | |
| SENSITIVE_ENV_VARS = ( | |
| "HF_TOKEN", | |
| "HUGGING_FACE_HUB_TOKEN", | |
| "WANDB_API_KEY", | |
| "GH_TOKEN", | |
| "GITHUB_TOKEN", | |
| ) | |
| _REDACTION_TOKEN = "[REDACTED]" | |
| # Patterns that match common bearer/credential shapes regardless of env name. | |
| _SECRET_PATTERNS: tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...] = ( | |
| re.compile(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]+"), | |
| re.compile(r"(?i)token\s*[:=]\s*[A-Za-z0-9._\-]+"), | |
| re.compile(r"hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"), | |
| re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"), | |
| re.compile(r"https?://[^\s/@]+@[^\s/]+"), # userinfo in URLs | |
| ) | |
| def _sensitive_values() -> list[str]: | |
| values: list[str] = [] | |
| for name in SENSITIVE_ENV_VARS: | |
| value = os.environ.get(name) | |
| if value: | |
| values.append(value) | |
| return values | |
| def redact(text: str) -> str: | |
| """Return ``text`` with known secrets and sensitive env values removed.""" | |
| if not text: | |
| return text | |
| redacted = text | |
| for value in _sensitive_values(): | |
| if value and value in redacted: | |
| redacted = redacted.replace(value, _REDACTION_TOKEN) | |
| for pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS: | |
| redacted = pattern.sub(_REDACTION_TOKEN, redacted) | |
| return redacted | |
| class RedactingFilter(logging.Filter): | |
| """A logging filter that redacts secrets from message and args.""" | |
| def filter(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> bool: | |
| record.msg = redact(str(record.msg)) | |
| if record.args: | |
| if isinstance(record.args, dict): | |
| record.args = {k: redact(str(v)) for k, v in record.args.items()} | |
| elif isinstance(record.args, tuple): | |
| record.args = tuple(redact(str(a)) for a in record.args) | |
| return True | |
| def configure_logging( | |
| *, | |
| level: int = logging.INFO, | |
| name: str = "explicit_learning", | |
| stream: Any = None, | |
| ) -> logging.Logger: | |
| """Configure and return a logger with redaction applied to all records.""" | |
| logger = logging.getLogger(name) | |
| logger.setLevel(level) | |
| logger.propagate = False | |
| if not logger.handlers: | |
| handler = logging.StreamHandler(stream) if stream else logging.StreamHandler() | |
| handler.setFormatter( | |
| logging.Formatter( | |
| "%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(name)s %(message)s", | |
| datefmt="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", | |
| ) | |
| ) | |
| handler.addFilter(RedactingFilter()) | |
| logger.addHandler(handler) | |
| else: | |
| for existing in logger.handlers: | |
| existing.addFilter(RedactingFilter()) | |
| return logger | |
| def get_logger(name: str | None = None) -> logging.Logger: | |
| """Return a child logger under the package logger (redaction inherited).""" | |
| base = logging.getLogger("explicit_learning") | |
| if not base.handlers: | |
| configure_logging() | |
| return base.getChild(name) if name else base | |